Property Title 1 (p1-80) Cases

7/28/2019 Property Title 1 (p1-80) Cases

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Ladera v.HodgesG.R. No.8027-R,September 23,1952, Vol. 48, No.12, Official Gazette

5374Reyes, J.B.L., J

FACTS: Paz G. Ladera entered into acontract with C.N. Hodges. Hodgespromised tosell a lot with an area of 278square meters to Ladera, subject tocertain terms andconditions. Theagreement called for a down payment of P

800.00 and monthlyinstallments of P 5.00each with interest of 1% per month, untilP 2,085 is paid in full. Incase of failure ofthe purchaser to make any monthlypayment within 60 days after it felldue,the contract may be considered asrescinded or annulled.Ladera built a houseon the lot. Later on, she defaulted in thepayment of the agreedmonthlyinstallment. Hodges filed an action for theejectment of Ladera.The court issued analias writ of execution and pursuant

thereto, the city sheriff leviedupon allrights, interests, and participation overthe house of Ladera. At the auctionsale,Laderas house was sold to Avelino A.Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on,purchased thehouse from Magno.Laderafiled an action against Hodges and the

judgment sale purchasers. Judgmentwasrendered in favor of Ladera, setting asidethe sale for non-compliance with Rule39,Rules of Court regarding judicial salesof real property. On appeal, Hodgescontendsthat the house, being built on alot owned by another, should be regardedas movable or personal property.

ISSUE:Whether or not Laderas house is aimmovable property.HELD:

YES. The old Civil Code numeratesamong the things declared by it

asimmovable property the followinlands, buildings, roads andconstructions of all kindadhered tosoil. The law does not make anydistinction whether or not the ownof the lot is the one who built. Alsosince the principles of accessionregard buildings andconstructions mere accessories to the land on wit is built, it is logical thatsaidaccessories should partake thenature of the principal thing


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Mindanao BusCompany v. TheCity Assessor andTreasurer G.R. No.L-17870,September 29,

1962, 6 SCRA197Labrador, J

FACTS:Petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is apublic utility solely engaged intransportingpassengers and cargoes by motor trucks,over its authorized lines in theIsland ofMindanao, collecting rates approved by

the Public ServiceCommission.Respondent sought to assessthe following real properties of thepetitioner; (a) HobartElectric WelderMachine, (b) Storm Boring Machine; (c)Lathe machine with motor; (d)Black andDecker Grinder; (e) PEMCO HydraulicPress; (f) Battery charger (Tungar 1chargemachine) and (g) D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel. It was alleged that thesemachineriesare sitting on cement or woodenplatforms, and that petitioner is the owner

of the land where it maintains andoperates a garage for its TPU motortrucks, a repair shop, blacksmith andcarpentry shops, and with thesemachineries, which are placedtherein.Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan deOro City assessed at P4, 400petitioner'sabove-mentioned equipment. Petitionerappealed the assessment totherespondent Board of Tax Appeals onthe ground that the same are notrealty.Respondents contend that saidequipments, though movable, areimmobilized bydestination, in accordancewith paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the NewCivil Code

ISSUE:Whether the equipments in questioare immovable or movable propertHELD:

The equipments in question aremovable. So that movable equipm

to beimmobilized in contemplationthe law, it must first be "essential aprincipalelements" of an industry oworks without which such industryworks would be"unable to functioncarry on the industrial purpose forwhich it was established."Thus, theCourt distinguished those movablewhich become immobilized bydestinationbecause they are essenand principal elements in the indusfrom those which maynot be so

considered immobilized because thare merely incidental, not essentiaandprincipal.The tools andequipments in question in this instcase are, by their nature, notessenand principle municipal elements opetitioner's business oftransportingpassengers and cargoby motor trucks. They are merelyincidentalsacquired asmovables used only for expediency to facilitaand/or improve its service.Evenwithout such tools andequipments, its business may becarried on, as petitioner hascarriedwithout such equipments, before twar. The transportation businesscouldbe carried on without the repor service shop if its rolling equipmis repaired or serviced in another sbelonging to another.

Makati Leasingand FinanceCorporation v.Wearever TextileMills, Inc.G.R. No.L-58469, May 16,1983, 122 SCRA29De Castro, J

FACTS:To obtain financial accommodations fromthe Makati Leasing andFinanceCorporation, the Wearever Textilediscounted and assigned severalreceivables withthem under a receivablepurchase agreement. To secure thecollection of receivablesassigned,Wearever Textile executed a chattelmortgage over certain rawmaterialsinventory, as well as machinery

ISSUE:Whether or not the machinery is reor personal property.HELD:

The machinery is a personal propeThe Supreme Court explained thatahouse of strong materials may beconsidered as personal property fopurposes of executing a chattelmortgage, there is absolutely noreason why a machinery, which


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described as an aero dryer stenteringrange. Upondefault of Wearever Textile,the Makati Leasing petitioned forextrajudicial foreclosure of the propertiesmortgaged to it. When the sheriff failed toenter Wearever Textilespremises to seize

the machinery, Makati Leasing applied fora replevin. Wearever Textile contendedthat it cannot be a subject of replevin or achattel mortgage because it is a realproperty as it is attached to the ground bymeans of bolts and that the onlyway toremove it is to destroy the concrete floor.

ismovable in its nature and becomimmobilized only by destination orpurpose, may notbe likewise treateas such.

Santos Evangelistav. Alto Surety andnsurance Co.,nc.G.R. No. L-11139, April 23,1958, 103 Phil.401Concepcion, J

FACTS:On June 4, 1949, Santos Evangelistainstituted a civil case for a sum of money.On the same date, he obtained a writ ofattachment, which was levied uponahouse, built by Rivera on a land situatedin Manila and leased to him. In duecourse, judgment was rendered in favor ofEvangelista, who bought the house atpublic auctionheld in compliance with thewrit of execution issued in said case.When Evangelistasought to takepossession of the house, Rivera refused tosurrender it, upon the groundthat he hadleased the property from the Alto Surety &Insurance Co., Inc. and that thelatter isnow the true owner of said property. Itappears that on May 10, 1952, adefinitedeed of sale of the same househad been issued to Alto Surety, as thehighest bidder atan auction sale held.Hence, Evangelista instituted an actionagainst Alto Surety andRicardo Rivera, forthe purpose of establishing his title oversaid house, and securingpossessionthereof, apart from recovering damages.After due trial, the CFI Manilarendered

judgment for Evangelista, sentencingRivera and Alto Surety to deliver thehousein question to Evangelista and to pay him,

jointly and severally, P40.00 a monthfromOctober, 1952, until said delivery, pluscosts.

ISSUE:Whether or not a house constructeby the lessee of the land on which isbuilt, should be dealt with, forpurposes of attachment, asimmovable property or aspersonalproperty.HELD:

The house is not personal propertymuch less a debt, credit or otherpersonalproperty not capable ofmanual delivery, but immovableproperty. As explicitly held, inLadevs. Hodges (48 OG 5374), "a truebuilding (not merely superimposedthe soil)is immovable or real propewhether it is erected by the owner the land or by ausufructuary or les

The opinion that the house of Riveshould have been attachedinaccordance with subsection (c) of ssection 7, as "personal propertycapable of manual delivery, by takand safely keeping in his custody",it declared that"Evangelista could have validly purchased RicardoRivera's house from the sheriffhousing project and relatedcommercial/industrial developmenintended for dispositionto andenjoyment of certain beneficiaries not the public in general and partlyasenabling component to finance tproject.


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ManilanternationalAirport Authority v.Court ofAppealsG.R. No.155650, July 20,

2006Carpio, J

FACTS:MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate

Tax Delinquency from the City ofParaaque for the taxable years 1992 to2001. MIAAs real estate tax delinquencywasestimated at P624 million.

Thus, the City of Paraaque, through itsCity Treasurer,issued notices of levy andwarrants of levy on the Airport Lands andBuildings. TheMayor of the City ofParaaque threatened to sell at publicauction the Airport Landsand Buildingsshould MIAA fail to pay the real estate taxdelinquency. City of Paraaquecontendsthat Section 193 of the Local GovernmentCode expressly withdrew thetaxexemption privileges of government-

owned and-controlled corporations upontheeffectivity of the Local GovernmentCode. However, MIAA avers that airportlands andbuildings are owned by theState, and thus, exempt from tax.

ISSUE:Whether or not airport lands andbuildings of MIAA are exempt fromreal estatetax.HELD:

Yes. MIAA is a government

instrumentality vested with corporpowers toperform efficiently itsgovernmental functions. MIAA is likany other governmentinstrumentathe only difference is that MIAA isvested with corporate powers.Unlessthe government instrumentais organized as a stock or non-stoccorporation, itremains a governmeinstrumentality exercising not onlygovernmental but alsocorporatepowers. Thus, MIAA exercises the

governmental powers of eminentdomain,police authority and thelevying of fees and charges. Theairport lands and buildings of MIAAproperty of public dominion andtherefore owned by the State or thRepublicof the Philippines. Hence, subject properties are not subject ttax

Serg's Products,nc vs PCI Leasingand Finance

On 13 February 1998, PCI Leasing andFinance, Inc. filed a complaint for sum ofmoney, with an application for a writ ofreplevin. On 6 March 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, judgeissued a writ of replevin directing itssheriff to seize and deliver themachineries and equipment to PCI Leasingafter 5 days and upon the payment of thenecessary expenses. On 24 March 1998,the sheriff proceeded to petitioner'sfactory, seized one machinery with wordthat the return for the other machineries.On 25 March 1998, petitioners filed amotion for special protective order,invoking the power of the court to controlthe conduct of its officers and amend andcontrol its processes, praying for adirective for the sheriff to deferenforcement of the writ of replevin. On 6April 1998, the sheriff again sought toenforce the writ of seizure and takepossession of the remaining properties.

Issue:Whether the machines are personareal property?

Held:The machinery were essential andprincipal elements of their chocolamaking industry. Hence, althougheach of them was movable or persproperty on its own, all of them habecome "immobilized by destinatiobecause they are essential andprincipal elements in the industry.

The machines are thus, real, notpersonal, property pursuant to Arti415 (5) of the Civil Code.

Contracting parties may validlystipulate that a real property beconsidered as personal. After agreto such stipulation, they areconsequently estopped from claimotherwise. Under the principle of


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He was able to take two more, but wasprevented by the workers from taking therest. On 7 April 1998, they went to the CAvia an original action for certiorari.

Citing the Agreement of the parties, the

appellate court held that the subjectmachines were personal property, andthat they had only been leased, notowned, by petitioners; and ruled that the"words of the contract are clear and leaveno doubt upon the true intention of thecontracting parties." It thus affirmed the18 February 1998 Order, and the 31March 1998 Resolution of the lower court,and lifted the preliminary injunction issuedon 15 June 1998. A subsequent motion forreconsideration was denied on 26

February 1999. Hence, the petition forreview on certiorari

estoppel, a party to a contract isordinarily precluded from denying truth of any material fact foundtherein. Thus, said machines areproper subjects of the Writ of Seizu(compare Tumalad v. Vicencio).

The holding that the machines shobe deemed personal propertypursuant to the Lease Agreement good only insofar as the contractinparties are concerned. Hence, whilthe parties are bound by theAgreement, third persons acting ingood faith are not affected by itsstipulation characterizing the subjemachinery as personal. In the prescase, however, there is no showing

that any specific third party would adversely affected.

Bustos v. Court ofAppealsG.R. No.120784-85,anuary 24, 2001,350 SCRA155Pardo, J

FACTS:Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2,1957. He had four (4) children,namely:Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, allsurnamed Fajardo. On September 30,1964, the heirs executed an extra-judicialpartition of the estate of Paulino

Fajardo.On the same date, Manuela soldher share to Moses G. Mendoza, husbandof Beatrizby deed of absolute sale. At thetime of the sale, there was no cadastralsurvey inMasantol, Pampanga. Later, thecadastre was conducted and the propertyinvolved inthe partition case was specifiedas Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B.

The shareof Manuela, which was sold toMoses, includes Lot 284 of the MasantolCadastre andLot 284 was subdivided intoLots 284-A and 284-B. Trinidad was in

physical possessionof the land. Sherefused to surrender the land to herbrother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza,despiteseveral demands.On September 3, 1971,Moses filed with the Court of FirstInstance, Pampanga acomplaint forpartition claiming the one fourth (1/4)share of Manuela which was sold tohim.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner can beconsidered a builder in good faith wrespectto the improvements he maon the property.HELD:No. The petitioner is a possessor in

bad faith. Based on the factualfindings fromthis case, it is evidentthat petitioner knew from the verybeginning that there was reallyno and that he held respondentsproperty as mere security for thepayment of theloan obligation.

Therefore, petitioner may claimreimbursement only fornecessaryexpenses; however, he inot entitled to reimbursement for auseful expenses whichhe may hav

incurred.


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During the pendency of the case forpartition, Trinidad Fajardo died. OnDecember 15, 1984, the heirs executedan extra-judicial partition of the estate of

Trinidad Fajardo.On February 16, 1987,Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold

Lot 284-B to spousesVenancio Viray andCecilia Nunga-Viray whereby the formersold a 250 square meter portion of thesubject lot, together with thetwo-storycommercial and residential structurestanding thereon. Sometime in May1969,Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed acomplaint against petitioner for recoveryof ownership and possession of the two-story building. However, petitioner filed asalesapplication over the subject propertyand was issued an OCT. Due to

overlapping of title, petitioner filed anaction for quieting of title. Judgment wasrendered in favor of therespondents.When respondent filed a motion forexecution, petitioner opposed, andallegedthat he had a right of retention over theproperty until payment of the value of theimprovements he had introduced on theproperty


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Lopez vs Orosa jrand plaza theater

1. Lopez was engaged in business underthe name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill.2. Orosa, who lived in the same provinceas Lopez, one dayapproached Lopez andinvited the latter to make an investmentinthe theatre business.

3. Orosa, his family and close friendsapparently were forming acorporationnamed Plaza Theatre.4. Lopez expressed his unwillingness toinvest. Nonetheless, therewas an oralagreement between Lopez and Orosa thatLopezwould be supplying the lumber forthe construction of the theatre.The termswere the following: one, Orosa would bepersonallyliable for any account that thesaid construction would incur;two,payment would be by demand and

not by cash on delivery.5. Pursuant to the agreement, Lopezdelivered the lumber for theconstruction.Lopez was only paid one-third of the totalcost.6. The land on which the building hasbeen erected was previously owned byOrosa, which was later on purchased bythe corporation.7. Due to the incessant demands of Lopez,the corporation mortgaged its properties.8. On an earlier relevant date, thecorporation obtained a loan with LuzonSurety Company as surety and in turn, thecorporation executed a mortgage over theland and building. In the registration ofthe land under Act 496, such mortgagewasnt revealed.9. Also due to the demands of Lopez,Orosa issued a deed of assignment overhis shares of stock in the corporation.10. As there was still an unpaid balance,Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plazatheatre. He asked that Orosa and Plazatheatre be held liable solidarily for theunpaid balance; and in case defendantsfailed to pay, the land and building shouldbe sold in public auction with theproceeds to be applied to the balance; orthat the shares of stock be sold in publicauction. Lopez also had lis pendens beannotated in the OCT.

ISSUES:W/N the materialmens lien for thevalue of the materials used in theconstruction of the building attachto said structure alone and doesntextend to the land on which the

building is adhered to?HELD:

The contention that the lien execuin favor of the furnisher of materiaused for the construction and repaa building is also extended to land which the building was constructedwithout merit. For while it is true thgenerally, real estate connotes theland and the building constructedthereon, it is obvious that theinclusion of the building in the

enumeration of what may constitureal properties could only mean onthingthat a building is by itself aimmovable property. Moreover, in absence ofany specific provision to the contraa building is an immovable propertirrespective of whether or not saidstructure and the land on which it adhered to belong to the same owAppelant invoked Article 1923 of thSpanish Civil Code, which providesWith respect to determinate reaproperty and real rights of the debthe following are preferred: xxxCredits for reflection, not entered orecorded, and only with respect toother credits different from thosementioned in four next precedingparagraphs. Close examination ofabovementioned provision revealsthat the law gives preference tounregistered refectionary credits owith respect to the real estate upowhich the refectionary or work wasmade. This being so, the inevitableconclusion must be that the lien socreated attaches merely to theimmovable property for theconstruction or repair of which theobligation was incurred. Thereforelien in favor of appellant for the


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11. The trial court decided that there wasjoint liability between defendants and thatthe materialmans lien was only confinedtothe building.

unpaid value of the lumber used inconstruction of the building attachonly to said structure and to no othproperty of the obligors

ulian S. Yap vs.Hon. Santiago O.Taada andGoulds Pumps

nternational (Phil),nc.,G.R. No. L-32917,uly 18, 1988

Doctrine: Article 415, par. 3 of the CivilCode considers and immovable propertyas everything attached to an immovablein a fixed manner, in such a way that it

cannot be separated therefrom withoutbreaking the material or deteriorating theobject. The pump does not fit thisdescription. It could be, and was, infact,separated from Yaps premiseswithout being broken of sufferingdeterioration. Obviously, the separation orremoval of the pump involved nothingmore complicated that the loosening ofbolts or dismantling of other fasteners.

Facts: The case began in the City Court ofCebu with the filing of Goulds PumpsInternational (Phil), Inc. of a complaintagainst Yap and his wife seeking recoveryof P1,459.30, representing the balance ofthe price and installation cost of a waterpump in the latters premises. The Courtrendered judgment in favor of hereinrespondent after they presented evidence

Issue: Whether or not the pump anits accessories are immovableproperty

Held: No. The water pump and itsaccessories are NOT immovableproperties. The argument of Yap ththe water pump had becomeimmovable property by its beinginstalled in his residence is untenaArticle 415, par. 3 of the Civil Codeconsiders and immovable propertyeverything attached to an immovin a fixed manner, in such a way thit cannot be separated therefromwithout breaking the material ordeteriorating the object. The pumdoes not fit this description. It coulbe, and was, in fact,separated from

Yaps premises without being brokof suffering deterioration. Obviousthe separation or removal of the pinvolved nothing more complicatedthat the loosening of bolts or


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ex-parte due to failure of petitioner Yap toappear before the Court. Petitioner thenappealed to the CFI, particularly to thesale of Judge Tanada. For again failure toappear for pre-trial, Yap was declared indefault. He filed for a motion for

reconsideration which was denied byJudge Tanada. On October 15, 1969,Tanada granted Goulds Motion forIssuance of Writ of Execution. Yapforthwith filed an Urgent Motion forReconsideration of the said Order. In themeantime, the Sheriff levied on the waterpump in question and by notice scheduledthe execution sale thereof. But in view ofthe pendency of Yaps motion, suspensionof sale was directed by Judge Tanada. Itappears, however, that this was not made

known to the Sheriff whocontinued withthe auction sale and sold the property tothe highest bidder, Goulds. Because ofsuch, petitioner filed a Motion to Set AsideExecution Sale and to Quash Alias Writ ofExecution. One of his arguments was thatthe sale was made without the noticerequired by Sec. 18, Rule 29 of the NewRules of Court, i.e. notice by publicationin case of execution of sale of realproperty, the pump and its accessoriesbeing immovable because attached to theground with the character ofpermanency. Such motion was denied bythe CFI

dismantling of other fasteners.


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Machinery &EngineeringSupplies, Inc. vs.Court of Appeals,et al.No. L-7057,

October 29, 1954

Doctrine: The special civil action ofreplevin is applicable only to personalproperty. When the machinery andequipment in question appeared to beattached to the land, particularly to theconcrete foundation of said premises, in a

fixed manner, in such a way that theformer could not be separated from thelatter without breaking the material ordeterioration of the object, it had becomean immovable property under Art. 415(3).Facts: Herein petitioner filed a complaintfor replevin in the CFI of Manila againstIpo Limestone Co., and Dr. AntonioVillarama, for the recovery of themachineries and equipments sold anddelivered to said defendants at theirfactory in Barrio Bigti, Norzagaray,

Bulacan. The respondent judge issued anorder, commanding Provincial Sheriff ofBulacan to seize and take immediatepossession of the properties specified inthe order. Two deputy sheriffs of Bulacan,Ramon S. Roco(president of Machinery),and a crew of technical men and laborersproceeded to Bigti, for the purpose ofcarrying the courts order into effect.Leonardo Contreras, Manager of therespondent Company, and Pedro Torres,in charge thereof, met the deputy sheriffs,and Contreras handed to them a letteraddressed to Atty. Palad (ex-officioProvincial Sheriff of Bulacan), protestingagainst the seizure of the properties inquestion, on the ground that they are notpersonal properties.

Later on, they went to the factory. Rocosattention was called to the fact that theequipments could not possibly bedismantled without causing damages orinjuries to the wooden frames attached tothem. But Roco insisted in dismantling theequipments on his own responsibility,alleging that the bond was posted for sucheventuality, the deputy sheriffs directedthat some of the supports thereof be cut.

The defendant Company filed an urgentmotion for the return of the properties

Issue: Whether or not the machineand equipments were personalproperties and, therefore, could beseized by replevin.

Held: No. The special civil action

known as replevin, governed by thRules of Court, is applicable only topersonal property. When the sherepaired to the premises ofrespondent company, the machineand equipment in question appearto be attached to the land, particuto the concrete foundation of saidpremises, in a fixed manner, in sucway that the former could not beseparated from the latter withoutbreaking the material or deteriorat

of the object. Hence, in order toremove said outfit, it becamenecessary, not only to unbolt thesame, but, also, to cut some of itswooden supports. Moreover, saidmachinery and equipment wereintended by the owner of thetenement for an industry carried osaid immovable and tended directo meet the needs of the saidindustry. For these reasons, theywere already immovable propertypursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 ofArticle 415 of the Civil Code.

Mr. Ramon Roco, insisted on thedismantling of at his ownresponsibility, stating that, precisthat is the reason why plaintiffposted a bond. In this manner,petitioner clearly assumed thecorresponding risks. It is well settlethat, when restitution of what hasbeen ordered, the goods in questioshall be returned in substantially tsame condition as when taken. Itfollows that petitioner must also doeverything necessary to thereinstallation of said property inconformity with its original conditio


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seized by the deputy sheriffs. On thesame day, the trial court issued an order,directing the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacanto return the machineries to the placewhere they were installed. The deputysheriffs returned the properties seized, by

depositing them along the road, near thequarry, of the defendant Company, atBigti, without the benefit of inventory andwithout re-installing them in their formerposition and replacing the destroyedposts, which rendered their useimpracticable.

The trial court ordered Roco to furnish theProvincial Sheriff with the necessaryfunds, technical men, laborers,equipments and materials. Roco raised

the issue to the CA; a writ of preliminaryinjunction was issued but the CAsubsequently dismissed for lack of merit.A motion for reconsideration was denied.


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Salvador H. Laurelvs. Ramon Garcia,et. Al.G. R. No. 92013.uly 25, 1990.

Doctrine: A property continues to be partof the public domain, not available forprivate appropriation or ownership untilthere is a formal declaration on the part ofthe government to withdraw it from beingsuch.

Facts: The subject Roppongi property isone of the four properties in Japanacquired by the Philippine governmentunder the Reparations Agreement enteredinto with Japan on 9 May 1956, the otherlots being the Nampeidai Property (site ofPhilippine Embassy Chancery), the KobeCommercial Property (Commercial lotused as warehouse and parking lot ofconsulate staff), and the Kobe ResidentialProperty (a vacant residential lot).

The properties and the capital goods andservices procured from the Japanesegovernment for national developmentprojects are part of the indemnification tothe Filipino people for their losses in lifeand property and their suffering duringWorld War II.*The Reparations Agreement providesthat reparations valued at $550 millionwould be payable in 20 years inaccordance with annual schedules ofprocurements to be fixed by the Philippineand Japanese governments*The Roppongi property was acquiredfrom the Japanese government under theSecond Year Schedule and listed underthe heading Government Sector,through Reparations Contract 300 dated27 June 1958. The Roponggi propertyconsists of the land and building for theChancery of the Philippine Embassy. Asintended, it became the site of thePhilippine Embassy until the latter wastransferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976when the Roppongi building needed majorrepairs. Due to the failure of ourgovernment to provide necessary funds,the Roppongi property has remainedundeveloped since that time.*During the incumbency of PresidentAquino, a proposal was made by formerPhilippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J.

Issues: Can the Roppongi propertyand others of its kind be alienated the Philippine Government?Does the Chief Executive, her officand agents, have the authority and

jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi

property?

Held: No. The Roppongi property wacquired together with the otherproperties through reparationagreements. They were assigned tthe government sector and that thRoppongi property was specificallydesignated under the agreement thouse the Philippine embassy. It ispublic dominion unless it isconvincingly shown that the prope

has become patrimonial. Therespondents have failed to do so.

As property of public dominion, theRoppongi lot is outside the commeof man. It cannot be alienated. Itsownership is a special collectiveownership for general use andpayment, in application to thesatisfaction of collective needs, anresides in the social group. Thepurpose is not to serve the State athe juridical person but the citizensis intended for the common and puwelfare and cannot be the object oappropriation.

The fact that the Roppongi site hasnot been used for a long time foractual Embassy service doesntautomatically convert it to patrimoproperty. Any such conversionhappens only if the property iswithdrawn from public use. A propcontinues to be part of the publicdomain, not available for privateappropriation or ownership until this a formal declaration on the part the government to withdraw it frombeing such


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Valdez, to lease the subject property toKajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, inexchange of the construction of 2buildings in Roppongi, 1 building inNampeidai, and the renovation of thePhilippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The

Government did not act favorably to saidproposal, but instead, on 11 August 1986,President Aquino created a committee tostudy the disposition or utilization ofPhilippine government properties in Tokyoand Kobe though AO-3, and AO 3-A to 3-D.On 25 July 1987, the President issued EO296 entitling non-Filipino citizens orentities to avail of reparations capitalgoods and services in the event of sale,lease or disposition. The four properties in

Japan including the Roppongi were

specifically mentioned in the firstWhereas clause. Amidst opposition byvarious sectors, the Executive branch ofthe government has been pushing, withgreat vigor, its decision to sell thereparations properties starting with theRoppongi lot.*Two petitions for prohibition were filedseeking to enjoin respondents, theirrepresentatives and agents fromproceeding with the bidding for the sale ofthe 3,179 sq. m. of land at 306Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo,

Japan scheduled on 21 February 1990; thetemporary restaining order of which wasgranted by the court on 20 February 1990.In G.R. No. 92047, a writ of mandamuswas prayed for to compel the respondentsto fully disclose to the public the basis oftheir decision to push through with thesale of the Roppongi property inspite ofstrong public opposition and to explain theproceedings which effectively prevent theparticipation of Filipino citizens andentities in the bidding process


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Benjamin Rabuco,et. al. vs. Hon.Antonio VillegasG.R. No. L-24661.February 28, 1974

Doctrine: When a property is owned by apolitical subdivision in its public andgovernmental capacity, the Congress hasabsolute control as distinguished frompatrimonial property owned by it in itsprivate or proprietary capacity of which it

could not be deprived without due processand without just compensation

Facts: In the early morning of April 19,1970, a large fire of undetermined origingutted the Malate area including the loton which petitioners had built their homesand dwellings. Respondents city officialsthen took over the lot and kept petitionersfrom reconstructing or repairing theirburned dwellings. At petitioners instance,the Court issued on June 17, 1970 a

temporary restraining order enjoiningrespondents city officials fromperforming any act constituting aninterference in or disturbance of hereinpetitioners possession of Lot No. 21-B,Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey ofthe City of Manila as safeguarded themunder the Courts subsisting preliminaryinjunction of August 17, 1965 pursuant toRA 3120.

Issue: Whether RA 3120 isunconstitutional as it infringes theright to due process.

Held: No. The Court herein upholdsthe constitutionality of Republic Ac

3120 on the strength of theestablished doctrine that thesubdivision of communal land of thState (although titled in the name the municipal corporation) andconveyance of the resultingsubdivision lots by sale on installmbasis to bona fide occupants byCongressional authorization anddisposition does not constituteinfringements of the due processclause or the eminent domain

provisions of the Constitution butoperates simply as a manifestationthe legislatures right of control anpower to deal with State property


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Levy D. Macasianovs. HonorableRoberto C. DioknoG.R. No. 97764August 10, 1992

Doctrine: Properties of the localgovernment which are devoted to publicservice are deemed public and are underthe absolute control of Congress. Hence,local governments have no authoritywhatsoever to control or regulate the use

of public properties unless specificauthority is vested upon them byCongress

Facts: On June 13, 1990, the respondentmunicipality passed Ordinance No. 86,Series of 1990 which authorized theclosure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan,Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streetslocated at Baclaran, Paraaque, MetroManila and the establishment of a fleamarket thereon, pursuant to MMC

Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979,authorizing and regulating the use ofcertain city and/or municipal streets,roads and open spaces withinMetropolitan Manila as sites for fleamarket and/or vending areas, undercertain terms and conditions..

On June 20, 1990, the municipal council ofParaaque issued a resolution authorizingParaaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer toenter into contract with any servicecooperative for the establishment,operation, maintenance and managementof flea markets and/or vending areas.

On August 8, 1990, respondentmunicipality and respondent Palanyag, aservice cooperative, entered into anagreement whereby the latter shalloperate, maintain and manage the fleamarket in the aforementioned streets withthe obligation to remit dues to thetreasury of the municipal government ofParaaque. Consequently, market stallswere put up by respondent Palanyag onthe said streets.

On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig.Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent ofthe Metropolitan Traffic Command,ordered the destruction and confiscation

Issue: Whether or not an ordinanceresolution issued by the municipalcouncil of Paraaque authorizing thlease and use of public streets orthoroughfares as sites for flea maris valid.

Held: No. The ordinance or resolutauthorizing the lease and use of pustreets or thoroughfares as sites foflea market is invalid. Property forpublic use, in the provinces, cities municipalities, consists of theprovincial roads, city streets, thesquares, fountains, public waters,promenades, and public works forpublic service paid for by saidprovinces, cities or municipalities.

other property possessed by any othem is patrimonial and shall begoverned by this Code, withoutprejudice to the provisions of speclaws.

Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel GCruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extensand Opena streets are local roadsused for public service and aretherefore considered public properof respondent municipality. Properof the local government which aredevoted to public service are deempublic and are under the absolutecontrol of Congress. Hence, localgovernments have no authoritywhatsoever to control or regulate tuse of public properties unless speauthority is vested upon them byCongress.Even assuming, in gratia argumentthat respondent municipality has tauthority to pass the disputedordinance, the same cannot be valimplemented because it cannot beconsidered approved by theMetropolitan Manila Authority due non-compliance by respondentmunicipality of the conditions impoby the former for the approval of tordinance.


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of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St.in Baclaran. These stalls were laterreturned to respondent Palanyag.

Further, it is of public notice that thstreets along Baclaran area arecongested with people, houses andtraffic brought about by theproliferation of vendors occupying

streets. To license and allow theestablishment of a flea market aloGabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt.Garcia Extension and Opena streetBaclaran would not help in solving problem of congestion. Verily, thepowers of a local government unit not absolute. They are subject tolimitations laid down by toeConstitution and the laws such as oCivil Code. Moreover, the exercise such powers should be subservien

paramount considerations of healtand well-being of the members of tcommunity. Every local governmenunit has the sworn obligation to enmeasures that will enhance the puhealth, safety and convenience,maintain peace and order, andpromote the general prosperity of inhabitants of the local units. Baseon this objective, the localgovernment should refrain from actowards that which might prejudiceadversely affect the general welfar

Republic vs CA281 scra vs 639

Morato has filed for patent over aparcel of land, of which was grantedunder the condition that he would notencumber it for a period of 5 years fromissuance of patent. It was then foundout that he mortgaged and leased thelots. The government sought for therevocation of the patent issued. Thetrial court and appellate court decidedin favor of the respondents.

DOCTRINE:The grantees title of ownership ofpatented land to be perfected shouldcomply with the requirements of the lawone of which is to keep the property forherself and her family within theprescribed period of five (5) years. If therequirements are not complied with, the

Foreshore lands have been definto be that part of the land whiis between the high and low water left dry by the flux and reflux of thtides. This is the strip of landthat lies between the high and watermarks and that is alternativewet and dry according to the flow othe tide.

Foreshore lands may not anymobe the subject of issuance of frpatents. Under property of pubownership or dominion areforeshore lands, as provided for in Civil Code.It is to be noted that when the seamoved towards the estate and thetide invaded it, the invaded proper


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State may take action for reversion of theland to the public domain.

When the seawater moves toward theestate of an owner, the invaded propertybecomes foreshore land and becomes part

of the public domain. Citing the case ofGovernment vs. Cabangis, the land underthe Torrens system which becomes part ofthe foreshore land reverts to the publicdomain and the title is annulled.

became foreshore land and passedthe realm of public domain.

Province ofZamboanga delNorte vsZamboanga City22 SCRA 1334

Doctrine: In the case of state properties,properties for public service are of publicdominion; this is not so in the case ofprovinces, cities, etc., said properties forpublic service are patrimonial since they

are not for public use.

Facts: Prior to its incorporation as achartered city, the Municipality ofZamboanga used to be the provincialcapital of the then Zamboanga Province.On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act39 was approved converting theMunicipality of Zamboanga intoZamboanga City.

Sec. 50 of the said Act also provided thatBuildings and properties which theprovince shall abandon upon the transferof the capital to another place will beacquired and paid for by the City ofZamboanga at a price to be fixed by theAuditor General.

The properties and buildings referred toconsisted of 50 lots and some buildingsconstructed thereon, located in the City ofZamboanga and covered individually by

Torrens certificates of title in the name ofZamboanga Province.

Issue: Whether all the propertiesconcerned are patrimonial propert

Held: There are two conflictingapplicable laws in the case at bar.

Applying the New Civil Code, if theproperty is owned by the municipa(meaning municipal corporation) inpublic and governmental capacity,property is public and Congress haabsolute control over it. But if theproperty is owned in its private orproprietary capacity, then it ispatrimonial and Congress has noabsolute control. The municipalitycannot be deprived of it without duprocess and payment of justcompensation. Under the said law,the properties in question, except two (2) lots used as High Schoolplaygrounds, could be considered patrimonial properties of the formeZamboanga province. Even the capsite, the hospital and leprosariumsites, and the school sites will beconsidered patrimonial for they arenot for public use. They would fallunder the phrase public works forpublic service for it has been heldthat under the ejusdem generis rulsuch public works must be for free


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It appears that in 1945, the capital ofZamboanga Province was transferred toDipolog. Subsequently, Republic Act 286was approved. creating the municipality ofMolave and making it the capital ofZamboanga Province.

Republic Act 711 was approved dividingthe province of Zamboanga into two (2):Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga delSur.

The Auditor General, apportioned theassets and obligations of the defunctProvince of Zamboanga as follows:54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur.

The Executive Secretary, by order of thePresident, issued a ruling holding thatZamboanga del Norte had a vested rightas owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned inSec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and isentitled to the price thereof, payable byZamboanga City. This ruling revoked theprevious Cabinet Resolution conveying allthe said 50 lots and buildings thereon toZamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of1945, when the provincial capital of thethen Zamboanga Province was transferredto Dipolog.

and indiscriminate use by anyone, like the preceding enumeratedproperties in the first paragraph of424. The playgrounds, however, wfit into this category.

On the other hand, applying the noobtaining under the principlesconstituting the law of MunicipalCorporations, all those of the 50properties in question which aredevoted to public service are deempublic; the rest remain patrimonialUnder this norm, to be consideredpublic, it is enough that the properbe held and, devoted forgovernmental purposes like localadministration, public education,

public health, etc. Under theaforementioned law, Republic Act3039 is valid insofar as it affects thlots used as capitol site, school siteand its grounds, hospital andleprosarium sites and the high schplayground sites a total of 24 losince these were held by the formeZamboanga province in itsgovernmental capacity and therefoare subject to the absolute controlCongress.

The records do not disclose wheththey were constructed at the expeof the former Province of ZamboanConsidering however the fact that buildings must have been erectedeven before 1936 whenCommonwealth Act 39 was enacteand the further fact that provincesthen had no power to authorizeconstruction of buildings such asthose in the case at bar at their owexpense, 14 it can be assumed thasaid buildings were erected by theNational Government, using nationfunds. Hence, Congress could verywell dispose of said buildings in thesame manner that it did with the loin question.


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But even assuming that provincialfunds were used, still the buildingsconstitute mere accessories to thelands, which are public in nature, aso, they follow the nature of saidlands, i.e., public. Moreover, said

buildings, though located in the citwill not be for the exclusive use anbenefit of city residents for they cobe availed of also by the provinciaresidents. The province then ansuccessors-in-interest are not redeprived of the benefits thereof.

But Republic Act 3039 cannot beapplied to deprive Zamboanga delNorte of its share in the value of threst of the 26 remaining lots which

patrimonial properties since they anot being utilized for distinctly,governmental purposes.

The fact that these 26 lots areregistered strengthens the proposithat they are truly private in naturOn the other hand, that the 24 lotsused for governmental purposes aalso registered is of no significancesince registration cannot convertpublic property to private.

In fine, the Court ordered hereindefendant Zamboanga City to retuto plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte inlump sum the amount of P43,030.1which the former took back from thlatter out of the sum of P57,373.46previously paid to the latter. Seconthe defendants were ordered to effpayments in favor of plaintiff ofwhatever balance remains ofplaintiffs 54.39% share in the 26patrimonial properties, after deductherefrom the sum of P57,373.46, the basis of Resolution No. 7 datedMarch 26, 1949 of the AppraisalCommittee formed by the AuditorGeneral, by way of quarterlypayments from the allotments ofdefendant City, in the manner


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originally adopted by the SecretaryFinance and the Commissioner ofInternal Revenue.

Chavez v PublicEstate AuthorityGR No. 133250,uly 9, 2002

Facts: On November 20, 1973, thegovernment through the Commissioner ofPublic Highways signed a contract withthe Construction and DevelopmentCorporation of the Philippines (CDCP) toreclaim certain foreshore and offshoreareas of Manila Bay. The contract alsoincluded the construction of Phases I andII of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP

obligated itself to carry out all the worksin consideration of fifty percent of thetotal reclaimed land. On April 25, 1995 thePEA entered into a Joint VentureAgreement (JVA) with AMARI to developthe Freedom Islands. This JVA was enteredinto through negotiation without publicbidding. The Senate Committee onGovernment Corporations and PublicEnterprises, and the Committee onAccountability of Public Officers andInvestigations, conducted a joint

investigation. Among the conclusion are:that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks totransfer to AMARI under the JVA are landsof the public domain which thegovernment has not classified as alienablelands and therefore PEA cannot alienatethese lands, the certificates of the titlecovering the Freedom Islands are thusvoid, and the JVA itself is illegal. OnDecember 5, 1997, President Ramoscreated a Legal Task Force to conduct astudy on the legality of the JVA. The Task

Force upheld the legality of the JVA,contrary to the conclusions of the SenateCommittees. On April 27, 1998, Petitioneras taxpayer filed the instant petition formandamus with prayer for the issuance ofa writ of preliminary injunction and TRO.Petitioner contends the governmentstands to lose billions of pesos in the saleby PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.

Issue: Whether or not the petitionehas legal standing to bring the suit

Ratio Decidendi: The petitioner hasstanding to bring the taxpayers sbecause the petition seeks to comPEA to comply with its constitutionduties. This duties are particularly answer of the right of citizens to

information on matters of publicconcern, and of a constitutionalprovision intended to insure theequitable distribution of alienablelands of the public domain amongFilipino citizens. Furthermore, thecourt considered that the petitionraised matters of transcendentalimportance tot eh public. The merefact that the petitioner is a citizensatisfies the requirement of personinterest when the proceeding invo

the assertion of a public right. Alsoordinary taxpayers have a right toinitiate and prosecute actionsquestioning the validity of acts ororders of government agencies orinstrumentalities if the issues raiseof paramount public interest and ifthey immediately affect the social,economic and moral well being of people. The amended JVA does notmake the issue moot and academisince this compels the court to ins

the government itself does not vioa provision of the Constitutionintended to safeguard the nationalpatrimony. The content of theamended JVA seeks to transfer titleand ownership of reclaimed lands tsingle corporation. The court does hesitate to resolve the legal orconstitutional issues raised to


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Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclosethe terms of any renegotiation of the JVA.Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale toAMARI of lands of the public domains asblatant violation of Sec 3, Art XII of theConstitution prohibiting the sale of

alienable lands of the public domain toprivate corporations. Petitioner assert thathe seeks to enjoin the loss of billion ofpesos in properties of the State that are ofpublic dominion.

formulate controlling principles toguide the bench, bar and the publi

The instant case raises constitutionissues of transcendental importancto the public. Court can resolve thicase without determining any fact

issue related to the case. The instacase is a petition for mandamus wfalls under the original jurisdiction the Court. Furthermore, PEA wasunder a positive legal duty to disclto the public the terms and conditifor the sale of its lands. The principof exhaustion of administrativeremedies does not apply when theissue involved is purely legal orconstitutional question. The right tinformation includes official

information on on-going negotiatiobefore a final agreement as requirby the constitution. The SupremeCourt granted the petition. PEA anAmari Coastal Bay DevelopmentCorporation are permanently enjoifrom implementing the amended JVwhich is hereby declared null and vab initio

Villarico vssarmiento

Facts:Villarico here is an owner of a lot that isseparated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenuehighway by astrip of land belonging to thegovernment.

Vivencio Sarmiento had a buildingconstructed on a portion of thesaidgovernment land and a part thereofwas occupied by Andoks LitsonCorp.In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchangeof Real Property, Villaricoacquired aportion of the same area owned bythegovernment

He then filed an accion publiciana allegingthat respondents(Vivencio) on thegovernment land closed his right of waytothe Ninoy Aquino Avenue andencroached on a portion of hislot

Ratio:No. It is not disputed in this case ththe alleged right of way to the lotbelongs to the state or property ofpublic dominion.oIt is intended for public use meaninthat it is not confined toprivilegedindividuals but is open to theindefinite public.Records show thathe lot on which the stairways werbuilt isfor the use of the people aspassageway hence, it is a propertypublic dominion.Public dominion property is outsidethe commerce of man and hence, cannot be:- Alienated or leased or otherwise

the subject matterof contracts- Acquired by prescription against

state- Cannot be the subject of attachm


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and execution- Be burdened by any voluntary

easementIt cannot be burdened by a voluntaeasement of right of way in favorothe petitioner and petitioner canno

appropriate it for himself andhecannot claim any right of possessioover it.

103882, 105276 FACTS:On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approvedgranting authority to all municipalities andchartered cities to undertake and carry

out at their own expense the reclamationby dredging, filling, or other means, of anyforeshore lands bordering them, and toestablish, provide, construct, maintain andrepair proper and adequate docking andharbor facilities as such municipalities andchartered cities may determine inconsultation with the Secretary of Financeand the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications.

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No.

121 was passed by the city of Pasay forthe reclamation of foreshore lands withintheir jurisdiction and entered into anagreement with Republic Real EstateCorporation for the said project.

Republic questioned the agreement. Itcontended, among others, that theagreement between RREC and the City ofPasay was void for the object of thecontract is outside the commerce of man,it being a foreshore land.

Pasay City and RREC countered that theobject in question is within the commerceof man because RA 1899 gives a broadermeaning on the term foreshore landthan that in the definition provided by thedictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of PasayCity and RREC, and the decision was

ISSUE:I. Whether or not the termforeshore land includes thesubmerged area.

II. Whether or not foreshore laand the reclaimed area is within thcommerce of man.

HELD:The Court ruled that it is erroneousand unsustainable to uphold theopinion of the respondent court thathe term foreshore land includessubmerged areas. To repeat, the te"foreshore lands" refers to:

The strip of land that lies between

high and low water marks and thatalternately wet and dry according the flow of the tide.A strip of land margining a body ofwater (as a lake or stream); the paof a seashore between the low-watline usually at the seaward margina low-tide terrace and the upper limof wave wash at high tide usuallymarked by a beach scarp or berm.(Webster's Third New InternationaDictionary)

The duty of the court is to interprethe enabling Act, RA 1899. In sodoing, we cannot broaden itsmeaning; much less widen thecoverage thereof. If the intention oCongress were to include submergareas, it should have providedexpressly. That Congress did not sprovide could only signify the


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affirmed by the CA with modifications. exclusion of submerged areas fromthe term foreshore lands.It bears stressing that the subjectmatter of Pasay City Ordinance No121, as amended by Ordinance No158, and the Agreement under att

have been found to be outside theintendment and scope of RA 1899,and therefore ultra vires and null avoid

chavez vs nha16452

FACTS:

On August 5, 2004, former SolicitorGeneral Francisco Chavez, filed an instantpetition raising constitutional issues onthe JVA entered by National HousingAuthority and R-II Builders, Inc.

On March 1, 1988, then-President CoryAquino issued Memorandum order No.(MO) 161 approving and directingimplementation of the Comprehensiveand Integrated Metropolitan Manila WasteManagement Plan. During this time,Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo,Manila, are being made residence of manyFilipinos living in a subhuman state.

As presented in MO 161, NHA preparedfeasibility studies to turn the dumpsiteinto low-cost housing project, thus,Smokey Mountain Development andReclamation Project (SMDRP), came intoplace. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-TransferLaw) was passed on July 1990 declaringthe importance of private sectors ascontractors in government projects.

Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, amongothers. The same MO also establishedEXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution

ISSUES:

Whether respondents NHA and RBhave been granted the power andauthority to reclaim lands of the pudomain as this power is vestedexclusively in PEA as claimed bypetitionerWhether respondents NHA and RBwere given the power and authoritby DENR to reclaim foreshore andsubmerged landsWhether respondent RBI can acquireclaimed foreshore and submergelands considered as alienable andoutside the commerce of manWhether respondent RBI can acquireclaimed lands when there was nodeclaration that said lands are nolonger needed for public useWhether there is a law authorizingsale of reclaimed landsWhether the transfer of reclaimedlands to RBI was done by publicbiddingWhether RBI, being a privatecorporation, is barred by theConstitution to acquire lands of pudomainWhether respondents can becompelled to disclose all informati


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and evaluation of the plan, respectively,to be assisted by the Public EstatesAuthority (PEA).

Notices of public bidding to become NHAsventure partner for SMDRP were published

in newspapers in 1992, from which R-IIBuilders, Inc. (RBI) won the biddingprocess. Then-President Ramosauthorized NHA to enter into a JointVenture Agreement with RBI.

Under the JVA, the project involves theclearing of Smokey Mountain for eventualdevelopment into a low cost housingcomplex and industrial/commercial site.RBI is expected to fully finance thedevelopment of Smokey Mountain and

reclaim 40 hectares of the land at theManila Bay Area. The latter together withthe commercial area to be built onSmokey Mountain will be owned by RBI asenabling components. If the project isrevoked or terminated by the Governmentthrough no fault of RBI or by mutualagreement, the Government shallcompensate RBI for its actual expensesincurred in the Project plus a reasonablerate of return not exceeding that stated inthe feasibility study and in the contract asof the date of such revocation,cancellation, or termination on a scheduleto be agreed upon by both parties.

To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist ofPhase I and Phase II. Phase I of theproject involves clearing, levelling-off thedumpsite, and construction of temporaryhousing units for the current residents onthe cleared and levelled site. Phase IIinvolves the construction of a fencedincineration area for the on-site disposalof the garbage at the dumpsite.

Due to the recommendations done by theDENR after evaluations done, the JVA wasamended and restated (now ARJVA) toaccommodate the design changes andadditional work to be done to successfullyimplement the project. The original 3,500

related to the SMDRPWhether the operative fact doctrinapplies to the instant positionHELD:

1. Executive Order 525 reads that

PEA shall be primarily responsible integrating, directing, andcoordinating all reclamation projecfor and on behalf of the NationalGovernment. This does not mean it shall be responsible for all. Therequisites for a valid and legalreclamation project are approval bthe President (which were providedby MOs), favourable recommendatof PEA (which were seen as a part its recommendations to the EXECO

and undertaken either by PEA orentity under contract of PEA or by National Government Agency (NHAa government agency whose authoto reclaim lands under consultationwith PEA is derived under PD 727 aRA 7279).

2. Notwithstanding the need for DEpermission, the DENR is deemed tohave granted the authority to reclain the Smokey Mountain Project fothe DENR is one of the members othe EXECOM which provides reviewfor the project. ECCs and SpecialPatent Orders were given by the Dwhich are exercises of its power ofsupervision over the project.Furthermore, it was the President vthe abovementioned MOs thatoriginally authorized the reclamatiIt must be noted that the reclamatof lands of public domain is reposefirst in the Philippine President.

3. The reclaimed lands were classialienable and disposable via MO 41issued by President Aquino andProclamation Nos. 39 and 465 byPresident Ramos.

4. Despite not having an explicit


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units of temporary housing weredecreased to 2,992. The reclaimed landas enabling component was increasedfrom 40 hectares to 79 hectares, whichwas supported by the issuance ofProclamation No. 465 by President Ramos.

The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling componentfor Phase II of the project.

Subsequently, the Clean Air Act waspassed by the legislature which made theestablishment of an incinerator illegal,making the off-site dumpsite at SmokeyMountain necessary. On August 1, 1998,the project was suspended, to be laterreconstituted by President Estrada in MONo. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBIexecuted a Memorandum of Agreementwhereby both parties agreed to terminatethe JVA and subsequent agreements.During this time, NHA reported that 34temporary housing structures and 21permanent housing structures had beenturned over by RBI.

declaration, the lands have beendeemed to be no longer needed fopublic use as stated in ProclamatioNo. 39 that these are to be disposto qualified beneficiaries.Furthermore, these lands have

already been necessarily reclassifias alienable and disposable landsunder the BOT law.

5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearstates that the NHA can acquireproperty rights and interests andencumber or otherwise dispose ofthem as it may deem appropriate.

6. There is no doubt that respondeNHA conducted a public bidding of

right to become its joint venturepartner in the Smokey MountainProject. It was noted that noticeswere published in nationalnewspapers. The bidding proper wdone by the Bids and AwardsCommittee on May 18, 1992.

7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 771explicitly states that a contractor cbe paid a portion as percentage othe reclaimed land subject to theconstitutional requirement that onFilipino citizens or corporation withleast 60% Filipino equity can acquithe same. In addition, when the lawere transferred to the NHA, thesewere considered Patrimonial landsthe state, by which it has the powesell the same to any qualified pers

8. This relief must be granted. It isthe right of the Filipino people toinformation on matters of publicconcerned as stated in Article II, Se28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 198Constitution.

9. When the petitioner filed the casthe JVA had already been terminatby virtue of MOA between RBI andNHA. The properties and rights in


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question after the passage of arou10 years from the start of the projeimplementation cannot be disturbeor questioned. The petitioner, beinthe Solicitor General at the timeSMDRP was formulated, had ample

opportunity to question the saidproject, but did not do so. Themoment to challenge has passed.

Documents

Property Title 1 (p1-80) Cases