Property Classification Digests

8/11/2019 Property Classification Digests

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[MAY 7, 1992] HIERS OF PROCESO BAUTISTA REP. BY PEDRO BAUTISTA, PET., VS. SPS. SEVERO AND

ESTER BARZA, RES.

On October 25, 1946, Proceso applied for a fishpond permit over 30 hectare parcel of public land

located in Sitio Central, Davao. The same was denied by the Division of Fisheries because it was needed

for firewood production as certified by the Bureau of Forestry. The rejection covered 49 hectares vis-a-viz the 30 hectares applied for. Proceso occupied an area w/c extended beyond the boundary of the one

he applied for and introduced improvements thereon between Oct. 25, 1946 and Nov. 9, 1948.

On Sep. 23, 1948, Barza filed for a fishpond application covering an area of approx. 14.85 hectares at

Sitio Bundas, Davao,a portion which overlapped the area originally applied for by Proceso.

On Feb. 8, 1949, Proceso once again filed, this time with the Bureau of Fisheries, another application,

but for 49 hectares and in Sitio Bundas not Central.

It is shown in the record of the BOFish that the 14.85 hectares applied for by Barza had been released by

the BOForrestry as available for fishpond purposes while the 49 hectares applied for by Proceso was not.Also, said area, including the portion applied for by Barza had been greatly improved by Proceso.

From this an administrative case arose with the Director of Fisheries thereafter ruling in favor of Barza,

subject however to the reimbursement of the amounts of improvements in the area to Proceso. Barza

did not comply with the decision while Proceso continued his possession/occupation of the property.

Issue:

Whether the priority rule in applications for permits as applicable to Proceso

Whether the Barzas may seek enforcement of the decision of the DoFisheries notwithstanding their

refusal to reimburse the Bautistas

Ruling:

No. Until timber or forest lands are released as disposable or alienable, neither the Bureau of Lands

nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to dispose of these lands for xxx fishpond leases and other

modes of utilization. Thus, even if Bautista were ahead of Barza by two years in terms of

occupation, possession and introduction of substantial improvements, he was not placed in a better

position than Barza. The priority rule under Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 applies only to

public lands already released by the Bureau of Fisheries. Until such lands had been properly

declared available for fishpond purposes, any application is ineffective because there is no

disposable land to speak of.

Yes. Although Bautista was in possession of the area for quite a number of years, he ceased to

become a bona fide possessor upon receipt of the decision of the Director of Fisheries granting due

course to Barza's fishpond application.


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(MAR. 27, 1929) GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILS., APPLICANT-APPELLANT, VS. CONSORCIA CABANGIS,

CLAIMANTS-APPELLEES.

This case is an appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Manila in cadastral proceeding No. 373

adjudicating the title and decreeing the registration of lots Nos. 36, 39 and 40, in favor of Consuelo,Consorcia, Elvira and Tomas, surnamed Cabangis, in equal parts, and dismissing the claims presented by

the Government of the Philippine Islands and the City of Manila.

Lots no. 36, 39, and 40 of Cadastral proceeding no. 373, were formerly part of a large parcel of land

belonging to the predecessor of Cabangis et al.

From the year 1896, said land began to wear away, due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until

the year 1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides, and

remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in

order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the

low lands which were completely covered with water, surrounding that belonging to the Philippine

Manufacturing Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming the reclaimedlots, the subject matter of

this case.

The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as the said lots once formed a part of a large parcel of

land belonging to their predecessors, whom they succeeded, and their immediate predecessor in

interest, Tomas Cabangis, having taken possession thereof as soon as they were reclaimed, giving his

permission to some fishermen to dry their fishing nets and deposit their bancas thereon, said lots belong

to them.

Issue:

The lots under discussion having been reclaimed from the seas as a result of certain work done by the

Government, to whom do they belong?

Ruling:

It belongs to the Government. Article 5 of the Law of Waters provide: xxx Lands reclaimed from the sea

in consequence of works constructed by the State xxx shall become the property of the party

constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.

The fact that from 1912 some fishermen had been drying their fishing nets and depositing their bancas

on lots 36, 39 and 40, by permission of Tomas Cabangis, does not confer on the latter or his successors

the ownership of said lots, because, as they were converted into public land, no private person could

acquire title thereto except in the form and manner established by the law .

In conclusion the court held that the lots in question having disappeared on account of the gradual

erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide, and having remained in such a state until they were

reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done by the Government,they are public land.


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(JUN. 30, 1988) RP, PET., VS. AMANDA LAT VDA DE CASTILLO ET AL., RES.

Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land, lots 1 and 2, located in Banadero,

Tanuan, Batangas. An OCT was issued to him by the RD on Feb 7, 1952.

After the death of Modesto, Amanda et al. executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in

favor of Florencio Castillo. So the OCT was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCTs were issued to various

persons.

The RP filed a case with the lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to

defendants Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for the

reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State, because said lands had always formed part of the

Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof, and being of public ownership, it could not be

the subject of registration as private property. Amanda et al. alleged in their answer that the

Government's action was already barred by the decision of the registration court; that the action has

prescribed; and that the government was estopped from questioning the ownership and possession of

appellants.

The trial court decided in favor of the government but on appeal, the CA reversed.

Issue:

Whether the lots in question are part of the public domain

Ruling:

Yes. The properties in question were shorelands of Taal Lake as established by the cadastral survey of

1923. Hence ownership over the same could not have passed on to the respondents.

It must be remembered, however, that lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in

question must be differentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is

alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides.

Such distinction draws importancefrom the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake , like Laguna de

Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been addedwhile accretion on a sea bank

still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by

the government to be no longer needed for public use.

But said distinction will not help private respondentsbecause there is no accretion shown to existinthe case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in

duck raising filled up the area with shells and sand to make it habitable .

The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as already ruled by this

Court, mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character.


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(APR-29-74) SPS. ROMEO MARTINEZ & LEONOR SUAREZ, PET. VS. CA, SEC & UNDERSEC OF PWC, RES.

There are two properties here, both of which are fishponds, located in Lubao, Pampanga; the one in

dispute is parcel no. 2. Said properties originally belonged to Paulino Montemayor, who secured a

titulo real over it way back in 1883. With his death, the property passed to his successors Maria nad

Donato who in turn, sold it to Potenciano Garcia. Initially, Garcia was prevented by the Mun. Pres. ofLubao, Pedro Beltran, to restore the dikes constructed on the property but was able to do so after

procuring the issuance of a permanent preliminary injunction from the CFI. Thereafter, he was able to

register the lands in his name despite opposition from the Atty. G and the Director of Forestry. The

parcels were subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de Dios and thereafter, the ownership of the

properties changed hands until eventually they were acquired by the Spouses.

To avoid any further dispute, the sps. referred the matter of their ownership to the Committeee on

Rivers and Streams which submitted a report to the effect that Parcel No. 2 of transfer certificate of title

No. 15856 was not a public river but a private fishpond owned by the herein spouses. 4 years later, the

Sec. of PWC ordered another investigation of said parcel, directing the spouses to remove the dikes on

the strength of R.A. 2056 (An Act To Prohibit, Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams. Dikes,

Or Any Other Walls In Public Navigable Waters, Or Waterways and In Communal Fishing Grounds, To

Regulate Works in Such Waters or Waterways And In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To Provide

Penalties For Its Violation, And For Other Purposes.)

Because of this, the present case was filed. Lower court ruled in their favor, but the CA reversed.

Issue: WoN Lot No. 2 is considered a public stream

Ruling:

Lot No. 2 is a public stream. Under Article 339 of the old Civil Code: Property of public ownership is -

That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by

the State, and banks shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character. Hence, the above-mentioned

properties are parts of the public domain intended for public use, are outside the commerce of men

and, therefore, not subject to private appropriation.

It is, therefore, clear that the authorities cited by the sps. as to the conclusiveness and incontestability of

a Torrens certificate of title do not apply here. The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-

registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot

validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court

of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 in the name of petitioners-appellants may beattacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive

period provided for by the Statute of Limitations. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of

the public properties fraudulently registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or

private acquisition does not prescribe.


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(Mar. 31, 1915) MUN. of CAVITE, PLAIN.-APPELLANT, VS. HILARIA ROJAS, DEF-APPELLEES.

Hilaria and her husband occupied a parcel of land of about 93 square meters in an area that forms part

of the public plaza known as Soledad by virtue of a contract of lease they entered into with the

Municipality of Cavite.

The case arose when the Municipality demanded the defendants to vacate the premises of the leased

land within 60 days after said demand. The defendants opposed this arguing that: the land did not form

or was not an integral part of Plaza Soledad, the lease they secured from the municipality was not void

and ultra vires, and that if they refuse to vacate said land it was because they had acquired the right of

possession thereof. Moreover, should they be ordered to vacate, they would suffer damages and

therefore should be indemnified in the amount of PHP3000 plus the costs of suit.

Issue: WoN the contract of lease entered into by the defendants with the municipality is valid

Ruling:

No, the lease was not valid. Under section 3 of the Act No. 1039 the Philippine Commission granted to

the municipality of Cavite all the land included in the tract called Plaza Soledad. The intention of the Act

was that the said plaza and other places therein enumerated should be kept open for public transit;

therefore there can be no doubt that the defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land of the

municipality leased by her, for it is an integral portion of Plaza Soledad, which is for public use and is

reserved for the common benefit.

According to Article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises

the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and

public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces." The said Plaza Soledad being a

promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude from

public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In

leasing a portion of said plaza or public place to the defendant for private use the plaintiff municipality

exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which it could

not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do. The Civil Code prescribes that everything which is not outside

the commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this

commerce, as was decided by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 195, which says:

"Communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their very nature outside of commerce are

those for public use, such as the plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc." Therefore, it must

be concluded that the contract of lease is null and void and of no force or effect, because it is contrary

to the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract. On this ground, the defendant must

restore and deliver possession of the land to the municipality, which in its turn must restore to the said

defendant all the sums it may have received from her in the nature of rentals just as soon as she

restores the land improperly leased. For the same reasons, because said contract is null and void in its

origin, it can produce no effect and consequently the defendant is not entitled to claim that the plaintiff

municipality indemnity her for the damages she may suffer by the removal of her house from the said

land.


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(JULY 20, 2006) MIAA, PET. VS. CA, CITY OF PARANAQUE, RES.

MIAA operates the NAIA complex in Paranaque. On 1997, the Office of the Gov. Corp Counsel issued an

opinion which posited that the LGC of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to

MIAA.

Thus MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due to the City of Paranaque. However, it was not

able to pay all the RET due, so the City issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airports and

Buildings. The Mayor even threatened to sell at public auction the Airport lands and buildings should

MIAA fail to pay the RET delinquency.

MIAA was able to get a TRO from the court but received it 3 hours after the conclusion of the public

auction.

Issue:

Whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from RET

If so exempt, Whether the RET assessments issued and all proceedings taken pursuant to such

assessments are void

Ruling:

Yes. First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the

National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are

owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.

GOCCsagency organized as a stock (capital stock is divided into shares and x x x authorized to

distribute to the holders of such shares dividends) or non-stock corp. (one where no part of its income is

distributable as dividends to its members, trustees or officers.).

MIAA is not a stock corp. because it has no capital stock divided into shares, and no stockholders or

voting shares. MIAA is not a non-stock corp. because it has no members. MIAA is a government

instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. Gov.

Instrumentalities are among those enumerated in the LGC that is exempt from tax and levy.

Airport Lands and Buildings are property of the Public Dominion. In Art. 420ports includes airports

and seaports.

Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of man hence they are not subject to levy,

encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale.

Real property owned by the state is NOT taxable. The only exception is when MIAA leases its real

property to a taxable person, in which case the specific real property leased becomes subject to real

estate tax.

Yes. Hence the public auction sale was also void.

Documents

Property Classification Digests