Property

Javier vs. VeridianoFelicidad Javier vs. Regino Veridiano and Reino RoseteG.R. No. L-48050. October 10, 1994Bellosillo, J.

Doctrine: A judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.

Facts:

On January 1963, Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No. 1641, Ts 308 of Olongapo Townsite Subdivision in Olongapo City. On December 1970, Javier filed Civil Case no. 926 (CC 926) for forcible entry against Ben Babol for entering a portion of the southwestern part of Lot 1641, Ts 308. The case was dismissed since the court considered the portion outside Lot 1461. The case became final and executory on April 1973.

Subsequently, Javier was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an Original Certificate of Title was issued in her favor. Meanwhile, Babol who was the defendant in CC 926 had sold the portion he was occupying to Rosete. 4 years after the finality of CC 926, Javier instituted a Civil Case No. 2203-0 (CC 2203-0) for quieting of title and recovery of possession. Rosete moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The CFI of Zambales dismissed the case.

Issue: Whether res judicata is applicable in the case.

Held:

No. The following are the requisites of res judicata:

a) there is final judgment or order; b) the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter; c) former judgment is a judgment on merits; and d) identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

The first three are present. There is identity of parties in the case. What is required is not absolute but substantial identity of parties. In the case, Rosete is a successor in interest of Babol by title.

Nevertheless, there is no identity of cause of action. CC 926 is a complaint of forcible entry or accion interdictal where the issue is physical or material possession of real property. In this case, Javier merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the land without asserting title.

CC 2203-0 is an action to recover a parcel of land or accion reivindicatori. In this case, Javier expressly alleged ownership (by virtue of the Original Certificate of Title issued) and specifically prayed that she be declared the rightful owner and be given possession of the disputed portion.

A judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.

Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the law of Karma.

GERMAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES VS CA

177 SCRA 495 – Civil Law – Property – Doctrine of Self-Help

FACTS:

In February 1982, the spouses Manuel and Cynthia Jose contracted with German Management and Services, Inc. for the latter to develop their landholdings into a residential subdivision. The spouses also executed a special power of attorney to that effect.

German Management started the project in February 1983, however, German Management discovered that the land was being possessed by Ernesto Villeza et al who were the farmers tilling the said land at that time. German Management spoke with Villeza et al but the farmers refused to vacate the land as the farmers claimed that they have been occupying the land for twelve years.

Nevertheless, German Management went on to develop the property and demolished the properties of the farmers without acquiring a court order. In turn, Villeza et al filed a case of forcible entry against German Management. In its defense, German Management invoked the Doctrine of Self-help which provides that:

The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (Article 429, Civil Code)

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of self-help is applicable in this case.

HELD:

No. The Doctrine of Self-help is not applicable because at the time when German Management excluded the farmers, there’s no longer an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation. That actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion by the farmers have already lapsed 12 years ago when they began occupying the said land. In fact, they were already peaceably farming the land.What should have been the remedy by German Management?

German Management should have filed either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria to lawfully eject the farmers.

But the farmers are not the real owners and in fact, the spouses Jose have a lawful title over the land?

Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Further, there is now a presumption of ownership in favor of the farmers since they are the ones occupying the said property. They can only be ejected either by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoriathrough which the spouses Jose’s better right may be proven.

Felix Caisip vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. L-28716, November 18, 1970Concepcion, C.J.

Facts:

The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant.

Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia. and administered by Antonio Chuidian. The overseer of the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the accused herein.

On May 17, 1958 Roxas y Cia filed a forcible entry case against Guevarra. The court decided in favour of Roxas y Cia and issued a writ of execution. The return of the writ showed that possession of Lot 105-A was turned over to the owner thru Caisip and that Guevarra and Cabalag were given 20 days from June 6, 1959 to vacate the premises. It also appears in the record that due to the tenacious attitude of Cabalag, Caisip sought the help of policemen Federico Villadelrey and Ignacio Rojales.

On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen weeding the portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her to leave but Cabalag refused to do so claiming that she and her husband has a right over the property. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he threatened to call the police, Caisip went to his co-defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local police, who were some distance away, and brought them with him. Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a squatting position, to stop weeding.

As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales grabbed her right hand and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and, together with Rojales, forcibly dragged her. The appellants maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that their acts are justified under Article 429 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether Article 429 of the Civil Code applies in the present case.

Held:

Article 429 is inapplicable, Cabalag was given 20 days from June 6, 1959 within which to vacate the premises. Cabalag did not, on June 17, 1959 — or within said period — invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its

co-possessor. Appellants did not “repel or prevent in actual or threatened . . . physical invasion or usurpation.” They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and her husband were in possession.

It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had committed a crime in the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period, which, appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is manifestly untenable, because:

(1) said period was granted in the presence of the hacienda owner’s representative, appellant Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed by the sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact, remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its owner and to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they, as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as “necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor,” and the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of necessary expenses.

It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without legal authority therefor, prevented the complainant from “doing something not prohibited by law,” (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her “to do something against” her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), “whether it be right or wrong,” thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code.


Custodio vs Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 483

Facts:

Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said property was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio and spouses Santos. As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there are two possible passageways.

The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distant from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.

Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed.

As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent access to the public street. Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trial court ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the public street and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.

On appeal by the respondent to the CA, the decision of the trial court was affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages were given to the respondents. Hence, this petition.

Issue:Whether or not the award of damages is proper?

Held:No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.

Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.

In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur:

(1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy;

(2) The acts should be willful; and

(3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.”

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation.

It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded.

One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.

Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate CourtG.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

Fernan, C.J.

Doctrine: It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.

Facts:

Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioner’s land, caused a young man to drown, damagaed petitioner’s crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some other destructions.

This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.

Issue: WON petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by respondent’s waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.

Held:

Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:

(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,

(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and

(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Clearly, from petitioner’s complaint, the water paths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such

action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.

Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.

Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.


NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS IBRAHIM

FACTS:

Lucman G. Ibrahim instituted an action against the National Power Corporation (NPC) for recovery of possession of land and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur on November 23, 1994. The complaint stated that in 1978 NPC used stealth and without permission took possession of the sub-terrain area of the questioned lands and therein constructed underground tunnels.

However, it was only discovered in 1992, when Omar G. Maruhom’s request to install a motorized deep well was rejected by the Marawi City Water District. However, NPC refused to vacate and / or pay damages considering that the area was prone to volcanic and tectonic activities. Instead, NPC filed an answer stating that the respondents were never in possession the sub-terrain portion because they failed to present proof of ownership and the tunnels were government projects for the benefit of all.

On August 7, 1996, The RTC denied the petition to vacate but ordered the NPC to pay the fair market value plus damages. On June 8, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the original decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ibrahim owns the sub-terrain properties?

HELD:

YES. The Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the property similarly belongs to Ibrahim. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.

Thus, the ownership of the land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.

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