Promoting political development abroad: Social condition and attitudes of latin American intellectuals

Promoting Political Development Abroad:

Social Condition and Attitudes of Latin American Intellectuals

FRANK BONILLA Massachusetts Institute o[ Technology

T O APPRAISE the mood and social condition of intellectuals in Latin America today invites

misreading. The deep emotionalism and extreme opinions that the theme elicits in the United States signal the need for caution and suggest the extent to which these judgments are colored by the insecurities and doubts of United States' intellectuals about their own and the United States' role in the area's politics. The increasing stereotyping of intellectuals in the developing world already conveniently inclines many to write them off as capable actors in their own lands, except as guided from outside. These intellectuals, we are told, though comfortably bourgeois, are in the main professionally incompetent, radical in ideology, fitful and violent in political action, soft on cor- ruption and subversion, hypersensitive concerning personal and national dignity, untrusting and unreliable, without genuine bonds to the masses they pretend to lead. Wherever such men make their influence felt-the cry is raised-they seek only to thwart the wholesome purposes of United States policy.

The baffling response we hear does not originate in the people we try to help but in a group of self-appointed spokesmen and mediators who stand between us and the mass of people. This group is made up of university teachers and students, writers, artists and intellectuals in general. It is these articulate people who are the sources of the rabid anti-Americanism which has been manifesting itself in many countries since the end of the second world war . . . . The intellectuals everywhere see America as a threat (Hoffer, 1952:15).

Admittedly, these impressions are by no means wide of the mark insofar as evidence on these points has been systematically put together. Poll after poll shows mass opinion to be generally favorable to the United States and to Americans, with hostility and

opposition to United States policies increasing geo- metrically with education. This fact makes more rather than less dangerous the obvious policy infer- ences that tend to be drawn, and lends a spurious sense of ethical certainty to simple rationales for one-sided intervention in the political life of nations groping toward means of effective self-management. The political incapacity and programmatic opposition to the United States of large sectors among the intellectual classes in Latin America, are readily taken to justify if not create the obligation to neutralize or bypass such resistance through a wide array of actions, both covert and open. 1 Whatever claims of political necessity may be made for any single set of such actions, the possibilities of connecting them coherently to any long-term sense or theory about the developmental process in any country are plainly not very good. More importantly, by framing the problem in this fashion we avoid the real issue, which has to do not merely with a misguided and inept body of intellectuals at odds both with their own people and the United States, but with a complex web of interactions between factions of United States intelligentsia and their counterparts abroad.

It may after all be true, as some intellectuals in Latin America and elsewhere affirm, that if Latin American intellectuals could bring the facts of their situation home directly to the American people in the mass, new levels of understanding and policy consensus would be immediately achieved. United States intellectuals are also beguiled by the notion of "people to people" communication, the implication being that they would not mind bypassing their own group in reaching out to others. The question then concerns not only what impedes Latin American intellectuals from assuming a more positive role in the political development of their own countries, but also the nature of the incompatibilities between intellectuals abroad and in the United States concerned with various aspects of development. Since the

4 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

United States has by no means settled at home on a universally satisfying model for the political participation of its own intellectuals, the projections out- ward of these domestic difficulties must also figure in the reckoning.

gains in critical self-steering and autonomy, it cannot be approached where the knowledgeable are divorced from power or the powerful shut their eyes to self-knowledge.

The intent here is not to essay an exhaustive look at these issues but rather not to lose sight of the fact that what tends to be taken for granted-the prima facie United States interest, right and perhaps obligation to manipulate other people's elites-is exactly what provokes the greatest tensions with respect to the particular group being discussed. This is not a guarded argument for passivity or against all forms of direct political action. But apart from the fact that most such United States actions directly and profoundly affect the lives of intellectuals themselves, United States anxiety about predicting the political future and ensuring safe regimes in the present does not fit neatly into the development needs of most nations as perceived by their own intellectuals. Never- theless, many of them eagerly join with or seek to entice the United States into collaborative searches for efficient, low-cost oligarchies-endeavors sup- ported by the mutual pragmatic illusion that once stability is achieved, a withdrawal or phasing out of United States support will permit a more natural equilibrium of internal forces. The regimes in power want development on all fronts, moderately paced and with minimal popular mobilization. Because they prefer moderation and are now being told that development is primarily a cultural and psychological process, they look from time to time toward the intellectual as a possible agent and collaborator in the non-coercive engineering of consent. Because according to their own standards these regimes often have good reason to doubt the real competence and root commitment of the intellectuals, all of them basically reject the importance of having major policy legiti- mized by a critical class of intellectuals. Yet the achievement of development goals and the management of the successive crises of national growth hinge importantly on the quality and organization of intellectual life. New forms of interdependence between political authority and the intellectual take form once the performance and legitimacy of regimes begins to be weighed in terms of their problem-solving capacity. To the growing inventory of elements crucial to political development should be added a minimal instrumentality-theoretical, technical, and institutional-for arriving at and handling sensitive judgments about the state of the society (see Lerner, 1959). If political development may be equated with

The Intellectual in Society

Intellectuals not only create and sustain fashion, tastes, and values; they too fall in and out of fashion. By reaching out and publicly paying deference to some intellectuals at home, President Kennedy won the hearts and buoyed the hopes of intellectuals everywhere. There were naturally some reservations about the genuineness of the President's cultural interests and some lurking suspicions of being ex- ploited to round out a carefully cultivated public image. Nevertheless, there seems to be no question that the representatives of the United States cultural world were charmed and flattered by the attention from Washington, the more so the more remote the individual's specialty was from any direct policy concern. 2 Both the susceptibility to symbolic acts and the tentativeness of the United States intellectual's approach to the centers of political power are illustrated here.

The subsequent noisy cleavage between Washing- ton and major sectors of the cultural and academic sphere could not fail to have an impact abroad, especially in Latin America. We refer here not to any decline in popularity for former President Johnson or negative effects on public opinion concerning United States policy, but rather to a parallel marginalization of intellectuals in several countries subtly linked to the change in mood in Washington as well as to specific policy decisions of the last several years. At the same time the symbolism of other acts was not lost on Latin American intellectuals-e.g., the hasty retooling of former cold war specialists for study and organizational work in the region, the proliferation of studies of intellectuals in which interest focused much more on their potential as subversives than on their cultural activities.

The vision of the intellectual as political evil incarnate-as the voice of disunity, defeatism, and subversion in the nation-is very particular to the military. In an earlier paper on cultural elites, I have linked the rise and fall of the fortunes of intellectuals in Latin America to the number of military regimes in the region. That essay touched only tangentially on the political role of intellectuals, but several of the

PROMOTING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT ABROAD 5

points made there bear summarization here since they will serve to set the context for the discussion that follows (see Bonilla, 1967). The main spheres of cultural activity were there defined as science, ideology, aesthetics, philosophy, religion, and mysticism. The priority values of the cultural sphere were identi- fied as t ru th , beauty, and delight or self- t ranscendence . Cultural elites were examined primarily from the point of view of their function as agents of attitude formation and change. The central argument, apart from noting the constraining circum- stantial effects of military or otherwise unsympa- thetic regimes, was that the facts of value dominance, power, and resource distribution in Latin America do not square with the proposition that Latin Americans as a people place a high valuation on cultural activity or achievement. Accomplishment in the cultural sphere was shown_ to be spotty, investment slender, institutions weak. The status of all but a handful of the most distinguished cultural figures was found to be precarious, and the force of the cultural values noted above as standards for motivating and judging action was deemed extremely feeble. This long- standing contradiction between social facts and a prized and generalized self-image was seen as impeding a fruitful reorganization of intellectual work in a way that would serve development needs. Moreover, behind the facade of radicalism and disaf- fection among intellectuals, we found a strong middle-class anchorage and the sustained powerful hold of sentimentalized bourgeois notions of pro- priety and social decorum. Because political radicalism was vitiated by a deeply ingrained social conservatism, the control of intellectual political dissidence had in fact proved relatively easy in Latin America, despite sporadic periods of unbridled repression and heroic resistance.

Such an assessment of cultural elites does not deny the importance of individual cultural leaders in the past or in contemporary political life, nor is the inten- tion to underplay regional cultural achievements. Historically, it may be the intellectual turned politi- cian who is glorified and credited with advancing national growth. Certainly no political movement of any moment lacks its small cadre of luminary pensadores. The point at issue has to do with the relative autonomy, power resources, institutional and value base of cultural as against other specialized leadership sectors in the society.

These remarks, specifically concerning cultural elites, apply broadly to intellectuals-though some

theoretical distinctions are worth making. Cultural elitism implies two basic criteria of identification: a sphere of activity (specified above) and a particular form of social recognition (elite status). In this con- nection, as for intellectuals, occupation and education are useful mainly to suggest the limits of the population from which the relevant sub-groups may be drawn, especially if the universe of candidates is relatively restricted. But whatever the overlap between the cultural or any other elite sector and the class of intellectuals, the latter is much more a consciously assumed role than an ascribed or achieved status. Being an intellectual means caring about ideas and implies a willingness to defend and espouse principles. It becomes then primarily a subjective state or stance, an appropriated role rather than a discrete social locus or a prescribed function. What- ever fragments of data we will be able to weave into the exposition that follows will ordinarily refer to groups believed to include high concentrations of intellectuals rather than to homogeneous bodies of self-designated intellectuals. It should be clear, however, that in our view it is that mark of special commitment or intensity that sets off the intellectual from others who may have equal schooling, similar professions, or even outstanding achievement or recognition to their credit. 3 The intellectual may thus have his occupational anchorage in almost any of a wide and growing range of concrete activities and may enter into a multitude of political roles. No single prescription for political participation by intellectuals guarantees a happy meshing of their action with the advancement of national political development, however this may be conceptualized. 4

Social location and the Experience of Change

Two studies (Bonilla and Michelena, 1967; and Bonilla and Silvert, forthcoming) provide most of the information about intellectuals that will be presented in these pages, s Both are useful not because they had a priority interest in intellectuals but because each set out to explore intra-class differences in such things as mobility patterns, general value orientation, and political behavior. By looking closely for meaningful differences among groups within the same or contigu- ous class strata, especially within the upper and middle classes, both studies provide useful clues about how intellectuals differ among themselves and from other groups of equal status. Very few of these data demonstrably refer to intellectuals in the strict sense defined above (that is, of strong subjective


identification with an intellectual role), but both studies include several groups that conventionally have been seen as engaged in activities requiring substantial intellectual skills and as major breeding grounds for the kind of militant and socially aware figure that is associated in the folklore with the intellectual. The elusiveness of the intellectuals in this respect reflects the extent to which they are a pseudo group, whether seen from the Marxist perspective (see Gramsci, 1959) as lettered super- numeraries appended to groups with true social functions (/.e., clear economic interests and political power), or as autonomous and free-floating embodi- ments of principles and ideals transcending class (Mannheim, 1936). The true intellectual leader, according to this second view, is not only above class but above ideas, and can therefore presumably begin to approach politics scientifically though perhaps not independently.

The two studies from which data for this analysis are drawn have the additional interesting feature that one contrasts groups at equivalent status levels across countries while the second looks in detail at intra-

class variations in a single country. The cross-national research includes samplings of graduates of three schools of the University of Buenos Aires (Medicine, Exact Sciences, and Economy and Commerce), professors of the National and the Catholic universities in Chile, members of the Congress and intellectuals (specifically in Mexico), and industrial managers with some professional training in Brazil. The Venezuelan research includes eight middle-class and upper-class groups with primarily political and cultural functions: high level government officials (below the very top elite), professionals on the staffs of government agencies, university professors, student leaders, labor leaders, parish priests, municipal councilmen, and secondary school teachers. 6 All but the last two of these provide viable points of entry to an assessment of the general social condition of individuals within or close to the circle of intellectuals. Plainly, only a most elliptical treatment and fragmentary presen- tation of data can be undertaken in this essay.

Results of the cross-national study substantially confirm the solidly urban and bourgeois origins of all the groups mentioned except the Mexican legislators,

TABLE I

SOME STATUS CHARACTERISTICS OF LATIN AMERICAN PROFESSIONALS

Have Upwardly Never Businessmen Native Mobile Rural Fathers* Fathers

Group % % % %

Argentina **

Medicine 58 83 56 55 Exact Sciences 62 86 55 52 Economy and Commerce 76 84 60 41

Chile

Professors of U. Chile 50 87 50 73 Professors of Cath. U. 25 74 37 70

Mexico

Legislator s 56 40 21 99 Intellectuals 52 70 29 85

Brazil

Managers 48 74 54 58

Tota/s

(625) (192) (516)

(85) (82)

(95) (178)

(168)

*Except for legislators with 42 per cent having fathers in agricultural pursuits, the principal non-business occupations for the fathers of these men are the liberal professions. **In this table the figures cover all Argentina respondents, that is, each profession includes first and last year students in the respective school as well as graduates.


who alone include substantial numbers with rural backgrounds (Table I). Except for the men in Congress, seven in ten or better in all samples have

never lived in a rural area. Again, except for the two Mexican samples and the professors at the Catholic University in Santiago, half or more of the persons in all samples had fathers in business. Mobility rates for all groups, except the more firmly rooted upper-class professors in the Chilean Catholic University are impressive. From half to three fourths of the groups sampled had fathers in lower status occupations than their own. The proportions o f individuals with foreign-born fathers in these high status occupations varied more sharply from country to country than any of the other characteristics, being about half in Brazil and Argentina, closer to seven in ten in Chile, and dwindling to insignificant levels in Mexico. The overall impression conveyed is one of a professional (and by derivation, intellectual) stratum manned by

the mobile offspring o f an urban-based, petty bourgeoisie that is cementing long-term status gains in the occupational and educational achievement of the present generation.

Venezuelan data concerning similar status and class characteristics for parallel groups in that country tend to confirm this picture of a professional and intellectual sector solidly ensconced within the middle and upper bourgeois strata. Comparing groups having primarily cultural and political leadership functions with others at the same upper-class and middle-class levels, we find great homogeneity with respect to income, occupational and educational mobility and mass media use, but perceptible differences in education and information levels. The items on media exposure and information shade over into what are called mediating dispositions in our analytical scheme, but it is worth registering early in the

TABLE II

STATUS CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL AND CULTURAL UPPER AND MIDDLE STATUS IN VENEZUELA

COMPARED WITH OTHER GROUPS IN THE SAME CLASS STRATA+

In tergenerational Years o f Father's Mobility in: Status Education Income Education Occupation Education Congruency

Mass Media Level of Exposure Information

Upper Class High government officials* 9 8 6 7 7 9 9 7 University professors* 9 8 6 7 7 9 9 7 Government staff* 8 8 5 7 7 7 9 7

Oil industry executives 7 8 5 7 7 6 9 7 Industrial executives 5 7 4 7 7 5 9 4 Agricultural entrepreneurs 4 7 2 7 6 5 7 5

Middle Class Student leaders* 8 5 6 5 7 5 9 7 Labor leaders* 4 6 2 6 7 6 9 6 Priests* 9 5 4 7 8 4 8 6 Municipal council members* 4 6 2 6 7 4 8 6

Operators of small industry 4 6 3 6 7 Government employees 5 5 4 5 7 Oil industry employees 4 6 2 5 7

4 8 5 5 5 5 5 g 4

+The numbers in the table are scale values recomputed by linear transformation to range from zero to ten. They are taken from a master matrix of group characteristics which is one element in a numerical simulation of the Venezuelan political system (see Michelena, 1967b: ch. 12).

*The asterisks identify those groups within each class level which on the basis of their cultural or political functions are hypothesized to have a high probability of containing intellectuals.


paper that it is the capacity to absorb information

that begins to set off intellectualistic sectors from

others at the same class levels. As may be noted in

Table II in the column headed "Status Congruency,"

the groups that would seem to be most likely to

harbor intellectuals are the ones that register highest

on this measure of compatibility among the various

status-setting characteristics. On this count, intel-

lectuals would appear to be among the most comfort-

ably situated upper-status groups in Venezuela.

Turning to more subjective material from the four-

country study on the self-identifications of profes-

sional groups, we get an even more unequivocal

impression that these individuals are not only tied by

common origins, shared experiences, and a daily

intermingling to the class sectors from which they

derive but that they also affirmatively recognize and

embrace these class bonds. As can be seen in Table

III, practically all groups almost unanimously declare

themselves to be middle-class and professionals. While

the one-sidedness of responses makes it difficult to

pursue within these groups the larger meaning of

these superficially unsurprising identifications, the

earlier allusion to the research by Soares should have

made clear that their significance is by no means

trivial or self-evident. More noteworthy in terms of

the widely expressed fears about the proletarianiza-

tion of the intellectual are the substantial proportions

in almost all groups and especially among university

TABLE III

SUBJECTIVE CLASS IDENTIFICATIONS OF SOME LATIN AMERICAN PROFESSIONALS

Class Identification:

Argentina Chile Mexico Brazil

Professors at: Physicians Scientists a Economists b U. Chile Cath. U. Legislators Intellectuals Managers

% % % % % % % %

lncome Rich 35 39 21 51 58 15 25 9 Modest 56 48 68 28 33 80 69 82 Poor 2 4 3 - - 5 - 3 None 7 9 8 21 9 - 6 6

Occupational Professional or

proprietor 98 98 90 88 91 75 86 53 White collar 2 - 9 11 7 11 11 45 Worker - - 1 - - 8 - - None - 2 - 1 2 6 3 2

Soc/a/

Upper class 5 5 2 4 23 2 9 10 Middle class 92 84 95 89 69 96 86 86 Lower class 1 4 1 3 - 2 2 1 None 2 7 2 4 8 - 3 3

Political

Aristocracy 4 5 1 3 12 1 3 4 Bourgeoisie 42 57 56 66 63 30 57 68 Proletarian 15 5 10 9 4 43 11 14 None 39 32 33 22 21 27 28 14

N= (175) (56) (174) (86) (82) (96) (179) (174)

aMathematicians and physicists, bGraduates of the School of Economic Sciences include more accountants and office managers than academic economists.


professors who count themselves among the wealthy. Ironically, it is the Brazilian managers who perceive themselves most modestly on the scale of income. Perhaps the matter is truly subjective, for Mexican intellectuals, who do not seem to possess any special sources of income or wealth, are somewhat more inclined to call themselves rich than are Mexican legislators, who in fact command substantially higher incomes.

concern in terms of development is to think seriously about the conditions under which such partial transfers of class allegiance can in fact be effected and made to have some political weight. It is one thing to make an empathic commitment and another successfully to break through the psychological and social barriers that divide the upper, middle and lower classes in Latin America.7

That the constraints of objectivity are appropri- ately only loosely at work is made abundantly plain in the responses to the scale of political class identifications. Respectable minorities in almost every sample feel free to reject this set of political categories altogether, while others, including a dramatic 43 per cent of legislators, forthrightly declare themselves as proletarians for political purposes, despite their compromisingly middle-class responses on other items. Do we have here the emancipated intellectual, bravely throwing off the shackles of class and following political principle wherever it leads? The question, of course, goes far beyond the trifling issue of whether there are crooks and demogogues in politics anywhere. Of greater

Mediating Dispositions and Psychological States

"Mediating dispositions" represent a particular set of abstractions from the varied data on individual feelings, perceptions, and judgments obtained in surveys such as the two that have been drawn on here. The simple supposition is that the individual through his experience, whether it be of considerable movement and change or long tenure in a given status, acquires a patterned cultural and psychological perspective on the social world. There are many pit- falls and methodological cul de sacs in any effort to discover or impose some order on this kind of material. ~ Our use of such data will be minimal here and is intended to further document the apparent

TABLE IV

ATTITUDINAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOME LATIN AMERICAN PROFESSIONALS

Argentina* Chile Mexico Brazil

Professors at: Physicians Scientists Economists U. Chile Cath. U. Legislators Intellectuals Managers

% % % % % % % %

Percentage saying they:

Are very happy or happy 80 73 84 79 88 86 78 91

Are practicing Catholics 70 42 75 56 94 81 66 62

Like competition 43 58 60 51 63 64 62 79

Are satisfied with the degree of unity in their group 30 51 42 36 37 29 43 43

Percentage high on the index of national identification

N=

35 32 37 34 13 57 30 36

(625) (192) (516) (85) (82) (96) (179) (174)

*In this table the figures cover all Argentina respondents; that is, each profession includes fkst and last year students in the respective school as well as graduates.

10 STUDIES IN COMPARATWE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

absence of strong tensions between intellectuals and their class peers with respect to basic social orientations.

If the pull of class ties is substantially reinforced by shared class values, then the image of the intellectual as the eternally displaced man is hardly tenable. Information from the two surveys runs counter to the familiar stereotype of the intellectual as a socially marginal man, set against a system he rejects (Table IV). In the most directly relevant sample-Mexican intellectuals-the main themes in free discussions of personal problems turned out to be the financial difficulties of maintaining a family in keeping with middle-class standards of decorum, problems in obtaining better training, more regular promotions, and broader recognition for achievement. In short, Mexican intellectuals, as most of the other more formally professional samplings, display

few signs of being seriously at odds with their middle-class cosmos. Substantial majorities among the Mexicans as among others report that they are happy, that they are practicing Catholics, that they enjoy competition. They are not more troubled than politicians or businessmen about social unity within their own ranks. On a composite measure of national identification, designed specifically to measure the disposition to accept social commitments transcending class, an average of only about one in three in all of these high level, heavily intellectual groups scored high.

The Venezuelan materials similarly provide little support for the notion that intellectuals are socially malintegrated or possess any special talent for rising above class concerns (Table V). The political and intellectual groupings show no particular edge over others on an almost identical measure of national

TABLE V

MEDIATING DISPOSITIONS OF POLITICAL AND CULTURAL UPPER AND MIDDLE STATUS GROUPS IN VENEZUELA

COMPARED WITH OTHER GROUPS IN THE SAME CLASS STRATA+

Upper Class

Attitudinal Pro Pro- National Optimism Modernity Leftism R i g h t i s m Identification

High government officials* 8 7 3 6 5 University professors* 7 7 4 6 5 Government staff* 8 6 4 6 5

Oil industry executives 8 5 3 5 5 Industrial executives 8 5 4 4 4 Agricultural entrepreneurs 7 5 4 4 4

Middle Class

Student leaders* 7 7 6 7 5 Labor leaders* 8 7 5 6 5 Priests* 6 6 3 4 3 Municipal council members* 8 6 5 5 5

Operators of small industry Government employees Oil industry employees

8 5 5 5 4 8 6 5 5 5 8 5 4 4 4

+Refer to note in Table II.

*The asterisks identify those groups within each class level which on the basis of their cultural or political functions are hypothesized to have a high probability of containing intellectuals


identification and only a tenuous advantage on a second measure of attitudinal modernity. They are just as optimistic about their own and the nation's future as all other groups. Not unexpectedly they stand out primarily on ideological orientations, being either more pro-leftist or more anti-rightist than other bourgeois sectors, with perhaps more emphasis on rejecting conservative appeals than on champion- ing leftist causes. They are, as Michelena (1967a) designates them, more "unstable centrists" than genuine leftists. In view of what has been said about non-political orientations, the impulse is to ask how any of these men ever got to be leftists at all. The more pertinent problem is what it means to have a Left populated and in large part led by individuals of such profoundly bourgeois attachments.

Political Evaluations and Capacity for Action

In the analytical paradigm to which reference has been made from time to time, evaluations are them-

selves a major form of political action. Other political acts are undertaken to give weight and substance to judgments made concerning the state of the society and one's place in it. In this sense such perceptions are an essential raw ingredient of political action and changes in them constitute major political events and major objects of political effort. From another perspective, evaluations both express and reaffirm or serve to modify the mediating, normative and psychological dispositions mentioned earlier.

We have focused on political evaluations because it is in this sphere that the intellectual's fire concen- trates and in which his anger and disillusion begin to come palpably to the surface even in the fairly controlled interview situation. Here one encounters direct criticism of government, expressions of long- standing irritations, admissions of galling feelings of impotence, a bitterness that is absent in all other parts of the interview. This black tone was communi- cated most graphically in the conversations with Mexican intellectuals, but the consistency of overall

TABLE V1

PRINCIPAL BARRIERS TO NATIONAL UNITY AS PERCEIVED BY LATIN AMERICAN PROFESSIONALS*

Argentina Chile Mexico Brazil


% % % % % % % %

International

Powerful international monopolies 50 69 65 61 54 42 58 42

The pressure of foreign governments 58 59 59 49 39 28 56 34

International political movements 42 29 37 14 32 30 31 34

National

Lack of civic culture in the mass 88 82 87 92 78 86 87 82

The selfishness of businessmen 38 37 41 49 56 61 38 16

Landowners 17 34 20 46 27 35 18 19

N= (625) (192) (516) (85) (82) (96) (179) (174)

*The figures in the table show the total per cent mentioning a given factor as first, second, or third importance.


response on these items makes plausible the supposition that such emotions were simmering just below the surface in other contexts.

There is an arresting sameness, for example, in the response patterns of the professionals in the four- country survey to a set of questions probing into the factors impeding national unity. Overwhelmingly they point to the lack of civic culture in the masses as the major impediment to pulling the nation together (Table VI). The business class and, to a lesser extent, landowners are also defined as enemies of national integration, but far less often in every case than the mass of citizenry. Externally, it is powerful international monopolies and the pressures of foreign governments (read here the United States) that tend to be seen by the majority as blocks to full sover-

eignty and self-affirmation. Though not insubstantial, the fears aroused by international political movements (read here Communism) are less widespread. Most of these men thus see themselves as hopelessly pinned between unrelenting pressures from the outside and a recalcitrant and politically unschooled mass at home.

Ironically, political involvement, though just 30 per cent, was highest (about three times the rate elsewhere) among Mexican intellectuals, a majority of whom forthrightly declared that most Mexicans have no effective voice in government (Table VII). In Argentina, where most of the professionals ques- tioned believe that their political opinions have some significance, well under one in ten reported any active political work in the previous six months. For some

TABLE VII

POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF LATIN AMERICAN PROFESSIONALS*

Per cent who:

Feel their personal political views are important

Believe majority in nation do not have an effective voice in government

Worked actively in politics in the last six months

Attended a union or professional society meeting in the last six months

Discussed politics heatedly with acquain- tances in the last six months

N=

Argentina ** Chile Mexico Brazil


% % % % % % % %

55 59 54 13 23 - 38 40

15 64 37

6 5 9 10 12 - 30 7

21 41 27 68 45 - 26 28

57 54 47 37 51 - 74 48

(175) (56) (174) (86) (82) (96) (179) (174)

*Blanks in the table indicate that a question was not asked of a given group.

**This table shows only the graduates of the respective faculties


this means an explicit privatization of political thought, assigning significance to political views that admittedly have no public projection. The professional is more characteristically engaged in professional groups than directly in parties and above all given to talk of politics rather than organized activity.

Substantially higher rates o f political participation and interest are reported by the political and cultural groups in Venezuela, some of whom are in effect professional politicians (Table VIII). Perhaps because they are so close to day-to-day politics, they take a somewhat more benevolent view of politicians than equivalent status groups. Still, they reproduce the broader pattern that has been described, differing from their class peers chiefly in the frequency with which they report irritation with government policy and in their preoccupation about the working of

foreign influence in the nation. The grievances of the intellectual are specifically political and have to do with his pervasive sense o f powerlessness and being manipulated from a distance.

By approaching the diagnosis of the intellectual's situation in this particular fashion, we have deliber- ately thrown into focus the extent to which the United States' presence is in itself problematic with respect to any effort to engage intellectuals collaboratively in actions aimed at political development. The groups that we have been describing are, as has been seen, comfortably bourgeois. Few of them have any doctri- naire commitment to revolution. One might even doubt the desire of many among them for genuine social reform. As concerns their traditional claims to leadership, those intellectuals without specialties directly related to development needs, are in most

TABLE VIII

POLITICAL EVALUATIONS OF POLITICAL AND CULTURAL UPPER AND MIDDLE STATUS GROUPS

IN VENEZUELA COMPARED WITH OTHER GROUPS IN THE SAME CLASS STRATA+

Foreign Irritation with Politicians' National Pol i t i ca l Political Influence Government Performance Unity Interest Participation

% % % % % %

Upper Class

High government officials* 76 72 65 18 67 46 University professors* 89 70 52 30 43 23

Oil industry executives 82 66 33 14 43 12 Industrial executives 69 44 36 17 36 6 Executives in commercial

enterprises 66 20 26 16 31 12

Middle Class

Student leaders* 91 88 63 13 72 77 Labor leaders* 78 62 83 25 81 92 Priests* 84 49 45 28 47 2

Small businessmen 55 32 43 28 15 13 Government employees 75 44 36 13 25 15 Oil industry employees 64 29 42 32 19 21

+This table has been compiled from a paper by Janice Perlam and Philip Raup, Jr. (1966). The percentages in the table indicate the proportions in each group scoring high on each factor or who evaluate each element as significantly high in Venezuela.

*The asterisks identify those groups within each class level which on the basis of their cultural or political functions are hypothesized to have a high probability of containing intellectuals.


countries increasingly on the defensive. Yet by virtue of their small numbers, education, and social advan- tages they remain inevitably within the elite circle whose members periodically gravitate to power. 9 Even in periods of withdrawal and relative inaction, they constitute a primary reference point for policy as the articulate and most aware segment of the public. We must be willing to explore frankly the implications of the fact that a majority in this group perceive their countries to be cut off by the United States from the full possibilities of development.

We have learned little from most efforts to analyze the significance of this phenomenon because we have tended to use such research mainly to put new names on an old problem and the patterns of leadership it generates. Where the policy-maker once saw only the machinations of cold war opponents, he now sees overflows of nationalism, culturally rooted political atavisms, crises of identity and insufficiencies of the civic culture. But the new labels only serve to further disconnect whatever understanding is gained about these vital psychological and value conflicts from any serious view of the consequences of our own actions. The more we learn about the psychological processes involved, the more loudly the call comes to steel our- selves for new and presumably unavoidable interven- tions, large and small. We continue to view manifes- tations of bitterness, rebelliousness, and extremism as gratuitous and autistic acts rather than as responses to a vision of the political world that our own actions serve to ratify.

Some major inputs, then, that might yield a large and constructive result in keeping with a new policy concerned with promoting political development abroad, would be (1) to recognize that autonomous leadership is not generated by taking over leadership or shuffling leaders around; (2) to submit more of our own actions and reactions to the canons of ration- ality, patience, and respect for others that we urge on Latin American intellectuals; and (3) to stop offering to help Latin Americans study themselves but ask

them to join us in studying those sensitive areas that are of common concern to us both, including United States involvement, as part of the problem rather than as a given. Research instruments now exist that can make such studies a continuous process of self- education and mutual self-discovery for the investi- gator, the policy-maker, and the concerned public rather than long, drawn-out bouts with data by solitary researchers. ~° New tools for research are only a single element in such combined actions. More critical is the positive will of political authorities backed by socially motivated technical staff to open the planning and policy process to a genuine involvement with those who have traditionally been mere objects of policy. The present experience of United States anti-poverty programs and the efforts of numerous national planning agencies in the region make it plain that this involves a long and painful reschooling for all concerned.

These dosing paragraphs have emphasized the kinds of initiatives we feel the United States must take in restructuring its relations with intellectuals abroad if a new commitment to stimulating political development as against defending some fixed abstrac- tion called "the United States' interest" is to be given meaning in our foreign policy. The alternatives to making development mean anything less than such a gradual increase in self-awareness and a felt sense of freely taken options in a world whose complexity one begins to master are clearly before us. It is being persuasively argued abroad and more recently at home (see Fanon, 1963) that the quantum of evil in the world cannot be reduced but must grow; that every cruelty, humiliation, and violation of man in the past can only be erased by a new act of equal ferocity. It does not take much reflection to see that this point of view is firmly grounded in psychological theory and presupposes only a continuing set of constraints on any other resolution to the lasting harm that prolonged felt powerlessness may work on the human spirit.

P R O M O T I N G P O L I T I C A L D E V E L O P M E N T A B R O A D 15

N O T E S

1. The range of such ongoing operations and a variety of proposals for their intensification can be seen in Winning the Cold War: The U. S. Ideological Offensive (see U. S. Congress. House of Representatives, 1965).

2. Some revealing comments from American writers called on various occasions to Washington can be found in Aivarez (1965).

3. Soares (1967), for example, demonstrates substantial differences in political orientations among individuals in the same occupation who designate themselves as intellectuals rather than scientists or professionals.

4. In seeking to gain some perspective on the present political circumstances of intellectuals and the likely prospects that they will in the near future contribute to rather than inhibit positive political change, it seems useful to turn to a "diagnostic" approach. This approach focuses in a most general sense on the national capacity to act politically on problems, that is, to provide authoritative and practical solutions to policy issues at minimal or at least tolerable social costs. The emphasis is on locating and defining the nature of stress or conflict in the society that impedes the achievement of specific goals or blocks anticipated policy action. Intellectuals, or any other group, can be said to advance political development insofar as their attitudes and actions show promise of enhancing the national capacity to understand, generate, guide, and adjust to a fairly specific array of so far imperfectly synchronized transformations in nations. No easy assumptions are made in this approach concerning the intrinsic meaning of conflict or consensus in relation to the national capacity for managing social change at minimal costs. Dissent with respect to interests, specific opinions, values, or ideologies is not directly equated with conflict, nor is agreement with respect to any of these presumed to provide a consensual base supportive of major change. Low social cost in this context means a minimum of violence to persons (including coercive action by government) as well as a reasonable rate of reduction in the human suffering inherent in existing social arrangements.

5. Bonilla and Miehelena (1967) covered thirty population groups having key political roles ranging from rural and urban working-class types through numerous middle-sector occupations to high government officials, proprietors, and industrial executives. The principal aim was to determine the ways in which the social location and particular experience of change of specific groups had led to distinctive styles of perceiving, evaluating, and acting on political alternatives. Fewer than half of the groups sampled are used in the present analysis. While the discussion of intellectuals that follows can adhere only roughly and selectively to the analytical framework developed for that research, it is worth keeping in mind that the data and analysis reported here are embedded within a framework of this scope.

6. In both studies each such group was independently sampled according to some random method appropriate to the case in hand. The most irregular sampling among all the groups mentioned was that of intellectuals in Mexico which was obtained by the so-called snowball technique. The actual instructions to the core of 75 respondents who nominated additional interviewees were the following: "We have begun our survey with a small group of intellectuals whose deep concern for national problems is well known. Taking into account the very special nature of the intellectual community, we have chosen to leave to our f'trst respondents the definition of who really forms an effective part of the intellectual group in Mexico. For this reason we ask you now to indicate the names of three persons that you know and feel merit the designation of "intellectuals", keeping in mind that we are interested in consulting principally those persons who best express or have greatest influence on the formation of Mexican thought in all its varied forms with respect to contemporary social, economic, and political problems." The sampling is by no means limited to purely "establishment" types, though as an elite sample such selective factors unquestion- ably have some weight.

7. Torcuato S. Di Tella (1964) gives a good account of the troubled and repeatedly abortive efforts to successfully integrate middle-class and working-class political movements in Argentina.

8. Not all the explanations necessary to understand the operations behind some of the composite measures shown in this section can be presented here. The interested reader is referred to the original study reports which have been cited.

9. The successive waves of intellectual generations that punctuate and give character to major historical periods in every Latin American country are the reflection of a similar pattern of consecutive sorties into public life by individuals. The political apathy of the intellectual is periodic rather than programmatic.

10. Some promising steps in this direction have been taken in the collaborative studies conducted by CENDES in Venezuela and MIT in the United States.

16 S T U D I E S IN C O M P A R A T I V E I N T E R N A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T

R E F E R E N C E S

ALVAREZ, A. (1965) Under Pressure. Baltimore: Penguin Books

BONILLA, F. (1967) "The cultural elite." In S.M. Lipset and A. Solari (eds.) Elites in Latin America. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

- - - a n d J. MICHELENA (1967) "A strategy for research on social policy." In F. Bonilla and J. Michelena, The Politics of Change in Venezuela, Vol. I. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

DI TELLA, T. S. (1964) El Sistema Politico Argentino y la Clase Obrera. Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires.

FANON, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press.

GRAMSCI, A. (1959) Oeuvres Choisies. Geneva: Editions Librairie Rousseau.

HOFFER, E. (1952) The Ordeal of Change. New York: Harper and Row.

LERNER, D. (1959) "Social science: whence and whither." In D. Lerner, The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences. New York: Meridian.

MANNHEIM, K. (1936) Ideology and Utopia (trans. by L Wirth and E. Shlis). New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.

MICHELENA, J. A. S. (1967a) "Nationalism in Venezuela." In F. BoniUa and J. Michelena, The Politics of Change in Venezuela, VoL 1. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

. . . . (1967b) "VENUTOPIA I: an experimental model of a national policy." In F. Bonilla and J. Michelena, The Politics of Change in Venezuela. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

PERLAM, J. and P. RAUP, JR. (1966) "A style of evaluation of the Venezuela middle and upper class." Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Insti tute of Technology (Mimeo.).

SOARES, G. (1967) '~Fhe politics of intellectuals." In S. M. Lipset and A. Solari (eds.) Elites in Latin America. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

SILVERT, K. and F. BONILLA (forthcoming) Education and the Social Meaning of Development. New York: American Universities Field Staff.

U. S. Congress. House of Representatives (1965) Winning the Cold War: The U. S. Ideological Offensive. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 88th Cong. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Studies in Comparative International Development will include bo th original studies and also works translated into English for the first time. Published by the Social Science I n s t i t u t e a t Wash ing ton University (St. Louis), and distributed by Sage Publications, Inc., the series has for its development the financial support of a National Science Foundat ion Grant under the N.S.F.'s program in support of sc ien t i f ic publications. In order to achieve maximum flexibility, each paper will be published separately, whatever the length of the monograph, and at the same time each study will form part of an Annual Register bound for library and professional use.

Manuscripts (in duplicate) should be addressed to the Editor of Studies in Comparative International Development, Social Science Institute, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri 63130. Each should include an abstract of not over 200 words summarizing the findings, and should be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial review, the author 's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering page. All identifying footnotes should also appear on a separate page.

Business correspondence should be addressed to: Sage Publications, Inc., 275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90212.

A n n u a l s u b s c r i p t i o n s , which include all monographs published in each volume, are $8.00 to individuals, $6.00 to students, and $12.00 to libraries and other insti tutional subscribers. Single monographs can be purchased for $1.00 each (orders for less than $3.00 m u s t be prepaid). The bound Annual Register is $18.00. Further information will be provided upon request.

The Monograph Series is indexed in the INTERNATIONAL INDEX TO PERIODICALS, New York, New York, and in SOCIOLOGICAL ABSTRACTS, New York, New York.

Applications for permission to quote from this journal should be addressed to the Editor. All quotat ions and citations under 500 words do not require any request for permission.

Change of Address: Notify your local postmaster and Sage Publicati~na Inc., giving bo th old and new addresses. Allow four weeks for the change.

Documents

Promoting political development abroad: Social condition and attitudes of latin American intellectuals