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Promoting Gas-Interconnector Investment-
Insights from Laboratory Experiments
Bastian HenzeTilburg University, CentER & TILEC
GRI Workshop Stockholm, September 24th 2009
Overview
• Questions & Experiments • Regulatory Schemes• Results & Conclusions• Recommendation on Future Research
Questions & Experiments
The Questions
• Are there regulatory schemes which combine competitive capacity allocation with security of Investments?
• Which incentives induce the TSO to choose an optimal level of Investment?
• The means to answer the questions:– Economic Laboratory Experiments
Core-features of Experiments
• Real Humans (“subjects”) are put into a controlled laboratory environment
• The subjects interact according to a set of rules (“institutions”) specified by the experimenter
• Subjects are paid in real currency, their payment is performance-depedent
In the Lab
• Subjects are seated in separate compartments
• Subjects makes entries on computer screens
• Software computes outcomes based on subjects’ inputs
• Inputs and outcomes are stored for later analysis
Data
Benefits
• Ex-ante Evaluation of Regulatory schemes in “real” or hypothetical environments
• Detection of Opportunities for efficiencty decreasing strategic behavior
• Low Costs
Regulatory Schemes
Rate of Return
• TSO is allowed to obtain a certain RoR on its assets
• Used and useful Rule: TSO is only allowed to obtain return on assets which are actually utilized for service provision. This prevents wasteful Investments
• Allocation of transport-capacity solely by means of spot market auctions
Regulatory Holiday / LTFTR
• TSO has a choice between fully relying on regulated, low volatility profits and a combination of those and transitory unregulated profits (“Regulatory Holiday”)– Transitory unregulated profits are potentially an
additional incentive for the TSO to invest
• Source of regulated income: Periodic sales of Long Term Financial Transportation Rights (LTFTR) to shippers
LTFTR?
• LTFTR are financial hedges• Shippers can buy LTFTR. LTFTR entitle
their holders to a payment equal to the spot market price of transport-capacity
• TSO and shippers might benefit: TSO has a source of low volatility income, while shippers can insure themselves against not obtaining transport-capacity and / or high transport-capacity prices
Results & Conclusions
Rate of Return
• Efficiency with experienced subjects is on average between 80% and 100%
• Comparison of expansion dynamics with the Regulatory Holiday scenario do however indicate that demand signals from spot markets are likely in general not sufficient for the TSO to assess the optimal level of investment under the RoR regulation– Performance decline for more “volatile”
environments than the one utilized very likely
Regulatory Holiday / LTFTR
• Installed capacity and efficiency are considerably lower than under RoR, especially in the first two thirds of the interconnector’s lifetime
• Cause: In order to maintain the opportunity for high future unregulated profits, the TSO expands capacity slowly
• Periodic LTFTR sale seems to deliver good demand information to the TSO
Installed Capacity Development with Experienced Subjects
0
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18
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Period
Installed Capacity
Optimum Rate of Return Regulatory Holiday / LTFTR
Spot Market Price Development with Experienced Subjects
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20
40
60
80
100
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Period
Price
Optimum Rate of Return Regulatory Holiday / LTFTR
Efficiency with Experienced Subjects
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Period
Efficiency
Rate of Return Regulatory Holiday / LTFTR
Further Observations
• TSO profits are significantly higher in the regulatory holiday scheme, shipper profits in aggregate Significantly lower compared to RoR
• Comparing the profits of shippers with LTFTR holdings to the profits of all shippers under RoR, there is no significant difference– Shippers “suffering” most under the regulatory
holiday scheme are those without LTFTR holdings
Conclusions
• The utilization of spot auction markets is essential for efficient allocation and does not impose losses on the TSO
• Periodic LTFTR auctions seem to deliver good demand information
• The tested regulatory holiday scheme does not provide incentives for an efficient capacity expansion
Recommendations onFuture Research
Additional Research is necessary!
• One scheme is, based on current findings, highly promising– RoR with additional LTFTR markets
• A new two-part tariff scheme promises highest levels of efficiency and profitability– Unique chance to assess this scheme which
promises to be beneficial to all parties involved
Invitation
• Energy Economics Policy Seminar• “Regulating Investments in Energy
Networks”• Organized by NMa, CPB and TILEC on
October 9th in The Hague• Info and Registration (until September 30th):
– http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/events/conferences/09102009/
Thank You Very Much!