Prolepsis according to Epicurus and the StoaEnglish summary of master thesis

Claartje van SijlNovember 2003

In my master-thesis I investigate the similarities and di!erences between theepicurean and the stoic concepts of prolepsis so as to achieve a better under-standing and to suggest an explanation for them.As Cicero tells us (ND I.44), Epicurus invented the term and introduced it inphilosophical discourse. Since there is no reason to doubt Cicero’s evidence onthe point, we can conclude that the Stoics took it over from Epicurus. Leavingaside the fact that the concept had to be embedded in a very di!erent philo-sophical system, it is hardly plausible that the Stoics would have taken oversuch a concept as prolepsis “lock, stock and barrel”,1 given the well-knownrivalry between the epicureans and Stoics.In current research, often only one of the schools is discussed, attending tothe relation with the other as a side-issue.2 Also, the temptation to refer toepicurean material in order to clarify the stoic theory on prolepsis is quitestrong, due to the scarcity of sources. Though this practice cannot be rejecteda priori as erroneous, because of the close similarities between the two schools,it should at least be avoided until the complete identity of the two school’sconception of prolepsis has been established. As I have tried to show, it isdoubtful that this would be possible, because of the lack of extensive evidenceand sources. Moreover, several di!erences are attended to, which show thefalsity of the identity hypothesis.

1Schofield (1980, p. 293).2E.g. Sandbach (1971), Long (1971a), Todd (1973), Sedley (1973), Schofield (1980),

Glidden (1983) and Asmis (1984). Manuwald (1972) and Goldschmidt (1978) are examplesof studies that try to attend more systematically to the relation between the two schools.

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After a short general introduction in Hellenistic epistemology and a discussionof the source-problem in general I concentrate on the following main aspectsof the theory of prolepseis.

Origin and formation of prolepseisIt is argued that according to both schools prolepseis cannot be innate. Since inthe main evidence concerning epicurean theory on the formation of prolepseis(DL X.32-33) a lot of non-epicurean, and sometimes even stoic terminologyis used, it becomes so suspicious, that we cannot safely conclude anything re-garding this point, except that epicurean prolepseis must arise naturally outof the fantasiai.With respect to stoic prolepseis more discussion is possible as to their in-nateness, though I have argued that they are not innate. Compared to theepicurean account of the formation of prolepseis, we can say more about thestoic theory of how prolepseis come into being. This also occurs ‘fysikos’ fromour perceptions, but only from the special fantasiai kataleptikai. It is arguedthat the Stoics expanded the epicurean theory in pointing out not only thefact that this is possible through mneme and empeiria (Aet. Plac. IV.11), butalso the structuring mechanisms facilitating the formation of specific concepts(like analogy, composition, etc. as pointed out in DL VII.52-53).

Ontological status and semantical function of prolepseisOf course, stoic lekta facilitate the linguistic expression of our thoughts andhence also of our prolepseis, which are physical modifications of the mind andcannot be passed on as such to other persons. Since lekta can be grasped byothers, they could be thought of as corresponding to the modern concept ofpropositional content.According to the epicureans, too, prolepseis exist only as modifications of ourmind, but they fervently rejected the stoic concept of lekta. Because of the ab-sence of lekta, the content of a prolepsis has sometimes to be interpreted as animage (as far as we can see it), sometimes as the propositional content (as faras it is true). In this chapter, Epicurus’ Ep.Hdt. 37-38 and the interpretationof Glidden (1983) are discussed extensively. It is argued that we cannot fullyunderstand this passage if we interpret it as relating only to Epicurus’ theoryof language, as Glidden does: attention to Epicurus’ epistemological concernsabout the starting points of knowledge is necessary.Also with respect to this aspect of the theory of prolepseis one could say theStoics systematized the epicurean doctrine, as they di!erentiated between themeaning of our words and the content of our prolepseis. However, it remainsto be seen whether their problematic ontological status of lekton really solvedanything. As to their ideas on the origin of language and its relation to ‘truereality’: these can best be seen as equivalent theories, rather than as reac-tions on or elaborations of the opponent’s view. Whereas the epicureans saw a

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chronological succession of natural and conventional meanings, the Stoics dis-tinguished rather between the contemporary existing superficial conventionsand the underlying, natural structure of language.

Prolepsis as criterion of truthNo doubt, Epicurus also introduced the concept of the kriterion tes aletheias,which was taken over by the Stoics. After a general discussion of this concept,the debate about the question whether the criterion of truth is to be seen asa capacity3 or instrument4 is considered, concluding that this is irrelevant forthe function it is supposed to fulfill. Also it is argued that the specific criterionof prolepsis functions for other adela than e.g. the criterion of aistheseis andhence cannot be reduced to the perceptions out of which it has been formed.Since the Stoics were more concerned about the problems with the fantasiakataleptike, we have hardly any sources on their conception of prolepsis askriterion tes aletheias. Thus, it is impossible to compare both schools in thisrespect.

Prolepsis in the debates between Kepos and StoaGiven that both school’s theories do not seem di!er fundamentally with re-spect to the main functions of prolepseis, it is astonishing to see their enormousconflicts about the content of specific prolepseis. As an example, the debate onthe nature of the gods as depicted by Cicero is considered. Both epicureans andStoics rely on vague common-sense intuitions of philosophically uneducatedpeople, inarticulate prolepseis of the gods to justify their own philosophicaltheologies. At the same time, however, these philosophical theological consid-erations serve to filter out mistaken additions of tradition that have pollutedthe original prolepsis of the philosophically uneducated people. This raises thequestion whom they refer to when both schools are talking of ‘our’ prolepsis:‘we, members of this philosophical school’, or ‘we, common Greeks’. Evidently,each of the schools elects those elements of the traditional theology that fitin best with the rest of their philosophy, respectively Olympic and cosmic gods.

In general I concluded that the formal similarities between the two theories ofprolepsis are close enough to explain why some current literature often doesnot distinguish systematically between them, but certainly not close enoughto simply identify them. What di!erences have been pointed out generally gofurther than consequences of the embedding in di!erent philosophies: generallythe Stoics can be seen as taking over the epicurean theory, while expanding,systematizing, and refining it.

3As has been argued a.o. by Striker (1996b), Striker (1996a) and Long and Sedley (1987).4As has been argued a.o. by Asmis (1984).

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English Table of Contents

1. Introduction

a) General introduction and statement of the main problemb) Introduction to Hellenistic epistemologyc) The general character of prolepsisd) Problem of the sources

2. Origin and formation

a) Are prolepseis innate?b) Formation of prolepseis according to the Kepos

i. Sourcesii. Diogenes Laertius on epicurean prolepseis

c) Formation of prolepseis according to the Stoai. Sourcesii. Refinement and explanation of “fysikos”

d) Comparision

3. Ontological status and semantical function

a) Keposi. Epicurus’ letter to Herodotus, paragraph 37-38ii. Semantics and prolepsisiii. Content and ontological status of prolepsis

b) Stoai. Content and ontological status of prolepsis; relation to lektaii. Semantics and prolepsis

c) Comparison

4. Prolepsis as criterion of truth

a) Generali. Function of a kriterionii. Kriterion: capacity or instrument?

b) Kepos: prolepsis as kriterioni. An independent, irreducible kriterion?

c) Stoa: prolepsis as kriteriond) Comparison

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5. prolepsis in the debates between Kepos and Stoa

a) A concrete example: De Natura Deorum

b) Kepos

c) Stoa

d) Comparison and results of this debate

6. Conclusion

7. Bibliography

8. English summary

9. English table of contents

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