PROJECT DOCUMENT II...Islamic Republic of Afghanistan PROJECT DOCUMENT ENHANCING LEGAL AND ELECTORAL CAPACITY FOR TOMORROW – PHASE II (ELECT-II) JANUARY 2012 – DECEMBER 20133 TABLE

PROJECT DOCUMENT

ENHANCING LEGAL AND ELECTORAL

CAPACITY FOR TOMORROW – PHASE II (ELECT-II)

JANUARY 2012 – DECEMBER 2013

United Nations Development Programme Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. 5

2. CONTEXT ................................................................................................................................................... 6

3. PROJECT STRATEGY AND PRINCIPLES ....................................................................................................... 9

4. FRAMEWORK OF OBJECTIVES, OUTPUTS AND ACTIVITIES ..................................................................... 12

5. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... 24

6. CONSULTATION AND ENDORSEMENT .................................................................................................... 25

7. BUDGET AND WORK PLAN ...................................................................................................................... 26

8. MONITORING FRAMEWORK AND EVALUATION ..................................................................................... 27

9. LEGAL CONTEXT ...................................................................................................................................... 28

10. ANNEX I: RISK ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................................ 29

11. ANNEX II: KEY INDICATORS, TARGETS AND ASSUMPTIONS FRAMEWORK ......................................... 47

12. ANNEX III: RESULTS AND RESOURCE FRAMEWORK ............................................................................ 53

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List of Acronyms ANA Afghan National Army ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy ANP Afghanistan National Police ANSF Afghanistan National Security Forces CTA Chief Technical Adviser CPAP Country Programme Action Plan DPA Department of Political Affairs EAD Electoral Assistance Division ECC Electoral Complaints Commission ELECT Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow EU European Union HR Human Resources HQ Headquarters IEC Independent Election Commission IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems ISAF International Security Assistance Force LOA Letter of Agreement MDG Millennium Development Goals MOI Ministry of Interior MP Member of Parliament PC Polling Centre PECC Provincial Electoral Complaints Centre PESG Post-Elections Strategy Group PS Polling Station STA Senior Technical Advisor SNTV Single Non Transferable Vote SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General TA Technical Assistance UN United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDP United Nations Development Programme VR Voter Registration

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In 2010, Afghan electoral management bodies assumed responsibility for all major decisions associated with the electoral process, including the planning and implementation of the 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections, or lower house of the National House – henceforth referred to as parliamentary elections. This marked a milestone for Afghanistan, a nation for whom years of conflict have made the establishment of electoral institutions and practices a particular challenge. With the technical and operational support of the United Nations Development Program Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (UNDP ELECT, 2006 – 2011), Afghan electoral management bodies sought to fulfill their mandates, in accordance with the law including attempting to address fraud and impunity. The outcome was challenging, but the last round of elections saw Afghan institutions developing more technical capacities, policies and procedures, enhancing their ability to implement electoral activities. At the same time, they still lack adequate financing and technical expertise; and political and operational events have undermined the credibility of the electoral process - indicating that progress is tenuous and could effectively be reversed without continued support. Afghanistan’s primary electoral management body, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) has welcomed the possibility of further UNDP-managed support; and there is wide consensus among donors that support to electoral authorities would be most effectively maintained through a UNDP-managed basket fund and an associated UNDP-led electoral assistance project. This project should respect Afghanistan’s sovereign authority and should be consistent with the process of transition or Afghanisation, as articulated in the Kabul Conference in July 2010. To this end, ELECT-II will comprise long-term assistance to Afghanistan’s IEC, focusing on institutional strengthening and capacity development. The overarching objective of ELECT-II is to support the national electoral institutions to plan and conduct credible elections with minimal external support, and to better ensure the integrity of the process. In its first stage and in alignment with the electoral cycle, objectives and activities will emphasize the sustainability of electoral institutions. Specifically, ELECT-II will aim to: Support the IEC to maintain and improve professional and electoral skills of staff; sustain and develop electoral facilities, systems, and infrastructure; develop mechanisms to improve governance and administration of future elections; assist the IEC to establish a basis for a sustainable voter registry system; review electoral delimitation issues, and increase the capacity of the IEC to encourage democratic participation. These objectives will be achieved through the following outputs: Output 1: Institutional, operational and technical capacity of the IEC is developed to ensure well

organised, future Afghan-led electoral processes. Output 2: The quality of the voter registry is improved to support future electoral operations. Output 3: Capacity of the IEC to encourage broader democratic participation is strengthened. In general, ELECT-II builds on the achievements of ELECT-I and makes use of the current relatively long post-election period to focus on the capacity development of the IEC. The next elections will follow in rapid succession with little or no time available for extensive capacity development in between. In addition, considering that the IEC’s aim of improving the Afghan voter registry is a long-term endeavour, ELECT-II also foresees assistance in this area. As a result of the current emphasis on capacity development, technical assistance to conduct the presidential, provincial and parliamentary elections will be the focus of a subsequent project document.

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2. CONTEXT

Years of conflict have damaged Afghanistan’s economic, political, physical, social and institutional structures. According to the human development index, Afghanistan ranks 174 out of 178 countries, globally. GDP per capita is USD 9641. The national average for school attendance among children six to thirteen years of age is estimated at 37%. However, enrollment in rural areas may be as low as 1%2 and just 23.5% of the adult population is able to read. According to one survey, adults cited as main sources of information: radio, friends and family, community meetings and sermons at the mosque.3 Additional cultural and security constraints on movement mean that education level and literacy rates are even lower among women. High fertility, tendency to work within the home and discrepancies in male and female income mean that women generally have less access to information and experience less freedom in making political decisions and expressing their opinions. Moreover, conflict-related Afghan civilian casualties rose significantly between 2009 and 20104. A secure environment with credible leadership and in which the rule of law is enforced is a necessary precondition for peace, reconstruction and development. Due to the absence of baseline data, extremely low capacity and the loss of the whole of the 1990s in terms of development, the Afghan Government endorsed the Millennium Declaration only in March 2004; and the country’s Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets were set for 2020, rather than 2015. Each of the MDGs is reflected in one or more of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS 2008/9 – 2012/13) pillars: Security; Governance and Rule of Law; and Economic and Social Development. More than any other instrument, the ANDS is fundamental to guiding and monitoring efforts to achieve the MDGs by 2020. Political will, policy commitments and transparent public information services are central to MDG progress. Social contracts between the government and the public, systems of accountability and capacity to deliver services are both necessary to restoring confidence in government and critical in post-conflict situations. On 20 July 2010, the Government of Afghanistan hosted5 the Kabul Conference, envisaged as a renewed commitment to the Afghan people. The conference marked a milestone in the Kabul Process of transition to full Afghan leadership and responsibility, building on previous international commitments, including the London Conference. In this forum, Government presented an Afghan-led plan for improving development, governance and security; including a realistic national agenda, with reform components, and a view to realise tangible results. In order to support the Government to implement its agenda, the need for sustained and coherent capacity development support at national and sub-national levels is a priority. The International Bonn Conference on Afghanistan on 5 December 2011 pledges sustained international support for Afghanistan for another decade. The renewed partnership between Afghanistan and the international community entails firm mutual commitments in the areas of governance, security, the peace process, economic and social development, and regional cooperation.6

1 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/

2 Afghanistan Human Development Report, 2007

3 Police Perception Survey, 2009: The Afghan Perspective

4 Ivan Simonovic, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights

5 Co-chaired by the United Nations

6 Final conclusion of the International Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, 5 December 2011

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The Afghan Government reaffirms its commitment to: “a stable, democratic society, free of the scourge corruption and in which the rights of all citizens are protected […] and to strengthening its institutions and the rule of law, ensuring a fully transparent electoral process, and also recognizing the importance of civil society participation in this regard.”7

The United Nations Development Program Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow project (UNDP ELECT, October 2006 – December 2011) shared and contributed to the goals set out in the Afghan National Development Strategy8. Throughout its duration, project priorities evolved9 to accommodate Afghanistan’s changing needs, challenges, capacities and assistance framework. Specifically, Afghan electoral institutions assumed progressively greater responsibility as international assistance was systematically decreased. The most recent Afghan elections, the 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections were strictly Afghan-led. Afghan electoral management bodies assumed responsibility for all major decisions, engaged frequently and directly with stakeholders, and acted as both national and international spokespeople. UNDP deliberately reduced its presence, drastically reducing the number of international staff and limiting the scope of its assistance to technical and operational support. Despite considerable ongoing pressure, the Afghan electoral management bodies sought to fulfill their Constitutional mandate to deliver a technical sound election. The commitment of electoral authorities to confront fraud and inconsistencies, in spite of threats and pressure from external parties, is testament to the will to develop credible electoral processes in Afghanistan. The need for transparency is essential to ensure public trust. Afghanistan is currently in a state of transition. International forces will be reduced as Afghans assume greater leadership and responsibility, in keeping with commitments stemming from the Kabul Conference and the process of transition (“Afghanisation”). The Government of Afghanistan and stakeholders have been building security institutions and governance capacity so that Afghan institutions are able to sustain themselves and become more resilient to internal and external threats. Therefore, in this context, continued support to capacity development in governance and consistent engagement with Afghan institutions will be critical to the future of democracy in Afghanistan.

Addressing Previous Challenges

Throughout the duration of the ELECT-I project the security situation became progressively worse, thus negatively impacting on the preparation and the conduct of the presidential (2009) and parliamentary elections (2010). IEC made strong efforts to establish polling centres all over the country. However, a firm stance was taken not to open polling centres in those places where security forces were not able to ensure the safety, leading to disenfranchisement of certain voters particularly from one community. Furthermore, in spite of improvements in the 2010 electoral process, both elections were characterised by instances of electoral fraud and revealed various technical shortcomings10.

In the absence of a sustainable peace in Afghanistan, conflict will continue to affect electoral events and activities. Nevertheless, several areas of focus can be identified which could serve to improve future electoral management:

Greater IEC staff capacity at all levels;

7 Statement by H.E. Dr. Zahir Tanin Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at the Briefing on Outcome of International Bonn conference on Afghanistan (8 December 2011) 8 Articulated in the United Nations Development Framework in Support to the Afghan National Development Strategy (UNDAF); Country

Program Action Plan (CPAP); and UNDP Strategic Plan for 2008 – 2011 9 2006, 2008, 2009

10 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Support Team Report of the 18 September 2010 Parliamentary Elections in Afghanistan

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Improved voter register and a need for delimitation of district boundaries;

Greater coherence and consistency regarding electoral regulations and procedures;

Reduced costs of the elections and greater sustainability of the electoral structures resulting in

reduced dependence on donor support;

Improved voter turnout and wider knowledge of the electorate concerning the concept of

democracy and election.

The electoral cycle represents an opportunity to consolidate the IEC as a credible and sustainable national institution. In coordination with other technical assistance partners ELECT-II will support the IEC to improve on these areas of electoral administration and to prepare for the next elections.

To this end, ELECT-II will emphasize capacity development of the IEC staff, assistance to improve the voter register and electoral procedures, as well as support regarding outreach to stakeholders and voters as core activity areas.

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3. PROJECT STRATEGY AND PRINCIPLES

Future electoral assistance must be implemented with great sensitivity, respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty and the Constitutional mandates of its institutions, amidst the process of transition, and in accord with commitments made by the international community in July 2010:

Good governance, the rule of law, and human rights form the foundation of the strategy to achieve a stable and prosperous Afghanistan. Improvements in these areas should not only increase the confidence of the Afghan people in their own future, but also underpin security improvements and economic and social development. It is also crucial that the Government, in pursuing its reforms, continue to consult with the people through their representative bodies, civil society, and other mechanisms11.

The UN Security Council has noted its continued respect for the principle of Afghanisation and the Government of Afghanistan’s commitment to long-term reforms of the electoral framework to help strengthening the integrity of the electoral process..12

There is wide consensus among donors that international support to electoral authorities would be most effectively maintained through a UNDP-managed basket fund and an associated UNDP-led electoral assistance project. Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission has also welcomed the possibility of UNDP-managed funding and technical assistance support13, in line with its five-year strategic plan.

UNDP approach The UNDP Country Program for Afghanistan (2010 – 2013) reflects a deliberate strategic shift to longer-term development-oriented programs that target poverty, human security and sustainable livelihood issues; and concentrates on strategic outcomes in which UNDP has a clear comparative advantage. Under Pillar B, Strengthening democratic governance, the Country Programme document states that democratic governance is:

… one of the pillars that will be accorded even greater attention… UNDP will work in several mutually reinforcing areas to promote good governance at the national level, with a particular focus on sub-national levels.

The Country Program is anchored in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF); and is designed to support the UNAMA mandate. ELECT-II will contribute to achieving the ANDS priority of Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights:

Strengthen democratic processes and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services and government accountability.

It will also contribute to achieving UNDAF outcomes:

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A Renewed Commitment by the Afghan Government to the Afghan People: A Renewed Commitment by the International Community to Afghanistan (20 July 2010) 12

Unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council as Resolution 1974 (2011) on 23 March 13

Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) is a constitutional body, responsible for the conduct of free and fair elections and referendums, efficiently and impartially. It operates according to Afghanistan’s constitution and electoral laws. The IEC played the lead role in organizing and managing the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections as well as the 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections. In 2011, the Independent Election Commission extended a formal request for electoral assistance from UNDP and the international community, at large.

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i. Stabilisation process is strengthened through effective integrated UN support to Government and communities;

ii. Government capacity to deliver services to the poor and vulnerable is enhanced; and iii. The institutions of democratic governance are integrated components of the nation state.

To help ensure sustainability and extend the benefits of support, UNDP promotes national ownership; greater strategic coherence of its programs; and stronger complementarities with bilateral and multilateral stakeholders.

Electoral cycle ELECT-II (January 2012 –December 2013) builds on the achievements of ELECT I and focuses on capacity development during the current relatively long period in between different elections. Full use should be made of this stage to conduct capacity development activities, as future elections in quick succession will allow little or no time for this type of capacity development in the brief interim periods. Considering that improving the Afghan voter registry is a long-term endeavour, ELECT-II also foresees assistance in this area. Pre-electoral and electoral technical assistance to conduct the future presidential and parliamentary elections will fall into a to-be-designed extension of the ELECT-II project. This will require sustained funding support for both operations and international technical assistance.

Graph electoral cycle Learning from challenges after the 2005 elections where the international community reduced significantly its support to the IEC, ELECT-II aims now to support the IEC in its post-electoral stage to develop and extend its staff capacity, re-orient operations, and establish a sustainable institution. By providing technical assistance for capacity development and financial support to accommodate operating costs, ELECT-II aims to assist the IEC to retain staff and develop its ability to prepare and conduct the upcoming elections.

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Some operating costs are already borne by the Government of Afghanistan. However, substantial costs remain, which are currently met through international support. Core operating costs should be increasingly encompassed in the government budget, but in the immediate future the IEC will still rely on direct international support to meet daily operating expenses.

Principles

UNDP electoral support is guided by a number of principles, based on these past experiences and lessons learned as well as best practices:

Elections should not be approached as an “event” but as a cycle. Electoral operations are widely acknowledged as fundamental to the credibility of elections. However, operations are only one component of a sound electoral cycle. Preparations (which draw much less public attention) are often neglected and this can have a negative impact on the entire electoral cycle. To this end, it is important to include a firm foundation of preparatory work, including assessment, capacity development and physical and institutional infrastructure and any necessary reforms, as an integral part of an electoral cycle. The IEC must be sustained and progress-to-date further developed. Sustainability refers not only to financial independence but also to technical and operational capacity to function without assistance. UNDP operates on the assumption that real development should be sustainable. UNDP support should not foster dependence but should serve as a means to independence. Ideally, the IEC should function with minimal and, eventually, no international support. Prior to the ELECT project, in 2005, elections were supported by approximately 500 international staff. It was recognised that a main function of international staff should be to develop the capacity of national staff. To support elections in 2009, ELECT employed far fewer (approximately 155) international staff and by 2010, ELECT employed only about 85 international staff. In keeping with this trend, ELECT-II could employ further reduced numbers of international staff to support the strategic plans of the IEC. Sustainable management systems might also include funding electoral authorities through existing government finance mechanisms, planning and budgeting within the parameters of the government budget, developing procurement capacity in line with government standards, or other measures. ELECT-II will also focus on increasing the sustainability of the IEC so that it can operate within the government budget, ensuring the IEC is less dependent on international funding support and technical assistance in the long term. Sustainability might also include the establishment of permanent field offices. Aside from reducing costs inherent in rental, this would mean that government would be responsible for all security, utilities and property maintenance. Capacity development is at the core of electoral support. The current focus of international assistance is long-term technical capacity development and strictly apolitical. If Afghan authorities do undertake processes to consider how best to strengthen and improve the wider electoral framework. A more experienced and skilled Afghan technical cadre will be on hand to advice with the international community ready to provide efficient technical and financial support. UNDP support should be focused. Past experience in Afghanistan indicates that UNDP support through the basket fund to non-core activities such as domestic observation, and training of parties and candidates can divert resources from the core goals. Cases in which programming is not directly correlated to core expertise can result

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in poorly designed and under-supervised subcontracts. Support for complementary activities should therefore be pursued on a bilateral basis outside the basket fund. Bilateral efforts should be mutually reinforcing and well-coordinated. Technical and financial support from the international community should be a collective and well-coordinated effort, with UNDP acting as one of the providers of support, but not the exclusive one. Experience from 2010 proves the UN can effectively anchor coordination of electoral support activities. This proved valuable in 2010, for instance, highlighting funding gaps to donors or providing a platform for coordination of activities as the operational tempo increased.

Scope of support in the immediate future

Solid capacity exists amongst IEC core staff following two elections in two years, including continued efforts on gender issues. With no major operations planned at this stage, it is essential to motivate experienced staff to remain in their current positions rather than seeking professional advancement elsewhere. To this end, the focus of the electoral support project should lie in developing capacity by retaining and further developing experienced staff and extending capacity gains to greater numbers of staff. ELECT-II should make a commitment to the IEC over the next two years (2012-2013), allowing the IEC to meet the diverse challenges in the first two years and to count on operational funding and international technical assistance through the subsequent electoral cycle. ELECT-II should direct provisional support to a robust program of staff development and incentives to ensure that key staff is retained and skills further developed.

4. FRAMEWORK OF OBJECTIVES, OUTPUTS AND ACTIVITIES ELECT-II will comprise long-term assistance to the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, focusing on institutional strengthening and capacity consolidation. The overarching objective of ELECT-II is to support the national electoral institutions to plan and conduct credible future elections with minimal external support. Strategic objectives are aligned with the electoral cycle. The first stage of the cycle allows the type of capacity development that is often not possible in latter parts of the electoral cycle, as operational activities take precedence. Moreover, assessment, capacity development and the establishment of physical and organizational infrastructure can define the level of success possible in subsequent stages of the cycle and are precursors to institutional sustainability. As articulated in an external and independently-conducted evaluation of the UNDP ELECT project: “The primary challenge facing ELECT in the post-election environment is how it can best use its remaining time and resources to assist the IEC to maintain and consolidate the gains made during 201014”. Many of these were based on individuals, and now need to be institutionalised.” In the immediate, post-electoral stage (2012 – 2013), in line with the IEC’s strategic plan (2011 – 2015), ELECT-II will:

Support the IEC in improving and consolidating its institutional capacity

Support the IEC in improving and consolidating the professional and electoral skills of staff;

Sustain and develop electoral facilities, systems, and infrastructure;

Develop procedures and mechanisms to improve governance and administration of future elections;

Support the IEC in establishing and implementing a strategy for a sustainable voter registry;

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Final Evaluation: Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow Project (Draft Report), 12 May 2011

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Increase capacity of the IEC in encouraging broader democratic participation; and

Support the IEC in its involvement in electoral boundary delimitation processes, as needed These objectives will be achieved through the following outputs: Output 1 Institutional, operational and technical capacity of the IEC is developed to ensure well

organised, future Afghan-led electoral processes. Output 2 The quality of the voter registry is improved to support future electoral operations. Output 3 Capacity of the IEC to encourage broader democratic participation is strengthened. Outputs will comprise a number of activities as follows:

Output 1:

Institutional, operational and technical capacity of the IEC is developed to ensure well organized, future Afghan-led electoral processes.

Activity 1.1 Activity Results

Support the IEC in strengthening its institutional capacity.

A comprehensive analysis of the functions of the various departments of the IEC, their internal processes, and the inter-departmental communications is completed by IEC. The internal functioning of the IEC is improved at all levels. Professional capabilities and electoral skills of IEC staff at headquarters and provincial level are strengthened. A comprehensive capacity assessment and professional development strategy is completed. Learning opportunities for IEC staff are significantly expanded to benefit a large number of staff at all levels. The performance of IEC staff in the administration of future electoral processes is significantly improved at all levels.

Following the electoral operations starting in 2003, and particularly the electoral exercises of 2009 and 2010, which were largely administered by Afghan authorities, a visible level of skill and experience of the Afghan electoral officers has been acquired but will need to be further developed. In conducting the 2010 elections with reduced technical and operational support of UNDP ELECT, the IEC showed that, as an institution, it has acquired significant ability to fulfil its constitutional mandates.

Like any other electoral management body, the IEC is responsible for guaranteeing capacity development of its staff between elections and to ensure the retention of its skilled and experienced staff. Staff retention and capacity development contribute to the sustainability of the institution and would also contribute to long-term cost reduction. In addition, with a view to ensure that the need for the international technical assistance is gradually minimized, the IEC must retain its existing institutional capacities and provide opportunities for further professional development to its staff.

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With no major electoral operations planned in the near future, it is essential to sustain the motivation of experienced staff to remain in their current positions rather than seek professional advancement elsewhere. There are still areas of electoral administration in need of improvement; and while headquarter staff are relatively strong; skills among provincial electoral officers are less uniformly entrenched. In order to establish a strategic, long-term capacity development plan, there is a need to support the IEC in its comprehensive assessment of its own institutional capacities. This process has already been initiated both at headquarters and provincial levels, with functional departments and their staff identifying their own roles, functions and relationships to others. Staff members are currently identifying areas for potential development (such as, in management arrangements, skills, technical expertise and knowledge at institutional, intradepartmental, departmental and individual level). Tailored professional development programs will then be identified to help IEC build its institutional and professional capacity in specific areas. Both short and long term programs could be instrumental in further developing staff skills, helping the IEC to establish a dedicated team of professional, experienced and well educated Afghan electoral officers that would require only a minimum level of international technical support. Moreover, these programs could help IEC to retain its core staff. It should be noted that information technology is a particular function that requires focused attention. Comparative experience indicates that IT electoral skill is one area that is the most elusive in terms of developing and consolidating local capacity. Not only does it require one level of specialization, IT, but also a second one, which is application of information technologies to specific areas of electoral administration. As a long-term activity and defining element of the ELECT-II project, ELECT-II staff structure will mirror that of the IEC. ELECT-II staff members will be embedded in each of the 9 core function areas. By employing a counterpart structure, ELECT advisers will support both departmental and individual development, and IEC staff will be able to exercise new and developing skills with ready support. Moreover, it enables the IEC to develop its institutional capacities at a comfortable pace and manage confidently throughout all stages of the electoral cycle. A key element will be to encourage the recruitment of qualified women in decision-making positions at the IEC as well as in public interfacing roles.


Review and refine IEC regulations and policies for Afghan elections.

Relevant provisions of the Afghan law are coherently and harmoniously translated into IEC regulations and policies, and are updated as required for future electoral processes.

Based on the legal framework, which changed from the 2009 to the 2010 election by Presidential Decree, the IEC developed a set of regulations that framed the electoral administration and the electoral process in general. The IEC made conscious and serious efforts to amend its regulations in order to conform to the latest electoral law. Nevertheless, the IEC believes that there is still room to improve the existing regulatory framework and has identified a need to review the regulations issued to ensure that it fits within the existing legal framework. Identification of strengths and weaknesses in the overall electoral process would help IEC to better regulate its policy decisions. Drawing on the experience of the two most recent elections, the IEC will identify weak points and technical challenges that may have arisen from legal provision, policy decisions and the internal electoral framework. Consequent changes in this framework could be an essential input in determining the modalities for future elections of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the review also has

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potential for informing any dialogue and negotiations on a possible review of the external legal framework. In preparation for this task of informing the reform process, the IEC will need to assess and determine the impact of the current electoral laws on the planning and conduct of transparent, fair, and credible elections.


Review and improve electoral procedures and guidelines.

Where appropriate, electoral procedures and guidelines are revised and updated as required for future electoral processes.

Given a lack of trust among stakeholders and related allegations of fraud, the IEC made transparency and fraud mitigation the primary focus throughout the 2010 electoral process. Despite the 2010 advances and improvements, the IEC plans to review all procedures in order to evaluate their efficiency and further increase the transparency of the processes. To this end, it has requested international assistance to enable it to conduct an extensive review of electoral procedures. This review will concern all aspects of elections, including candidate nomination, polling and counting, but particular efforts are planned to review the tallying process. Given the importance of the tally process, the IEC gave particular attention to the tallying process in 2009 and 2010 and centralized tabulation was established for greater transparency and accountability (unlike the 2004 and 2005 elections, when result tabulation was done provincially); centralized tallying was essential in the identification and management of fraud in both elections. Nevertheless, the IEC will also review and assess the tally process in 2009 and 2010, to identify ways to improve efficiency, and to reduce time required before the announcement of results, without sacrificing transparency and accuracy.


Support the development and implementation of strategies to promote gender mainstreaming in electoral administration.

Gender issues are fully integrated in IEC regulations, policies, guidelines and procedures.

The IEC has a gender unit within its temporary structure and it is in the process of embedding this unit as a permanent department under the government structure. This gender unit, which is the mechanism to inform and design gender related activities is, however, currently vulnerable on two fronts: firstly it only contains non-IEC staff whose valuable skills and professional experience may not be able to be retained, and secondly, the IEC reverted to a heavy male bias after the reduction of temporary staff (which, pared down to only permanent staff, became over 95% male). To date, the gender unit has been instrumental in developing institutional capacity and providing attitudinal and structural changes in order to achieve gender mainstreaming. The unit will require continual support to retain and further develop experienced staff.

ELECT-II will support the unit in planning and implement the necessary activities to ensure they are integrated into IEC areas of responsibility from recruitment and training to outreach and operations.


Strengthen field operations, communication and coordination.

A robust polling centre database (with polling centre risk factors, staffing needs and logistical support requirement) is established.

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The performance of IEC provincial structures is significantly improved compared to previous elections.

While it has been generally acknowledged that the IEC had developed its institutional capacity through the last two elections, it has also been accepted that the most fragile component of the institution remains its provincial level. For this reason, the IEC has decided to undertake continued efforts to strengthen the provincial structures, boost the work of the provincial electoral offices and enhance communication and coordination between the headquarters and the provinces. These actions should include a re-examination of field structure with particular emphasis on regional structure. If regional elements are abolished, then it is vital to ensure that management structures are in place to control activities in each province. It is also important to examine the role of communication with the field via operations officers in a centralised operations centre. Additionally, there is a need for analysis and restructuring of the information flow between field operations and various departments, as well as between departments. Historically there have been many communications on an ad-hoc and personal relationship basis, which has caused many instances of uneven application of procedures and processes as well as providing grounds for external complaints of preferential treatment. Finally, it is important to aim at improving the structuring of operational reporting such as polling day and voter registration reporting between polling and registration centres and headquarters, as voter registration reporting and comprehensive polling day reporting has been extremely problematic. Developing a comprehensive analysis of available communications infrastructure and the use of satellite phones, for example, is a small but important area that if properly implemented would provide large cost savings and strengthen the credibility of election reporting. Support to these efforts will be a core area of work for ELECT-II. Support for the provincial offices will bring rapid operational benefits. The production of a polling station database based on information from the field is crucial to future planning and budgeting for voter registration and election processes. Furthermore, an important component of work both following any voter registration operation and prior to the next elections is the refinement of polling centre lists – possibly to include details such as Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and security data as well as staffing and logistical support requirements. To this end, a polling station database will be produced including historical data from recent elections. This will be used as the basis for a field analysis; locations and numbers of polling stations would be confirmed or revised based on identification and location of individual settlements, cartography and consultative meetings with electoral stakeholders, mullahs, NGOs and others by the Provincial Electoral Offices. Information about areas where security factors prohibited meetings would be factored into the planning of further electoral operations.


Construct permanent infrastructural facilities to accommodate IEC provincial offices and warehouses.

An expert engineering firm is hired to provide technical oversight, and ensure conformity of infrastructure development activities with international engineering standards. IEC provincial office and warehouse construction is completed in all provinces with allocated land.

Institutional capacity refers not only to human resources and skills. It also encompasses the presence of sufficient infrastructure, equipment and assets, in a manner that allows the institution to fulfil its

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mandate. As part of the institution building process, IEC has been considering building facilities to accommodate offices and warehouses, not only at headquarters (where the IEC already owns sufficient facilities) but also in the thirty-four provinces, where no IEC-owned facilities exist. Discussions on the provision of land are already on-going with the government. Purpose built facilities will dramatically reduce long term cost producing a more sustainable field infrastructure, allow for easy inventories, ensure a uniformity of operations across all provinces, allow for a higher degree of quality control on operations, and reduce opportunities for financial corruption15. The development of physical infrastructure in the provinces will be a critical component of the ELECT-II. Every effort will be undertaken to ensure that, where possible, existing infrastructure will be used in coordination with the Government of Afghanistan and UN agencies. For example, the UNDP Herat compound is in the process of being handed over to the IEC as, resulting in dramatic cost reductions. Other avenues could include handover to the IEC of vacated ISAF or PRT facilities or infrastructure. The IEC has already indicated its willingness to share its facilities where possible and indeed the IEC media centre is already being used by other government and non-government agencies for their activities. It is important to note that once these facilities are established, they become government property and therefore responsibility for maintenance and upkeep passes to the government. This will go a long way to reducing the need for continued donor support and enhancing the sustainability of the IEC as an institution.


Develop capacity of the IEC to systematically manage information in order to monitor progress and build institutional memory.

The IEC regularly documents quantitative progress indicators and these are complemented by qualitative analysis. The electronic library of the IEC resource centre is easily accessible to IEC staff and is systematically updated.

The IEC should be able to record and monitor information and progress indicators for output areas on a regular basis. In its Strategic Document, the IEC has cited as one of four strategic activities: “Establishment of a centre of excellence”, noting that this includes the establishment of an effective monitoring and evaluation system. Aside from enabling the IEC to chart progress and trends, consistent monitoring and evaluation will allow the institution to adapt its approach, as necessary and ultimately to achieve its goals more swiftly and efficiently. Another strategic activity cited by the IEC is the “building of trust amongst stakeholders.” Being able to provide accurate, quantitative and qualitative information will also contribute to this goal. In order that this information and progress charting is useful both in the short and long-term it is important to process and archive it systematically. Considering the large number of election related documents produced prior to, during, and after each election and the importance of safeguarding and sharing them with stakeholders, the IEC needs to review the available information management system. In order to protect the institutional memory, the IEC has proposed to conduct an assessment of the range of contents of the resource centre and its information management systems. This would

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In addition to enhancing the field presence and corporate image of the institution, construction of 34 provincial offices and warehouse facilities would help the IEC to avoid repeating 2005 experience when, following the elections, procured election assets were lost and not properly maintained, due largely to lack of available and adequate facilities.

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include, but would not be limited to, an assessment of the IEC resource centre, and archives, and the overall management of standard documents. To ensure that stored information is transparent, user-friendly and easily accessible, soft copies and regular updates could be made available on the IEC intranet, or even on the Internet, via the IEC webpage. In addition, the IEC Intranet could provide a portal for IEC staff at different levels and locations to access information from the archive. The process would help the IEC to ensure that progress made and lessons learned in each election are retained for future reference. The availability of documents and possibility of sharing them with other stakeholders would increase transparency as well as confidence in the IEC and the election process in general.


Strengthen IEC administrative, procurement and financial systems.

IEC’s capacity to handle and account for increasing operational funds is progressively improved. IEC’s capacity to conduct procurement according to international and national standards is developed

Currently, a significant share of the IEC’s financial requirement is funded by the international community, mainly through UNDP, following UNDP rules and procedures and implemented by UNDP staff. This situation has not stimulated the development of a strong administrative and financial infrastructure or expertise within the commission. A move to a more sustainable model will include exploring the option of funding electoral authorities through government mechanisms, planning and budgeting within the parameters of the government budget, developing procurement capacity in line with government standards, or other measures. Therefore it is essential to ensure that the IEC develops and strengthens its expertise and capacities to administer funds, to be able to conduct procurement according to international and national standards and to be accountable to both national authorities and international donors. ELECT-II will help the IEC to explore how this new system can be adopted.


Support the IEC in the logistical planning and maintenance of fixed assets, equipment, supplies and services for recurrent IEC functions.

The cost-effectiveness and timeliness of logistical operations is significantly improved for future electoral events. The tracking, inventory and management of IEC assets become more systematic.

It is imperative that ELECT-II continues to help IEC maintain the assets and equipment it already has acquired over the last years, and also to replace and procure assets, as required. It is important that, when considering the application of information technologies to specific areas of electoral administration, the technological choices made are appropriate and minimise external dependencies, rather than increasing them. As in any other electoral management body, the IEC’s major operational efforts are linked to logistics (transport and retrieval of sensitive electoral material) and success depends largely on logistical capacity. Despite significant operational challenges, IEC’s logistical efforts were satisfactory in 2009, and notably improved for the 2010 elections. Nevertheless, IEC feels it can, and should do even better for future elections. In this context, the IEC has decided to revamp its logistical and assets management systems. This will be done through carefully assessing the strengths and weaknesses of

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logistics and asset management systems during 2009 and 2010 elections, and based on this assessment; identifying and creating practical opportunities for further improvement.

Activity 1.10 Activity Result

Support operational costs of the IEC and provide salaries and other emoluments required for the IEC to retain essential staff and to function efficiently at its current level.

The IEC is able to retain qualified and competent staff to perform its core headquarters- and provincial-level functions. The IEC stays open and facilities and equipment continues to function efficiently at its current level to ensure a conducive work environment.

The IEC largely depends, on international funding for its day-to-day existence. Without this funding, the future of the institution would be precarious and all investments and efforts to build a credible electoral institution would most probably be lost. In this context, continued financial support to the IEC is critical. Whereas salaries for IEC permanent staff are borne by Afghan governmental funds; those for essential, but temporary staff have been provided through international support over recent electoral cycles. Funding for the IEC to retain its essential staff is therefore critical to maintaining institutional capacity. Through ELECT-II, the international community will make a long-term commitment to the IEC to allow the IEC to meet the diverse challenges of the first two intervening years, and to count on operational funding and international technical assistance through the subsequent phases of the electoral cycle. The IEC has decided to adapt to future government decisions with regard to salary scales, which is highly likely to result in large scale attrition of staff. This support is intended as a medium term mechanism to retain staff while the information and experience they have is institutionalised. The IEC daily operational costs are those costs needed by the IEC to run their day to day operations at headquarters and at their 34 provincial offices. Some of the items that are included in these costs are: rent, utilities (electric, gas, water, etc.) vehicle maintenance, fuel for vehicles and generators, facilities management, travel, security, communications, equipment maintenance and replacement, supplies, etc. Without this additional support the IEC provincial offices would have to be closed and many of the IEC daily activities at headquarters would have to be stopped. To avoid such a scenario, ELECT will continue to provide support in this critical area.

Output 2

The quality of the voter registry is improved to support future electoral operations

For almost a decade, voter registration programmes and supplementary exercises have been conducted to produce voter lists for Afghanistan’s Presidential, Parliamentary and Council elections.

These programmes have been affected by difficulties, insecurity and limitations. Strategies recommended and employed at various times have differed in approach. They have cost substantial sums of money – as well as many lives.

The external evaluation of the UNDP ELECT project has recommended: “Support the development of a comprehensive and sustainable voter registry. A realistic effort is needed to help solve the complex issue of creating a comprehensive, accurate and sustainable voter registration database linked to a proper boundary delimitation process and

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allowing for the holding of elections at the district and local levels. This process should start with an in-depth assessment of the current register, systems and register needs. Such an assessment should recommend options regarding the types of systems that are the most appropriate for the Afghanistan context, including one which the IEC could maintain over the long term.”

Output 2 is in accordance with this recommendation, although it seeks to take into account the security and other realities on the ground.


Assess the relevance and potential use of the current voter registry database in future elections

The utility, limitations, and applicability of the current voter registry database for future elections are established.

The 2003 – 2005 database is structurally inconsistent with the 2008 database.

The voter register compiled between 2003 and 2010 has been subject to a number of technical reviews and design changes, resulting from policy and strategic decisions made at those times. Detailed technical evaluations of the voter register have been compiled by a number of experts in the field. While a civil registry is desirable – though not necessarily suitable for use as a voter registry – the cost, security of data, management of rapid change and time needed to compile the registry make it imprudent to consider a joint registry at present. Nonetheless, there is a wealth of information about the Afghan electorate. Between 2008 and 2010, 4.5 million voter registration cards were issued. Around 17 million voter cards exist in the country, including however a significant number of multiple registrations to be cleaned out. The technical and political considerations cast a doubt as to the possible utility of the current database for future elections. There is still a lot of technical and operational work required to update the current database with information collected during the last voter registry update. It is worth highlighting that the IEC still has not been able to data-enter the voter registration forms from the 2010 update exercise. To finalize the process, the IEC would be required to start the process of data entry again, in the near future. A detailed, technical assessment is required to determine whether the current database can be used in further elections and if so, what kind of work needs to be carried out to update the database.


Support and advise the IEC in their evaluation of the suitability of various alternatives for the improvement of the voter registry.

An informed decision and action plan as to how to improve the voter registry is agreed upon.

It is essential that the IEC starts in a timely manner to determine what could be alternatives to the use of the existing database, should it be determined that the current database is neither feasible nor politically acceptable for the next elections. A number of options should be considered, from having elections without a voter register, through conduct of a voter registration update operation, to requiring a brand new, complete voter registration exercise before the elections. In any case, careful planning and design will be imperative in order to overcome the deficiencies of the current system, to ensure that future operations are cost effective and viable under the current security conditions and to ensure that any option is sustainable and does not create further dependencies of the IEC on external partners.

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ELECT-II will provide expert advice on alternative approaches, enabling the IEC to make timely decisions.


Support the IEC in the improvements of the voter registry database and system.

An operational plan for voter registry improvements is completed in a timely manner. The existing voter registry is improved.

Between the years 2008 – 2010, some USD 70 million has been expended on voter registration in Afghanistan. This level of funding is not sustainable and is not desirable as a future method of operation.

The IEC intends its strategy to accommodate a long-term sustainable process involving field operations at the sub-provincial level. More detailed data specifications will be developed, as will fully operational plans and the proposed locations for field offices.


Support district boundary delimitation processes, as needed.

The IEC establishes formal links and works with line ministries responsible for boundary delimitation and village mapping.

It should be highlighted that, in order to make progress in the design and implementation of sustainable voter registration systems, it is important to ensure that constituency boundaries are clearly defined. For the conduct of district elections, delimitation of both urban and rural district boundaries is essential, but as yet there are major issues to be resolved in this area. One such issue is the completion of the government’s village mapping project. Delimitation involves many government agencies and ministries, including CSO, IDLG, the DGC, the MoI and the IEC. This emphasizes the necessity for linkages and coordination between these bodies, and ELECT-II will support the IEC’s participation.

Output 3

Capacity of the IEC to encourage broader democratic participation is strengthened


Support the IEC in promoting public discussion on electoral governance and broader democratic participation

IEC develops and implements a civic education strategy targeting the general public and particularly marginalized groups Targeted civil society groups engaged to deliver civic education messages

An important lesson learnt in past elections was that the majority of media programming has focused on individual campaign events and ignored critical social issues such as the nature and importance of democratic participation, human rights, freedom of opinion, secrecy of the ballot and the equality of all voices. This is an opportunity to promote understanding of the importance of participation within the democratic process especially for marginalized groups who do not have ready access to information.

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Media should therefore be engaged to increase public understanding of democratic principles, increase the flow of information and to encourage the broadest participation through on-going public information and civic education campaigns. Engaging formal and informal civil society groups to conduct public information campaigns can create a broader public understanding about elections, democratic principles, and the role of national electoral institutions. However if they are conducting an information campaign on behalf of the IEC, then the IEC must carefully select (non-partisan, reach within the country – geographic and groups such as women) their partners and ensure they are involved in all aspects of the public outreach campaign from development to implementation. Developing this sort of long term partnership provides the IEC to have reliable access to a diversity of views and ideas and an infrastructure for delivering their campaign in a timely and effective manner. It can also improve outreach to sections of society that are often unheard and unseen, including women, Kuchis, illiterate groups and those with special needs and youth, thereby increasing inclusivity in the democratic process. A critical focus area aims to increase community support for women’s participation in electoral events. This means contributing to conditions under which women are able to express themselves through dialogue and voting activities; as well as campaigning, running for office and coordinating lobby groups. Increase in such community support, would at the same time reduce social stigma that currently discourages women from involving themselves in electoral processes. Moreover, reducing social stigma could also encourage the wider voting population to give greater consideration to female candidates and voices.

The IEC are exploring possible outreach synergies with other government organisations. Furthermore, apart from support to the implementation of the IEC strategy, ELECT-II can, if requested, assist through investigating possible cooperation with other international organisations.


Support the IEC in developing its capacity to plan and implement its voter education campaigns

The IEC develops a voter education strategy The capacity to implement voter education campaigns is improved

Distinct from activity 3.1, which emphasises a deeper understanding of democratic principles, voter education provides information for voters, which is specific to an electoral operation. Voter education activities should target the greatest number of citizens, and particularly women, as well as other marginalised groups, increasing the information available to them with regard to electoral principles, procedural information, political and social platforms, and information affecting their selection of candidates. A desired outcome of these projects is to encourage dialogue between women’s groups and their elected representatives. However, besides being an essential pre-requisite for a successful electoral event, voter education also has immense potential for providing explanatory information about principles and concepts of democratic participation. ELECT should therefore support the IEC in utilising a range of formal and informal mechanisms to make voters more informed on the electoral mechanisms and democratic participation.

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This period between elections provides an opportunity for the Public Outreach Department to explore new and more innovative ways of reaching people. They have an opportunity to develop and test ideas and outreach methods through smaller pilot projects before committing to mounting a large campaign that needs to reach the whole country in a relatively short time.


Support the IEC in its relationships with external stakeholders.

Formal communication mechanism with key stakeholders is established. Key stakeholder groups are informed, aware of the IEC's role and status, and better able to support the democratic process. A strategic approach to media is implemented throughout the electoral cycle

An inclusive electoral process must draw in the broader stakeholder community to promote awareness, participation, transparency and ownership of the process in order to enhance its credibility. The IEC will need to establish a variety of mechanisms to promote coordination and information sharing among its key stakeholders. Improving the reputation of the IEC as a credible institution depends on:

a) a sense of ownership among stakeholders; and b) the broader public perception of the IEC.

Ownership will result from a regular and formalised dialogue with stakeholders, based on reciprocal transparency, and inclusive participation. To this end, the IEC will need to coordinate regular information-sharing opportunities.

The broader public may be engaged through strategic use of the media and a regular flow of accurate and timely election-related information. ELECT-II will continue to support the IEC in organizing external relations events and expanding its communication channels.

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5. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

Project Governance will consist of the Project Board, Technical Group and UN coordination. The Project Board (Steering Committee) will provide overall direction in the implementation of the project. The Technical Group will be a forum for discussion of technical issues and the development of policy and activity approaches. Technical Group outputs will inform the Project Board. IEC will lead consultations with all stakeholders with technical support from the project team.

A) Project Board The Project Board will convene once three months. Should there be an urgent requirement for a Board decision, it may be convened as and when necessary. Project Board will be co-chaired by the IEC and UNDP. Members of the Board will include UNAMA, UNDP, donors and key stakeholders. The Board is responsible for general oversight of project activities, including financial oversight and approval of the work plan and funding allocations. It should receive regular reports from the electoral management body, approve major activities and expenditures, reach consensus and take decisions on any change in the project work plan, provide ongoing risk analysis, and consider funding for emerging issues. The Project Board retains overall management control of the project and is accountable for resource mobilisation and overall expenditure. The Board will serve as the Project’s ultimate review body. Deliberations of the Project Board will be informed by input from the Technical Group. Decision making is by consensus.

B) Technical Group

The Technical Group is the principal thematic review body for the project. It is co-chaired by the IEC and UNDP. Members include IEC, UNDP, UNAMA, donors and other participants, as agreed. Other participants may be invited by the co-chairs after consultation with the members of the group. The Technical Group will also review policy matters pertaining to the project and the electoral process; consider emerging issues and needs, and provide advice and feedback to the Project Board. The Group will meet at least monthly. The Technical Group may be informed by a number of thematic sub-groups which will cover every activity aspect. The Technical Group agenda is established by the IEC in coordination with ELECT-II and will include an update by the IEC, as well as a political update from UNAMA, if necessary. In the interests of mutual transparency the agenda will also include reports from donors.

C) Project management and Coordination of technical Assistance to IEC

ELECT-II will be nationally-implemented (by the IEC) with UNDP support. Project implementation will be done in close consultation and partnership with international donors and UNAMA. Support to the electoral management body as well as provision of project inputs will be provided by a technical assistance team, led by a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA). The CTA will be responsible for substantive and technical leadership as well as overall management of the project activities, and will provide high-level electoral advice to the IEC. He will be supported in this task by a team of Senior and Departmental Technical Advisors (capacity building, planning and procedures, voter registration, IT, logistics, field operations, public outreach, etc.), a Project Coordinator, Communications Specialist, and Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, and a Project Management Unit (Operations Manager, HR, Finance, Procurement, and Asset Management). The CTA will report directly to the UNDP Country Director either directly or through a designated representative.The technical and operational assistance team will be embedded within the different IEC departments, and will provide assistance with a major focus on capacity-development and skills transfer to national counterparts. Technical advisors will be based at IEC headquarters, but will travel periodically to provincial IEC offices to provide field-level support as required. The CTA will ensure strong donor coordination, progress reporting, and oversight over human and financial resources. UNDP ELECT will also actively endeavour to increase the number of female advisors at all levels.

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D) UNDP Country Office Support

Within the UNDP Country Office, a dedicated focal point will facilitate UNDP Country Office support to ELECT-II project; provide quality assurance of project documents and processes; and ensure compliance with UNDP corporate procedures, rules and regulations. The UNDP Country Office will provide oversight over the procurement, human resource management, budget planning and finance management, administration and logistics, as well as tracking of donor contributions and transfers.

E) UN Coordination

Over and above the mechanisms outlined above the IEC, UNAMA and UNDP will convene additional coordination meetings at political and technical levels, with donors and Heads of Missions as required. NATO/ISAF may be requested by the IEC to provide support to the Afghan National Security services and may also be formally requested to provide contingency logistical support in extremis. UNAMA in consultations with UNDPKO, UNEAD, and UNDP will coordinate political-level discussion in accordance with its mandate. Throughout the implementation of the project, UNEAD, in coordination and consultation with DPKO/UNAMA, will play its General Assembly mandated role, including providing policy and technical advice to ensure coherence and consistency in the provision of UN electoral assistance. UNEAD will also assisting in providing names of qualified experts from the UN electoral assistance roster, and reporting to member states on the nature of requests and assistance. As per the UNDP-DPA Note of Guidance on electoral assistance, UNDP Country Office will keep the UNEAD Focal Point on electoral assistance fully appraised of the political and technical status of ELECT-II project and seek advice and assistance on political, technical matters.

Given that the planned Needs Assessment Mission had to be postponed indefinitely due to the prevailing political/electoral/security situation, this Project Document will be reviewed and possibly amended in accordance with the findings of a future NAM or review mission from EAD.

6. CONSULTATION AND ENDORSEMENT Stakeholders have been consulted extensively when drafting the ELECT-II project document. The project has been agreed by donors at the donor meeting of 28 November 2011 and by a project appraisal committee (PAC) on 7 December 2011, consisting of UNDP Afghanistan, UNDP Headquarters, EAD and UNAMA.

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7. BUDGET AND WORK PLAN

Activity 2012 2013 Total

OUTPUT 1: OPERATIONAL/ TECHNICAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

1.1 Strengthening Institutional Capacity $3,000,000 $3,000,000 $6,000,000

1.2 Revision Legal Regulations $300,000 $300,000 $600,000

1.3 Procedures and Guidelines $300,000 $300,000 $600,000

1.4 Gender Mainstreaming $300,000 $300,000 $600,000

1.5 Field Operations $1,500,000 $1,500,000 $3,000,000

1.6 Construction Permanent Provincial Offices $6,000,000 $7,000,000 $13,000,000

1.7 Information Archival $300,000 $300,000 $600,000

1.8 Admin, Procurement and Financial Systems $450,000 $450,000 $900,000

1.9 Logistical Planning and Assets Maintenance $600,000 $600,000 $1,200,000

1.10.1 IEC Salary Assistance $3,200,000 $3,200,000 $6,400,000

1.10.2 Daily Operational Costs $5,711,163 $5,300,000 $11,011,163

Output 1 Subtotal $21,661,163 $22,250,000 $43,911,163

OUTPUT 2: VOTER REGISTRY ANALYSIS, PLANNING AND IMPROVEMENTS

2.1 VR Analysis $300,000 $0 $300,000

2.2 VR System Support $300,000 $300,000 $600,000

2.3 VR Improvements $12,000,000 $12,000,000 $24,000,000

2.4 Support Delimitation $150,000 $150,000 $300,000

Output 2 Subtotal $12,750,000 $12,450,000 $25,200,000

OUTPUT 3: IEC’S CAPACITY TO ENCOURAGE BROADER DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

3.1 Civic Education $2,000,000 $2,000,000 $4,000,000

3.3 Voter Education $400,000 $600,000 $1,000,000

3.2 IEC External Relations $400,000 $600,000 $1,000,000

Output 3 Subtotal $2,800,000 $3,200,000 $6,000,000

ELECT 2 PROJECT MANAGEMENT COSTS

ELECT International Project Staff $2,500,000 $2,500,000 $5,000,000

ELECT National Project Staff $900,000 $900,000 $1,800,000

ELECT Daily Operational Costs $750,000 $750,000 $1,500,000

ELECT Security $250,000 $250,000 $500,000

PM Subtotal $4,400,000 $4,400,000 $8,800,000

SUBTOTAL $41,611,163 $42,300,000 $83,911,163

General Management Support@ 7% $2,912,781 $2,961,000 $5,873,781

TOTAL $44,523,944 $45,261,000 $89,784,944

A detailed breakdown of the budget is included in the Annual Work Plan.

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8. MONITORING FRAMEWORK AND EVALUATION Monitoring and evaluation will be integral to project implementation. As a joint IEC/UNDP/Donor exercise, the Project Board will assess progress and risks on a quarterly basis. The management team will monitor progress by tracking outputs and activity results against indicators and benchmarks for each planned activity. Qualitative measurements and assessments will include compliance with human rights principles, aid effectiveness principles, and the IEC’s own Codes of Conduct as appropriate. Monitoring and evaluation of the project will involve the following processes: Within the annual project cycle

Project Progress Reports shall be submitted by the Chief Technical Adviser to the Project Board through the Programme Support Unit of the UNDP Country Office. As part of its obligation to quality assure all programming funded through UNDP, the UNDP Country Office will continually review project planning documents and undertake periodic monitoring missions in partnership with the IEC and donors as appropriate. The results of these quality assurance exercises will be used to support continuous strengthening of UNDP support to elections and will be reflected in quarterly and annual project reporting to donors.

Monthly IEC project reporting will provide on-going activity updates and inform stakeholders in real time, about issues arising.

Internal weekly reporting by all project units will help track sectoral activities, and build a repertory of data to support periodic assessment of project performance.

An Issue Log shall be activated in Atlas and updated by the Project Support Officer to facilitate tracking and resolution of potential problems or requests for change.

A Risk Log, based on the generalised risk assessment provided in this document, shall also be activated in Atlas and regularly updated by reviewing the external environment that may affect the project implementation.

A Lessons Learnt Log shall be activated and regularly updated to ensure on-going learning and adaptation within the organisation, and to facilitate the preparation of the Lessons Learnt Report.

A Monitoring Schedule Plan shall be activated in Atlas and updated to track key management actions and events.

An Annual Review Report shall be prepared by the Chief Technical Adviser and shared with the Project Board. This shall comprise a summary of results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level.

Quarterly and Annual Financial Analysis will be carried to assess delivery rates, and check that all UNDP and donor resources are being utilised in accordance with the project document and annual work plans/budgets. Further, the project shall be subject exclusively, to the internal and external auditing procedures provided for in the financial regulations, rules and directives of UNDP.

Internal Reviews

Quarterly Assessment shall be undertaken on a quarterly basis, to determine progress towards completion of key results.

Annual Project Review shall be conducted during the fourth quarter of the each year, or soon after, to assess the performance of the project, and appraise the Annual Work Plan for the following year. In the last year of the project, this review will be a Final Assessment. This review will be driven by the Project Board and may involve other stakeholders as required. It shall focus on the extent to which progress is being made towards outputs, and that these remain aligned to appropriate CPAP outcomes.

Independent Evaluations

Mid-term and final independent external evaluations: UNDP will initiate an evaluation after the two years of project implementation. In case the project will be extended beyond 2013, this evaluation will serve as mid-term evaluation with a final evaluation taken place at the end of the project. The structure of these evaluations will be determined by UNDP but based on the interests,

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concerns and inputs of stakeholders. These evaluations should inform objective, independent reports on project progress towards stated objectives, issues arising, lessons learned, and include recommendations to improve future implementation.

9. LEGAL CONTEXT This document, together with the CPAP, signed by the Government and UNDP, which is incorporated by reference, constitute together the instrument envisaged in the Supplemental Provisions to the Project Document, attached hereto. Consistent with the above Supplemental Provisions, the responsibility for the safety and security of the implementing partner and its personnel and property, and of UNDP’s property in the implementing partner’s custody, rests with the implementing partner. The implementing partner shall: a) Put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the

security situation in the country where the project is being carried; b) Assume all risks and liabilities related to the implementing partner’s security, and the full

implementation of the security plan. UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of this agreement. The implementing partner agrees to undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/AQList.pdf This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.

http://intra.undp.org/bdp/archive-programming-manual/docs/reference-centre/chapter6/sbaa.pdf

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10. ANNEX I: RISK ASSESSMENT

The risk assessment for ELECT-II embodies the best estimate of the security, political, institutional, technical, and operational risk factors and conditions prevailing during the formulation Project Document. It is based on knowledge of past events, implementation experiences and lessons learnt as a predictor of future threat scenarios. While all care has been taken to make the assessment as objective as it can be, the inherent uncertainties pertaining to fluid security, political, institutional, technical and operational conditions may not have precluded all the elements of subjectivity. Risks are assessed from a results-based perspective which considers the possibility that some risks could occur and potentially thwart intended results. For each output and activity, risks which might deter progress are described with regards to their probability of occurrence; the severity and impact on planned results; their aggregate risk levels; and the rage of mitigation measures and options for lowering the likelihood and severity of those risks. Likelihood of occurrence

The “likelihood of occurrence” is a best estimate which is informed by prior knowledge, experiences, lessons learnt; and a prediction of futuristic events. It is rated on a 5-pointer scale as follows:

1) Rare: The threat is uncommon, has not occurred over the last two years, and is not expected to occur over the lifespan of ELECT-II project;

2) Unlikely: This threat has occurred very rarely, or a few times but current and future circumstances militate against its occurrence. It is therefore not expected to happen in the next two years.

3) Likely: This has occasionally occurred in the past. Conditions exist which suggest that this threat could sporadically occur in the next two years if mitigation measures are not undertaken.

4) Almost Certain: This has frequently happened in the past. The conditions fanning its occurrence remain the same, implying that it is still expected to occur on a frequent basis over the next two years. Mitigation measures will be crucial for alleviating the severity of these risks.

5) Certain: The threat has systematically occurred in the past and remains imminent. Mitigation measures will be crucial for alleviating the severity of these risks.

Impact on planned activities and results

The severity of any given risk is a measure of its impact on planned activities and expected results. It represents a worst case scenario with regards to the ability to successfully implement the project in event of stated risks. Essentially, severity of the identified risks has also been gauged against a 5-pointer scale as follows:

1) Insignificant: The risk is rather trivial and does not affect implementation of planned activities;

2) Minor: This risk could cause slight, intermittent disruptions of planned activities. However, these disruptions do not derail overall progress towards expected results.

3) Moderate: Planned activities are disrupted to a level where project results may be slightly affected.

4) Major: The risk triggers sustained disruption of planned activities as planned. The ability to achieve project results as intended with regard to timeliness, cost-effectiveness, and efficiency is significantly reduced.

5) Critical: Support for planned activities is withdrawn. Funding is halted, activities stall, and results are not achieved.

Risk level

This is expressed as a function of likelihood of occurrence and the impact of the risk on planned activities as follows:

1) Very Low: Implementation of mitigation measures is not justified.

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2) Low: The risk should be managed through routine procedures. No special resources ought to be allocated for this risk category.

3) Medium: Closely monitor this risk; immediately unleash mitigation measures once the risk arises. Appraise donors about these risks through regular the reporting fora.

4) High: This requires constant senior management attention. Apply and sustain mitigation measures over the project lifespan. Appraise donors about these risks through regular and other ad hoc reporting fora.

5) Very High: As in High above, this also requires constant senior management attention and continual application of mitigation measures over the project lifespan. In addition, senior management ought to formulate stand-by contingency plans and invoke them as required. Keep donors informed on a monthly basis or bi-monthly basis with regards to the risk’s status and efficacy of the mitigation actions.

Mitigation measures

These are intended to firstly, lower the likelihood that the particular risk will actually occur, and secondly, alleviate the severity or impact of the risk on planned activities and results – if indeed the risk occurs. Sadly, risks are external threats over which UNDP, IEC or ELECT-II management have no control. Thus, mitigation actions cannot and should not be expected to prevent and neutralise some or all the risks from occurring. The matrix developed and portrayed below outlines risks foreshadowed, how they could affect the ELECT-II programming, and the actions to alleviate them. The conditions underlying the risk analysis are expected to constantly change over in future. The risk framework will therefore be revised, updated and appraised on a quarterly basis or as required.

ELECT-II RISK MITIGATION FRAMEWORK

It is considered that the following risks are the most important:

1. Turnover amongst senior leadership of the IEC. 2. The security environment deteriorates to the point where the IEC is unable to function in some districts 3. Turnover in personnel results in loss of skills acquired through IEC staff training and institutional memory. 4. Any changes to Afghan law affecting electoral processes may occur with insufficient time before the elections to enable their timely incorporation into IEC

regulations and policies. 5. IEC operational funds (for salaries, asset maintenance, utilities, and logistical supplies) are not expended as agreed, and are diverted to fund ineligible activities. 6. The gender mainstreaming message does not resonate in IEC departments. 7. Despite its best efforts, the IEC is unable to identify a suitable, financially viable and sustainable system. 8. IEC does not take a lead role in planning and consistently coordinating and reporting with key stakeholder groups. 9. UNDP is unable to recruit and retain key international advisors to the IEC

These risks, together with their likelihood of occurrence, impact on planned results, risk level and mitigation measures are marked in light grey in the risk matrix below.

OUTPUTS AND INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES

Risk no.

DESCRIPTION OF RISK LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURENCE

IMPACT ON PLANNED RESULTS

RISK LEVEL

MITIGATION MEASURES & LEAD

ENTITY

OUTPUT 1: INSTITUTIONAL, OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CAPACITY OF THE IEC IS DEVELOPED TO ENSURE WELL ORGANISED, FUTURE AFGHAN-LED ELECTORAL PROCESSES

1 The existing senior leadership of the IEC is replaced by new people who do not support ELECT-II

Unlikely

The tenure of some IEC Commissioners has expired and it is likely that some or all will be replaced. Also it is possible that senior members of the secretariat may leave due to normal career development. While (re)appointments will happen it is however less

Low to Moderate

The IEC is not in a critical decision-making phase of elections. This will allow time to adapt to changes.

At the same time, this could compromise the independence of the institution and, by extension, the integrity of the democratic

Low to Medium

Work in close collaboration with new Commissioners, continuing capacity-assessments and other planned activities. (ELECT)

32


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

likely that any new senior leadership would reject the current ELECT-II support.

process.

2 The security environment deteriorates to the point where the IEC is unable to function in some districts

Likely

Insecurity in the country has dramatically escalated over the years. And, according to security analysts, this is expected to get worse in the coming years. At the onset of the Spring season, terrorists made it explicit that will intensify their attacks, not only on Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF, but also government entities. IEC personnel and facilities have been attacked by Anti Government Elements before, and this could recur systematically or as isolated incidents.

As Afghan National Security Forces assume more security responsibility in event of

Major

If there is a voter registration operation with a field component, security risk mitigation measures will be essential

High Formulate a comprehensive Security Response Plan for different threat levels (IEC); Appeal to government to provide adequate security for IEC facilities (IEC) Closely monitor the security situation, and take appropriate measures as per Security Response Plan (IEC)

33


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

ISAF draw-down, it is likely that they could be over-extended and unable to effectively protect communities and government installations.

Activity 1.1:

Support the IEC in strengthening its institutional capacity

3 Turnover in personnel results in loss of skills acquired through IEC staff training and institutional memory.

Likely

Due to the politically sensitive nature of work with the IEC, staff can be subject to external pressure and this can lead to a lack of motivation.

Major

Loss of technical capacity within the IEC will have administrative, operational, and financial implications for implementing the scope of work envisaged under ELECT-II. This will also wear down overall coordination, morale, and performance within different departments of the IEC.

Medium-High

Appeal to government to respect the institutional and operational independence of the electoral body (Donors)

Introduce appropriate wage and non-wage incentives to motivate and retain IEC staff (IEC)

4 Despite training and professional development opportunities, the performance of IEC staff in the administration of future elections does not

Likely

The technical ability and confidence of electoral staff to discharge their duties during the 2010 Wolesi Jirga election was

Major

Poor staff performance damage the credibility of the IEC as an electoral body, and constrain its ability to

Medium-High

Formulate and adopt a performance evaluation tool to assess individual, team, and organisational

34


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

improve. highly variable.

In spite of training staff may fail to grasp the subject matter, lack motivation to practice newly acquired skills or are coerced by local power brokers and abdicate their professionalism.

effectively organise elections.

performance (IEC).

Provide tailor-made capacity building and training programmes based on institutional and personal needs, knowledge/skill gaps, and performance goals (IEC).

Promote an institutional culture of professionalism and excellence.

(IEC)

Activity 1.2: Construct permanent infrastructural facilities to accommodate IEC provincial offices and warehouses.

5 Funds meant for the construction of IEC provincial offices and warehouses are misappropriated. Construction works are shoddy, and fail to reflect value-for-money.

Unlikely

It is not possible to completely eliminate elements of corruption in any construction activity in Afghanistan.

IEC as an institution has been striving to strengthen its ethical integrity and has in fact achieved great strides ever since a new administration was appointed after the

Major

Any misapplications of construction funds will stall construction activities; or result into sub-standard buildings that will be expensive to maintain in the long term.

Medium-High

Create robust a financial oversight tool with triggers for cash flows, which are conditioned to specific deliverables (UNDP).

Conduct value-for-money audits at all stages of the construction, and halt to demand improvements – if indeed shoddy works

35


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

disputed 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council elections. In 2010, UNDP felt satisfied by the outcome of a fiduciary and management assessment of the IEC and as a result, agreed through a Letter of Agreement, to disburse substantial operational funds to be directly managed by the electoral body.

However, and as mentioned above, if drastic shake-ups of IEC structures occur, the outcome of previous fiduciary and management assessments could be rendered unreliable.

Further, the deteriorating security conditions in the country may impair concrete audit activities to detect financial fraud.

are evident (UNDP).

Conduct another fiduciary and management assessment of the IEC, if drastic structural changes occur within the organisation. Re-calibrate if necessary, cash flow conditions to minimise risk of financial leakages (UNDP).

36


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

6 An expert engineering firm is recruited too late to oversee foundational works, or is incapable of comprehensively discharging its oversight function.

Unlikely

Previous experience has indicated that UNDP managed procurements sometimes fail to align with the speedy operational demands of electoral work.

Once recruited, the expert engineering firm may get constrained by the deteriorating security situation, and be unable to perform on-site oversight, as required.

Major

Failure to provide timely or adequate engineering oversight will compromise quality construction standards.

Medium Expedite recruitment of the expert engineering firm, and once recruited, insist that firm develops agreeable contingency plans to comprehensive oversight in all provinces (UNDP).

7 The Bills of Quantities and budget for IEC provincial offices and warehouses are under-estimated, causing a shortage of construction funds.

Unlikely

Specifications for construction works are based on the “best guess” planning scenario. No systematic on-site visits and assessment have been done to calibrate specifications to local conditions.

Major

Construction works will either stall; or engineering standards will be compromised.

Medium Reallocate existing funds from activities that are likely to have a surplus (Donors and Project Board).

8 Government fails to allocate ample, suitable land on which to construct IEC provinces offices and

Likely

As of May 2011, only 14 out of 34 provinces had acquired land for IEC

Major

Ample, suitable land is a cardinal prerequisite for construction.

Medium-High

Continue to appeal for high-level political support; remain engaged with the President to secure his

37


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

warehouses office and warehouse construction. Although IEC Senior Management has written to the President requesting his intercession for provinces which still lack land for construction, no response has thus far been received.

Without it, IEC’s planned infrastructural development activities will stall.

intercession (IEC).

Activity 1.3: Review and refine IEC regulations and policies for Afghan Elections.

9 Any changes to Afghan law affecting electoral processes may occur with insufficient time before the elections to enable their timely incorporation into IEC regulations and policies.

Likely

Experience has shown that political realities do not necessarily correspond to electoral operational timelines

Major

Last-minute legal or regulatory changes result in rushed policies and procedures which may have a serious operational impact.

Medium-High

Actively encourage government to conduct any electoral, legal or regulatory reforms in a timely manner (Donors / IEC).

Activity 1.4: Review and improve electoral procedures and guidelines.

10 Same as risk for activity 1.3

Activity 1.5: Strengthen IEC administrative and financial systems.

11 IEC operational funds (for salaries, asset maintenance, utilities, and logistical supplies) are not expended as agreed, and are diverted to fund ineligible activities.

Unlikely

The administration of IEC’s operational funds is in accordance with a Letter of Agreement (LoA) between UNDP and IEC. The LoA highlights a

Major

Although unlikely, a diversion of funds would severely affected planned activities.

Medium Maintain strict observance of the terms of the LoA, and demand justification for any deviations as a trigger for subsequent cash flows (UNDP).

38


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

budget to support a clear set of IEC activities, and a procedure for accounting for expended funds. At any time, the LoA can be amended to accommodate any emergent needs of the electoral body. It’s precisely this flexibility in responding to emergent needs that makes it unlikely for IEC to flout the funding guidelines.

Activity 1.6: Develop capacity of the IEC to systematically store and retrieve information.

12 Data collection neither systematic nor complete

Likely

Historically, data collection has been ad hoc and unsystematic

Major

Institutional memory would be lost.

Medium IEC establishes, disseminates and enforces proper procedures for document management (IEC / ELECT)

Activity 1.7: Strengthen field operations, polling centre databases, communication, and coordination.

13 Credible demographic data is not available and this prevents a better linkage of the polling stations with the voter population.

Likely

The polling centre list for 2010 Wolesi Jirga was highly contentious. Although IEC took more time and care to consolidate it, critics argued that the final polling centre distribution

Major

A dysfunctional polling centre distribution would easily be used as political capital to discredit the electoral process.

Medium-High

Investigate the result of such surveys as have been conducted by different organisations

(IEC / ELECT)

39


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

did not properly conform to population distribution patterns on the ground. Without valid population data from the Afghan Central Statistics Office, it is difficult to see how these two variables (population distribution vs polling centre distribution) can be harmonised.

14 A significant number of polling centres cannot be physically accessed due to security threats.

Very likely

Initial feedback from the provinces for the upcoming PC verification operation has indicated that up to 25% of the PCs cannot be accessed, even through low profile visits by Afghan staff.

Medium

Data collection will be delayed but future changes to the security environment may enable data collection at a later stage

No mitigation measures exist for low profile operations.

15 Despite its positives, an attempt to harmonise and coordinate communication and reporting between IEC HQ and the field, through the Field Operations Unit, leaves other departments feeling disempowered.

Likely

The practice of ad hoc communication between HQ and the Field has sometimes resulted in operational inefficiencies. However, attempts to centralise communication through Field Ops has affected interpersonal dynamics.

Insignificant

A feeling of alienation among IEC Departmental heads might be accompanied by a little reduction in morale, which overall, should not be significant enough to hamper planned results.

Low Stress, and ensure there is wide appreciation of the rationale for harmonised communication and reporting, through the Field Operations Unit (IEC);

Establish a team to

40


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

network with all Departmental heads in real time, to ensure communication, instructions, and reports are systematically collated without omissions or commissions (IEC).

Activity 1.8: Improve strategies to mainstream gender issues in electoral administration.

16 The Gender Unit is not integrated within the permanent IEC structure and operations; or is integrated too late to allow the unit perform its gender mainstreaming and capacity building role.

Likely

While there has been commitment at the highest levels to elevate the Gender Unit into a permanent structure of the IEC, administrative bureaucracy within government has slowed down the transition.

Major

As a temporary, ad hoc structure, the IEC Gender Unit will not be assigned permanent staff; and will perhaps, lack the necessary institutional mandate to influence the work of other permanent units.

Medium-High

Lobby government to recognise and expedite the integration of Gender into IEC structure (IEC)

17 The gender mainstreaming message does not resonate in IEC departments.

Likely

Over the previous years, the Gender Unit struggled to “be heard” by other departments. There is now an opportunity to bring gender awareness to the fore, as the IEC will remain in a non-operational phase for at least the next two years.

Major

Gender issues are not considered when developing strategies, procedures, and operational plans.

Activities enabling the equal participation of women in the electoral administration will not

Medium-High

Provide high level leadership to facilitate gender mainstreaming; create a policy which makes it mandatory for all IEC internal administrative regulations, procedures, and guidelines to incorporate gender issues. (IEC).

41


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

None the less, the training and other support activities of the Gender Unit might be too little to offset the deep-seated cultural prejudices which disadvantage women, the disabled, Kuchis, and other marginalised social groups.

be implemented.

Coordinate the work of the IEC Gender Unit with relevant activities and/or programmes of the Ministry of Women Affairs (MOWA), UN Women, and Civil Society Organisations (IEC)

18 IEC fails to recruit the required number of qualified female staff to gender-balance staffing – at HQ and in the field.

Likely

IEC has struggled in the past to attract qualified female candidates for its various staffing positions. The biggest female staffing challenges have often been faced at provincial level, particularly in insecure and conservative locations. With insecurity extending into wider geographical locations, female recruitment into IEC positions will only get more challenging.

But even in Kabul which is deemed more secure and less conservative, the ratio

Major

Cultural sensitivities in Afghanistan necessitate that gender mainstreaming can be more effectively championed by female interlocutors. The inability of the IEC to recruit sufficient qualified female staff in all departments, and particularly in the Gender Unit, militates against gender balance in the IEC and in electoral operations.

Medium-High

Introduce special incentives to encourage qualified females to work for the IEC (IEC)

42


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

of female staffers to male has remained low. At present, the Gender Unit itself comprises more male than female staff; while several departments do not have a single female staffer.

Activity 1.9: Support the IEC in the maintenance and provision of assets, equipment, IT, logistical supplies, and other goods & services for recurrent IEC functions.

19 Assets are not able to be secured and original inventories are in accurate.

Likely

IEC does not have permanent secured warehousing in the provinces, and inventories are still incomplete due to prevailing security conditions.

Major

Asset management is weakened, and assets for future operations are lost.

Medium-High

Development of an accurate assets database and secure warehousing. (IEC)

Hire of independent companies to audit assets in insecure provinces. (UNDP)

Activity 1.10: Provide salaries and other emoluments required for IEC to maintain essential staff.

20 IEC cannot continue to receive staff retention allowances as they do not correspond with current government pay scales.

Likely

The Civil Service Commission is standardising pay scales across all governmental departments and institutions. Additional staff retention allowances are likely to be disallowed.

Major

As evidenced in 2006, removal of the allowances would lead to the majority of critical IEC staff leaving, resulting in the loss of institutional memory and expertise.

Ensure that the importance of staff retention is appreciated by the government. (Donors)

OUTPUT 2: THE QUALITY OF THE VOTER REGISTRY IS IMPROVED TO SUPPORT FUTURE ELECTORAL

43


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

OPERATIONS

Activity 2.1: Assess the relevance and potential use of the current voter registry database in future elections.

21 The voter registry databases and/or data centre servers have not been accessed in a year and there may be issues with data.

Unlikely

The IEC has problems accessing the data as the staff members previously managing the databases have left without proper handover. However backups of the data and software exist.

Insignificant

The installation of the backups if necessary would require purchase of new hardware.

Medium Contact previous staff members or rehire previous ELECT advisors to gain the passwords and address the issue.

Activity 2.2: Support and advise the IEC in their evaluation of the suitability of alternative voter registration systems.

22 Despite its best efforts, the IEC is unable to identify a suitable, financially viable and sustainable system.

Medium

On-going dialogue is focussing on a long term evolutionary process. Short term solutions remain unclear but are being investigated.

Major

A voter registry which is perceived inadequate would reduce the credibility of future elections

Medium-High

Continued dialogue with key stakeholders and technical experts (IEC)

A strategy is developed to manage expectations of all stakeholders (IEC)

Activity 2.3: Support district 23 Political will to conduct Likely Moderate Medium Create awareness

44


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

boundary delineation processes, as needed.

district boundary delineation is inadequate.

Boundary delineation has not emerged as a key and priority demand from sub-national stakeholders to warrant high level political response.

Weak demand for district delineation implies that government will not prioritise it.

about the rationale and need for district delimitation through targeting policy makers (IEC)

Activity 2.4: Support the IEC in the improvements of the voter registry database and system.

24 Deteriorating security situation impedes the voter registration exercise in some locations.

Likely

Most security analysts agree that the security situation in the country has progressively deteriorated.

Major

Failure to conduct voter registration in all provinces will result in an ethnically imbalanced register and disenfranchise voters from particular locations.

High Coordination with security forces during any field operations. (IEC)

25 IEC is unable to recruit the required number of staff, especially female – to conduct the voter registration exercise.

Likely

IEC has had problems in the past, with the recruitment of “front-line” staff. Perceptions of insecurity and actual threats/intimidation from AGEs have been central factors hindering IEC staff recruitment. In the more conservative areas, women have often been prohibited by their families to work in public institutions. These factors might still play a part if IEC

Major

Because of inadequate staffing, IEC could be forced to open fewer registration centres. This will aggravate problems of access, and eventually leave sections of eligible voters unregistered.

Medium-High

Secure the buy-in of religious and tribal leaders in encouraging qualified people, including women, to work with the IEC (IEC);

Deploy voter registration staff in their home districts (IEC)

45


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

decided to move ahead with voter registration.

OUTPUT 3: CAPACITY OF THE IEC TO ENCOURAGE BROADER DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION IS STRENGTHENED.

Activity 3.1: Support the IEC in engaging the public in discussion on electoral governance and broader democratic participation.

26 Security situation impedes the dissemination of materials and/or messages.

Likely

It is very likely that any field activity will involve significant security risks.

Moderate

Reduces options available to the IEC for the delivery of messages, and discourages political dialogue

Medium Non-interactive mechanisms, such as Bill-Boards, posters, and so on, can be explored (IEC)

27 Women's civil society networks have insufficient reach to disseminate messages to all provinces, including more remote areas.

Likely

The traditional and cultural prejudices which marginalise women might limit the number of women groups that are interested and willing to participate in education and information about the democratic process.

Major

Limited targeting of women will reduce their democratic participation and therefore any election results would be less representative.

Medium-High

Obtain buy-in, and seek support and involvement of village elders and religious leaders

(IEC and Civil Society groups)

Activity 3.2: Support the IEC in its voter education campaigns

28 Public awareness about electoral procedures and guidelines remains poor.

Likely

High levels of illiteracy and the difficult security environment are likely to limit voters’ exposure to voter education messages.

Moderate

An uninformed public is more vulnerable to electoral manipulation

Medium Use a wide range of non-written materials in voter education campaigns (IEC).

Activity 3.3: Support the IEC in 29 IEC does not take a lead Unlikely Medium Low Support the IEC to

46


Risk no.



RISK LEVEL


ENTITY

its relationships with external stakeholders.

role in planning and consistently coordinating and reporting with key stakeholder groups.

To date, the IEC has not had a formalised system for recording and reporting progress to stakeholders.

There would be lower confidence in the IEC’s ability to function as an institution independent of external assistance.

establish formalised external reporting systems. (ELECT)

PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IEC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

30 UNDP is unable to recruit and retain key international advisors to the IEC

Likely

UNDP has at times faced difficulties getting international specialists to work with the IEC. Some selected staff have turned down their offers because of concerns for their safety, and benefits which are not proportional to the high risk.

Major

A lack of advisory support to the IEC will diminish the effectiveness of the capacity building role of the UNDP.

Preparations for the next electoral operations will be negatively affected.

Medium-High

Revamp security and recruitment measures for international staff to increase the physical and psychological well-being (UNDP).

47

11. ANNEX II: KEY INDICATORS, TARGETS AND ASSUMPTIONS FRAMEWORK

The following table states the overall outcome of the project and contains indicators and milestone that help to assess the rate of success of this outcome.

PROJECT Outcome

Outcome Indicator Baseline Milestone 1 (Target Year 1)

Milestone 2 (Target Year 2)

Ultimate milestone (2014)

The IEC is able to conduct credible elections with enhanced democratic participation

Pillar I: Capacity (Indicator 1) Planned IEC conducted the 2009 and 2010 elections with heavy management support from the international community and underdeveloped internal mechanisms (ad hoc planning, non-consistent procedures, high turnover of staff, rented infrastructure, etc)

departmental plans and procedures are in place, training program is on its way, 50% of the provinces have been trained, 40% of the infrastructure is completed

transparency and accountability systems are in place; acceptable turnover of staff

The IEC has the capacity to run with minimal support from the international community the elections of 2014 and 2015

The IEC can conduct the next elections with minimal international support (departmental plans and procedures are place, personnel is trained and a high number of retained staff, infrastructure, transparency and accountability systems are established)

Achieved Source

Elect observation - IEC monitoring & evaluation - external evaluation

Pillar II: Voter Registration (Indicator 2) Planned current voter registry is out-dated and contains duplicates

VR database assessment is completed; VR improvement operational plan is developed

Effective voter list is ready to prepare the 2014 and 2015 elections

The voter registry process for the elections 2014 and 2015 can fall back on an effective voter list

The IEC has an effective voter list that can be used for the 2014 and 2015 elections

Achieved Source

Elect observation - IEC monitoring & evaluation - external evaluation

Pillar III: Outreach (Indicator 3) Planned TAF survey 2011 opinion of the IEC and electoral

opinion of the IEC and electoral

Afghan people have a better perception of

Public perception of the IEC and the

48

electoral process is improved process is improved

process is improved the IEC and the electoral process during and after the 2014 and 2015 elections

Achieved Source

TAF survey 2012 - 2013 – 2014

This next table contains key indicators for the different activities of each output. These key indicators are also part of the Results Resource Framework (RRF) in annex III. The numbering of these key indicators corresponds with the numbering in the detailed RRF.

OUTPUT 1 Output Indicator 1.1.1 Baseline Milestone 1 Target (date) Assumptions

Institutional, operational and technical capacity of the IEC is developed to ensure well organized, future Afghan-led electoral processes

INSTITUTIONAL: Functions of the various departments of the IEC, their internal processes, and the inter-departmental communications are formalised and systems are in place to ensure that operational efficiencies are maximized

Planned Roles and responsibilities not yet clearly defined

Needs assessment conducted (Q1 2012)

Formalization and implementation of structured meetings and chain of communication (Q4 2013)

Staff skills are retained through IEC trainings and maintenance of institutional memory.

Achieved

Source

Needs assessment and self-assessment workshops

Output Indicator 1.1.5 Baseline Milestone 1 Target (date)

TECHNICAL CAPACITY: Staff is trained according to strategy

Planned CSC survey done early 2010

Strategy agreed. XX% increase in number of IEC staff receiving learning opportunities in line with strategy (Q4 2013)

Sufficient funding is available to support expanded staff professional development programmes in line with institutional needs and priorities.

Achieved

49

Source

IEC training department records


Number of international TA reduced. Planned 2010 elections (86 Internationals)

Numbers int'l advisors for operational periods agreed (25 TBD) (Q1 2013)

International technical support (25 TBD) (Q4 2013) (9 months from Elections)

The professional development activities carried out under this output are effective and skilled and competent staff is retained. Note: Calculation using same methodology as 2010

Achieved

Source

International election reports


Number of Provinces with a permanent office and warehouse.

Planned None Construction commenced in 17 of provinces (Q3 2012)

All provinces are equipped with provincial offices and warehouses (Q4 2013)

Government land will be made available for provincial offices and warehouses in all provinces.

Achieved

Source

Title deeds of government land and existing physical structures


50

Electoral procedures and guidelines are revised and updated with gender issues integrated (as agreed by the gender unit).

Planned Electoral procedures exist from the 2010 elections, but require content revision and input from gender unit

Formalisation of the gender unit (Q4 2012)

80% of guidelines and procedures have sign off by gender unit

The existing legal framework is substantially maintained.

Achieved Gender unit is formalised by the CSC

Source

Existing and revised procedures


A gender unit is formally established. Gender issues are fully implemented in IEC’s HR and electoral regulations, policies, guidelines and procedures.

Planned Permanent Gender Unit established, but lacks strategic focus and influence within the IEC.

Gender Unit is formally established and able to provide structural and strategic input into IEC's HR and electoral regulations, policies, guidelines and procedures. (Q4 2012)

Gender is formally entrenched in all IEC work and strategic plans. (Q2 2013)

The Gender Unit is able to be fully integrated into IEC structures and operations.

Achieved Gender mainstreaming priorities resonate within all IEC departments.

Source Sufficient numbers of qualified female employees are available for recruitment.

Direct observation

51


The percentage of women working in the IEC Planned Currently 36 women are employed in the IEC

The number of women working in the IEC has increased by 15% compared to the baseline (Q4 2012)

The number of women working in the IEC has increased by 25% compared to the baseline (Q4 2013)

Gender mainstreaming priorities resonate within all IEC departments.

Achieved Sufficient numbers of qualified female employees are available for recruitment.

Source

Direct observation

OUTPUT 2 Output Indicator 2.3.1 Baseline Milestone 1 Target (date)

The quality of the current voter registry is improved to support future electoral operations

An improved voter registry is produced through a mechanism to be defined by the IEC, including the development of an operational plan

Planned Current VR is outdated and contains duplicates

Strategy and operational plan for improved VR is defined by the IEC 50% VR offices are functional (Q3 2012)

Improved VR is produced and adopted 100% VR offices are functional (Q4 2013)

Security risk mitigation measures are sufficient to allow any mandated field operations.

Achieved

Source


village list agreed to enable the next election Planned IEC does not have visibility on village locations

50% of villages compiled

80% of village list agreed with IEC and line ministries

Political will to conduct district boundary delineation is adequate.

52

Achieved

Source

Direct observation.

OUTPUT 3 Output Indicator 3.1.1 Baseline Milestone 1 Target (date) Assumptions

Capacity of the ICE to encourage broader democratic participation is strengthened

Percentage of districts covered by Civic Education activities

Planned None

20% of the districts are covered by civic education activities


Security situation does not impede the dissemination of materials and/or messages. List of targeted CSOs agreed with IEC (Q1 2012)

Achieved civil society networks have sufficient reach to disseminate messages to all provinces, including more remote areas.

Source

Project reporting

Output Indicator 3.1.2 Baseline Milestone 1 Target (date) Assumptions

Number of targets Civil society groups trained and engaged to deliver VE messages

Planned none 50% of CSOs engaged (Q2

2012), of which at least half

target women

100% of targeted CSOs engaged (Q4

2013), of which at least half

target women

Security situation does not impede the dissemination of materials and/or messages. List of targeted CSOs agreed with IEC (Q1 2012)

Achieved civil society networks have sufficient reach to disseminate messages to all provinces, including more remote areas.

53

12. ANNEX III: RESULTS AND RESOURCE FRAMEWORK

Intended Outcome as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resource Framework:

Outcome 4: The state and non-state institutions are better able to promote democratic participation and be accountable to the public. Outcome indicators as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets: 1) Indicator: Level of public confidence that their votes determine the results of elections; Baseline: 2008 TAF survey; May 2009 International Republican Institute Survey; Target : Increase of public confidence by 20%. 2) Indicator: Proportion of population considering that Parliament is representing them and addressing the major problems of people in Afghanistan; Baseline: 65% (2008 survey); Target: 70%.

Applicable Key Result Area (2012-13 Strategic Plan):

Partnership Strategy

Project title and ID (ATLAS Award ID): Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT), ATLAS Award ID 00063078

INTENDED OUTPUTS OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS) INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES RESPONSIBL

E PARTIES RESOURCES

Output 1: Institutional, operational and technical capacity of the IEC is developed to ensure well organised, future Afghan-led electoral processes Output Baseline: IEC conducted the 2009 and 2010 elections with heavy management support from the international community and underdeveloped internal mechanisms (ad hoc planning, non-consistent procedures, high turnover of staff, rented infrastructure, and other) Annual Targets: 2012: a. departmental plans and procedures are in place, b. training program is on its way, c. 50% of the provinces have been trained, d. 40% of the infrastructure is completed 2013: transparency and accountability systems are in place; acceptable turnover of staff 2014-2015: the IEC has the capacity to run with minimal support from the international community the elections of 2014 and 2015 Indicator: The extent to which the IEC can conduct the next elections with minimal international support (departmental plans and procedures are place, personnel is trained, a high number of retained staff, infrastructure, transparency and accountability systems are established)

Activity 1.1: Support the IEC in strengthening its institutional capacity

Indicator 1.1.1: Target Year 1 Activity Result

UNDP Elect $6,000,000

The extent to which the IEC has done a comprehensive analysis of the functions of its various departments, internal processes and inter-departmental communications

a) needs assessment conducted (Q1 2012) b) Departmental and individual TORs defined and formalized (Q2 2012)

A comprehensive analysis of the functions of the various departments of the IEC, their internal processes and the inter-departmental communications is competed by the IEC

Baseline: Target Year 2

54

Roles and responsibilities are not yet clearly defined


The extent to which an interdepartmental meeting and reporting mechanism with a chain of communication is developed

Initiation of regular inter-departmental meetings (Q4 2012)

The internal functioning of the IEC is improved at all levels

Baseline : Target Year 2

Current silo-ing and unclear lines of communication

Formalisation and implementation of structured meetings and chain of communication (Q4 2013)

Indicator 1.1.3 Target Year 1 Activity Result

development of Capacity Development Needs Assessment (CDNA)

CDNA at national and provincial levels conducted (Q1 2012); CDNA completed (Q2 2012);

Professional capabilities and electoral skills of IEC staff at headquarters and provincial level are strengthened

Baseline 1: Target Year 2

no CDNA has been done /


A comprehensive capacity assessment and professional development strategy is completed

training and professional educational plan developed (Q3 2012)

A comprehensive capacity assessment and professional development strategy is completed.


only ad hoc capacity assessments have been done /


number of IEC staff that received learning opportunities

x% of IEC staff receive learning opportunities (Q4 2012)

Learning opportunities for IEC staff are significantly expanded to benefit a large number of staff at all levels

Baseline : Target Year 2

x% of IEC staff has received learning opportunities in 2011

x% of IEC staff receive learning opportunities (Q4 2013); Overall professional capabilities increased through targeted trainings and education (Q4 2013)


55

Reduced number of international TA to assist IEC N/A

The performance of IEC staff in the administration of future election processes is significantly improved at all levels


2010 elections (86 int'l TA) Numbers int’l advisors for operational periods agreed (25; TBD) (Q1 2013)

Int’ technical support (25; TBD) (Q4 2013) – 9 months from elections.

Activity 1.2: review and refining IEC regulations and policies for Afghan elections


UNDP Elect $600,000

The extent to which provisions of the Afghan law are coherently and harmoniously translated into IEC regulations

All IEC regulations are updated in compliance with Afghan laws and policies (Q2 2012)

relevant provisions of the Afghan law are coherently and harmoniously translated into IEC regulations and policies and are updated as required, for future electoral processes


IEC regulations and policies during the 2010 elections (in compliance with Afghan law), prior to amendments to the Law on Elections through presidential decree

Systems are established and in place to ensure IEC regulations are updated to reflect changes and/or amendments to Afghan law (Q2 2013)

Activity 1.3 Review and improve electoral procedures and guidelines


UNDP Elect $600,000

The extent to which electoral procedures and guidelines are revised and updated.

Electoral procedures are fully reviewed and revised (Q2 2012)

Electoral Procedures and guidelines are revised and updated


Electoral procedures from 2010 elections

Systems are established to enable the IEC to update electoral procedures beyond the scope of the Elect-II project (Q4 2013);

Activity 1.4 Support the development and implementation of strategies to promote gender mainstreaming in electoral administration

56


UNDP Elect

$600,000

The extent to which gender issues are fully implemented in IEC regulations, policies, guidelines and procedures

The IEC has formally established a gender unit (Q4 2012)

Gender issues are fully integrated and entrenched in all IEC work and plans


lack of a permanent mechanism to promote gender mainstreaming

a) The gender unit is able to provide structural and strategic input into IEC’s HR and other policies, guidelines, procedures and outreach (Q2 2013); b) Gender sensitivity is formally entrenched in all IEC work and strategic plans (Q4 2013)


The percentage of women working in the IEC has increased

The percentage of women working in the IEC has increased by 15% (Q4 2012)

A higher percentage of women works in the IEC


At the end of 2011, 36 women are working in the IEC The percentage of women working in the IEC has increased by 25% (Q4 2013)

Activity 1.5 Strengthen field operations, communication and coordination


UNDP Elect $3,000,000 The extent to which a polling centre database (with polling centre risk factors, staffing needs and logistical support requirements) is established

a) Field surveys completed and database established Q2 2012) b) Expanded database established and populated, with provision for systematic updates and review (Q4 2012)

a polling centre database (with polling centre risk factors, staffing needs and logistical support requirements) is established


57

Current database is insufficient as a planning tool for future electoral operations

Data base is used for operational planning (Q1 2013)


The extent to which the performance of IEC provincial structures is significantly improved compared to previous elections

Redesigned operational structures are formalized (Q4 2012)

performance of IEC provincial structures is significantly improved compared to previous elections


Current chain of command has regional and provincial structures. Regional structures are not permanent, resulting in operational inefficiencies

IEC provincial structures facilitate operations through clear lines of communication and authority (Q4 2013)

Activity 1.6: Construction of permanent infrastructure facilities to accommodate IEC provincial offices and warehouses



Number of provinces with a permanent office and warehouse

Construction commenced in 17 provinces (Q3 2012)

All provinces are equipped with a permanent office and warehouse

Baseline: Target Year 2 Actions:

Current situation: no provincial offices and warehouses; IEC has received 12 land parcels in different provinces; current elections infrastructure is underdeveloped and does not comply with international engineering standards

All provinces are equipped with provincial offices and warehouses (Q4 2013)

a) an expert engineering firm is hired to provide technical oversight and ensuring international engineering standard b) Land parcels are secured in all provinces c) construction of provincial offices and warehouses

Activity 1.7 Develop capacity of the IEC to systematically manage information in order to monitor progress and build institutional memory.


UNDP Elect $600,000 A proper M&E and reporting mechanism is in place

development of a M&E and reporting systems and schedules to provide quantitative and qualitative information to key stakeholders (Q2 2012)

The IEC regularly documents quantitative progress indicators, complemented by qualitative analysis


58

non-existence of an M&E framework

The IEC uses the input from its M&E framework to make qualitative analysis of the process and improve future programming


The extent to which the electronic library of the IEC resource centre is easily accessible to IEC staff and is systematically updated

Improved document management system developed to increase accessibility and enable systematic updating of all electoral resources (Q2 2012)

A robust electronic library of the IEC resource centre is easily accessible to IEC staff and is systematically updated


IEC electronic library exists but is not widely used and does not possess the necessary systems for regular updating

Data populated and document management system is fully functional (Q3 2013)

Activity 1.8 Strengthen IEC administrative, procurement and financial systems


UNDP Elect $900,000

The extent to which IEC's capacity to handle and account for increasing operational funds is progressively improved

IEC is able to pass state audit without condition (Q4 2012)

IEC's capacity to handle and account for increasing operational funds is progressively improved


IEC's financial administration systems are in line with Afghan laws and regulations

IEC systems and professional capacity to manage financial administration in a timely manner is increased and IEC is able to conduct internal audits (Q4 2013)


The extent to which procurement is done independently by the IEC according to international and national standards

Alignment of UNDP and governmental procurement guidelines; training and implementation; IEC procurement passes state audit without conditions (Q4 2012)

IEC’s capacity to conduct procurement according to international and national standards is developed


the majority of procurement in previous elections was conducted by UNDP

all procurement is done by IEC (Q4 2013)

59

Activity 1.9 Support the IEC in logistical planning and maintenance of fixed assets, equipment, supplies and services for recurrent IEC functions



The extent to which cost-effectiveness and timeliness of logistical planning is significantly improved for future electoral operations

IEC is able to develop and provide a comprehensive and cost-effective distribution and retrieval plan for future operations (Q4 2012)

Cost-effectiveness and timeliness of logistical operations is significantly improved for future electoral events


Managing of contractors at field level was not optimal


The extent to which tracking, inventory and management of IEC assets has become more systematic

Asset database is developed and populated, inventory structures formalised and finance and field operations staff trained in database management and maintenance (Q3 2012)

tracking, inventory and management of IEC assets has become more systematic


Asset management database currently in development, not in use yet

Asset management throughout the supply chain is controlled through a unified database, and asset management structures are formalized in accordance with best practices (Q2 2013)

Activity 1.10 Support operational costs of the IEC and Provide salaries and other emoluments required for the IEC to retain essential staff


UNDP Elect $6,400,000 The extent to which the IEC is able to retain essential staff to perform its core headquarters and provincial level functions

Minimum 80% retention of staff with ongoing work commitments for preparation for future elections (Q4 2012)

The IEC is able to retain qualified and competent staff to perform its core headquarters and provincial level functions


60

Current 498 permanent staff have been through two cycles and have significant institutional knowledge and professional experience

Minimum 80% retention of staff with ongoing work commitments for preparation for future elections (Q4 2013)

Indicator 1.10.2 The IEC can run its operational costs

$11,011,163

Baseline: The international community supports the operational costs of the IEC

$43,911,163

Output 2: The quality of the voter registry is improved to support future electoral processes Baseline: current voter registry is out-dated and contains duplicates Annual Targets: 2012: a. VR database assessment is completed; b. VR improvement operational plan is developed 2013: Effective voter list is ready to prepare the 2014 and 2015 elections 2014-2015: The voter registry process for the elections 2014 and 2015 can fall back on an effective voter list Indicator: The extent to which the IEC has an effective voter list that can be used for the 2014 and 2015 elections

Activity 2.1 Assess the relevance and potential use of the current voter registry database in future elections


UNDP Elect $300,000

The extent to which the utility, limitations and applicability of the current voter registry database are established for future elections

a) preliminary surveys are reviewed and analyzed (Q1 2012) b) comprehensive report on the utility of existing VR data is provided to IEC (Q2 2012)

The utility, limitations and applicability of the current voter registry database are established for future elections


preliminary VR assessment have been conducted on the VR database

/

Activity 2.2 Support and advise the IEC in their evaluation of the suitability of various systems for the improvement of the voter registry

Indicator 2.2.1 Target Year 1 Activity Result UNDP Elect $600,000

61

An informed decision and action plan as how to deal with future voter registration is agreed upon

Action plan developed and formalized for voter registry improvements (Q2 2012)

An informed decision and action plan as how to improve the voter registry is agreed upon


Currently no action plan is in place; dependent upon recommendations comprehensive VR report

/

Activity 2.3 Support the IEC in the improvement of the voter registry database and system


UNDP Elect

$24,000,000

An improved voter registry is produced through a mechanism to be defined by the IEC, including the development of an operational plan

Strategy and operational plan for improved voter registry is defined by IEC

An operational plan for voter registry improvements is completed in a timely manner

Baseline: 50% offices are functional (Q3 2012)

current voter registry is outdated and contains duplicates

The existing voter registry is improved

Indicator 2.3.2 Target Year 2

Number of sub-provincial offices operational Improved voter registry is produced and adopted (Q4 2013)

VR offices are functional

Baseline:

Currently no VR office operational 100% VR offices are functional (Q4 2013)

Activity 2.4 Support the district boundary delimitation processes, as needed


UNDP Elect $300,000

Number of villages compiled 50% of villages compiled (Q4 2012)

The IEC establishes formal links and works with line ministries responsible for boundary delimitation and village mapping

Baseline: Target Year 2 Village list agreed to enable the next election

IEC does not have visibility on villages locations 80% of village list agreed with IEC and line ministries (Q4 2013)

$25,200,000

Output 3: Capacity of the IEC to encourage democratic participation is strengthened

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Baseline: Perception of the public of the IEC and the electoral process as found by the Asian Foundation survey of 2010 and 2011 Annual Targets: Opinion of the IEC and electoral process is improved (source: TAF survey 2012-2013-2014-2015) Indicator: The extent to which public perception of the IEC and the electoral process is improved

Activity 3.1 Support the IEC in promoting public discussion on electoral governance and broader democratic participation



percentage of districts covered by civic education activities


IEC develops and implements a civic education strategy targeting the general public and particularly marginalized groups


None 50% of the districts are covered by civic education activities


Number of targeted civil society groups trained and engaged to deliver civic messages

50% of selected CSOs engaged, of which at least half target women (Q4 2012)

Targeted CSO engaged to deliver civic education messages


None 100% of selected CSOs engaged, of which at least half target women (Q4 2013)

Activity 3.2 Support in IEC in developing its capacity to plan and implement in its voter education campaigns

Indicator 3.2.1 Target Year 1 Activity result


the development of a voter education strategy IEC develops a voter education strategy


None IEC has a voter education strategy (Q2 2013)

Indicator 3.2.2 Target Year 1 Activity result

the extent to which a VE operational plan, guidelines and procedures are developed

the capacity to implement voter education campaigns is improved

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None VE Operational plan, guidelines and procedures developed (Q4 2013)

Activity 3.3 Support the IEC in its relationships with external stakeholders



schedule of regular meetings with key stakeholders Agreement of schedule of regular meetings with key stakeholders (Q1 2012); implementation of …

A formal communication mechanism with key stakeholder is established


implementation


A structured and regular communication and reporting mechanism is in place to communicate about external relationship activities and a number of key stakeholder groups are informed, aware of IEC's role and status; and better able to support the democratic process

development of a regular reporting schedule to provide quantitative and qualitative information to key stakeholders (Q2 2012)

Key stakeholders are informed and aware of IEC's role and status to better support the democratic process


IEC conducts ad hoc meetings with key stakeholders on work in progress

Regular detailed reports on IEC's activities and future strategies are presented and provided to key stakeholders (Q4 2012)


the extent to which a media strategy is formulated and implemented

Formulation of a media strategy (Q4 2012)

A strategic approach to media is implemented throughout the electoral cycle


media is pro-actively engaged during operational periods

Implementation of the media strategy (Q1 2013)

$6,000,000

Documents

PROJECT DOCUMENT II...Islamic Republic of Afghanistan PROJECT DOCUMENT ENHANCING LEGAL AND ELECTORAL CAPACITY FOR TOMORROW – PHASE II (ELECT-II) JANUARY 2012 – DECEMBER 20133 TABLE