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ANALYSIS OF MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF TAUNSABARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION

PROJECT

TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

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Ali Ajaz 2CONTENTS

Chronology of Creative Events 3

Discharge Capacities 3

Drafting Methodolgy 4

Project Players 4

Historical Background 5

Need of Rehabilitation and its Possible Benefits 5

Project Duration & Cost 6

Environmental Impact Assessment of Project and Mitigation Measures 7

Operations Phase Impacts 7

Construction Phase Impacts 7

Concerns related to Resettlement Plans 8

Effects of Project on Indus Dolphin 10

D.G. Khan Canal Closure during 2005-06 Rabi season 10

Taunsa Canal Operation Schedule for 2006-07 Rabi Season 13

Impact of the cofferdam breach and the consequences 13

Problems & Proposed Remedial Measures 14

Additional Modifications 18

New Works 18

Rehabilitation Works 18

Monitoring & Evaluation 19

Performance Review 19

Services by Directorate General Monitoring & Evaluation 20

Quality Assurance and Control 21

Project Quality Management System 21

Source Approvals 22

Steel Reinforcement 22

Cement 22

Quality Assessment 22

Quality Control (QC) Data 23

Summary of Tests Conducted On Construction Materials 23

Weather Data 24

Cumulative Status of Compressive Strength Test Result (Class A) 25

Cumulative Status Of Compressive Strength Test Result (Class B) 25

Management & Economical Review 26

Constraints for ICB 01 27

Overall Progress Summary 28

Glossary 29

References 30


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CHRONOLOGY OF CREATIVE EVENTS

1. Design phase 195019532. Construction started 15.9.19533. Main barrage structure completed 7.1.19584. River diverted through the barrage 11.4.19585. Inauguration ceremony 3.3.1959

DISCHARGE CAPACITIES

1. Barrage 10, 00,000 cusecs2. DG Khan Canal 8,301/14,200 cusecs3. Muzaffargarh Canal 8,285 cusecs4. Taunsa Panjnad Link Canal 12,000 cusecs5. Normal Pond Level 446.00 ft.


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DRAFTING METHODOLGY FOR CONTRACTING OF TAUNSA BARRAGE

EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

TYPE OF CONTRACT: UNIT ITEM RATE CONTRACT

PROJECT DELIVERY METHOD: DESIGN BID BUILD

PROJECT PLAYERS

OWNER: PAKISTAN IRRIGATION AND POWER DEPARTMENTGOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB.

CONTRACTORS: A Joint Venture of:M/s Descon Engineering Ltd. Pakistan&M/s China Gezhouba Water & Power Group Company (China)

CONSULTANT: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS (NDC)&

NATIONAL ENGINEERING SERVICES PAKISTAN (NESPAK)In Association WithATKINS GLOBAL (WATER) UK


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Historical Background:

The Taunsa Barrage on the River Indus (see map) was completed in 1958 to divert waterto two large areas on the left and right banks of the river making irrigated agriculturepossible for about 1.18 Mha of this arid landscape in Punjab Province.

Indus River waters are diverted into the Dera Ghazi Khan (D. G. Khan) canal that runsfor over a hundred miles north-south along the Indus River right bank irrigating about400,000 ha, and into the Muzaffargarh canal along the Indus River left bank to irrigateabout 385,000 ha. Water is also diverted at Taunsa through the Taunsa-Punjnad (T.P.)Link canal to supplement the water supply for an additional 394,000 ha land along thelower reaches of the Chenab River. The Taunsa Barrage has helped some 6 millionPakistanis, ranging from rich landholders to poor subsistence farmers to make a livinggrowing wheat and cotton on an otherwise bone-dry plain.

In addition to regulating the waters of the Indus River, the barrage also carries a criticalroad link, a gas and oil pipeline, and telecom links across the river. This makes the

Taunsa structure a major conduit between Southern Punjab and the provinces to the south(Sindh) and west (Baluchistan).

Need of Rehabilitation and its Possible Benefits:

Design deficiencies and aging have resulted in numerous structural weaknesses in thebarrage and an unstable hydraulic situation exists in the downstream portion of thebarrage. Although it is difficult to determine exactly when or how the Taunsa Barragemight fail, experts were of the view that the weaknesses were so serious that failure couldconceivably occur in the near future. An international panel of independent expertsestablished to review the project feasibility study and design concluded in August 2004

that the present condition of the Barrage has deteriorated to an extent where the failureof the structure is highly probable.

Failure of the barrage would not only cause immediate flood damage and potential loss oflife but also cause total crop failure in the 785,000 ha irrigated directly by water from thebarrage as well as cause an extended interruption of drinking water supply in the canalcommand areas. As a result, its immediate rehabilitation was considered an emergency.In addition to these dangers, the barrage was operating below its potential efficiencybecause faulty design prevented it being used to its limits (i.e., it could not be operated ina way that would provide full water supply to each of the three canals). This meant thatfor some considerable time the canals on either side had been unable to withdraw water at

their design capacities and could not serve their full command areas.

A rehabilitated Taunsa Barrage will benefit a total of 1,179 million ha, including directbenefits for about 725,000 ha. The main crops grown in this area are wheat in rabi season(dry season) and cotton in kharif season (wet season). Rehabilitation will enable thediversion of water at the original design capacity of these canals, significantly increasingwater supply and improving its reliability for irrigation and drinking benefiting some 8million people.


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Environmental Impact Assessment of Project and Mitigation Measures:

An EIA was prepared and cleared by the Bank before loan negotiations (November 22,2004). The EIA was made publicly available at the office of the District Officer(Environment) in Dera Ghazi Khan District, and the Punjab Public Library, Lahore. Apublic hearing to discuss the EIA was held in Dera Ghazi Khan on August 23, 2004. The

EIA foresaw two types of impact from the project:

o Operations Phase Impacts

Since 1972 the pond and shore area behind the barrage (an area of about 6,567 ha) havebeen a protected game and wildlife sanctuary, and in 1996 it was declared to be aRAMSAR site. The site is an important wintering, nesting and resting area for migratoryand resident waterfowl (it is located on the Indus Flyway) including several rare species.The rare Indus dolphin and otter are also present there. The EIA determined thatoperational pond levels will remain within current seasonal ranges when therehabilitation is completed and that there will be no significant ecological impact from

the rehabilitation.

o Construction Phase Impacts

Potential construction phase impacts identified in the EIA included temporary landacquisition, local labor, canal closures, access and vehicle impacts (dust, noise and safety)and safety and health (particularly sexually transmitted infections (STI) and HIV/AIDS).At the time of the EIA a detailed site and construction plan was not available. TheGovernment assured the Bank that no land acquisition and hence no involuntaryresettlement would be necessary. The government also gave assurances that the durationand timing of closures would remain the same as under the pre-project regime, and that

the other identified issues would be addressed as indicated in the EnvironmentalManagement Plan (EMP).An Environmental Management Plan (EMP) was prepared in the form of guidelines thatwere incorporated into the bidding documents and contracts for construction, and were tobe incorporated into the new O&M Manual for the barrage when the project wascompleted. The Government agreed to implement the EMP, constantly monitor the keyindicators given in the EMP, and provide the Bank with an annual environmentalmonitoring or audit reports. The Bank received the first environmental audit report for theproject in August, 2006.

After the project was launched in May 2005 and more detailed construction program

were prepared by the contractor after its mobilization, the determination that no landacquisition would be needed proved inaccurate. About 160 households were moved fromthe construction site between late July, 2005 and early August, 2005 to a location selectedin consultation with the project affected people (PAP). In order to ensure that the impactof these types of significant changes from those represented in the EIA and EMP arerecognized and mitigation actions taken in a timely manner, the Bank required that theProject Management Office (PMO) prepare a Change Management Statement (CMS) toupdate the EIA. The first such CMS was prepared by the project authorities with the


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Ali Ajaz 8assistance of an international wetlands expert and submitted to the Bank in March 2006.The CMS (2006) is available in the Banks public information center.

Concerns related to Resettlement Plans:

The contractor is responsible for the care of water during construction, the safety of thesite and areas that could be affected by a failure and for logistical arrangements (material

and equipment storage, worker housing, etc.) that ensure that the construction is carriedout and completed in the most cost efficient and timely manner. The contractor wasmobilized at the site in June and July, 2005. The relocation of about 160 households,which was not anticipated at the time of the EIA, was carried out in late July and earlyAugust, 2005.

The affected community comprises predominantly Mohanas, who call themselves Sheikh.In addition, there are some Bhattis, Khetrans, and Chandios sub-community groups aswell. The community does not have an indigenous leadership structure. Their commonlanguage is Saraiki, generally spoken in Southern Punjab.The livelihoods of a significant majority of affected households are connected to the

river. The men spend their time collecting river grass and twigs from the bushes thatwomen use to make traditional jhaarus (brooms) and to weave baskets. Most householdsare involved in more than one occupational activity with broom making, basket makingand fishing constituting about 85% of average household income with respective sharesof 33, 32 and 20 percent.

Overall reported average monthly household income is at Rs.11,613. Average monthlyhousehold income of the affected community on the Right Bank is comparatively lower(Rs. 8,630/month) than that of the Left Bank (Rs. 12,078/month). The only apparentdifference between the two communities is the larger household size of the community onthe Right Bank at 11.1 compared to 4.8 on the Left Bank.

The displacement of these families was carried out between late July and early August,2005 without prior notification to or approval of the World Bank. The Bank learned aboutthe displacement from a local NGO and within weeks visited the site and required that aresettlement action plan (RAP) be prepared by the project authority. The RAP wasapproved by the Bank in November 2005.

Prior to displacement, the people were living on the river banks in houses and dwellingsmade of mud walls and brick masonry laid with clay mortar. Few of them had in-housetoilets, electricity, and collective or individual water pumps. At the new resettlement sitesall the affected households have access to these facilities. The new resettlement sites are

furnished with electricity, collective or individual water pumps, and toilets.

Complaints of police coercion of the people to be relocated were lodged with theGovernment and the Bank. As the Bank was not a witness to the initial relocation processand had not approved it, the Bank has not been able to determine a single verifiableversion of events. The Bank was concerned about allegations of police enforcementduring the resettlement and requested an investigation by a third party. The investigationby the Muzaffargarh District Coordination Officer found that no police intimidation tookplace but this could not be further verified.


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Implementation of the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for 150 households started inNovember 2005 and is now completed satisfactorily: compensation payment, housingconstruction, provision of community facilities including streets and open drains,mosques, shared toilets and hand pumps, etc. Using a grievance mechanism establishedunder the plan, a further 10 households qualified for resettlement bringing the totalhouseholds resettled to 160. In addition to compensation for physical assets, all the

affected households are paid an income disturbance allowance varying between Rs.10,000 to Rs 26,000 depending upon the household size. Additional cash allowanceswere paid to especially vulnerable households identified by the communitys Committee.

Furthermore, some community members have received work and training from thecontractor at the project site. The mid-term review in April 2007 indicates that the livingconditions for the resettler households have clearly improved in terms of housing,infrastructure and public service facilities and that the resettler and host villagers aregenerally satisfied with the resettlement progress and outcome.

The entire community of relocated households is represented by 13 community leaders

elected by them to take decisions. This group includes two women. Five of theserepresentatives, including one Imam who leads prayers in a mosque, were interviewed bythe Bank in mid-May 2006. They told the Bank that the decision to move was taken bythe community itself which asked the Irrigation Department for assistance. They also saidthat the identification of the new sites was done collectively by the project authorities andthe community and that no force was used during the relocation. The list of affectedhouseholds and their losses was prepared and endorsed by the community leaders and thecompensation is based on the list provided to the project authorities. They found the Rs40,000 compensation for structures was rather low but nonetheless acceptable, they said.

Among some concerns the five leaders raised was that the new settlement was a little

farther from the river causing worry about their hold over fishing access they had enjoyedpreviously. All the legitimate applications of the affected communities members havebeen or are being processed by the 1st and 2nd tier grievance redress committees set upfor the project. One issue which is being addressed as a high priority through PRSPinitiative is the livelihood/business development assistance. A total of 17 CommunityOrganizations have been formed at the relocated and neighboring communities.The land belongs to the Irrigation Department. The Irrigation Department discussed theproposal of providing land titles to the project affected persons (PAPs) with the LandRevenue Department but was informed that it was not possible. Ultimately IrrigationDepartment prepared a site layout/plan showing both the locations of resettlement andneighboring communities in consultation with the local communities concerned. This site

plan is to be shared with the communities.

Based on information gathered by a Bank team of social development experts, thedisplaced community at Taunsa does not possess the characteristics given in the Bankpolicy on Indigenous Peoples. They are an occupational group living near the barrage forits access to the river and flood protection. Their livelihoods are based primarily onfishing and gathering reeds. Many of them are also seasonal or itinerant workers. They donot maintain distinct social institutions from their neighbors and do not speak a distinctlanguage.


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Effects of Project on Indus Dolphin:

In January 2006, it was brought to the attention of the Bank team that two Indus Dolphinswere alleged to have died near the project site. The timing and causes of these incidents

were unknown. The Bank requested the Irrigation Department (IPD) to investigate theseclaims. The supervisory consultant attached to the Project Management Office (PMO)completed an investigation and its report, which was received in March 2006, could onlyverify the death of one dolphin downstream of the barrage and there was no evidence thatits death was caused by project activities. The Bank also received a report from thePunjab Wildlife Department (PWD) prepared at the request of the IPD, which found noevidence for dolphin deaths in the project area

In September, 2006, WWF-Pakistan provided a report on the alleged deaths of one ormore Indus Dolphins at Taunsa. The original report of the dolphin deaths claimed adolphin had become stranded in the D.G. Khan canal. The WWF report concludes that

there was no evidence of a dolphin becoming stranded in the D. G. Khan Canal; however,interviews indicated that a dolphin became entangled in a fishing-net near gate number45 of the barrage on December 7, 2005. Apparently, it was released from the net,photographed outside the water, and released back into the river. Its subsequent survivalis uncertain.

Following this incident, the Contractor has set up and organized basic training to aDolphin Rescue Team, and employed a game watcher to ensure the protection of theIndus Dolphin and other species. It was agreed with IPD in September 2006 that WWF Pakistan and PWD will assist in such initiatives in the future. In early 2007, theSociologist of the Supervising Consultant and four persons from the fishing community

settled at Taunsa Barrage attended 2-day training in dolphin handling at the DolphinRescue Center, Sukkur, Sindh, Pakistan.

D.G. Khan Canal Closure during 2005-06 Rabi season:

Nearly the entire Indus Basin irrigation system consists of earthen canals with someamong the largest and longest in the world. Such canals, for which the science of theirdesign was done in Punjab in the early 20th century, are remarkably stable if wellmaintained and operated as designed. Efficient and effective maintenance is enhanced ifthe canal is closed for a brief period every year. The canals in Punjab are normally closedin the dry season each year, usually for a period of 4 weeks in December and January, to

carry out annual maintenance and repair, after an initial watering of the predominantwinter wheat crop.

Not all canals receive water in the winter or rabi season. Before storage was built toprovide regulation of the Indus River and its tributaries in the 1970s (at Tarbela andMangla dams), the limited water available in the rivers in the dry season had to beallocated to a few canals. Historically, these canals were called perennial canals becausethey were entitled to water in both the wet and dry seasons and commonly had water inthem year round. The remaining canals were called non-perennial canals, and these were


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Ali Ajaz 11entitled to water only in the wet season. This classification and correspondingentitlements were enshrined in the original irrigation acts adopted in the late 19th century.The rules in these acts were quite strict. For example, the amended Canal and DrainageAct (1973) states that " no claims shall be made against the government for compensationin respect to losses caused by the failure or stoppage of the water in a canal for thepurpose of any repairs, alterations or additions to the irrigation infrastructure" .

Since the construction of storage reservoirs at Tarbela and Mangla, more water hasgenerally been available for irrigation in the dry season, and many non-perennial canalshave regularly received water since that time. However, the position of the IPD is thatthis condition has not changed the original legal entitlements, or in the case of non-perennial canals, their lack of a legal entitlement in the dry season. They receive a waterallocation only in those months and years when water availability exceeds the entitlementof the perennial canals. The determination of water availability and its allocation amongthe canals is made by the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) based on the inter- provincial Water Apportionment Accord and estimated demands provided by therespective provincial irrigation departments. Hence, the period during which a non-perennial canal does not operate (has no water flowing in it) each year depends not only

on the time it takes to complete scheduled maintenance, but also on the availability ofwater for the canal, i.e., in a water short year these canals would generally not operate fora period longer than is required for maintenance because water availability is less thanthey would expect to receive in a normal year.

The D.G. Khan Canal and Muzaffargarh Canal fed by Taunsa Barrage are both non-perennial canals. They both had received water allocations in the dry season every yearover the period 1995-2004 and they both are regularly closed for annual maintenance andlack of water, especially the D. G. Khan canal which has had chronic sedimentationproblems that have limited its capacity. Over the period 1995-2004, the average numberof days in the dry season during which the D. G. Khan canal is not operational or without

water was about 63 days (ranging from 20 to 88 days), and for Muzaffargarh canal 99days (ranging from 33 to 135 days). The high variability of these periods without waterand their length are most strongly influenced by limited water availability.

The winter low flow season in the Indus River is the critical construction period foremergency repair of the Taunsa Barrage. In 2005-2006 work was planned for the rightside of the barrage (repair of the damaged downstream floor of the barrage) and the D.GKhan headworks requiring closure of the D.G. Khan canal for a longer period than thenormal closure period for maintenance. Moreover, water availability in the 2005-2006rabi season was low. Only 1.036 million acre feet (Maf) was available for D.G Khan andMuzaffargarh canals (50% of the total water allocation is given to each canal) in

comparison to the long term average of 1.5 Maf, and the allocation of 1.36 Maf in 2006-2007. Subsequently, in 2005-06, the D.G. Khan canal was closed from November 15-December 16, 2005 and January 1-February 23, 2006 (86 days) and the MuzaffargarhCanal from December 17, 2005 to February 23, 2006 (69 days).

During the 2005-06 rabi season, the Irrigation Department supplied water to the D.G.Khan canal to facilitate wheat sowing from October 15 to November 14, 2005 along theD.G. Khan Canal and drinking water supply through an existing feeder channel fromDecember 17-31, 2005. It was reported that the farmers concerned were informed of the


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Ali Ajaz 12canal operation schedule through Agriculture and Irrigation Departments field staff butsome farmers in the canal command areas interviewed by the Bank team either did notreceive the information or did not receive it in time to make adjustments.

The long history of canal closure for maintenance in Pakistan has resulted in farmer'sadoption and development of a variety of coping mechanisms. For example, in morerecent times with the great expansion of tube wells in usable groundwater areas, farmers

have an important alternative to canal water to irrigate their winter crops. Of criticalimportance to the farmer is timely knowledge that there will be a closure, when it willbegin, and how long it will last. Adjustments such as harvesting the preceding kharifseason crop, what crop and what variety to grow, when to plant, or whether to leave all ora part of the land fallow depends on this information.

Despite the reported efforts of the IPD to inform farmers about the canal operationschedule in the 2005-2006 rabi season, it was not effective, and some claims of damagesensued. The Bank team endeavored to investigate the effect of the long non-operational period of D.G.Khan Canal in 2005-2006 on rabi crops in the canal command area.Production data from the Agriculture Department for the districts included in the canal

command areas suggests that overall there was not a significant reduction in wheatproduction in the area in comparison with previous years. The exception is some unioncouncils of Rajanpur district in the D. G. Khan canal command, which is a salinegroundwater area, where it appears farmers had few if any alternatives once it becameclear that no canal water would be available. In contrast, farmers in fresh groundwaterareas, even if they did not own a tube well would commonly be able to buy tube wellwater in lieu of the canal water (groundwater markets are quite common in freshgroundwater areas of Punjab ). Data collected by the Bank mission indicates that the longnon-operational period of canal could have contributed to the adverse impact on somefarmers. However, available data is not adequate to determine with any precision whichfarmers were impacted and the extent or nature of those impacts.

The Provincial Government launched a poverty targeted program (Punjab Rural SupportProgram, PRSP), which is an integrated pro-poor rural development program for foursouthern districts of Punjab, namely Layyah, D.G.Khan, Rajanpur and Muzaffargarh, ofwhich the last three districts constitute the Taunsa command area, in the summer of 2006.This program, supported by about US$5 million, is planned to run for four years. TheBank requested that this program give a special emphasis to the four union councils(UCs) in Jampur tehsil of Rajanpur district where a significant decrease in wheat areasown during the 2005-06 rabi season was observed. The immediate assistance to the 4UCs targets small farmers (with landholding size of 12.5 acres or less). In these four UCs,wheat seeds have been distributed to 7,047 small farmers owning 40,593 acres of land in

the 2006-07 rabi sowing season. Over 100 hand pumps were installed to improvedrinking water supply. A large number of Community Organizations (COs) have beenformed whose members will benefit from the routine programs of PRSP, namelyconstruction of physical infrastructure, provision of micro credit, skill training etc. ThePRSP activities have now been expanded to other areas of the DG Khan andMuzarffagarh canal command as well as Taunsa project site.


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Ali Ajaz 13Taunsa canal operation schedule for 2006-07 Rabi season:

To minimize construction-related interruptions to canal operation, the IrrigationDepartment engaged an independent international panel of experts to review andoptimize the project construction program. Related project construction this rabi seasonwas planned to be undertaken when the canals are non-operational due to lack of wateravailability. At the same time, preventive measures such as repair of damaged state tube

wells, and installation of hand pumps, to mitigate possible impact on farmers in brackishgroundwater zones of Muzaffargarh Canal Command were undertaken Accordingly, 42state-owned tube wells were made operational thus augmenting water supplies, 30 COswere formed to undertake developmental activities as aforementioned, and 126 handpumps were installed for increasing the drinking water supply. Furthermore, a multi-media communication strategy and program was implemented for wide and timelyconsultation and information dissemination in the canal command areas well in advanceof the planned closure period that year.

The canal operation schedule for 2006-07 rabi season was disseminated at the beginningof the rabi season to the farmers concerned through different media (27,000 pamphlets,

loud speakers in village mosques, radio and press conference, IPD and AgricultureDepartment staff, District Nazims, Tehsil Nazims, Nazims and members of UnionCouncils etc.). The canal operation schedule was virtually in accordance with the Induswater allocation plan proposed by Punjab and approved by IRSA based on its forecast a14% shortfall in water availability for the 2006-07 rabi season, before it was publiclydisclosed. The actual closure period of the two canals emanating from Taunsa Barrageduring the dry winter season (rabi), were as follows: The D.G. Khan Canal, fromDecember 11, 2006 to January 27, 2007, and Muzaffargarh Canal, from December 11,2006 to February 21, 2007 respectively. This schedule was also the result of thecofferdam breach which took a few days to fill.

Impact of the cofferdam breach and the consequences:

The upstream cofferdam breached on January 15 at about 7:15 pm, at a distance of about300 feet from the left bank of the river and inundated ongoing grouting and concretingwork on the downstream barrage floor on two bays; breached a small coffer damenclosing the work area; and damaged part of main downstream cofferdam (without breaching it) which encloses the area where the downstream sub-weir is underconstruction. No casualties occurred and no damage to private land and/or assets wasreported. The breach was closed on January 19 and measures are being taken tostrengthen the cofferdam and prevent recurrence of similar incidents. The IrrigationDepartment and its contractor/consultants endeavored to minimize the delays in canal

water supply. Reportedly drinking water supplies to DG Khan canal resumed on January27 against the original date of January 16 a delay of 11 days. The delay of irrigationsupplies was announced and publicized widely as was done for drinking water supplies.The irrigation water supply was started on February 15 in place of February 11 - a delayof 4 days.In terms of mitigation measures, installation of hand pumps continued in the four unioncouncils of Rajanpur district and Thal branch of Muzarffagarh Canal.


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Problems & Proposed Remedial Measures

Retrogression of levels on the downstream of barrage and consequential issues

Construction of a subsidiary weir to raise tail water levels


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Repeated damages to stilling basin appurtenances including rupture of skinconcrete and leaking joints of mass concrete

Grouting of leaking joints and removal of weak concrete from top of existing d/sfloor and laying of thick new concrete of 4000 psi strength

Sedimentation problems in DG Khan

Canal

Construction of silt excluder andraising of crest of head regulator ofD.G Khan canal by 1 ft


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Repeated subsidence of the backfill of left and right flared out walls on the downstream

Provision of a proper filter and pressure release pipes behind the flared out walls


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Additional Modifications

Provision of vibrating wire (electronic) piezometers

Replacement of 11 gates of under sluices

Modification of remaining 53 gates of main weir

Replacement of hoisting system of all the barrage gate

Replacement of 7 gates of TP Link and 7 gates of DG Khan canals along withmodification of 5 gates of Muzaffargarh canal

Automation with central control mechanism

New Works:

A 4,347.5 ft long Sub-weir 920 ft d/s of the Barrage

Provision of Two Fish Ladders and a Navigation Lock

Protection Works u/s and d/s of Sub-weir

Instrumentation Installation of Gates for Navigation Lock and Fish Ladder

Rehabilitation Works:

Strengthening of Barrage Chute and Stilling Basin Floor

Grouting of Cavities under the Floor and voids in the Floor

Installation of Instruments in the Floor

Provision of Silt Excluder in the Right Under-Sluice of the Barrage

Raising the Sill of the DGK Canal Head Regulator

Extension of downstream Guide Banks.

Relocation of Silt Ejector Disposal Channel of DGKC


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Monitoring & Evaluation:

PROJECT OVERVIEW

Performance Review:

Notice to commence was given by the Engineer to the Contractor for construction of civilworks of Taunsa Barrage Emergency Rehabilitation Project (ICB-1) on May 10, 2005.The project duration is 36 months, however, major works are planned to be completed infirst two years.

The Projects first year works started on September 01, 2005. The works under thiscontract were done on the right side of the Barrage where downstream sub-weir andallied structures were constructed. The downstream sub-weir would help in raising tailwater level and will ensure proper dissipation of energy in periods of high flood. RightFish Ladder structure was also remodeled and extended to allow easier movement of fishthrough the Barrage structure. A Silt Excluder was constructed and the DG Khan Canal

Head-Regulator was rehabilitated for better strength and modernization. The MainBarrage body was also strengthened during this period and right half of the Main Barragestructure, i.e. bay 32 to bay 65, was rehabilitated. The major activities planned for thefirst year were successfully completed in time.

The Project started its second year on September 01, 2006. During the second year, civilworks on the left side upstream and downstream of the main Barrage are being done. TheSub-weir and allied structures for the left side downstream of the main Barrage will beconstructed during this year.

Additionally, the Guide Banks will be extended and new ones will be constructed for the

Abutment and Flared Out walls. Also, the settled blocks in the downstream right half willbe rehabilitated. The main Barrage bays 01 to 31 will be rehabilitated during this period.In addition to this, the mechanical and electrical (E&M) portion of rehabilitation of mainBarrage and Under Sluice gates is also in progress.

As of March 15, 2007, the Projects Civil works (ICB-01) portion is lagging from its planfor the second year by 45% (SPI = 0.547). Although the progress delay has beensomewhat covered during this period as compared to the previous report (SPI = 0.512 asof February 19, 2007), still there is a lot of work remaining to be completed during the


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Ali Ajaz 19second year of the project (2006 2007). Breakdown of Batching Plant No. 2 (100 cumcapacity) for 10 days during March 2007 and consistent breakdown of one of the twoSheet Piling Hammers is contributing to the delay in the progress. Current trend indicatesthat the Main Barrage Rehabilitation Works will be successfully completed before start ofthe flood season (July 2007), however some portion of Sub-Weir Construction might bedelayed to the next working season (October 2007 onwards) due to the current delay andslow pace of the work. ICB-02 and JICA Contractors are working on the relevant E&M

works and are making satisfactory progress in their respective areas.

Services by Directorate General Monitoring & Evaluation (DGM&E):

DGM&E has contributed to the Taunsa Barrage Emergency Rehabilitation Project in anumber of ways:

A. Facilitation in Creation of Project Management Office (PMO) for Barrages

B. Preparation of Contract Documents (Drafting of Clause SP-11)

The Directorate General of Monitoring & Evaluation has helped in the preparation of the

Contract Documents by drafting the Clause SP-11 of the Contract Documents. Thisclause was approved by the World Bank without any changes to it. Clause SP-11 is theproject control clause which enumerates as to how the project will be planned and theprogress monitored. This Project Control Clause can be used in other ICB contracts of thePunjab Government.

C. Preparation of Project Plan

As per clause 11 of Special Provisions of the Contract Documents, the Contractor has tosubmit a detailed construction schedule within 28 days starting from the Letter ofAcceptance. In order to facilitate stakeholders of the project, the Directorate General of

Monitoring & Evaluation, in consultation with the Project Management Consultant, hasprepared a detailed project plan for the Taunsa Barrage Emergency Rehabilitation Project.The project plan document was submitted by the DGM&E to the Secretary I&PDepartment on 17th May, 2005. The project plan was developed using the available project information from; PC-1 Document, Engineer Estimate, Contractor's bid,Contractor's method statement, Contractor's initial project plan, Historical data fromIrrigation Department, Books/Material related to Irrigation Engineering and Discussionswith the Client and the Consultant.The plan prepared by the DGM&E will help parties involved in the project to understandthe underlying scope, constraints, problems, risks, assumptions and other aspects of theproject while finalizing the project plan submitted by the Contractor.

D. Vetting of the Contractors Project Plan

The Contractor submitted his construction schedule on 11th May, 2005. After reviewingthe plan of the Contractor, comments of the DGM&E were conveyed on 21st May, 2005.It was observed that the schedule submitted by the Contractor can not be termed as aBaseline Construction Schedule as the Contractor failed to break-up any further theTender schedule already submitted by him meaning there by that his understanding of theproject is pretty much the same as was developed by him during his bid preparation stage.


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Ali Ajaz 20It was suggested that regular meetings be conducted between the PMO for Barrages,Punjab Barrages Consultants, the Contractor and the DGM&E, P&D Department forProject Plan development and its finalization. It was iterated that the services of theDGM&E may be utilized to facilitate the PMO for Barrages, Punjab BarragesConsultants and the Contractor for development of construction schedule acceptable toall the stake holders.

E. Project Status Reports

In order to apprise the I&P Department as well as the P&D Board of the developments ofthe project, the following project status reports have been generated by the DGM&E fromtime to time:

SN Project Status Report No. Issue Date Data of Report

1 TBRP-023 January 19, 2007 January 15, 2007

2 TBRP-024 February 28, 2007 February 19, 2007

3 TBRP-025 March 20, 2007 March 15, 2007

Quality Assurance and Control:

THE ISO 9000 DEFINITION IS, TOTLITY OF FEATURE AND CHARACTERISTICSOF A PRODUCT OR SERVICE THAT BEARS ON ITS ABILITY TO SATISFYSTATED OR IMPLIED NEEDS.

Project Quality Management System:

Organization Resources

Quality Plan and Management Procedures

Specifications

Design Control

Construction Completion

Monitoring, Inspection and Testing

Periodical Reports

Inspection, Measuring and Test Equipment

Non Conformance Reports and Actions

Quality Record Control

Internal Quality Audits

Personnel Training and Management

Statistical Techniques


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Ali Ajaz 21

Source Approvals

Steel Reinforcement

ASTM-615-81(a) Diameter & Weight

X-sectional Area

Ultimate strength

Percentage elongation

Bend test

Regular quality tests are conducted in accordance with Contract Provision onsamples collected from stock at site

Approved sources Fazal and Pak Steels

Steel Sheet Piles

Mill Test Certificate from M/s ARCELOR RPS including Heat Analysis, TensileTests etc

After delivery of sheet piles at site, samples got tested for tensile strength andpercentage elongation from Pakistan Standard Quality Control Authority, LahorePakistan

CEMENT

Approved sources

Askari Cement

Maple Leaf

DG Khan Cement

Javedan Cement

Quality Assessment

References and Quality Assurance (QA) Standards

Standard References

Contract References

Quality System References

Definitions and Abbreviations

Frequency of Testing for Construction Material

o Testing Frequency For Soils

o Testing Frequency For Cement


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Laboratory TestsSr.No.

Tests No. of TestsPerformed(This month)

No. of TestsPerformed(To date)

No. of TesRequired

1 Gradation of Coarse Aggregate 46 1046 8722 Gradation of Fine Aggregate 22 494 425

3 Unit Weight of Coarse Aggregate 23 595 431

4 Unit Weight of Fine Aggregate 23 362 237

5 Specific Gravity of CoarseAggregate

12 449 406

6 Specific Gravity of Fine Aggregate 15 260 2097 Sand Equivalent 14 274 233

8 Los Angles Abrasion 10 330 212

9 Absorption of Coarse Aggregate 12 449 406

10 Absorption of Fine Aggregate 15 260 209

11 Soundness of Coarse Aggregate 2 46 68

12 Soundness of Fine Aggregate 2 51 48

13 Cylinder Testing 426 17,736 17,193

14 Cylinder Casting 510 17,874 17,418

15 Compressive Strength of Bricks 4 184

16 Atterburg limits 11 40

As perrequireme

Field Tests

1 Temperature 85 2979 2903

2 Slump of Concrete 85 2979 2902

3 Cylinder Moulding 510 18210 177544 Field Density Tests 101 949 As per

requireme

Ali Ajaz 22o Testing Frequency For Steel Reinforcement

o Testing Frequency For Fine Aggregate

o Testing Frequency For Coarse Aggregate

o Testing Frequency For Concrete

o Testing Frequency For Admixtures

Quality Control (QC) Data

Summary of Quality Tests

Weather Data

Production of Concrete

Tests Conducted on Fine Aggregate

Tests Conducted on Coarse Aggregate

Tests Conducted on Concrete

Tests Results Conducted on Soil for Earthwork Excavation and Filling

Summary of Tests Conducted On Construction Materials:


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Discharge RecordAvg. Temperature

Discharge (Cfs)Gauge (ft)Sr.

No.Date

Max (Co) Min (C

o)

Weather ConditionHumidity

%U/S D/S U/S D/S

Remarks

1 1-Jan-2006 22 12 Cloudy 77 18140 18140 430 419

2 2-Jan-2006 21 12 Cloudy 87 16373 16373 430 419.7

3 3-Jan-2006 22 8 Cloudy 80 15742 15742 430.2 419.74 4-Jan-2006 20 7 Cloudy 86 16444 16444 429.9 420.1

5 5-Jan-2006 22 8 Sunny 86 15778 15778 429.9 420.1

6 6-Jan-2006 23 6 Sunny 74 15778 15778 429.9 420.1

7 7-Jan-2006 22 5 Sunny 68 15315 15315 429.8 420.3

8 8-Jan-2006 24 4 Cloudy/Dusty 75 14863 14863 429.8 420

9 9-Jan-2006 23 8 Cloudy 74 17233 17233 429.8 420.1

10 10-Jan-2006 23 8 Cloudy 74 17233 17233 430.2 420.1

11 11-Jan-2006 21 8 Sunny 76 17474 17474 430.2 420.1

12 12-Jan-2006 22 9 Sunny 75 1747 17474 430.3 420.1

13 13-Jan-2006 25 8 Cloudy 81 17474 17474 430.3 420.1

14 14-Jan-2006 23 9 Cloudy 82 17233 17233 430.3 420.1

15 15-Jan-2006 21 11 Sunny 74 16512 16512 430.2 420.1

16 16-Jan-2006 19 11 Cloudy 87 16512 16512 430.1 420.1

17 17-Jan-2006 21 12 Cloudy 82 16512 16512 430.1 420.1

18 18-Jan-2006 18 8 Sunny/Dusty 81 16512 16512 430.1 420.1

19 19-Jan-2006 13 9 Sunny/Dusty 85 16512 16512 430.1 420.1

20 20-Jan-2006 12 8 Sunny 82 16512 16512 430.1 420.1

21 21-Jan-2006 20 12 Cloudy 78 16512 16512 430.1 420.1

22 22-Jan-2006 23 9 Sunny 76 16997 16997 430.2 420.1

23 23-Jan-2006 24 11 Sunny 77 16976 16976 430.35 420.2

24 24-Jan-2006 25 10 Sunny 81 16976 16976 430.35 420.225 25-Jan-2006 24 10 Sunny 81 18222 18222 430.4 420.3

26 26-Jan-2006 25 10 Sunny 81 18222 18222 430.4 420.3

27 27-Jan-2006 26 10 Sunny 81 18222 18222 430.4 420.3

28 28-Jan-2006 27 12 Sunny 76 18222 18222 430.4 420.3

29 29-Jan-2006 23 12 Sunny 77 18222 18222 430.4 420.3

30 30-Jan-2006 25 13 Sunny 78 18222 18222 430.4 420.3

31 31-Jan-2006 24 12 Sunny 76 18466 18466 430.45 420.4

PBCIRRIGATION AND POWER DEPARTMENT GOVT. OF PUNJAB

Taunsa Barrage Emergency Rehabilitation And Modernization Project

Comulative Status of Compressive Strength Test Results (Class-A)

0%

10%20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

120%

130%

140%

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 185 190 195 2

Lab. Test #

C

ompressiveStren

Average Achieved Strength 7Days (Achieved Strength)Req. Str.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

120%

130%

140%

150%

160%

170%

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115

Lab. TEST No.

CompressiveStren

28 Days (Achieved Strength) Req.Str. Average Achieved Strength

After 7 Days

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 2

Lab Test NO.

CompressiveStren

Average Achieved Strength 7Days (Achieved Strength) Req. Str.

AFTER 07 DAYS

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

160%

180%

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190

Lab Test NO.

CompressiveStren

28 Days (Achieved Strength) Req.Str. Average Achieved Strength

AFTER 28 DAYS

PBCIRRIGATION AND POWER DEPARTMENT GOVT. OF PUNJAB

Taunsa Barrage Emergency Rehabilitation And Modernization Project

Comulative Status of Compressive Strength Test Results (Class-B)

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%110%120%130%140%150%160%170%180%

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220

Lab. Test #

CompressiveStren

Average Achieved Strength % 07 Days Achieved Strength % Req. Str.%

0%10%20%30%40%

50%60%70%80%90%

100%110%120%130%140%150%160%170%180%190%200%

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 14Lab. TEST No.

CompressiveStren

28 Days Achieved Strength % Req.Str. % Average achieved Strength %

AFTER 07 DAYS

AFTER 28 DAYS

Ali Ajaz 23

Weather Data (January-2006):


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0.00

20.00

40.00

60.00

80.00

100.00

1-G.I.

2-S.W.

3-G.B.

4-D

/SEB

5-S.E.

6-D.C.

7-H

R

8-F.L

9-

GE

Bill Nos.

Weight

ed%

Planned Value (%) Achieved Value (%)

Ali Ajaz 24

Management & Economical Review:


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Ali Ajaz 25

CONSTRAINTS for ICB 01:

1. Delay in approval of Variation Orders & works

Delay in approval of Variation Orders & works against which have beencompleted, is resulting in crisis in the financial Management of the Works

2. Delay in Formation of DRB:

The disputed items of Claims and the Variation Orders pertaining to completed

works are pending due to non formation of DRB till to date. The disputed sum isRs. 1,773 M (approx.). This delay is resulting in financial crisis for the Contractor.


Sr.# Job Description VO Amount Job Duration

1 Telephone Exchange Building 4,716,889 Aug-05 ~ Feb-06

2 Reduced Closure Period 132,443,393 Dec-06 ~ Feb-07

3 Additional Works for the Safety of the Barrage 17,053,073 Apr-06 ~ May-06

4Additional Works for Rehabilitation of Settled

Blocks at Right Pocket28,193,390 Jan-07 ~ Feb-07

5Care and Handling of Water (Cofferdam and

Unwatering/Dewatering) at Right Pocket.109,277,014 Dec-06 ~ Feb-07

6 Right Guide Bank Compacted Sand Filling 4,131,659 Dec-05 ~ Feb-07

7Additional Sand Filling underneath Sub Weir (L/S)

Stage 0280,309,320 Oct-06 ~ Nov-06

8Additional Works for Rehabilitation of Existing Left

Fish Ladder.14,376,942 Mar-07 ~ Apr-07

390,501,680Total

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Ali Ajaz 26

Taunsa Barrage Emergency and Rehabilitation and Modernization ProjectCivil Works-ICB Contract 01

Overall Progress Summary

(As of May 31, 2007)

Provisions Progress

Items of Work/BOQBills

BOQPlanned

ProgressActual

Progress/a

Payment tothe

Contractor/b

1-General Items 1,364,104,653 1,278,330,621 1,147,942,800 1,147,942,800

2-Subsidiary Weir 2,587,148,910 2,587,148,910 2,634,413,549 2,532,399,089

3-Guide Banks 159,836,691 155,499,274 72,992,588 51,377,4044- Repair Works forExisting Barrage

601,951,698 601,951,698 403,650,000 403,650,000

5- Silt Excluder in U/SRight Pocket

36,289,782 36,289,782 37,825,160 37,825,160

6- Excavation ofDiversion Channel

3,864,000 3,864,000 646,877 646,877

7- Remodeling ofDGK Canal H/R

6,206,297 6,206,297 5,539,581 5,539,581

8- Remodeling of Fish

Ladders

25,954,505 25,954,505 14,950,409 14,950,409

9- Gate Equipment forSubsidiary Weir

60,869,303 60,869,303 1,646,129 29,714

Total 4,846,225,839 4,756,114,390 4,319,607,094 4,194,361,035

%age of Contract Price 98.14% 89.13% 86.55%

10- Variation Orders - 253,766,361 253,766,361 253,766,361


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Ali Ajaz 27

Glossary:

WEIR- The weir is the solid obstruction put across the river to raise water into the canal

BARRAGE- The function of barrage is similar to that of weir but heading of water iseffected by the gates alone

DIVIDE WALL- A divide wall is an embankment protected by concrete block. it is buildat right angle to the axis of the weir separating the weir and under sluice

UNDER SLUICE- The under sluice maintain a deep channel in front of the headregulator and dispose off heavy silt and a part of food discharge on the d/s side of thebarrage

SILT EXCLUDER- Silt excluder is a device by which silt is excluded from waterentering the canal. It is constructed in the bed in front of head regulator

COFFER DAM- A cofferdam is an enclosure within a water environment constructed toallow water to be displaced by air for the purpose of creating a dry work environment.

FISH LADDER- It is constructed along the divide wall. Itis a device designed to allowfish to negotiate the artificial barrier in either direction. In the fish ladder the optimumvelocity is 6 to 8 m/sec.

UNIT RATE CONTRACT- Unit rate contract types are an agreed to rate for theperformance of specified work. Monetary exchange takes place when work is performedand is directly proportional to the volume and range of work. These types of contract aremost prevalent in the building industry.

DESIGN BID BUILD- Also known as Design-tender, is a project delivery method inwhich the agency or owner contracts with separate entities for each the design andconstruction of a project.

ICB- International Competitive bidding

PC-1- Preliminary Construction

DRB- Design Review Board


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