Progress and Purpose - United States Marine Corps...UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380 I 973 PCN 19000412400 Library of Congress Card No. 73—600153 For sale by the

Progress and Purpose:A Developmental History

Of TheUnited States Marine Corps

1900- 1970

By

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, USMCR

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONHEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPSWASHINGTON, D.C. 20380

I 973

PCN 19000412400

Library of Congress Card No. 73—600153

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,Washington, D.C. 20402—Price: $1.75 GPO supply price

Stock Number 0855—00067

FOREWORD

In this work the fighting record of the U.S. Marine Corps is not discussed but rather the inven-tiveness of those Marines who pioneered the amphibious role that would be played by the Corpsin the 20th century.

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, the author, has been active in the Marine CorpsReserve for many years and served on active duty as an infantry platoon leader in Korea. Morerecently he has taken leave from his civilian pursuits of teaching social and political history atSt. John's University in Jamaica, New York, to serve two years at the Historical Division ofHeadquarters Marine Corps and a year in Vietnam as an assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff,G—l, III Marine Amphibious Force. He has a PhD in American studies from the University ofLondon and is completing a book analyzing British and American amphibious (combined) oper-ations, 1920— 1945.

This work is dedicated to the proposition that Marines, past, present, and future, are expertsin their craft, namely, amphibious warfare. However, amphibious warfare is a complex subject andthis book does not pretend to be the last and definitive work on 20th century development ofamphibious doctrine, tactics, equipment, and techniques. It should be considered an exploratorywork, one that invites further research and study. Comments on the text, including citation oferrors of both omission and commission, are solicited.

E. H. SIMMONSReviewed and approved: Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

1 March 1973. Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

U'

PREFACE

Marine Corps contributions to the development of doctrine, tactics, and techniques of am-phibious warfare have been cited in various Marine Corps histories for at least the past 70 years. Itwas the idea of Lieutenant General James M. Masters, Sr., then Commandant of Marine CorpsSchools, 1966—1968, to restate these contributions and to cite some other contributions such as thedoctrine of vertical envelopment and the use of helicopters in land warfare. My idea was to tell thestory of these contributions without using a chronology of Marine "firsts."

The book is generally divided into decades giving the status of the Marine Corps during theparticular decade, coupled with a brief introduction into the political and economic climate of thetimes. This was of course important because it is those economic and political factors that directlyaffected the military situation.

In researching for the story, three unique things became apparent. The first was that in 1932,the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico chose to study a case history in disaster from World War I,the Gallipoli-Dardanelles Campaign of 1915—16. Rear Admiral L.E.H. Maund, Royal Navy, mighthave given the answer for Marine Corps Schools if it had been asked of them—Why study Gallipoli?Admiral Maund said of Gallipoli, "It had imagination, it had the promise of great strategic gains;while the reasons for its failure could easily be discerned and had to do with lack of technique,material and belief in this form of warfare—shortcomings that could all be overcome." It is the"shortcomings" that Marine planners had overcome by the commencement of World War II. Thesecond unique accomplishment that surfaced was that Marine Corps Schools had the first writtendoctrine on landing operations before it had suitable landing boats to carry out the doctrine. Inlike fashion, within 15 years after the "Tentative Landing Operations Manual" was published, theMarine Corps Schools had the first written doctrine on helicopter operations before actually pos-sessing a helicopter.

As a by-product of researching this book, I discovered and used quite extensively the GeneralBoard Records of the United States Navy which apparently had seen little previous use by Marineresearchers. My profound thanks go to Dr. Dean C. Allard, Head of the Navy Operational ArchivesBranch, Naval Historical Division and Mrs. Kathleen Lloyd who made these records available to me.My major source of information came from Breckinridge Library, Marine Corps Educational Cen-ter at Quantico. Mr. Dave Brown and Mrs. Lyvia Garsys of the library helped me through the mazeof files there. The Historical Amphibious File at the library is a gold mine for amphibious warfareresearchers and the cooperation of all personnel there is outstanding. The people at the librariesof the Office of the Chief of Military History of the Army and of the Navy Department were mosthelpful noting particularly Mr. W. Bart Greenwood and Mrs. Rita Halle of the Navy Library.Getting closer to home, Mrs. Clara Miller and Mrs. Frances Rubright of the History and MuseumsDivision Library and Archives were exceptionally helpful. Sergeant Michael L. Gardiner and LanceCorporal Isaac C. Moon, Jr., both had a hand in typing various versions of the manuscript, but thelion's share of work on the final manuscript was done by Miss Kay P. Sue. The index was compiledand prepared for publication by Miss Cynthia J. Nash. The maps and sketches were prepared bySergeants Kenneth 'W. White and Jerry L. Jakes. I am particularly indebted to Mr. Henry I. Shaw,Jr., Chief Historian of the History and Museums Division at Headquarters Marine Corps and Profes-sor William H. Russell of the United States Naval Academy. I doubt if Winston Churchill could havegotten his works past their critical eyes without their strong recommendation and comments.In any event—they were right in all instances.

Historical accuracy is my responsibility alone and the very few unsolicited grains of personalV

opinion are mine also. A debt of gratitude goes to those officers who read my drafts and gave methe benefit of their knowledge and invaluable experience. Unless otherwise noted, all illustrationsare official Department of Defense (Marine Corps) photographs.

Lastly, I would like to dedicate this book to the Amphibious Warfare Presentation Team killedin the performance of their duty to their country and to their Corps in a plane crash in January1968. In the final analysis, the members of the Presentation Team represented all Marines, past,present, and future. They were about their duty, telling the story of what the Marine Corps/NavyTeam does best—conduct amphibious operations. As long as there are oceans and littoral areas of theworld, there will always be a need to know the workings that makeup the amphibious operation.

/<t

KENNETH J. CLIFFORDLieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE . 1

The Nature of the General Board 6

Advanced Base Force—The Reason for Existence 8

Advanced Base Force Comes of Age 15

"The World Must Be Safe for Democracy" 21

II. POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 25Evolution of a Staff 27Duties and Missions 29Maneuvers, Expeditions, Football, and Mail 30Fleet Maneuvers—l922 31

Fleet Maneuvers—1923—l924 32

Aloha—Fleet Maneuvers—1925 35Marine Corps Schools 36

Aviation—The Magnificent Men in Their Flying Machines 38

III. ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 41

Marine Corps Schools of the Thirties 43The Manual 46

The Contents 47

Boats, Lighters, and Amphibians 48I—Landing Boats 48Il—Lighters 52

Ill—Amphibians 53

Marine Aviation in the Thirties 58

The Genesis of Close Air Support 58

IV. THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB 61

War Plans 61

Refinement of Tactics and Techniques in Amphibious Operations During WorldWar Il—Naval Gunfire (NGF) 65

Close Air Support (CAS) 67

Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) 69

Trials and Adaptations—Marine Aviation 70

And Then Came the Bomb 71

Repeat of the 1930s 73

Phib—31 77

V. THE FIFTIES: MASSIVE RETALIATION, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE,AND NUCLEAR STALEMATE 79

Introduction 79

The Status of the Marine Corps in the 1950s 79

Korea—The Test 82

Optimum Organization and the Boards 84

Techniques and Hardware Development During the l950s 88

Research and Development (R&D) Cycle 91

vii

VI. THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 95Pacification in General, Civic Action in Particular 96

In Support Of 100

The Helicopter and Refinement of Tactical Mobility 103

High Mobility and the Fire Support Base 105

Research, Development, and Studies in the 1960s 107

The Decade to Come 109

Vertical/Short-Take-Off and Landing 112

APPENDICESA— Notes 115

B— Bibliography 127

C— Glossary of Abbreviations 133

D— Commandants of the Marine Corps in the Twentieth Century 135

E— Commanders at Quantico 137

F— Outline of the development of the Landing Operations Manual 139

G— Students and instructors who were assigned to MCS during preparation ofTentative Landing Operations Manual

H— List of participants in conference held at Quantico, Virginia, on 9 January1934 for purpose of discussing Tentative Landing Operations Manual 143

I— Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board Members 145

J— Citation to accompany the award of the Medal of Merit to Donald Roebling ... 147

INDEX 149

VIII

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE

Mark Sullivan describes America on thefirst day of the new century thus:

The American of 1900, reading his paper onMonday morning, New Year's Day, or the Sundaypaper of the day before, or almost any paper dur-ing the year, observed, with some uneasiness, thatthe head-lines continued to occupy themselves, asthey had for a considerable time, with the Philip-pines, Cuba, Porto Rico, Guam, Aguinaldo, theIgorrotes; words which three years before had nomore meaning to him than to stir old memories ofsomething he had seen in his schoolboy biogra-phies—you couldn't be confident how to pronouncethe names . . . If the American, reading the papersof New Year's Day, 1900, was more than commonlyreflective over the serious aspects of the news, itwas only partly because the sporting page and thecomic strip had not yet arrived to overbalance theAmerican newspaper on the side of the merelydiverting. It was due also to the presence in thenewspapers of that day and in the sermons of theday before, of a spirit of solemnity, occasioned bythe coming of a new year and, as some said, a newcentury.1

The United States population at the startof this new century had an estimated 76,094,000persons of whom there were nearly 39 millionmales.2 Out of this then-vast population camethe little known U.S. Marine Corps of 5,240men and 174 officers including the BrigadierGeneral (later Major General) CommandantCharles Heywood.

There was little difference, in the minds ofthe general public, between the Marine Corpsand the Navy. The recent Spanish-AmericanWar had been a "Naval War" and the sub-sequent events of occupation and the Philip-pine insurrection were an Army show. Therewere no Marine national heroes, such as theNavy's "Hero of Manila Bay," Admiral GeorgeDewey, or the Army's "Rough Rider," TeddyRoosevelt. The only group of people who per-haps knew the difference between an officerof Marines and an officer of the Navy line wasthe Washington social crowd. When it cameto proper representation at the 'White House,the Navy didn't hesitate to make clear that

Major General Charles Heywood, 9th Commandantof the U.S. Marine Corps, 30 June 1891 to 2 October1903. (USMC Photo #302066).

the Marines did not represent the Navy. TheMarines were quite separate.

During the early years of the McKinleyAdministration, Colonel Theodore A. Bingham,an Army Engineer, had the position of Com-missioner of Public Buildings and Groundsand acted as a kind of major-domo of theWhite House. Colonel Bingham had to selectthe President's two military aides, traditionallyrepresenting the two branches of the service.There had been no objection to the first as-sistant, an able army artillery officer. The fatalerror was the choice of the Navy representa-tive, Captain Charles L. McCawley. CaptainMcCawley was an admirable young man, witty

I

2 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Lieutenant Dion Williams and a detachment from the USS Baltimore saluting Admiral Dewey on his visit tothe Navy Yard, Cavite, Philippine Islands on 13 June 1898. (USMC Photo #4831).

and well-bred. The trouble was that he didnot belong to the Navy proper. He was acaptain of Marines. Navy circles buzzed withthe news that officers of the line had beenpassed over at the Executive Mansion. TheNavy Department was boiling with resentment.To allay the fears of some of the Navy officials,

Marine gun crew on board the USS Alliance in1888. (USMC Photo #515255).

Secretary of the Navy John D. Long got thePresident's consent to augment the detail ofaides with a naval officer. The grave crisis ofWashington society was resolved and the Navy'sfeelings were saved.

Willis J. Abbot has written a history of theMarine Corps entitled Soldiers of the Sea,published in 1918. In the foreword of the book,it was noted that "until now one could searchthe public libraries almost in vain for workspertaining to the U.S. Marine Corps, as such,and Mr. Abbot has rendered a notable serv-ice." The fact is that this statement was nottechnically correct. There was in existence asecond edition (1903) of Major Richard S.

Collum's History of the United States MarineCorps. Though it was not a runaway bestseller, it did provide, for those interested, thestory of the Marine Corps.

The Marines did get some notoriety of sortswhen the former Assistant Secretary of theNavy, Theodore Roosevelt, in his last year asPresident in 1908 caused the removal ofMarines from naval vessels. Efforts to removeMarines from ships had been made by a groupof naval officers from 1890—94, led by theMarine Corps antagonist, Captain William F.Fullam, USN. These early efforts were rejected

- -

TL1

BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 3

Group of officers, 1st Battalion of Marines (Huntington's), Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. (Seavey's Island), inSeptember 1898. Left to right: Lieutenants Lewis C. Lucas; Clarence L. A. Ingate; Melville J. Shaw; Newt H. Hall;and George C. Reid. (USMC Photo *515616).

by the Secretary of the Navy but were againbrought up in 1908. This time the pleas fell onthe sympathetic ears of the President whoissued an Executive Order which defined theduties of the U.S. \1arine Corps and specificallyleft out duty on board naval vessels. Notonly were the Marines withdrawn from ships,but, to rub it in, the Wash ington Post, in afeature article, declared that the Army was toget the Marines by transfer to the Army infan-try. The newspaper stated:

Mr. Roosevelt had not only reached this conclu-sion, but has taken preliminary steps toward thepractical development of the plan. He alreadyhas conferred with officers of the general staff, andalso with General Leonard Wood, who is knownto be close to him in military matters. GeneralWood and the members of the general staff areformulating a scheme outlining the Presidentialideas.6

The Navy Department countered this rumorby submitting a detailed statement to theHouse Naval Affairs Committee. It was madeclear that "It is of the utmost importance thatthe Marine Corps remain absolutely under thecontrol of the Navy Department and all warplans thus far laid down provide for the closecooperation of the Marine Corps with the Navy,afloat and ashore." The President of theGeneral Board, Admiral Dewey, in a letterto the House Naval Affairs Committee, reiter-ated the importance of Marines within theDepartment of the Navy because of the needfor an expeditionary force to assist the fleetin seizing and holding advanced bases. Hishigh regard for Marines stemmed back to hisManila Bay victory when he asserted: "If therehad been 5,000. Marines under my command


Sketched reproduction of a cartoon dealing withPhoto #528702).

at Manila Bay, the city would have surrenderedto me on May 1, 1898, and could have beenproperly garrisoned. The Filipinos would havereceived us with open arms, and there wouldhave been no insurrection." 8

It is interesting to note that this friend ofthe Marine Corps, Admiral Dewey, was in favorof the President's Executive Order 969, butfor different reasons; none were sinister. Hesaid that "while the marines will no longerform parts of the crews of the ships, the navyis to have the services of this fine corps forthe important and necessary duties laid downin that order." Outwardly, it would appearthat it was a family fight between the Navyand the Marine Corps. But of course it wasnot. It became quite political because it in-volved the actions of the President of theUnited States and his use of the ExecutiveOrder. The ramifications of the use of this

order not only affected the Navy and MarineCorps but touched on prerogatives of Congress.

The right to issue such an order withoutspecial provision of law was assumed on theground that the President as Commander inChief of the Army and Navy could dispose ofthe naval forces according to his judgment.In a vote two months later, the Senate woulddispel this view.

The controversy thus became a matter ofprinciple involving Presidential powers vis-a-vis Congressional prerogatives. Some strongCongressional leaders upheld the Presidenton the basis of separation of powers. Amongthe Senate luminaries supporting the Presidentwere William E. Borah, Robert M. LaFollette,and Henry Cabot Lodge.

The newspapers had to reorient the peoplewho followed the controversy from November

THE WASHINGTON POST FEBRUARY 26, 1909

WILL SOMEBODY TELL THE MARINE JUST WHERE HE'S UATBy DeMar.

the Marines on Navy ships controversy. (Taken from USMC


1908 to March 1909. They had to identify ex-actly what Marines were and what they did.The public was learning, in popular news-paper fashion, that the Marines had been in-volved in the "Naval War" with Spain, thatMarines served on most naval vessels, includingthe Maine, and thus participated in all thenaval battles of the war. They learned thatMarines were with Dewey at Manila Bay andSampson at Santiago. They learned that inaddition to Teddy Roosevelt's "Rough Riders,"there were Marines in Cuba who fought theSpaniards to capture Guantanamo Bay. Theyfurther learned that in addition to the U.S.Army in the Philippines and its occupationforce, the Marines had, at the end of 1901,over 2,000 men in the Philippines. They be-came aware that Marines fought alongside ofthe Army against the insurrectionists. The

public was reminded of Marines like MajorLittleton W. T. Waller and places like Samar.

The intricate matter of restoring Marines tonaval vessels was resolved in March 1909.Senator Eugene C. Hale, Chairman of theSenate Committee on Naval Affairs, tacked onto the Naval Appropriations Bill a provisothat eight percent of the enlisted men on boardbattleships be Marines.'° Notwithstanding thespirited defense of the President's action, theSenate, by a vote of 51 to 12, adopted theamendment restoring the Marine Corps to theships of the Navy. Those voting in the negativewere all Republicans and members of thePresident's party, the majority party.1' In thewaning hours of his administration, in factthe day before he left office, President Rooseveltstruck his colors, but only halfway. On 3March 1909, he issued orders restoring the

Sketched reproduction of a cartoon dealing with the return of Marines to Navy ships. (Taken from USMC Photo#528701).

THE DAILY EVENING TELEGRAPH - PHILADELPHIA, TUESDAY, MARCH 30. 1909

TEDDY HEARS BY WIRELESS.BvARTN.E0.

TAFT PUTS MARINES BACK ON THE QUARTER DECK


l\'farines to ships, but placing them under theorders of the captains of the vessels on whichthey were to serve.* The technicality was thatunder the old order of things Marines had hadspecific duties. One of these was to maintaincertain guns of the secondary battery. Now thePresident's order placing them under the direc-tion of the ship's captain made it possible toassign the Marines any sort of duty on boardship and conceivably remove them from allguns.

The General Board of the Navy could en-vision difficulties arising out of this portionof the order and consequently recommended tothe new Secretary of the Navy, George L. vonMeyer, and the new President, WilliamHoward Taft, that it be changed. So it wasthat on 26 March 1909, three weeks after Mr.Roosevelt had left office and sailed to Africafor a lion hunt, President Taft issued a mem-orandum from the White House:

Upon the recommendation of the General Boardit was decided at the Cabinet meeting today thatthe amendments to the regulations adopted on SMarch in regard to the Marines should be revokedand the old regulations should be restored.

The Marine Corps and friends of the MarineCorps on the Naval Appropriations Committeehad won out. Benjamin Standish Baker, a popu-lar correspondent for the Boston Transcript,had written:

it is common to hear officers both of thearmy and of the line of the navy admit that whenit comes to being in constant and effective touchwith members of Congress, and thus securing de-sired legislation and favors, the Marine Corps iseasily leader."

The point is that the controversy in 1908 wasa blessing in disguise for the Marine Corps ifnot Theodore Roosevelt. If the action of thePresident diminished for the time being theduties of the Marine Corps by taking Marinesoff naval vessels, the resulting publicity re-minded the American public, including theCongress, that there was such an organizationcalled the Marine Corps which definitelyshared the tasks of defense of the United Stateswith the Army and Navy.

It should be recalled that inauguration day for theincoming President of the United States was 4 Marchand that not until the 20th Amendment was ratifiedin 1953 was it changed to 20 January.

The Nature of the General Board"And doth not a meeting like this make amends"

Thomas Moore (Irish Melodies)

A general board has been made, of whichthe Admiral is president, and the function ofwhich is to consider questions relating to theefficient preparation of the fleet in case of warand for the naval defense of the coast.

Thus the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. John D.Long, reported to the President in his annualreport in November 1900. This routine men-tion of the General Board could not possiblyindicate the great ramifications that this boardwould have on the defense structure of thenation, Navy, and Marine Corps in the succeed-ing four decades. There was no question thatthe need for this type of board existed, thequestion was what role it should take—advisoryor executive in nature.

Prior to the Spanish American War, theUnited States had no central advisory authorityfor determining naval policy. During the war,the Secretary of Navy appointed a Naval WarBoard, sometimes called the Strategy Board, tocollect military information, prepare strategicplans, and generally advise him on strategy,policy, and the conduct of the war. The mostdistinguished member of this board was RearAdmiral Alfred T. Mahan. With the close ofthe war, the War Board quietly went out ofexistence. The success with which this rudi-mentary general staff functioned tended to cry-stallize sentiment within the Navy for theestablishment of a more permanent organiza-tion of comparable character. The fact thatafter the war the Navy's increased responsibili-ties extended to opposite sides of the globemade careful planning by a body similar toa naval general staff an urgent necessity.

One of the most progressive officers in theNavy, Captain Henry C. Taylor, urged theSecretary of the Navy to approve a type ofgeneral staff for the efficiency of the Navy.Among Taylor's more influential supporterswas Admiral Stephen B. Luce, the elderstateman of the Navy, who was then living inretirement at Newport, Rhode Island.14 Inaddition, Taylor had the support of the cur-rent hero, Admiral George Dewey, who was astrong supporter of some sort of central au-thority. Dewey argued that "we had been mak-ing our appropriations without a proper re-gard for their expenditures to the definite endof developing a fighting force as an efficient

BACKGROUND— 1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 7

whole; 'e had been building ships withoutregard to homogeneity '5 Perhaps it wasthe times and the fear of a Prussian-type gen-eral staff that had emerged in the Kaiser's Ger-many that frightened people. There weremisgivings in Congress and elsewhere by thosewho feared that a full-fledged general staff,with powers of command, would usurp theauthority of the civilian secretary. As a com-promise, Secretary Long established the Gen-eral Board of the Navy with no executive func-tions but merely with an advisory capacity.

A major factor in the immediate acceptanceof the board on the part of the rank and fileof the Navy and its prestige with the publicat large was the presidency of George Dewey,Admiral of the Navy. His place in naval historywas already won; his character was abovereproach; his professional attainments wereof the highest.'6 The other members of theboard were the President of the Naval WarCollege, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,and the Chief of the Office of Naval Intelli-gence. Others were ordered to serve with thebody as their assistance was desired."

On 29 March 1900, Colonel George C. Reid,USMC, Adjutant and Inspector of the MarineCorps, was appointed by the Secretary ofNavy as a member of the board.18 Thus theMarine Corps initially had a member on theGeneral Board. As its first order of business,Secretary Long ordered the new board to con-sider campaign plans for different war situa-tions in the Philippines and their vicinity. Asit turned out the main peacetime function ofthe board would be that of making recom-mendations for the annual shipbuilding pro-gram. Along this line, a board member, Ad-miral Henry C. Taylor, defined the board'sfunction: "Not to say what force we shouldhave but to prepare for war whatever forceCongress should give us." 19 The General Boardof the Navy, while an advisory body to theSecretary of Navy, became in reality the spokes-man for him. During the first 20 years of thiscentury there were four administrations andeight Secretaries of the Navy. With the ex-ceptions of George von Meyer (1909—13) andJosephus Daniels (1913—21), the Navy's Secre-taries served on the average of two years. Itwould be quite understandable that the Secre-tary of the Navy would rely quite heavilyon the General Board. The board was madeup of the most distinguished and, hopefully,

the most intelligent officers of the Navy. Untilhis death in 1914, the President of the Boardwas Admiral Dewey. The great experience andcontinuity of the officers of the board wouldbe hard to ignore, if one were inclined to doso. However, most Secretaries of the Navy werepleasant people who were politically rewardedand who wanted to do a good job, quietly.They certainly did not want to overshadowtheir Commander in Chief. In any event, Presi-dents such as Theodore Roosevelt, WilliamHoward Taft, and Woodrow Wilson would besomewhat of a challenge to overshadow.

The General Board, therefore, studied a

problem, had hearings, and then submitted itsreport to the Secretary of the Navy with rec-ommendations. Rarely, if ever, during thisperiod, did the Secretary of the Navy fail toapprove the General Board recommendations.With the very nature of the structure of theNavy Department and the evolution of thepowers of the General Board, it became ap-parent that the Marine Corps could do verylittle on its own without the approval of theGeneral Board. Considering the times, theremay not have .been anything inherently wrongwith the situation.

The Marine Corps did not suffer in any wayunder this arrangement. On the contrary, theGeneral Board in most matters consulted theCommandant when considering advanced basedeployments, increases in personnel strength,and the like. The board, however, did makeits own decisions after hearing what the Com-mandant had to say. It was a unilateraldecision—the General Board's. The board wasquite vigilant in matters that would endangerthe loss of the Marine Corps to the Army andwas always favorably disposed to increasingthe Marine Corps when this could be justified.So it was, in the early years, that the all-power-ful General Board through the person of theSecretary of the Navy made decisions on de-ployment, organization, training, strength, andlocation of facilities. It was fortunate that theMarine Corps had a sympathetic General Boardof the Navy in the early years of this century.The only way the board's decisions could beoverridden was by the necessity of assigningMarines in emergency expeditionary service.A crisis in Cuba or Haiti, etc., predisposedthat the Marine Corps would be needed. Itwas the President and Secretary of State whomade the decisions, the board simply and will-

I8 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Marines of the Advanced Base Brigade demonstratethe operation of the Colt machine gun at Philadelphiain October 1913. (USMC Photo #517216).

ingly assented. The Marine Corps wa orderedand the Marine Corps responded. In these de-cisions the role of the General Board wasminimal.

Advanced Base Force—The Reasonfor Existence*

If one were interested in ascertaining whatspecifically are the responsibilities of the MarineCorps today, a reading of the National SecurityAct of 1947, as amended, would give the ans-wers. To use terms such as "responsibilities,""missions," and "roles" when discussing theMarine Corps 70 years ago would be incorrect.The designation of elements of the MarineCorps as the Advanced Base Force came aboutnot in order to assign a "responsibility" or a"mission" to the Corps, but rather to solvea controversy within the Navy Department.The controversy was over the question of towhom should the assault mission be assigned,

There is inconsistency in the correspondence of theGeneral Board, Secretary of Navy, and the CMC rela-tive to the use of the term Advanced or Advance asit pertains to Bases, Forces, and the like. It is intendedthat Advanced be used throughout this text.

and it would last four years.** On the one side,some naval officers wanted to keep the Navyline in exclusive control of landing operations.Other naval officers simply believed that sea-men were too busy for landing parties, thatthey must concentrate on working the ship andits guns. They could not be spared for landingoperations. The controversy focused attentionon the landing force issue and thoughtful menconcluded that the Marine Corps could fill thebill. By the time of the Spanish-American Warthose thoughtful men were vindicated when,in the battle for Guantanamo in Cuba, a Ma-rine battalion under Marine command hadseized the advanced base that conferred victory.The Guantanamo precedent of successfully seiz-ing advanced bases was strengthened by similarexperience in the Philippines and China.20 Aprecedent of great value to the Marine Corpswas made and the evolutionary assignment ofthe "assault mission" fell to the Marine Corps.After bases were secured, the Marine Corpswould still be needed in defense and develop-ment of these bases. Its authority for thismission came from the General Board immedi-ately after it was organized, April 1900.

At the first meeting of the General Board,Colonel George C. Reid, member of the board,was requested to:

put before it the number and organizationof a force of Marines sufficient to hold each ofthree positions at Culebra in the West Indies,Samana (in Santo Domingo), and Guantanamo inCuba; composition of this force as to infantry andartillery to maintain a position against cruisersor naval brigades landing to attack it.2'

In addition, the General Board recommendedto the Secretary of Navy that:

two transports of capacity sufficient to carry500 marines each witb 2 months' commissary afl(IQuartermaster Stores etc. be made ready in theevent of a naval compaign in Asiatic waters andthat they be moved to an advance base near thescene of hostilities.

The General Board specifically recommendedthat the Marines would be "best adapted andmost available for immediate and sudden call"for use in defending any advanced base.23The Army's role was considered at this time,but:

Professor William Russell covers this controversyeminently well in The Genesis of FMF Doctrine:1789—1899," l'art 1, April 1951, Part II, May 1951, PartIII, June 1951, and Part IV, July. 1951 in the MarineCorps Gazette v. 35, nos., 4, 5, 6. and 7.

BACKGROUNI)_19OO_192O_C011NG OF AGE 9

/

1 *


Marines of the Advanced Base Brigade practice aswinbling pedestal-mounted naval guns at Philadelphiain October 1913. (USMC Photo #516704).

in the opinion of the General Board therequirements of the naval establishment o{ theUnited States include a military organization ofsufficient strength in numbers and efficiency, to en-able the Navy to meet alt demands upon it forservices within its own sphere of operations, with-out dependence upon the cooperation of the Armyfor ti-oops and military supplies, for such a forceof the Army may not always be available24

With the "who" completed, the "how" and"where" phase of the advanced base situationgot underway. The General Board requestedthe Secretary of Navy to direct the BrigadierGeneral Commandant to organize immediatelyfour companies of 104 enlisted men each, and"have provided for such battalion and storedat Philadelphia, ready for instant use, a com-plete equipment for expeditionary field serv-ice for such force." 25 The General Board fur-ther recommended that officers and enlistedmen of this battalion be thoroughly trainedand instructed in the following areas:

(a) The construction of field fortifications, gunemplacements, gun platforms and magazines;

(b) The transportation of guns of less than 8-inchcaliber from ship to point of emplacement and themounting of same;

(c) The construction and operating of field tele-graph and telephone lines, signal, searchlight andrange-finder stations;

(d) The planting of mines, countermining andthe operating of torpeclos for harbor defense.

The board also recommended that the com-panies composing such a battalion be keptorganized and maintained at their full strength,ready, in all respects, for immediate service.26

The request by the General Board to theSecretary of the Navy to direct the Marine Corpsto organize, train, and equip a unit to ac-complish a specific task was a first of its kind.Colonel Reid, as member of the General Boardand the Brigadier General Commandant,Charles Heywood, set about forming a fixeddefense battalion to fulfill the requirements setby the Secretary of Navy. To build up thebattalion of four companies of approximately104 men per company, Marines were trans-ferred from Seavey's Island (Portsmouth, NewHampshire), League Island (PhiladelphiaNavy Yard), and Port Royal, South Carolina(Parris Island, South Carolina) to the battalion.The battalion was physically located in twoplaces, Newport, Rhode Island, and Annapolis,Maryland. Instruction in the subjects outlinedabove began at these two posts by July 1902.

Before the sites of Newport and Annapoliswere chosen for this advanced base schooling,the Commandant was requested to commenton the best site for such instruction. He saidthat:

- - - of all the stations, Port Royal was the beststation for such instruction as it is nearly stir-rounded by water—and being removed from thepernicious influences of a large city, in consequenceof which the men will be more apt to be interestedin this work - -

- 27

Future Marine Corps "boots," at what waslater to become Parris Island Recruit Depot,would partly agree with the Commandant thatit was indeed "removed from the pernicious in-fluences of a large city." Instruction in ad-vanced base work was continued until Septem-ber 1902 when the battalion, under the com-mand of Colonel Percival C. Pope, wasassembled at Norfolk, Virginia. In October,another company, under the command ofCaptain Smedley D. Butler, joined the battalionincreasing its total strength to 19 officers and522 enlisted men.ss The battalion sailed forCulebra in November on board the USSPrairie where practical application was dem-onstrated in developing a plan for the defenseof that island. The Marines participated in ex-tensive advanced base exercises with the fleetuntil January 1903. It was generally agreedthat Marines had done a good job in defendingCulebra. The next year, 1904, similar work in

— - ______t.wu,tu._.


the defense of Grande Island in Subic Bay,Philippines, was accomplished.29

While there was no need to convince navalofficials, the Russo-Japanese War furnishedfurther evidence of the value of advanced bases,particularly the Japanese naval advanced baseestablished in the Elliot Islands.* The occupa-tion of the Elliot Islands was of inestimablevalue to Japan in operations against the Rus-sians.

The question of possible and probable ad-vanced base sites was under constant reviewby the General Board. All the war plans madeby the General Board required advanced basesin addition to the permanent base, Guantanamoin the Caribbean and the advanced base,Grande Island, in the Philippines. The MarineCorps dictum, "it depends on the situation,"was all too true in planning for advancedbases. The General Board felt that the pre-cise location, defense, and time of occupationwould depend upon the circumstances of theparticular campaign. International "flaps" didtend to narrow speculation as to the site ofpossible future campaigns.

American relations with Japan in 1906 and1907 became strained when the San FranciscoSchool Board decided to segregate Asians fromother students and designated a special "Orien-tal Public School" for all Chinese, Japanese,

9The Elliot Island Group is located in the Gulf ofKorea of the Yellow Sea, approximately 60 miles north-east of Dairen and Port Arthur.

and Korean students. Flushed with victoriesover Russia, "the Japanese people were deeplyincensed by such measures. Their press re-sponded immediately to the school board'saction with protests that ranged from rage tohurt incredulity." 30 President Theodore Roose-velt, in February 1907, called San Francisco'sentire school board, headed by:

a bassoon-playing mayor under indictmentfor graft, to come to the White House. The Presi-dent flusally broke the deadlock, but not until hewaved his Big Stick and l)ared his big teeth. TheCalifornians were persuaded to repeal the offensiveschool order anti to accept what came to be knownas 'the Gentlemen's Agreement.' This secret under-standing was worked out, during 1907—08, by anexchange of diplomatic notes between Washingtonand Tokyo. The Japanese, on their part, agreedto stop the flow of coolies to the mainland of theUnited States by refusing to issue passports. TheCalifornians, their fears largely allayed, henceforthslept easier.'1

It is interesting to note that during the periodof the American and Japanese war scare, theAmerican Naval Attaché in Berlin reported tothe Navy Department:

German opinion would undoubtedly favorthe United States in a Japanese-American conflict.But he added the discomforting bit of intelligencethat the British and German admiralties agreedJapan would probably vin.'

In spite of the talk of war, the Navy, throughits spokesman Admiral Dewey, President of theGeneral Board, stated "that he did not expectserious trouble with Japan for a very long

Marines of the Advanced Base Brigade work with mobile searchlights in Philadelphia in October 1913. (USMC Photo#516701).


STAFF AND CLASS, SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, ANNAPOLIS, MD., 1906.

Officers of the Staff, seated left to right: First Lieutenant W. G. Fay, Captain D. P. HaIl, Captain J. H. Russell, Major F. J. Moses,Captain George C. Thorpe, Captain Harold C. Reisinger. Officers of the class, standing left to right: Second Lieutenants W. W.Buckley, Julian P. Wilcox, Benjamin B. Gossett, H. B. Pratt, Bennet Puryear, Jr., Robert L. Denig, Logan Tucker, Henry S. Greene,

Randolph Coyle, C. F. B. Price, William C. Wise, Jr., Charles S. McReynolds.

Many future senior officers of the Marine Corps, including the 16th Commandant, John H. Russell, Jr., are includedin this portrait, (USMC Photo #514699).

time." Some other members of the GeneralBoard believed there was, in the realm ofpossibility, a chance of future hostilities withJapan. Consequently, in January 1907, theArmy and Navy decided to undertake jointstudies along those lines for a possible war withJapan. The studies were inaugurated at thesuggestion of Major General J. Franklin Bell,the Army Chief of Staff.

On a lower level, Marines were ordered tocommence extensive construction of tempor-ary defenses at Olongapo in the Philippines.Twenty 6-inch, four 4.7-inch, four 4-inch, andsixteen 6-pounder guns were mounted in 10weeks. "The work amounted to the temporarydefense of a permanent base for which per-manent fortifications had not been pro-vided." The situation at Olongapo resultedin some confusion as to the character and

purpose of a naval advanced base. The Philip.pine construction brought up the question ofthe cooperation of the Army in such work.35During the protracted consideration of the mat-ter in 1908 and 1909, the strength of the MarineCorps was materially increased by Congress "sothat there was a sufficient force of Marinesto meet the probable demands of the Navyin this respect, and the cooperation of theArmy received no further considerations."

In 1907 and again in 1909, the GeneralBoard urgently presented to the Navy Depart-ment the need for consolidating equipmentwith regard to advanced bases. The Secretaryof Navy approved the board recommenda-tions that the materiel on the Atlantic coastbe assembled at Philadelphia and that for theadvanced base outfits in the Pacific be as-sembled at OIongapo. The Commandant of


the Marine Corps (CMC)* was given the re-sponsibility for the custody and care of alladvanced base material. In addition, he wasto "take the necessary steps to instruct theofficers and men under your command in theuse of this material."

On 18 April 1910, Major General Comman-dant George F. Elliott submitted to the Secre-tary of Navy a copy of the proposed course ofinstruction for an advanced base school to beestablished at New London, Connecticut. Whileit was to be primarily an officers' school, 40 en-listed men were assigned to the first class of in-struction which began in July 1910. In additionto the advanced base school, two Marine officerswere assigned to the Army School for SubmarineDefenses at Fort Monroe, Virgina. This was nec-essary because the Navy had planned to useArmy mines, pending the acceptance of a newnaval mine. In addition, two other Marine offi-cers were detailed to attend the Army SignalSchool at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, "in orderthat they may acquire a complete knowledge ofwireless telegraphy and the construction andoperation of field telegraph and telephonelines." °

In a memorandum to the prospective officerstudents of the Advanced Base School, theCommandant declared:

The establishment of a school for the purpose ofinstructing and training marine officers along cer-tain well-defined lines of work, pertaining to theattack and defense of advanced bases, presupposesa good working knowledge of the elementary pro-fessional subjects and is in the nature of a post-graduate course.

In order to obtain the best results, the instruc-tion in such a course must be both theoretical andpractical, systematic and progressive. The militarysubjects covered in the defense of a base are many;and, while theoretical instruction in these subjectsis essential, the training or practical work is nonethe less important. The subjects are so varied andtheir scope so comprehensive that it is considereda year should, if possible, be devoted to the course.

In general terms, the defense of an advancedbase may be divided into

(1) The Gun Defense(2) The Mobile Defense(3) The Mine Defense(4) General Governing Considerations 4°

The Commandant envisioned the Gun De-fense instruction to include naval ordnance;gunnery; explosives and projectiles; fortifica-tions, as relating to defense of the guns; and

*Commandant of the Marine Corps has been usedthroughout the text for uniformity, but the more com-mon title prior to World War II was Major GeneralCommandant.

communications. Instruction in Mobile Defensewas to encompass construction of more or lesspermanent field fortifications, obstacles anddemolitions, map reading, and field artillery.The Commandant made note that whenstudying field artillery, consideration would begiven to "the development and use of this armin connection with infantry and for both directand indirect fire." ' It is easy to look back andput labels on things. But in the meaning ofthe quotation above, the Commandant's in-struction in a sense paved the way for theconcept of combined arms within the MarineCorps. In studying Mine Defense, all types ofmines, torpedoes, and obstructions were to beconsidered. In examining General Considera-tions, the Commandant recommended a studyof the organization, supply, and movement ofMarines assigned to advanced base work bemade. He believed that other considerationsinvolved the study of bases, their necessity anduse, and historical studies that would be use-ful and applicable to advanced base work andthe making and use of war plans. The text-book material, where applicable, was suppliedby the Navy and Army. As an example, theNavy's Bureau of Ordnance supplied the bookHigh Explosives and Mines and the Army do-nated Field Artillery Drill Regulations. TheMarine Corps' Major Dion Williams contrib-uted an original booklet Instructions for theReconnaissance of Bays, Harbors And Adja-cent Country.* Practical work formed a largepart of the course involving assembling anddismounting of guns, construction of fieldworks, and the like. The location of the schoolat New London was not entirely suitable andthe next year, 1911, the school was removed toPhiladelphia.2 The school was successful al-though interrupted during the subsequentyears by calls to expeditionary service in Nic-aragua, Cuba, and Mexico. The Commandanthad responsibility for maintenance, readiness,and training of the Advanced Base Force.Likewise, the General Board had the respon-sibility for continual study of the feasibilityof advanced base locations and the make up ofadvanced base outfits.

Late in 1909, as the General Board beganserious consideration of the advanced base

*First published in 1905 by direction of the Presi-dent of the Naval War College. A second revised editionwas published in 1917 by the Government PrintingOffice under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy.Copy at Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Ma-rine Corps.

±1

I: . •_ •


Marines preparing to embark at Philadelphia for du-ty in Nicaragua, August 1912. (USMC Photo #516235).

problem, three men, destined to play an im-portant part in the evolution of the Ad-vanced Base Force, had written papers, severalweeks apart, that were ultimately forwardedto the General Board, all dealing with ad-vanced bases. Major Dion Williams, who asearly as June 1902 had written an article aboutthe defense of naval stations while assignedto the Office of Naval Intelligence, submitteda report dated 2 November 1909: "Report onMen, Material & Drills Required for Estab-lishing a Naval Advance Base."" CommanderWilliam L. Rodgers, USN, then the NavalWar College representative at the Army WarCollege, submitted a report dated 20 Novem-ber 1909, entitled "Advanced Bases."" MajorJohn H. Russell, a student at the Naval WarCollege, submitted a study, "General Princi-ples Governing the Selection and Establish-ment of Advanced Bases and the Compositionof an Advanced Base Outfit," and an addi-tional concurrent report, "Additional Noteson Field Work Construction for AdvancedBases." 46 Perhaps writing ability had nothingto do with it, but in any event, this MajorRussell later became the 16th Commandantof the Marine Corps. Also about the sametime, Lieutenant Colonel Eli K. Cole, afterinstalling the advanced base material at SubicBay in the Philippines, was ordered to the

Army War College. While there he wrote astudy entitled, "Outfit Necessary for Seizureand Fortifications of Positions by a Small Ex-peditionary Force."

If the Marine and Navy contributions werenot enough, in the January—February 1911 is-sue of the Journal of United States Artillerywas an article by a "Colonel Martin—an Ex-Confederate Officer" entitled "The Selec-tion and Defense of Naval Bases." 48 This ar-ticle was brought to the attention of AdmiralDewey, President of the General Board. Ad-miral Dewey wanted to know the true iden-tity of "Colonel Martin" and wrote to the edi-tor of the Journal accordingly. The Managerand Editor of the Journal, Major T. W. Win-ston, replied to the Admiral that the authorof the article was Captain R. E. Wyllie, CoastArtillery Corps, presently stationed at FortHancock, N.J.49 Major Winston explained thatWyllie's assumption of the nom-de-plume wasmerely to get an impersonal discussion of themerits of the arguments which he advanced.Major Winston was elated to know that some-one on the General Board read the Journaland offered to send a copy of the Journalregularly with "our compliments." Two dayslater, the Secretary of the General Boardwrote to say that he would be glad to be addedto the mailing list. It would seem that therewas a pat-on-the-back for Captain Wyllie ofthe Army, but not so. Admiral Dewey for-warded the article to the Secretary of the Navyand said that:

in the opinion of the General Board, thisarticle is very ably written, and sets forth thewriter's conception of the subject in an exceedinglyclear and pleasant style. The views expressed by"Col Martin" are not at all novel, however, andhave often been expressed by naval officcrs in thediscussions by the general board and the NavalWar College."

Captain Wyllie would probably have agreedin the dictum—you win some and lose somel

To round out the articles on the subject ofthe various aspects of advanced bases, MajorHenry C. Davis, wrote an article "AdvanceBase Training" for the March 1911 issue of theU.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. LieutenantColonel L. C. LUcas, wrote a report for theGeneral Board entitled "Artillery Armamentof Advanced Base Regiment," dated about 1

July 1913. Captain H. A. Knapp, USN, de-livered a lecture and paper on the "Interna-tional Law in its Relation to Advance Bases"to the Naval War College on 29 May 1915. It

BACKGROUND—l900-l920--COMING OF AGE 15

would seem that there was enough written onthe subject of advanced bases at the time butthere were many questions still unanswered.The very basic question was "What number ofmen is sufficient for the defense of an ad-vanced base?" Of the Marine writers, Lieu-tenant Colonel Cole and Major Russell agreedthat a regiment would be needed for theproper defense of a base. Major Russell sug-gested that each company of the total 12companies should have 150 men each, givingthe three-battalion regiment 1,800 men. MajorWilliams' report differed somewhat as he en-visioned a proper defense based on two regi-ments of 1,300 \'1arines each, assembled at thesite of the advanced base outfit. With thisaccomplished, the "force would be drilled inall of the operations of establishing a basefrom the preparatory stage of map readingto the actual firing of the guns at target prac-tice with towing targets." 51 It would be severalyears before the General Board would decidewhat would be the proper defense force. Itwould come closest to Major Williams' ideas.

The next item to be considered was theterms in general use concerning advanced baseforces. In 1911, the Navy issued a generalorder which defined the temporary characterof the naval advanced base, and this definitionalong with other terms were incorporated inthe Navy Regulations in 1913. The MarineCorps understood these definitions, as inter-preted by 1\Iajor General CommandantGeorge Barnett, as follows:

Advanced Basesmay be divided into two generalclasses—permanent and temporary. The permanentadvanced base is ordinarily defended by permanentfortifications and covers an extensive repair plant.By 1914, an example of this type of advancedbase was Pearl Harbor. The temporary advancedbase is not ordinarily fortified until after the dec-laration of war, but in view of the length of timeavailable the defense installe(l must, at the startat any rate, be of temporary nature. Again, in1914, examples of this type of advanced base wereOlongapo and Guam. The temporary nature of anadvanced base involves three main elements: first,the best defense necessary to meet an attack bygunfire from the sea: second, the use of mines andminefield guns, that would prevent the approach ofhostile craft in the vicinity of the train which thebase is covering: third, proper defense against at-tacks by forces landing beyond the range of thefixed defense guns, that attack the train from theland side.

It should be noted at this point, that the useof the term "train" refers to "fleet train."During the decade preceding 1914, the coil-

cept had developed of an organized fleet trainconsisting of auxiliaries, colliers, tankers, re-pair ships, water-distilling ships, supply ships,destroyer tenders, and the like needed to serv-ice and supply a combat fleet at sea, inde-pendent of a fixed shore base.

In a prophetic note on things to come, theMajor General Commandant stated that "inview of the recent developments in aeronau-tics, adequate defenses against attacks by diri-gibles or aeroplanes must be considered," 52

General Barnett believed that the forces as-signed to the defense could be divided intotwo parts: the fixed defense regiment, whichinstalled and manned the guns and mines,and the mobile regiment which opposed land-ings beyond th'e range of the fixed defenseguns:

In case the enemy has once landed, retain themat such distance from the base, that the base it-self could not he reached by gun fire. In additionto the fixed defense and infantry forces there mustof necessity he searchlight detachments, an engi-neer company, signal company and field artillery.1'

Advanced Base Force Comes of AgeAs previously mentioned, the question of

the actual size of the Advanced Base Forcewas settled temporarily in 1913. The GeneralBoard recommended to the Secretary of Navywho agreed, that there be a fixed defense regi-ment of 1,250 men assembled on the EastCoast at Philadelphia and another at MareIsland on the WestCoast. The Advanced Baseequipment on Olongapo would l)e redistributedto Guam and Mare Island. The board alsorecommended that:

two mobile defense regiments about 1,250men each. may be required in war to reinforce thefixed defense regiments, one on each coast—suchorganizations in peace are (lesirahle but not strictlynecessary.'4

In 1914, the recommendations of the Gen-eral Board regarding sti'ersgth of fixed andmobile defense regiments were reafhrmecl bythe Secretary of Navy. "The recommendationsof the General Board concerning the size ofthe advanced base regiments are approved forthe present." The Major General Com-mandant agreed to the advanced base site lo-cations. He said:

both stations are centrally located in regardto other Posts of the Marine Corps. transportationfacilities are satisfactory and supplies can be oh-tamed in a minimum of time, and both are nearMarine Corps Depots."

/7hi


That the General Board had faith in theMarine Corps is reflected in a letter to theSecretary of Navy which stated that:

• judging from the excellent work of theMarine Corps under all conditions with which ithas been confronted for many years in the pastit is reasonable to believe that, with a proper Out-fit, it will be able to make good whatever circum-stance require the establishment of an advancebase.1

The next logical step in the evolution ofthe Advanced Base Force was :0 test the equip-ment and men to determine whether this or-ganization required any changes. The Gen-eral Board requested and the Secretary of Navydirected that exercises be heki in connectionwith the Atlantic Fleet during the winter of1913—14. More Marines became available in thesummer of 1913 with the return of expedi-tionary forces from Cuba.5 In addition, theAdvanced Base School was reopened at Phila-delphia and the 1st Regiment (Fixed De-fense) was stationed there for training. Theregiment consisted of one battery of 5-inchrapid fire .40 caliber guns; one battery of 3-

inch rapid fire guns; one battery of 3-inchlanding guns; two U.S. Army experimental4.7-inch heavy field guns; one mine batterywith 60 mines; one signal company; one en-gineer company with the necessary equip-ment, together with eight automatic rifles andfour 1-pounders.59

A young captain of Marines described thestepped-up training taking place at the time:

A new scheme of things was under way in theItarine Corps. A regiment had been designated asan Advance Base Force. It was being trained tooccupy a base jn advance of the arrival of thefleet.

I found that the easy days in Philadelphia wereover. With drills and 4 hours a day schooling, wedidn't get out of the Yard until 4:30 in the after-noon. Then we had to study at night.

We had six companies. One was a field artillery,one had four 5-inch naval guns, one had four3-inch naval guns, one was engineers and machineguns, one was mines and one was signals. Iwas put in command of the Sixth Company, tohandle the 3-inch naval guns. - - - Hours everyday in the Yard we had to haul those 3-inchnaval guns around. We had to build a portablerailroad. We had to dig pits. We had to build gun

Supplies are brought alongside the USS Prairie, frequent Marine troopship, loading at Philadelphia in 1913.(USMC Photo #516234).


platforms. We had to mount the guns. And then,when we had it all done, we had to tear the wholebusiness down and do it all over again. That keptup until the first of January, l914.°

The Atlantic Fleet exercises in January 1914were to become the first thoroughly plannedadvanced base problem whereby the MarineCorps would try out the advanced base mater-ials. It became especially important that it besuccessful, as far as Marine Corps participa-tion was concerned, if not for any otherreason but to counteract a report given bythe Aide-for-Inspections. In March 1910, theSecretary of Navy had charged th MarineCorps to prepare for the care and custodyof advanced base material and to give instruc-tion in the use of this equipment. In addi-tion, he advised that the Naval Division ofInspections would be charged with its inspec-tion.61 It is with this wedge that the MarineCorps nemesis, Captain William F. Fullam,USN, reappeared on the scene. As Aide-for-Inspections, Captain Fullam was all too happyto give out the news of his findings upon hisinspection and report concerning the advancedbase outfit, personnel, and instruction at Phil-adelphia in 1913. His report was forwarded tothe General Board by the then Assistant Sec-retary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, on2 May 1913.

Captain Fullam reported that the advancedbase outfit and its operations were a failure.He said no actual work was done except forminor work at Culebra and Subic Bay andthat "from the point of real efficiency forwar purposes, it may be said that practicallynothing has been accomplished during thepast 13 years 62 Captain Fullam statedthat the Naval War College and the AdvancedBase School handled the problems of ad-vanced bases academically with a few officersreceiving elementary as distinguished frompractical instruction. In "painful contrast,"he pointed out, the Italians had completelyand promptly established an advanced baseoutfit in Sicily in October 1911 in 48 hours.This, hesaid, was an example of what couldbe done and ought to be done in advancedbase operations. He later admitted that hepurposely refrained from inviting special at-tention to the fact that the Italian force wasapparently composed of naval officers andsailors! Captain Fullam blamed what he calledthe "past failures" on the material, personnel,instruction, and lack of transports. He attrib-

Rear Admiral William F. Fullam, vigorous opponentof the use of Marines for sea duty. (USN Photo#19—N —3646).

uted these past failures to the Marine Corpsand categorically stated that it was the fault ofMarine Corps organization. Never at a loss forwords, Captain Fullam not only inspected theproblems but solved them. He believed theMarine Corps should have been broken intopermanent battalions to serve under their owncolors. After reorganizing the Marine Corps,Captain Fullam introduced in a disguised formthe argument that the Marines should be re-moved from naval vessels:

It is plain that the work assigned to Marines onboard battleships and cruising vessels of the Navygives them no training or experience whateverwith mines, torpedoes, and other practical work,but this employment simply scatters them in suchmanner that an effective and properly instructedorganization is impracticable. This fact is empha-sized because it has been, and will continue to be,the one most serious obstacle to that organizationand instruction which would make the MarineCorps most effective in time of war, and whichwould at the same time secure homogeneity in ourman-of-war crews and recognize that the bluejacketsare in every way fitted for, and that the) shouldhe instructed in, every military duty on boardship.'

Major General Commandant William P.Biddle answered the charges of Captain Fullamin detail. Perhaps the most poignant reply fromthe CMC was that pertaining to the organiza-tion of the Marine Corps. He said:

- . the subject of a proper organization of theMarine Corps has received the careful study of


Major General William P. Biddle, 11th Commandantof the Marine Corps, 3 February 1911 to 24 February1914. (USMC Photo #308435).

Marine officers of ability and experience and it isbelieved by me and by them that the present sys-tem of semipermanent companies, battalions andregiments is much better suited to the requirementsof the Marine Corps than would be the system bywhich officers and men were attached permanentlyto one organization during their entire service.'4

The President of the General Board, in theperson of Admiral Dewey, carefully exam-ined all of the proposals and criticisms ofCaptain Fullam regarding the Marine Corpsand the Advanced Base Force. He carefullyread the replies to the criticism by MajorGeneral Biddle. Without exception, includingthe proposal to move the Advanced BaseSchool from Philadelphia to Pensacola, Cap-tain Fullam's proposals were logically andsystematically disapproved by Admiral Deweyand the General Board. Admiral Dewey wasparticularly agitated with Fullam's attemptto resurrect the argument concerning removalof Marines from naval vessels, He said:

the General Board does not believe that anyactual economy will result from the removal ofthe Marines from the battleships and cruisers for,as the Marines now are stationed at the batteryand its accessories their places will have to betaken by an equal number of bluejackets. Their

commanding officer, being a division officer, willhave to be replaced by a line officer. The GeneralBoard regrets the renewed agitation of the ques-tion of removal of Marines from ships of the Navyin which the strength of the Marine detachmentis sufficient to demand the presence of a Marineofficer, and it further believes that this action, ifpersisted in, may eventually cause the loss of theMarine Corps to the Navy and its absorption bythe Army."

Captain Fullam should have been awarded amedal as the one most likely to wreck Navy-Marine Corps relations. In spite of the Ful-lams, or because of the Fullams, the Navy-Marine Corps relationship survived and out ofit was forged the Navy.Marine Corps team oftoday.

It was with this background, the MarineCorps Advanced Base Force commenced theAtlantic Fleet Exercises in January 1914. Itwas going to defend thoroughly the advancedbase against invasion. The theories on paperwould now become the realities of a defenseof an invasion. Though not realized at thetime, the exercise was the forerunner of sev-eral phases of what are known no* as amphib-ious operations. At no time was that termused during the period being discussed. TheGeneral Board specifically requested the Ma-rine Corps to give practical instruction andapplication to such items as:

(I) Stowing material on transports;(2) Landing material from the transport to the

beach;(3) Transporting the material from the beach to

the various sites;(4) Preparation of battery sites and mounting of

the guns;(5) Establishment of fire control and observation

points;(6) Planting of mines;(7) Defense of mine fields;(8) Establishment and use of searchlight sta

tions;(9) Exercise with guns, including target practice;(10) Covering the site selected against attacks

from the land, including transportation necessaryfor supply and handling of material."

The Marine Corps phase of the exercise gotunder way when, on 3 January 1914, the FirstAdvanced Base Regiment, a fixed defense regi-ment commanded by Colonel Charles G. Long,sailed from the Philadelphia Navy Yard on thetransport Hancock. The Second Advanced BaseRegiment, a mobile regiment of 27 officerscommanded by Lieutenant Colonel John A.Lejeune, sailed from Pensacola, Florida on thetransport Prairie. 67 These two regiments be-


came the First Advanced Base Brigade underthe command of Colonel George Barnett andarrived off Culebra on 10 January 1914. *

After the exercise Barnett, then Major Gen-eral Commandant reported to the Secretaryof Navy that:

upon their arrival at Culebra the men, withthe advance base material, landed—guns weremounted and proper disposition was made of theguns and material for the advance base defenseagainst an attack by the fleet, who landed forcesfrom the ships. In 6 days time the guns wereall mounted and ready for firing and the islandwas declared in a state of war. From that timeon affairs on shore were conducted as nearly aspossible as they would have been in case of realwar. Bombardments of the shore fortifications weremade, operations were conducted for the discoveryof mine fields and attempts made to drag for themines. Searchlight tests were made, also tests forplotting from the plotting stations of the minecompany. A night attack was made by a landingforce from the fleet, which the umpires decidedwould have been unsuccessful in case of real war,under the conditions existing.'

In an unofficial version of the exercise, Cap-tain Frederic M. Wise recalled:

There was a peculiar situation on Culebra. Ithad no land.locked harbor where we were goingto land, though at another part of the island youcan go through a cut and find a land-locked harborbig enough to shelter the whole fleet. But at thespot where we landed, with a heavy wind blowingup every afternoon, all the material had to belanded mornings. In the afternoon the sea wastoo heavy. Lighters we had carried down on theHancock's deck were swung overboard. Those heavynaval guns were hauled up from the holds, loweredaboard the lighters, and towed ashore by launches.They were skidded ashore, the portable railroadwas constructed up to the gun positions high onthe hills, gun.pits dug, platforms built, gunsmounted. Inside several days, the Island of Culebrawas fortified. Mine fields had been laid while wewere getting our batteries into position. Telephonecommunications were established. An infantry regi-ment had arrived with us. They dug rifle pits. Wewere ready for the "enemy" fleet.

Ten days or 2 weeks after we had the islandfortified, all the preliminaries were completed, um-pires appointed, all the maneuvers started. Thebig ships of the fleet, which were supposed theo.retically to have transports full of troops with them,slipped up under cover of the night, and sentlanding parties of sailors and Marines ashore.They were to capture the batteries and clear thepath for a big landing force. The umpires watched

*Ten days after his return to Washington in Feb-ruary 1914, Colonel Barnett was appointed the 12thCommandant. He became the first graduate of theNaval Academy (Class of 1881) to become CMC, andthe first CMC to be appointed to a 4.year term, inaccordance with a law passed the previous year.

it all. It was one glorious "Fourth of July." Every-body was blazing away. And then the umpiressolemnly announced that the Island of Culebra wasimpregnable, which I always thought was a damnedlie.'9

On board the USS Hancock at Pensacola,Florida, the First Brigade Commander, Colo-nel Barnett, was transmitting the "Report onManeuvers and Operations." In the last para-graph of his letter, Colonel Barnett said "Ihave this day turned over command of theBrigade to Lieutenant Colonel John A. Le-jeune, and I feel that in so doing I amturning over to him a most efficient brigade." 70In general, Colonel Barnett was praisingthe performance of the brigade—an efficientbrigade. The brigade commander's analysisof the exercise had listed several minor fail-ings but did state that "one of the most seriousproblems to be dealt with is the providing ofproper transportation for supplies, guns andammunition, etc., on shore, and it is believedthat a reasonable amount of motor tractorsmust be provided." 71 The Commander in

Signal tower manned by Marines at Vera Cruz, 1914.(USMC Photo #517450).

;-• V .. -

S

—p


Marines leaving for Vera Cruz, 23 April 1914. (USMC Photo #H—276--3).

Horse-drawn 3-inch naval landing gun drill, Camp klliott, Panama Canal Zone, 1913. (USMC Photo #521516)..

.:

BACKGROU ND— 1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 21

Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet, RearAdmiral Charles J. Badger, explained:

the actual establishment of the AdvancedBase at Culebra this winter, the joint exercises heldwith the fleet, and the gun and mine practicesheld have been of great benefit to the personnelof the Brigade. Unfortunately, the gun and minepractices were unavoidably hurried and the maxi-mum benefit could not be derived therefrom. It isstrongly recommended that frequent opportunitybe given for extended Advance Base work of thiskind. . .

The now Major General Commandant andformer brigade commander, George Barnett,replied:

the experience gained in the exercise lastwinter, I have no doubt that the outfit as furnishedcan be standardized and cut down somewhat, as Ifully appreciate the necessity of mobility whichcan only result where the outfit furnished is assmall as possible, considering all the necessities ofthe portions in use.7'

Unquestionably much valuable experience andtraining was gained from the establishment ofthe advanced base at Culebra in January 1914.Many of the mooted questions as to the num-ber of personnel and types of equipment weresettled. Specifically settled was the size of theAdvanced Base Force. Admiral Dewey wrotethat the:

General Board therefore considers that twoMarine Regiments, one fixed defense and one mo-bile, of about 1,250 enlisted men each, regularlydrilled in advanced base operations, is an adequatepeace time provision to defend Culebra or any ofthe advanced base sites so far considered by theGeneral Board. This number is well within thecapacity of the peace complement of the MarineCorps to furnish, and of the Navy to transport.74

The Secretary of Navy, Josephus Daniels,approved Admiral Dewey's and the GeneralBoard's recommendation two weeks later. TheGeneral Board had recommended that the ad-vanced base exercises be held each year as amatter of routine training. History and eventswould interfere with the training until thewinter of 1922. The expeditionary role of theMarine Corps was realized with the landing ofMarines at Vera Cruz in Mexico in April1914, Haiti in 1915, Santo Domingo in 1916,and France in 1917. The decade of the 1920swould see the resumption of advanced basetraining.

The Advanced Base Force, while not des-tined to be actively committed during WorldWar I, was kept intact, numerically at least,

during the war. The potential use of the forcein the Caribbean was always considered. TheGeneral Board felt that one of the immediateweaknesses was the poorly equipped bases inthe Caribbean. The board felt:

in a war with Germany the United Statesmay at some stage in the conflict find Germany onthe offensive with her fleet at large and in a po-sition to operate in the Caribbean against theVirgin Islands, Porto Rico, Cuba and ultimatelythe Panama Canal. To meet this offensive theUnited States must have properly equipped basesin the Caribbean. .

.

Again time and events in other parts of theworld would directly affect the happeningsin the Caribbean. Events in Congress duringthe summer of 1916 would change the MarineCorps for the remainder of the decade, andindeed for the remainder of its history.

"The World Must Be Safefor Democracy"

Woodrow Wilson, War Message,2 April 1917

The Naval Appropriation Bill which be-came law on 29 August 1916 ostensibly author-ized the largest shipbuilding program everundertaken by the United States up to thattime. The Marine Corps personnel bill that wasincorporated into the appropriation bill hadincreased the authorized number of enlistedmen by 5,000, from about 8,000 to over 13,000,and the number of commissioned officers from343 to 600. It also permitted the Marine Corpsto promote to brigadier general, Colonels Lit-tieton W. T. Waller, Joseph H. Pendleton, EliK. Cole, and John A. Lejeune. An active re-cruitment campaign was instituted for enlistedmen, and numerous hours of examination forpromotion of a great many officers and theappointment of many second lieutenantstook place. Another aspect to be consideredwas the acquiring of new bases to train thesehoped-for new personnel. In quick order, SanDiego was chosen by the House Naval AffairsCommittee as the site for the West Coast base.The city of San Diego had donated a largetract of land which was supplemented by thegovernment purchase of additional tracts.

Quantico, Virginia, became the East Coastbase. It had all the area for field exercises,and rifle and artillery ranges. The Commari-dant "did not want a base within the limits ofan active navy yar(1 as the industrial andother Navy requirements paramount there

I

IT


would probably crowd out the Marine Corpsactivities." Expansion of the Marine Corpsbecame a fact. Over a period of approximately

two years, the Marine Corps expanded and de-mobilized in record breaking numbers. Thefollowing figures illustrate these fluctuations:

Commissioned andWarrant Officers

EnlistedMen

TotalMarines

U.S. Declared War 6 April 1917 511 13,214 ' 13,72530 June 1917 776 26,973 27,74913 March 1918 1,389 38,629 40,01830 June 1918 1,503 51,316 52,819Armistice Day 11 November 1918 1,474 70,489 72,96SMaximum Strength Peaked 11 December 1918 2,462 72,639 75,10130 June 1919 2,270 46,564 48,83430 June 1920 1,104 16,061 17,165

"Major Edwin N. McClellan, USMC, The United States Marine Corps in the World War, (Washington: Govern-ment Printing Office, 1920).

U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States—Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington:Government Printing Office, 1960).

"Strength of the Navy, March 13, 1918," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 43, no. 5 (May 1918), P. 936.These figures include USMC reserve personnel and female reservists.

Guidance of all this expansion within theMarine Corps became the responsibility of theadministrative staff departments and the As-sistant to the Commandant, Brigadier GeneralJohn A. Lejeune, and his small working group.They supervised a more than five-fold expan-sion of the Marine Corps. They dispatchedtwo brigades to France, maintained an ad-vanced base force of brigade size, provided ex-peditionary forces in the Caribbean, and fur-

nished security detachments and sea-going Ma-rines for the Navy.78 The best summary of theactions of l\'Iarines in 'World 'War I, is stillMcClellan's account. He observed that:

Within 1 year after the outbreak of war theMarine Corps placed about as many enlisted menin France as there were in the Marine Corps whenwar was declared . . . Approximately 30,000 Ma-rines were sent overseas to join the American Ex-peditionary Forces and 1,600 for naval duty ashore

During the war a great many additional Ma.

Machine gun instruction at Marine Officers' School, Quantico, during World War I. (USMC Photo 2O447).

BACKGROUND— 1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 23

rifle detachments were detailed to guard the radiostations, naval magazines, ammunition depots,warehouses, cable stations and other naval activi-ties, and the detachments already established werelargely augmented . The Marine Corps, whilemaintaining the Fourth Brigade of Marines a totalof .258 officers and 8,211 enlisted men, that foughtin eight battle operations suffering approximately12,000 casualties, placed and maintained the FifthBrigade of Marines of the same strength in France;supplied the Commanding General of the SecondArmy Division, and many officers on his staff; fur-nished a considerable number of officers to com-mand Army units of the Second and other divisions,and for staff and detached duty throughout theAmerican Expeditionary Forces; participated in thenaval aviation activities in France and in the Azores;and during the period of the war succeeded in per-forming in a highly satisfactory manner the navalduties required of it, including the maintenance oftwo brigades of prewar strength standing by toprotect the Mexican oil fields, and as an advancedbase force in Philadelphia; one in Cuba; one inSanto Domingo and one in Haiti; administered andofficered the Haitian Gendarmerie and Guardia Na-cional Dominicana; as well as providing efficient1ariiie detachments for numerous navy yards andnaval Stations in the United States; and in theVirgin Islands; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; PearlHarbor, Hawaiian Islands; Guam; Cavite andOlongapo, P.!.; Managua, Nicaragua; Peking, China;San Juan, P.R.; London, England; Cardiff, Wales;Paris, France; and the Azores; and supplied manyofficers and enlisted men for special and detachedduty at home and abroad.

World War I gave the Marine Corps exper-ience in integrated staff work:

After a study of the British and French ArmyStaffs, as developed through 3 years of combatexperience, the Commanding General, AEF, adopteda system patterned upon the French staff . . . Inturn the US. Army staff system became thoroughlyfamiliar to Marines serving in the AEF. It wasemployed by the 4th and 5th Marine Brigades, asthey were organized under AEF tables of organi-zation. While brigades were the largest Marine unitsto serve in France, individual Marines learned thefunctioning of the staff at divisional level throughassignments to Army Units. A Marine General com-manded the 2d Infantry Division, while otherMarines served on its staff from time to time. Thatthis staff system proved useful for Marine purposesis attested to by the fact that Marine Corps staffdevelopment in the postwar period was based onthe staff of World War J9

Another aspect of Marine Corps experiencefrom World War I was in the aviation field.The relatively new Marine Corps aviationcomponent, on the day the United States de-clared war against the Central Powers, 6 April1917, consisted of four officers and 30 men, allpart of the complement of the Naval AirStation, Pensacola, Florida.80 By the end of thewar, the total officer and enlisted strength ex-ceeded 2,400. The Marine Corps selected andtrained its own pilots and mechanics. They

Planes of the 1st Marine Aviation Force at La Fresne, France, in 1918; on the left are DH—9As of "A" Squadron,on the right is a DH—IB of "C" Squadron. (USMC Photo #529554).


flew just about all types of planes existing atthe time, DeHaviland 4Bs, Curtiss JNs, etc.The 1st Marine Aeronautic Company, consist-ing of 13 officers and 133 enlisted men, de-ployed to Ponta Delgado, Azores, for anti-submarine patrol operations in January 1918.With 18 seaplanes, it was the first fully trainedand equipped American aviation unit to gooverseas in World War J81

In July 1918, the First Aviation Force landedin France. While waiting for their DellavilandDH—4Bs to arrive, the pilots did some moon-lighting with the British and French. This Avi-ation Force consisted of Squadrons A, B, C,D, and Headquarters Company. It was organ-ized to operate under the Navy as the DayWing of the Northern Bombing Group innorthern France. It operated in the Dunkirkarea against German submarines and theirbases at Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges inBelgium. Incidents of Marine aviators destroy-ing a troop train and dropping food to be-leaguered French troops were omtnendablebut isolated.

The war would not be won by Marine avia-tion or any other aviation. The war was a land-mass war—with great armies engaged, sup-ported by artillery, and later tanks. Aviation,in its infancy, had to wait for another day. Itwas ironic that, through no fault of theirown, Marine aviators did not fly support for

any Marine ground forces. It was Major AlfredA. Cunningham, the first Marine aviator andthe fifth naval aviator, who commented that"the only excuse for aviation in aiy service isits usefulness in assisting the troops on theground to successfully carry out their opera-tiOns." 82 Other times and other wars wouldfully justify Marine aviation and what it coulddo in support of the Marines on the ground.

In France in 1918. Left to Right: Brigadier GeneralWendell C. Neville, commanding the 4th Brigade ofMarines; Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D.Roosevelt; and Major General John A. Lejeune, com-manding the 2d Division. (USMC Photo #529042).

CHAPTER II

POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD

America's present need is not heroics but heal-ing; not nostrums but normalcy; not revolutionbut restoration; . . . not surgery but serenity.

Senator Warren C. Harding, 1920

Normalcy, while difficult to define, was whatthe American people wanted. The decade ofthe twenties would usher in a new President,a new political party, and for the Marine Corps,a new Commandant. The American people re-jected the League of Nations and the Democra-tic Party. They wanted to leave the problemsthat international relations brought and returnto the "normalcy" promised by the Republi-cans in the presidental election of 1920. WarrenG. Harding and his party won and, with thispopular support, disowned the League of Na-tions. If the League was unpopular, disarma-ment was not. Senator William E. Borah ofIdaho introduced in December 1920, a monthafter Harding's election, a resolution that wasto become a joint congressional resolution,which favored a tripartite disarmament con-ference. By June 1921, it passed the Senateunanimously and the House by a vote of 332to 4. Harding's Secretary of State, CharlesEvans Hughes, made informal overtures tothe governments of Britain, Japan, France, andItaly in a note of 8 July 1921. He later broad-ened this invitation to Belgium, China, Portu-gal, and the Netherlands. The agenda wasalso enlarged to include not only arms butproblems of the Far East in general. Althougha great Asiatic power, Russia was not invitedto attend since the United States refused torecognize the existence of the Soviets. All butJapan promptly replied with polite enthusi-asm. After a 2½-week delay, Japan acceded tothe invitation to discuss naval disarmament,.On 11 August 1921, Secretary Hughes issuedformal invitations to the nine select powers.Three months later on 12 November 1921,the conference met in Washington with all thefanfare appropriate to the first international

congress of this kind ever to be held in theWestern Hemisphere:

Secretary Hughes, instead of mouthing the usualplatitudes at the opening session, threw a verbalbombshell by suggesting that the nations limit theirnaval weapons and scrap existing ships. He pro.posed that the United States, Great Britain andJapan junk a total of 66 ships amounting to 1.87million tons. Hughes stunned the audience withthis audacious proposal; hushed silence greeted himwhile he read his proposals followed by wild ap-plause at the conclusion of his address.1

"In less than 15 minutes, he destroyed 66ships with a total tonnage of 1,878,043—more,as one British reporter put it, 'than all theadmirals of the world have sunk in a cycle ofcenturies.'" 2 Summarized, Secretary Hughesproposed a 10 year "holiday" in capital shipconstruction; * scrapping specific ships whichwould result in a 5:5:3:1.7:1.7 ratio amongthe United States, Great Britain, Japan, Italy,and France.**

The dramatic announcement vastly short-ened the time of negotiation and helped as-sure the acceptance of the American propos-als. "The reactions of the press and pulpitall over the world were tremendously enthus-iastic. If Hughes' address was intended as anoblique bid for worldwide popular support,it was outstandingly successful." The threegreat powers most concerned, the United States,Great Britain, and Japan, ultimately agreedto the ratio formula but with compromises byall. France and Italy had no problem agree-ing to their ratios.

Considering the time, the United States wasin the mood for massive cuts in the federalbudget. "Senators Henry Cabot Lodge andOscar W. Underwood bluntly informed

*As defined at Washington, a capital ship was awarship. not an aircraft carrier, exceeding 10,000 tonsor carrying guns in excess of 8 inches in caliber.

**The ratio 5:5:3:1.7:1.7 referred to the total tonnageallowed in capital ships as 500,000; 500,000; 300,000;

175,000; and 175,000 tons.

25


Hughes that Congress, ever-conscious of thetaxpayer, would not vote additional burdensin order to attain the costly and unnecessaryhonor of ruling the waves." ' Great Britain,with a badly strained economy, welcomed aholiday in building. By 15 December 1921, Ja-pan consented to the Hughes ratio in spite ofmass meetings in Tokyo and newspaper edito-rials supporting demands for greater tonnage.The alternative, for Japan as well as the otherpowers, was a ruinous naval race. Japan'sreward for her consent to the ratio was thecontroversial nonfortification clause to be in-cluded in the treaty.

America agreed not to fortify her Pacificislands, excepting Hawaii. The United Statesparticularly agreed not to fortify the Philip-pines, Guam, Wake, and the Aleutians. GreatBritain agreed not to fortify Hong Kong, Bor-neo, the Solomons, and the Gilberts. Japan, inturn, agreed not to fortify Formosa or theformer German possessions in the Pacificnorth of the equator, which had been man-dated to her, notably the Marianas (lessGuam) and the Carolines. It would be anunderstatement to say that the nonfortificationclause was bitterly denounced by the Navy:

American naval authorities were shocked at theagreement to forego the development of adequatelydefended naval bases in Guam and the Philippines.To them it appeared that the United States wasautomatically foreswearing the possibility of suc-cessful fleet operations in Asiatic waters and in effectunderwriting Japanese naval supremacy in the FarEast. Subsequent history has of course largely sub-stantiated this view.'

Professor Thomas A. Bailey, American his-torian and writer, asserted:

- . . as far as naval limitation was concerned,the non-fortification agreement was the crucialcompromise. Japan accepted a small naval ratio,but obtained greater security. Britain and Americaconsented to leave Certain of their insular posses-sions inadequately protected, but retained greatertonnage in capital ships.'

In the context of the times:• . . there was a well founded Conviction Ofl the

part of the American delegation that it was bar-gaining away an empty right, one that Congresswould probably either never exercise at all or elseimplement on too modest a scale to make any dif-ference in event of war. After all, both Guam andthe Philippines had already been American pos-sessions for 23 years without anything much beingdone toward military and naval development. Whatreal prospect was there of a change of Americanpolicy? On the other hand, there was good reasonto think Japan would fortify her island posses-sions, in the absence of a treaty prohibition.'

The major achievements of the Washing-ton conference were reflected in the adoptionof three closely interrelated treaties. TheUnited States, Great Britain, France, andJapan agreed in the Four-Power-Treaty to re-spect one another's rights in their insularpossessions in the Pacific and to consult to-gether should such rights be threatened. Withthe addition of Italy, these same nations con-cluded the Five-Power-Treaty with its navalratio and nonfortification clause. "The publicaccepted the Five-Power-Treaty, not as a tem-porary naval arrangement at best, but as thefinal substitute for the irksome necessity ofnaval expansion." S And finally, all thosecountries with interests in the Pacific joinedin the Nine-Power-Treaty in which they un-dertook to respect the sovereignty and inde-pendence of China and to uphold the prin-ciples of the Open Door policy. This then wasthe climate, the climate of disarmament andhopeful peace, that the United States embarkedon in the decade of the twenties.

In America and elsewhere, it is a generallyaccepted sociological certainty that wars,whether the world war variety or the unde-clared Korean and Vietnam types, do affectsociety at all levels. The essence of war trans-forms, for good or bad, the social, political,economic, and military fabric of our nation.The twenties were no exception. Excludingthe military, the bibliography of the "RoaringTwenties" or "Jazz Age" reflected one of thebest documented decades of our history. Themilitary bibliography is sparse. Suffice it tosay the public became less and less inter-ested in war and anything related to it. TheHarding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrationspursued the policy of economy in the govern-ment. Obviously, this policy affected the mili-tary services. It curtailed the personnel strength,equipment, and general spending of the serv-ices. For this period, it would seem that themilitary was in a retrenchment phase. Pos-sibly so, but it did channel the Services intomaking do with what they had and preparingfor war with what they hoped to have. Itgave time to study the lessons of the GreatWar and to experiment.

In a rather paradoxical situation, the les-son of World War I that the Navy and theMarine Corps chose to study was the greatestmilitary failure of modern times—Gallipoli.For decades, Gallipoli would be the symbol ofthe absurdity of endeavoring to land troops

POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 27

and supplies on a hostile shore. The Armywould not give Gallipoli a second thought,primarily because it was in the business ofland-mass warfare and not that of seizing abeach. The Marine Corps, from the late twen-ties up until World War II, would have as anintegral part of its schools' curriculum a defini-tive study of Gallipoli and the how's and why'sof its failures.

The Marine Corps would also experimentwith its own internal reorganization, schoolssystem, and equipment. This decade wouldbecome one of awareness. The most responsiblepeople in the Marine Corps became cognizantof the fact that it could not continue to dupli-cate the Army, as it did in World War I.The Marines, however, by their experience inadvanced base training and vast amount ofexpeditionary service could work out a mis-sion that was, by its very nature, unique forthe Marine Corps.

Evolution of a StaffIn June 1920, the last months of the Wilson

Administration and Navy Secretary JosephusDaniels' tenure, Major General John A. Le-jeune was appointed 13th Commandant of theMarine Corps. He was to have a rather raredistinction of serving three Presidents as Com-mandant and could have been appointed for afourth term had he not chosen to retire in1929. Many problems faced the new Command-ant such as recruiting, officer promotions, andinternal reorganization of Headquarters. Inthe area of recruitment, Congress and spe-cifically the House of Representatives, author-ized certain personnel strength for the Ma-rine Corps. In fiscal year 1920, the authorizedstrength for officers and men was 27,400. TheHouse of Representatives, however, only ap-propriated funds for 20,000 officers and men.Similarly, today's authorized strength of the

Special cognizance

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS, I DECEMBER 920

(Derived from HEADQUARTERS MEMORANDUM of above date)


Marine Corps is 400,000 men as provided forby the National Security Act of 1947 asamended, but actually the appropriated fundsfor the personnel strength for fiscal year 1971was 237,100 men.9 In any event, the recruit-ment drive in the early years of the decadewas a success and the appropriated strengthof the Marine Corps averaged about 20,000men for the remainder of the twenties. TheCommandant unsuccessfully asked Congressfor legislation to change the method of officerpromotions for most years of his tenure asCommandant. The system, with its inequitiesin the examinations adopted by the MarineCorps in 1892, did not keep pace with theArmy and Navy systems of promotions of theirofficers. The Marine Corps would have to wait9 or 10 more years before a "selection" methodof officer promotion was authorized by Con-gress.

In regards to internal reorganization of theHeadquarters, it was apparent to the Com-mandant and to other thinking Marine of-ficers that the Marine Corps could never returnto the pre-World War I years of operation.In those years, the Commandant plus threeor four of his aides could totally managethe operations of the Corps. It would be im-

possible for them to do so in the postwarMarine Corps. As a consequence, the Armystaff system, familiar now to many senior Ma-rine officers with World War I experience,was adopted. It must not be assumed that Ma-rine Corps officers were totally without staffexperience. On the contrary, valuable staffexperience, while not the functional varietyevolved in World War I, was gained by Ma-rine officers serving with the Haitian Gendar-merie and the Guardia Nacional of the Domini-can Republic. In addition, officers serving withthe Advanced Base Force and with the fleetgained valuable staff experience. It is inter-esting to note that a look at the evolution ofthe Officer Fitness Report reflects the emphasisplaced on command and staff assignments.

Prior to 1916, general comments were madeon record cards and in correspondence con-cerning officer qualifications. From about Oc-tober 1916, the Adjutant and Inspector's Divi-sion of Headquarters Marine Corps introducedinto the administrative system Navy-MarineCorps (NMC) Form 652. This form was en-titled "Report on the Fitness of Officers of theU.S. Marine Corps." The form would con-tinually change in subsequent years to add ordelete items deemed essential or nonessential

COMMANIING OFFICER ANI) STAFF, MARINE (ORI'S SCHOOLS, QCANTI('O. VA.. 1927-I92

. t tt to rht I,4,tt, n'it i i \V. Iti 1. i. Na . . , t g-i, 1 3. r W. -

I..-. ..n-3 \V. I, iI.II(Il. it It. fliflILp, 5Ij.r R. L. J,g, tij i it. it, t!I y, \Ttj.''.1. 'i t. ,'I-ht): 1.,\i-i tt, (1at.ir (t. }-t. t''i,i'. It'' [. I.. t.-'_-.

II III ', ,I!tI! .2i.,\ittiui, (tta,1t I'. It. iI.'t ,', I'. itr''Itii.' .\I,u'ie,' te.'' .1 I F!-t J.t-,,',-ii'u,l t. i', itt&tI.','Itt, I_,.tzt t. . '-, , -

- I' -,.- i. I'i-t .t,ut,uint it. A. i'i... iit t,1,trte aster Clerk It. i5an.

Many of the general officers who led the Marine Corps in World War II and the Korean War (Geiger, Denig, Larsen,Erskine, Hermle, Rockey, Nini,ner, Pollock) are included in this group. (USMC Photo #29442).


to the Marine Corps. In the initial NMC form,among the many items under "ProfessionalQualifications," there appeared "AdvancedBase Work" and "Fleet Marine Officer." Thelatter item pertained to a senior Marine officerassigned to the fleet as a staff and liaison of-ficer. In about April 1922, the NMC form wasrevised again and this time "Advanced BaseForce" was deleted but "Force Marine Officer"was added. Force Marine Officer referred toduty with the Expeditionary Forces that wasquite familiar to all Marine officers of thetwenties. The form also reflected new billetsstemming from World War I such as "gas of-ficer," "machine-gun officer," and "DivisionMarine officer." In about October 1926, thefitness report was again updated to the formwhich would be used until about September1935. It was essentially the same form but withthe addition of specific questions as to the fit-ness of an officer to command an organization"appropriate to the next higher grade" suchas platoon, company, battalion, regiment, bri-gade, or corresponding organization.

General Lejeune reorganized his Headquar-ters into a staff system which, in essence, isstill in effect today. The Commandant, in aMarine Corps Order of 1 December 1920, reor-ganized the Headquarters staff as follows (seealso Chart 1):

The Planning Section was expanded into theDivision of Operations and Training, composed ofOperations, Training, Materiel, Military Intelli-gence, and Aviation Sections . . . Although itwas not organized according to the numberedsystem employed by major field commands, theDivision of Operations and Training, neverthelesswas divided into functional subdivisions, encom-passing operations, intelligence, training, and lo-gistics, such as were found in the field-type staff.There was no personnel section, however and theAviation Section was an organization not found inthe executive staff of major field commands. Stafforganization for the control of aviation matters wascomplicated by the fact that the officer in charge ofMarine Aviation served both the Commandant ofthe Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Opera-tions. As first organized in 1919, the Marine Avi-ation Section was directly under the control of theDirector of Naval Aviation in the Office of theChief of Naval Operations. The duties of the Ma-rine Aviation Section included supervision of re-cruiting, training, personnel, and logistical matterspertaining to aviation.

By this organization, the Commandant alsocreated the Personnel, Recruiting, and EducationalSections. Their function was to relieve the Corn-inandant and his immediate aides of what had be-come an unmanageable burden of routine ad-ni inistration .'°

In the field, the reorganization parallelingthat of Headquarters took the form of a func-tionally organized executive staff, combined atthe higher levels with a staff of technical ex-perts. The executive staff, according to a Ma-rine Corps definition, was "that body of as-sistants to the Commanding General of aForce or Independent Brigade of Marineswhich coordinates the work of the Adminis-trative, Technical, and Supply Staffs, and ofthe Troops; and which composes and issuesthe detailed orders by which the decisions ofthe Commanding General are communicated."The tables of organization of 1922, which firstprovided for executive staffs in the MarineCorps, specified that an independent brigaderated a staff made up of B—I, personnel; B—2,intelligence; B—3 operations and training; andB—4, supply. A brigade which was part of alarger unit, however, used the World War I-type staff in which personnel and supply werecombined. Infantry regiments, as part of a bri-gade, had a staff similar to that of an inde-pendent brigade except that the four num-bered sections were designated R rather thanB. Independent infantry regiments had thesesame staff positions as did independent in-fantry battalions, but without the numericaldesignations. Within a regiment, battalionstaffs at first lacked a supply officer, but thisdeficiency was remedied by 1925. By 1936,however, the four section staff had beenadopted for all ground units in the MarineCorps from battalion through brigade level."

Duties and Missions

In 1922, the Commandant wrote to the mem-bers of the General Board recommending tothem that the strength of the Marine Corpsshould be determined by its peacetime dutiesand wartime missions. He was endeavoring topoint out that:

hereas the Conference on the Limitationof Armament has restricted the immediate materialmeans (navies) for waging war on sea, there is norestriction on the size of the mobile forces whichmay he attached to, or be held in readiness forservice with the Fleet. 12

It would be pointed out that the Conference on theLimitation of Armament is synonymous with theVashington Disarmament Conference and the NavalDisarmament Conference. Subsequent American historyhooks use the names interchangeably. As a result ofthe Conference, initially held in Washington, nine sep-arate treaties were drafted and signed.


The Commandant set forth the Marine Corpsduties and missions as follows:

• . • 2. The duties which the Marine Corps is re-quired to perform in time of peace are as follows:

(a) As marine detachments on board the vesselsof the Fleet in full commission.

(b) As guards for navy yards, naval stations, am-munition depots, naval prisons, etc., at home andabroad.

(c) As garrisons for Haiti, Santo Domingo, Vir-gin Islands, Guam, Peking, Managua, etc.

(d) As a mobile force in training for use on ex-peditionary duty abroad for the purpose of carry-ing out the foreign policy of our Government, or foremergency use at home.

(e) As detachments necessary for the recruitingservice, for training recruits, and for adniinistra-tive purposes.

3. The primary war mission of the Marine Corpsis to supply a mobile force to accompany the Fleetfor operations on shore in support of the Fleet:This force should be of such size, organization,armament and equipment as may be required bythe plan of naval operations. Also it should befurther utilized in conjunction with Army opera-tions on shore, when the active wival operationsreach such a stage as to permit its temporary de-tachment fron1 the Navy.

4. (a) The secondary mission of the MarineCorps in time of war is to continue the perform-ance of its peace time duties, as outlined in Para-graph 2, immediately above.13

As it turned out, the Marine Corps wouldnot get the added men requested—that is fromthe appropriated figure of 21,000 to 27,400,the authorized figure. By the end of the fiscalyear 1922, the Marine Corps would balanceout to 21,233, losing 1,757 from the precedingyear. The Navy would balance out to 100,211,losing 32,616 and the Army 148,763, losing81,962.14 The importance of the CMC Memo-randum in February 1922 was not the super-ficial request for added personnel for theMarine Corps, that would become a nationalpastime for succeeding Commandants, it wasrather the terminology and basis for doctrinethat would evolve from it.

In discussing a possible war in the Pacific,the Commandant alluded to the fact that be-tween Honolulu and Manila, the United Stateshad no developed naval base. In a war, such abase would be necessary. "The loss of Guamunder this situation would be most serious andits recapture would he necessary to the conductof successful naval operations in the Pacific."He pointed out that "the advantage of havingimmediately available a mobile Marine Corpsforce adequate to conduct offensive land op-erations against hostile Naval Bases is appar-ent" He recommended that there he adequate

personnel and material to "maintain in readi-ness in the United States on the Pacific Coastand on the Atlantic Coast, the nuclei of suchMarine Corps organizations as may be neces-sary to guarantee success in war to any navalexpedition requiring a mobile land force.- -

"iS The recommendations of General Le-jeune of February 1922, in a routine memoran-dum to the General Board, changed thetactical direction the Marine Corps wouldpursue in the succeeding decades. He envis-ioned a mobile force, a force in readiness, anda force capable of offensive operations. Thisforce would not be seizing an undefended oruninhabited advanced naval base, On the con-trary, "offensive land operations against hos-tile naval bases" would be the task facing theMarine Corps. In the final analysis, was thisnot the birth of the Fleet Marine Force as itis known today?

Maneuvers, Expeditions, Football,and Mail

The Quantico Marine Base having beengreatly improved since its founding in 1917, be-came the home for the Advanced Base Forcefor the Atlantic Coast in 1920. By 1922, "thediscontinuance of the use of the term Ad-vanced Base Force as now applied to organiza-tions of the Marine Corps" was recommendedby the CMC.16 Finally in 1923, "the generalterm Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces shallbe used to designate as a whole, those perma-nently or provisionally organized units of theMarine Corps which are available for overseasservice with the Fleet." 17 The old AdvancedBase Force for the Atlantic Coast was accord-ingly changed to the East Coast ExpeditionaryForce. It was joined in 1925 by a West Coastcounterpart. The West Coast ExpeditionaryForce became a reality with the addition ofMarines from the 4th Marine Regiment re-cently returned from Santo Domingo.'8 Marinesnot involved in expeditionary service in Hon-duras, Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, Cuba,and Chifia were involved in less dangerousbut just as strenuous work called maneuvers:

The first of these maneuvers took place near thesites of the Battle of the Wilderness. A reinforcedbrigade with a considerable amount of heavy equip-ment, including 155 millimeter guns pulled by 10-ton tractors, marched to that area from Quantico.As part of its effort to obtain favorable publicity,President Harding was induced to attend themaneuvers. During the following summer (1922)similar field exercises, but on a larger scale, were


staged at Gettysburg with a small army of about4,000 marines, armed with all manner of equipmentleft over from the World War. They even had a pla-toon of tanks. The Commandant of the Corps com-mented that the organization was a 'miniaturearmy small but highly trained and powerfullyarmed.' President Harding again attended themaneuvers. A bid for publicity was made by there-enactment of Pickett's famous charge in theBattle of Gettysburg. During the following year(1923) the Marines from Quantico went into theShenandoah Valley for maneuvers. Together withthe corps of cadets from the Virginia Military In.stitute, they re-enacted the Civil War battle ofNew Market, in which battle the cadets of thatinstitution had formed part of the Confederateforces. The summer maneuvers of 1924 were heldin the vicinity of Sharpsburg, Maryland, with morethan 3,000 Marines from Quantico and ended withthe spectacular reenactment of the Civil War bat-tle of Antietam, carried Out as a modern attack.This time the reinforced brigade returned throughWashington where it was reviewed by PresidentCoolidge."

There was no question that the maneuverswere important. The Commandant felt that"these . . . maneuvers offered excellent op-portunities in respect to troop and staff train-ing and the testing of equipment and othermaterial." 20 They also did no harm to theMarine Corps image with the American public.Aside from the summer maneuvers, the Ma-rine was involved with guarding the mails,winning national rifle competitions, attempt-ing but failing to build a 50,000-seat stadiumat Quantico, sponsoring a nationally-knownfootball team that after a good fight wasbeaten by the University of Michigan in 1923—26 to 6. The overwhelming importance of thedecade for the Marine Corps, however, wasthe experience gained, along with the Navy,from the fleet exercises held during the wintersof 1922 and 1923 and the spring of 1925.

Fleet Maneuvers—i 922If, as the CMC said, staff training and testing

of equipment were important in the land ma-neuvers held during the 1920s, then the prac-tical and valuable experience gained in thefleet maneuvers were of inestimable value tothe Marine Corps. It is this same period oftrial, error, and sometimes disaster, that com-pany and field grade officers obtained theknowledge that would be the key to the suc-cessful operations of World War II. Mostsenior Marine commanders of the 40s, such asHolland M. Smith, Charles D. Barrett, Alexan-der A. Vandegrift, etc., were participants inthe valuable fleet maneuvers of the l920s. The

first such exercise took place from January toApril 1922 when a Marine expeditionary de-tachment under the command of LieutenantColonel Richard M. Cutts participated in ex-ercises held at Guantanamo Bay and at Culebra.These exercises were designed primarily to testthe possibilities of landing the 155mm gun andaccompanying 10-ton tractor from ship-to-shore in small boats. The 9th Company, 10thMarines, consisting of three officers and 135 menwith one 155mm and two 75mm field guns,one .10-ton and three 5-ton tractors, was landedfrom the USS Florida at Guantanamo Bay."During the period at Guantanamo, close at-tention was paid to the training of the gun'screws and special details, the hardening of themen, and testing out of all material, and com-munication." 21

In March, the company was reembarked inthe Florida and taken to Culebra. The 35thCompany, consisting of three officers and 100men, joined the force at Guantanamo and tookpart in the exercises at Culebra. Material wasagain moved by small boats from ship-to-shoreat Culebra and three problems of attack and de-fense were worked out with the Control Force,U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Lieutenant Colonel Cuttscommented that "it has been conclusively dem-onstrated that artillery up to and including155mm guns and 10-ton tractors can be trans-ported by battleships and landed in ship'sboats." 22

Cutts, however, qualified his recommenda-tion by pointing out that "all conditions mustbe exceedingly favorable to obtain a successfulresult at the land place; more favorable thancan normally be expected." The favorable con-ditions referred to implied that there mustnormally be a calm sea and moderate surf.These ideal conditions that would be rarelyfound in operations such as this did not makethe task impossible. Colonel Cutts recom-mended that a "lighter" be constructed fortransporting heavy guns. "It should not beself-propelled owing to increased weight en-tailed, and the absolute necessity of ground-ing." 23

Four years later, Cutts would get to test atroop and artillery lighter, however, it was notself-propelled. In the summary of his report,Colonel Cutts noted that what must have beenobvious to officers of the Marine Corps that "inattempting to weigh carefully the advantagesand disadvantages of both the attack and de-fense of a base, by far the greater stress has


come on the defense . It is hopedsome method and material may be developedto solve the problem of the attack." 24 In as-sessing the exercises of 1922, the Commandantcommented that "while the exercises of 1922were defensive in their nature, they broughtout the difficulties of attack in landing opera-tions against hostile opposition and the furtherpresumption that the Marine Corps should bepreparing for offensive landing operations inaddition to the defensive advanced base work.25

Fleet Maneuvers—1923—1924

In the winter maneuvers of December 1923through February 1924, the CMC assigned anexpeditionary force of over 3,300 officers andmen under the command of Brigadier GeneralEli K. Cole to Fleet Exercise No. IV. The fleetexercises under the command of AdmiralRichard E. Coontz, Commander in Chief, U.S.Fleet, were conducted at Culebra and theCanal Zone. The force was divided approxi-mately in half with 1,550 men with 6 155mmguns, 12 75mm guns, and 18 machine guns de-fending Culebra against attack. This force wasknown as Marine Corps Expeditionary Force(MCEF), Culebra, P.R. and under the com-mand of Colonel Dion Williams. The defenseforce at Culebra included engineers, gas andsignal troops, plus aviation, balloon service,and antiaircraft units and a light tank pla-toon.26

Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, USMC. (USMC Photo#520349)

Brigadier General Dion Williams, USMC. (USMCPhoto #529182).

The remaining portion of the expeditionaryforces, totalling 1,750 Marines, were known asMCEF, U.S. Fleet, and under the command olGeneral Cole. It comprised a hostile landingforce which effected landings in the PanamaCanal Zone and at Culebra against ColonelWilliams' men. The MCEF, U.S. Fleet com-prised the 5th Marine Regiment, a headquar-ters company, radio service company, gas pla-toon, naval medical corps personnel, and fourArmy liaison officers. To say the results of theexercises were unsatisfactory would have to bethe understatement of the decade. Landingon the wrong beach, boats being lost for a time,insufficient naval bombardment, transportpoorly loaded, etc. were some of the criticismsof what went wrong.27 It was expected thatmany things would not go right. What wasimportant in the exercises of 1924 was theexperience of a large-scale landing and the manyrecommendations to improve future landings.

If one transport was poorly loaded, thefreighter USS Sirius was not. The assignmentof a detachment of 25 Marines and one officer,the forerunner of a combat cargo officer, madecargo off-loading feasible. Colonel Williams re-ported "that the loading and unloading of theSirius constituted one of the most valuable les-sons of the maneuvers." 28 The 1924 exerciseswere significant in that they demonstratedgreat problems that were endemic in a ship-to-shore landing at the time. They also pro-

I


duced the beginning of serious experimenta-tion with landing craft more suitable than thestandard ships' boats. Two types of boats weretested, the first of which was a derivation ofthe British 'beetle" boats first used by them atSuvia Bay, Gallipoli in August 1915. The CMCrequested the CNO to have the one "fifty foot(50') motor lighter, (Beetle boat), nowbeing built at Norfolk, Virginia, placed onboard the USS Henderson" 29 for testing duringthe winter maneuvers. The Henderson, thetransport Chaumont, and the Sirius were theother ships assigned to the MCEF.

General Cole assessed the value of the"beetle boat," officially designated "TroopBarge A," as follows:

We had with us a so-called "Beetle' capable ofcarrying a 75mm gun and about 60 men, or 100riflemen—this is a beginning, but the present de-sign must be altered, if for no other reason thanthat its stowage on board ship reduces the motorsailers by two—i.e. one 50' and one 40', with land-ing capacity of 160 men. Some design must bearrived at whereby a transport can carry boats forat least 60 percent of the infantry force on board,with special provisions for artillery, transporta-tion, supplies, etc. These boats should be sea-worthy enough to allow them to go 20 miles undertheir own power, and if possible of a design to

Unloading equipment of the Marine Corps Expedi-tionary Force at Culebra, Puerto Rico, January 1924.(USMC Photo #516047).

permit their being towed by a minesweeper or adestroyer at reduced speed. A design which willgive protection against machine gun fire and whichprovides for some machine gun fire from the boatis desirable.°

Unloading a 75mm gun from a "Beetle" boat during fleet maneuvers at Culebra, Puerto Rico, in 1924. (USMCPhoto #515227).

_t'I

I!

r

-


Christie amphibian tank, mounting a 75mm gun, istested at the Culebra maneuvers in 1924. (USMC Photo*523 115).

The other boat tested during the wintermaneuvers of 1924 was the "Christie Tank."Unlike the "beetle boat," this test was sched-uled to be a great surprise to Colonel Williams'forces defending Culebra. Its appearance was

attributed to Brigadier General Smedley D.Butler. He had been designated to commandthe MCEF but was replaced by Brigadier Gen-eral Eli K. Cole on 14 December 1923. WhileButler was still concerned with the exercise,he had corresponded with Walter Christie ofthe Sun Shipbuilding Company of Chester,Pennsylvania who had built an amphibioustank in 1922. After successful tests on the Hud-son River in New York and later tests on thePotomac River, Christie asked the CMC to testhis tank in the winter maneuvers of 1924. TheCMC accepted his offer and the Commander inChief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral Robert E. Coontz,gave authorization to the Commander, ScoutingFleet, Vice Admiral Newton A. McCully, totest the Christie Tank.32 General Butler askedChristie and Admiral McCully to keep the useof the tank a secret in order to surprise thedefenders of Culebra.33

The tests were conducted on the Christietank but no mention of it surprising the de-fenders of Culebra was noted in the reportsafter the exercises were over. The CMC notedto the Secretary of the Navy that "two special

1Ien of the 5th Marine Regiment landing at Culebra, Puerto Rico, during fleet maneuvers, 1924. (USMC Photo #515293).

—,

•

ivi I'I


types of boats for landing operations wereused experimentally with interesting, althoughnot decisive results." The Christie tank,while successful on rivers, proved unseaworthy."Even though never perfected, it was theearliest forerunner of the amphibian tractor(LVT) which was to make such a remarkablerecord in World War II."

Aloha—Fleet Maneuvers— 1925

In April 1925, joint Army and Navy exer-cises were held off the Hawaiian Islands. Thenumber of Marines employed was a simulated42,000-man landing force but in reality 1,500took part. An important factor was an experi-ment with the landing force staff. The normalschool activities in the Field Officers School atQuantico were suspended in March and thestudents and instructors all became membersof the "Blue" MCEF (attacking force) of Ex-ercise #3. The group was commanded by Colo-nel Robert M. Dunlap, Commanding Officer ofMarine Corps Schools. "The exercises ... werecompletely successful from the standpoint ofthe Marines. The plans worked to perfectionand the landing was accomplished." ° ColonelDunlap and his staff participated in a Navycritique at the Marine Barracks, Pearl Harborfrom 1 to 4 May. After his return to Quantico,another critique was held there on 1—5 June1925 emphasizing Marine problems. Recom-mendations in the critique ranged from propertactical organization to discarding canvas leg-gins. They pointed out the need for experi-ments to develop a "boat suitable for landingthe first waves ashore on a defended coastcapable of being carried on transports and ca-pable of being turned out in quantity oncewar is determined upon 38

If there was a single unchanging thread inall of the fleet exercises during the 1920s itwas the constant recommendation that a "suit-able boat' be developed to land the landingforces. Marine participation in fleet exerciseswas interrupted for the remainder of the de-cade due to renewed expeditionary commit-ments in Nicaragua, Haiti, and China and thebandits' return to robbing the mails at home.It would not be until 1932 that the MarineCorps would resume its participation in fleetmaneuvers. However, the intervening yearswould bring more experimentation with land-ing lighters and see the development of a mis-sion.

During July 1926, a detachment of Marinesunder the command of Major Maurice E.Shearer was ordered to Hampton Roads, Vir-ginia to make tests of two 50-foot motor light-ers, one for landing troops and the other forlanding artillery. Both lighters were built bythe Navy. The detachment was broken intotwo platoons, the infantry platoon from the5th Regiment commanded by First LieutenantCharles Connette and a section of 155mm artil-lery from the 10th Regiment commanded byFirst Lieutenant Melvin E. Fuller.39 The MotorTroop Lighter was a development from a pre-vious design generally known as the "beetlebarge" It was a "special purpose" lighter tobe used primarily for the landing of the firsttroop wave under fire. Smaller boats carryingabout 100 men were envisioned to be used tocarry the rest of the troops as soon as thebeach had been cleared. The motor trooplighter being tested was 50-feet long and hadabout a 14-foot beam. It was propelled by twomotors, and was armored against small armsfire. It had the capacity to carry machine gunsor 37mm guns for offensive power. The de-signers had no special provisiOns for retractionof this boat from the beach but "if the landingis on a beach of such a nature as to permitwithdrawal they may be used in landing ofsubsequent waves, if not, they afford protecteddressing stations, or even machine gun nests." 40

Lieutenant Connette made three differenttests of the capacity of the boat. He had loadedas many as 126 men with light marchingpacks but concluded that "it would not bepractical to place so many men in the boat inany kind of rough sea." When tests were madein landing the boat, 100 men with heavymarching packs were loaded on board at thenaval base in Norfolk:

The boat proceeded under her own power toOcean View Beach, a distance of about four mileswhere Jandings were made through a very light surf.The boat was put up to the beach with her bowabout three feet clear of the water. The landingfrom boat was made, clearing the boat in twominutes at first trial and about one and one halfminutes at the second trial. Had the front hatchopening been larger the boat could have been un-loaded in less than one minute. The boat left thebeach very easily after being reloaded.1

The 50-foot lighter for landing artillery wasdesigned primarily for a maximum effort oflanding the 155mm gun and its tractor on anystretch of good beach in a moderate surf. How-ever, a secondary purpose was considered in


duct of landing operations." This was in-deed a milestone in the restatement of theMarine Corps mission.

Marine Corps Schools"Education has for its object the formation of

character"—Herbert Spencer

Series "E" light tank of the 3d Brigade being loadedon board ship at Tienisin, China, in September 1928.(USMC Photo #528193),

using the lighter for landing troops, equip-ment, and ammunition, "thus securing distri-bution at beach head, and avoiding congestionat landings which are possible only for ships'boats," 42 The lighter was not self-propelled andhad to be towed by another boat:

It had to be beached stern-to and the gun orvehicle unloaded over a stern ramp. Retractingwas easy but the single disadvantage was that thelighter could not be worked in and beached untilthe beach had been secured.

In 1927, the Joint Board of the Army andNavy* recognized the history, experience, andaffinity for Marine Corps in landing operationsand assigned as a general function the responsi-bility to "provide and maintain forces for landoperations in support of the fleet for the initialseizure of advanced bases and for such limitedauxiliary land operations as are essential to theprosecution of the naval campaign." The re-port further established that "the Marinesbecause of the constant association with navalunits will be given special training in the con-

*As a result of command experiences in the SpanishAmerican War, which showed the need for a betterU.S. military organization to handle preparation ofjoint war plans, the conduct of joint training, andcontrol of joint operations, the Joint Army-Navy Boardwas established in 1903. This body was responsiblefor advising the civilian secretaries on major policiesaffecting the two armed services, It was superseded bythe Joint Chiefs of Staff organization after May 1942.

Formal military education of officers in theMarine Corps only goes back to 1891 whenthe School of Application was founded fornewly commissioned officers. The initial loca-tion of the school was at the Marine Barracksin Washington but subsequently it moved toAnnapolis, Port Royal, Norfolk, and finally toQuantico in April 1917. By 1920, and aftergoing through several name changes, theschool was known as the Marine Officers'School. By July 1922, it had three separatecourses in session—the field officers course, thecompany officers course, and the basic course.For the first time, all courses or, as it evolved,all schools, were located at Quantico. The Ba-sic School would subsequently be moved toPhiladelphia in 1923 but would return toQuantico during World War II.

The curriculum of all of the schools atQuantico, commonly called Marine CorpsSchools (MCS) during the 1920s, was natu-rally Army oriented. This orientation was bydesign, organized as such, because of the recentexperiences in World War I. In addition, alltexts, with the exception of Advanced Basewritings, used by MCS were written by theArmy. Army orientation continued throughoutthe education of Marine officers in that manysenior Marine officers attended the Army WarCollege or the Command and Staff College ofthe Army.

The Army's schools were excellent but bytheir nature patterned for the organizationtraining, equipment, and mission of the Army.The knowledge gained from the Army schoolscould only serve as good experience to theindividual officer and perhaps give him newideas as to how to improve his own organiza-tion, etc. The Marine-Army graduate return-ing to his battalion, regiment, or some staffduty, found an organization, different in num-ber, equipment, and mission. Mission was thekey. What was the mission of the MarineCorps? Marines in the past had had a greatdiversity of jobs. They had been part of a


land mass war, had seized and defended smallislands, fought bandits abroad, had governedwhole countries, and had guarded the mails.In addition, the new decade of the twentiesbrought the further improvement of the air-plane, tank, and radio. How would these newdevelopments be utilized in the spectrum ofpossible missions? How could a school prepareofficers to meet the challenges of carrying Outany of the above mentioned tasks? The an-swer came not by a single, simple order but byan evolutionary process. War plans, preparedunder the Joint Board of the Army and Navy,provided the impetus of the evolutionary proc-ess that ultimately restated the landing opera-tions mission that was the responsibility of theMarine Corps.

With this task in mind, the Marine CorpsSchools would have to develop a course ofstudy of their own. The traditional Armycourses could not give them the answer, theywere not geared for it. One such original workwas the study of the technique of small wars.A vast amount of uncorrelated informationhad accumulated through the years, but no at-tempt had been made to consolidate it into aform which could be used in passing on thisinformation to other officers. In 1922, MajorSamuel M. Harrington, while a student of theField Officers Course, undertook a comprehen-sive study of small wars. As a result, he pre-pared a definitive treatise entitled, "The Strat-egy and Tactics of Small Wars." * AfterHarrington left Quantico, Colonel Ben H.Fuller, Commanding Officer of MCS, requestedMajor Harrington to send him copies of hiswork on small wars "in order to build up acourse strictly [patterned for] Marine Corpswork 46

Colonel Fuller had Harrington's work in-corporated into the school's curriculum. Thispublication presented certain principles oflanding operations, the seizure of cities, andoperations in the field, as they applied to smallwars. It constituted the first consolidated anal-ysis of small wars available for study. Sincesmall wars continued to be an immediate con-cern of the Marine Corps, Major Harrington'swork was the basis for more detailed writingon the subject later. In 1935, a "Restricted"

* Major Harrington had published two articles en-titled, "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars," Ma-rine Corps Gazette, v, 6, No. 4 (December 1921) andv. 7, No. 1 (March 1922). These articles were a con-densed version of his definitive treatise.

book entitled Small Wars Operations waspublished for use within the MCS. In 1940, arevised and corrected version of small warswas published for the Marine Corps by theGovernment Printing Office for general use,entitled the Small Wars Manual.

The curriculum at MCS began to change.As a result of the report of Colonel Robert H.Dunlap, Commanding Officer of MCS, concern-ing the Fleet Exercises of 1925, the CMCdirected that the subject of Overseas Expedi-tions and Ship-to-Shore Operations be devel-oped and made an important feature of thetactical course in both the Field and CompanyOfficers' Schools.47 By 1926, tactics studies em-phasized Marine Corps activity in conjunctionwith the fleet and landing operations. The fol-lowing subjects became part of the MCS reg-ular curriculum: 48

tion

(a) The strategy of the Pacific Ocean(b) Expeditionary forces(c) Naval considerations for an overseas expedi-

Brigadier General Samuel M. Harrington, USMC.(USMC Photo #25101).

(d) Embarking and loading troops and supplies(e) Hydrographic and meteorological study(f) Tactical principles of securing a beachhead(g) Landing places (configuration, terrain, and

naval artillery support)(h) Naval gunfire(i) Beach parties(j) Shore parties(k) Waves(I) Naval provisions for disembarkation(m) Disembarkation

— ii


(n) Boats(o) Night landings(p) Command and liaison(q) Exercise and debarkation(r) Consolidation and exploration(s) Withdrawal

The above subjects of instruction, with re-spect to landing operations, totaled 49 hoursas compared to five hours in 1925. The increasedpart the MCS would play in the developmentof landing operations was reflected in theschedule for the academic year 1927—28. Acomplete revision and expansion of the coursestripled the emphasis on landing operations.MCS added a touch of sophistication with theaddition of Army and Navy Officers as instruc-tors or visiting lecturers. Army officers per-sented topics with respect to their own special-ties. Naval officers quite definitely added theirtalents to the climate whereby landing opera-tions would be made. Some of the lectureswere presented by Captain Ralph M. Griswold,"United States Fleet Operations and the NavalStaff"; Captain Dudley W. Knox, "The Strategy

The Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune,Senator Edward C. Hale, Chairman of the Committeeon Naval A flairs, and Brigadier General Eli K. Cole,at Quantico's airfield on 25 March 1925. (USMC Photo#515907).

of the Atlantic"; Commander Raymond A.Spruance, "Naval Intelligence"; Rear AdmiralFrank H. Schofield, "The Strategy of the Pa-cific"; and Commander Howard M. Lammers,"Naval Gunfire in Support of a Landing."

During the academic year 1928—29, theschools were crippled by depletion of the staffof instructors, most of whom were sent to Nic-aragua. However, this did not result in a de-crease in the emphasis on landing operationsinstructions.50

By 1930, the MCS had become the center forthe development of techniques in landing op-erations. It would be at MCS, in the succeedingdecade, that the experience, theory, and find-ings would be incorporated into a functionalmanual of doctrine.

Aviation—The Magnificent Men inTheir Flying Machines

If ground Marines were making strides inlanding operations during the l920s, the airMarines were making strides in tactics andtechniques in aerial warfare. We have seenthat through no fault of their own, Marineaviators did not support Marine ground troopsduring World War I. However, Marine airmade up for it after the war. Marine aviationunder the command of Major Thomas C.Turner was the only U.S. military air servicethat actually saw combat during the period be-tween World War I and World War II. Marineair served in Santo Domingo from February1919 until July 1924, in Haiti from March 1919to August 1934, and in Nicaragua from 1927to 1933. Throughout those years, Marine pilotswere not only experiencing combat but werealso contributing radically new tactics to bothground and air warfare.5' During this period ofthe twenties, Marine planes and pilots weresent to the Pacific for the first time when theywere assigned to Guam. In April 1927, ele-ments of three squadrons were shipped toTientsin, China in support of the MCEF sentthere. There was no combat action in China—it was centered in Latin America, It was inSanto Domingo in 1919 that Lieutenant Law-son H. M. Sanderson first experimented withdive-bombing.

Sanderson found that he could hit a targetmore often by pointing his plane toward thetarget and releasing his bomb from a make-shift rack after diving to a low level (about250 feet) at an angle of about 45°—the angle


which came to be known as glide bombing inWorld War 11.52

In February 1927, Major Ross E. Rowell,commanding officer of a unit of 6 DHs and 81men, was directed to support the 5th Marinesthat had been dispatched to Nicaragua a monthearlier. Rowell had further experimented withdive-bombing and made it mandatory intraining his pilots. Dive-bombing became astanding operating procedure in Rowell's unitand a first for Marine air. Other services andother countries used dive-bombing developedin their own way. "Most senior Marine aviatorsdoubt that any individual can claim credit fortrying to hit his target by aiming his plane atit." Also in the late twenties, Major EdwinH. Brainard, who succeeded Turner as Officer-in-Charge of Marine Aviation, managed to ob-tain the first plane the Marines ever had whichwas built to transport cargo, the three-engineFokker transport. In 1927, Brainard himselfdelivered the Fokker to Nicaragua for use.After two other Fokkers arrived, Marine cargooperations made military history in flightsmade and pounds of freight carried.5 In an-other first of sorts, a Marine patrol• pinneddown by Nicaraguan bandits spotted severalMarine planes. The patrol laid out on theground panels of cloth indicating the directionand range of the enemy and asked for an airattack. The subsequent bombing and strafingattack became the first known instance of anair attack being directed by ground troops.'5This tactic became a fundamental element ofclose air support later on.

At home, in July 1926, Marine aviation waspreparing for its second class of aerial observa-

tion. The Commanding Officer of the School ofAerial Observation located at Quantico hadrequested the Brigade Commander, MCEF todirect cooperation of the Fifth Regiment withthe Observers School in an air-ground com-munication problem. He considered the prac-tice essential in rounding out the aerial ob-server for work with the infantry. In additionto their normal duties with expeditionaryforces, Marine aviators participated in nationalair races, aerial surveys, night flying, exhibi-tion flying, and other flight training.

By 1930, Marine Corps aviation was firmlyentrenched in two major installations andthree overseas bases located as follows:

Aircraft Squadrons, East Coast ExpeditionaryForce, Marine Barracks, Quantico

Aircraft Squadrons, West Coast ExpeditionaryForce, Naval Air Station, San Diego

Detachments with 2d Brigade, Managua, NicaraguaDetachments with 1st Brigade, Port-au-Prince, HaitiDetachments with Naval Station, Guam, Mariana

Islands

An early Marine transport p/one, the Fokker TA—2,gaining altitude over Lake Managua, Nicaragua, on 9April 1930. (USMC Photo #530022).

I


Lieutenant Christian F. Sc/iilt and his crew standing in front of a DT—2 torpedo bomber at New York in October/925. Lieutenant Schilt was awarded the Medal of Honor for actions in Nicaragua in 1928. (USMC Photo #515971).