TORTS CASE DIGESTS1. Professional Services, Inc. vs. AganaG.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007FACTS:On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid." On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered these remarks: "sponge count lacking 2 and "announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for closure." After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to seek further treatment and was told that she was free of cancer. On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish. The pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery. A complaint for damages was then filed by Natividad and her husband against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividads body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. On February 16, 1986, Natividad died and was duly substituted by her children.ISSUES:1. Whether Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes are liable for negligence andmalpractice2. Whether PSI may be held liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.HELD:This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence, the elements of which are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividads body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampils negligence is the proximate cause of Natividads injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividads vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampils negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.Dr. Fuentes is absolved of any liability. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. Dr. Ampil, being the lead surgeon, was the "Captain of the Ship." That he discharged such role is evident from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision. It was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividads body. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical City Hospitals staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. The failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in fixing the negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.2. Orlando Garcia, Jr. (Community Diagnostics Center) vs. Ranida and Ramon SalvadorG.R. No. 168512 March 20, 2007FACTS: Respondent Ranida Salvador underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostics Center (CDC) as a prerequisite for regular employment. Garcia, a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test. On October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test result indicating that Ranida was HBs Ag: Reactive. The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Dr. Castro as pathologist. When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter apprised her that the findings indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus, based on the medical report submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranidas employment for failing the physical examination. It was later determined that there was an error in the previous examination and that the respondent was not suffering from Hepatitis B. Respondent was rehired by the company.ISSUE: Whether Garcia (CDC) is liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an incorrect HBsAG test result.HELD: The Court held that CDC was negligent because there was no licensed physician in CDC as required by law. CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist. In the License to Open and Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the years 1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Naagas, M.D., Undersecretary for Health Facilities, Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was named as the head of CDC. However, defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community Diagnostic Center nor an employee of the same nor the employer of its employees. Defendant pathologist comes to the Community Diagnostic Center when and where a problem is referred to him. Castros infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory. "Supervision and control" means the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units. Moreover, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of defendant-appellee Castro. Lastly, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the authorization of defendant-appellee Castro.3. DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE v SPOUSES JOHN DAVID Z. GO and NORA S. GOG.R. No. 160889, April 27, 2007QUISUMBING, J.:Facts:Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in OB- Gyne at the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital and was the attending physician of Nora Go who gave birth to her fourth child on April 20, 1992. After giving birth, Nora suffered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which were not completely expelled after delivery. Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood pressure and remained unconscious. To stop the bleeding, Dr. Cantre massaged Noras uterus and ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. John David Go, Noras husband, noticed 2 by three 3 inches burn (as confimed by the nurses) in the inner portion of Noras left arm.2 days later, John filed with the hospital a request for investigation as to cause of Noras injury. The Hospitals medical director Dr Abad called Dr. Cantera who explained that the blood pressure cuff caused the injury. Dissatisfied, John brought wife Nora to the NBI for a physical examination by a medico-legal officer who later on testified that the injury is a burn caused by a droplight when placed near the skin for about 10 minutes and that it cannot be caused by the blood pressure cuff since the scar was not around the arm, but just on one side of the arm. Consequently, the hospital shouldered all the expenses for Noras affected arm skin grafting (in 1992) and another scar revision (in 1993). Unfortunately, the incident left an unsightly mark and pain in her left arm. When sleeping, she has to cradle her wounded arm. Her children cannot play with the left side of her body as the injured arm aches at the slightest touch. Spouses Go then filed a complaint for damages against Dr. Cantera, Dr. Abad, and the hospital.Issue:Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages?Held:Yes, the petitioners are liable for damages. In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur: (a)the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.In this case, all the requisites are present: (a)the injury is not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby; ( b)both the droplight and the blood pressure cuff are instruments within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the "captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeons control; and (c)the injury could only be caused by something external and outside Noras control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. Hence, the petitioner is obliged to pay Nora moral damages. Article 2217 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.4. FILINVEST LAND, INC. V. FLOOD-AFFECTED HOMEOWNERS OF MERITVILLE ALLIANCE, Represented by GABRIEL DELIM and VICTOR RAQUIPISOG.R. No. 165955, August 10, 2007SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:Facts:Filinvest Land, Inc. (FILINVEST) is a domestic corporation engaged in realty development business One of its ventures is the Meritville Townhouse Subdivision (Meritville), the first low-cost townhouse project in Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City, having its project site near Naga River. 54 homeowners, respondents , purchased their Meritville housing units from Filinvest. Subsequently, the Filinvest developed the Meritville area and built new subdivisions built with elevations higher than that of Meritville causing Meritville to become a rains catch basin during the wet season especially everytime the Naga River overflows.Due to perennial flood, the 54 homeowners townhouses suffered severe damages. As such, they sent letters demanding Filinvest to address the problem. In response, Filinvest installed in the area a pumping station with a capacity of 6,000 gallons per minute and improved the drainage system but these measures were not enough.Homeowners then filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint against Filinvest praying that Filinvest be ordered to upgrade the elevation of the affected areas and repair the units from Block 17 to 25. In the alternative, they asked Filinvest to transfer them to its other flood-free housing projects so that they could allowing them to "sell-back" their affected units.Filinvest contends, however, that they already took appropriate measures to prevent flooding of Meritville, as approved by Las Pias City local government. HLURB decided in favor of the homeowners, ordering Filinvest to upgrade the area and pay P25,000 damages to each affected homeowner.Issue:Whether or not Filinvest is liable for damages?Held:No. Filinvest is NOT liable for damages. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Further, negligence is defined as "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do." In this case, there was no showing that flooding was due to the negligence of Filinvest.In addition, prior to developments, there was no flooding in the subdivision. The flooding was caused by Naga river, a public property, hence, it is the it is the Las Pias City government which has the duty to control the flood in Meritville Townhouse Subdivision and should address the problem and not Filinvest. Republic Act No. 7924 (An Act creating MMDA) also provides that Flood control and sewerage management is one of the services to be provided by the individual local government units (LGUs) comprising Metropolitan Manila.5. Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. vs. Tanjangco556 SCRA 154June 27, 2008Facts:The Tanjangcos owns lots located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision managed by Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. On the other hand, the Cuasos own lot adjacent to the lots of the Tanjangcos. Thereafter, Cuasos began the construction of their house over their lot. Before, during and after the construction of the house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual Rules and Regulations of the Association. Unfortunately, the perimeter fence encroached on the lot of the Tanjangcos.Issue:Whether or not Corinthian is liable to the Tanjangcos.Held:Yes. It is not just or equitable to relieve a subdivision association of any liability arising from the erection of a perimeter fence which encroached upon another person's lot when by very its own Manual, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that no construction can be started unless the plans are approved by thr Association.6. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Noble Casiano572 SCRA 71November 27, 2008Facts:Noble is a pocket miner in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet. A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by members of the community. NPC installed high tension electrical transmission lines traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten feet. As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Then he died.Issue:Whether or not NPC is liable.Held:Yes. NPC cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by attributing negligence to the victim. It was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicno to Hogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.7. Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo v. Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., and Contech Construction Technology Development CorporationG.R. No. 170596, November 28, 2008Facts:Petitioner decided to construct a 5-storey concrete building on their lot in Binondo, the NSS Building, and for this project, they contracted the services of Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation (Contech) as their General Contractor. Adjacent to their lot is a semi-concrete building known as the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG Building), owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. (respondent). During the construction of the NSS Building, the respondent received complaints from their tenants about defects in the building. There were cracks appearing on the floors, the steel door was bent, and concrete slabs of the walls were falling apart.An inspection of the premises revealed that the excavation made by Contech on petitioners' land was close to the common boundary, exposing the foundation of the LSG Building. Petitioners had undertaken and completed the repairs on the LSG Building. However, more defects in the LSG Building appeared, i.e., tilted floors, cracks in the columns and beams, distorted window frames. Apparently, the LSG Building was continuously sagging and the respondent felt that it was no longer safe to occupy the building. Thereafter, petitioners and Contech were sued by respondents. The trial court found defendants negligent but plaintiff also with contributory negligence because the LSG Building was originally a 2-storey building that added 2 more floors without the proper reinforcements for its structural integrity. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.Issue:Whether the liability of petitioner be mitigated due to the contributory negligence of respondent Li Seng Giap & Sons, Co.Held:Yes. There is contributory negligence on the part of LSG. The building was supposed to be only 2 storeys. Verily, the foundation of the LSG Building, which was good to support only two floors, remained the same and could not support the weight of the present 4-storey building more so when the adjacent lot was excavated by petitioners. Thus, considering that respondent's negligence must have necessarily contributed to the sagging of the LSG Building, a reduction of the award is warranted. 8. Norman Gaid v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009Facts:Norman Gaid was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the Laguindingan National High School is located. During that time, several students were coming out of the school premises so Gaid drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the school. Michael Dayata (Dayata), a student, attempted to board the jeepney from behild the left side of the road but was not noticed by Gaid and his conductor Mellalos. Dayata was pinned to the rear wheel of Gaids jeepney and was seen lying and caught in between the rear tires. Dayata was brought to the hospital but was later on pronounced dead. Consequently, Gaid was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.Issue:Whether petitioner should be held liable for damages resulting from the death of Dayata.Held:No. The petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the school and he cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the left side.Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Thus, lacking the first element of simple negligence, petitioner should not be held liable.9. Spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio v. Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc., G.R. No. 190601, February 7, 2011Facts:For their wedding, Sps Guanio booked at the Makati Shangri-La Hotel. They claimed that during the reception, the guests complained of delay in service of the food, the salmon were small and didnt correspond to the ones in the food tasting, the hotel waiters were ruled and unapologetic, and that they were compelled to pay for their drinks despite the open bar agreement. Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the RTC Makati. In their answer, the hotel alleged that the reason for the delay was the sudden increase of the guest list from 370 max to 480. The RTC found for the Sps Guanio, relying on the apology letter that said that the hotel disappointed the spouses. CA reversed the RTC decision, holding that the proximate cause of the injury was the unexpected increase in the guests, entirely attributable to the Sps Guanio. Hence, this petition.Issue:Whether the doctrine of proximate is applicable in the case at bar.Held:No. The Court finds that since petitioners complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine of proximate cause finds no application to it. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads:Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.10.FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION VS. DE LOS SANTOS, et alG.R. No. 152033 March 6, 2011FACTS: On September 30, 1984, Teresa Elena Legarda-de los Santos, the wife of respondent Wilfredo de los Santos was fetched by Armando, from Rizal Theater after Teresas theater performance. Armando drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma, a company car assigned to Wilfredo. Two other members of the cast of production joined Teresa Elena in the Galant Sigma. While traveling along the Katipunan Road, the Galant Sigma collided with the shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner Filipinas Synthetic Corp. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12 meters from the point of impact, the Galant Sigma burst into flames and burned to death beyond recognition all four occupants of the car.A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple homicide was brought against Mejia, which was decided in favor of Mejia (shuttle driver). The families of the deceased against Mejia filed a consolidated civil case. The RTC ruled in favor of herein respondents. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the CA and the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.ISSUE: Whether Mejia was negligentHELD:Yes. Petitioner argues that the RTC admitted that De los Santos made a turn along White Plains Road without exercising the necessary care which could have prevented the accident from happening. According to petitioner, the sudden turn of the vehicle used by the victims should also be considered as negligence on the part of the driver of that same vehicle, thus, mitigating, if not absolving petitioners liability.It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by law, specifically Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136. Under the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in the present case, Mejias violation of the traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. A closer study of the Police Accident Report, Investigation Report and the sketch of the accident would reveal nothing but that the shuttle bus was traveling at such a reckless speed that it collided with the car bearing the deceased.11.REGALA VS. CARING.R. NO. 188715 APRIL 6, 2011Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Spirig Street, BF Resort Village, Las Pias City. When petitioner decided to renovate his one storey residence by constructing a second floor, he under the guise of merely building an extension to his residence, to which respondent verbally consented on condition that petitioner would clean the area affected by the work. In the course of the construction of the second floor, respondent and his wife Marietta suffered from the dust and dirt, which fell on their property. As petitioner failed to address the problem to respondents satisfaction, respondent filed a letter-complaint. In his letter-complaint, respondent related that, despite the lack of a building permit for the construction of a second floor, petitioner had demolished the dividing wall, failed to clean the debris falling there from, allowed his laborers to come in and out of his (respondents) property without permission by simply jumping over the wall, and trampled on his vegetable garden; and that despite his protestations, petitioner persisted in proceeding with the construction, he claiming to be the owner of the perimeter wall. In finding for respondent, the trial court declared that, apart from the fact that petitioner knowingly commenced the renovation of his house without the requisite building permit from the City Engineers Office, he misrepresented to respondent his true intent of introducing renovations. On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was negligent?HELD:No. In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained were the proximate effect of petitioners act or omission. It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought respondents consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties.The testimony of petitioner and his witnesses, specifically Architect Punzalan, demonstrates that they had actually taken measures to prevent, or at the very least, minimize the damage to respondents property occasioned by the construction work. Architect Punzalan details how upon reaching an agreement with petitioner for the construction of the second floor, he (Punzalan) surveyed petitioners property and found that the perimeter wall was within the confines of petitioners property; that he, together with petitioner, secured the consent of the neighbors (including respondent) prior to the start of the renovation as reflected in a neighbors consent before the construction began, he undertook measures to prevent debris from falling into respondents property such as the installation of GI sheet strainers, the construction of scaffoldings on respondents property, the instructions to his workers to clean the area before leaving at 5:00 p.m; and that the workers conducted daily clean-up of respondents property with his consent, until animosity developed between the parties.12. Dr Rubi Li v Spouses SolimanG.R. No. 165279 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:respondents 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was suffering4 a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the bone which usually afflicts teenage children. Following this diagnosis and as primary intervention, Angelicas right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells, and hence minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from spreading to other parts of the patients body (metastasis), chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.However, she died, just eleven (11) days after the (intravenous) administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. Because SLMC refused to release a death certificate without full payment of their hospital bill, respondents brought the cadaver of Angelica to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for post-mortem examination.The Certificate of Death6 issued by SLMC stated the cause of death as follows:Immediate cause : a. Osteosarcoma, Status Post AKAAntecedent cause : b. (above knee amputation)Underlying cause : c. Status Post Chemotherapyrespondents filed a damage suit7 against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged them with negligence and disregard of Angelicas safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas untimely demise. Further, it was specifically averred that petitioner assured the respondents that Angelica would recover in view of 95% chance of healing with chemotherapy ("Magiging normal na ang anak nyo basta ma-chemo. 95% ang healing") and when asked regarding the side effects, petitioner mentioned only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness ("Magsusuka ng kaunti. Malulugas ang buhok. Manghihina"). Respondents thus claimed that they would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely assured them of its side effects.In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was not liable for damages as she observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient diedRespondents appealed to the CA which, while concurring with the trial courts finding that there was no negligence committed by the petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that petitioner as her attending physician failed to fully explain to the respondents all the known side effects of chemotherapy.ISSUE:whether the petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side effects to the parents of the child patient who died while undergoing chemotherapy, despite the absence of finding that petitioner was negligent in administering the said treatment.RULING:The petition is meritorious.The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient.51This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from the formers realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating, hence the indispensability of expert testimonies.52There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.64Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelicas parents.When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the procedure.On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence to respondents claim that petitioner told them of 95% chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like petitioner who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of chemotherapys success rate.The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical treatment cannot thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all instances. Further, in a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, "the plaintiff must prove both the duty and the breach of that duty through expert testimony.66Such expert testimony must show the customary standard of care of physicians in the same practice as that of the defendant doctor.67the legal standard of disclosure is not subject to construction as a categorical imperativeNevertheless, juries that ultimately determine whether a physician properly informed a patient are inevitably guided by what they perceive as the common expectation of the medical consumer"a reasonable person in the patients position when deciding to accept or reject a recommended medical procedure."68(Emphasis supplied.) 13. Tison v Spouses PomasinG.R. No. 173180 PEREZ, J.:FACTS:Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney,1 figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City.2The opposing parties gave two different versions of the incident.Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarnis father, was on board the jitney and seated on the passengers side. He testified that while the jitney was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from the opposite direction and encroaching on the jitneys lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was dragged further causing death and injuries to its passengers.3On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.4Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of petitioners. Respondents prayed for indemnification for the heirs of those who perished in the accident, petitioners countered that it was Laarnis negligence which proximately caused the accidenthe Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing the complaint for damages, tThe trial court considered the testimony of Jabon regarding the incident more convincing and reliable than that of Gregorios, a mere passenger, whose observation and attention to the road is not as focused as that of the driver. The trial court concluded that Laarni caused the collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer.The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon caused the vehicular collision.ISSUE:Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?RULING:The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight to this finding greater than the opposite conclusion reached by the appellate court that the driver of the tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision.One reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon was because his concentration as driver is more focused than that of a mere passengerSo that as between the respective versions of the plaintiffs thru their passenger and that of the defendants thru their driver as to the cause or antecedent causes that led to the vehicular collision in this case, the version of the driver of defendant should ordinarily be more reliable than the version of a mere passenger of Plaintiffs vehicle, simply because the attention of the passenger is not as much concentrated on the driving as that of the driver, consequently the capacity for observation of the latter of the latter on the matter testified to which is the precise point of inquiry --- the proximate cause of the accident --- is more reasonably reliable. Moreover, the passengers vision is not as good as that of the driver from the vantage point of the drivers seat especially in nighttime, thus rendering a passengers opportunity for observation on the antecedent causes of the collision lesser than that of the driver.There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligentthe negligence of Gregorios daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident.We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his drivers license,The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision.Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed theretoIn the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer drivers restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license.14) SPOUSES FERNANDO & LOURDES VILORIA vs. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC. (CAI), GR No. 188288 (16 January 2012)FACTSFernando agreed to buy airline tickets on board CAI after Margaret Mager of Holiday Travel (HT) agency informed him that there were no available seats at Amtrak. Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their flight. Mager informed him that flights to Newark, New Jersey, USA via CAI were fully booked and offered the alternative flight via Frontier Air. Since alternative flight would be more costly and would mean traveling by night, Fernando opted to request for a refund. Mager denied his request as said tickets were non-refundable. When Fernando saw an Amtrak station nearby, he made inquiries and was told that there were seats available anytime. Fernando confronted Mager with the Amtrak tickets, telling her that she had misled them into buying CAI tickets by misrepresenting that Amtrak was already fully booked. Fernando reiterated his demand for a refund but Mager denied it.Fernando sent a letter to CAI demanding a refund. Continental Micronesia denied his request and advised him that he may take said tickets to any CAI ticketing location for re-issuance of new tickets. When Fernando went to CAIs ticketing office to have the tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket to Los Angeles under his name, he was informed that Lourdes ticket was non-transferable, thus, cannot be used for the purchase of a ticket in his favor.Sps. Viloria filed a complaint against CAI. CAI interposed, among other things, that it should not be liable for Magers acts because she was not a CAI employee. Citing Articles 1868 and 1869 of the Civil Code, RTC-Antipolo City ruled that Mager was CAIs agent, hence, bound by her bad faith and misrepresentation.On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed RTC-Antipolo Citys decision and ruled that CAI cannot be held liable for Magers act in the absence of any proof that a principal-agent relationship existed between CAI and HT, as the contract was not an agency but that of a sale. Hence, this petition.ISSUEassuming that an agency relationship existed between the two, would CAI be bound by the acts of HTs agents and employees such as Mager?HELDYes. SC mentioned that an examination of its pronouncements in China Air Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, et al. [264 Phil 15 (1990)] will reveal that an airline company is not completely exonerated from any liability for the tort committed by its agents employees. A prior determination of the nature of the passengers cause of action is necessary. If the passengers cause of action against the airline company is premised on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline companys agent, there must be an independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its agent. The mere fact that the employee of the airline companys agent has committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline company liable. There is no vinculum juris between the airline company and its agents employees and the contractual relationship between the airline company and its agent does not operate to create a juridical tie between the airline company and its agents employees. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agents employees and the principal-agency relationship per se does not make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the need to prove the principals own fault or negligence.On the other hand, if the passengers cause of action for damages against the airline company is based on contractual breach or culpa contractual, it is not necessary that there be evidence of the airline companys fault or negligence. As SC stated in China Air Lines, "in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier."SC denied the petition.15) NOGALES vs CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER Case DigestROGELIO NOGALES vs. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER et al.G.R. No. 142625December 19, 2006Facts: Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales ("Corazon"), who was then 37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada ("Dr. Estrada") beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as December 1975. Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales ("Spouses Nogales") to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center ("CMC"). t 6:13 a.m., Corazon started to experience convulsionsAt 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn.At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse. Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was "hemorrhage, post partum.Issue: Whether or not CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.Ruling: Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority.For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC.16) Teoderico Manzanares v. People of the Philippinesgr nos. 153760-61 oct. 12, 2006Facts: At about 2:30 oclock in the afternoon of 13 January 1983, a vehicular collision took place along MacArthur Highway in Bulacan nvolving an Isuzu six-wheeler truck and a passenger jeepney. The Isuzu truck was owned by petitioner Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. and was then driven by petitioner Teodorico Manzanares. The passenger jeepney, on the other hand, was registered in the name of Teodoro Basallo. It was established during the trial that the passenger jeepney was heading southwards in the direction of Manila while the Isuzu truck was heading the opposite way. The incident resulted in the deaths of the driver of the passenger jeepney Jesus Basallo, Miguel Anas, Ferdinand Exaltacion, and Antonio Pasco. It also inflicted serious physical injuries to some of the passengers. The families of the deceased Ferdinand Exaltacion[2] and Miguel Anas[3] instituted separate civil cases for damages against petitioners Manzanares, Manhattan Enterprises, Inc., the latters managing partner, Eduardo Yang, and the operator of the passenger jeepney, Teodoro Basallo. The heirs of Antonio Pasco opted to file a complaint against petitioners Manhattan Enterprises Co. and Teodorico Manzanares. Two of those who sustained injuries also filed their respective complaints against petitioners and Teodoro Basallo. In her complaint,[6] Felicidad Tomaquin claimed that because of the incident, she would not be able to report to her work in a factory for more than twelve months while Cita Vicente demanded that she be paid her salary for the two-month period that she was unable to perform her job as a secretary in a law firm in Bulacan. Teodoro Basallo was sued on the basis of breach of contract of carriage as he was the registered owner of the passenger jeepney. Teodoro Basallo alleged that while he owned the passenger jeepney involved in the collision, the same was on lease to his brother and the jeepneysdriver, Jesus Basallo for P100.00 a day thus, he did not have a contract of carriage with anyone.ISSUE: whether respondent Basallo is presumed negligent having contributory negligence in this case.Held: no. As to petitioners argument that Jesus Basallo should be presumed negligent because he was driving with an expired license and the passenger jeepney owned by his brother Teodorico did not have a franchise to operate, we hold that the same fails to convince. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence.17. Universal Aquarius, Inc. and Conchita Tan v. Q.C. Human Resources Management Corp.FACTSUniversal Aquarius, Inc. (Universal) is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of chemical products in Metro Manila. It operates a chemical plant in Antipolo City. Conchita Tan (Tan), as a proprietor under the name and style of Marman Trading (Marman), is engaged in the trading, delivery and distribution of chemical products in Metro Manila, with a depot in Antipolo City adjoining Universal's chemical plant. Q.C. Human Resources Management Corporation (Resources) is engaged in supplying manpower to various establishments. It supplied Universal with about seventy-four (74) temporary workers to assist Universal in the operation of its chemical plant in Antipolo City.Rodolfo Capocyan, claiming to be the general counsel/national president of the labor organization called Obrero Pilipino (Universal Aquarius Chapter) sent a Notice of Strike to Universal. Resources informed the Regional Office of DOLE that the officers and members of Obrero Pilipino are its employees and not employees of Universal. Five days later, however, Copocyan and 36 other union members of Obrero picketed, barricaded and obstructed the entry and exit of Universal's Antipolo City chemical plant and intercepted Universal's delivery trucks thereby disrupting its business operations. Marman's depot, which adjoined Universal's plant, suffered a similar fate.Universal and Tan filed a Complaint against the strikers and Resources before the RTC of Antipolo for breach of contract and damages suffered due to the disruption of their respective business operations. The strike ended after the forging of an agreement between Universal and Obrero.ISSUEWON Universal and Tan has a cause of action against ResourcesHELD Yes. Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. It is the delict or the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff. Its essential elements are as follows:1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. It is only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.The Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against Resources. The Complaint alleged that Universal had a contract of employment of temporary workers with Resources; and that Resources violated said contract by supplying it with unfit, maladjusted individuals who staged a strike and disrupted its business operations. Given these hypothetically admitted facts, the RTC, in the exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction, could have rendered judgment over the dispute.However, with regard to Tan's claim for damages, the Court finds that she has no cause of action against Resources. A thorough reading of the allegations of the Complaint reveals that Tan's claim for damages clearly springs from the strike effected by the employees of Resources. It is settled that an employer's liability for acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment. The question then is whether, at the time of the damage or injury, the employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer or, independently, in that of his own. An employer incurs no liability when an employees conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of employment. Unquestionably, when Resources' employees staged a strike, they were acting on their own, beyond the range of their employment. Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for damages caused by the strike staged by its employees.18. Cayao-Lasam v. Sps. RamoleteFACTSThree months pregnant Editha Ramolete, respondent, was brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal bleeding. Upon advice of petitioner relayed via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on the same day. A pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak cardiac pulsation. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa." Petitioner performed the D&C procedure. Editha was discharged from the hospital the following day.Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Dr. de la Cruz, Dr. Mayo and Dr. Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus in the latters womb. After, Editha underwent laparotomy, she was found to have a massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy and as a result, she has no more chance to bear a child.Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete (respondents) filed a Complaint for Gross Negligence and Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC). Respondents alleged that Edithas hysterectomy was caused by petitioners unmitigated negligence and professional incompetence in conducting the D&C procedure and the petitioners failure to remove the fetus inside Edithas womb. Petitioner contended that it was respondents negligence and omission in insisting to be discharged against doctors advice and her unjustified failure to return for check-up that contributed to her life-threatening condition.Board of Medicine (the Board) of the PRC rendered a Decision,14 exonerating petitioner from the charges filed against her. The case was then elevated to the CA.ISSUEWON respondent can claim damages against petitionerHELDNo. Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient. There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.Respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that petitioner failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done. Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who was clearly an expert on the subject. Dr. Manalo specializes in gynecology and obstetrics, authored and co-authored various publications on the subject, and is a professor at the University of the Philippines. According to him, his diagnosis of Edithas case was "Ectopic Pregnancy Interstitial (also referred to as Cornual), Ruptured." In stating that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas uterus resulting in her hysterectomy. It is evident from his testimony that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas uterus. the D&C procedure was conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances, and that there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha. In the testimony of Dr. Manalo, he stated further that assuming that there was in fact a misdiagnosis, the same would have been rectified if Editha followed the petitioners order to return for a check-up.Based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Edithas injury was her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of petitioners orders. The immediate cause of Edithas injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury.19. CRESENCIA ACHEVARA, ALFREDO ACHEVARA, and BENIGNO VALDEZ vs. ELVIRA RAMOS, JOHN ARNEL RAMOS, and KHRISTINE CAMILLE RAMOSG.R. No. 175172 September 29, 2009Ponente: PERALTA, J.:FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Arnulfo Ramos in a vehicular accident that happened along Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur. Crescencia Achevara was sued as the operator of the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez (Valdez), which was involved in the vehicular accident.Respondents alleged that Valdez was driving a passenger jeep in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner when he tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. Petitioners denied the allegations and claimed that Valdez was driving southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep coming from the south and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very well knew had a mechanical defect.ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may be held liable for the collision.HELD: The court ruled in the negative. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Valdez was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road. The court finds that Valdez is guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which proximately caused injury to another.However, the court also believes that Arnulfo Ramos is guilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway. An ordinarily prudent man would know that he would be putting himself and other vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk for driving a mechanically defective vehicle. Under the circumstances, a prudent man would have had the owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped using it until it was repaired. Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property.The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite knowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos. The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the defendant who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is made liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be said that it was Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap, Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Considering that the time the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds, he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.20. LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATIONG.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, JFACTS: A vehicular accident took place along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City, between a Toyota Altis owned by C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin (Aquilino), and a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo (Rodel). A passenger of the Altis, Estela Maliwat (Estela) sustained injuries and was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when the Ford Expedition violently rammed against the cars right rear door and fender. On the other hand, Ramos maintained that the Altis crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the MMDA order prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection and the concrete barriers placed thereon.ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos may be held liable for the negligence of his employee Rodel.HELD: There is no doubt that Aquilinos violation of the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident. His negligence is established by the fact that he violated a traffic regulation. This finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code which states that: "Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. According to the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it unnecessary to delve into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.*Causation21)G.R. No. 173146 November 25, 2009AGUSAN DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ANECO)vs.ANGELITA BALEN and SPOUSES HERCULES and RHEA LARIOSANACHURA, J.:Facts:Petitioner ANECO is a duly organized and registered consumers cooperative, engaged in supplying electricity in the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City. In 1981, ANECO installed an electric post traversing Balens residence which was ptotested by Miguel Balen with the District Engineers Office and with ANECO, but his protest just fell on deaf ears. On July 25, 1992, Balen, Lariosa and Exclamado were electrocuted while removing the TV antenna from Balens residence. The antenna pole touched ANECOs main distribution line which resulted in their electrocution. Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa suffered extensive third degree burns. Respondents Balen and Lariosa then lodged a complaint for damages against ANECO. ANECO, however, denied liability, arguing that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents negligence in removing the TV antenna and in allowing the pole to touch the high-tension wires.Issue:WON ANECO's negligence is the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by respondentsHeld:The SC ruled in the affirmative. It held that it is in fact ANECO which provided the proximate cause of the injuries of respondents. One of the tests for determining the existence of proximate cause is the foreseeability test, which provides that where the particular harm was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendants misconduct, his act or omission is the legal cause thereof. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of the law of negligence. To be negligent, the defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risk which made the actors conduct negligent, it is obviously the consequence for the actor must be held legally responsible. Thus applying aforecited test, ANECO should have reasonably foreseen that, even if it complied with the clearance requirements under the Philippine Electrical Code in installing the subject high tension wires above MIGUEL BALENs house, still a potential risk existed that people would get electrocuted, considering that the wires were not insulated.*Human Relation: Intentional Torts22)G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010TITUS B. VILLANUEVAvs.EMMA M. ROSQUETAABAD, J.:Facts:Respondent Rosqueta, formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs, tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Arroyo assumed office. But on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior. Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Valera to Rosquetas position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Villanueva, then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera. Subsequently, the RTC issued a TRO, enjoining defendants from implementing Valeras appointment. While the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in force, Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner, prompting Rosqueta filed a complaint for damages against Villanueva.Issue:WON petitioner Villanueva is liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto caseHeld:The SC ruled in the affirmative. Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 2010 and 2111 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty. It held that Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valeras right to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner.*Human Dignity(guys pasensya na pero ako din naguguluhan at nalilito kung bakit andito ang kasong ito, ilang beses kung binasa pero di ko talaga marelate sa Torts and Damagaes subject natin)23)G.R. No. 186496 August 25, 2009PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.DANTE GRAGASIN y PARCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:Facts:Accused-appellant Gragasin was convicted by the RTC of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. In giving full weight and credit to victim AAAs testimony, the trial court applied the doctrine that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC, but modified the penalty and award of damages. acquittal. The accused appealed contending that his guilt was not proven reasonable doubt.Issue:WON accused-appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubtHeld:The SC ruled in the affirmative. In rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial, not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but because the absence of free consent is presumed. In this case, considering that AAA was barely nine years old at that time, no proof of involuntariness on her part is necessary. AAA, being a minor at the time the act was committed against her, is considered by law to be incapable of consenting to the sexual act. Moreover, not only did AAA identify accused-appellant as her rapist; she also recounted the rape in detail, particularly how the sexual intercourse took place. A rape victim, who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness. With respect to the absence of hymenal lacerations on AAAs genitalia, it is well settled that what is essential is that there was penetration, however slight, of the labia minora, which circumstance was proven beyond doubt in this case by the testimony of AAA. In sum, the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving accused-appellants guilt. On the award of damages, civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape. Moral damages are automatically awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. Exemplary damages are awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. There being no aggravating circumstance that can be considered, the award of exemplary damages would have to be deleted.24.) ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J. DATUING.R. No. 179799 September 11, 2009NACHURA, J.:FACTS: Respondents Emma J. Datuin and Sansio Philippines, Inc. filed an affidavit of complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio a proprietor of Alvi Marketing. The MTC issued a warrant of arrest and she was subsequently arrested while visiting her family house in Quezon City. On the other hand, Gregorio alleged that she could not have issued the bounced checks as she did not have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn; the signature on the bounced checks were radically and patently different from her own signature. Gregorio then filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin, that as a result of her wrongful arrest and arraignment, she suffered helplessness, hunger and humiliation and being distraught. Datuin and Sansio meanwhile filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that Gregorios complaint arose from grounds of compensation arising from malicious prosecution.ISSUES: Is Gregorio entitled to damages arising from her wrongful? (yes)Is the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution?HELD:Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Gregorios civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution. Gregorio claimed damages for the embarrassment and humiliation she suffered when she was suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon City while visiting her family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad in Oas, Albay. Gregorio anchored her civil complaint on Articles 26,[21] 2176,[22] and 2180[23] of the Civil Code. Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin, Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in her complaint. YES. Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.It appears that Gregorios rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Although she was never found at the office address in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives in Quezon City, while she was visiting family. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.25.) PO3 BENITO SOMBILON, JR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 175528 September 30, 2009LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:FACTS: AAA, a fifteen (15)-year old minor, was investigated by the appellant, P03 Sombilon in connection with a complaint for Theft . AAA alleged that Appellant, in conducting the investigation, took her inside a room and locked it. The Appellant pointed a gun at her, and asked her: Did you steal the necklace?. AAAs fingers were then electrocuted. Subsequently, she was asked: Dalaga ka na ba? (Are you a woman now?), and was told: I am single too. Simultaneously, she was touched all over her body including her breasts, her belly, and her private parts. She was also kissed on her cheek. She struggled to resist the sexual advances but Appellant prevailed. Thereafter, AAA was allowed to go home, but because of AAAs condition, her mother brought her to be examined by a doctor. The medical Certificate disclosed injuries on the occiput region, forehead, fingers of bilateral hands, bilateral breast areas and there was slight body tremors, and thus, with the diagnosis of slight physical injuries..ISSUE: Is the accused is guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness as defined under the RPC? Is the victim entitled to damages?HELD: YES. For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness under the foregoing provision, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age.Lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner. The evidence shows that appellant committed lewd acts against AAA when he touched her all over her body. The appellant even previously asked AAA, as if it was a prelude for things to come, Dalaga ka na ba? and thereafter conveyed to her that he is single too. Appellant employed force and intimidation, he pointed a gun at the forehead. Further,the medical Certificate shows that AAA suffered slight physical injuries which include multiple slight contusion of bilateral breast areas.As to the damages awarded, Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that in criminal offenses, exemplary damages as part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In the case at bar, although relationship has not been alleged in the information, the offense having been committed, however, prior to the effectivity of the new rules, the civil liability already incurred by appellant remains unaffected thereby. A The Court declined retroactive application of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: The retroactive application of procedural rules, nevertheless, cannot adversely affect the rights of the private offended party that have become vested prior to the effectivity of said rulesAlso, the Court declared that upon a finding of guilt of the accused for acts of lasciviousness, moral damages may be further awarded to the victim in the same way that moral damages are awarded to victims of rape even without need of proof because it is assumed that they suffered moral injury. Considering the immeasurable pain and anguish that the victim had to suffer in the hands of the petitioner; the trauma that she had to endure even after the incident; and the sexual perversity of petitioner, who is a police officer.26. GMA Network, Inc. vs. Jesus BustosG.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006Facts: In the August 1987 physicians licensure examinations conducted by the Board of Medicine of the PRC, a total of 941 failed out of the 2835 examinees. On February 10, 1998, over 200 unsuccessful examinees filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel PRC to re-evaluate the test papers alleging that there were mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking.Rey Vidal, a news writer and reporter of GMA Network, Inc., was assigned to gather news about said filing of mandamus and after securing a copy of the petition, narrated the news coverage for GMAs Headline News which aired on February 10, 1988. The respondents then filed a damage suit against Vidal and GMA contending that what was reported were false, malicious and one-sided. They further stated that as a measure to make a forceful impact on the latters audience, the former were made use of an unrelated and old footage to make it appear that the doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees. On the other hand, the GMA contended that the report was contextually a concise and objective narration of a matter of public concern and that the press freedom guarantee covered the telecast in question, undertaken as it was to inform, without malice, the viewing public on the conduct of public officials.The RTC found for GMA on the postulate that the Vidal telecast report in question is privileged. The respondents filed for a motion of reconsideration which was denied and thus, went on appeal to the CA. The CA reversed the decision and ordered GMA to pay, in solidum, damages to the respondents.Issue:Whether or not the insertion of the old film footage constitutes malice to warrant the award of damages to the respondents.Held:The award of damages is untenable.An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person. On the other hand, malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous or defamatory remarks made the same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. In the case at bench, the news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of privileged matter, the same being the product of a simple narration of the allegations set forth in the mandamus petition of examinees devoid of any comment or remark. Both the CA and the trial court in fact found the narration to be without accompanying distortive or defamatory comments or remarks. What at bottom petitioners then did was simply to inform the public of the mandamus petition filed against the respondent doctors who were admittedly the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine. It was clearly within petitioner Vidals job as news writer and reporter assigned to cover government institutions to keep the public abreast of recent developments therein. It must be reiterated that the courts a quo had determined the news report in question to be qualifiedly privileged communication protected under the 1987 Constitution. Likewise, the video footage was not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature.27. Joseph Saludaga vs. Far Eastern UniversityG.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008Facts:Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Saluduga was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation due to the wound he sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was filed against him.Saludaga filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a complaint against Galaxy Management and Development Corp., the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within its premises and Imperial, Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner.The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Saludaga, ordering FEU and de Jesus, President of FEU, to pay jointly and severally Saladuga the damages and Galaxy and Mariano to indemnify jointly and severally FEU and de Jesus. The respondents appealed to the CA which reversed the decis