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Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for P Producing collisions for P ANAMA ANAMA , , instantaneously instantaneously Joan Daemen and Gilles Van Assche STMicroelectronics

Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

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Page 1: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 20071

Producing collisions for PProducing collisions for PANAMAANAMA,, instantaneouslyinstantaneously

Joan Daemen and Gilles Van Assche

STMicroelectronics

Page 2: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 20072

OutlineOutline

• Introduction• Structure of a collision in PANAMA• Properties of the non-linear function• Transferring equations• Backtracking cost• Producing the collision• Conclusion

Page 3: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 20073

Structure of PStructure of PANAMAANAMA

• Chaining value (CV)• Starts from 0

• Iterate with input blocks• CV size > input block size (li)

• Do blank iterations• Iterate with output blocks

• Output mapping• Collision in the CV → collision

• Blank iterations make it difficult otherwise

0

Input block

Round

Input block

Round

...

Round

Round

Output block

Round

Output block

...

Blank iterations

Page 4: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 20074

Collision in the chaining valueCollision in the chaining value

• Differential trail• input differences• CV differences

• Collision differential trail• Initial CV difference = 0• Final CV difference = 0

s0

p0

Round

...

DP

t0

s0

RoundDP

t0

s0

RoundDP

t0

s0

p0

p0

Page 5: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 20075

Inside PInside PANAMA = state + bufferANAMA = state + buffer

LFSR

Non-linear function ½

Input

State

Buffer

Page 6: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 20076

BufferInput

Shape of the differentialShape of the differential

• Buffer collisions• Atom• Rijmen et al.• Our attack

• State injection• Five instances of …• sub-collisions

BufferInput

BufferInput

Page 7: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 20077

Sub-collision in stateSub-collision in state

• Two-round differential trail• completely determined by

• 3-block input difference sequence

• State difference • Two differentials over ρ

½

½

p’1

p’2

p’3

V’

W’

Page 8: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 20078

PPANAMA’s state updating function ANAMA’s state updating function ½½

0

°

¼

µ

a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8

A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A0 A1 A2 A3 A5A4 A6 A7 A8

1 3 6 10 15 21 28 413 23 2 14 27 9 24 8

Page 9: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 20079

PPANAMA’s state updating function ANAMA’s state updating function ½½

0

°

¼

µ

a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8

A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A0 A1 A2 A3 A5A4 A6 A7 A8

1 3 6 10 15 21 28 413 23 2 14 27 9 24 8

Page 10: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200710

Differential over Differential over °°

1 1 1 1a0

°

1 1 1 1c0

aa+a0

Page 11: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200711

Differential over Differential over °°a0=0

a2=1

a9=1

a10+a11=1

a11+a12=1

a13=0

1 1 1 1a0

°

1 1 1 1c0

aa+a0

1 1 1 1a0

°

1 1 1 1c0

aa+a0

Page 12: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200712

Differential over Differential over °°a0=0

a2=1

a9=1

a10+a11=1

a11+a12=1

a13=0

1 1 1 1a0

°

1 1 1 1c0

aa+a0

1 1 1 1a0

°

1 1 1 1c0

aa+a0

11111…

1

11111…

1

11111…

1

11111…

1

Page 13: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200713

Differential over Differential over °°

• Given differential (a', c')• Linear conditions on the absolute value a

• Simple condition (1 bit) or parity conditions (2 bits)• Location of conditions only determined by a'• Number of conditions is w(a '), weight of a'

Page 14: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200714

Transferring conditionsTransferring conditions

a(j)

p(j)

a(j{1)

p(j{1)

Immediate satisfaction

Bridge

Page 15: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200715

Counting conditions and Counting conditions and degrees of freedomdegrees of freedom

w(a')-8

w(a')-8

w(a')-8

w(a')-8

Page 16: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200716

The backtracking costThe backtracking cost

-8019311

-62-2661419412

-80-80-80

w(a')-8w(a')

max ∑ w(a')-8

s0

p0

Round

...

DP

t0

s0

RoundDP

t0

s0

RoundDP

t0

s0

p0

p0

Page 17: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200717

BridgingBridging

0

°

¼

µ

a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8

A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A0 A1 A2 A3 A5A4 A6 A7 A8

1 3 6 10 15 21 28 413 23 2 14 27 9 24 8

0

°

¼

µ

a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8

A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A15 A16 A0 A1 A2 A3 A5A4 A6 A7 A8

1 3 6 10 15 21 28 413 23 2 14 27 9 8

A14

24

Page 18: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200718

Dependency removalDependency removal

0

°

¼

µ

a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8

A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A15 A16 A0 A1 A2 A3 A5A4 A6 A7 A8

1 3 6 10 21 28 413 2 14 27 9 8

A14

23

1524

Page 19: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200719

Dependency removalDependency removal

0

°

¼

µ

a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8

A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A15 A16 A0 A1 A2 A3 A5A4 A6 A7 A8

1 3 6 10 21 28 413 2 14 27 9 8

A14

23

1524

1

32

Page 20: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200720

Dependency removalDependency removal

0

°

¼

µ

a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4=0 a5 a6 a7 a8

A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A15 A16 A0 A1 A2 A3 A5A4 A6 A7 A8

1 3 6 10 21 28 413 23 2 14 27 9 8

A14

24

15

Page 21: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200721

Dependency removalDependency removal

0

°

¼

µ

a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a0 a1 a2=1 a3 a5 a6 a7 a8

A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A15 A16 A0 A1 A2 A3 A5A4 A6 A7 A8

1 3 6 10 15 21 28 413 23 2 14 27 9 8

A14

24

a4=0

Page 22: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200722

Producing the collisionProducing the collision

• Choose a differential• Least number of conditions to be bridged

• Work out the equations• Immediate satisfaction• Bridges• Dependencies

• Finally, it takes• 35 input blocks• 30 bridges• So a total of 65 evaluations of the round function

Page 23: Producing Collisions for PANAMA, Instantaneouslyradiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/PanamaAttack-Presentation.pdf · Fast Software Encryption 2007 1 Producing collisions for PANAMA, instantaneously

Fast Software Encryption 200723

ConclusionConclusion

• PANAMA hash function is broken• Source file to generate collisions available

• The way forward: RADIOGATÚN• Feedback from state to buffer• Lower number of input words per round• Backtracking cost• Ongoing

http://radiogatun.noekeon.org/panama