Proclus vs Plotinus on the Procession of Matter

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Horizontalism or Verticalism? Proclus vs Plotinus on the Procession of MatterAuthor(s): Gerd Van Riel

Source: Phronesis , Vol. 46, No. 2 (May, 2001), pp. 129-153

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Horizontalism or Verticalism?

Proclus vs Plotinus on the Procession of Matter

GERD VAN RIEL

One of the central topics of the Neoplatonic debate on matter is the ques-

tion of how it relates to the One Good. The basic Neoplatonic claim is

clear enough. If one maintains that the Good is the first and omnipresent

principle of reality, then matter, too, must be originated by the Good. This

indeed is the claim that distinguishes Neoplatonism from gnostic dual-

ism. Most Neoplatonists, particularly in the later tradition, took it that mat-

ter for this reason cannot be evil. But even those in the school who held

that matter is evil (this was Plotinus's own thesis) did accept that, ulti-

mately, matter stems from the One Good. Of course, the latter position

requires a subtle argument to prove that an offspring of the Good can turn

out to be evil.

In the present article, we shall briefly present Plotinus's explanation of

matter's being evil while stemming from the One, and confront it with the

doctrine of the later Neoplatonists. We intend to show that the central

point of difference between Plotinus and his successors on the issue results

from a difference in perspective. Plotinus, on the one hand, proposed a

vertical or hylemorphic scheme: he considered the emanation of real-

ity from the One as a process in which a substratum (generated by a

higher level) receives its specific form from above. The later Neoplaton-

ists, on the other hand, presented a horizontal scheme: they held that

the procession consists in the combination of two elements at the same

level, which are modalities of a duality of primordial principles. We shall

argue that this shift between Plotinus and his successors is the result of a

new reading of Plato's Philebus.

1. Plotinus's Hylemorphism

In Plotinus's treatise on evil (Enn. I 8, n? 51 in the chronological order),

matter and evil are said to be identical: they are non-being, not in the

sense of a mere otherness (trFp6trj;, cf. Plato, Soph. 257 c-258 c), but as

the contrary of being,' without, however, losing real existence. Plotinus is

? Koninklijke Brill NV Leiden 2001 Phronesis XLV12

I Enn. I 8, 3.7-9; cf. II 4, 16.1-5: Is matter, then, the same thing as otherness? No,




13 GERDVANREL

aware of possible objections against this thesis, the most important one

being raised from an Aristotelian point of view. For, according to Aris-

totle, being has no contrary. An opposition can only exist between char-

acteristics or attributes within one single genus or species; in that case, the

contraries are those characteristics that are at the greatest possible dis-

tance from one another.2 Plotinus answers that this objection is valid, if

one confines being (ousaa) to concrete individual substances. But at a

general level, being as such does have a contrary. It consists more pre-

cisely in the absence of everything that determines being.3 Needless to say,

Plotinus here makes a shift from the Aristotelian notion of oiaoia (trans-

lated as substance ), to the Platonic oui'aa, which is intelligible being,

the separate existence of the forms. In this perspective, the contrary of

being must have a very specific nature: as opposed to being's full deter-

mination, it must be fully undetermined; it must lack all measure, all limit,

all quality and form, etc. It is mere indeterminacy, a limit concept that

can only be grasped with a bastard reasoning (voOo; Xoyiyozo6) based on

its effects.4 Moreover, the privation of the forms is the privation of the

Good, since, as Plotinus explains in Enn. VI 7 [38], 15-18, a form is

rather it is the same thing as the part of otherness which is opposed to the things which

in the full and proper sense exist, that is to say rational formative principles. [all the

quotations of Plotinus's Enneads are taken from the Armstrong translation]

2 Arist., Cat. 3 b 24-26; 6 a 17-18: Substances never have contraries. How could

first substances have them - this man, for example, that animal? Nothing is contrary

to them; neither is anything contary to 'man' or 'animal' [i.e., in general, taken as

genus or species].... We call those things contrary which, being within the same class,

are most distant the one from the other . [tr. Cooke, modified]

I Enn. I 8, 6.27-42: But if the Good is substance, or something which transcends

substance, how can it have any contrary? That there is nothing contrary to substance

is established by inductive demonstration in the case of particular substances; but it

has not been demonstrated that this applies in general. But what can there be contrary

to universal substance and, in general, to the first principles? Non-substance is con-

trary to substance, and that which is the nature and principle of evil to the nature of

good: for both are principles, one of evils, the other of goods; and all the things which

are included in each nature are contrary to those in the other; so that the wholes are

contrary, and more contrary to each other than the other contraries. For the other con-

traries belong to the same species or the same genus and have something in common

as a result of this belonging. But things which are completely separate, and in which

there are present in one the contraries to whatever is necessary for the fulfilment of

the being of the other, must surely be most of all contraries, if by contraries we mean

things that are furthest of all removed from each other.

I Cf. Plato, Tim. 52 b 2, quoted at Enn. I1 4, 10.6-11, and 12.33. See also I 8,

9.14-18.




HORZONTALISMOR VERTICALISM? 131

&yaeorE8&;,5 i.e., it conforms to the nature of the Good, and it transmits

goodness to the lower realms. According to Plotinus, the existence of this

non-being can be deduced in analogy with the affirmation of the existence

of the ideas: just as that which is measured (TO gEgETpr?vov) cannot be

measure itself (to g?tpov), that which is unmeasured (lo &`Cgtpov) cannot

be unmeasuredness as such (i1& a&spica).6 So there is a kind of participa-

tion, pointing towards the existence of an essential form that plainly and

fully is that which is participated in by concrete things. If, then, we find

ways in which things fall short of determination, then the absence of all

determination should have an existence in itself, with this oddity that the

'common character' of the participants in this case is the absence of any

characteristic. This pure absence of all determination is evil, primary evil,

which is participated in by all particular, secondary evil things.7

The basis of this theory is the Aristotelian concept of prime matter, to

which - if we can assume that he believed in it - Aristotle himself appears

to attribute indeterminacy.8 However, according to Aristotle, that does not

mean that matter is privation. As he says in the Physics (192 a), priva-

tion and matter are one in substratum, but two in definition . This means

that privation is the absence of a certain characteristic that should, or

could, be present in a given substratum. Plotinus disagrees with this weak

definition of privation. Again, he accepts the suitability of Aristotle's theory

in the case of individual, concrete substances, but he radicalises the theory

by accepting that the substratum, matter as such, is privation. This identi-

fication of the substratum and privation entails that when a form or charac-

teristic is imposed on matter, its privation is not extinguished, but rather

preserved. It undergoes the imposition of the forms, without being altered

itself, i.e., without losing its essential indeterminacy.9

The Neoplatonic version of hylemorphism thus assumes not a mere

abstract difference between matter and form, but rather a contrariety or

contradiction, a loose combination of two independent elements. It is mat-

ter that makes that a thing is deficient in comparison with the forms.

Because of matter, a thing is not what it should be or could be.'0 Matter

is receptivity for the forms, but at the same time - and on this point the

I Cf. Plato, Rep. VI, 509 a 3.

6 I 8, 3.23-35.

7 1 8, 4.1-12.

8 Arist., Met. IX 7, 1049 a 24 - b 3.

9 II 4, 16; cf. O'Brien 1996, 178-181.

10 Corrigan 1996, 32-33.




132GERDVANREL

Neoplatonists depart from Aristotle - matter displays a fundamental resis-

tance to the forms. It will never be completely formed, since it has a

force that devours, or corrupts, the forms.'2

The characterisation of matter as the totally indeterminate substratum

requires an explanation of how this substratum is produced. Plotinus

asserts that matter is a stage (the very last stage, to be precise) in the ema-

nation of reality from the Good. In the ongoing multiplication of things -

by which the distance from the Good increases - the force of the Good is

ever decreasing. Matter is to be situated at the point where the force of

the Good comes to an end in a total i'cFtWt;. Hence, it is evil.

2. Procession through the Creation of a Substratum

Enn. V 4 [7] is one of the main texts in which Plotinus expounds his views

of the procession of reality from the One. Here he writes if there is any-

thing after the First, it must necessarily come from the First; it must either

come from it directly or have its ascent back to it through the beings between,

and there must be an order of seconds and thirds, the second going back

to the first and the third to the second .'3 Plotinus immediately chooses

the second option: reality comes from the first principle through clearly

determined stages, each of them producing the subsequent realm. The

question is then raised how the First can produce multiplicity without los-

ing its uniqueness and self-sufficiency. If the first principle , Plotinus

answers, is the most perfect of all, and the primal power, it must be the

most powerful of all beings and the other powers must imitate it as far

as they are able. '4 The first is the principle of everything, because it is

the &6vagit; [CWv iivltov.'5 In this sense, the One is unlimited: it cannot

have anything outside it, and hence, it cannot be bound within limits.'6

Aristotle also held that the receptivity of matter sets limits on the imposition of

the forms, stating that not any portion of matter is susceptible to any form. Plotinus

radicalises this idea, putting the emphasis on the proper dynamic of the predisposition

of matter, which in itself is refractory and goes counter to the form. Plotinus finds

support for this idea in a passage of Plato's Timaeus (41 b), where it is asserted that

the universe is composed of voi; and 6cvac?'y, this necessity being interpreted as the

refractory nature of matter. The same goes for the ancient nature (&pxacia qpiat;) of

the Politicus (273 b), which, according to Plotinus, is matter before it has been struc-

tured by the demiurge; cf. 1 8, 7.6.

12 2 8, 8.19-28.

3 V 4 1.1-5.

14 V 4, 1.23-26.

' 5III 8, 10.1.

16 V 5, 10.18-23, where Plotinus paraphrases Plato, Parm. 137 d 4-8.




HORIZONTALISMOR VERTICALISM? 133

Moreover, being perfect, it contains everything in it. The Aristotelian

notion of potency is enlarged here to an active power to produce the

lower,'7 even though Plotinus does not use the term active potency , as

do Aristotle'8 and later Neoplatonists.'9 Plotinus uses a more simplified

terminology, drawing an opposition between the 6iUvojit; (or creative

power) and ro 8uvaiget (meaning the receptive potentiality, which is restricted

to the sensible world).20

This account should not lead to premature conclusions. For the state-

ment that the One is the power of everything does not mean that the

generative power in question can be attributed to the first principle with-

out qualification. If that were the case, then this attribution would cer-

tainly threaten the One's absolute unity. Therefore, this phrase should be

taken in a weaker sense, assuming that this so-called power of the One

can only be demonstrated ex effectibus. Indeed, the procession of lower

reality from the One follows a very specific procedure. It does not imply

any kind of creation, but rather it assumes a self-development of the

lower. For the One does not give being, it only provides the possibility to

develop being. In a famous formula, Plotinus states that It [i.e., Intellect]

received from the One a potency to produce and to fill itself with its off-

spring; thus, the One gives what it does not have itself. 2' Indeed, the One

cannot have a power, since that would jeopardize its unity. This power,

then, will only have true existence at the level of Intellect, where it reveals

itself as a trace of the higher.

The procedure through which the One produces a potency , i.e., an

indeterminate substratum that subsequently develops its specific mode of

being, can be followed in the first place on the level of Intellect. As we

have seen, Intellect receives a potency to produce and to fill itself with its

offspring.22 This potency, Plotinus says, is transmitted from the One to

Intellect in the same way as fire emits warmth, or as smelling objects

' Cf. Bussanich, 1988, 30; Narbonne 1993, 29.

1 Arist., Met. IX 1, 1045 b 35 - 1046 a 35.

19 In Proclus, the distinction between active (or perfect) and passive (or imperfect)

potency is one of the central features of the doctrine of SAvcRtt;; cf. infra.

20 Enn. 1I 5. Corrigan 1996, 106-115 argues that the omission of the Aristotelian

terminology is an effect of Plotinus's conviction that matter is identical with privation:

in fact, although matter is said to be potentially all things , it is not affected by the

imposition of the forms, and, hence, it cannot be said to have a passive potency. It

is not shaped by the forms, but merely receives them.

21 VI 7, 15.18-20.

22 This means that the Intellect actualises the potency of the One. Consequently, the

Intellect can be called the first ?V pyrcEa of the Good (I 8, 2.21; cf. III 8, 11.1-5; V

3, 12.27).




134 GERDVANREL

spread their perfumes: they do so as an additional result of their proper

activity, i.e., as a superabundance that does not affect the substantial activ-

ity or the essence of the bearer.23

The production of Intellect is realised in two different phases. Origin-

ally, the Intellect was completely absorbed by the One. It did have the

capacity to contemplate, but without thinking (e,BXrisv avofr4).24 So there

was no voib, but only a direct contact (Oi't; icai oiov e9acpij),25 a state

which, in the description of the return of reality towards the One is

called the loving intellect (voi; epiv).26 In a second phase, Intellect

receives the compressed power to produce everything. Since, however, this

power was too strong, the Intellect had to fragment (auve'9paue) it in order

to make it bearable. In this way, Intellect became a unity-in-plurality: it

filled itself with separate parts. These parts are the Forms, which thus stem

from the One (being the result of the power of the One), but which only

become Forms on the level of Intellect, and according to the specific mode

of being that prevails in that hypostasis.27 Thus, the Forms have the form

of the Good , and the Intellect is good as well, being the unity of all the

Forms: it is a polychrome goodness (&yAxov lotKiXov).28

A similar explanation can be found in Enn. III 8, in a passage where

Plotinus raises the question of how the Intellect can become a multiplic-

23 V 1, 6.30-37; V 4, 2.26-34.

24 VI 7, 16.14.

25 V 3, 10.42; cf. Trouillard 1955, 46.

26 VI 7, 35.23-27.

27 HOE 6E [sc. r& OEo,pO'gteVa] Eii air6v [SC. TOV VOVV] oi'X 'W 'ICri iV, &X

l io; rcyxEv (VI 7, 15.13-14). Hadot 1988 translates: Ces Formes sont venues dans

l'Esprit, non pas telles qu'elles etaient dans le Bien, mais telles que l'Esprit les a

acquises. Armstrong writes: But they came to it, not as they were there, but as

Intellect itself possessed them. And Brehier has: Le Bien vient en elle [sc. l'Intelligencel,

non tel qu'il est dans sa transcendance, mais telle qu'elle peut le recevoir. The lat-

ter interpretation is not correct: the Good itself does not descend. The subject of the

phrase is not rO ayaOov, but ra Ortpo4tirva. However, the real problem with this sen-

tence lies in X5 avo'&; eaxev : this cannot mean here as intellect itself possessed

them (Armstrong's translation; cf. also Sleeman-Pollet 1980, s.v. ?%1tv Ad). For

Intellect did not possess the Forms before. Presumably, this consideration inspired

Hadot and Brehier to render i''Xev as it acquired or received the Forms, although

this meaning of the word is not attested elsewhere. The best solution is to give 6;

VaXev the meaning of EXo followed by an adverb: to be (such and such) [attested

with 6k in Plotinus: cf. Sleeman-Pollet 1980, s.v. ?eXrtv Ba]. The objects that are con-

templated can only become objects when they assume the typical mode of being

that governs the realm of Intellect. Cf. VI 7, 32.34-36: the beauty of the Good is form-

less, and manifests itself in a different way (&XXov TpO62ov) in the Forms.

28 VI 7, 15.23-24.





ity, if originally it formed a unity with the One. His answer is that when

Intellect contemplates the One, it never does so as if it were a unity (in

that case, indeed, there would be no Intellect at all). But beginning as

one (apEa6gvo; &,; 'v) it did not stay as it began, but, without noticing it,

became many, as if heavy (Itepapirgvo;), and unrolled itself because it

wanted to possess everything - how much better it would have been for

it Plotinus ironically laments,29 not to want this, for it became the second. 30

In this way, Intellect reveals the unlimited power of the One. As a mat-

ter of fact, Intellect is the first to be truly unlimited, since, as we have

seen, this kind of attribute cannot apply to the One without denying its

unity. This unlimitedness of the Intellect is the substratum that undergoes

the operation of the One. In that sense, it can be called (intelligible) mat-

ter: For in the intelligible world, too, matter is the unlimited, and it would

be produced from the unlimitedness or the power or the everlastingness

of the One - unlimitedness is not in the One, but the One produces it. 3'

Subsequently, this substratum receives its definite structure, not by an

additional operation of the One, but rather by a self-development of the

substratum. Thus, the limit, measure, or order, is not imposed on the sub-

stratum as an extemal factor; rather, it appears at the decisive moment at

which a certain being develops its own specific nature. This self-develop-

ment is accomplished through a return to the One. At Enn. V 1, 7, Plotinus

writes the following: How does it [i.e., the One] generate Intellect?

Because by its return to it, it sees: and this seeing is Intellect. (...)

Intellect, certainly, by its own means even defines its being for itself by

the power which comes from the One (...). Intellect sees, by means of

itself, like something divided proceeding from the undivided, that life and

thought and all things come from the One, because he is not one of all

things; for this is how all things come from him, because he is not

confined by any shape; that One is one alone: if he were all things, he

would be numbered among beings. For this reason that One is none of

the things in Intellect, but all things come from him. This is why they are

29 Obviously, Plotinus does not consider it as a real possibility that the Intellect

would have chosen its own fall. This interpretation, which was held by Ph. Merlan

(1975, 124), was convincingly refuted by Bussanich (1988, 82-83), following Rist

(1967, 341): [this passage] does not mean that it [i.e., intellect] recklessly broke away,

but that it has 'faced up' to living apart after its generation - indeed it had no option .

30 III 8, 8.30-36.

31 II 4, 15.17-20; cf. V 1, 5.6-9, where the Pythagorico-platonic dyad is identified

with intelligible matter (cf. Szlez6k 1979, 77 and 85; Narbonne 1993, 65; Bussanich

1988, 119).




136GERDVANREL

substances; for they are already defined and each has a kind of shape.

Being must not fluctuate, so to speak, in the indefinite, but must be fixed

by limit and stability; and stability in the intelligible world is limitation

and shape, and it is by these that it receives existence. 32

Thus, apart from the unlimitedness, Intellect also receives limit from

the One, albeit in an indirect way, i.e., when it turns itself towards the

Principle. At that moment, it truly becomes Intellect (icai voi) iirl Nv).33

This scheme of production is repeated at every level of reality: first, the

power of a certain being brings forward an undetermined substratum at a

lower level, and subsequently, by turning itself to its origin, this substra-

tum develops its own specific being. That is to say, this substratum is not

completely undetermined:34 it has the capacity to develop its own shapes

and forms. Or, in other words, the forms are not imposed from elsewhere,

but they are potentially present within the substratum; they only need

the return towards the origin to be actualised.

At the lowest level of reality, this scheme returns in a very particular

way. In order to be active and fertile, the soul has to produce a place

(o6o;) to live. Thus, the (lowest, i.e., the vegetative) soul produces an

undetermined substratum that will undergo its activity, just as was the case

at the higher levels. However, this lower substratum is very particular, in

that it completely lacks the possibility to develop its own determination:

Just as everything which was produced before this was produced shape-

less, but was formed by turning towards its producer and being, so to

speak, reared to maturity by it, so here, too, that which is produced is not

any more a form of soul (for it is not alive) - but in this case, it is absolute

indefiniteness. For even if there is indefiniteness in the things before it, it

is nevertheless indefiniteness within form; the thing is not absolutely indefinite

but only in relation to its perfection; but what we are dealing with now

is absolutely indefinite. 35 This particularity is due to the fact that the

power that originally came from the One has been extremely weakened.

We have reached the edge, and there is nothing below it. The last pro-

duct of the emanation, i.e., matter, brought forward by the soul, is not

capable itself of turning itself to its producer. This means that any deter-

mination will have to be imposed on the substratum. In other words, the

32 V 1, 7.5-6;13-14;17-27. Cf. II 4, 5.31-34: The movement and otherness that

came from the First are undefined, and need the First to define them; and they are

defined when they turn to it ; see also V 3, 11.1-15.

33 VI 7, 16.20.

34 Cf. III 4, 1.12-14.

35 III 4, 1.8-14.




HORIZONTALISM OR VERTICALISM? 137

soul will have to deliver a second effort. After having produced the sub-

strate, the soul has to turn back to the lower stage, in order to bring beauty

and form in it.36 The determination, then, remains entirely external to the

substratum: as we have seen before, matter's indeterminacy is not extin-

guished by the soul's imposition of forms, it just undergoes it without

losing its own nature.37 In that sense, Plotinus declares that the soul only

conveys an image (E'8oXov) of form to matter.38 The first aspect of deter-

mination is the introduction of a receptivity: the completely indeterminate

substratum is perfected (trXztoU'uvov) in the sense that it is made capa-

ble of undergoing the determination of the forms: When it is perfected

it becomes a body, receiving the form appropriate to its potentiality, a

receiver for the principle which produced it and brought it to maturity. 39

This receptivity in itself, then, is good. Without the receptivity of matter,

evidently, the forms would be powerless in the sensible world. Hence,

Plotinus states that matter spreads itself out under the soul and is illu-

mined '. So, ultimately, there is an element of goodness in matter, which

is really the last thinkable stage the good can reach: an openness or recep-

tivity to the good. However, in itself, matter is mere darkness, and imme-

diately darkens the sparkle that comes from the soul. In that sense, matter

can be seen as the cause of evil: the soul has to turn back to the lower

in order to bring the forms in it. When the circumstances are favourable,

the soul does so without losing sight of the higher (which it takes as the

paradigm of the images it produces). However, it always risks going astray

when it just looks down. For the lower has a refractory nature, resisting

the operation of the soul; this always threatens the soul with being merged

in matter, and so with being cut off from its elevated origin.4'

This gives us an account of how matter can be derived from the One.

It is the totally indefinite substratum, in which the power of the Good

comes to an end. Its production reflects the way in which all other levels

of reality come to be, with the difference that the lowest substratum is

wholly incapable of developing determination out of itself.

The scheme is a vertical, or hylemorphic one, placing the indetermi-

nacy at a lower level (and ultimately, the true or complete indeterminacy

36 IV 3, 10.20-42.

3 Cf. II 4, 5.15-18 (the body as a veicpOV KEKOCanRtVOV).

38 IV 3, 10.38-41.

39 III 4, 1.14-17.

40 I 8, 14.38.

41 IV 3, 10.22-27; for Plotinus's theory of the cause of evil, see O'Brien 1993, 19-

49; Corrigan 1996, 32-101 and 180-256; Schafer 2000, 1-35.




138 GERDVANREL

at the bottom of the system), and bringing in determination from above.

This makes it very difficult, in the end, to explain how matter can be

derived from the good, and how it is not a separate principle of evil. For

this reason, the later Neoplatonists refused to take over Plotinus's view.

3. Procession through a Triadic Structure

According to the later Neoplatonists, matter proceeds from the Good in a

straightforward way. Matter is not evil at all. It is good and even divine

(FvOEov).42 The basis for this claim is to be found in the later Neoplaton-

ists' interpretation of Plato's Philebus. Here (i.e., Phil. 23 c-30 e), they

argue, Plato presents a very important analysis of the highest levels of

reality, stating that the One Good, or the Cause, is immediately followed

by a duality of principles (nipa;, or the Limit, and at`nlpov, or the Unlimited).

These principles are present throughout all reality, everything being a

combination of the two. Hence, at every level of reality, there are two ele-

ments, each belonging to either one of the two principles.

This new interpretation was established by Iamblichus,43 who because

of his Neopythagorean interests paid particular attention to the fourfold

classification, and especially to the duality of nc'pos and axetpov presented

in this dialogue. From lamblichus onwards, this high esteem for the prin-

ciples of the Philebus becomes common doctrine in the Neoplatonic

school. Furthermore, it was combined with the dual scheme of iU'nap4tq

and 8evajW that figures in the Chaldaean Oracles.4 Of course, there were

debates on more than one of the implications of this interpretation (such

as, e.g., on the possibility of accepting a contrariety at this very high level

of reality, a point raised by Damascius, as we shall see below), but on

the general outline of the theory, all authors agreed.

Thus, we have a very sophisticated scheme in which the nature of mat-

ter can be linked to the nature of the Good. We shall concentrate on Proclus's

presentation of the issue, as it is the best documented version. In his view,

Limit and the Unlimited receive their bnoO6aota from the first principle,

being a revelation of its nature. Hence, they are the central elements in

the explanation of the production of multiplicity from the First cause. For,

42 Procl., De malorum subsistentia X, 34.17 (quoted below).

43 For Iamblichus's interpretation: see Van Riel 1997, 31-46.

4 Or. Chald. fr. 4 Des Places. Cf. O'Meara 1989, 93: lamblichus produced an

enormous Chaldaean Theology in which the Chaldaean Oracles were interpreted with

the help of the Pythagoreans and of Plato's Philebus.





in the first place, the principle can only produce unity, and this unity

is as it were crystallised in the principle of Limit. In order to explain

the existence of multiplicity, another element is required: a principle that

governs the development of the lower from the absolute One. These two

principles are directly linked to the First, of which they are the first mani-

festations, while at the same time being the ultimate stage in the ascent

towards the First. Apparently, the plenitude of the First can only be expressed

by a duality of principles.

According to Proclus, the first of these two principles, i.e., nipaq, is that

which defines the limits of a being, thus providing a separate existence:

The Limit determines (&apopi4t') every being, it circumscribes (irrpi-

ypaipq) it and places it within its own boundaries ((MiatrCrv E'V o1K1ot?po?t) ...

so that every being has its own nature, boundary, property and place

through the first Limit. 4

Thus, the existence of a being is the result of the first Limit's (bo icpGnov

nrEpa;) delimitation of the being as a separate entity.46 It receives a proper

existence (the IU'nap~t; of the Chaldaean Oracles) as a result of the oper-

ation of ntpa;. For a being would not be able to exist without constitut-

ing a separate unity. So the operation of ir'paq consists primarily in the

unification that is required for a being's existence.

Hence, Proclus declares that ic'pac is the first One, or the One in the

true sense of the word , as opposed to the First principle, which could

only be called One in a metaphorical sense: The First is not truly one,

for it is superior, as it has been declared many times, even to the one.

Where, then, to situate the one that is completely one in the true mean-

ing of the word? There is a one that precedes being, which even produces

being, and which is primordially the cause of being, since that which pre-

cedes this one transcended even the unity and the cause; it had no rela-

tion with anything and was imparticipable, exceeding everything. 47

The principle of Limit is the first real One, which gives a lasting prop-

erty (6vqio; ibt6'rS)48 to beings, and everywhere in reality it guarantees

the gov1l, i.e., the preservation of unity within the multiplication.49

This principle governing the govil does not give rise to multiplicity.

Since the principle of Limit can only produce unity, the production of

41 Procl., In Crat. 42, 13.21-22 and 24-26.

4'6 Cf. In Tim. III 176.1: o ?PSpo; Xal TO ipa; c(pOepEl riiv iSrap tv icauTou.

47 Theologia Platonica (TP) III 8, 31.12-18 [ed. Saffrey-Westerink, my translation].

48 TP III 9, 37.25-26.

49 TP III 8, 32.15-25.




14 GERDVANREL

multiplicity from the One must be due to the operation of a different prin-

ciple. Clearly, the procession of reality is brought about by a generative

power (yEvvlt d &)vag.u)50 of the higher. Since it is impossible to ascribe

anything, including a power , to the First, this generative power must

occupy a separate place in the system, apart from the First and from Limit.

Like the Limit, the generative power constitutes a series, having mem-

bers at every level of reality: every being is productive in one way or

another, since producing is a characteristic of being itself. The series is

governed by the principle of Unlimitedness (6o a&itpov), which causes the

procession of reality.5

Why is this 6`clpov immediately associated with creative 6i'vapt;?

First, of course, there is the evidence of the Chaldaean Oracles, which

posited &6vagi; as a complementary term over against U'nap4t;. Proclus

also provides a more substantial argument. He agrees with Plotinus52 that

on the intelligible level the unlimitedness can only be a qualitative one,

stated in terms of &13vait;.53 For true being does not have any extension

or any part. It is the most similar to the One, as standing closest to it,

and it is most nearly akin to it .54 If, then, actual multiplicity is opposed

to the One (i.e., it is to be situated at the opposite side of reality), then

potential multiplicity must stand as close as possible to the One. Mul-

tiplicity qua &6va;l; is inversely proportional to actual multiplicity.55 In

other words: on the basis of this analysis, Unlimitedness qua &uvapit is

linked to the highest levels of reality, where the actual multiplicity is

minimal, if it exists at all. The closer to the One, the greater the Avvast;.

This identification of &i?ltpov with &vvaRt;, combined with a hierarchy

of the different manifestations of 6{cv4x1t (depending on the distance from

the One), leads to the conclusion that the 'a'ielpov itself exists in different

degrees. In his Elements of Theology, prop. 95, Proclus expresses this idea

in the following way: The more unified potency is always more infinite

than one which is passing into plurality .56 The argumentation given in

50 TP III 8, 31.18-23; III 12, 45.4-6; Elementatio Theologiae (ET) 56, 54.21-22;

125, 112.9-10 fed. Dodds].

5' TP III 8, 32.21-23.

52 Plot., Enn. II 4, 7.13-20; 10.1-35. Plotinus dwells on Aristotle's analysis of the

aWetpov in Physics III, 4-8.

S ET 86, 78.19-20: Flav to `vuo; ov &n-tpov ?o-tlv OVT?- KcaTaT TO sXfo; o006te KaTa

tO JE?YE00;, acX& MT&ta t'JV 68vcCpv ovi6v [tr. Dodds].

2' ET 86, 78.26-27: Evort oTaTov, &TE EMTytQT(O tOV E'VO TEMay>IEVOV, KQI TO) EVI

OW5F?V6tGtOV.

ss ET 86, 78.28-80.14.

56 ET 95, 84.28-29: faa 8i&vaut; ivitmoxr_pa oi&aa t1; nxVOxvog-Vs; &ilpot?px.





support of this proposition restates the thesis presented at prop. 86: when

things are divided or multiplied, the potency becomes manifold as well.

Division enfeebles the potency, while multiplication breaks its unity.

But how can something be more infinite than something else? To

explain this paradoxical statement, Proclus refers to the hierarchical struc-

ture of reality, claiming that all infinitude in things which have Being

is infinite neither to the superior orders nor to itself'.57 Apparently,

infinitude is a qualification attributed to that which is at a higher level,

to indicate the incomprehensibility of its compressed power. This is due

to the fact that the lower is produced by the higher, not because the higher

wishes to produce, but because of a superabundance of its power (I'rnppoki

or RcEptoia O' v6oa;I).58 This superabundant power of a higher level is

incomprehensible for the lower, in which the actual multiplicity is greater.

There is, then, a chain of successive infinite powers: every being is pro-

duced by the infinite power of a higher being, and has in its turn an infinite

power to produce a lower being. This scheme presupposes a twofold

understanding of the notion of 6vva,ugt. On the one hand, it is the lower

being's participation in the &Uvagl; of the higher, which brings it about

that the lower being can exist; on the other hand, it is the zuvaxg; of the

lower itself that brings it about that it can produce the subsequent level

of reality. This twofold understanding is deduced from Plato's Sophist,

where the Eleatic Stranger makes the following observation: I suggest

that everything which possesses any power of any kind (6o 0'nouvoiv

[ttva] KFicTnEj?Vov 5wvvagtv), either to produce a change in anything of any

nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause,

though it be only on one occasion, has true being. For I set up as a de-

finition which defines being, that it is nothing else than power (&wcqvap;) .59

Proclus discusses this text twice in the third book of the Platonic Theo-

logy.' He always stresses the distinction between what Plato calls to 'otoux-

VOiV KEKtT7jE'VOV 86vcgitv and 8Uva1uy. Although this does not seem to

correspond to Plato's intentions (probably Plato only wanted to introduce

some variation in his terminology, using 8&vxjvict; as a metonymy of

everything that possesses any power of any kind ), Proclus recognises a

hierarchical structure in the text: The Eleatic Stranger first calls being

57 ET 93, 84.1-2: HI&v T6O ai1Etpov EV Tot; OUaIV OQUit ?Otq 1pKEt4tEVO1q aEtpOV ErtiV

G1)te Elavrp.

58 ET27, 30.25-32.9; 71, 68.9-16; 121, 106.16-22; 133, 118.18-19; cf. Gersh 1978,

33-34.

59 Plato, Sophist, 247 d 8 - e 4 [tr. Fowler].

60 TP III 9, 39.4-14 and 21, 74.11-18.




142GERDVANREL

'endowed with power' (6vva6.jivov),6' because it was produced, so to

speak, by the presence (getovxaia) of the first 6iuvaoit, and it participates

in existence (iSicap,t;) thanks to the Limit (nipa;), and in 6'vx,ua;, thanks

to the Unlimitedness (a&intpia). Then he defines being as 6iUvvau;, because

it produces and generates everything, and because it is everything in a

unitary way (ivoEt&C;). 62 Being is used here to denote what is called

elsewhere the monad of being ,63 the first being that contains all beings

in a unitary way . It is the first mixture of Limitfiv6ap4t; and the Un-

limited. This being, Proclus maintains, possesses S&)vaji; in two ways. It

not only participates in the first Unlimitedness, but it also is &)vat; itself,

being that which produces all the subsequent levels. As the first offspring

of a&r6olepa4 and aUn,ouanetpia,M this first being is exemplary for every-

thing that will follow. Everywhere in reality, 6uCt1pix will be present, and

all beings will have an infinite generative power vis-a-vis the lower.65

As S. Gersh has remarked, this scheme implies an interesting transfor-

mation of the Aristotelian doctrine of &6vaj;. The author reveals two cen-

tral modifications: (1) the Neoplatonists apply the doctrine per analogiam

to the intelligible world: the gods, the divine intellects, and the divine

souls. Thus, one is entitled to use the terms of act and potency within

theology, bearing in mind that they only dimly reflect processes which

transcend man's full understanding . With regard to the sensible world,

the authority of Aristotle is not challenged, and the scheme remains valid

without any modification. (2) The doctrine is combined with the Neo-

platonic theory of emanation. The succession of the different levels is now

explained as the actualisation of that which was potential at the pre-

vious level. '6

61 Coni. Saffrey-Westerink pro Uvvacuv ex 8uvaOCgv() mss. Proclus must envisage

here what was called TO xFcrTngEvov &6vagtv in the Sophist. If the conjecture of

Saffrey-Westerink is correct (which seems to be the case, given the fact that the same

term is repeated, in an identical context, and without textual problems, at 21, 74.11),

one may say that Proclus's rendering of the text is rather free. Nevertheless, he gives

the impression of considering 8ovipevov to be a literal quotation (in III 9, 39.4-14

and 21, 74.11-18 alike). Hence, we think that Proclus's Sophist in fact did read 6vva-

jEvov here. Perhaps, the interpolation of [Ttva] in the textual tradition of the Sophist

passage can be explained as the remainder of a variant (6otocoIv) 6iva(gevov) .

62 TP III 9, 39.5-10.

63 TP III 9, 36.2-3: i] yap C'oToODaia ravtov ?CaTi T(l) ovtcv aKp tpo cai otov gova;

4 For the terms au't67Epaec and ox'rroawrpia, see In Parm. VI, 1121.21 and 33; ET

92, 82.30.

65 See, e.g., TP III 12, 45.3-6, and III 9, 39.11-14, quoted below.

' Gersh 1978, 32-33.





Although these remarks reveal the core of the Neoplatonic modifica-

tions of the Aristotelian doctrine, one should add another element of equal

importance. Apart from the application of the scheme of &6vai; - vpycla

to the intelligible world, the distinction between the potential and the

actual is adapted to the &uvaqtt; itself. This explains the occurrence of

expressions like 8vcvCCgt; icaT EvEpYErv : the power that becomes opera-

tive in actu. This actual &Uvajl; is opposed to the &vvaxi; that is not yet

active, called Kpv(pia qvatt; , as in the following passage: Every-

where, the power (&vvagt;) is the cause of the creative processions (yovi-

Ji)V icpoo6wv) and of all multiplicity: the hidden power (cpu{pia vvagc4;)

is the cause of the hidden multiplicity (KpxMpiou 1ck10oo);), whereas the

power that is actualised and that has manifested itself is the cause of com-

plete multiplicity (Q &e cat' 'veplyexav iwa EavUiiv CnCP1Va(s, toil nawvrEXo). 67

The icpinpia S&vajt; is a kind of potentiality, but it would be too

simple to identify it with Aristotle's notion of TO a I6uae.68 For the

Aristotelian potentiality is the receptivity of a substratum, awaiting the

imposition of the form. Proclus's icpUvia uvaIt; is not receptivity, but

the generative power that is not yet actualised.

To understand fully what Proclus meant by indicating the potential-

ity of the power with the term latent or hidden (Klpulpia), one should

be aware of the fundamental difference he makes between StIpiv o;

and i'pipiw'; . In the procession of reality, each level is the manifesta-

tion of that which was hidden at the previous stage: The multiplicity is

present in a hidden way and without distinctions in the first beings,

whereas it is present in a divided way in the subsequent beings. For the

more a being is akin to the one, the more it hides the multiplicity and is

determined only according to unity. 69

A higher level in reality is always more unified than its offspring.

This implies that the gradual procession can only take place when the

multiplicity is present potentially in the higher. However, this potential

multiplicity does not threaten the unity of the higher: it is a multiplicity

67 TP III 9, 39.11-14. The ai$vat; lcar' ?VFpYFtav (i.e., the actualisation of the gen-

erative power) should not be confused with the va'wt; toi Ic=t evepyeclav which is

discussed in, among other passages, ET 78, 74.15-16. The power of that which is

actual comprehends the entire generative power, whether it be potential or actual. It

is the power through which one act can produce another.

6 Gersh 1973, 43, does not make the distinction between the KpuwPia &6vc4u; and

Tr6 8vairt: The notion of the 'occult' nature of power is full of religious significance

for Proclus, but despite this added level of meaning, we can easily recognize it as that

which is, in more prosaic moments, simply styled potentiality .

69 TP III 9, 39.20-24.




144 GERDVANREL

without any distinction, which will only reveal itself when it becomes

actual at a lower level.70 Proclus thus indicates that the multiplicity is pre-

sent in nucleo, or compressed , in the higher. For the high degree of unity

at that level did not allow the multiplicity to reveal itself.7'

This relation of `q(pCvot1 marks the relation between the First and the

principles of xicpa; and anictpov themselves. Proclus often quotes a phrase

from the Philebus, where Plato says that the god has shown nt'pa; and

&Xlctpov (TOV Os6v ?X&o7gEsV lELo.) TO pEV O&IrEpOV 86itl T&)V 0VToV, TO 6i?

ncEpa;, Phil. 23 c 9-10). Proclus consistently replaces the 6rat of the

Platonic formula with the term CK(pativEv , thus stressing the fact that, in

his interpretation, the two principles are the manifestations of the First.

This manifestation has a peculiar meaning: Proclus deduces from the

quoted phrase that the god is the n7oar0Ttii; of the two principles.72

Thus, making use of the principles of nEipo; and &iseipov as the first

manifestations of the First principle, Proclus is able to explain the preser-

vation of unity as well as the production of multiplicity in the procession

of reality. For the unity (warranted by the operation of ic'po; at every

level) always potentially contains the multiplicity of the lower, while the

principle of multiplicity governs the transition from a hidden to a man-

ifest &vvagt;. Being the manifestations of the First, the principles of iep;a

and &1XEcpov themselves must stand as close as possible to the origin of

all reality. They will reappear everywhere in reality, constituting all beings

as a combination of two elements at the same level.

The first glKTO6V, which is the result of the operation of the principles

of 'epa; and anitpov, is intelligible being (vo1Ti-i o'ioaio), encompassing all

beings. At TP III 9, Proclus explains how this ItK?oV is produced from

the preceding principles: The mixed proceeds from the First, as we have

said, and it is not only composed of the two principles that come after the

First, but it also proceeds from them. It is triadic: in the first place, it par-

ticipates in the ineffable unity and in the entire hypostasis that comes from

the God; from the Limit, it gets its existence, its uniformity and its last-

ing property, and from the Unlimited it has its power and the hidden

<inclusion> of everything in it.73 For, generally speaking, since it is one

70 Thus, e.g., concerning the production of the intellective level (VOEpOv) by the

intelligible (vollrov): In Parm. IV 973.17-21 and TP III 3, 12.23-13.1; concerning the

relation between the discursive reasoning of the soul and the unitary vision of the intel-

lective realm: In Parm. III 808.6-24.

1 Cf. the notion 'vawt; ?viaia in ET 121, 106.10-12.

72 TP III 7, 29.28-30.2; 8, 30.19-21; 32.3-4. Cf. Van Riel 2000, 402-406.

mss. Kaci riv iv aik&4 cpiptOv rdwv t6vvrow * In a footnote, Saffrey and

Westerink add <iteptoXilv>, without, however, adopting the conjecture in the text. In





and not one, its 'one' exists in accordance with the Limit, its 'not one' in

accordance with the Unlimited, while the mixture and totality of these two

is derived from the First. 74

From this presentation of the first gItKtOV, we can deduce how Proclus's

system works: the gtucotv possesses inoouatLc; as well as uiSapt; and &Uvapi;.

It receives its in6caTacl; from the First,75 while its viSiapRtq is derived from

itEpCC;, and its vcvagt; from &iaprpia. Thanks to the Limit it is a separate

entity with a lasting existence, and thanks to the Unlimited it receives a

generative power and potentially contains everything.

The question, then, is which role should be attributed to the First. How

to explain that, on the one hand, everything gets its unity from the

First ,76 while, on the other hand, the cP'?66po cZvwat; proceeds from the

existence of the One (aob t5; inbap4ro; 'ob evo6;)77 - a formula which, as

we have seen, serves to denote nipa;? As we have seen before, nrEpa; is

the One in the true sense of the word . This could seem to suggest that

the operation of Limit is identical to that of the First. However, there is

an important difference between the two. The unity provided by nEcpa; is

mere existence, without any further determination. The unity that comes

from the First, on the other hand, is the combination of this act of being

with generative power. This combination gives rise to a real being : a

being that has a proper character and a proper place in the structure of

reality. These elements are constitutive for the irn6aucat;,78 which is pro-

vided by the First.79

any case, the meaning is clear: Proclus intimates the presence in the first being of a

multiplicity which is not yet actually developed (Saffrey and Westerink highlight the

parallel with KpU(Ptov nXii0o; at 39.2-3). See also the term Kps(pia inepto i' at ET 152,

134.11.

7 TP III 9, 37.21-38.3: HpO6E1ai iEV <01V> LWK TOV) lp3TOA) TO RIKTOV, (007EE ETE1tOgEV,

KOa osiK E?TtV LK TOWV iT TO rE6V &pxv iOVOV, rpO6ett SE Ki EK TOUT(V, t Ec& TI Tpl-

auto6v, d1v ?'iV 1pcPrrV i K TOV ) OCoi gTE'XOV EV?E; &ppnITox) WK Xi T6Xii; in'VOTa-

oeo, ,K 8 & TOi5 ir?pccrTO; -nV zpXv cai KT RtOVOCtSet; jI Tniv gO6vtIov i8o'T6ra XaR-

Pavov, LE &? Tni; WlEtiaS TTV 55)Vag41V KXat LVV ?V aOUTQ) Kp1PtOV TOW lEaVT(*V Oxo

yip, IEEt KWa ?V E?TI IaI 0UX EV, TO hEV EV aUT(p KOCTa TO 7EEPOX WMapXE, TO 0 OUX E V

MaTa TO a&R?ipOV, I 8? TO{nTOV atpOTip0W UpRt1t; KaWt bk6rM5; ?.c Toi snpo'TO)U.

75 Cf. TP III 7, 29.28-30.2: the First as BJ'oaTaxTt -

76 TP III 8, 34.16-17: 1 EV LV(001 TOIU ItGtV EW T0) lpO)TO5). Cf. III 9, 37.23-25

(quoted above).

77 TP III 8, 32.1-2.

For this technical meaning of the term zn6oGTaG1;, indicating the fact that a being

receives a specific character and a proper place in the procession of reality, see In

Parm. 1054.27-28; Steel 1994, 81.

79 In Van Riel 2000, 410-413, we argued that, in the system of Proclus, the Philebus

only provides the abstract ontological scheme of the triadic constitution of a being,




146GERDVANREL

Every gtucO6v receives its combined unity from the First principle. This

means that on each level of reality, the combination has to be established

anew. Apparently, the mixed is not capable of transmitting its property

(i.e., the mixedness itself). This is of central interest in respect of the

relation between the mixed and the other principles (the First, ncepaq and

ancipov): for the gtcTKotv cannot have the same status as the others, since

it does not communicate its formal character to other beings. That is not

to say that the mixed is not productive: it does produce other things, but

it can only do so by virtue of its elements, which are modalities of Limit

and the Unlimited. They generate a new existent thing and endow it with

generative power; this newly existing thing will derive its proper being

('nLO6raat;) not from the previous gwto6v, but from the First cause.

Accordingly, Proclus makes a principal distinction between the way in

which the itro6v is produced, and the way in which nrpcpa; and a`ncetpov

proceed from the First cause: Therefore, suggesting the immense differ-

ence between the way in which the two principles are generated, and the

mode of generation of the mixed, Socrates says that 'the god has shown

the Limit and the Unlimited' (for they are henads that derive their exis-

tence from the one, and, so to speak, manifestations coming from the

unparticipated and first unity), while he 'makes' the mixed and composes

it through the first principles. Hence, to the extent that 'making' is in-

ferior to 'manifesting', and a generation is inferior to a manifestation, to

the same extent has the mixed received a procession from the one that is

inferior to that of the two principles. 80

This reveals the essential difference between the gtKtO6V and the two

principles: the gtKrov is made , combined by the First, whereas, as we

have seen before, the two principles must be seen as the manifestations

(&9qxvaGEt;) of the First. Like them, the gtITO6v receives its bx6o'aata from

the First, but in this case, the First does not directly produce the mixed

as Its own revelation. The procession is accomplished through the inter-

mediary principles of nipac and a nLlpov, and the First only provides, or

makes the combination.

As a consequence of the implicit statement that the combination of

Limit and the Unlimited has to be realised anew in every separate being,

Proclus holds that ic'pa; and anctpov have a twofold existence: they appear

as the principles that constitute the tKTO6v, and as the elements that are

whereas the concrete, specific nature and place of beings (i.e., their proper iic6atactl)

is deduced from the Parmenides.

xn TP III 9, 36.10-19.





present within the mixed. For the two principles do not merge once and

for all in the first combination: they reappear within the mixed, and will

thus produce the lower. The gimov - qua rUKToV - is not the cause of its

own elements.8' The latter are produced in a second tpo6o6o; (the first

npoo6oo; being the production of the gtKT6V itself) by the principles of

ic,pa; and ainetpov.82

Thus, the whole reality is governed by a duality, from the highest to

the lowest levels, before as well as within every gixt6Ov. In a certain sense,

the unity that characterises the itKtov seems to be too weak to exclude all

duality. Damascius will raise this point to criticise Proclus: how to explain

that the unity given by the First principle itself is not strong enough to

overcome all duality? Moreover, how can one posit a duality at the level

of reality immediately below the First? Should not that level be the high-

est possible unity?83

Although this criticism is correct, it should not lead to a precipitous

judgement. Proclus does indeed stress the true existence of a contradistinction

on the level of the principles, but, on the other hand, he is cautious to

safeguard unity. This is testified by his claim that the infinite generative

power always is inherent in the Limit: If, then, this One [i.e., the 'first

real One', meaning nepa;] is a cause and produces being, then there must

be within this One a power that generates being .Y This implies that the

Unlimited (which will manifest itself as the generative power) never exists

apart from nipa;: Of this triad [i.e. i?pa; - aielpov - gIKtOv] the Limit

is a deity that proceeds at the top of the intelligible world from the unpar-

ticipated and primordial god; it gives measure and demarcation to all

things ... whereas the Unlimited is the inexhaustible power of that deity. 85

8' TP III 10, 41.19-20: (... atotXr1i6v,) xv Eo g.wccov o1va iv a'itTrov Ka8X oaov EGr't

l-tlwov.

82 TP III 10, 42.5-26.

83 Damascius, De Princ. II 22.1-31.6; Damascius generally denies any real con-

tradistinction on the level of the principles; concerning the production of the mixed

(which he calls the Unified ), he argues that the First can only be the cause of unity,

not of a combination (a{opuat;); as a consequence, there must be another principle,

the iiuo6v itself, which does communicate its proper formal character to the lower,

and which thus governs a series (28.7-22).

84 TP III 8, 31.18-20: 'Akk' ei a&i6ov E'T TOUTO TO EV Kat V)rOoTaTlKOV TOMi OvTO;,

&vagit; av Ev acTr(i yevviviw roiV ovTo; bnapXot.

85 TP III 12, 44.23-45.4: Qflv ro giEv n?pa; rEti OEor6 ai' &Cpp Tr VoirT4 xpO-XO V

&iro To6 aCOE'Ko1) Ical npwTIao01) OEQi, navTa ETpW pvat cd popiov ... .o . T 17ECepOV

1vagt; a9vKe1XEIRTO; rTOV OEO) TO?TOi.




148 GERDVANREL

Proclus states more than once86 that the triadic scheme of Limit, Unlimited

and Mixed reappears at every level of reality, from the highest levels of

the intelligible world87 down to the lowest realm (i.e., nature, consisting

in a combination of form and matter). The manifestations of Limit and of

the Unlimited constitute two separate series (artpai or ucrtotXiac), headed

by the two principles.88

This multiplication-or proliferation-of the triadic structure is one of

the most remarkable features of Proclus's system. It is grounded in a con-

cern to account for the fact that the procession constitutes a gradual and

continuous process, without any void.89 Although a theoretical explanation

always needs static notions (which actually break the continuity of the

process into separate moments) in order to explain anything at all, Proclus

tries to establish a system in which the distance between the moments is

as small as possible.

4. Proclus's Hylemorphism

At the lowest level of the two series we find the couple of form and mat-

ter. Here, in the sensible world, aduElpia undergoes a remarkable inversion.

The a ncrpov no longer presents itself as a productive power, but is reduced

to mere receptivity. Matter (the bottom line of the system) is devoid of all

determination and creativity, but it displays an infinite capability of being

determined,' which is the lowest possible modality of the principle of the

Unlimited.

The distinction between a power to generate and a potency to be deter-

mined was present in nucleo in the passage of the Sophist quoted above,

where Plato differentiates between the capability of a being to make

something (coiEiv) and to undergo something (c6acrXtv). However,

86 TP III 8, 33.3-34.5; In Parm. VI 11 19.4-1123.21; cf. Beierwaltes 1979, 55-57 for

a discussion of these texts.

87 The first triads of the intelligible world are the following: 1st triad: irEpa; -

ancetpov - ovi-aa (predominant element = ipopa;); 2nd: nr0pa; - a&nIrpov - &olj (pre-

dominant element = airrnpov); 3rd: nErpa; - 'a'elpov - vobS (predominant element =

gtvrOv). Proclus thus integrates the triad ovaia - 4on - vov; of Plato's Sophist (248

e); cf. Hadot 1968, 262-263.

88 Cf. In Tim. I 176.6-177.2.

89 Cf. In Tim. I 378.25-26: W&v 6vrcov io P106o0; Cuvrxi1X; it l at Olo%V ?V TOi; OU,iv

anokiXF-rat ic'Evov. TP III 4, 15.24-26; De mal. Subsist. 13.9-10; 14.13 (processus

continuus).

I Proclus takes over the Aristotelian formula: 86uv6.t& il i'XT -ra naivta: TP III 8,

34.7 (Arist., De an. III 5, 430 a 10-11).






15 GERDVANREL

Proclus reduces this passive potency of matter to the principle of the

anctpia taken from the Philebus. However, it only imitates the principle,

just as the sensible form only imitates the operation of the Limit. For the

plenitude and perfection of the higher is found lacking in this world: That

which is eminently present in the first things is deficiently present in the

last. 97 In this sense, the receptive power imitates the generative power by

inverting the perfection of productivity into the imperfection of receptivity.

This reversion of the operation of the principles marks the transition

from the intelligible to the sensible world. At a certain moment in the pro-

cession of reality, something is produced which is not capable of return-

ing to the higher, or of preserving actual unity.98 This weakening of the

power of the principles was inevitable, says Proclus, because the gifts of

the first principles are transmitted everywhere in reality; they do not only

generate the more perfect things, but also those things that are less per-

fect in their mode of being .99 Or in other words: the Good cannot be ster-

ile.'?? At any level, it will produce its offspring, and it will not stop doing

so until it reaches the final point where its force is so weakened that there

is nothing left to produce. Nevertheless, even this stage remains good, but

the fertility of the Good is inverted here, in the sense that it is reduced

to being a merely passive suitableness to undergo the operation of that

which is productive.

In this way, we find an inverted proportion between a power's produc-

tivity and its receptivity. The productive and receptive power appear in a

pure way at the extremes of the system: the purely productive power is

located at the top, whereas the completely receptive power occupies the

bottom of reality. Between them, there is a gradual transition in the inter-

mediary realms, in which the productivity is always in decrease, while the

receptivity increases.

Parm. IV, 842.37-843.23); thus, the suitableness functions as the principium indi-

viduationis in the causal npo6o6o;. Moreover, it implies the mutual dependence of the

causans and the causatum (cf. ET 79, 74.24-26). For a thorough discussion of other

aspects of the theory, see Steel 1996, 124-135.

97 TP III 10.41.2-4: T& -yap ?V Troi; IEpcbrot; OvTa WaccO biEpoXiv, txtTa ?V Tot Eaxa-

Tot; CYTI KaTa 9v

98 TP III 10, 40.10-41.12; III 8, 34.1-11.

9 TP III 10, 41.12-15: Toiro &? oltat Cnu4kaivetv avayii 6taltrdw XVptoV &px%@v

ai 86Fet; lcat 4IEXpt tv ECXa6Tv 8tK&CUot, Kcai ov jovov la TrXto6Trpa yEvv(Ltv &XXk

icc Ta& a&Trratpa KaTa riv inro6Taotv.

'a' In Tim. I 372.27-373.3 raises the question why the procession is not limited to

perfect things. Proclus answers that if the npo'o8o; were to stop with the gods, then

the gods themselves would not be good, for goodness implies fertility: T0 yap Oriov





Thus, in later Neoplatonism, Plotinus's vertical scheme is replaced

by a horizontal one, placing limit and unlimitedness at the same level.

The undetermined is no longer conceived as a substratum, but rather con-

stitutes a very important principle that rules the emanation of reality from

the One. On the basis of this new viewpoint, the later Neoplatonists crit-

icise Plotinus, as Proclus does in the following passage: The undetermined

is not the matter of determination; rather it is its power. And neither is

determination the form of the undetermined; rather it is its existence. And

a being is constituted by those two .? Thus, the undetermined is seen as

a separate principle that is operating throughout the entire reality.

Matter concludes the series of the manifestations of the Unlimited. It

is the lowest level, but nevertheless, it is a member of the series. Hence,

one must conclude that even matter is produced by the One Good: If, as

we have said, the god produces all kinds of unlimitedness, then he also

produces matter, which is the ultimate unlimitedness. This, then, is the

first and ineffable cause of matter. '02

Thus, the absence of determination can no longer be associated with

evil. On the contrary, it can be demonstrated that it stems from the good.

As a direct consequence, Proclus affirms that it is impossible to associate

matter with evil in any way whatsoever: In the Philebus, [Plato] produces

matter itself and the whole nature of the unlimited from the One, and, in

general, places the divine cause before the distinction between limit and

the unlimited. Thus he will admit that matter is something divine and good

because of its participation in and origin from god, and that is never evil.

(...) That it is wrong to posit matter as the primary evil, is, I think,

sufficiently demonstrated by Socrates in the Philebus, where he argues that

unlimitedness is generated from god. (...). For god is the cause both of

the existence of limit and the unlimited and of their mixture. This <unlim-

ited>, therefore, and the nature of body, qua body, must be referred to one

cause, namely god, for it is he who produced the mixture. Hence, neither

body nor matter is evil, for they are the progeny of god, the one as a mix-

ture, the other as unlimitedness. '03

ayovov civact not, ayaOov; e&tat 6& &yovov, ?i eaXatov. See also ET 122: to gkytoi6v

iatiV OV r6 oyaoEt8&;, akkX Xo rayaOoupy6v. Cf. Trouillard 1977, 105-107.

101 TP III 9, 40.4-6: O05 yap eaxtv iUXii coiv ntpaxo; xo a&tctpov, &XXW &vag, OV

Et0 Oo altipO) ?0 sTEpa;, acXXca iUMp41; - a' &(poiv &? T0 OV.

'01 In Tim. I 384.30-385.3: ci olV, &uitcp C1'iolvI, O ecb; naaav an1piav 1ixpianat,

cal Tqv l)1)V tGpToolv, EoUXav oOUaxv a?c?lptav. wat a-T R.v npontcatr Kat appTiTo;

aitia 'r; USX7. Cf. Ibid. 385.9-17.

103 De malorum subsist. 34.9-35.14 (transl. Opsomer-Steel). We thank J. Opsomer

and C. Steel for having made their translation available to us before publication.




152GERDVANREL

In this way, the triadic scheme taken from the Philebus provides the

key to a new understanding of the structure of reality. Not only does it

enable Proclus to refute Plotinus's identification of matter with evil, it also

makes it possible to harmonise the hylemorphic explanation of the phys-

ical world with the analysis of the principles in the intelligible world. In

his commentary on the Timaeus, Proclus points out that this dialogue

reveals two principles (i.e., matter and form) that are transcended by a

cause that brings them together (i.e., the Demiurge). However, Proclus

continues, in the Philebus this scheme is made more universal (KaOo-

XtK1nepov).'4 For the principles of the Philebus govern the entire reality,

whereas those in the Timaeus are restricted to the intra-mundane (-ar

ey6oaj.a).'05 The analyses of the latter ought to be read in the broader per-

spective provided by the Philebus, for, as Proclus says, every ytuYOv6.iVOV

is a gstKTov, but not every gIK.tOV is a ytyv6O'evov .'0 The same should be

said, mutatis mutandis, for the relation between the Philebus and the

Parmenides, which was considered to be Plato's standard work on theol-

ogy. For the latter (more precisely, the second hypothesis) exclusively uses

the triadic structure to explain the divine, or intelligible, world.'07 The

Philebus offers a framework that is indispensable for integrating the analy-

sis of the intelligible and the sensible world into one complete synthesis.

Institute of Philosophy

University of Leuven

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Proclus vs Plotinus on the Procession of Matter