Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics · Proceedings of the European Society for ... Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics ... our statement. So the sensory-dependence-thesis

Proceedings of theEuropean Society for Aesthetics

Volume 7, 2015

Edited by Fabian Dorsch and Dan-Eugen Ratiu

Published by the European Society for Aesthetics

esa

Proceedings of the European Society of Aesthetics

Founded in 2009 by Fabian Dorsch

Internet: http://proceedings.eurosa.orgEmail: [email protected]: 1664 – 5278

EditorsFabian Dorsch (University of Fribourg)Dan-Eugen Ratiu (Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca)

Editorial BoardZsolt Bátori (Budapest University of Technology and Economics)Alessandro Bertinetto (University of Udine)Matilde Carrasco Barranco (University of Murcia)Josef Früchtl (University of Amsterdam)Robert Hopkins (New York University)Catrin Misselhorn (University of Stuttgart)Kalle Puolakka (University of Helsinki)Isabelle Rieusset-Lemarié (University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)John Zeimbekis (University of Patras)

PublisherThe European Society for Aesthetics

Department of PhilosophyUniversity of FribourgAvenue de l’Europe 201700 FribourgSwitzerland

Internet: http://www.eurosa.orgEmail: [email protected]

Proceedings of theEuropean Society for Aesthetics

Volume 7, 2015

Edited by Fabian Dorsch and Dan-Eugen Ratiu

Table of Contents

Paul CrowtherThe Need for Art, and the Aesthetics of the Self: A Copernican Turn 1-21

The Aesthetics GroupTurn, Turn, Turn: Civic Instrumentalisation and the Promotion of

Autonomy in Contemporary Arts Funding 22-45

Gemma Argüello ManresaParticipatory Computer-Based Art and Distributed

Creativity: the Case of Tactical Media 46-67

Zsolt BátoriPhotographic Deception 68-78

Alessandro BertinettoGombrich, Danto, and the Question of Artistic Progress 79-92

Stefan Bird-PollanBenjamin’s Artwork Essay from a Kantian Perspective 93-103

The Branch CollectiveTowards Gesture as Aesthetic Strategy 104-114

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Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 7, 2015

Camille ButtingsrudThinking Toes…? Proposing a Reflective Order of Embodied

Self-Consciousness in the Aesthetic Subject 115-123

Ilinca DamianOn What Lies Beneath the Process of Creation 124-136

Wiebke DeimlingMoralism about Propaganda 137-147

Daniel DohrnAccording to the Fiction: A Metaexpressivist Account 148-171

Damla DönmezSaving ‘Disinterestedness’ in Environmental Aesthetics:

A Defense against Berleant and Saito 172-187

Luis Eduardo Duarte ValverdeNet.Art as Language Games 188-196

Colleen FitzpatrickEmpathy, Anthropormorphism and Embodiment in Vischer’s

Contribution to Aesthetics 197-209

Jane ForseyForm and Function: The Dependent Beauty of Design 210-220

James GarrisonThe Aesthetic Life of Power: Recognition and the Artwork as a

Novel ‘Other’ 221-233

Aviv Reiter & Ido GeigerKant on Form, Function and Decoration 234-245

Carmen González GarcíaFacing the Real: Timeless Art and Performative Time 246-258

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Nathalie HeinichBeyond Beauty: The Values of Art — Towards an

Interdisciplinary Axiology 259-263

Kai-Uwe HoffmannThick Aesthetic Concepts — Neue Perspektiven 264-279

Gioia Laura IannilliThe Aesthechnics of Everyday Life: Suggestions for a Reconsideration of

Aesthetics in the Age of Wearable Technologies 280-296

Jèssica Jaques PiRepenser Picasso. Le Désir Attrapé par la Queue et les Iconographies

Culinaires de l’Absurde et de la Stupeur 297-316

Mojca KüplenArt and Knowledge: Kant’s Perspective 317-331

Iris LanerScience, Art, and Knowing-How: Merleau-Ponty on the Epistemic

Qualities of ‘Experimental Practices’ 332-362

Regina-Nino MionThe Unpredictability of the Political Effect of Art 363-369

Vitor MouraKundry Must Die — Stage Direction and Authenticity 370-390

Michaela OttAesthetics as Dividual Affections 391-405

E. L. Putnam‘Bring a Camera with You’: The Posthumous Collaboration of

Ahmed Basiony and Shady El Noshokaty 406-415

James RisserSensible Knowing in Kant’s Aesthetics 416-427

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Salvador Rubio MarcoPhilosophizing through Moving-Image Artworks:

An Alternative Way Out 428-438

Lisa Katharin SchmalzriedBeauty and the Sensory-Dependence-Thesis 439-463

Niklas SommerSchiller’s Interpretation of the ‘Critique of the

Power of Judgement’ — A Proposal 464-475

Tak-Lap YeungHannah Arendt’s Interpretation of Kant’s ‘Judgment’ and its Difficulties 476-493

Elena TavaniGiacometti’s ‘Point to the Eye’ and Merleau-Ponty’s Painter 494-511

Daniel TkatchTranscending Equality: Jacques Rancière and the Sublime in Politics 512-528

Connell VaughanAuthorised Defacement: Lessons from Pasquino 529-551

Oana VodăIs Gaut’s Cluster Account a Classificatory Account of Art? 552-562

Katarzyna WejmanPlot and Imagination Schemata, Metaphor and Aesthetic Idea — A

Ricoeurian Interpretation of the Kantian Concept of Imagination 563-578

Zsófia ZvolenszkyArtifactualism and Inadvertent Authorial Creation 579-593

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Beauty and the Sensory-Dependence-Thesis

Lisa Katharin Schmalzried*

Universität Luzern

Abstract. The sensory-dependence-thesis claims that beauty necessar-ily depends in part on sensory properties. Consequently, judgements ofbeauty about non-sense-perceptual features or objects like, for example,character traits or mathematical proofs, can only be understood metaphor-ically. Aestheticians have disagreed about this thesis throughout the his-tory of aesthetics. Despite this enduring disagreement, hardly any meta-theoretical debate about the sensory-dependence-thesis exists. This paperaims to start such a debate. It accepts Gaut’s challenge that the burdenof proof is on the defenders of the thesis and examines four argumentssupporting it. According to the first argument, the sensory-dependence-thesis should be accepted because judgements of beauty are made immedi-ately and must therefore depend on immediately accessible, sensory prop-erties. According to the second, because it best explains the intuitivelyappealing and widely accepted acquaintance principle. According to thethird, because, etymologically considered, “aesthetic” means “pertainingto sense perception” and hence all aesthetic properties have to partly de-pend on sensory properties. According to the fourth, because any theoryof beauty should avoid impoverishing our means of expression and reject-ing the sensory-dependence-thesis would lead to such an impoverishment.This paper argues that although the first three arguments fail, the fourthprovides a good metatheoretical reason for the sensory-dependence-thesis.

1. Introduction

Think of a piece of music, a birdsong, a painting, or a landscape, and tryto imagine that you find them beautiful. And now try to imagine that howthey sound or look like has not influenced your judgements of beauty. As-sumedly, that is hard to imagine. The beauty of those objects dependson their sensory properties, especially, on their sounds and colours.1 This

* Email: [email protected] This paper will not discuss whether beauty can only depend on visual and auditory,

perhaps even only on visual properties, as some authors suggest, see, e.g., Scruton (2011),p. 20; Tatarkiewicz (1972), p. 166; Tolstoy (1899), pp. 13-14. It allows that beauty can alsodepend in part on gustatory, olfactory, and tactual properties.

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Lisa Katharin Schmalzried Beauty and the Sensory-Dependence-Thesis

does neither mean that beauty itself is a sensory property, nor that it com-pletely depends on sensory properties, only that it partly depends on them.This thesis is rather uncontroversial. It becomes controversial, however,if beauty has to partly depend on sensory properties. Exactly this is theclaim of the sensory-dependence-thesis. If one accepts this thesis, judge-ments of beauty about non-sense-perceptual features or objects cannot beinterpreted in a literal sense. Non-sense-perceptual features or objects can-not be directly perceived by the senses, although they might be accessibleby means of sense perception.2 The character of a person, for example,has no colour, or sound, or any other sensory property. Although gesturesor facial expression are perceptible by the senses and can give some hints,what kind of character a person has needs to be inferred based on variousobservations.3 Consequently, a judgement of beauty about the characterof a person, that is, a judgement of inner beauty, can only be understoodmetaphorically. The same holds for judgements of beauty about proofs,theorems, theories, or ideas, or about the mere content of poems or nov-els, or about non-sense-perceptual conceptual works of art.

The sensory-dependence-thesis is controversial as a look into the his-tory of aesthetics shows. Although ancient and medieval philosopherstend to reject the thesis, whereas contemporary aestheticians tend to ac-cept it, one finds defenders and opponents of it at all times.4 Defendersare amongst others Beardsley, Burke, Danto, Kant, Schiller, and Zang-will.5 Opponents are amongst others Gaut, Hutcheson, McGinn, Plato,Plotinus, and Reid.6

Opponents can point out that that we attribute beauty to non-sense-perceptual features and objects in everyday life.7 From time to time, wespeak about beautiful character traits, characters, or souls, about the beau-tiful content of literary works, about beautiful theorems, proofs, and ideas,

2 See, e.g., Binkley (1977), p. 269; Costello (2013), p. 277; p. 295; Shelley (2003), p. 372.3 See, e.g., Schmitt & Altstötter-Gleich (2010), p. 9.4 For example, Plato (1925, 298 a) and Aristotle (1997, 146a.21) mention the view that

beauty is what is pleasant to the eyes and ears, see also Tatarkiewicz (1972), pp. 165-166.5 See, e.g., Beardsley (1962), p. 624; Burke (1990), p. 83, pp. 101-102; Danto (2003), p.

93; Kant (1986); Schiller (1971), p. 28; Zangwill (2001), p. 122, p. 127.6 See, e.g., Gaut, (2007), chap. 6; Hutcheson (2004), p. 24; McGinn (1997), chap. 5;

Plato (1925); (2006); Plotinus (2002); Reid (1796), p. 424; p. 448.7 See, e.g., Gaut (2007), p. 124; Meskin (2004), p. 74.

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and so on. Furthermore proverbs like “True beauty comes from within”testify the widespread belief that beauty should not be restricted to thesensory realm. But other proverbs like “Beauty is only skin-deep” supportthe sensory-dependence-thesis. And defenders of the thesis canpoint out that we do not attribute beauty as naturally and easily to non-sense-perceptual features and objects as to sense-perceptual ones. If wecall a person beautiful based on her character, we not simply say that sheis beautiful. We tend to add that we speak about inner beauty. If, on theother hand, we judge her to be beautiful based on her outward appear-ance, we feel no need to explain or clarify our statement. So the sensory-dependence-thesis is controversial both on a philosophical and a prethe-oretical, intuitive level.

Given this disagreement, it surprises that hardly any aesthetic debateabout the sensory-dependence-thesis exists.8 The reason might be thatthe sensory-dependence-thesis follows, for example, from Kant’s theoryof (free) beauty, but not from a Platonic theory of beauty. The crucialquestion might not be whether to accept the sensory-dependence-thesis,but whether to accept a Platonic, or Kantian, or any other elaborated the-ory of beauty. Thinking about the sensory-dependence-thesis independ-ently from an elaborated theory of beauty, that is, on a metatheoreticallevel, might not be necessary.

But not few aestheticians accept or reject the sensory-dependence-thesis not as a consequence of their theories, but as a basic assumption.9And it is a natural first step into elaborating a theory of beauty to thinkabout the scope of beauty, that is, about what kind of objects can be calledliterally beautiful. Accepting the sensory-dependence-thesis leads to anarrow scope of beauty allowing only judgements of beauty about sense-perceptual features and objects to be understood literally. Rejecting the

8 Exceptions prove the rule, see, e.g., Gaut (2007), chap. 6. Some authors discuss theextended sensory-dependence-thesis, that is, whether aesthetic properties have to partlydepend on sensory properties, see, e.g., Carroll (2004); Shelley (2003), Zangwill (2001),chap. 8. Section 4 of this paper will discuss the extended sensory-dependence-thesis indetail.

9 For example, Burke and Reid both explain beauty in terms of loveability, but whereasBurke (1990, p. 83) accepts the sensory-dependence-thesis at the beginning of his treatise,Reid (1796, p. 448), denies it.

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thesis leads to a wide scope of beauty allowing also judgements of beautyabout non-sense-perceptual features and objects to be understood literally.The scope of beauty determines which judgements a theory of beauty hasto analyse in detail. Furthermore, a wide scope is sometimes consideredas suggesting a subjectivist theory.10 Additionally, a wide scope gives areason to reject a theory of beauty that cannot explain judgements ofbeauty about non-sense-perceptual features or objects.11 A narrow scope,on the other hand, gives a reason to reject or restrict a theory of beautythat allows non-sense-perceptual features and objects to be literally beauti-ful. So the sensory-dependence-thesis can influences what kind of theoryof beauty one formulates and/or whether one approves of an elaboratedtheory. Some metatheoretically acceptable arguments for or against thesensory-dependence-thesis are desirable. The premises of such argumentsshould not only be acceptable by representatives of one specific elaboratedtheory of beauty, but of different theories of beauty in order to count asmetatheoretically acceptable.

Gaut argues that the burden of proof rest with the defenders of thethesis.12 Attributing beauty to non-sense-perceptual features or objects isneither uncommon, nor obviously false, nor senseless. This provides primafacie evidence for a literal interpretation. In order to argue against sucha literal interpretation, the sensory-dependence-thesis has to be defendedbecause it blocks a literal interpretation. This article accepts Gaut’s chal-lenge. It considers four arguments supporting the sensory-dependence-thesis, at which one can find hints in literature. Section 2 discusses theargument of immediacy, section 3 the argument of the acquaintance prin-ciple, section 4 the etymological argument, and section 5 the argument ofirreducibility. It will turn out that only the fourth argument provides agood metatheoretical reason for the sensory-dependence-thesis. To avoidany misunderstanding, this paper defends the sensory-dependence-thesisonly with respect to beauty. It does not extend it to all aesthetic proper-ties.

10 See, e.g., Reid (1796), p. 779; Sircello (1975), p. 5.11 See, e.g., Plotinus (2002), p. 28.12 See Gaut (2007), p. 124.

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2. The Argument of Immediacy

To begin with, sometimes we say something like “I can see that this roseis beautiful” or “I hear the beauty of this song”. Straightforwardly inter-preted, this way of speaking implies that beauty itself is a sensory prop-erty. But, first, beauty would have to be perceptible by different senses,although normally sensory properties can only be perceived by one sense.Colours can be seen, sounds be heard, and so on. And beauty is not alwayspurely visual or auditory (or purely gustatory, olfactory, or tactual). Thebeauty of some objects does not neatly fall into one of these categories.The beauty of a person, for example, is not purley visual, but also partlyauditory and olfactory.13 So beauty would be a rather odd sensory prop-erty, not clearly connected to one of the senses. Secondly, if two personsperceive an object under the same circumstances and if their senses are notseriously impaired, they should have the same sense perception. But theycan and often do disagree in their judgements of beauty.14 Thus if we saythat we perceive that something is beautiful, this way of speaking shouldnot be understood as implying that beauty itself is a sensory quality.

Rather, this common way of speaking may simply point out that howwe perceive sensory properties and how we form judgements of beautysaliently resemble each other, namely, in their immediacy. We immedi-ately see, for example, that a rose is red and immediately judge that it isbeautiful. Inspired by this similarity, one can try to develop an argumentfor the sensory-dependence-thesis, even for its stronger version: (P1IM)Judgements about the beauty of x are/can be made immediately. (P2IM) Ifjudgements about the beauty of x are or can be made immediately, beautyhas to depend on immediately accessible properties of x. (P3IM) Imme-diately accessible properties of x are its sensory properties or depend onthose. Consequently, beauty has to depend on sensory properties. Thecrucial question is what “immediately” exactly means in the context ofthis argument. One can think of a temporal, an epistemic, and a logicalinterpretation.

Temporally interpreted, “immediately” means “immediately after thefirst acquaintance with x”. Undisputedly, some judgements of beauty are

13 See, e.g., Etcoff (1999), pp. 235-241.14 See, e.g., Hutcheson (2004), p. 24.

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made immediately after the first acquaintance with an object. Sometimeswe meet someone and instantly think “Wow, what a beautiful person”.Sometimes we see a hitherto unknown painting or hear piece of musicfor the first time and can appreciate their beauty straightaway. Exampleslike these are numerous. Sometimes the beauty of an object strikes us atonce.

Sometimes, however, one forms a judgement of beauty, only after onehas been acquainted with an object for some time, and the object in ques-tion has not always changed during this time. Sometimes one needs tolook at a painting or to hear a piece of music again and again in orderto appreciate their beauty. This observation does not yet defeat a tem-poral interpretation of P1IM as long as we could have judged the beautyof the painting or the piece of music at once. Perhaps, we have not seenthe painting’s beauty at once because we have been inattentive or haveconcentrated on the “wrong” features. If we would have looked more care-fully, we could have instantly seen its beauty. Perhaps, we have not heardthe music’s beauty because we have had a lack of musical education at thistime. Otherwise, we would have heard the beauty at once.

But some works of art are very complex, and one simply needs time toget to know the whole work, no matter how well educated one is and howattentively or carefully one studies the work. And judgements of beautyare not only about works of art. Think, for example, about judgements ofbeauty about human beings. At the first encounter with a person, one getsto know one aspect of her character, if one is lucky. In order to really getto know her character, one needs time, one has to observe her in differentsituations at different times, and has to talk and listen to her. That iswhy judgements of beauty about the character of a person cannot be madeimmediately after the first acquaintance with a person. One can deny thatthis an examples of a literal judgement of beauty, but this would beg thequestion. So temporarily interpreted, only some, but not all judgementsof beauty can be made immediately after the first acquaintance with anobject.15 But this restricted reading of P1 does not suffice to argue for thesensory-dependence-thesis, which applies to all judgements of beauty.

15 See, e.g., Hume (2006), p. 5; Reid (1796), p. 455.

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Epistemically interpreted, “immediately” means “without any (concep-tual) knowledge about x”. This interpretation is inspired by remarks ofHutcheson and Kant.16 Basically, both authors defend the same idea.17

We can form a judgement of beauty about an object even if we do notknow what kind of object it is. We do not have to know whether it is ahuman being, a work of art, a flower, or anything else. We also do nothave to know what is symbolises or which purpose it fulfils. Judgementsof beauty do not require any conceptual knowledge about an object.

But if one prefers a theory of beauty explaining beauty primarily interms of perfection, some conceptual knowledge about the object of thejudgement of beauty seems to be necessary. Representatives of such the-ories would hence reject the epistemic interpretation of P1IM. And evenKant would only defend the epistemic interpretation of P1IM with respectto some judgements of beauty, namely, those of free beauty. Judgementsof dependent beauty presuppose a concept of the object in question.18 Soone cannot metatheoretically defend that all judgements of beauty can bemade without any (conceptual) knowledge about the object in question,and the epistemic interpretation of P1IM therefore is not a good premisefor a metatheoretically acceptable argument in favour of the sensory-dependence-thesis.

Logically interpreted, “immediately” means “non-inferentially”. Ac-cordingly, P1IM claims that judgements of beauty are not inferred fromprinciples. Representatives of aesthetic rationalism would reject such aninterpretation of P1IM.19 Yet, following the British empiricist traditionand of course Kant’s influential aesthetic theory, the logical interpretationof P1IM has become a commonplace in aesthetics.20 And our everyday lifeexperience seems to confirm this assumption. We do not reason out thatsomething is beautiful, although we sometimes try to explain our judge-ments of beauty afterwards. And we lack any sufficiently concrete prin-ciples of beauty from which we could infer that something is beautiful,

16 See Hutcheson (2004), 25; Kant (1963), AA V 207.17 Carroll (2001, pp. 25-26) interprets Hutcheson in this sense.18 See Kant (1963), § 16.19 See, e.g., Beiser (2009), p. 2; Shelley (2013), § 1.1.20 See, e.g., Hutcheson (2004), 25; Kant (1963), AA V 216; Mothersill (1984), chap. IV/V;

Shelley (2013), § 1.1.; Sibley (1965), p. 153.

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and aesthetics has failed to provide us with such principles. The logical in-terpretation of P1IM is hence both intuitive appealing and widely acceptedin aesthetics.

Hutcheson points out that forming a judgement of beauty resemblessense perception in this respect.21 We also do not infer that an objectpossesses a certain sensory property, we simply perceive it. This is oneof the reasons why Hutcheson speaks of taste as an internal sense. Thissimilarity, however, does not yet secure the success of the argument of im-mediacy. The logical interpretation leads to problems defending P2IM. Itdoes not follow from the non-inferentiality of judgements of beauty thatbeauty has to depend on non-inferentially accessible properties. Let usassume that the beauty of an object partly depends on a property, whichhas to be inferred. Yet, inferring the property and forming a judgementof beauty are two separate processes. After one has inferred that the ob-ject possesses this property, one can non-inferentially form a judgementof beauty.22 That is why the logical interpretation of the argument of im-mediacy fails at P2IM.

To recap, the temporal and the epistemic interpretation cannot defendP1IM with respect to all judgements of beauty, and the logical interpret-ation cannot defend P2IM. So although forming a judgement of beautyresembles sense perception, both are made non-inferentially, this resemb-lance does not suffice to establish the sensory-dependence-thesis.

3. The Argument of the Acquaintance Principle

The second argument draws on the so-called acquaintance principle. Thebasic idea of the acquaintance principle is that one cannot judge and appre-ciate something aesthetically without a first-hand experience. Judgementsof beauty are traditionally considered as examples of aesthetic (value)judgements. Hence the acquaintance principle also applies to them, andsometimes the principle is explicitly formulated with reference to judge-ments of beauty.23 Focused on judgements of beauty, the principle claims

21 See Hutcheson (2004), 25.22 See, e.g., Hume (2006), p. 5; Shelley (2013), § 1.1.23 See, e.g., Kant (1963), p. AA V 216; Reid (1796), p. 429.

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that a first-hand experience of an object is prerequisite for a judgement ofbeauty. Consequently, I cannot judge an object to be beautiful if I am notpersonally acquainted with it, even if someone else has described it to meor has asserted that it is beautiful.

The argument of the acquaintance principle is inspired by an observa-tion made by Konisberg.24 Often the acquaintance principle and the sens-ory dependence of beauty (or aesthetic properties in general)25 are men-tioned and defended in the same context.26 Therefore it seems natural tospeculate that a close connection between the acquaintance principle andthe sensory-dependence-thesis exists. This leads to the argument of theacquaintance principle: (P1AP) A judgement of beauty about x requiresa first-hand experience of x. (P2AP) The best explanation why a judge-ment of beauty about x requires a first-hand experience of x is that beautyhas to partly depend on sensory properties of x. P1AP states the acquaint-ance principle focussed upon judgements of beauty. P2AP claims that thesensory-dependence-thesis best explains the acquaintance principle. So ifone does not want to give up the acquaintance principle, one should alsoaccept the sensory-dependence-thesis. One should be equally committedto the sensory-dependence-thesis as to the acquaintance principle.

Wollheim introduces the acquaintance principle as “a well-entrenchedprinciple in aesthetics” (Wollheim 1980, 223). And various aestheticiansdo indeed accept the principle.27 And it is not only widely accepted inaesthetics, it is also intuitively appealing.28 One might object that someauthors have raised the acquaintance principle to question in recent yearsand that it has undergone various reformulations.29 For the sake of theargument, however, let us accept P1AP for the moment and turn to P2AP.

A basic objection against P2AP might be that the acquaintance prin-ciple appears to be an aesthetic axiom for which no further explanation

24 See Konisberg (2012), pp. 159-160.25 See in detail section 4 of this paper.26 See, e.g., Kant (1963), AA V 216; Pettit (1987), p. 25; Tormey (1973), p. 39.27 See, e.g., Kant (1963), AA V 216; Eaton (1994), p. 392; Mothersill (1961), p. 78; (1984),

p. 160; Pettit (1983), pp. 25-26; Reid (1796), p. 429; Sibley (1965), p. 137; (1974), p. 16;Tanner (2003); Tormey (1973), p. 39; Wollheim (1980), p. 223.

28 See also Konigsberg (2012), p. 153.29 See, e.g., Budd (2003); Hanson (2015); Hopkins (2006); Konigsberg (2012); Livingston

(2003); Meskin (2004); Robson (2013).

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can be given. But in order to accept its axiomatic status, one has to showwhy possible explanations are not convincing. As P2AP proposes a pos-sible explanation, one has to take P2AP seriously, even if one thinks thatthe acquaintance principle is an aesthetic axiom.

If one accepts the sensory-dependence-thesis, knowing the sensoryquality of an object, especially, how it looks or sounds like, is prerequisitefor a judgement of beauty. One way to gain this knowledge is to perceivethe object by the senses, which is one way to get personally acquaintedwith it. Sometimes a personal acquaintance with an adequate surrogatecan be equally sufficient.30 If I see a high-quality photography of a paint-ing or hear a high-quality recording of a concert, I might be able to judgethe beauty of the originals. If one accepts the sensory-dependence-thesis,whether a reproduction is adequate depends on whether it can exactly orat least sufficiently convey the sensory quality of the original object.31

A mere verbal description of an object does not enable us to form ajudgement of beauty according to the acquaintance principle. The sensory-dependence-thesis can help to understand why. Although I can learn fromanother person that a rose is red, I cannot learn how exactly the rose lookslike. A description can convey that an object possesses certain sensoryproperties, but cannot convey its exact sensory quality. Therefore onecannot base one’s judgement of beauty on a verbal description, it seems.32

Admittedly, a verbal description alone is not enough. But imagine avery sensitive observer or listener who possesses the ability to describe anobject in detail, vividly, and exactly. And imagine a person with an ex-tremely well trained sensory imagination. Guided by the description ofthe person who has actually perceived the object, the latter person mightbe able to imagine the object as if she actually perceives it. She might beable to form a judgement of beauty without having actually perceived it inthis case.33 Although this scenario is not impossible, however, it is ratherunlikely. Both, the person actually perceiving and describing the object

30 See, e.g., Binkley (1977), p. 266; Carroll (2004), p. 414; Hopkins (2006), pp. 90-92;Tormey (1973), p. 39, Meskin (2004), p. 74.

31 For a criticism of this criteria, see, e.g., Hanson (2015), pp. 252-254; Livingston (2003),p. 263.

32 See Binkley (1977), p. 266.33 See, e.g., Hopkins (2006), pp. 93-94.

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and the person imagining it, have to fulfil too many demanding require-ments. Secondly, even if a person manages to imagine an object as if sheactually perceives it, she has a quasi first-hand experience. The sensory-dependence-thesis can hence explain a slightly modified version of the ac-quaintance principle, namely, that a judgement of beauty about x requiresa first-hand or quasi first-hand experience of x (or an adequate surrogate).

The acquaintance principle does not only deny that judgements ofbeauty can be based on mere verbal descriptions, but also that one canadopt a judgement of beauty from someone else. If someone tells me thata rose, which I have not seen myself, is beautiful, I am not justified inadopting this judgement of beauty, even if I know that the person is trust-worthy. Aesthetic judgements seem to be not transferable from personto person (or at least only on rare occasions). The sensory-dependence-thesis should also explain why this is the case in order to count as the bestexplanation of the acquaintance principle.

An asymmetry regarding the reliability of sensory and aesthetic testi-mony is notable, though.34 If someone has perceived an object under nor-mal circumstances, if her sense perception is not seriously impaired, if sheremembers what she has perceived, if she does not want to deceive me, Ican learn from her which sensory properties an object has. If, for example,she tells me that a rose is red, I am justified believing that the rose is red.According to the acquaintance principle, however, I cannot adopt the be-lief that the rose is beautiful, even if she tells me that it is. If so, how canthe sensory-dependence-thesis explain the problematic status of aesthetictestimony?

Besides this, one would have to argue that the sensory-dependence-thesis provides the best explanation in order to defend P2AP. One hasreason to doubt this because it makes sense to apply the acquaintanceprinciple also to judgements of beauty about non-sense-perceptual fea-tures or objects. First, also in the case of non-sense-perceptual featuresor objects, a mere description of non-sense-perceptual features or objectsmight not be sufficient for a judgement of beauty. Admittedly, sometimesa verbal description is the way to become acquainted with of some non-sense-perceptual features or objects. Hanson argues, for example, that

34 See Pettit (1987), p. 25.

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descriptions yield acquaintance with some conceptual works of art.35 Butnot every non-sense-perceptual feature or object can be fully grasped bya mere verbal description. If someone paraphrases the content of a novel,outlines the basic idea of a mathematical proof, or enlists some charactertraits, these descriptions are an inadequate basis for a judgement of beauty.Rather, one should actually read the novel, understand and think throughthe mathematical proof, or meet the person personally and observe herin different situations in order to be able to judge their beauty. In otherwords, one needs a first-hand experience of these non-sense-perceptual fea-tures or objects in order to be able to judge their beauty. As these examplesillustrate, first-hand experience does not have to be understood as first-hand sense-perceptual experience.36 Secondly, also judgements of beautyabout non-sense-perceptual features or objects are not transmissible fromperson to person. It is problematic to adopt a judgement of beauty simplybecause someone else says that the content of a novel, a mathematicalproof, or the character of a person is beautiful.37 Once again, a first-handexperience seems to be necessary. To sum up, the acquaintance principlecan also make sense in the case of judgments of beauty about non-sense-perceptual features or objects. If so, not the sensory dependence, but an-other feature of beauty seems to be the best explanation of the acquaint-ance principle, if it can be explained at all.

To sum up, as the acquaintance principle can be defended without be-ing committed to the sensory-dependence-thesis, P2AP can be rejected.Therefore the argument of the acquaintance principle fails independentlyfrom the question whether one should actually accept the acquaintanceprinciple.

4. The Etymological Argument

So far, not much attention has been paid to the fact that beauty counts as aparadigmatic example of an aesthetic property. The etymological roots of

35 See Hanson (2015), p. 252.36 See, e.g., Eaton (1994), p. 392; Hopkins (2006), p. 90.37 Meskin (2004, pp. 89-90) claims that aesthetic testimony in the case of proofs and

theories is reliable.

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the word “aesthetic” lie in the ancient greek “aísthēsis”, meaning “pertain-ing to sense perception”.38 Hence, etymologically considered, only some-thing with a close connection to sense perception deserves to be called aes-thetic.39 This consideration motivates the etymological argument: (P1E)Aesthetic properties have to partly depend on sensory properties. (P2E)Beauty is an aesthetic property. Consequently, beauty has to partly de-pend on sensory properties. The core of this argument is the extendedsensory-dependence-thesis, which P1E formulates.40 But is the extendedsensory-dependence-thesis metatheoretically acceptable?

First, aesthetic properties are mostly discussed, sometimes even de-fined as properties relevant for art criticism in recent aesthetic debate.41

But not all properties of works of art, which seemingly matter for art cri-ticism and evaluation, depend on the works’ sensory properties. Think,for example, of Duchamp’s Fountain.42 Danto says about this work: “itis daring, impudent, irreverent, witty, and clever” (Danto 1981, pp.93-94).These properties influence the value of Duchamp’s Fountain qua work ofart.43 But they do not depend on the work’s sensory properties. Even ifyou have not seen the Fountain, if you know that it is an urinal customaryin trade of 1917, which Duchamp has signed and put into an art exhibition,you can judge the work as daring, impudent, irreverent, witty, and clever.How exactly the Fountain looks like, which colour it has, or whether some-thing is reflected in its surface is not crucial. Or think about the criticismand evaluation of literary works of art.44 Assuming that the content of aliterary work is irrelevant for the work’s value as a work of art is rather odd.Thus it should possess aesthetic properties. As the content of a literarywork is one of its non-sense-perceptual features, the content’s aestheticproperties cannot depend on sensory properties, though. Hence if onethinks about aesthetic properties in terms of properties relevant for art

38 See Kovach (1974), p. 9.39 See Kovach (1974), p. 9.40 The extended sensory-dependence-thesis corresponds to Shelley’s (S)-thesis (2003,

p. 364) and Zangwill’s weak dependence thesis (2001, p. 127).41 See, e.g., Gaut (2007), pp. 34-35; Goldman (2009); Kivy (1975), p. 197.42 See, e.g., Carroll (2004), p. 418; Shelley (2003), p. 368.43 See Shelly (2003), p. 370.44 See, e.g., Binkley (1977), p. 269; Carroll (2003), p. 420; Eaton (1994), p. 392; Living-

ston (2003), pp. 265-266; Shelley (2003), pp. 373-375.

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criticism, one has to reject the extended sensory-dependence-thesis. Oth-erwise one cannot properly criticize and evaluate some works of art.

Zangwill defends the extended sensory-dependence-thesis against thisobjection.45 He distinguishes between aesthetic and artistic properties.Aesthetic properties determine the aesthetic value, artistic properties theartistic value of a work of art. And although some artistic properties areaesthetic, not all of them are. The extended sensory-dependence-thesisprovides a distinguishing feature. All aesthetic, but not all artistic proper-ties have to depend in part on sensory properties.

The advantage of this proposal is that it clearly distinguishes two separ-ate questions, which became intermingled by the development of aesthet-ics and art philosophy. On the one side stands the purely art philosophicalquestion what determines the value of a work of art qua art. On the otherside stands the broader aesthetic question what an aesthetic property is.Prima facie, one does not have to concentrate on art in order to answer thesecond question because not only works of art possess aesthetic propertiesas the example of beauty well illustrates.

To explain what an aesthetic property is and how it is to be distin-guished from a non-aesthetic property is notoriously difficult to answerand is intensively discussed in aesthetics. It is noticeable, however, thatmost attempts to define aesthetic properties or at least to point out salientfeatures are not committed to the extended sensory-dependence-thesis.Let me illustrate this with some examples. First, aesthetic properties mightbe defined as taste properties.46 Normal intelligence and sense percep-tion alone are not enough to attribute aesthetic properties, rather tasteas a special aesthetic sense is required. This proposal is not committed tothe extended sensory-dependence-thesis as it explicitly distinguishes tastefrom the ‘normal’ senses.47 Secondly, one can agree with Sibley that aes-thetic properties depend on non-aesthetic ones and that the attributionof aesthetic properties is non-condition-governed.48 But as non-aestheticproperties are not only sensory ones, the extended sensory-dependence-thesis does not follow from this proposal either. Thirdly, Kivy emphasises

45 See Zangwill (2001), p. 137.46 See, e.g., Hungerland (1962-1963), p. 43; Sibley (1959), p. 421; (1965), p. 135.47 See also Hutcheson (2004), p. 24.48 See, e.g., Sibley (1959), (1965).

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that we consider and enjoy aesthetic properties for their own sake.49 Butnothing prevents us from enjoying the funniness of a joke’s payoff for itsown sake, even if it does not depend on the sound of the words used totell the joke. Furthermore, some authors approach aesthetic propertiesby giving examples.50 Many of these exemplary aesthetic properties donot have to depend on sensory properties. Think, for example, of beingunified, sentimental, or tragic. Thus, to define or at least to better un-derstand aesthetic properties, one does not have to defend the extendedsensory-dependence-thesis.

So although the extended sensory-dependence-thesis makes sense ety-mologically, it cannot be defended on a metatheoretical level, and hencethe etymological argument fails. One can wonder whether thereby one hasnot found an argument against the sensory-dependence-thesis, namely, ifone also rejects P2E.51 According to P2E, beauty is one aesthetic prop-erty amongst others. Sometimes, however, beauty is considered to be averdictive aesthetic property, to use Zangwill’s terminology.52 If so, judge-ments of beauty are the same as aesthetic value judgements. Sometimesjudgements of beauty are even considered as equivalents to judgementsof artistic value.53 If so, saying that a work of art is beautiful means thesame as saying that it is a good work of art. Aesthetic success or meritnow depends on aesthetic properties, artistic success or merit on artisticproperties.54 If the extended sensory-dependence-thesis holds neither foraesthetic nor for artistic properties (if one wants to draw such a distinc-tion), beauty does not necessarily depend on sensory properties either.The etymological argument can be turned into an argument against thesensory-dependence-thesis, it seems.

Sometimes “beauty” is indeed used as a synonym for “aesthetic suc-cess”, sometimes also for “artistic success”. Another, narrower meaningof beauty, however, exists.55 First, it makes sense to point out that some

49 See Kivy (1975), pp. 209-211.50 See, e.g., Goldman (2009), p. 125; Kivy (1975), 197-198; Sibley (1959), p. 421-422.51 Collingwood (1938, pp. 38-41) and Bell (1913, pp. 11-16) claim that beauty has nothing

to do with aesthetic consideration. This is, however, a rather unusual position.52 See Zangwill (2001), chap. 1.53 See, e.g., Kovach (1974), p. 30; Mothersill (1984).54 See, e.g., Zangwill (2001), chap. 1.55 See, e.g., Scruton (2011), p. 13.

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works of art are good works of art, some even masterpieces without be-ing beautiful.56 Duchamp’s Fountain or Picassos Les Demoiselles d ’Avignonare just two examples of such works of art. Secondly, it also makes senseto point out that something can be aesthetically valuable without beingbeautiful.57 Just think of a sublime mountain view. If so, “beauty” in thisnarrower sense is not a synonym for “aesthetic success” or “artistic suc-cess”, although a work of art can become a good work of art (partly) be-cause it is beautiful, or something can count as aesthetically valuable be-cause it is beautiful. P2E refers to this understanding of beauty. If beauty isonly an aesthetic or artistic property among others, rejecting the extendedsensory-dependence-thesis does not exclude that the sensory-dependence-thesis holds for some aesthetic properties. Whether beauty is one of thoseaesthetic properties is still an unanswered question.

5. The Argument of Irreducibility

Short remarks of Burke and Danto inspire the fourth argument. At thebeginning of his treatise on beauty, Burke writes:

“By beauty I mean, that quality or those qualities in bodies by whichthey cause love, or some passion similar to it. I confine this defin-ition to the merely sensible qualities of things, for the sake of pre-serving the utmost simplicity in a subject which must always distractus, whenever we take in those various causes of sympathy which at-tach us to any persons or things from secondary considerations, andnot from the direct force which they have merely on being viewed.”(Burke 1990, p. 83).58

Danto mentions a similar idea:

“Some people are beautiful, some are not, some are downright ugly.These differences we register through the senses. We are attracted

56 See, e.g., Danto (2003), pp. 33-37; Nehamas (2007), chap. 1; Tatarkiewicz (1972), p.177.

57 See, e.g., Beardsley (1962), p. 626.58 See also Burke (1990), p. 101-102.

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to people because of their beauty, and even fall in love with them be-cause they are beautiful. But human beings have qualities of intellectand character that attract us to them despite their lack of beauty. […]To be sure, we often commend these qualities by speaking of themas “beautiful” –but this has nothing to do with aesthetic considera-tions at all, and it seems to me that it muddles the concept of beautyirreparably if we say that these qualities are another species or or-der of beauty. […] I propose we restrict the concept of beauty to itsaesthetic identity, which refers to the senses, […].” (Danto 2003, p.92).

Burke accepts the sensory-dependence-thesis for the sake of simplicityand in order to avoid distractions. Danto fears that without the sensory-dependence-thesis the concept of beauty becomes irreparably muddledwith other concepts. So both authors defend the sensory-dependence-thesis in order to prevent “beauty” from becoming a superfluous ormuddled concept. The argument of irreducibility aims to elaborate thisidea: (P1IR) A theory of beauty should not impoverish our means of ex-pression. (P2IR) A theory of beauty has to distinguish irreducible from re-ducible judgements of beauty in order to prevent impoverishing our meansof expression. (P3IR) If a theory of beauty rejects the sensory-dependence-thesis, it looses the means to distinguish irreducible from reducible judge-ments of beauty. That is why a theory of beauty should accept the sensory-dependence-thesis.

One aim of a theory of beauty is to better understand what we expressby calling something beautiful. It aims at conceptual clarity. In order toachieve this aim, it concentrates on judgements of beauty, that is, on judge-ments using the formulation “x is beautiful” or variations of this formula-tion, and then try to analyse and to explain them. P1IR emphasises that atheory of beauty should feel obliged to do grasp the full meaning of judge-ments of beauty in their analysis. Otherwise it impoverishes our means ofexpression. A theory of beauty should help us to express ourselves moreclearly because we better understand what speaking about beauty means,we should not be less able to express ourselves precisely.

In the case of some judgements of beauty, let us call them reducible,speaking about beauty can easily and without loss of meaning be replacedby using another concept. Sometimes, for example, if I say that a rose is

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beautiful, all that I want to say is that the rose is agreeable. “Beauty” isjust another name for agreeableness in this case. Insofar it is superfluous.Our means to express ourselves would not be impoverished if we couldonly speak about agreeableness and never about beauty. Not all reduciblejudgements of beauty might have exactly the same meaning. Dependingon the context of utterance and the object in question, “x is beautiful”might sometimes mean “x is agreeable”, sometimes “x is attractive”, some-times “x is perfect”, sometimes “x is artistically good”, and so on. A theoryof beauty should carefully distinguish these different meanings. If it doesnot and tries to find a common denominator of these different meanings, itmight conclude that the concept of beauty is extremely vague and uninter-esting because all that the reducible judgements seem to have in commonis that they convey a somehow positive evaluation.59 Or it might concludethat “beauty” is a muddled concept because the different meanings of thereplaceable judgements of beauty seem to be at best connected by a familysimilarity, if at all.60 If all judgements of beauty were reducible, a theoryof beauty could only differentiate between their different meanings. If itthen would suggest that we should avoid speaking about beauty and useinstead the respective synonyms, this would not impoverish our means ofexpression. It would rather lead to conceptual clarity and precision.

If, however, some judgements of beauty are irreducible, this procedurewould impoverish our means of expression. In the case of an irreduciblejudgement of beauty, speaking about beauty cannot be replaced by usinganother term without loss of meaning because we can only or best expresswhat we want to express by saying “x is beautiful”. This does not meanthat irreducible judgements of beauty cannot be analysed or explained atall. For example, part of the meaning of an irreducible judgement of beautymight be that the object in question is pleasant. The point is that this doesnot exhaust its whole meaning. Irreducible judgements should thereforenot be treated as or confused with reducible judgements.

But why should one assume that some judgements of beauty are irredu-cible? The recent aesthetic debate does not pay much attention to beauty.Beauty has lost its predominant position. Perhaps, aesthetics has learned

59 See Beardsley (1962), pp. 623-624. Wittgenstein (1968, p. 20), e.g., comes to such aconclusion.

60 Wittgenstein (1979) hints at such a conclusion.

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its lesson and has understood that “beauty” is an uninterestingly vague orsimply muddled concept, which is superfluous in the end, and thereforedoes not discuss it anymore. But this is neither the only nor the best ex-planation why contemporary aesthetics lost its interest in beauty. Aes-thetics nowadays mostly concentrates on art philosophical questions. It issometimes even defined as mere art philosophy.61 And attempts to defineart or to explain the value of works of art in terms of beauty got out of stylebecause works of art, especially, contemporary works of art do not aim atbeauty.62 Contemporary aesthetics does not think much about beauty be-cause beauty does not play a prominent role in art, and not because theconcept of beauty is proved to be superfluous.

Professional art criticism set aside, we often speak about beauty. Andeven if we sometimes could express ourselves equally effectively and pre-cisely without speaking about beauty, it is a rather strong assumption thatwe could always forgo speaking about beauty. Furthermore, it is remark-able that philosophers have tried to elaborate theories of beauty (nearly)at all times. This enduring interest in judgements of beauty can be best ex-plained in my opinion if some judgements of beauty are irreducible. Theyfascinate philosophically because it is a challenge to grasp and to explaintheir full meaning.63 One can thus assume that some judgements of beautyare irreducible. If so, they should be distinguished from reducible ones.

According to P3IR, one looses the means to distinguish irreduciblefrom reducible judgements of beauty if one rejects the sensory-dependence-thesis. This premise is inspired by Burke’s and Danto’s remarks. It isnot an unreasonable assumption that beauty can be explained in termsof attractiveness, especially, if one thinks about human beauty. A person’sattractiveness can depend on her mere sense-perceptual features like hervisual appearance, the sound of her voice, or her smell, but also on her non-sense-perceptual features like her character traits or intellectual abilities.If I simply call someone attractive, it is not clear whether her attractive-ness depends wholly, or partly, or not at all on her sense-perceptual fea-tures. Some judgements of human beauty resist to be analysed in termsof attractiveness just because of this. Speaking about attractiveness can-

61 See, e.g., Beardsley (1981), p. 4; Binkley (1977), p. 267.62 See, e.g., Danto (2003); Nehamas (2007); Tatarkiewicz (1972), p. 177.63 For a similar idea, see Mothersill (1984), p. 11.

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not capture the sensory dependence of beauty. If we could not expressthis, this would impoverish our means of expression, especially, becauseno other equally well-established concept other than beauty exists thathighlights sensory dependence and has more or less the same meaning. Sothe irreducibility of these judgements of beauty has to be preserved. If onerejects the sensory-dependence-thesis, however, one cannot differentiatethese apparently irreducible judgements of beauty from reducible ones,and would hence impoverish our means of expression.

To generalise this idea, think of all the synonyms of beauty, which arediscussed: “attractiveness,” “agreeableness,” “artistically goodness,” “use-fulness,” “perfection,” and so on. None of these synonyms bears a directconnection to the sensory realm. Non-sense-perceptual features and ob-jects can be attractive, agreeable, artistically good, useful, perfect, and soon. If one gives up the sensory-dependence-thesis, the same is true forbeauty, and hence it does not speak against an equation, although otherreasons might speak against it. In the case of some judgements of beauty,however, what makes them irreducible is exactly that one wants to pointout the sensory dependence. Because of this, none of these synonyms cancapture the full meaning of these judgements. If one rejects the sensory-dependence-thesis, one cannot explain why this is the case. If, however,one accepts the sensory-dependence-thesis, this explains why they are ir-reducible and why the proposed synonyms can only capture part of theirmeanings. They cannot convey the sensory dependence of beauty. Nomatter whether one tries to analyse beauty primarily in terms of agree-ableness, attractiveness, artistically goodness, perfection, and so on, if onegives up the sensory-dependence-thesis, one looses one’s means to point tothe sensory dependence. If so, one impoverishes our means of expression,which a theory of beauty should avoid.

If one pursues this line of thought and keeps in mind that the extendedsensory-dependence-thesis has been rejected, this provides another reasonto give up the sometimes-made equation between judgements of beautyand judgements of aesthetic or artistic success. Neither aesthetic, norartistic merit does have to depend on sensory properties, but beauty has to,as I have just argued.64 To distinguish beauty from aesthetic and artistic

64 See also Beardsley (1962), p. 635.

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success leads to further conceptual clarity.65 And the sensory-dependence-thesis at least partly justifies this distinction. As already emphasised, con-ceptual clarity and precision is a major aim of a theory of beauty.

6. Conclusion

This paper has raised the question whether one should accept the sensory-dependence-thesis. It has aimed to answer this question metatheoretic-ally, not drawing on assumptions only acceptable for representatives ofone specific elaborated theory of beauty because the sensory-dependence-thesis can influence what kind of theory of beauty one formulates and/orwhether one approves of, rejects, or restricts an elaborated theory of beau-ty. This article has accepted Gaut’s challenge that the burden of proofrests with the defenders of the thesis. The first argument has tried to de-duce the sensory-dependence-thesis from the immediacy of judgementsof beauty. But a temporal and an epistemic interpretation of “immediate”does not allow to claim that all judgements of beauty can be made immedi-ately, and a logical interpretation not that judgements of beauty have to de-pend on immediate, that is, non-inferentially accessible properties. Thatis why the argument of immediacy fails. The argument of the acquaintanceprinciple fails because the acquaintance principle can be defended withoutdefending the sensory-dependence-thesis. Thus the sensory-dependence-thesis cannot provide the best explanation for the principle. The etymolo-gical argument has to be rejected because it rests on the extended sensory-dependence-thesis. Not all properties, which contemporary aestheticstreats as aesthetic, depend on sensory properties. The argument of irredu-cibility, in contrast, provides a good metatheoretical reason to defend thesensory-dependence-thesis. It argues that theories of beauty should notimpoverish our means of expression. Rejecting the sensory-dependence-thesis, however, would confine the richness and precision of our means ofexpression. In the end, this article defends the sensory-dependence-thesis.It has not elaborated or defended any particular theory of beauty, though.This task is set next.

65 See also Danto (2003), p. 58.

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