Upload
alain
View
32
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
Problems from Chapter 8. Galileo and the Papal Inquisition. Describe strategies in the subgame perfect equilibrium. What does pope do? What does Galileo do at each of his decision nodes? What does the inquisitor do?. Strategic Form. Three Players.—What are the strategies? . - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Citation preview
Problems from Chapter 8
Galileo and the Papal Inquisition
Describe strategies in the subgame perfect equilibrium.
What does pope do? What does Galileo do at each of his decision nodes? What does the inquisitor do?
Strategic FormThree Players.—What are the strategies?
Strategic form if Pope refers case
Confess Before Torture. Confess if tortured
Confess before torture . Do not confess if tortured
Do not confess before torture. Confess if tortured
Do not confess before torture. Do not confess if tortured
Torture 5,4,3 5,4,3 4,5,1 1,1,2
Do not torture
5,4,3 5,4,3 2,2,4 2,2,4
Galileo’s Strategy
Payoffs if Pope Refers the Case to the Inquisition
Inquisitor’sStrategy
Payoffs listed x,y,z means x for Pope, y for inquisitor, z for Galileo
Strategic form if Pope doesn’t refer case
Confess Before Torture and Confess if tortured
Confess before torture but do not confess if tortured
Do not confess before torture, confess if tortured
Do not confess before torture, do not confess if tortured
Torture 3,3,5 3,3,5 3,3,5 3,3,5
Do not torture
3,3,5 3,3,5 3,3,5 3,3,5
Galileo’s Strategy
Payoffs if Pope Does not refer the Case to the Inquisition
Inquisitor’sStrategy
Payoffs listed x,y,z means x for Pope, y for inquisitor, z for Galileo
Some Nash equilibria
• Pope refers, Galileo will confess before torture and will confess if tortured, Inquisitor will torture if Galileo doesn’t confess beforehand.
• Pope refers, Galileo confess before torture, would not confess if tortured, Inquisitor will torture.
• Pope doesn’t refer, Galileo will not confess before torture, wouldn’t would confess if tortured, Inquisitor would torture if G doesn’t confess.
More Nash equilibria
• Pope doesn’t refer the case. Galileo would not confess either before or after torture. Inquisitor would torture.
• Pope doesn’t refer the case. Galileo would not confess either before or after torture. Inquisitor would not torture.
Piquant facts for fans of the waterboard.
• Galileo would rather confess before being tortured than be tortured.
• But if he is tortured, he would rather not confess. • Pope would like Galileo to confess without being
tortured. • Pope would also be happy if Galileo is tortured and
confesses.• But Pope would rather not refer the case if Galileo
would be tortured and not confess.• So Galileo is not brought before the Inquisition.
Goblins Gold Problem
• Seven goblins, A,B,E,G,K,R, and U, divide 100 gold pieces
• A proposes an allocation of the gold. If at least half vote yes, allocation is accepted
• If not, A is sent away. Then B proposes and the remaining Goblins vote.
• This process continues down the list until either a proposal is accepted or only U is left in which caseU gets all the gold.
Working backwards
If only two goblins are left, R and U, then it is R’s turn to propose. R can make anything pass by voting for it. So he will choose 100 for R and 0 for U.Suppose there are 3 goblins left, K, R, and U, then it is K’s turn to propose. K’s best strategy is to offer 1 to U, 0 to R and 99 to himself. Why?
What’s the pattern?
• What if there were 100 goblins?• How about 200?• How about 300?
• What does this problem have to do with subgame perfection?
When does a lawmaker want a moderate law?
• Pick numbers so that a gentle law is enforced but not obeyed, and a severe law is neither enforced nor obeyed, but a moderate law is enforced and obeyed.
Taking Turns in the Dark:(Subgame perfection with incomplete information )
Econ 171
Subgame Perfection with Imperfect Information
Can the notion of subgame perfection help us if there is incomplete information?
What is a regular subtree of a game?
• It is a subtree starting from one of the nodes of the game such that this subtree contains an entire information set if it contains at least one node from that set.
• A subgame is defined to be a regular subtree together with the associated payoffs.
• A proper subgame of a game is a subgame that does not contain the entire game. (by analogy to a proper subset of a set)
Subgame perfection
• In a game with imperfect information, a strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if for every subgame of the game, its substrategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
What is a substrategy profile?
• A strategy profile for a game specifies what a player will do at every information set in the game and specifies the payoffs at the end of the game.
• A substrategy profile of the original strategy profile specifies what will happen at every information set in the subgame.
Alice and Bob Play in the Dark
Bob
Go to A Go to B
Go to A
Alice Alice
Go to B Go to A Go to B
23 0
011
32
How many proper subgames does this game have?
A) 0B) 1C) 2D) 3E) More than 3
Alice and Bob Play in the Dark
Bob
Go to A Go to B
Go to A
Alice Alice
Go to B Go to A Go to B
23 0
011
32
How many subgame perfect Nash equilibria does this game have?
A) 0B) 1C) 2D) 3E) 4
Alice, Bob, and the outside option
Go to A Go to B
Go to A
Alice Alice
Go to B Go to A Go to B
23 0
011
32
2.5 1
Go shoot pool
What are the subgame perfect equilibria in this game?
Bob
BobGo to Movies
The Yule Ball Tale
The Yule Ball Story
Page 283, in your text.
How many proper subgames (subgames not equal to the whole game) does this game have?A) 0B) 1C) 2D) 3E) More than 3
Dating Dilemma
Ron
Hermione
Victor Asks
Y,Y,Y Y,Y,N Y,N,Y Y,N,N N,Y,Y N,Y,N N,N,Y N,N,NAsk 8,3,6 8,3,6 8,3,6 8,3,6 1,8*,8* 1,8*,8* 3,2,4 3,2,4
Don’t 7*,6*,5* 7*,6*,5* 7*,6*,5* 7*,6*,5* 2,5,3 2,5,3 2,5*,3 2,5*,3
Hermione
Victor Doesn’t Ask
Y,Y,Y Y,Y,N Y,N,Y Y,N,N N,Y,Y N,Y,N N,N,Y N,N,NAsk 4,7*,7* 6,1,2 4,7*,7* 6,1,2 *4,7*,7* 6,1,2 *4,7*,7* 6,1,2
Don’t 5,4,1 5,4,1 5,4,1 5,4,1 5,4,1 5,4,1 5,4,1 5,4,1Ron
Simplifying the Game
If Hermione ever reaches either of the two nodes where Ron gets to ask her, she would say Yes. So a subgame perfect equilibrium must be a Nash equilbrium for the simpler game in whichHermione always says “yes” to Ron if she hasn’t accepted a date from Victor.
Yes to Victor No to Victor
Ask 8,3,6 1,8*,8*
Don’t Ask 7*,6*,5* 2,5,3
Victor Asks
Hermione’s strategy
Ron’s Strategy
Yes to Victor No to Victor
Ask 4,7*,7* 4*,7*,7*
Don’t Ask 5,4,1* 5,4,1*
Hermione’s strategy
Victor Doesn’t Ask
Ron’s Strategy
One lesson:Subgame Perfection does not
eliminate all of love’s quandries