STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF SPARTANBURG

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEASFOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

RODNEY DEAN TURNER, )

)PLAINTIFF, )

)vs. )

)ALAN WILSON, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL )CAPACITY AS THE ATFORNEY GENERAL )OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, )ASHLEY MCMAHAN, IN HER FORMER )OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT )ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OP)SOUTH CAROLINA, EUGENE DONOPIUE, )IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPECIAL AGENT )WITH THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW )ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, TONY WYATT,)IN HIS FORMER CAPACITY AS MAYOR )PRO-TEM OF THE TOWN OF LYMAN AND)IN HIS PRESENT AND FORMER )CAPACITIES AS TOWN COUNCILMAN OF )THE TOWN OF LYMAN, RITA OWENS, )LARRY CHAPELL, DONNIE WETZEL, AND )TERESA SHULER IN THEIR PRESENT OR )FORMER OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS TOWN )COUNCH. MEMBERS OF THE TOWN OF )LYMAN, THE SOUTH CAROLINA OFFICE )OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE )SOUTH CAROLINA LAW ENFORCEMENT )DIVISION, AND THE TOWN OF LYMAN, )A BODY POLITIC OF TRIE STATE OF )SOUTH CAROLINA, )

)DEPENDANTS.

SUMMONS

No.:_

(Jury Trial Requested)

TO THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE-NAMED:

YOU ARE SUMMONED and requured to answer the Complaint in this action, a copy of

which is hejsrewlth serred upon you, and to serve a copy of yout Answer to said Complaint on the

subscribed, Andrew J. Johnston, PA, at 184 North Daniel Morgan Avenue, Post Office Box 3252,

Spartanburg, South Carolina, 29306 within thirty (30) days from the semce hereof, exclusive of the

date of such service; and if you fail to answer the Complaint within the dme aforesaid. Judgment by

default wiU be rendeted against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint.

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ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

ANDREW J. JOHNS'SC Bar No. 3064

184 North Daniel Morgan Avenue

Spattanburg, SC 29306(803) 591-1093

Spartanburg, South Ca-colina

August ^ .2017

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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OP SPARTANBURG

RODNEY DEAN TURNER,

PLAINTIFF,

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEASFOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

vs. COMPLAINT

No.:

(Jury Trial Requested)

))

ALAN WILSON, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL )CAPACnY AS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL )OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, )ASHLEY MCMAHAN, IN HER FORMER )OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT )ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF)SOUTH CAROLINA, EUGENE DONOPIUE, )IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPECIAL AGENT )WITH THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW )ENFORCEMENT DP/ISION, TONY WYATT,)IN HIS FORMER CAPACITY AS MAYOR )PRO-TEM OF THE TOWN OF LYMAN AND)IN HIS PRESENT AND FORMER )CAPACITIES AS TOWN COUNCILMAN OF )THE TOWN OF LYMAN, RITA OWENS, )LAKRY CHAPELL, DONNIE VVETZEL, AND )TERESA SHULER IN THEIR PRESENT OR )FORMER OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS TOWN )COUNCIL MEMBERS OF THE TOWN OF )LYMAN, THE SOUTH CAROLINA OFFICE )OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE )SOUTI-I CAROLINA LAW ENFORCEMENT )DIVISION, AND THE TOWN OF LYMAN, )A BODY POLITIC OF THE STATE OF )SOUTH CAROLINA, )

)DEFENDANTS. _1

TO: ALL ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS:

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, Rodney Dean Turner by and tluough his undersigned attorney

requesting a jury trial and complaining of the Defendants as follows:

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION

1. That the Plaintiff, Rodney Dean Turner, (hereinafter "Turner"), was at aU times

relevant to this complaint a resident of the County of Spartanburg, State of South Carolina.

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2. The Defendant Alan Wilson, (hereinafter '"Wilson"), was at all times herein the

Attorney General of the State of South Carolina and acting under color of law. Wilson is sued in Ills

individual capacity under federal law for compensatory and punitive damages for actions taken under

color of law and within the scope of his employment in his administtative capacity.

3. The Defendant, Ashley McMahan, (hereinafter "Mc]V[ahan"), was at all times herein

employed as an Assistant Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, and acting under the color

of law. McMahan is sued in her individual capacity under federal law fot compensatoiy and punitive

damages for actions taken under color of law and within the scope of her employment in her

administrative and invesdgative capacity.

4. The Defendant Eugene Donohue, (hereinafter CCDonohue??), was at aU times herem

employed as a Special Agent for the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division^ and acdng under

color of law. Donohue Is sued in his individual capacity under federal law fot compensafcoty and

punitive damages for actions taken under color of law and within the scope of his employment m his

investigative capacity.

5. That the Defendants Tony Wyatt, Rita Owens, Lat'ty Chapell, Donnie Wetzel, and

Teresa Shuler, (hereinafter "The Lyman Town Council") were at all times elected officials of the

Town of Lyman, South Carolina, and acting undei: the color of law. The Lyman Town Council are

sued in their individual capacities under federal law for compensatoty and punitive damages for

actions taken under the colot of law and within the scope of their elected positions and in their

administcative capacities.

6. The Defendant South Carolina Office of the Attorney General, (hereinafter

"SCAG ), is die appropriate party defendant as a state agency for the acts and omissions of Its

agents /employees in the course and scope of their employment and/of offlcml dudes pursuant to the

South Carolina Tort Claims Act. SCAG is also an appropriate party defendant as an entity fot

supervisory claims arising from customs or practices which violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant

SCAG is sued for compensatory damages only under die South CatoUna Tott Claims Act causes of

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action and for actual, consequential and punitive damages, as well as attorney fees and costs under 42

U.S.C, § 1983 causes of action.

7. The Defendant South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (hereinafter "SLED"), is

the appropriate patty defendant as a state agency fot the acts and omissions of its agents /employees

in the course and scope of theit employment and/or official duties pursuant to the South Carolina

Tort Claims Act. SLED is also an appropriate party defendant as an entity for supemsoiy claims

arising from customs or practices which violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983. SLED is sued for compensatoiy

damages only under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act causes of action and for actual,

consequential and punitive damages, as well as attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 causes

of action.

8. The Defendant Town of Lyman, (hereinafter "The Town of Lyman"), is the

appropriate party defendant as a body politic for the State of South Carolina and is the appropriate

party defendant as a body politic for the State of South Carolina and for the acts and oraissions of its

agents /employees in the course and scope oftheu: employment and/or official duties pursuant to the

South Cat-oUna Tort Claims Act. The Town of Lyman is also an appropriate party defendant as an

entity for supervisoiy claims arising from customs or ptactfces which violate 42 U.S.Q § 1983. The

To\vn of Lyman is, sued for compensatory damages only under the South Cafolina Tort Claims Act

causes of action and for actual, consequential and punitive damages, as weU. as attorney fees and costs

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 causes ofacdon.

9. At all tunes relevant to this Complaint, all defendants conspired together and acted

in concert and are Joindy and severely responsible fot the harms caused to the Plaintiff.

10. Turner brings Ins state claims act against Defendants SCAG, SLED, and The Town

ofLyman pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10 et seq. and § 15-

5-9- et seq. The Plaintiff further invokes this court's concurrent jurisdicdon to hear his claims against

Defendants WUson, McMahan, Donohue, The Lyman Town Council, SCAG, SLED and The Town

of Lyman arising under the United States Constitution and federal statutes. Speci&cally, 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983, § 1988, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

11. Turner took the office of M^ayor of the Town of Lyman on July 7, 2008, and was re-

elected to that position on July 9, 2012. As a result of die indictments, Govemoi: Nikkt Haley

suspended Turner from this office.

12. Turner became a certified police officer in the State of South Carolina on Octobef

26, 1990. As a result of due indictments, Tutner was prohibited from carrying a firearm and lost the

ability to be a. police officer.

13, Turner joined the GSP Airport police on September 23, 1991, and at the time of his

arrest in his case was fi Sergeant with that organization. Because Tutnet could not act as a police

officer, he was forced to resign his position

14. Turner was arrested on of about August 5, 2015, on arrest warrants alleging three (3)

counts of criminal violations.

15. The first warrant aUeged cfiminal conduct occumng between July 8, 2008, and

August 15, 2014. This conduct was alleged to involve common law misconduct in office; to wit: that

Turner acted without legal authority in regard to a lease of Town of Lyman real property and by

entering Into "secret negodations concerning a town legal matter."

16. The second warrant alleged criminal conduct occurring between Febmaty 21, 2014,

and August 14, 2014. Tills conduct was alleged to have involved an allegation of violation of the

eavesdcopping or wiretapping statute by electronic means under SC Code Ann. § 17-30-20.

17. The third warrant alleged criminal conduct occurring between July 8, 2008, and

August 14, 2014. Tills conduct was alleged to have involved statutory misconduct in office under SC

Code Ann. § 8-1-80; to wit: that Turner committed corruption and oppression by wiUfally and

dishonestly ignotmg state law."

18. The affiant on all three arrest warrants was Donohue.

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19. Turner was arrested on these, three warrants on August 5,2015.

20, On August 7, 2015, Turner through counsel, requested a pteliminary hearing and

further requested that Donohue be personally present for the hearing put'suant to S.C. Code Ann.

§ 17-23-162. McMahan was notified of this request.

21. Upon information and belief, when contacted by Sparfcanburg County officials to

schedule the preliminary hearing in the case, Donohue claimed that he would not be available until

August 31, 2015, and the hearing was scheduled for that date.

22. On August 21, 2015, McMahan sent an email to undersigned counsel stating that

she had sought and received two grand Jury indictments on the arrest warrants and that Turner was

therefore no longer entitled to a preliminaiy hearing.

23. Donohue, McMahan, SLED, and SCAG violated Turner's Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by using the grand jury as a "mere playthtng" in otdef to defeat

Turner's legal right to a preUminai-y hearing wherein, his counsel could cross-examine Donohue and

challenge the existence of probable cause and possibly seek an early dismissal to the case.

24. Donohue was the sole witness before the Spartanburg County grand jury on the

indictments.

25. When the indictments were presented to the Spartanburg County jury, only two

indictments were ptesented, one for common law misconduct In office and the other for a violation

of the witetapping statute.

26. On June 13, 2016, McMahan offered a plea bargain to Turner wherein he would

offer to plead guilty to a lesser charge of statutory misconduct in office under S.C. Code Ann. § 8-1-

80 with a recommendation of a probationary sentence.

27. This offer was rejected by Turner.

28. Subsequently, McMahan left SCAG for the private practice of law.

29. The case was reassigned to Assistant Attorney General, Megan Burchstead.

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30. On. November 2, 2016, Burchstead uncondiri-onaUy nolle prossed the charges

against Turner with the written notation that the charges lacked "prosecutorial merit and/or

evidence."

31. That the actions and/or failures to act by Wilson, McMahan, Donohue, SCAG, and

SLED, as described in this complaint, constitute conduct which amounts to willful, wanton, reckless,

malicious and intentional bad faith conduct which has harmed the Plaintiff. Specifically, but not

limited to, the actions and/or faiLures to act constitute a \villful wanton reckless, malicious and

intentional bad faith failure to Invesdgate and/or supervise.

32. That the actions and/ot failures to act of Wtlson, McMahan, and SCAG as

described above encompasses conduct outside of theii- roles as advocates and includes conduct that

is investigative and administcative.

FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTIONAbuse of Process Against SLED

33. Turner incoipo-rates by reference all pfevious allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

34. That SLED Is vicariously Uable for the acts of emissions of Donohue acting within

the course and scope of his employment.

35. That SLED, through its acts and omissions, specifically but not limited to those

described above, employed legal process and/or aided and abetted others In die employment of legal

process against Turner for an ulterior purpose and that those actions and/or failures to act were

willful and not proper in the regular conduct of such proceedings.

36. That as a result of Defendant SLED'S willful, wanton- and grossly negligent acts and

omissions, the Plaintiff has suffered harm and damages as hereinafter set out.

FORA SECOND CAUSE OF ACTIONIntentional Infliction of Emotional DisU-ess Against SLED

37. Turner incorporates by reference all previous allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

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38. That SLED is vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of Defendant Donohue

acting within the course and scope of his employment.

39. That SLED, duough its acts and omissions, speclflcaUy but not limited to those

described above, intentionally and recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress, or acted in such a

way that it would be certain that such distress would result from their conduct, against Turner.

40. That SLED'S conduct was so extreme and outtageous as to exceed aU possible

bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community.

41. That the acts and omissions of SLED caused Turner emotional distress that was so

severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.

42. That as a further result of SLED?s willful, wanton and grossly negligent acts and

omissions, die Plaintiff has suffered harm and damages as hereinaftef set out.

FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTIONCivil Conspitacy Against SLED

43. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

44. That SLED is vlcarlously Uable for the acts and omissions of Defendant Donohue

acting within the course and scope of his employment.

45. That SLED, through its acts and omissions, specifically but not limited to those

described above, combined and Joined, but not limited to: SCAG, WUson, McMahan, the Lyman

Town Council Members, and the Town of Lyman for the purpose of injuring and causing special

damage to Turner.

46. That as a result of SLED)s wiUfui, wanton, and grossly negligent acts and omissions,

the Plaintiff has suffered harm and damages as hereinafter set out.

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FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTIONAbuse of Process Against Defendant SCAG

47. Turner mcoi-porates by reference all previous allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

48, That SCAG is vicariously liable for die acts and omissions of Defendants Wtlson

and Mc]V[ahan actmg \vithiii the course and scope of their employment.

49. That SCAG through its acts and omissions, specifically but not limited to those

described above, employed legal process and/or aided and abetted others in the employment of legal

process against Turner for an ulteriot purpose and that those actions and/of faiLures to act were

willful and not proper in the regular conduct of such proceedings.

50. That as a result of SCAG's wffiful, wanton and grossly negligent acts and omissions

the Plaintiff has suffered harm and damages as hereinafter set out

FOR A FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTIONIntentional Inflicdon of Emotional Distress Against SCAG

51. Turner incotpomtes by reference all previous aU-egations of fact and law as If

repeated herein.

52. SCAG is vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of Defendants Wilson and

]V[cMahan acting within the course and scope of theu: employment.

53. That SCAG, through its acts and omissions, specifically but not limited to those

described above, intentionally and recklessly inflicted severe emotional disttess, or acted In such a

way that it was certain that such distress would result from their conduct, against Turner.

54. That SCAG)s conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible

bounds of decency and must be regarded atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

55, That the acts and omissions ofSCAG caused Turner emotional distress that was so

severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.

56. That as a result of SCAG's willful, wanton and grossly negligent acts and omissions

the Plaintiff has suffered harm and damages as hereinafter set out.

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FORA SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTIONCivil Conspiracy Against SCAG

57. Turnef incoi-porates by teference all previous aUegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

58, SCAG Is vlcariously liable for the acts and omissions of Defendants Wilson and

McMahan acting within the course and scope of their employment.

59. That SCAG, through its acts and omissions, specifically but not limited to those

described above, combined and joined with others, including but not limited to, SLED, Donohue,

Wilson, McMahan, the Lyman Town Council Members and the Town of Lyman for the purpose of

injuring and causing special damage to Turner.

60. That as a result of SCAG's wiUfuI, wanton and grossly negligent acts and omissions

Turner has suffered harm and damages as hereinafter set out

FOR A SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION§1983, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against McMahan in her

individual capacity

61. Turner incoi-porates by reference all previous allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

62. MclVtahan, by her acts and omissions, speciflcaUy but not limited to those described

above, violated Turner's constitutionally protected rights. SpeciftcaUy:

a. Interfering with and violating Turner's Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by seeking to deprive him of life, liberty or property without due

process of law by abusing process and other acts as documented above; and

b. Interfering with and violating Turner s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to a meaningful opportunity to present a fuU and complete

defense by abusing process and other acts as documented above.

63. That as a result of Mx^ahan's willful, wanton and grossly negligent acts and

omissions. Turner has suffered substantive and procedural due process violations resulting in harm

and damages as heireinafter set out.

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FOR AN EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION§1983 Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Donohue in his Individual

capacity

64. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous atlegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

65. Donohue, by his acts and omissions, specifically but not limited to those described

above, violated Turner s constitutionally protected rights. SpecificaUy:

(a) Interfering with and violating Turner's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

by seeking to deprive him of life, Uberty or property without due process of law, by abusing

process and othei: acts as documented above; and

(b) interfering with and violating Turner's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to

a meaningful opportunity to present a full and complete defense by abusing process and

other acts as documented above.

66. That as a result of Donohue)s willful, wanton and grossly negligent acts and

omissions, the Plaintiff has suffered substantive and procedural due process violations resulting in

harm and damages hereinafter set out.

FOR A NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION§1983, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Wilson in his individual

capacity for supervisot'y UabiUty ofMcNfahan

67. The Plaintiff fncorpotates by reference aU previous allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

68. Witson had actual or constmctlve knowledge of the conduct of Defendant

McMahan, all the actions and faiLutes to act of McMahan described above, and that said conduct

posed a pervasive and unteasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens Uke Turner.

69. Wilson had a duty to supervise McMahan, a duty that encompasses training,

supervision, and discipline. Wilson was grossly negligent in his supervision of McMahan in failing to

property and adequately supervise McMahan and her actions and failures to act as described above.

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70. Wilson's response to die knowledge of acdon and failures to act as described above

shows deliberate indifference ot tacit authorization of the alleged offensive conduct and

created/condoned customs, policies and/or practices that are deUberately indifferent £o the

UkeKhood that the employee/agents wiU violate the constitutional rights of citizens like Turnef.

71. Wilson knew or should have known, that his supervision of McMahan was

inadequate and created the possibility for potential harm such that Tumet has suffered harm due to

Wilson's actions or faUutes to act In die supervision ofMcMahan.

72. As a result of the willful, kno\vlng and gtossly negligent acts and omissions of

Wilson in supervising MclVTahan, Turnei: has suffered substantive and procedural due process

violations resulting in harm and damages as hereinaftet set out.

FOR A TENTH CAUSE OF ACTIONGross NegUgence under the SCTCA against SCAG for negligent supervision ofWilson and

McMahan

73. Turner incorporates by reference all previous allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

74. SCAG had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct of Wilson and

McMahan, all the actions and failures to act of WUson and McMahan described above, and that said

conduct posed a pervasive and unireasonable risk of injury to citizens like Turner.

75. SCAG had a duty to supervise WUson and McMahan, a duty that encompasses

training, supemsion, and discipline. SCAG was grossly negUgent in its supervision of WUson and

McMahan in failing to properly and adequately supervise Wilson and McMahan's acdons and failures

to act as described above.

76. SCAG's response to the knowledge of actions and failures to act as described above

shows deliberate Indifference or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive conduct and

created/condoned customs, policies and/or practices tEtat are deliberately mdifferent to die

likelihood that the employee/agents wlU violate die constitutional rights of citizens like Turner.

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77. SCAG knew or should have known that its supervision of WUson and McMahan

was inadequate and created the possibility for potential harm such as Turner has suffered harm due

to SCAG's actions or failures to act in the supervision ofWUson and McMahan.

78. As a result of the willful, knowing and grossly negligent acts and omissions by

SCAG m supervising Wilson and McMahan, Tumet has suffered damages as hereinafter set out.

FOR AN ELEVENTH CAUSE OP ACTIONGross negligence under the SCTCA against SLED for negligent supervision ofDonohue

79. Turner incorpofates by teference all previous allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

80. SLED had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct of Donohue, of all of

the acdons and failures to act of Donohue as described above, and that said conduct pervasive and

unreasonable risk of injury to citizens like Turner.

81. SLED had a duty to supemse Donohue as said above, and that said conduct posed

a pervasive and unreasonable risk of injury to citizens like Tumer.

82. SLED had a duty to supervise Donohue, a duty that encompasses training,

supervision, and discipline. SLED was grossly negligent in its supervision of Donohue in failing to

properly and adequately supemse Donohue's acdons and failures to act as described above.

83, SLED s responses to die knowledge of actions and failures to act as described

above show deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the aU-eged offensive conduct and

created/condoned customs, policies and/or practices that are completely indiffetent to the likelihood

that the employee/agents will violate the constitudonal rights of citizens Uke Turner.

84. SLED knew of should have known that its supervision of Donohue was inadequate

and created the possibility of potendal harm that Tumet has suffered harm due to SLED'S actions or

failures to act in the supervision ofDonohue.

85. As a result of the willful, knoxvmg and grossly negligent acts and omissions by

SLED in supemsing Donohue, Turnei: has suffered damages as hereinafter set out

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FOR A TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION§1983, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against SCAG and for supervisory

Uabllity of Wilson and McMahan

86. Turner incorporates by reference aU previous aUegations of fact and law as If

repeated herein.

87. SCAG had actual of constructive laiowledge of the conduct of Wilson and

McMahan, all the actions and failures to act ofWllson and McMahan desa-'ibed above, and that said

conduct posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injuty to citizens Uke Turner.

88. SCAG had a duty to supecvise Wilson and McMahan, a duty that encompasses

traming, supemsion, and discipline. SCAG was grossly negligent in Its supervision of Wilson and

McMahan in falling to properly and adequately supervise Wilson and McMahan's acdons and failures

to act as desa-'ibed above.

89. SCAG's response to the Imowledge of actions and failures to act as described above

shows deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive conduct and

cL-eated/condoned customs, policies and/ot pjL'actices that are deliberately mdifferent to die

likelihood that the employees/agents will violate the constitutional rights of citizens like Turner.

90. SCAG knew or should have known that its supervision of Wilson and McMahan

was inadequate and created the possibility for potential harm such that Turner has suffered harm due

to SCAG s actions ot failures to act in the supemsion ofWilson and McMahan.

91. As a result of the willful, knowing and grossly negligent acts and omissions by

SCAG in supervising Wilson and JVtcMahan, Turner has suffered substantive and pfocedural due

process violations resulting In harm and damages as hereinafter set out

FOR A THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION§1983, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against SLED and for supervisory

liability of Donohue

92. Turner incorporates by reference aU previous allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

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93, SLED had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct of Donohue, all die

actions and failures to act of Donohue described above and that said conduct posed a petvasive and

unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like Turnei:.

94. SLED had a duty to supervise Donohue, a duty that encompasses training,

supervision, and discipline. SLED was severely negligent in Its supervision of Donohue In falling to

property and adequately supervise Donohue's actions and failures to act as described above.

95. SLED?s responses to the actions and failures to act as described above shows

deliberate indifference or tacit of authorization of the aUeged conduct and created/condoned

customs, policies and/or practices that are deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that the

employees /agents will violate the constitutional rights of citizens Uke Turner.

96. SLED knew or should have known that Its supervision ofDonohue was inadequate

and created the possibility for potential harm such as Turner has suffered harm due to SLED)s

actions or failures to act in the supervision ofDonohue.

97. As a result of the willful, knowing and grossly negligent acts and omissions by

SLED in supervising Donohue, Turner has suffered substantive and procedural due process

violations resulting in harm and damages as hereinaftet: set out.

FOR A FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTIONGross Negligence under the SCTCA against The Town ofLyman for negligent supervision

of the Lyman Town Council Members and other employees and/or agencies

98. Turner incorporates by reference all previous allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

99. The Town of Lyman had actual or constmctive knowledge of the conduct of the

Lyman Town Council Members, as well as other employees and/or agents of die Town of the

Lyman and all of their acdons and failures to act as described above^ and that such said conduct

posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of injury to citizens like the Turner.

100. The Town ofLyman had a duty to supervise die Defendant Lyman Town Council

Members, and other employees/agents, a duty that encompasses training, supervision, and discipline.

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The Town of Lyman was grossly negligent in its supervision of the Town Council Members and

other employees or agen-ts of the town and in falling to properly and adequately supervise the Town

Council Member's and employees/agents and their failures to act as described above.

101. The Town of Lyman's response to the knowledge of acdons and failutes to act as

described above shows deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of alleged offensive conduct and

created/condoned customs, policies and/or practices that are deliberately indifferent to the

likelihood that the employees/agent will violate the constitutional rights of citizens Uke Turner.

102. The Town ofLyman knew or should have known that its supervision of Defendant

Town Council Members and other employees/agents was inadequate and created the possibility for

potential harm such as the Plaintiff has suffered harm due to the Town ofLyman's actions or failures

to act in the supervision of the Town Council Members and other employees/agents.

103. As a result of the willful, knowing and grossly negligent and omissions by the Town

of Lyman In supervising the Town Council Members and other employees /agents. Turner has

suffered damages as hereinafter set out.

FOR A FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION§1983, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Town ofLyman and for

supervisory liability of die Lyman Town Council Members and other employees /agents

104. Turner incotporates by reference aU- previous allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

105. The Town of Lyman had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct of the

Lyman Town Council Members and other employees/agents and all the actions and failures to act of

the Lyman Town Council Members and other employees/agents and that said conduct posed a.

pervasive and unreasonable constitutional risk of injury to citizens like Tumet.

106. The Town ofLyman had a duty to supeivise the Lyman Town Council MeiTibei's,

and other employees/agents, a duty that encompasses training, supervision, and discipline.

107. The Town of Lyman was grossly negUgent in its supervision of the Town Council

Members and other employees /agents of the town and In failing to properly and adequately

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supervise the Lyman Town Council Membec's and employees/agents and their failures to act as

described above.

108. The Town ofLyman's response to die knowledge of actions and failures to act as

described above show deliberate indifference or tacit authorisation of alleged offensive conduct and

created/condoned customs, policies and/of ptactices that are deliberately indifferent to the

likelihood that the employees /agent will violate die constitutional rights of citizens like Turner.

109. The Town of Lyman knew or should have known that its supervision of the Town

CouncU Members and other employees/agents was inadequate and created the possibility for

potential harm such as Turner has suffered harm due to the Town of Lyman's actions or failures to

act in the supervision of the Town Council Members and other employees/agents.

110. As a result of the willful, knowing and grossly negligent and omissions by the Town

of Lyman in supervising the Lyman. Town Council IVEembets and other employees/agents, Turnei'

has suffered substantive and procedural due process violations resulting In harm and damages as

hereinafter set out.

FOR A SIXTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTIONMalicious Prosecution against Wilson, McMahan, Donohue, the Lyman Town Council,

SCAG, SLED and die Town ofLyman pursuant to § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment

111. Turner incofpotates by teference all previous allegations of fact and law as if

repeated herein.

112. Some or all of the Defendants of theit employees/agents instituted or continued

original Judicial proceedings against Turner.

113. The institution of conrinua.don of these judicial proceedings were by or at the

instance of, some or all of the Defendants or theit employees/agents.

114. These proceedings were temiinated in Turner's favor.

115. There was malice In the institution or contribution of such proceedings.

116. The proceedings were instituted or continued without probable cause.

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117. The Defendants and/ot their employees/agents acted under color of law and/or

local governmental custom or ptacrice.

118. Turner was seized and deprived of his Liberty as a direct result of some or all of the

Defendants' actions.

119. All Defendants violated Turner's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

120. The acts of the Defendants committed to the deprivation of fights under this course

of action in a reasonably foreseeable manner.

121. Tumec suffered injuries and damages as a direct result of these actions by

Defendants,

DAMAGES

12L That as to SCAG, SLED and the Town ofLyman, under the South Carolina Tort

Claims Act causes of actions, Turner is informed and believes that he is entitled to actual and

consequendal damages putsuant to S.C. Code § 15-51-40 and such other relief as the Court deems

Just and proper.

122. That as to Wilson, McMahan, Donohue^ the Lyman Town Council Members,

SCAG, SLED and the Town ofLyman^ under aLL non-South CaroHna Tort Claims causes of actions,

Turner is informed and beUeves that he is entlded to actual, consequential and pumtive damages,

damages pursuant to S.C. Code § 15-51-40 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, et seq. and such other and further

relief as the Court deems just and proper.

123. That as to WUson, McMahan, Donohue, the Lyman Town Council IVEembers,

SCAG, SLED and the Town ofLyman, under all non-South Carolina Tort Claims causes of actions,

Turner is Informed and believes that he is endded to attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1988 and such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, having fully set forth the gtounds of his Complaint, Turner asks this Court

to award compensatory and punitive damages in an appropriate amount, attorney fees and costs

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and such other and further reliefas this Coutt deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

By:.

Spartanbui'g, South Carolina

August 3» . 2017

ANDREW}. J\)I^STONAttorney for PUindffSC Bar No.: 3064

184 N Daniel Morgan Avenue

Spartanburg, South Carolina 29306Telephone: (864) 591-1093

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