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Private Equity Club 2008Exploring what’s on the horizon*
*connectedthinking
2PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Ashley CoupsPrivate Equity Assurance Leader, PricewaterhouseCoopers
3PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and ParticipationTuesday 9 September 2008
David PayneDirector, PricewaterhouseCoopers
Management considerations
Julian SansumPartner, PricewaterhouseCoopers
Benchmarking management packages
Fiona TalbotDirector, PricewaterhouseCoopers
Tax considerations
4PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
David PayneDirector, PricewaterhouseCoopers
5PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Management Considerations
•Management equity – conventional wisdom
•Trends across Europe
•Challenging environment for management equity
6PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Conventional wisdom- Align management interest with focus on capital growth
Debt
Additional financing PE House(Subordinated debt, preferred shares, etc)
Earnings Growth
Shareholder
Value
EnterpriseValue
Enterprisevalue
Sh
areh
old
ers
Val
ue
Time
‘Sweet Equity’
Multiple Arbitrage
ENTRY EXIT
7PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Trends across Europe
• General investor focus on capital gain• Generally capital gains taxed at lower rates than income across Europe• Actual or shadow equity used subject to local jurisdiction (cf USA)• Ratchet mechanisms often used in Secondaries
• Pan-European Anglo Saxons typically more generous cf local (esp inBenelux, Scandinavia & Nordics)
• Annual cash out bonus reduced in favour of capital growth
• Management awareness of Buy-out mechanics is generally high except inCE Europe
8PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Challenging environment for management equity
• 2006 & 07 multiples at historic high
• 2008 multiples now reflecting current environmentValuationMultiples
• Banks generally looking to reduce exposures & increasereturns
• Buy & Build support difficult to obtain
• Reaction to under-performance
Post-crunchdebt markets
• Economic downturn across UK and Europe
• Top-line growth looking much more challenging
• Manufacturing, Automotive, Retail & Services affected
Currenteconomic
environment
Prevalence ofSecondaries &
Tertiaries
• Level of appetite of primary management
• Second tier investment may be based on ‘one way bet’
• Attract and Retain of best talent
• Time horizons moving out
9PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Challenging environment for management equity
- Equity growth via only debt repayment significantly reduces equity return
Debt
Additional financing PE House(Subordinated debt, preferred shares, etc)
Shareholder
Value
EnterpriseValue
Enterprisevalue
Sh
areh
olde
rsV
alue
Time
‘Sweet Equity’
ENTRY EXIT
Earnings Growth
10PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Challenging environment for management equity
• Re-structuring may wipe out value of mgt’s rollover• Senior team appetite effect at most important time (trading & banks)• Investor appetite for equity reset at time when all shareholders having
difficulty• Importance of reputation for working our situation
• Re-focus on income• Greater understanding of the risk, risk of over-reaction• Bench-marking of packages more important
• Financial issues for individual managers• Second tier very likely to borrow for secondary / tertiary deals• Conflict of interest for primary buy-out team
11PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Summary
• Economic environment leads to increased risk of problems
• Mgt understanding of risks relating investment changed
• Change in population of available mgt
• Valuation reduction ultimately favours new deal environment
12PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Julian SansumPartner, PricewaterhouseCoopers
13PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Benchmarking Management Packages
Topical reward issues
1. Positioning incentive packages
2. Tier 2 plans
3. Reducing costs
4. Post IPO plans
14PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Comments on current PE model
• Typical private equity structures are strongly geared to the delivery of valuethrough management equity
• Expectation of return moving from a few years to 5 years +
• Listed companies geared around 3 year rolling periods
• Considerable recent growth in value for listed incentives
• Need to consider remuneration model typical in listed environment forcomparison
15PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Key features of plc and PE reward at senior levels
Listed Private EquityElement
Market median Lower quartile - medianBase
Modest ModestBenefits
Some DB, move towards DC,especially FTSE 250 DC or nonePension
• Annual awards• Basket of financial metrics (EPS,
FCF, EBITDA, sales, margin,ROCE, EVA, etc) and personal
• Upper quartile for topperformance
• Annual awards• Based on financial performance
(EBITDA, cash), not personal• May be ahead of market for
exceptional performance
Bonus
• 3 year rolling (annual) awards• Based on performance linked to:
• relative TSR• financial measure (e.g., EPS)
• Metrics not well understood• No personal investment• Modest gearing• Wide participation, 3-5 layers
• Single award, 3-5 year exit• Exit value is clear target• Substantial personal investment• Much higher gearing than plc• Narrower participation, say top 5-
10• By far the largest part of the
package
LTIP
16PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Positioning incentive packages
• Rational model for PE house to set value of incentives
• Linked to benchmarked values in listed / survey information
• Reduce risk of overpaying or underpaying
Performance
Gain
1. Listed plans – lower leverage
a) Where should PE line bepositioned?
b) What slope should it have?c) Where should it cross the listed
line?
2. PE plan – higher leverage
17PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Tier 2 plans
• Some medium / long-term incentive common below top tier in listedcompanies
• Competitive pressure means private equity owned businesses may needto respond
• Equity pot too distant / used for top management
• Cash alternatives worth considering
18PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Tier 2 plans
• Gear up annual bonus & defer
• Quickly builds to major lock in
• Leavers mean bonus % can be increased
Year 1
£
Base
Bonus
DeferredBonus 1
Base
Bonus
DeferredBonus 1
DeferredBonus 2
Year 2
Base
Bonus
DeferredBonus 1
DeferredBonus 2
Year 3
DeferredBonus 3
Pays
c0.5 -1 x base deferral
19PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Reducing costs
• Employment tax efficiency• Pension salary sacrifice, travel & subsistence, canteens, etc• Company cars v private, private fuel
• Salary costs• Benchmark
• Organisation design• Monks 6 Factor system provides objective approach to rightsizing
Ideal organisation design? More typical organisation design?
Bloated middle / senior management
20PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Post IPO incentive plans
• PE businesses have been successful using PE pay model
• Concerns around adopting full listed model on listing
• Efficient approach:• Benchmark packages to latest listed company practice• Develop hybrid arrangements using the best of PE and listed
company models• Avoid randomisation / lack of correlation prevelant in some listed
plans• Consult with Remuneration Committee• Consult with shareholders• Develop all employee plans
21PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Summary
• Current market means deals may take longer to exit• Need to consider competitive pressure for management talent + tier 2s and
below• Good benchmarks can be achieved by looking at the listed sector
22PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Fiona TalbotDirector, PricewaterhouseCoopers
23PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Tax considerations
•Income vs Gains
•Trends across Europe
•Underwater schemes
24PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Income vs Gains
Income rates• Vary across Europe with higher rates in Nordic territories and Western
Europe (40% - 50%)• Some Eastern European territories have lower rates (13% - 30%)
Capital rates• Have traditionally been lower, ranging across Europe between 0% and
30%
Social taxes• Watch Western Europe (and Hungary) which have uncapped social tax
obligations
25PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Income vs Gains
Current trends• Social tax obligations has always meant that non-employment income
favoured• However, across Europe we are seeing a convergence of capital and
investment income rates, e.g. Spain with a flat 18% rate• Or rates which differentiate types of income, e.g. investment income
and dividend income attracting different rates of tax
26PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Income vs Gains
Impact for management schemes• Depending on territory, management team members may be happy or
want to take investment income rather than gains• Differing tax rates in each territory could mean offering a mix of
securities• Continued focus on moving away from employment income if at all
possible
27PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Trends across Europe
Some territories have started to focus on the taxation of managementparticipation (and PE executive returns)
Focus varies between territories but falls broadly into three camps:• Investor status of management team member• Valuation of management securities• Recharacterisation of management securities
28PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Trends across Europe
Investor status of management team member:• Leaver provisions (e.g. Sweden, Denmark)
- Does the use of leaver provisions link the security to employment with theresult that all returns should be chargeable as employment income?
• Share rights (e.g. Germany, Austria)- Do “vesting”, leaver or any other provision call into doubt whether
beneficial ownership of the security has passed. Is the tax point delayed?
• Investment amounts (e.g. France)- Is there a real, meaningful investment amount at risk to demonstrate
investor status?
29PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Trends across Europe
Valuation of management securities• Capital structure (e.g. UK)
- Does the capital structure, and in particular the coupons onshareholder debt, provide values above par for managementsecurities?
Recharacterisation of management securities• Returns on PE deals (e.g. Netherlands)
- Potential specific rates of tax for investor income?
30PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Underwater Schemes
• Management equity can be underwater for a number of reasons
• To maintain goal congruence and incentivisation impact some restructuringmay be necessary
• Two main areas of focus• Shareholder debt which stands ahead of equity• Equity itself
• The objective of any restructuring to move value into the ordinary equity(which management hold alongside the PE house)
31PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Underwater Schemes
• Quantum of shareholder debt can have the effect of creating too high ahurdle before management equity is “in the money”
• Original structuring would utilise shareholder debt so that if interest isdeductible the group has a Corporate Tax shield
• If this shield is no longer required and the group has CT capacity then canwaive shareholder debt to lower hurdle on the equity
32PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Underwater Schemes
• Accruing coupon on shareholder debt contributes to the hurdle onmanagement equity
• If a CT deduction is no longer required then consider “turning off” theinterest
• Again, this has the impact of reducing the hurdle and thereby increasingvalue of equity
33PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Underwater Schemes
• If corporate restructure going on, then management can hold equity at thatNewCo level
• NewCo capital structure can reflect the desire to increase management’sshare of equity
• The type of restructuring will depend on the group’s needs
• The economic impact of the route chosen will need to be thought through –lowering the hurdle will give a different outcome to increasingmanagement’s percentage of equity for example
34PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Underwater Schemes
• Banking and/or shareholder docs can prohibit restructuring – can anyoneblock?
• Tax will be triggered if management receive, howsoever, positive value
• In ALL cases reduce the hurdle on managements’ equity so that it is justbreaking the surface and able to breath but DOES NOT come out of thewater
35PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Management Incentive Schemes and Participation
Summary
• A changing landscape
• Renewed focus on management participation by tax authorities
• Changing economic climate has seen management returns falter
• Getting managements’ tax position right can have a material impact ontheir returns
This publication has been prepared for general guidance on matters of interest only, and does not constituteprofessional advice. You should not act upon the information contained in this publication without obtaining specificprofessional advice. No representation or warranty (express or implied) is given as to the accuracy or completenessof the information contained in this publication, and, to the extent permitted by law, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,its members, employees and agents do not accept or assume any liability, responsibility or duty of care for anyconsequences of you or anyone else acting, or refraining to act, in reliance on the information contained in thispublication or for any decision based on it.
© 2008 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. All rights reserved. 'PricewaterhouseCoopers' refers toPricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (a limited liability partnership in the United Kingdom) or, as the context requires, thePricewaterhouseCoopers global network or other member firms of the network, each of which is a separate andindependent legal entity.