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Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff Voelker (UCSD)

Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

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Page 1: Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

Privacy-PreservingAttribution and

ProvenanceUC San Diego & University of Washington

Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs

Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff Voelker (UCSD)

Page 2: Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

Privacy-respecting forensics

Privacy: No extra information to “bad guys”.

Attributable / trackable: Can track the “bad guys” with special “properties”

Violate privacy: “Bad guys” can “track” the “good guys” without intended “special properties”

Avoid attribution / tracking: “Bad guys” can circumvent “tracking”

Page 3: Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

Evidence-based security research

Pursue a two-pronged research agenda Long-term “clean slate” architectural design, grounded in Principled work on today’s concrete security environment

Obvious analogy to the medical field Ongoing, fundamental research into biological processes Continuously developing treatments for prevalent disease Each independent process informs and guides the other

Page 4: Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

A vision for a future Internet

Strong anonymity Strong forensics

We are hereCan we get here and here

simultaneously?

Page 5: Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

What we have today

Each hop and destination might: Inspect/influence payload Fingerprint OS Fingerprint application Fingerprint physical device

Ad hoc; easy to fool if skilled attacker; but loss of privacy if average user

A

B

Page 6: Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

A

B

A

Attributable: Trusted third party can attribute physical origin of every single packet

Verifiable: Every hop and destination can verify that the trusted third party can attribute origin

Anonymous: Unauthorized parties cannot attribute physical origin of packets

What we want

Page 7: Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

Our System: Clue

Dual Pentium 3.4GHz, 4GB RAM;Dual Pentium 3GHz, 1GB RAM

Page 8: Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey: Laptop and mobile device theft prevalent

and expensive problem: $30k per incident

10% of laptops are lost or stolen in first year

97% of lost or stolen laptops never recovered

Lost/stolen Internet devices

Page 9: Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

Privacy-respecting recovery

Goal: Recover locations of lost or stolen devices

Timeline Owner possession (not lost nor stolen) Lost or stolen but unmodified State erased or reset Machine destroyed

Recoverability: Loss or flea market thief

Location privacy: Tracking service, thief, outsider

Page 10: Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

Lookup IKi(T) IKi(T),EKi(LocationInfo)

Adeona

Forward secure PRG to evolve keys over time

Use shared key to compute indices as well as encrypt data

Use DHT to prevent traffic profiling

Page 11: Privacy-Preserving Attribution and Provenance UC San Diego & University of Washington Alex C. Snoeren & Yoshi Kohno, PIs Stefan Savage, Amin Vahdat, Geoff

Our goal: Determine feasibility of putting privacy-respecting attribution into the network

But lots of issues, including: Who should be the trusted third pary?

Internet is multi-national Remember the Clipper Chip? Intel’s Processor Serial Number?

Politics and technology