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Principles of Macroeconomics. Economic Crisis. HOW DID WE GET HERE. C HANGES H AZARD A CCOUNTABILITY O VERSIGHT S PECULATION. HOW DID WE GET HERE. Chaos Theory Study of nonlinear dynamics, where seemingly random events are actually predictable - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
Principles of Macroeconomics
Economic Crisis
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
CHANGES
HAZARD
ACCOUNTABILITY
OVERSIGHT
SPECULATION
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
Chaos Theory
Study of nonlinear dynamics, where seemingly random
events are actually predictable
ASK YOURSELF: Could this have been predicted?
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
CHANGES IN BANKING LEGISLATION
Glass-Steagall Act (1932 & 1933)
Distinction between everyday banks and investment banks
Repealed in 1999
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
Depository Institution Deregulation And Monetary Control Act 1980
Allowed banks to
both lend and invest
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
1982 Garn St Germain & Alternative Mortgage
Transactions Parity Act
Allowed banks to offer: Adjustable Rate Loans
Interest Only Loans Balloon Payment Loans
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
1982 Garn St Germain & Alternative Mortgage
Transactions Parity Act
Allowed banks to make: Adjustable Rate Loans
Interest Only Loans Balloon Payment Loans
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
Gramm-Leach Bliley ACT (1999)
Banks, investments and insurance
under one umbrella
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
EXAMPLES
JP Morgan buying Bear Stearns
Bank of America buying Merrill Lynch
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
MORAL HAZARD
Behavioral change because something
is reducing our risk
We do not bear 100% of the risk
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
MORAL HAZARD
Individuals who are
risk adverse
become more
tolerant or accepting of risk
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
MORAL HAZARD
Seat Belts
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. $250,000 per account
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
MORAL HAZARD
Consumers and lenders
took on excessively
high levels of risk
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
CONSUMERS
Sub Prime Mortgages
Low credit scores – high risk loans
Higher interest rates
Higher loan origination fees
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
CONSUMERS
About 80% of the Sub-Prime loans
were Adjustable Rate or
Pick-A-Payment Loans
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
CONSUMERS
Interest Only Loans
If unpaid, interest becomes part of the loan principal
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
CONSUMERS
“Liar Loans” – lied about income
Fraud--False income claims
Worst Liar loans “NINJA LOANS”
No Income, No Job, No Assets
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
CONSUMERS
Today, homeowners with “liar loans” are stuck -- no help
Did moral hazard only affect consumers?
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
Encouraged people to take out loans they couldn’t afford
Believed housing P continue to rise, if default, pricey asset
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
Moral Hazard
Government bailed out thrifts and loans and saving and loans in the 1980s
Government will do it again
Transferred risk from lenders to government
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
Lenders didn’t have to keep the loans,
they could sell to investors
Sell to investors and get more
money to lend
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
Risk is transferred from lenders
to investors
Not all lenders did this
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
SECURITIZATION began 1970s: Banks pool mortgages into MBS (mortgage backed securities)
Sub-prime loans were securitized - packaged with high quality loans
Sold to investors as mortgage-backed securities
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
Bad loans combined with good or high quality mortgage backed securities
Toxic Assets
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
Faulty rating process that overrated sub prime loans for investment purposes
Ratings underestimated true risk of sub prime loans
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC
Government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) since 1968
Privately owned and operated
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
Only lenders not required to report publicly their financial problems
Protected by US government
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
Borrowed money at low interest rates
from foreign investors, if mortgage defaults,
US government would protect the investors
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC
Guaranteed “liar loans” from Countrywide and Indymac
Countrywide bought by BofA and Indymac taken over by FDIC
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS/INVESTORS
Carry trade, derivatives, hedge funds, credit
default swaps are not discussed here
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
LENDERS
US top 5 banks control 96% of the derivatives
Assuming a great deal of risk if buyers stop buying real estate or interest rates rise
BofA, Citibank, JP Morgan chase, HSBC Bank USA, Goldman Sachs
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY
American Dream Homeownership
1970s political goal
Increase US homeownership rate
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY
Target low income groups
US homeownership rate increased from 64% in 1980 to 69.1% in 2005
Census Bureau estimate 4Q2008 is 67.5%
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY
1996 US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) set a goal
for the US Treasury’s Financial Management Service (FMS)
At least 42% of the mortgages purchased must be for borrowers whose
household income was below the median income in their area
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY
2005: Target increased to 52%
At least 52% of the mortgages purchased must be for borrowers whose household income was below the median income in their area
By 2008 US Treasury FMS owned or through mortgage pools sponsored about 50% of all US mortgages
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY
Banks could be fined—not lending to “nontraditional customers” like those with no credit history
Down payment requirements became 2nd mortgages
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY
2003 White House and Alan Greenspan called for stricter controls on GSEs (government sponsored enterprises) and wanted limitations on the amount of their high risk investments
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY
From Terry Frieden: CNN Washington BureauFriday, September 17, 2004 Posted: 5:44 PM EDT (2144 GMT)
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Rampant fraud in the mortgage industry has increased so sharply that the FBI warned Friday of an "epidemic" of financial crimes which, if not curtailed, could become "the next S&L crisis."
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY2004 US Congressional Hearings examined
fraudulent accounting practices within Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Highly publicized
Everyone should view the YouTube video or read the transcript of this hearing
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY2005 US Senate Banking Committee proposed a bill
for a new regulator who would be able to adjust the size of the GSEs' (government sponsored enterprises) portfolios.
Regulator would oversee GSEs to keep them from running into financial trouble and limit their risk.
Regulator would have increased power comparable to that of a bank regulator.
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY
2005 US Senate Banking Committee proposed bill was endorsed by Alan
Greenspan and the White House
BUT the proposed bill did not come to a vote
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY
Fed
Moral Suasion to ease lending
What Does Moral Suasion Mean?
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITYPersuasion method when the Fed influences
or exerts pressure, but not force, banks into follow a policy
‘Moral’ is the idea of moral responsibility to operate in a way consistent with furthering the good of the economy
When Bernanke appears before Congress and discusses economic activity he can influence financial markets
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY
FedLow interest rates 2001-2004
Easy money-encourages risk taking
Raised interest rates during 2005-2006
Adjustable rate mortgage holders began to see rising monthly payments
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
ACCOUNTABILITY
Securities Exchange Commission SEC did not regulate Wall Street securities rating industries
Securitized mortgages were overrated, not reflective of the true investment risk
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
OVERSIGHT
Given the class discussions to date and what has occurred in the economy, what do you think about the issue of oversight?
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
SPECULATION
“Irrational Exuberance”
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
SPECULATION
People took out loans they could not afford
Why?
What went wrong?
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
SPECULATION
Re-Fi mania took place
Why?
What went wrong?
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
SPECULATION
Lenders made loans to everyone whether or not they were credit worthy
Why?
What went wrong?
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
SPECULATION
Loans were securitized, packaged with high quality loans, sold to investors as mortgage-back securities
Why?
What went wrong?
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
CHANGES
HAZARD
ACCOUNTABILITY
OVERSIGHT
SPECULATION
Macroeconomics, March 30, 2009, Martha Stuffler
HOW DID WE GET HERE
WHAT IS GOING ON √
HOW DID WE GET HERE √
WHAT HAVE WE DONE
COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE CHOICES BEING MADE