title: PrinciplesforDeterminingtheAirForceActive/reserveMix

author: Robbert,AlbertA.;Williams,WilliamA.;Cook,CynthiaR.

publisher: RANDisbn10|asin: 083302762Xprintisbn13: 9780833027627ebookisbn13: 9780585247687

language: English

subjectUnitedStates.--AirForce--Recruiting,enlistment,etc,UnitedStates.--AirForce--Reserves.

publicationdate: 1999lcc: UG883.R631999ebddc: 358.4/137/0973

subject:UnitedStates.--AirForce--Recruiting,enlistment,etc,UnitedStates.--AirForce--Reserves.

Pagei

PrinciplesforDeterminingtheAirForceActive/ReserveMix

AlbertA.RobbertWilliamA.WilliamsCynthiaR.Cook

PreparedfortheUnitedStatesAirForce

ProjectAIRFORCERAND

Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionunlimited

Pageii

TheresearchreportedherewassponsoredbytheUnitedStatesAirForceunderContractF49642-96-C-0001.FurtherinformationmaybeobtainedfromtheStrategicPlanningDivision,DirectorateofPlans,HqUSAF.

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Robbert,AlbertA.1944-PrinciplesfordeterminingtheAirForceactive/reservemix/AlbertA.Robbert,WilliamA.Williams,CynthiaR.Cook.p.cm."MR-1091-AE"Includesbibliographicalreferences(p.).ISBN0-8330-2762-X1.UnitedStates.AirForceRecruiting,enlisting,etc.2.UnitedStates.AirForceReserves.I.Title.II.Williams,WilliamA.1952-III.Cook,CynthiaR.1965-UG883.R631999358.4'137'097321dc2199-042520

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PrefaceThemixofactiveandreserveforcesconstitutingthetotalAirForcehasshiftedduringthelastdecade'sforcedrawdown.However,reductionsacrosstheactiveandreservecomponentsofthetotalforcehavenotbeenproportional.Moreover,decisionsaffectingonecomponentmayhavebeenmadeindependentlyofdecisionsaffectingothercomponents.Recentforcereductionsandtransfersamongcomponentsmaynothavebeenguidedbyaclearandacceptedsetofprinciplesfordetermininganend-stateforcemix.

Theshapeandsizeoftheforcemixcanhaveimportantimplicationsforthecost,effectiveness,sustainability,andpopularandpoliticalsupportofmilitaryforces.However,forceplannersandprogrammersmaynotbefullyawareoftheseimplicationsandmaythereforemakeoradvocateforce-structuringdecisionsthatdonotoptimallysupportnationalinterests.Thisreportassembles,examines,andrationalizesasetofprinciplestohelpforceplannersandprogrammersrecognizetheseimplications.

Forthemostpart,fundamentalprinciplesapplicabletocontemporaryactive/reserveforcequestionshavebeenhammeredoutinpastpolicydeliberations.Ourcontributionwastoassembletheprinciplesinacoherentframeworkandtoelicitareviewandcritiqueoftheframeworkbycurrentstakeholdersandcommentators.Towardthatend,ourresearchincludedaforum,heldinMay1998,ofleadersandthinkersfromanumberofmilitary,civilian,academic,legislative,andinterest-grouporganizations.

ThisresearchwasundertakenfortheDirectorofStrategicPlanning,HeadquartersUnitedStatesAirForce.Itrespondedto,andbenefited

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from,interestonthepartoftheAirNationalGuardandAirForceReserveadvisorstotheDirector.

ProjectAirForce

ProjectAIRFORCE,adivisionofRAND,istheAirForceFederallyFundedResearchandDevelopmentCenter(FFRDC)forstudiesandanalysis.ItprovidestheAirForcewithindependentanalysisofpolicyalternativesaffectingthedeployment,employment,combatreadiness,andsupportofcurrentandfutureairandspaceforces.Researchisperformedinfourprograms:AerospaceForceDevelopment;Manpower,Personnel,andTraining;ResourceManagement;andStrategyandDoctrine.

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Contents

Preface iii

Figures ix

Tables xi

Summary xiii

Acknowledgments xxi

Acronyms xxiii

ChapterOneIntroduction

1

Background 1

ObjectivesandApproach 3

Perspective 4

Scope 4

OrganizationoftheReport 5

ChapterTwoForce-MixPrinciplesAnOverview

7

SixFactorsinMakingActive/ReserveMixDeterminations

7

SocialandPoliticalConsiderations 7

ReadinessandAvailability 8

PersonnelFlowConsiderations 9

Cost 9

IntegratingtheSixFactors 10

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ChapterThreeSocialandPoliticalConsiderations

13

Introduction 13

TheoreticalFramework 14

SocialandPoliticalFactors 15

Militia-NationConsiderations 15

PublicAwareness/TrustofMilitaryInstitutions 18

LinkingForceEmploymenttoPublicSupport 23

RepresentativeForceIssues 24

InfluenceofVeteransinSociety 29

PoliticalInfluenceoftheRC 30

StateMissionsoftheANG 31

HowSocialandPoliticalConsiderationsConstraintheForceMix

33

ChapterFourReadinessandAvailability

35

Readiness 35

PeacetimeReadinessIndicators 36

UnderlyingFactorsExperience,Training,andOperationalIntegration

38

Availability 40

AvailabilityWhenMobilized 40

AvailabilityWhenNotMobilized 42

ImplicationsfortheForceMix 45

ChapterFivePersonnelFlow

49

EarlierViewsonPersonnelFlow 49

ModelingthePersonnelFlowConstraint 51

ForceMixBasedonStrength 53

ForceMixBasedonFighterWingEquivalents 53

UsingtheModel 56

ImplicationsfortheForceMix 57

ChapterSixCost

59

MeetingMTWDemands:Force-StructureAvailability 60

CostComparisonComplexities 60

CostComparisonResults 62

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DifferencesinDesignedOperationalCapabilities 66

AStrategyforOptimizingForce-StructureAvailabilityandCost

66

MeetingSSC,OOTW,andOtherPeacetimeDemands 67

MeasuringPeacetimeFighterDeploymentCapacityandItsCost

67

MeasuringPeacetimeAirliftProductiveCapacityandItsCost

68

AStrategyforOptimizingDeploymentCapacityandCost

70

TradeoffsBetweentheConflictingDemands 70

ConflictingDemandsforFighterForceStructure 70

AComparativeLookatAirliftForceStructure 71

MakingTradeoffs 73

ImplicationsfortheForceMix 73

ChapterSevenConclusions

75

References 79

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Figures

S.1.AFrameworkforConsideringMultipleForce-MixPrinciplesSimultaneously

xv

S.2.NotionalValuesforForce-MixConstraints:AnANGCase

xviii

1.1.StrengthsandOperatingCosts

2

2.1.AFrameworkforConsideringMultipleForce-MixPrinciplesSimultaneously

11

3.1.ReserveComponentsAreGeographicallyDispersed

19

3.2.PercentageofFemaleOfficersandOfficerAccessionsintheTotalForceAmongThreeAFComponents,FY1996

25

3.3.PercentageofFemaleEnlistedMembersandEnlistedAccessionsintheTotalForceAmongThreeAFComponents,FY1996

26

3.4.PercentageofMinorityOfficersandOfficerAccessionsAmongThreeAFComponentsintheTotalForce,FY1996

27

3.5.PercentageofMinorityEnlistedPersonnelandEnlistedAccessionsAmongThreeAFComponentsintheTotalForce,FY1996

28

3.6.LocusofPoliticalandSocialConstraintsontheForceMix

34

4.1.AverageORIRatings,19921996

37

4.2.FY1997TDYDaysbyANGAircrews

44

4.3.FY1997DaysinUniformbyANGAircrews

44

4.4.AvailabilityofAFRAircrewsbyDurationofTDY

45

4.5.LocusofAvailabilityandReadinessConstraintsontheForceMix

46

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5.1.SustainabilityofRCFighterPilotRequirements

56

5.2.LocusofthePersonnelFlowConstraintontheForceMix

58

6.1.AlternativeEqual-CostForceMixes

72

6.2.CostConsiderationsintheForceMix

74

7.1.NotionalValuesforForce-MixConstraints:AnANGCase

76

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Tables

3.1.TheMilitiaintheConstitutionandtheBillofRights

16

4.1.AverageFlyingHoursandCombatExperienceofPilotsinTypicalRCandACB52Units

38

4.2.ReadyAircrewProgram(RAP)AnnualTrainingMissions

39

6.1.RecurringPeacetimeCostsforSelectedUnitTypesPreviousCostComparisonStudies

63

6.2.RecurringPeacetimeCostsforSelectedUnitTypesSABLEModel

65

6.3.CostperDeployedAircraft-Day,F16Squadrons

69

6.4.CostPerProductiveFlyingHour,C141Squadrons

69

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Summary

Introduction

WhatshouldAirForcedecisionmakersconsiderwhenmakingforce-mixdeliberationsacrosseachelementofthetotalforceactive,AirForceReserve(AFR),andtheAirNationalGuard(ANG)?Generally,rationaldeliberationsofforce-mixdecisionshavefocusedonthreefactorscost,militaryeffectiveness,andavailability.However,thesethreefactorsmaynotbetheonlyconsiderationsthatshouldapplyindetermininganappropriateforcemix.ThereisalsotheissueunderstoodbutoftenintangibleofhowreserveforceshelptomeetcertainsocialandpoliticalobjectivesimportanttotheAirForceandDepartmentofDefense(DoD)andhowthereservecomponent(RC)capturesvaluableexperienceandexpertisethatwouldotherwisebelost.Inaddition,itisnecessarytounderstandwhytheflowofhumancapitalfromactivetoreserveforcesmustbekeptwithinfeasiblebounds.Finally,itisimportanttounderstandcostconsiderationsinadisaggregatedway;inotherwords,doesthetypeofmissiontheAirForceperformsfavoronecomponentovertheother?

Thisreportanswersthefollowingtwoquestions:(1)whatprinciplesshouldbeconsideredinforce-structuredecisionsthataffecttheactive/reservemix?and(2)howdotheseprinciplesinteractwithoneanother?Weaddressedthefirstquestionprimarilybyreviewingpreviousstudiesorcommentariesonforce-mixissuesandfoundthattherelevantprinciplesaregenerallyrecognizedbuthavenotbeenassembledintoacoherentframework.Inaddressingthesecondquestion,wenotedthattheprinciplesgenerallydonotpre-

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scribeaspecificactive/reservemix.Rather,theytendtosuggestconstraintstheproportionsofthemixshouldbeaboveorbelowsomespecifiedboundary,whichmayvaryasafunctionoftotalforcesizeorotherfactors.Whenconsideredsimultaneously,theseconstraintsmaydefineafeasibleregionwithinwhicharangeofforce-mixpossibilitieswouldbeacceptable.Ifnosuchfeasibleregionexists,force-structureplannersmustchooseorcompromisebetweenconflictingconstraints.

Inproposinganddiscussingtheseprinciples,wehaveobservedthatactivecomponent(AC),AFR,andANGrepresentatives,andtheiradvocatesoutsideoftheAirForce,tendtoseetheissuesthroughdifferentlenses.Wehaveattemptedtoavoidacomponent-specificviewpoint,basingourproposedprinciplesonanoverallobjectiveofmaximizingtheAirForce'scontributiontonationaldefense.Insomecases,thatamountstooptimizingthedistributionofavailableresourceswithintheAirForce'stotalforce.Inothercases,itinvolvesenhancingtheAirForce'spostureforclaimingresources(funds,manpower,policylicense,politicalsupport,etc.)fromthelargersociety.Inthelattercases,theworthyobjective,webelieve,isnottomaximizeAirForceresourcesthroughpoliticalmanipulationbutrathertomaximizethequalityoftheAirForce'slinkagestothelargersociety,relyingonthedemocraticprocesstogoverntheresourceoutcomes.

DesigningaForce-MixFramework

Basedonourreviewofpreviousstudiesandcommentariesontheactive/reservemix,wefoundthatsixmajorfactorsshouldbeincludedindesigningaforce-mixframework:(1)socialconsiderations,(2)politicalconsiderations,(3)readiness,(4)availability,(5)personnelflow,and(6)cost.

FigureS.1providesaschemeforintegratingthesesixfactors.Arrowsontheboundarylinesindicatetheexpecteddirectionoftheconstraint.Thefiguresuggeststhatsomeoftheseconstraintsmightvaryasafunctionoftotalforcesize.

Thefiguredepictssocialandpoliticalconsiderationsestablishinglower-boundconstraints.Politicalutilitiesdependinpartonthetotalforcemaintainingavisiblepresence,witheitheractiveorreserve

Pagexv

FigureS.1AFrameworkforConsideringMultipleForce-MixPrinciplesSimultaneously

SOURCES:FY88and89NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(PublicLaw100-180),FY88DoDAppropriationsAct(PublicLaw100-102),FY98NationalDefenseAutorizationAct(PublicLaw100-202),andFY98DoDAppropriationsAct(PublicLaw105-56).NOTE:Thesumofmilitarypersonnelapproporationsandoperationsandmaintenanceappropriationsisusedasaproxyforop

forces,inlocalcommunities.Astotalforcesizedecreases,reserveforceswillbeincreasinglycalledontoprovidethepresenceandmustthereforeconstitute,ataminimum,alargerproportionofthetotalforce.Thus,thepoliticalconstraintisrepresentedbyaslopingline.Wesuggestthatsocialutilitiesdependonthereserveforcesaminoritywithinthetotalforceoccupyingalargeenoughproportionoftheforcetocontinuetoinfluencethevaluesandcultureoftheactiveforcemajority.

Readinessandavailabilityconsiderationssetupperboundsonreserveforces.Weassumeaconstantdemandforrapidlydeployableforcesthatmustbemetpredominantlywithactiveforces.Asthetotalforce

becomessmaller,thisconstantdemandcallsforanincreasingproportionoftheforcetobesuppliedbytheactivecomponent(representedbyaslopingavailabilityconstraintlineinthefigure).OurhypothesisisthattherearegenerallynoappreciablereadinessdifferencesbetweenAirForceactiveandreserveforces.Thus,readinessdoesnotconstrainthemix.

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Thepersonnelflowconstraintalsosetsanupperbound.TheRCdependsonacriticalflowofhumancapitalfromtheAC.AstheRCproportionincreases,itbecomessolargerelativetotheACthatthiscriticalflowcannolongerbesustained.Inthesteadystate,thisproportionwouldnotvarywithtotalforcesize.

Takentogether,theseconstraintsformafeasibleregioninwhichaforcemixwouldsimultaneouslysatisfytheprinciplesassociatedwiththeconstraints.Aspecificforcemixcanthenbetargetedonthebasisofcostconsiderations.Reserveforcesareconventionallyviewedaslesscostlythanactiveforces,indicatingthattheproportionoftheforceintheRCshouldbealongtheborderformedbytheupper-boundconstraints.However,reserveforcesmaybemorecostlythanactiveforcesinmeetingoperationsotherthanwar(OOTW)andsmaller-scaleconflict(SSC)demands,sothatthedirectioninwhichcostconsiderationsdrivetheforcedependsontheneedbeingmet.IfOOTW/SSCdemandscannotbemetwiththeleastcostlymajortheaterwar(MTW)forcestructure,itwillbenecessaryforforcestructureplannerstochoosebetweenalarger,morereserve-intensiveforcethatbettermeetsMTWdemands,andanequal-cost,smaller,moreactive-intensiveforcethatbettermeetsongoinghigh-tempodemands.

BuildingtheFrameworkWhattheAnalysisTellsUs

Inexaminingtheavailableevidence,wefoundthatthelociofsomeoftheseconstraintsarecurrentlyunknowableandthatothersaremission-orcomponent-dependent.Wherepossible,wederivednotionalresultsusingavailabledataorwhatwebelievetobereasonableestimatesthereof,focusingforpurposesofillustrationonfighterforcestructure.

Inouranalysisofhowsocialandpoliticalconsiderationsconstrainthe

forcemix,weintroduceterminologythatallowsustomorepreciselylabeltheassociatedconstraints.Wefindthatasocialidentification,embeddedness,andinvestment(IE&I)constraintissloped,sothatasthetotalforcedecreasesinsizeandismoregeographicallyconcentrated,theRCwillplayanincreasingroleinmaintainingcontactwiththelargersociety.However,thepreciselocation

Pagexvii

ofthislowerboundarycannotbedetermined.WealsofindthataminoritystatusconstraintdrivenbyresearchontheboundarybetweenatokenandminoritylevelofrepresentationforaseparatelyidentifiablesubgroupwithinaninstitutionsetsafloorfortheRCatabout20percentofthetotalforce.

Basedonouranalysisofreadinessandavailability,wefind(ashypothesized)areadinessparitybetweentheACandRC,whichleadstonoreadinessconstraint.Availability,however,islimitedfortheRCbecauseofitspredominantlypart-timeworkforce.BecauseofgreaterlimitsoncumulativedeploymenttimeanddurationofdeploymentrelativetotheAC,theRCislessavailableformeetingcontingencyrequirements.Thus,theavailabilityconstraint,likethesocialIE&Iconstraint,issloped(althoughintheoppositedirection).Inotherwords,asthetotalforcedeclinesinsize,assumingforceemploymentdemandsremainconstant,adecreasingproportionofthetotalforcecanbeplacedintheRC.

Basedonourmodelingofpersonnelflowsbetweentheactiveandreserveforces,wefindthatwecanestablisharoughupperboundontheproportionoftheRCinthetotalforce,assumingotherrelatedparametersareknown.Theseparametersvarybymissionandmissiondesignseries(MDS)andalsobydifferencesbetweenANGandAFRintheirperceivedabilitytoabsorbinexperiencedundergraduatepilottraining(UPT)graduates.

Finally,intermsofcost,ouranalysisarguesforalargerproportionofthetotalforceintheRCwhencontemplatingMTWscenariosandasmallerproportionwhencontemplatingSSCandOOTWscenarios.DecisionmakersmustweighthetradeoffsbetweenmeetingMTWandSSC/OOTWneeds.

ApplyingtheFrameworktoanANGCaseANotionalExample

FigureS.2depictstheframeworkfortheANGcaseappliedtothefighterforcestructure,wherenotionalpersonnelflowconstraintsmightallowtheRCtooccupyupto42percentofthetotalfighterforce.Thiscreatesafeasibleregiontotherightofthesocialconstraint.Thefeasibleregionmightbereducedifanavailabilityconstraintcameintoplayorifadecisionmakerweretosupplyajudg-

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FigureS.2NotionalValuesforForce-MixConstraints:AnANGCase

mentallocusforthepoliticalconstraint.Withinthisfeasibleregion,cost-consciousdecisionmakerswouldgravitatetowarda42percentmixiftheywereprimarilyconcernedaboutpreparednessforMTWscenariosortowarda20percentmixiftheywereconcernedwithmeetingcurrentcontingencydeploymentneeds.Itispossible,ofcourse,toweighcostmoreheavilythaneitherthepersonnelfloworsocialconstraints.Inthatcase,decisionmakersmightdrivethemixabove42percent,consciouslyacceptingadegradationinexperiencelevelsandreadiness.Alternatively,theycoulddrivethemixbelowthe20percentRCminoritystatusconstraint,possiblycompromisingRCmembers'capacitytoinfluencethevaluesandperceptionsofACmembers.

Ifpersonnelfloworavailabilitywereevaluatedusingdifferentparameters,thoseconstraintscouldconceivablylietotheleftoftheRCminoritystatusorsocialIE&Iconstraints.Therewouldbenofeasibleregion.Insuchacase,decisionmakerswouldhavetocompro-

Pagexix

misebetweenconflictingobjectives.ThemostlikelyoutcomewouldbetodeemphasizetheminoritystatusandsocialIE&Iconstraintsbecausethecaseforapplyingtheformerinthepresentcontextislesscompellingandthelocusforthelatterisunknown.

Weagainstressthatthespecificforce-mixresultsreportedherearenotional.Wherepossible,weusedinputvaluesthatwejudgedtobeapproximatelycorrect,recognizingthatwedidnothavetheresourcesinthisprojecttoobtainorderiveanalyticallyrigorousinputs,especiallywhentheinputsarelikelytovaryacrossmissions.Also,becauseofvariationsacrossmissionsorMDSs,force-mixdecisionscannotbemadeintheaggregate.TheymustbemadeforeachmissionorMDSindividually.

Conclusions

Althoughtheresultsreportedherearenotional,webelieveourresearchprovidestwoconcretecontributionstotheforce-mixdecisionprocess.Thefirstcontributionisaframeworkforintegratingtherangeofconsiderationsthatdecisionmakersfaceandgainingperspectiveontheargumentsofferedbyvariousinterestgroupshopingtoinfluencetheforcemix.Thesecondcontributionisaroadmapformoredetailedresearchintospecificmission/MDSforcemixesorageneralmodelthatincorporatesmission/MDS-specificinputs.

Perhapsourmostsignificantfindingisthatcostconsiderationscutinoppositedirectionsdependingonwhethertheforceisbeingoptimizedformajortheaterwarpreparednessorforpeacetimecontingencyoperations.Inourview,peacetimecontingencydemandsmustbegivenmoreweightinforce-mixdecisions,especiallyinMDSsexperiencinghighdeployment-relatedstress.

Pagexxi

AcknowledgmentsInspirationforthisprojectcamefromBrigGenJohnHarvey,USAFR(ret.),andBrigGenJosephSimeone,ANG,whoservedasAirForceReserveandAirNationalGuardadvisorstotheAirForceDirectorofStrategicPlansduringacriticalperiodintheproject.LtGenDavidW.McIlvoy,AirForceDirectorofStrategicPlanningattheinceptionoftheproject;hissuccessors,MajGensCharlesF.WaldandNortonA.Schwartz;andtheirdeputydirector,Dr.ClarkMurdock,supportedtheproject.LtColCalHutto,ourAirStaffpointofcontact,providedessentialcoordinationandsupport.MajCarlD.RehberghelpeduswithAirForceReserveissues,whileMajGregRiddlemoserandMr.GaryTaylorprovidedsimilarsupportregardingtheAirNationalGuard.

FortyindividualsjoinedusatRANDinMay1998foraforumthatexploredtheissuesaddressedinthisreport.Wethankalloftheparticipantsinthatforumforhelpingustofocusontherightissuesandtoplacetheminappropriateperspectives.Inparticular,wethankMr.BrianSharratt,DeputyAssistantSecretaryoftheAirForceforReserveAffairs;MajGen(ret.)RogerSandler,presidentoftheReserveOfficerAssociation;MajGenSamCarpenter,militaryexecutivefortheReserveForcesPolicyBoard;MikeHiggins,aprofessionalstafferfortheHouseNationalSecurityCommittee;andLarryKorb,aseniorfellowattheBrookingsInstitute.Otherparticipantsintheforum,towhomwealsooweourappreciation,includeseveralstateassistantadjutantgeneralsforair,seniormobilizationaugmentees,seniorstaffmembersfromtheAirStaffandseveralmajorcommands,academicians,andfellowmembersoftheRANDstaff.

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WithinRAND,BobRoll,ourprogramdirectorattheinceptionoftheproject,providedstrongleadershipandvaluableinsightinshapingtheproject.ColleaguesDonPalmerandCarlDahlmanprovidedhelpfulinputandadvice.PaulSteinbergandJeanneHellercontributedimmeasurablytothereadabilityofthereport.ReviewsbyJackGraserandDickBuddinsharpenedourthinkinginseveralareas.

Anyremainingerrorsare,ofcourse,ourown.

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Acronyms

AC activecomponent

AFR AirForceReserve

ANG AirNationalGuard

DOC designedoperationalcapability

DoD DepartmentofDefense

FH flyinghours

FWE fighterwingequivalent

IE&I identification,embeddedness,andinvestment

MDS majordesignseries

MTW majortheaterwar

NPS nonpriorservice

OOTW operationsotherthanwar

OPTEMPO operationstempo

ORI operationalreadinessinspection

PAA primaryaircraftauthorized

PERSTEMPOpersonneltempo

POL petroleum,oil,andlubricants

PS priorservice

QDR QuadrennialDefenseReview

RC reservecomponent

RPI ratedpositionidentifier

SAAM specialassignmentairliftmission

SORTS StatusofResourcesandTrainingSystem

SSC smaller-scaleconflict

Pagexxiv

TDY temporaryduty

UPT undergraduatepilottraining

UTC unittypecode

Page1

ChapterOneIntroduction

Background

InAirForceandDepartmentofDefense(DoD)force-structuredecisionmaking,eachelementofthetotalforceactive,AirForceReserve(AFR),andtheAirNationalGuard(ANG)hasproponentsthatoftenseektomaximizetheresourcesdevotedtoit.Proponentsincludeseniorleadershipwithinthecomponents,Congress,andstakeholdersexternaltoDoD,suchasassociationsthatadvocatetheinterestsofthevariouscomponents.Inthisoftentimescompetitiveenvironment,resourceallocationdecisionswouldbettersupportpublicinterestsiftheywereguidedbyasetofprinciplesformaximizingatotalAirForcecontributiontonationaldefense.

Moreover,theforcemixhaschangedsignificantlyduringthelastdecade.Figure1.1showsthatactivecomponent(AC)strengthreductionswereproportionallygreaterthanreservecomponent(RC)strengthreductionsduringthelastdecade(whichhasshiftedthemixtowardagreaterproportionintheRC).Infiscalyear(FY)1988,thetwoRCstheANGandtheAFRtogetherconstituted25percentoftotalAirForcestrengthand11percentoftotaloperatingcosts.InFY1998,theRCconstituted33percentofthetotalstrengthand16percentofthetotalcost.InourreviewoftheliteratureandinourinterviewswithACandRCdecisionmakers,wefoundnoevidencethatthisshiftoccurredaspartofaconsciousforce-mixstrategy.Rather,itoccurredasaresultofmanydecisions,takenindependently,regardingactivecomponent(AC)andreservecomponent(RC)forcestructure.Wearguethattherearegoodreasonsformak-

Page2

Figure1.1StrengthsandOperatingCosts

SOURCES:FY88and89NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(PublicLaw100-180),

FY88DoDAppropriationsAct(PublicLaw100-202),FY98NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(PublicLaw105-85),andFY98DoDAppropriationsAct

(PublicLaw105-56).NOTE:Thesumofmilitarypersonalappropriationsandoperationsand

maintenanceappropriationsisusedasaproxyforoperatingcost.Thisprovidesonlyarough

indicationofoperatingcosts,becausethemilitarypersonnelappropriationincludesthecost

ofmilitarypersonnelengagedinnonoperatinvbactivities,suchasprocurement.Other

appropriationsProcurement;Research,Development,Test,andEvaluation;Rovolvingand

ManagementFunds;MilitaryCOnstruction;andFamilyHousingareeitherunrelatedorlessclearly

relatedtotheoperatingcostsofthecomponents.

ingforce-structuredecisionsaffectingtheforcemixinanintegratedratherthananindependentway.

Generally,rationaldeliberationsoftheforcemixhavefocusedonthreefactorscost,militaryeffectiveness,andavailability.AsthedatainFigure1.1suggest,andaswillbedemonstratedinmoredetaillaterinthereport,forcestructurecostslessintheRCthanintheAC.Additionally,AirForceRCunits,incontrasttosomereserveforcesinotherservices,generallymeetorexceedAClevelsofmilitary

Page3

effectiveness.However,reserveforcesarelessavailablethanactiveforcesexceptinsmallnumbers,theycannotbedeployedasrapidlyasactiveforces;therearestrictstatutorylimitsonhowandforhowlongtheymaybecalledupinvoluntarilyforactiveduty;andtherearepracticallimitsonhowlongandhowoftentheycanbeemployedvoluntarily.

Theseconsiderationscanbecombinedtoformanimplicitprinciplefordeterminingacost-effectiveforcemixmaximizetheRCproportion,subjecttosatisfyingavailabilitydemandsthatgenerallyrequireactiveforces.

However,unitoperatingcosts,militaryeffectiveness,andavailabilityarenottheonlyconsiderationsthatapplyindetermininganappropriateforcemix.ThereisalsotheissueunderstoodbutoftenintangibleofhowreserveforceshelptomeetcertainsocialandpoliticalobjectivesimportanttotheAirForceandDoDandhowtheRCcapturesvaluableexperienceandexpertisethatwouldotherwisebelost.Inaddition,itisnecessarytounderstandwhytheflowofhumancapitalfromactivetoreserveforcesmustbekeptwithinfeasiblebounds.Finally,itisimportanttounderstandcostconsiderationsinadisaggregatedway;inotherwords,doesthetypeofmissionbeingperformedfavoronecomponentovertheother?

ObjectivesandApproach

Inpreparingthisreport,wesoughttoanswerthefollowingquestions:

Whatprinciplesshouldbeconsideredinforce-structuredecisionsthataffecttheactive/reservemix?

Howdotheseprinciplesinteractwithoneanother?

Inreviewingpreviousstudiesorcommentariesonforce-mixissues,wefoundthattherelevantprinciplesaregenerallyrecognizedbut

havenotnecessarilybeenassembledintoacoherentframework.Wealsofoundthatsomeprincipleshavebeenarticulatedformilitaryforcesingeneral,andthusneedtobetailoredtotheAirForcecase.

Inaddressingthesecondquestion,wenotedthattheprinciplesgenerallydonotprescribeaspecificactive/reservemix.Rather,they

Page4

tendtosuggestconstraintstheproportionsofthemixshouldbeaboveorbelowsomespecifiedboundary,whichmayvaryasafunctionoftotalforcesizeorotherfactor.Whenconsideredsimultaneously,theseconstraintsmaydefineafeasibleregionwithinwhicharangeofforce-mixpossibilitieswouldbeacceptable.

Perspective

Inproposinganddiscussingtheseprinciples,wehaveobservedthatAC,AFR,andANGrepresentatives,andtheiradvocatesoutsideoftheAirForce,tendtoseetheissuesthroughdifferentlenses.Wehaveattemptedtoavoidacomponent-specificviewpoint,basingourproposedprinciplesonanoverallobjectiveofmaximizingtheAirForce'scontributiontonationaldefense.Formostoftheprinciplesweadvocate,thatamountstooptimizingthedistributionofavailableresourceswithintheAirForce'stotalforce.

Whenexaminingsocialandpoliticalissues,wefindthattheoperantobjectiveistoenhancetheAirForce'spostureforclaimingresources(funds,manpower,policylicense,politicalsupport,etc.)fromthelargersociety.Thepossibilityexiststhatsuccessinthisendeavorcouldcomeattheexpenseoftheotherservices,ofdomesticprograms,orofothersocialinterests.Evaluatingthesewelfareeconomicimplicationsisbeyondthescopeofourstudy.Consequently,theperspectiveweadoptinevaluatingsocialandpoliticalissuesisnotaneconomicone.Rather,wetakeanorganizationalecologyperspectivemilitaryorganizationswillnotobtainneededresourcesiftheyfailtocultivateappropriatelinkagestothelargersociety.Theworthyobjective,webelieve,isnottomaximizeAirForceresourcesthroughpoliticalmanipulationbuttomaximizethequalityoftheAirForce'slinkagestothelargersociety,relyingonthedemocraticprocesstogoverntheresourceoutcomes.

Scope

Theendproductinthisresearchisnotaspecificforcemix.Asweshalldemonstrate,theappropriateforcemixiscontingentonanumberofvariablefactors.Ourobjectiveistoidentifytherelevantprinciples,leavingtodecisionmakersandtheirstaffsthetaskofapplyingtheprinciplesinspecificforce-structuringactions.

Page5

OrganizationoftheReport

ChapterTwodescribesingeneraltermsthebroadfactorswehavefoundtobeimportantinforce-mixdecisionsandprovidesamodeltoenablethefactorstobeconsideredsimultaneously.InChaptersThreethroughSix,wediscusstheimplicationsofthesefactorsingreaterdetail,showingbasedonouranalysiswherethelocusofeachfactororconstraintisinthemodel.ChapterSevengivesourconclusionsandrecommendations.

Page7

ChapterTwoForce-MixPrinciplesAnOverviewBasedonourreviewofpreviousstudiesandcommentariesontheactive/reservemix,wefoundthattherelevantissuescanbeaggregatedintosixmajorfactors.Inthischapter,webrieflydescribethosefactorsandindicateingeneraltermshowtheyinfluencetheidealforcemix.Wealsopresentourframeworkforconsideringthefactorssimultaneously.Subsequentchaptersexaminetheindividualfactorsmorethoroughly.

SixFactorsinMakingActive/ReserveMixDeterminations

Thesixfactorsweidentifiedare(1)socialconsiderations,(2)politicalconsiderations,(3)readiness,(4)availability,(5)personnelflow,and(6)cost.Sincesocialandpoliticalconsiderationsarecloselyrelated,wediscussthembelowtogether;thesameholdstrueforreadinessandavailability,whicharealsodiscussedtogether.

SocialandPoliticalConsiderations

Reserveforcesmayhavesocialandpoliticalutilitiesthatdifferfromorcomplementactiveforceutilities.Torealizetheseutilities,wesuggestthattheproportionofthetotalAirForcesuppliedbytheRCmustexceedsomecriticalmass.

Theseutilitiesarerelatedtoanumberofconsiderations.Thereisastronghistoricalandconstitutionalpresumptionthatatleastpartofthenation'smilitaryforcesshouldbeprovidedbycitizen-soldier

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militiasratherthanregularforces.Althoughrootedinpoliticalconcernsprevalentinthenation'srevolutionaryperiod,relianceonmilitiaforcesmayhavecontemporarybenefits.

Reservistsaremorefullyintegratedintothelargersocietythanactive-dutymembers,enablingthemthroughpersonalcontacttoextendpublicawarenessandtrustofmilitaryinstitutions.

Call-upofreservistsforreal-worldemploymentissubjecttostrongerpoliticalchecksandbalancesthantheemploymentofactive-dutyforces,thusdiscouragingmilitaryinvolvementthatlackspublicsupportandbroadeningsupportforemploymentsthatareundertaken.

Reserveunits,especiallythoseoftheANG,arelessgeographicallyconcentratedthanactiveunits.(OnemightexpectthatthegreatergeographicrepresentationoftheRCwouldmakeitmoredemographicallyrepresentativethantheAC,butouranalysisinChapterThreedidnotfinditmarkedlyso.)Representativenessinanyformcontributestopublictrustingovernmentinstitutions.

Byincreasingthenumberofveteransinthesociety,reserveforcesincreasetheproportionofkeypublicpolicydecisionmakersandinfluencerswhohavemilitaryexperienceandarethusmorelikelytotakeinformedpositionsaboutmilitaryissues.

ANGunitsprovideanefficientandeffectivesourceofdisciplinedmanpowertosatisfystatemissions(disasterrelief,civildisturbance,etc.).

ReadinessandAvailability

Becausereserveforcesrelyheavilyonpart-timeparticipantswhohavefull-timeoccupations,theyarelessavailablethanactive-dutyforces.Theymayalsobelessreadythanactive-dutyforcesbecauseoflimitedopportunitiesfortraining,particularlyunit-sizedtraining

exercisesthatcannotbeeffectivelycompressedorsegmentedintoweekenddrillperiods.Inpractice,theselimitationsapplymoretoArmy,Navy,andMarineCorpsreserveforcesthantoAirForcereservists,manyofwhomcaneffectivelytraininsmallaggregations(individualsorcrews)andwhocanalsobereadilyintegratedinto

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activeforceswithoutinvoluntaryunitcall-ups.Nonetheless,activeforcesmustremainlargeenoughtomeetrapid-deploymentneedsandtoprovidesustainedinvolvementinoperationsthatexceedstatutorylimitationsonthedurationofcall-ups.

Activeforcesalsofacesomereadiness-limitingconditions.Turnoverinactive-dutyflyingsquadronsishigherthaninreservesquadronsbecauseofrotationsintoandoutofcockpitdutiesandtopermitgreaterabsorptionofnewpilotsenteringtheratedforce.RCpilotsoftenhavepreviousACexperience.Asaresult,ACpilotshaveonaveragelessweaponssystemexperiencethantheirRCcounterparts.

PersonnelFlowConsiderations

Tomeettheirmanpowerneeds,reserveforcesrelyheavilyonaflowoftrainedandacculturatedpersonnelfromactive-dutyforces.Itisunlikelythatreserveforcescouldfindsufficientqualifiednonpriorservice(NPS)recruitstomeetalltheirneeds,giventhatnonpriorservicerecruitsgenerallymustagreetoaninitialperiodofactivedutyfortraininglengthyenoughtocompleterecruitandinitialskilltraining.Ifthemaximumacceptablenonpriorserviceinputtoreserveforcescanbedeterminedandifactive-forceseparationandreserveaffiliationratesareknown,anupperlimitontheratioofreservetoactiveforcescanbedetermined.

Cost

Activeandreserveforceoperatingcostshaveoftenbeencomparedonaper-unitorper-aircraftbasis.Thatis,theoperatingcostsofreserveunitsarecomparedwiththoseofsimilaractiveunits.Thiscostcomparisonapproachassumesequalavailabilityandemployabilityofactiveandreserveunits.Suchanassumptionisappropriateforemploymentofforcesinmajortheaterwar(MTW)orsomelarge-scalemilitaryoperationsotherthanwar(OOTW)scenarios,where

call-upofreserveforcescanmakethemfullysubstitutableforactiveforcesformanyrequirements(thosethatarecompatiblewithstatutorycall-uplimitations).

However,inmostOOTWorsmaller-scalecontingency(SSC)scenarios,thiscostcomparisonapproachisnotappropriate.

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Sustaineddeployments,suchasthoserelatedtopeacekeepinginBosniaorenforcementofno-flyzonesinIraq,generatedemandsthat,givenacceptabledurationsandfrequenciesofdeployment,aredifferentfromMTWdemands.Shortofcall-up,reserveforcesfacealimitonacceptablefrequencyanddurationofemploymentthatismuchtighterthanthatofactiveforces.Thus,inmeetingthesedemands,reserveforcesarenotfullysubstitutableforactiveforces.AnappropriatecostcomparisonforOOTWandSSCscenariosmustbebasedonoutputsusefulinthesescenarios.Arelevantoutputisthenumberofdaysperyearthatanaircraftwithappropriateaircrewsandlogisticsupportcanbedeployed.Thecostperoutputisthencomputedasannualaircraftoperatingcostsdividedbydeployableaircraftdaysperyear.

IntegratingtheSixFactors

Figure2.1providesaschemeforintegratingthesixfactorsdiscussedabove.ThefiguredepictsasetofconstraintsontheproportionofthetotalforcethatisintheRC.Arrowsontheboundarylinesindicatetheexpecteddirectionoftheconstraint.Thefiguresuggeststhatsomeoftheseconstraintsmightvaryasafunctionoftotalforcesize.Insubsequentchapters,wewillindicatewhatwebelievetobetheapproximatelocioftheseconstraintsinsomecontexts.

Thefiguredepictssocialandpoliticalconsiderationsestablishinglower-boundconstraintsontheproportionofthetotalforceintheRC.Politicalutilitiesdependinpartonthetotalforcemaintainingavisiblepresence,witheitheractiveorreserveforces,inlocalcommunities.Astotalforcesizedecreases,reserveforceswillbecalledupontoprovidethepresence,andtheymustthereforeconstitute,atminimum,alargerproportionofthetotalforce.Thus,thepoliticalconstraintisrepresentedbyaslopingline.Thesocialconstraintsuggeststhatthereserveforcesmustoccupysomeminimumconstantproportionofthe

forceinordertoinfluencethevaluesandcultureofthetotalforce.

Readinessandavailabilityconsiderationssetupperboundsonreserveforces.Weassumeaconstantdemandforimmediatelyandcontinuouslyavailableforcesthatmustbemetprimarilybyusingactiveforces.Asthetotalforcebecomessmaller,thisconstantde-

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Figure2.1AFrameworkforConsideringMultipleForce-Mix

PrinciplesSimultaneously

mandcallsforanincreasingproportionoftheforcetobesuppliedbytheactivecomponent(representedbyaslopingavailabilityconstraintlineinFigure2.1).Asdiscussedaboveandinmoredetaillater,therearegenerallynoappreciablereadinessdifferencesbetweenAirForceactiveandreserveforces.Thus,readinessdoesnotconstrainthemix.

Thepersonnelflowconstraintalsosetsanupperbound.TheRCdependsonacriticalflowofhumancapitalfromtheAC.ThereissomeratioofACtoRCsizebeyondwhichthiscriticalflowcannolongerbesustained.Inthesteadystate,thisratiowouldnotvarywithtotalforcesize.

Takentogether,theseconstraintsformafeasibleregioninwhichaforcemixwouldsimultaneouslysatisfytheprinciplesrepresentedbytheconstraints.Aspecificforcemixintheregioncanthenbetargetedonthebasisofcostconsiderations.Asmentionedabove,re-

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serveforceshavebeenconventionallyviewedaslesscostlythanac-tiveforces,indicatingthattheforcemixshouldbealongtheborderformedbytheupper-boundconstraints.However,ifreserveforcesarefoundtobemorecostlythanactiveforcesinmeetingOOTWandSSCdemands(seeChapterSix),thedirectioninwhichcostconsiderationsdrivetheforcewilldependontheneedbeingmet.Itmaybenecessaryforforce-structureplannerstochoosebetweenalarger,morereserve-intensiveforcethatbettermeetsMTWdemands,andanequal-cost,smaller,moreactive-intensiveforcethatbettermeetsOOTW/SSCdemands.

Notethatwedepictnofeasibleregionatsmallerforcesizes.Inthisforcesizerange,thegoalofkeepingreserveforceslargeenoughtoobtainpoliticalutilitiesmightconflictwiththegoalofkeepingenoughactiveforcestomeetrapiddeploymentdemands.Similarly,itispossiblethatinsomecontextstheupper-boundpersonnelflowconstraintwilllietotheleftofthelower-boundsocialconstraint,sothatthereisnofeasibleregionatanyforcesize.Whenthereisnofeasibleregion,force-structuredecisionmakersmustmaketradeoffsbetweenconflictingprinciples.

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ChapterThreeSocialAndPoliticalConsiderations

Introduction

ThearmedforcesoftheUnitedStatesdonotandcannotoperateinisolationfromthelargerAmericansociety.Theyarepartofapolitywhoseneedstheymustserve.Moreover,towinthetrustandsupportofthelargerpolity,thearmedservicesmustbewidelyperceivedasservingimportantsocialneeds.Withoutthistrustandsupport,thearmedforceswillnotgettheresourcestheyneedtofunctioneffectively.

WearguethattheAirForcecansecuresupportbyunderstandingandmanagingthreekindsoflinkagesbetweenthemilitaryandsociety(Kestnbaum,1998).Theselinkagestaketheformofasharedvaluesystem,asharedsocialstructure,andsharedinterestsandattachments.WefurtherarguethatbecausetheRChasconsiderablymoreopportunityforinteractionwithciviliansociety,itisbettersituatedthantheACtodevelopthesethreelinkages.TheRCcancommunicatethedesiresandexpectationsofciviliansocietytothetotalforceandcan,inturn,communicatethemissionsandneedsofthearmedforcestociviliansociety,thuslimitingoverallisolationofthearmedforcesfromsociety.

Inthischapter,wefirstexplainthetheoreticalframeworkofhoweachoftheselinkagesworkstoincreasetheattachmentbetweenthearmedforcesandsociety.Wethenexamineanumberofsocialandpoliticalfactorsthathaveabearingonthestrengthoftheselinkages.Finally,weassesshowthesesocialandpoliticalconsiderationsshouldoperatetoconstraintheforcemix.

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TheoreticalFramework

Thefirstpotentiallinkagebetweenthearmedforcesandsocietyisasharedvaluesystem.Sharedvaluesinademocraticsocietymightrelatetosuchissuesasdiversityandinclusion,citizenshiprightsinrelationtoobligations,closenessofthemilitarytothepeopleitissupposedtoprotect,responsivenessofthegovernmenttoitspeople,theprotectionofdemocracyfromcentralismandtyranny,andlimitationsonadventurism.Theoperativemechanismtoestablishthislinkageisidentification,wherebypeoplecanlookacrossinstitutionaldividesandfindotherswhosharetheirvaluesorideals.Citizenswhoidentifywiththeirarmedforcesaremorelikelytosupportthem.

Thesecondpotentiallinkageisanetworkofsharedsocialstructuresthroughwhichmilitarymembersareintertwinedwiththeirciviliancounterparts.Sharedsocialstructurescanbefoundintheworkplace,schools,churches,communityserviceorpoliticalorganizations,oreventhroughbeingincommonsocialpositions,suchasmiddle-classtaxpayersinasmalltown.ComparedwiththeAC,membersoftheRCarelikelytohavemanymoresuchsharedstructureswiththeciviliancommunitiesofwhichtheyareapart.Theoperativemechanismtoestablishthislinkageisembeddedness,wherebypeoplewhoareseparatedbyinstitutionalboundariesinonesphere(militaryversuscivilian)arelinkedwithcommoninstitutionsinotherspheres.Anarmedforceembeddedintolargersocietywillhavemoreopportunitiestounderstandandbeunderstoodbycivilians.

Finally,theRCpromotesgreatersharedinterestsandattachmentsbetweenthoseinthearmedforcesandciviliansociety,thethirdlinkage.Forexample,veteransmaintainaninterestinthemilitary;thenumberofveteransinsocietyisarguablygreaterwithalargerRC.Also,themobilizationofreservistsgeneratesinterestamongothersintheircommunities.Theoperativemechanismtoestablishthislinkage

isinvestment,throughwhichpeoplebecomeinterestedinpersonsandinstitutionsbyvirtueoftheirconnectionsandattachmentstothesepeople.Acitizenryinvestedinitsarmedforcesismorelikelytosupportthem.

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SocialandPoliticalFactors

Anumberofsocialandpoliticalfactorshavebeenofferedasargumentsforreserveforces:

ThemaintenanceofstatemilitiasasentitiesseparatefromanationalarmedforceiswrittenintotheConstitution.

TheRCincreasesthepublic'sawarenessandtrustofmilitaryinstitutions.

Publicreactiontoreservecall-upsprovidesacheckonexcessiveuseofthemilitary.

TheRCismorerepresentativeofsocietythantheAC.

TheRCincreasespoliticalsupportforthearmedforces.

TheNationalGuardservesspecificstateroles.

Eachofthesesocialandpoliticalfactorswouldworkthroughthemechanismsofidentification,embeddedness,and/orinvestmenttoincreasetheconnectionsbetweensocietyandthemilitary.

Beyondthefactthatsuchfactorsarguefortheexistenceofthereserves,itisalsoreasonabletoconsidersuchfactorsinforce-mixdecisions,supplyingdecisionmakerswithcompellingreasonstomaintainsomeminimumproportionoftheforceintheRC.Itmaybemoredifficulttoquantifyhowthesesocialandpoliticalconsiderationsshouldaffecttheforcemixthanitwouldbetoquantifyhowotherfactorssuchascost,effectiveness,orpersonnelflowshoulddoso.Yetwithoutthelinkagesandsupportthatthesesocialandpoliticalconsiderationsembody,themilitarywillbelessabletogathertheresourcesitneeds.Perhapsmoreimportant,theconsiderationsoffersomethingofabasisformaintaininganRCwithinademocraticsociety.

Militia-NationConsiderations

ThetraditionofcitizensoldiersintheUnitedStatesdatesbacktobeforethenationwasborn,andthenfurtherbackintoAnglo-SaxontraditioninEngland.PartofourromanticunderstandingoftheRevolutionaryWaristhatoffarmerslayingdowntheirplowsand

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pickinguptheirmusketstodrillandthentoserve.TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesreflectsthistraditionandclearlylaysthegroundworkfortheexistenceofpart-timesoldiers,astheexcerptsinTable3.1demonstrate.

Section8ofArticleIgivesCongressthepowertofederalizethemilitiaasameanstoachievebroadergovernmentobjectivessuchassecurityandstability.However,themilitiaisclearlynotafederalforcesincetherearecertainrightsandresponsibilitiesreservedtothestates,suchasofficerappointmentsandtraining.Infact,Section2ofArticleIIdistinctlyseparatestheregularforces,whichnowin-

Table3.1TheMilitiaintheConstitutionandtheBillofRights

ArticleI,Section8

TheCongressshallhavePowerTolayandcollectTaxes,Duties,ImpostsandExcises,topaytheDebtsandprovideforthecommonDefenseandgeneralWelfareoftheUnitedStates;butallDuties,ImpostsandExcisesshallbeuniformthroughouttheUnitedStates;ToprovideforcallingforththeMilitiatoexecutetheLawsoftheUnion,suppressInsurrectionsandrepelInvasions;Toprovidefororganizing,arming,anddiscipliningtheMilitia,andforgoverningsuchPartofthemasmaybeemployedintheServiceoftheUnitedStates,reservingtotheStatesrespectively,theAppointmentoftheOfficers,andtheAuthorityoftrainingtheMilitiaaccordingtothedisciplineprescribedbyCongress;AndTomakeallLawswhichshallbenecessaryandproperforcarryingintoExecutiontheforegoingPowers,andallotherPowers

vestedbythisConstitutionintheGovernmentoftheUnitedStates,orinanyDepartmentorOfficerthereof.

ArticleII,Section2

ThePresidentshallbeCommanderinChiefoftheArmyandNavyoftheUnitedStates,andoftheMilitiaoftheseveralStates,whencalledintotheactualServiceoftheUnitedStates.

AmendmentII

AwellregulatedMilitia,beingnecessarytothesecurityofafreeState,therightofthepeopletokeepandbearArms,shallnotbeinfringed.

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cludetheAirForceaswellastheArmyandNavy,fromthemilitia,orNationalGuard.

Thisconstitutionallanguagewasacompromisebetweentwofactionsofthedocument'sdrafterstheFederalists,whowantedastrongnationalgovernment,andtheAnti-Federalists,whowantedtoensurestates'rights.TheFederalistsinsertedtheclausethatgrantsCongressthepowertocallforththemilitia.TheAnti-Federalistswantedtomakesurethestateswouldhaveaccesstothemilitiatobalancethepowerfulcentralgovernment,sotheSecondAmendmentwasincorporatedintotheBillofRights.Thelanguageinthisamendmentisoftenunderstoodinalimitedsenseastherighttobeararms.However,therighttobeararmsshouldbeunderstoodinthecontextofmaintainingalocalmilitiathatcanbeusedbythestates.

ThemilitiawasunderstoodbydraftersoftheConstitutiontobeacrucialmeanstocertainendsthatcannotbebetterservedbyenlargingthestandingarmybecausethetwoinstitutionsarefundamentallydifferent.Kohn(1997)suggeststhatthemilitiaisanarmedcountervailingpowertopreventtheregularmilitaryfrombecomingtoostrongandtoensurethatcivilianshavecontrolovermilitaryaffairs.Heseesthiscountervailingpowerasnecessarytopreventtyrannyofastrongcentralgovernmentbasedonmilitarycontrolandtheadventurismofsuchagovernmentattemptingtoincreaseitsspanofcontrolbytryingtoconquerothernations.ThefoundingfatherssawexamplesoftheserisksalloverEurope.

Anotherendthatthemilitiaservesisoneofcitizenship,assuggestedbyKestnbaum(1997).Democraticsocietyisstrengthenedwhenrightsofparticipationinthedemocracyareearnedinthedefenseofthenation.Also,ademocraticarmedforcemustremainrootedinthepeoplebymakingsurethatasubstantialportiondonotseethemselvesstrictlyascareermilitarybutinsteadidentifywithciviliansandplan

toreturntocivilianlife.

ThoughtheConstitutioncallsforamilitia,itdoesnotofferdirect,specificpurchaseonthequestionofsizingtheNationalGuard.Atitsheart,theConstitutionisadocumentembodyingthesharedvaluesofoursociety,andtheexistenceoftheRCisanexpressionofthesevalues.ThefunctionoftheRCinthisinstanceistohelpmaintain

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thedemocracyandenhanceitsvalue.Decisionmakersneedtobeawareofthisfunctionwhensizingthetotalforce.

PublicAwareness/TrustofMilitaryInstitutions

TheRCservestopromotepublicawarenessandtrustofmilitaryinstitutionsbyprovidingcivilianscontactwiththemilitaryandbyprovidingmilitarymemberscontactwithciviliansociety.

CivilianContactwiththeMilitary

Thecontacthypothesissuggeststhatonerolereservistsplayiscommunicatingtheculture,structures,andgoalsofthemilitarytoawiderpublic.ThisrolehasnotgoneunrecognizedwithintheRCcommunity.McDonald(1996)exhortsreserveofficerstodeveloplinkswiththecommunityandtotrytoenhancetheimageofthereservesthroughthemedia.''Youngofficersrepresentanimportantlinkbetweenthearmedforcesandtheciviliansocietyandarefirst-classmilitaryambassadors.Theyarekeyplayersinpromotingabroaderunderstandingoftheimportanceofourmilitarydefense"(p.34).

Contactbetweenthemilitaryandsocietyprovidesanentranceforpositivemilitaryvaluesintothebroaderculture.Forexample,militarysociologistCharlesMoskosandhisassociates(e.g.,MoskosandButler,1996)havelongmadetheargumentthatthemilitaryhasahigherpercentageofAfricanAmericanmanagersthananyotheremploymentsectoroftheU.S.economy.Thesemanagersare,ofcourse,themembersoftheofficercorps.Inthemilitary,whitesaremuchmorelikelytoreportto,andtakedirectordersfrom,blacksthantheyareinthecivilianeconomy.RCmemberswhoaremanagedbyminorityofficersinthemilitarywillbeabletorecognizeandcommunicatethevalueofdiversityintheircivilianjobs.

CiviliancontactwiththemilitaryisenhancedbythefactthattheRC,

particularlytheANG,isbydesignfarmoregeographicallydispersedthantheAC.AsindicatedinFigure3.1,75percentoftheAirForceACisconcentratedin13states,whereas75percentoftheRCisspreadover25states.Foroperationalreasonsrelatedtoheavydeploymentdemand,theACcanbemademoreefficientandlessstressedbyconcentratingitonasmallernumberoflarger-scaleinstallations.IfsuchrebasingweretooccurwithintheAC,theRC'srelativelygreatergeographicaldispersalwouldtakeonevengreater

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Figure3.1ReserveComponentsAreGeographicallyDispersed

importanceasanavenuetoincreaseopportunitiesforcontactbetweenciviliansandthemilitary.

MilitaryContactwithCivilians

Theflipsideofpublicsupportformilitaryinstitutionsismilitarymembers'understandingofthelargersociety.Althoughactive-dutymembersofthemilitarymayhavesignificantcontactwithciviliansintheirdailylivesandjobs,theymayalsobeisolatedfromthem,especiallyifstationedonaremotebaseorabroad.Themilitarybrancheshavetakenconsiderablecaretodevelopculturesthatreflectcertainvalues,withaneyetowardmakingabetter,stronger,andmorecohesivefightingforce.Thesevaluesmaynotbesharedor,ifshared,followedbylargersociety.Ricks(1997)tellsofMarinesafterbootcampbeingfacedwithakindofcultureshockwhentheygohomeonleave.Civiliansare"abunchoffreaks"(p.233);"overweight,andalittlesloppy"(p.228);"self-destructive,nottrying,justgoofingaround"(p.229);''losers"(p.229);"peoplewithobnoxiousattitudes,nopolitenesswhatsoever,nasty"(p.231).OneMarine,freshoutofbootcampsays"Defendingmycountry?Well,it'snotreallymy

country.ImayliveinAmerica,buttheUnitedStatesissoscrewedup"(p.236).

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Thequotations,althoughnotarepresentativesample,aretellingandareacauseforconcern.Membersofthemilitaryaresworntoprotectandservethelargersociety.Thepotentialdangerliesinanarmedforcethatdecidesthatitisabovesocietyorthatsocietyisnotworthyofprotection.Whilewedonotconsiderthisalikelyoutcome,itistheworst-caseconsequenceofamilitarythatbecomestooremoteanddisconnectedfromthegeneralcitizenryandtheirvalues.

Infact,membersofthemilitaryareverydifferentfromciviliansintermsoftheirpoliticalaffiliation.Ina1997OlinInstitutepaper(alsocitedintheWallStreetJournal,1997),Holstifoundthatthemilitaryisnotablyconservativeandpartisan.In1976,33percentofthemilitaryand25percentofthecivilianopinionleaderssurveyedidentifiedthemselvesasRepublicans.1By1996,67percentofthemilitaryopinionleaderswereRepublicans,whereasonly34percentofthecivilianleaderswere.Thissignificant,radicalshifttotherightisevenmorepronouncedamongyoungermilitaryopinionleaders:92percentofthosebornafter1954areRepublican.TheWallStreetJournalarticlecitesanunnamedthree-stargeneralwhoclaimsthatthe"singlegreatestdangerfacingtheU.S.militarytoday[is]thepossibilitythatapoliticizedmilitarywillstaythatway,growinglessandlessresponsivetociviliancontrolovertime."

Reservistsofferabridgebetweenthemilitaryandlargersocietybecause,asfull-timeemployeeswithinandgenerallylonger-termresidentsoftheirrespectivecommunities,theyenjoygreaterembeddednessinsharedsocialstructuresthantheirACcounterparts.WhereasACairmenandofficersmayalsohavecontactwithcivilians,theircontactsaregenerallylessextensiveandlesswelldevelopedthanthatoftheirRCcounterparts.TheRCisbettersituatedthantheACtomakeknowntheAirForce'smissionsandneedstocivilians

1Inthisstudy,asurveysamplewasdrawnfrom4000opinionleaders

whosenameshadbeenderivedfromsuchgeneralsourcesasWho'sWhoinAmericaandWho'sWhoofAmericanWomen,aswellasmorespecializeddirectorieslistingleadersinoccupationsthatareunderrepresentedinWho'sWho,includingmedialeaders,politicians,militaryofficers,laborleaders,StateDepartmentandForeignServiceOfficers,andforeignpolicyexpertsoutsidegovernment.ThemilitarysampleincludedstudentsattheNationalWarCollegeandasmallernumberofsenioruniformedPentagonofficerswhosenamesweredrawnrandomlyfromtheCongressionalDirectory.

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andinabetterpositiontounderstandthevaluesandinterestsofciviliansandconveythesebacktothetotalforce.

ImplicationsfortheForceMix

Theforce-miximplicationsofincreasedopportunityformilitary/civiliancontactarerelatedtohowtheviewsandideasofaminoritygrouparerespectedbythemajority.Inthiscase,theissueiswhetherabetterappreciationofthevaluesandinterestsofthelargersocietyfoundamongmembersoftheRC(aminority)canbeeffectivelycommunicatedtomembersoftheAC(amajority).Insightcanbefoundintheliteratureonorganizations.Kanter(1977)offersatypologyofminoritygroupsbasedontheirlevelofrepresentationinanorganization.Herworkfocusesonwomenintheworkplace,butthereasoningcanbeextendedtoanysituationwhereless-representedindividualsaretryingtomakeanimpactinalargergroup.

InKanter'ssystem,auniformgroupisonewheremembersareallinonecategory.Askewedgroupisonewheremostofthepeopleareofonetype,perhapsmakingup85percentofthewhole.Membersoftheminoritygroupwouldberareenoughtoappearastokensandwouldfaceheightenedperformancepressures,sincetheirsuccessesmaybediscountedbuttheirfailureshighlypublicizedandscrutinized.Moreseriously,socialisolationwouldmakeit"difficultfor[thesemembers]togenerateanalliancethatcanbecomepowerfulinthegroup"(p.209).Intiltedgroups,thesplitislesssevere,withperhaps65percentofmembersinonegroupand35percentintheother.Kantercharacterizesthelargergroupinthisrangeasamajorityandmembersofthesmallergroupasaminorityratherthanastokens.Here,"minoritymembershavepotentialalliesamongeachother,canformcoalitions,andcanaffectthecultureofthegroup.Theybegintobecomeindividualsdifferentiatedfromeachotheraswellasatypedifferentiatedfromthemajority"(p.209).Atratiosof60:40through

50:50,themajorityandminoritymembersarebalancedandcanbecomedistinctive"subgroupsthatmayormaynotgenerateactualtype-basedidentifications''(p.209).

FortheRCtobetakenseriouslytobeabletoformacoalitionthatcanbeheardthisanalysiswouldsuggestthatmaintainingthestatusofminorityratherthantokenisnecessary.Kanterisnotclearontheproportionatwhichmembersofasubgroupceasetobetokens

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andachieveminoritystatus.2Indeed,thiscanbeexpectedtovarybysituation.However,onepossiblereadingoftheworkisthatasubgroupacquiresminoritystatuswithaslittleas20percentorasmuchas40percentofthepopulation.ThisindicatesthattheRCshouldconstituteaminimumproportionofthetotalAirForceinthe2040percentrangestoensureithassufficient"voice."ThisassumesthattheANGandAFRcanjointogetherinacoalitiontorepresenttheviewpointsofthecitizen-soldier.

Kanter'sargumentsabouttokenismandhowproportionsofminoritiesaffecttheirperceivedinfluencewerebasedonobservingfemalesintheworkplaceintheearly1970s.Inherexample,companymanagementdidnotprovidetheleadershiprequiredtoreducediscriminationagainstwomenwithintheorganization.Inmanycases,womenfounditdifficulttodotheirjobseffectivelybecauseofeffortstosubvertthematalllevelsoftheorganization.Thelevelofminorityrepresentationsheoffersasapointatwhichminoritiescanbeheard(35percent)isprobablyafunctionofthisproblematicsituation.

Incontrast,RCmembersperformingtheirjobsamongACmembersmightnotbeasnoticeableasfemaleswouldbeinapredominatelymaleenvironment.Indeed,itisquestionablewhetherACofficersandairmeninfactviewRCindividualsasbeingofdistinctandlowerstatus.Also,theAirForcedoeshaveexperienceintegratingaminoritygroupintoitsranks.ThehistoryofremovingracialbarriersblockingAfricanAmericanparticipationinthearmedservicesoffersafascinatingexampleofhowstrongleadershipenabledanorganizationtogivelietotheargumentthatsocialcohesionresultingfromracialsimilarityisacriticalfactorinunitperformance(RostkerandHarris,1993).StrongcivilianandmilitaryleadershipthatfocusedonlegislatingacceptablebehaviorsofwhitesratherthanonchangingattitudeshelpedcreatetheintegratedAirForcethatweobservetoday.

2Otherresearchongendertokenismfindsadifferentrangeofeffects.Southetal.(1982)findthat"tokenwomenarenotfoundtofacemoresevereorganizationalpressuresthannontokens"(p.587).Yoder(1991)findsthatthestudiedpressuresonwomen"occuronlyfortokenwomeningender-inappropriateoccupations,"whereasintheAirForce,RCmembersarenotininappropriateoccupations.Izraeli(1983),however,generallysupportsKanter'sworkontokenism.

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ItisextremelydoubtfulthatmembersoftheRCareinapositionanalogoustothatofAfricanAmericansbeforeintegration(orofwomeninKanter'sstudy).Incontrast,theRCiswellintegratedintothefunctioningofthetotalforce.Moreover,themessageremainsthatastrong,effective,andeducatedleadershipcanensurethatmembersoftheRCaretreatedwithrespect.Thus,webelievethataconstrainttowardtheminimum(20percent)ofKanter's"minoritystatus"rangeofthresholdswouldbesufficienttoensurethattheRChaseffectivevoiceinthetotalforce.

LinkingForceEmploymenttoPublicSupport

AftertheVietnamWar,themilitarydevelopeditstotalforcepolicy,whichithasmaintainedtothepresentday.Binkin(1993,pp.110111)offersaconsidereddiscussionofthebasisforthispolicyanditsviability.

AsrelatedbyBinkin,GeneralCreightonAbrams,afterthearmedforces'Vietnamexperience,advocatedacloseoperationalassociationbetweentheactiveArmyandtheRCtokeeptheACfrombeingsenttoawarwithouttheinvolvementoftheRC.TheRCwouldbridgethegapbetweentheactivemilitaryandAmericancitizens,sothattheactivemilitarywouldbelessisolatedincaseofwar.Hence,"ifreservesmustbeactivatedinordertosustainactiveforcesinanythingmorethanlimitedcontingencies,presidentswillbelessinclined(andpoliticallylessable)tobecomeinvolvedinmilitaryactionswithoutextensivenationaldebateandpoliticalconsensus."(Lacy,1986;alsocitedinBinkin.)

Thetotalforcepolicyincreasesthepossibilitythatcivilianswillbeacquaintedwithsomeonewhoisservinginthetheaterofwar,andpossiblysomeonewhobecomeswoundedorkilled.Inshort,sincemembersoftheRCareembeddedinsociety,theirfriendsandcoworkerswillhaveahigherprobabilityofbeingdirectlytiedto

someonemakingasacrificeforthecountry.Thetotalforcepolicybringsthewarhometoalargernumberofcivilians.Ifonlymilitarycareerprofessionalswereinvolved,theboundariesaroundwhogetskilledorwoundedcouldkeepthewaronanintellectualandless-emotionallevelforthosecivilianswithoutfriendsorcoworkerswhoareservingandsacrificing.Thus,usingtheRCensuresaninvolvedsociety.

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Binkin(pp.149151)teststhispropositionusingdatafromthePersianGulfconflict,reachingmuchthesameconclusionsasaRANDreport(RAND,1992,pp.9597).(Infactthetwoauthoritiesciteeachotheronthistopic.)BinkinplotsGalluppolldataonpublicsupportforthewaragainstreservemobilizations,showingthatsupportforthewardeclinedasreserveswerebeingcalledup.Hedoesnotdefinitivelystatethattherewasacause-and-effectrelationshipbetweenthetwofactors,buthesuggeststhatsupportmighthavedeclinedfurtheriftheconflicthadbeenlongerandthenumberofAmericancasualtieshadincreased.Publicopiniondidnotnecessarilyactasabrakeintheshortandrelativelyunbloody(forAmericans)conflict.RANDcitesanecdotalevidencethat"mobilizationofreservesalsomobilizedsupportofthewar"andthatemployerssupportedtheirreservistemployees(p.96).However,thereisnostrongevidenceeitherwaythatintegratingthereserveswiththeactivemilitaryhelpsmaintainsupportordiminishesit.

RAND(1992)concludesthatifdecisionmakersconsiderthatintegrationofthecomponentsoftheforceisimportantandnecessary,thenthisisapoliticalreasontoshapetheforceinsuchaway.Theresultinginteractionproducesacitizenrythatknowsandcaresmoreaboutthemilitaryandtheinstitutionandmaybemorelikelytoparticipateknowledgeablyinanypublicdebateaboutforceemployment.Peoplemaybemorelikelytosupportfundingforthearmedforcessothatthosetheyknowwillbebetterpreparedintheeventofmilitaryaction.

However,theseanalysesofferlittleornopurchaseontheproportionofthetotalforcethatmustbeintheRC.IfthethesisunderlyingthetotalforcepolicyisvalidthatusingtheRCimposesacheckoninappropriatemilitaryactionandcreatespublicsupportforthoseactionsthatareundertakenresearchershaveofferednohypothesesonhowmanypeoplemusthavecontactwithRCmemberstoobtainthose

effects.

RepresentativeForceIssues

Krislov(1974)suggeststhatonemethodofsecuringbroadsocialsupportforgovernmentpolicyandactionistodrawarepresentativesegmentofsocietyintothegovernment.Doingsopromotesbothinvestmentinthevaluesofandidentificationwiththeinterestsofthe

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governmentonthepartofallsegmentsofsociety.AppliedtotheAirForceforce-mixquestion,thisperspectivewouldarguetoincreaseproportionsoftheforcethataremoredemographicallyrepresentativeanddecreasethosethatarenot.Todeterminetherelativerepresentativenessofthevariouscomponents,wereviewedDoDdemographicdataonofficersandenlistedpersonnelbothatcurrentstrengthsandamongnewaccessions(DoD,1997).

GenderDiversity

Figure3.2showsthepercentageofwomenintheofficercorpsaswellasnewofficeraccessionsinfiscalyear1996.Figure3.3doesthesamefortheenlistedranks.

Ofthethreebranches,theAFRhasbyfarthehighestpercentageofactivefemaleofficers,atover24percent,whiletheANGhastheleastdiverseofficercorpsofthethreecomponents,beingonly13.4percentfemale.

Allthreecomponentsareattractingfemaleofficersatahigherpercentagethantheircurrentrepresentation,withnewfemaleofficers

Figure3.2PercentageofFemaleOfficersandOfficerAccessionsinthe

TotalForceAmongThreeAFComponents,FY1996

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Figure3.3PercentageofFemaleEnlistedMembersandEnlistedAccessions

intheTotalForceAmongThreeAFComponents,FY1996

intheAFRmakingupalmost28percentofthetotal.Ifthetrendismaintained,itwillleadtoagradualincreaseinthepercentageoffemaleofficersinthethreebranches.Thus,thelevelofgenderdiversityamongofficersintheAirForcecouldbeincreasedbymakingtheAFRlargerrelativetotheothertwocomponents.

Fortheenlistedcorps,theAFRisagainthemostgender-representativecomponent.Infiscalyear1996,19.1percentofthemembersoftheAFRwerefemale,whereaswomenmadeup16.9percentoftheACand15.1percentoftheANG.TheANGagainhastheleastgenderdiversityintheAirForce.

However,ofthethreecomponents,theACisrecruitingthelargestpercentageofenlistedfemales,at26percent.Ifthistrendcontinues,theACshouldsurpasstheAFRasthemostgender-representativecomponent.TheAFRlagsbehind,with21.4percentofitsnewrecruitsbeingfemale.Again,theANGattractsthesmallestproportionofnewfemalerecruits,at17.7percent.However,allthreecomponentsarerecruitingfemalesathigherlevels,whichovertime

willincreasethepercentageoffemaleenlistedairmen.Thus,thelevelof

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genderdiversityamongenlistedpersonnelintheAirForcecouldbeincreasedbymakingtheAFRandAClargerrelativetotheANG.

Wenotethatouranalysesofgenderrepresentationwereconductedatanaggregateratherthananoccupationallevel.Someoccupationshavebeen,historically,morefemale-intensivethanothers.Thus,itispossiblethatgenderdifferencesamongthecomponentsreflectdifferencesintheoccupationalmixamongthecomponents.

Racial/EthnicDiversity.Figure3.4breaksdownthenumbersfortheofficercorpsandforofficeraccessionsofthethreecomponentsinfiscalyear1996intermsofracial/ethnicdiversity.Figure3.5providesthesameinformationforenlistedpersonnel.

Asthefigureshows,therearefewmajorracial/ethnicdifferencesamongACandRCofficers.TheANGhasthehighestpercentageofHispanicofficers,whereastheACleadsinpercentageofblacks.However,thedifferencesarenotgreat.

Figure3.4PercentageofMinorityOfficersandOfficerAccessionsAmong

ThreeAFComponentsintheTotalForce,FY1996

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Figure3.5PercentageofMinorityEnlistedPersonnelandEnlistedAccessions

AmongThreeAFComponentsintheTotalForce,FY1996

Forofficeraccessions,thereareagainonlyslightdifferencesinrecruitmentpatternsofminorities.TheANGexceedstheothertwocomponentsinitsrecruitmentofHispanics.TheAChasthehighesttotalproportionofminorityaccessions.

AsshowninFigure3.5,theenlistedranksaremarkedlymoreracially/ethnicallydiversethantheofficercorps.Inparticular,theAFRhasahighpercentageofblacks,at18percent.DifferencesamongthecomponentsregardingparticipationbyHispanicsarelessmarked,withtheANGhavingthehighestproportioninitscurrentstrengthandtheACrecruitingthelargestproportion.TheANGleadsinthe"other"category,whichincludesAsians,NativeAmericans,andPacificIslanders.Wecannotdrawclearconclusionsaboutwhichcomponentdoesthebestjobofrecruitingandretainingminorities.

ImplicationsfortheForceMix

WefoundthattheRCismorediversethantheACinsomegenderandracial/ethniccategoriesandlessdiverseinothers.Thus,representativenessdoesnotargueforshiftingtheproportionofthe

forcetowardeithertheRCortheAC.

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InfluenceofVeteransInSociety

Holdingforcecostsconstant,alargerRCproportionresultsinalargertotalforceand,arguably,producesmoreveterans(memberswithsomemilitaryservice).3Theinfluenceoftheseveteranscanbepositiveindefense-relatedmatters.Inaddition,veteranshavetiestoothersinsocietyandcanthusincreaseunderstandingofthemilitaryamongthosewithwhomtheycomeintocontact.

ButlerandJohnson(1991)studiedhowAmericansfeltaboutfiscalsupportforthemilitary(spendingonarmsandforeignaid,inparticular),theobligationtoserve,theoverallqualityofthemilitary,andminoritiesinthemilitaryandopportunitiesforminoritiesserving.TheyanalyzeddatafromtheGeneralSocialSurvey,abiennialnationalsurveyofadultsnotlivingininstitutionalsettings(suchashospitals,prisons,andmilitarybarracks).Theypooleddatafrom1982,1983,and1984togenerateasamplewithalargernumberofveteransandAfricanAmericans.Generally,theyfindthat,holdingotherfactorsconstant,veterans,olderpeople,andsouthernersaremorelikelytosupportthemilitary,whilemorehighlyeducatedpeoplearelesssupportiveofthemilitary.Characteristicshavinglittleeffectincluderaceandincome.Ofimportancehereistheirfindingthatmilitaryserviceincreasessupportforthemilitary.

Ivie,Gimbel,andElder(1991)analyzeddataonmenandwomenwhowereborninthe1920stoseeifmilitaryexperiencesinWorldWarIIandKoreaaffectedtheirattitudestowardthemilitary.Theyfindthatbeingaveteranorbeingmarriedtoaveteran,havingachildwhoservedinthemilitary,andmaintainingsocialtieswithfriendsfromtheserviceincreasesupportformilitarypreparedness.4

3Holdingcostsconstant,alargerRCproportionresultsinasmallerACandanRCthatincreasesbymorethanthedecreaseintheAC.SomeproportionofthelargerRCrequirementwouldbemetusingnonprior

serviceresources.IfthosenonpriorserviceresourcesturnoveratthesameorhigherratesthanthesmallernumberofACresourcestheydisplace,theresultwillbemoreveterans.Althoughwedonothaveseparateturnoverforprior-serviceandnonpriorservicereservists,wenotethatturnoverintheRCisgenerallyhigherthanturnoverintheAC.4Supportformilitarypreparednessismeasuredbyafive-pointscalerangingfrom"stronglydisagree"to"stronglyagree,"indexingsupportforthefollowingfourstatements:(1)Astrongdefenseshouldbethenumber-oneprioritytoday,rankingabovesocialneedsandabalancedbudget;(2)RegistrationforthedraftisneededtoensureastrongAmerica;(3)Militarytrainingshouldreceivestrongsupportinourcollegesand

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Similarly,ButlerandJohnson(1991)findthatveteranstatusispositivelyrelatedtosupportforthemilitary.

MilitaryexperienceisincreasinglyrareamongmembersofCongress.Withinthelast25years,thepercentageofmemberswithanymilitaryexperiencehasfallenfrom70.6to35.8percent.5WithfewerveteransinCongress,thereisagreaterpossibilitythatmilitaryappropriationswillfallshortofneeds.6

PoliticalInfluenceoftheRC

MembersoftheRCcanusetheirextensivepoliticalnetworkstogarnernationalsupportforthearmedforces.TheANG,inparticular,hasmembersinall50stateswhocanlobbytheircongressionalrepresentativesinsupportoftheirgoals.EvenwithoutactivelobbyingbytheRC,congressionalinterestinmaintainingalocalmilitarypresence,perhapsbecauseofjobs,willenhancethelikelihoodthatCongresswillvoteinsupportofparticularACorRCgoals.

OneexampleistheperpetualoverfundingofC130transportaircraftprocurement.Yearafteryear,Congress,perhapslobbiedbyeithertheaircraftmanufacturerorlocalreservecomponents,fundsprocurementofmoreC130sthantheAirForcerequests.7TheextrasfindahomeintheRC,whereinfactalargeportionoftheairliftmissionexists.

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highschools;and(4)Allmenabove18shouldberequiredtotakeacertainamountofmilitarytraining.5Dataforthe93rdCongressarederivedfromRosterofUnitedStatesCongressionalOfficeholdersandBiographicalCharacteristicsofMembersoftheUnitedStatesCongress,17891993:MergedDataFile,9thInter-UniversityConsortiumforPoliticalandSocialResearch,1993,AnnArbor,Michigan.Dataforthe105thCongressarederivedfromCongressionalUniverse(worldwidewebservice),CongressionalInformationService,

Bethesda,Maryland(accessedDecember17,1998).6AsstatedintheIntroduction,theobjectiveoffosteringalargernumberofveteransinsocietyandingovernmentisnottomaximizemilitaryresourcesbutrathertohelpcreateconditionsinwhichdemocraticsocialandpoliticalprocessesresultinanappropriatelevelofmilitaryresources.7ThisraisesthequestionofwhethertheAirForceinfactreliesonknowledgethatthiswillhappenwhenitputstogetheritsbudgetrequestsforaircraftacquisition.IfprogrammersknowthatCongressisgoingtoforceacertainnumberofairliftaircraftontheAirForce,theAirForcecanaskformorefightersorbombersthanifithadtohusbanditsresourcesmorecarefully.

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Accordingtothisargument,RCpoliticalinfluenceshouldbeharnessedinsupportofallnewweaponacquisitionsbyplanningforinitialintroductionofnewweaponsinbothACandRCunits.Butshouldforce-mixdecisionsbeshapedtoinvokepoliticalsupport?Ourviewisthatthepublicinterestisgenerallynotwellservedwhenanagencyattemptstobendnationalprioritiestowarditsownendsthroughpoliticaladvocacyratherthanshapingitsmissiontowhatthecitizenrydeemsimportant.Thisisparticularlytrueifalesseffectiveorefficientforcemixwereadoptedtogainpoliticaladvantage.

WedistinguishsuchdirectpoliticalRCinfluencefromamoreindirectsort,whichisthedevelopmentofpublicsupportforthearmedforcesthroughvotingandothermanifestationsofpoliticalpreferences.Themilitaryneedspublicsupporttosustainitselfinanenvironmentoflimitedresources,wheredefenseisjustoneofmanypublicgoodscompetingfortaxdollars.TheRC,withitstiestothelargersociety,iswellpositionedtocommunicatetheimportanceofdefenseandnationalsecuritypolicytoacitizenrywhosemoreimmediateconcernsandinterestsmaylieinotherdirections.WeargueinthisreportthattheRC'sindirectinfluencethroughtheprocessesofidentification,embeddedness,andinvestmentplaysasignificantroleingeneratingpublicsupportforthemilitary.

StateMissionsoftheANG

Unliketheothercomponentsofthearmedservices,theNationalGuardhasastaterole.Itcanbecalleduponbystategovernorstoofferemergencyassistanceinadisasterthatmaypresentproblemstoanoverwhelmedcitizenry.Examplesaresnowstorms,floods,earthquakes,andfires,aswellasemergenciesresultingfromsocialunrest.

Brown,Fedorochko,andSchank(1995)examinedthenatureofthestatemissionsoftheNationalGuardtodetermineiftheGuardhad

sufficientmanpowertofulfillthem.Theycollectedsurveydatafrom49ofthe54NationalGuardentities(inall50states,plustheDistrictofColumbia,Guam,PuertoRico,andtheU.S.VirginIslands).Inaddition,theyconducted15sitevisitstostudyindepthstaterequirementsfortheGuardandhowwelltheyhadbeenmet.The

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studyincludedboththeArmyNationalGuardandtheAirNationalGuard.

TheauthorsexaminedcaseswheretheGuardwascalledouttorespondtostateemergencies,includingHurricaneAndrewthatstruckFloridaandLouisianain1992,HurricaneInikithatdamagedHawaiiin1992,theenormousMidwesternfloodsin1993thatputhugeportionsofWisconsin,Missouri,Iowa,Illinois,SouthDakota,Nebraska,Kansas,andNorthDakotaunderwater,andthe1992LosAngelesriotsthatfollowedtheacquittalofthepoliceofficerswhohadbeenaccusedofbrutalizingRodneyKing.Ineachofthesecases,NationalGuardsmennumberinginthethousandswerecalleduptorespondtothecrisisconditions.8

ThestaffingoftheNationalGuardwasmorethanadequatetoperformallthestatemissionsforwhichitwascalledupon.TheGuardusuallybackedupstateresourcesandtheFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)ratherthanservingasafront-lineresponsetodisaster.TheremaynotbeenoughNationalGuardcapacitytofullyresolvepeakdisasters,butthesepeaksarerelativelyrare,andtheGuardisonetoolinanadequatepackageofemergencyreliefthatissufficienttorespondtocivilemergencies.BrownandhiscolleaguesdonotrecommendincreasingthesizeoftheGuardtorespondtopeakdisasters,whichtheycharacterizeasanuneconomicalapproach.SizingtheGuardtodealwithraredisasterswouldmeancreatingaforcethatisunderusedthevastmajorityofthetime.Ifincreasedcapabilityshouldbeconsiderednecessary,regionalpactsbetweenthestateGuardorganizationscouldinstitutionalizeandeasethesharingofresourcesamongthestates.TheexampleoftheOklahomaAirGuardairliftingfeedtocattleinNewMexicowhiletheNewMexicoGuardrespondedtootheraspectsofaheavysnowstormshowstheviabilityofthisoption.

Brownetal.(1995)reportthatonlyasmallfractionofANGunitsormembersserveonstatemissionsinanygivenyear(andinmanyyearsthereisnorequirementfortheirservices).Thus,evena

8MajordisasterstendtorequireresourcesmorelikelytobefoundintheArmyNationalGuardthanintheAirNationalGuard.However,theANGcontributesspecialcapabilities,suchasairliftandcivilengineering,inadditiontogeneral-purposemanpower.

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significantlyreducedRCwouldnotnegativelyaffecttheabilityoftheANGtoperformitsstatemissions.

StatemissionsoftheANGgarneragreatdealofpositivepublicityfromthemediaandsupportfromthepublic,increasinginterestandinvestmentintheinstitution.Moreover,citizenswhomayhavelittleornocontactwiththemilitaryoritsmembersinusualtimesmayhavesignificantcontactduringdisasters,furtherdeepeningthismeansofattachmentbetweenciviliansocietyandthearmedforces.ThisisprobablynotasufficientreasontosetaflooronthesizeorproportionoftheANGinthetotalforce.

HowSocialandPoliticalConsiderationsConstraintheForceMix

Ourcurrentresearchseekstodeterminethedegreetowhichsocialandpoliticalconsiderationsshouldconstraintheforcemix.WeillustrateourfindingsusingthetwoconstraintlinesdepictedinFigure3.6.NotethatthelinesinFigure3.6arelabeleddifferentlyfromthecorrespondinglinesinFigure2.2.ThelabelsintroducedheremorefullyreflectthevocabularyandconceptsintroducedinChapterThree.OnelinerepresentstheRCproportionofthetotalforceneededtoprovideasufficientlevelofsocialidentification,embeddedness,andinvestment(IE&I)linkingthearmedforcestothelargersociety.TheotherlinerepresentstheminimumproportionthattheRCmustoccupytohaveameaningfullevelofrepresentationandinfluencewithinthetotalforce.

TheIE&Iconstraintlineisslopedbutitsprecisepositioncannotbedetermined.Wecantheorizethatasthetotalforcedecreasesinsizeandismoregeographicallyconcentrated,theRCwouldplayanincreasinglyimportantroleinmaintainingcontactwiththelargersociety.TheRCwouldhavetooccupyanincreasinglylargerproportionofthetotalforcetoprovidetherequiredmassina

sufficientnumberofcommunities.Thisexplainstheslopeoftheline.However,wehavenobasisforestimatingthemassorcommunitypenetrationneededtoobtainthesebenefits.Thus,thepositionofthelineisunknown.

Aminoritystatusconstraintisshownat20percent.Asdiscussedearlier,thisisatthelowendofKanter'srangeofthresholdsbetween

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Figure3.6LocusofPoliticalandSocialConstraintsontheForceMix

atokenandminoritylevelofrepresentationforaseparatelyidentifiablesubgroupwithinaninstitution.WeofferthisconstraintwiththecaveatthatKanter'stheorywasdevelopedafterobservingdemographicminoritiesthataremoreclearlydistinctthanaretheactiveandreservecomponentsofthearmedservices,andinasituationwhereleadershipdidnotworktoensurethattheminoritywastakenseriously.Generalizingthetheorytoapplyitintheforce-mixcontextmustbedonewithcaution.

Finally,weofferacaveatthatAirForceforce-miximplicationscannotbeconsideredinisolationfromthoseoftheotherarmedservices.Inmanycases,thesocialandpoliticalfunctionsthatarepartofthelogicofastrongRCareservedsimilarlybytheArmyandtheAirForceNationalGuardsandReserves.TheArmyRCismuchlargerthantheAirForceRC,andpresumablyhowtheArmyaddressestheforce-mixquestionwouldhavemoreofaneffectonthefeedbackloopbetweenthemilitaryandsocietythanwouldtheforcemixwithintheAirForce.

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ChapterFourReadinessAndAvailabilityInthischapter,wediscusseffectiveness:howwellRCunitsservemilitaryneedsrelativetosimilarlyconfiguredACunits.Toanswerthisquestion,weconsideredtwoaspectsofeffectiveness:thereadinessofaunittoperformitsintendedmilitaryfunctionsandtheavailabilityofaunitforemploymentbynationalcommandauthorities.Readinessdependsontheunit'saccesstoresources(personnelandequipment)andtoprocesses(trainingandmaintenance)neededtokeeptheseresourcescombat-ready.Availabilitycombineselementsofresponsiveness(howsoonisaunitavailable)andduration(forhowlongisitavailable).IfACandRCunitssystematicallydifferineitherofthesetwoaspects,effectivenesswillbeaffectedbytheforcemix.

Readiness

Generally,modernRCairassetsreceivemuchpraisefortheircombateffectiveness.Forexample,RCunitsandaircrewsservedduringoperationsDesertShieldandDesertStormwithlittlereadinessdifferencesbetweenthemandtheirACcounterparts(RAND,1992,pp.5657).SimilarevidenceexiststhatRCunitsperformwellwhendeployedforcurrentpeacetimecontingencyoperations.1

1AcurrentjointforcecombatoperationscenterdirectorsaidthattherewasnodiscernibledifferencebetweenRCandACunitsdeployedinhisareaofresponsibility.HeclaimedthatonlyminimallocalareacheckoutwasrequiredforexperiencedRCunits.Anotherobserverattributedonlyaverageorbelow-averageperformancetoRCcombatrescueunits,someofwhicharrivedatforwardoperatingareaslackingbasiccombatrescue

skills.ThisobserversaidRCrescueunitsmaynothaveadequateaccessto

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Althoughactualperformanceincombatisthebestreadinessindicator,itcannotbeobservedduringpeacetime.Thus,wemustlookatavailablepeacetimereadinessindicatorstodeterminehowRCunitscomparewithACunits.SomemeasuresofreadinessareavailablefromthejointreadinessreportingstructuretheStatusofResourcesandTrainingSystem(SORTS).Otherindicatorsincludeoperationalreadinessinspections(ORIs)andexerciseswhereRCunitsperformwiththeiractivecounterparts.SORTSmeasuresinputstoreadinesspersonnelstatus,equipmentstatus,andtrainingwhereasinspectionsandexercisestendtomeasureoutputsoroutcomesmoreakintoactualcombatcapabilities.

PeacetimeReadinessIndicators

Asaninputmeasure,SORTSprovidesalimitedmeansforbenchmarkingunits.AirForceunitsgenerallymaintainahighernaturalstateofreadinessthantheotherservicesinboththeACandRC,andSORTSrevealslittledifferencebetweenRCandACairunits.

ORIresultsalsoshowlittledifferencebetweenACandRCunits,althoughtheprocessforRCunitscanbesomewhatdifferentfromthatforACunits.2Theinspectionteamincludesaugmenteesfromthegainingcommandandmucheffortisinvestedinmakingsurethattheprocessmirrorstheactiveprocessforlikeunits.FewdifferencesbetweentheACandRCwerefoundinORIresultsfortheyears19921996(seeFigure4.1).Overallratings(onascaleof1to11)areslightlylowerforRCunits,althoughtheyarestillwellinthesatisfactoryrange.Forfighterunits,theoverallscoresaresomewhathigherforRCunitsthanforACunits.3

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rangesandotherforcesnecessarytotraintothesamelevelasactive-dutycombatrescueunits.Inaddition,theseunitsmaybemoreactivelyengaged

withstateandlocalmissions,whichbuildbasicairmanshipbutdolittleforthemoredemandingcombatrescuemissionwhereahighdegreeofcoordinationwithsupportingforcesisrequired.Thecombatrescuemissionhasarelativelyhighmissionoperationstempoforthetotalforce.2DoingwellontheORIinmostRCunitsishighlydesired,justasitisintheactiveforce.OnereservisttoldRANDthatthefirstquestionaskedduringhisinitialhiringinterviewwashiswillingness(andability,givencivilianemployment)tomakehimselfavailablefortheunitORI.3UnpublisheddatagatheredfromAirCombatCommand,officeoftheInspectorGeneral,byRANDresearchersWillardNaslundandCraigMoore.

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Figure4.1AverageORIRatings,19921996

RCunitshavehistoricallydoneverywellinvariouscombatcrewcompetitions.ThiscouldbetheresultofanRCunithavinghigheraveragetotalcareerandmissiondesignseries(MDS)flyingtimeandgreaterexperienceoverallthanasisterACunithas.ButcompetitionsmaynotbeanappropriatereadinessgaugeforRCorACperformance,becausetheflightandmaintenancecrewswhoparticipatearethebest-of-the-best.However,ahigheraveragenumberoftotalcareerflyinghoursandmoretimewiththeunitaremajorstrengthsthatRCaircrewsbringtothetotalforce.ThisdifferenceinexperiencewillincreaseasanticipatedshortagesofACpilotsemerge.4

4Operationspersonnelatamixed-forceactivewingtoldRANDthatsomecombatfightersquadronshad4050percentofpersonnelwithlessthantwoyearsofactiveflyingexperiencebeyondtheirinitialmissionqualification(RANDinterviews,AprilMay1998).

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UnderlyingFactorsExperience,Training,andOperationalIntegration

WeidentifiedthreefactorsthatunderlietheRC'sreadinessparitywiththeAC.First,asmentionedabove,RCpersonnelgenerallyhavemoreunit-specificandaircraft-specificexperiencethantheirACcounterparts.Second,RCaircrews,despitehavingfeweravailabledutydays,comeclosetoachievingqualitativelywhatACunitsachievewithhighernumbersintheirtrainingprograms.Third,relativelysmallRCelementscanbereadilyintegratedwithotherRCandACelementstoformprovisionalunitsforemployment.

Experience

ExperiencelevelsinRCunitsaregenerallysignificantlyhigherthantheyareinACunitsforseveralreasons.First,manymembersofRCunitshavepriorACexperience.Second,RCaircrewstendtoremainincockpitflyingdutiesfarlongerthanACaircrews,whomustrotatebetweenstaffandcockpitassignments.Asanexample,Table4.1showsindicatorsofexperienceforpilotsintwoB52squadrons,oneintheRCandoneintheAC.

Training

ThetrainingprogramforanRCunitgenerallycontainsthesamecategoriesoftrainingmissionsasthetrainingprogramofanACunitwithasimilarmission,butwithfewermissionsrequiredinsomecases.Table4.2shows,forexample,thenumberofannualtrainingmissionsforcomparableRCandACunits.Annualmissionrequirementsareidenticaltomaintainabasicmission-capablestatus(forpilotsinstaffpositions),butcombatmission-readystatus(forpilotsinlinecockpitpositions)requiresfewermissionsintheRC.Someobserversbelievethatgenerallyhigherexperiencelevels

Table4.1AverageFlyingHoursandCombatExperienceof

PilotsinTypicalRCandACB52Units

Indicator RC ACTotalhours 32661809B52hours 22441446Instructor/evaluatorhours 621 464Proportionofpilotswithcombatexperience

60% 12%

SOURCE:OfficeofAirForceReserve,HeadquartersUSAF,dataasofApril1998.

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Table4.2ReadyAircrewProgram(RAP)AnnualTrainingMissions

BasicMissionCapable CombatMissionReadyInexperiencedExperiencedaInexperiencedExperienceda

F16,Block40AC 72 60 116 96ANG 72 60 90 76

A10AC 72 60 102 90ANG 72 60 90 72SOURCE:DirectorateofTraining,HeadquartersAirCombatCommandRAPtaskingmessagesforJuly1998toJune1999.aExperiencedpilotsarethosewhoexceedanestablishedflying-hourthresholdthatvariesbyMDS.

permitRCunitstomaintainthesameproficienciesasACaircrewsevenwithfewertrainingmissions.

OperationalIntegration

Tobeconsideredreadyintheprevailingenvironmentofcontingencydeployments,RCunitsmustbeabletofunctioneffectivelyinthepackagesizesatwhichtheyarecommonlyavailable.Asdiscussedinmoredetailbelow,RCparticipationinmostcontingencydeploymentsdependsonvoluntaryparticipationratherthanmobilization.DeployablepackagesofRCpersonnelandequipmentthereforetendtobeoflessthanfullsquadronscale.

Fortunately,airoperationsandtheirdirectsupportallowsmallerpackagesfrommultipleunitstobeassembledtoformprovisionalunitsatemploymentsiteswithoutunacceptablylosingoperationaleffectiveness.AnexampleistheANGRAINBOWdeploymentofANGBlock42F16C/Ds.Aircraft,manpower,andresourcesare

combinedfromthreeunitstodeployin-theaterinaunifiedmissionpackage.EachunitcommanderhasflexibilityinmeetinghisdeploymentcommitmentswhileenablingtheANGtodeployasufficientlysizedunitinpeacetime.5

5TheRAINBOWconceptdemonstratesthatintegrationofsmallerunitsispossiblewithoutmajorproblems.However,unlessunitsareexercisedonaregularbasis,unitcommandersmayfeelmorecomfortablewithmembersoftheirownsquadronsandlogisticssupport.RecentRAINBOWdeploymentshaveconcentratedondeploying

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Availability

Inthepast,availabilitywasrelativelyeasytodefineforRCunits.RCunitswerewrittenintooperationalplansinamannersimilartoACunits.RCunitsgenerallyflowintoadeploymentschedulealongsideACunits,assumingtimelymobilizationoftheRCunits.Aftermobilization,RCunitsbecomefull-timeassetsforaspecifiedduration.However,thisisnotacompletepictureofhowjointforcecommandersareusingforcestoday.Recurringandlong-durationpeacetimeforceemploymentsrequiretheRCtoparticipateinanonmobilizedstatus.Thus,availabilityofreservistsunderbothmobilizedandnonmobilizedconditionsmustbeconsidered.

AvailabilityWhenMobilized

LegallimitsonmobilizationarecontainedinTitle10,USCode,Section12301-12305.Themainprovisions,whichapplytoallreservecomponentscollectively(Army,Navy,AirForce,MarineCorps,andGuard),areasfollows:

IntimeofwarornationalemergencydeclaredbyCongress,reserveunitsandindividualsnotassignedtounitsmaybeorderedtoactivedutyforthedurationofthewaroremergencyandforsixmonthsthereafter.

Atanytime,areserveunitorindividualnotassignedtoaunitmaybeorderedtoactivedutyfornotmorethan15daysayear.

IntimeofnationalemergencydeclaredbythePresident,ReadyReserveunitsandindividualsnotassignedtounitsmaybeorderedtoactivedutyfornotmorethan24consecutivemonths.6Notmorethan1,000,000membersoftheReadyReservemaybeonactivedutyatanyonetimeunderthisprovision.

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equipmentfrommultipleunitswhiledrawingmanpowerprimarilyfromasingleunit.Researchneedstodeterminewheretheproblemsofintegrationdetractfromaunit'sabilitytoperformitsmission.However,leadership,personality,andsharedexperiencemayplaythekeyroleinsuccessfulintegrationatthetacticalunitlevel.6TheReadyReserveconsistsofallreservistsexceptthoseinaninactiveorretiredstatus.

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WhenthePresidentdeterminesitisnecessarytoaugmenttheactiveforce,SelectedReserveunitsandindividualsnotassignedtounitsandaspecialmobilizationcategoryoftheIndividualReadyReservemaybeorderedtoactivedutyfornotmorethan270days.7Notmorethan200,000membersoftheSelectedReservemaybeonactivedutyunderthisprovisionatanyonetime,ofwhomnotmorethan30,000maybemembersoftheIndividualReadyReserve.

TheprovisiontorecalltheSelectedReserveforperiodsupto270dayswasaliberalization,in1994,ofpreviouslawthatallowedacall-upof90daysplusa90-dayextension.TheprovisionforaspecialmobilizationcategorywithintheIndividualReadyReservewasaddedin1998.

Theseprovisionslimittheavailabilityofreservistsinseveralways.Limitsonthedurationofcall-upsandonthenumbersallowedonactivedutyaresuchthattheACmustbeusedtomeetmanycontingencies,especiallythoseinwhichdeclarationofanationalemergencyisdeemedinappropriateorundesirable.AlthoughitisonlynaturalthattheACshouldbethefirstoptionconsideredtomeetmostcontingencies,decisionmakersshouldconsiderthelegallimitationsonRCavailabilityindeterminingtheforcemix.Ingeneral,thetotalforceshouldbesizedsothattheACcanmeetallbut200,000manpowerrequirementsinapeacetimecontingencyor1,000,000manpowerrequirementsinanationalemergencyshortofdeclaredwar.

Anotherlimitationonavailabilityistherequirementthatreservistswhoareorganizedandtrainedinunitsmustberecalledwiththeirunitsratherthanindividually.Asapracticalmatter,relativelysmallunitpackages(unittypecodes,orUTCs)canbespecifiedinmobilizationplans.Still,thisprovisioncouldimpedetheflexibleandefficientuseofreservistsinsomecircumstances.

7TheSelectedReserveconsistsofindividualswhoparticipateininactive-dutytrainingperiodsandannualtraining.TheindividualReadyReserveconsistsofReadyReservememberswhoarenotintheSelectedReserve.ThespecialmobilizationcategoryofIndividualReadyReservistssubjecttocall-upundertheprovisioncitedheremustbewithin24monthsofseparationfromactiveduty,volunteersforentryintothespecialmobilizationcategory,andingradesandskillsdesignatedbytheservicesecretaryconcerned.

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AvailabilityWhenNotMobilized

InhisFY1999AirForcePostureStatementtoCongress,ActingSecretaryoftheAirForceF.WhittenPetersstatedthattheservicehadhelpedtoreduceoperationaltemporatesforactiveunitsthroughthe

creativeuseoftheReserveandGuardunitsandincreasesinmanninginhighlystressedspecialties.However,theseeffortshaveplacedanewburdenontheRC.During1997,RCaircrewsservedanaverageof110daysinuniform,withtheirsupportteamsserving80days.(DepartmentoftheAirForce,1998,pp.23.)

Althoughthose110daysinuniformwerenotalldaysdeployedoverseas,theyweredaysthatmayhavebeenspentawayfromafull-timejob,home,andfamily.AssumingthattheRCiscurrentlyrespondingatornearitscapacitytoalleviateheavydeploymentdemands,thisnumberofdaysinuniformmaybeanapproximateupperlimitonparticipationforthepart-timeRCforce.Giventimerequiredfortrainingandotheradministrativeneeds,availabilityofpart-timersfordeploymentisconsiderablylessthanthe110daysinuniformstatedabove.

ThalerandNorton(1997)estimatedthenumberofcontingencydeploymentdaysavailableforACandRCaircrews.Assumingadesiredmaximumof120temporaryduty(TDY)daysperyearisestablishedforactiveaircrews,theycalculatedthatACaircrewsinthecontinentalUnitedStatesspendaround50TDYdaysperyearparticipatinginindividualtraining,jointexercises,andotheractivitiesnotrelatedtocontingencyoperations.Thisleaves70daysavailableforcontingencyoperations.8ThalerandNortonalsopostulatethatRCcrewsareavailablefor50daysofTDYperyear,ofwhich15daysareavailableforoverseascontingenciesafternoncontingencytraining,exercise,andotherneedsaresatisfied.ThislimithasbeenvalidatedthroughourowninterviewswithRCrepresentativesattheheadquar-

8ThalerandNortonpostulatethataircrewsinEuroperequireslightlymorenoncontingencyTDY(60days),leavingslightlyfewerdaysavailableforcontingencies(60days).

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tersandunitlevel.9ACaircrewdeploymentstoSouthwestAsiahavebeenreducedto45days,whichmaybeclosetoaminimumrotationdurationtopermiteffectivecontinuityofoperationsforfightersorcommandandcontrolaircraft.Althougha45-dayoverseasdeploymentfitswithinthepostulated50-daylimitforRCaircrews,suchadeploymentwouldnotallowenoughadditionalTDYforaREDFLAGorotherunittrainingdeploymentafterreturntothehomestation.RCunitscanrotateaircrewstodeploymentsitesinincrementsoffewerthan45days,buttheimpactofshorterrotationsonoperationaleffectivenessremainstobeexamined.

TheANGhascollectedaircrewactivitydatathathelptoputThalerandNorton'spostulatedlevelofavailabilityinperspective.Figure4.2showsthenumberofTDYdaysexperiencedbyactiveflyingaircrewsinANGwingsduringFY1997.TheaveragenumberofTDYdaysis37days,somewhatfewerthanthe50dayspostulatedbyThalerandNorton(1997).

TDYbyreservistsisincludedwithintotaltimespentinuniform.Figure4.3showsthenumberofdaysinuniformforactiveflyingaircrewsinANGwings(allpayperiodsfortraditionalguardsmenandperiodsbeyondthenormaldutydayforfull-timetechniciansandactiveGuard/Reservestatusindividuals).WesupplythesedatatohelpputtheTDYdatainperspective.

ThereisevidencethatlengthofaTDYassignmentisasimportantasthetotalyearlytimeawayindeterminingtheavailabilityofRCaircrews.AFRvolunteerratesfornormaloperations,smallcontingencies,andlargecontingenciesduring1996areshowninFigure4.4.ThedatashowasteepdropoffinvolunteersforTDYsof10daysormore.Accordingtothesedata,thereservestrategicairliftpilot,whoisofferedshorterTDYs,maybemorelikelytovolunteerthanafighterpilotorcivilengineerwhomustvolunteerinchunksof

45daysormore.

9Intervieweeshavesaidthatforsomepersonnel,50daysperyearisatthehighendofwhattheycanexpecttoprovidegiventheirfull-timeworkandfamilyresponsibilities.However,exceptasconstrainedbylaw,full-timereservistsmayhavethesameavailabilityasACmembers.

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Figure4.2FY1997TDYDaysbyANGAircrews

Figure4.3FY1997DaysinUniformbyANGAircrews

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Figure4.4AvailabilityofAFRAircrewsbyDurationofTDY

ImplicationsfortheForceMix

TheevidenceindicatesthatRCunitsareasreadyasACunitsforuseinamajortheaterwar,andhaveapproximatelythesameavailability,assumingmobilization.RCunitsmaintainahighlevelofreadiness,notwithstandingfewertrainingmissionsthanACunits,becausetheyhavehigherexperiencelevels.However,formajoroperationsshortofdeclaredwarandforcurrentpeacetimecontingencyoperations,RCunitshavelimitedavailabilityrelativetoACunits.

Givenreadinessparity,100percentoftheforcecouldbeintheRCwithnolossofeffectiveness,asindicatedbythelocusofthereadinessconstraintinFigure4.5.ThisfindingoffersnoguaranteethattheRCcouldmaintainitscurrenthighstateofreadinessinthelongrunifithadnoACasasourceofexperiencedaccessions.ThispersonnelflowconstraintwillbeconsideredseparatelyinChapterFive.

Availability,ontheotherhand,islimitedfortheRCbecauseofitspredominantlypart-timeworkforce.Becauseoflimitsonmobiliza-

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Figure4.5LocusofAvailabilityandReadinessConstraints

ontheForceMix

tion,theRCcannotsatisfycertainshort-noticeorlong-durationrequirementsspecifiedinoperationalplans.GreaterlimitsoncumulativedeploymenttimeanddurationofdeploymentrelativetotheACmeanthattheRCislessavailableformeetingcontingencyrequirements.Asthetotalforcedeclinesinsize,assumingtheseforceemploymentdemandsremainconstant,theavailabilityconstraint,asdepictedinFigure4.5,permitsadecreasingproportionofthetotalforcetobeplacedintheRC.10However,thespecificlocusofthis

10Toillustratewhythelineisslopedformajorcontingencies,considerahypotheticalMTWrequirementfor2,000,000militarypersonnel,ofwhomamaximumof1,000,000maybemobilizedreservists.Ifthetotalforceconsistsof3,000,000militarymembers,atleast1,000,000mustbeintheactivecomponentinordertomeettheMTWrequirement.ThislimitstheRCtonomorethan67percentofthetotalforce.Ifthetotalforcewerelarger4,000,000therequirementcouldbemetwithanRCofupto75percentofthetotal.Toillustratewhythelineisslopedforsmallerpeacetimecontingencies,considerahypotheticalfighterforcemix.

AssumethatACsquadronscan

(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)

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constraintvariesbymissionorfunction.Theavailabilityconstraintforahigh-tempoassetsuchasanAWACSunitwillbefardifferentfromtheconstraintforalow-tempoassetsuchasanairdefenseorspaceoperationsunit.

(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)

support1200deployedaircraft-daysperyearandRCsquadronscansupport360.(TheseavailabilityestimatesarederivedinChapterSix.)Ifthetotalforcemustbesizedat20fighterwingequivalents(FWEs),eachconsistingofthreestandard-sizedsquadrons,tosupportatwo-MTWscenarioandmustsupply,say,50,000deployeddaysperyear,itcanconsistof,atmost,8.73RCFWEs,or43.6percentofthetotalfighterforce.Thecomputationsare:RCcontribution8.73FWE3squadrons360deployedaircraft-days=9428deployedaircraft-daysACcontribution(208.73FWE)3squadrons1200deployedaircraft-days=40,572deployedaircraft-daysThesumoftheRCandACcontributionstodeployedaircraft-daysis50,000.AnysubstitutionofmoreRCFWEsforfewerACFWEsresultsinfewerthan50,000deployedaircraft-days.Ifthetotalforceisreducedto16FWEsbutfacesthesamedeploymentdemand,itcanconsistof,atmost,threeRCFWEs,or19percentofthetotalfighterforce.

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ChapterFivePersonnelFlowIndividualswhoseparatefromactivedutyandsubsequentlyaffiliatewithareserveunitprovideasignificantbaseonwhichtobuildRCreadiness.YearsofexperiencegainedbyindividualsintheACandRCarenotequivalent,becauseofdifferencesinthetimeavailabletopracticemilitaryskills:38daysayearintheRC(62daysforpilots)and225daysintheAC(RAND,1992).1Itisdifficultforreservistswhohaveneverbeenonactivedutytogainproficiencyincomplexskillswiththislimitedamountofannualtraining.2Thus,RCreadinessdependsonasignificantflowofexperiencedmanpowerfromtheACtotheRC,whichimposesaconstraintonforce-mixplanning.

EarlierViewsOnPersonnelFlow

TheGatesCommission(formally,thePresident'sCommissiononanAll-VolunteerArmedForce),formedin1969tomakerecommendationsaboutthetransitionfromconscriptiontoanall-volunteerforce,recognizedthepossibleimplicationsforRCsustainability.Amongotherconcerns,theCommissionexaminedwhetheranall-volunteeractiveforcewouldsustainasufficientflowofpriorservice(PS)accessionstothereserveforcesandwhethertheremainingnonpriorservice(NPS)accessionrequirementcouldbemetfromthecivilian

1The38-dayfigureforreservistsisbasedon12monthlyweekenddrillsoftwodayseachplus14daysofactive-dutytrainingperyear.Aircrewsareauthorizedanadditional24daysofflighttrainingperiods,foratotalof62days.2Thiswouldnotbetrue,however,forreservistswhosefull-timeoccupationscloselymatchtheirreserveduties.

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recruitingpool(President'sCommission,1970,pp.109117).Withexpectedactiveandreserveforcesizes,theCommissionprojectedfeweractiveforcelossesandthereforeasmallerpoolfromwhichtorecruitPSaccessionstotheRC.However,withexpectedgainsinreserveforceretention(predicatedontheCommission'srecommendedpayenhancements),theCommissionconcludedthattheall-volunteerforcewouldyieldaratioofPStoNPSreserveaccessionsatorabovehistorical(pre-Vietnam)levels.

NPSaccessionsfelldramaticallybetween1970and1976,forcingthereservestorelyevenmoreheavilythananticipatedonPSrecruiting(BrinkerhoffandGrissmer,1986,p.214).ShortfallsinNPSaccessionscausedreservestrengthstodropsignificantlyfrom1973to1978,duringtheearlyyearsoftheall-volunteerforce.By1983,however,strengthlevelswererestoredandreserveforcescontinuedtoenjoyahighproportionofPStoNPSaccessions.ThePSproportionoftotalreserveaccessions(acrossallservices)was31.9percentin1970,risingtoapeakof79.6percentin1974,andlevelingoutat56.6percentin1982(BrinkerhoffandGrissmer,p.209).

RecognizingtheimportanceofPSpersonneltothereserves,CongressenactedtheArmyNationalGuardCombatReadinessReformActof1992,whichdirectedtheSecretaryoftheArmytoestablish''anobjectiveofincreasingthepercentageofqualifiedprioractive-dutypersonnelintheArmyNationalGuardto65percent,inthecaseofofficers,andto50percent,inthecaseofenlistedmembers,bySeptember30,1997."3Anexaminationofrelevant1989datashowedthattheArmyNationalGuardwasexperiencingPSaccessionswellbelowthesegoals.However,hadthesegoalsappliedtotheANGandAFR,theywouldhavebeenfarexceededforbothofficers(85and87percentfortheANGandAFR,respectively)andenlistedpersonnel(63and75percent,respectively)(RAND,1992,p.263).

Theactive-to-reserveflowofpilotsisespeciallymeaningfultoairRCreadiness.Becauseofthelengthofundergraduatepilottrainingandsubsequentweaponsystemqualification,mostpilotsintheairRChaveprioractiveservice.AnanalysisofDoD'sBaseForce(aplan-

3Section1111ofPublicLaw102-484,asamendedbyPublicLaws103-35,103-60,and103-337.See10USC10105.

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ningandprogrammingtemplatedevelopedin1989)revealedthatitcontainedanactive-to-reservepilotratioofabout1to0.9(RAND,1992,p.234).ThisratiowasconsideredsufficienttosupporttherequiredflowofpilotsintotheRC.However,previouslypublishedresearchdoesnotindicatehowfarthisratiocanshifttowardagreaterreserveproportionwithoutjeopardizingthesupplyofPSpilotstotheRC.

ModelingthePersonnelFlowConstraint

Theactive-to-reserveflowofpersonnelcanbemodeledbyrepresentingthedemandforPSaccessionsintheRCandtheavailabilityofexperiencedlossesfromtheactiveforce.Tocomputethereservedemand,letbetheannualaccessionrequirementforthereservecomponent,thereservecomponentstrength,andtheannualaggregatelossratefromthereservecomponent.4Assumingconstantstrengthfromyeartoyear,theannualreserveaccessionrequirementisaproductofthelossrateandthestrength:

Thisaccessionrequirementcanbecomputedfortheentirereservestrengthorforanysubsetofit.Forexample,therequirementmightbecomputedseparatelyforofficerandenlistedpersonnelorforasingleoccupationalgroupsuchaspilots.Thelossrateusedforthispurposeshould,ofcourse,correspondtothespecificstrengthsubsetofinterest.

Thetotalpooloflossesfromactivestrengthcanbesimilarlycomputedbyapplyingalossratetotheactivestrength.LetPbethePSpoolofACseparateesavailableforaccessiontotheRC,Satheactivestrength(eithertotalstrengthorsomesubsetofinterest),andtheaggregatelossratefromtheactiveforce:

4Populationvariablesareexpressedinuppercaseandrateorratiovariablesareexpressedinlowercase.

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Someactive-forcelossesmaybeeitherineligibleforentryintotheRC(e.g.,retirees)orwillnotmeetRCrequirements(becauseofgrade,yearsofservice,orothersimilarcharacteristics).Ofthoseeligibleandmeetingrequirements,somewillnotbeinterestedinaffiliatingwithanRCunit.ThePSpoolmustbeadjustedtoaccountforthesefactors.LeterepresenttheproportionofthePSpooleligibleandmeetingrequirementsandftheproportionwillingtoaffiliatewithareserveunit.TheadjustedavailablePSpool,AP,isthus:

TheratioofavailablePSrecruitstoaccessionrequirements,,isthusameasureoftheabilityoftheactiveforcetosustaintheexperienceneedsofthereserveforce,anditisafunctionofactiveandreservestrengths,activeandreservelossrates,andthereserveeligibilityandaffiliationratesofactiveforcelosses.5Insomecases,therearespecifiedvaluesforthisratio.Forexample,tomeetthecongressionalguidelinediscussedabove,theratioforArmyNationalGuardaccessionshasavalueof0.65.TheAFRplansforandobtainsPSaccessionsforvirtuallyallitspilotrequirements,sothattheratiohasavalueofapproximately1.TheANGabsorbsalargerproportionofNPSpilotaccessions,resultinginaratioofabout0.57.6Letxrepresentthedesiredratio.Therelationshipcanbeexpressedformallyas

wherexisavaluebetween0and1.

5Thisformulationassumes,forsimplification,thatPSaccessionsaffiliatewithreserveunitsinthesameyeartheyleavetheactiveforce.Inthesteadystate,theformulationholdswithoutthisassumption.6AccordingtodatasuppliedbyANG/XO,theANGlosesabout350pilotsperyear.TheANGgets180UPTslotsperyeartobefilledbyANG

members,yielding150UPTgraduatesperyearaftertrainingattrition.Theremaining200lossesarereplacedusingPSaccessions.

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ForceMixBasedOnStrength

IfadesiredvalueforxinEq.(4)isknown,theequationsforAPandArcanbeusedtosolvefortheneededratioofactivetoreservestrengths.Substitutingtheright-handsidesofEqs.(1)and(3)forArandAPyields:

Bytransformation,theminimumratioofactivetoreservestrength,,canbefound:

Givenaspecifiedvalueofxandexpectedvaluesofe,f,andtheminimumSa/Srcanbecomputed.7Forexample,usingnotionalvaluesx=1,lr=0.10,e=0.7,f=0.5,andla=0.06,Sa/Srmustbeatleast4.8(i.e.,activepilotstrengthmustbeatleast4.8timesasgreatasreservepilotstrength).ForacasemorerepresentativeofcurrentANGexperience,avalueofx=0.57mightbeused,yieldingarequiredACtoRCratioof2.7to1.

ForceMixBasedOnFighterWingEquivalents

Theforcemixisoftendiscussedintermsofaratioofactive-to-reservepersonnelstrengths.Ifso,thecalculationsabovearesufficienttoexpressthesustainabilityconstraint.Inothercontexts,themixisexpressedasaratioofactive-to-reserveunits.Notably,the

7Ingeneral,expectedvaluesshouldbeselectedsotheyproduceaconservativeestimateoftherequiredratio.Inthiscase,ahigherSa/Srratioismoreconservative.Thus,aprudentanalystwouldselectavalueforlrnearthehighendofhistoricallyobservedreservelossratesandvaluesforfandlanearthelowendoftheirhistoricallyobservedranges.

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force-structuremixisoftengivenasaratioofactive-to-reservefighterwingequivalents(FWE).8

TodeterminerequiredFWEratiosbasedonexperiencedpilotneeds,furthercomputationsarerequired.Theseadditionalcomputationswillconvertpilotstrengthstothenumberofaircrafttheycansupport.SinceFWEarealineartransformationofthenumberofoperationalaircraft,aproportionthatholdsforaircraftwillalsoholdforFWE.Theadditionalinputfactorsrequiredarecrewratiosandallowancesforpilotsinnonoperationalpositions.LetFSijbetheforcestructure(numberofaircraft)inactiveorreservecomponentiandweaponsystemj,Sijbethepilotstrength,cijthecrewratio,andoijtheproportionofthepilotforceinoperationalpositions.9Then

and

Equation(8)isexpressedasaninequalitybecause,likeEq.(6),itdenotestheminimumrationeededtosatisfypersonnelflowconsiderations.Theresultscanbesummedacrossallfighterweaponsystemstodetermineatotalforcestructuremix:

8AFWEconsistsof72operationalaircraft.9Operationalpositionsincluderatedpositionidentifier(RPI)1and2positionsinoperationalsquadrons.Nonoperationalpositionsincludeallother

pilotrequirements,includingRPI1and2positionsintrainingunits.

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Usingnotionalvaluesoa=0.6,ca=1.25,or=0.8,cr=1.25,andSa/Sr=4.8(andassuming,forthesakeofsimplification,thatthesevaluesareconstantacrossallweaponsystems),wecancomputeFSa/FSr=3.6.Translatingthisratiotoaproportion,thesenotionalfactorswouldsuggestaforce-structuremixthatisnomorethan22percentintheRC.WithSa/Sr=2.7(moreappropriatefortheANG),theresultisFSa/FSr=2,oraforcethatisnomorethan33percentintheRC.

Therequiredforce-structureratiocanbefurtherrefinedtorecognizethatreservefighterpilotaccessionrequirementscanbemetfromsourcesotherthanactive-dutyfighterpilotlosses.Somerequirementscanbemetusinglossesfromotherservicesorpilotswhoseactive-dutyflyingwasnotinfighters.Becausethesepilots,especiallythosewhohavenotflownfighters,willrequireextensivetransitiontrainingandwilldiluteexperiencelevelsinreserveunits,alimitontheproportionofreservefighterpilotaccessionstakenfromthesesourceswouldappearreasonable.Toseehowthislimitaffectstheforcemix,weintroduceanotherfactorinEq.(4).Lettbethemaximumproportionofreservefighterpilotaccessionsthatmaybetransitioningfromadifferentflyingcommunity.Iftwereset,forexample,at30percent,thenonly70percent(1t)ofthereserveaccessionsrequiredtomeetthePSfighterpilotaccessiontargetwouldhavetocomefromtheactive-dutyfighterpilotlosses.Thus,ifAPrepresentstheavailablePSpooldrawnfromactive-dutyfighterpilotlosses,Eq.(4)becomes

Eq.(6)becomes

Iftheforce-mixconstraintsarerecalculatedwitht=0.3,thestrengthratioconstraint,Sa/Sr,dropsfrom4.8to3.3andtheFWEratioconstraint,dropsfrom3.6to2.5(28percentintheRC).UsingthePSaccessionratiomorerepresentativeoftheANG,Sa/Srdrops

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from2.7to1.9andtheFWEratioconstraint,dropsfrom2to1.4(42percentintheRC).

Figure5.1capturesthesesustainabilitycalculationsgraphically.ItshowsannuallossesasasubsetoftotalACfighterpilotstrength.WithintheannuallossnumberisasubsetofthoseeligibletoaffiliatewiththeRC.Withinthatpopulationisasmallernumberwillingtoaffiliate.Thisnumber,plussimilareligibleandwillingpilotlossesfromotherthantheAirForcefighterpilotinventory,mustbelargeenoughtofillannualRCfighterpilotaccessionrequirements.

UsingtheModel

Theinputvaluesusedfortheabovecalculationsareroughestimatesdevelopedfromlimiteddatasourcesorpartiallyinformedopinion.Determiningmorepreciseexpectedvaluesforthevariousinputfactorsneededforthiscomputationisbeyondthescopeofthisstudy.However,thefactorscanbedeterminedthroughanalysisofhistori-

Figure5.1SustainabilityofRCFighterPilotRequirements

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calpersonnelflowsandexpertjudgmentonexperiencerequirements.WenotethattheQuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR)recommendedareductionoftheactivecomponenttoabout12FWEandanincreaseinthereservecomponentto8FWE.ThisyieldsanFSa/FSrratioof1.5forfighterunits,suggestingthatacloseexaminationofthesustainabilityconstraintiswarranted.

Anaircraft-denominatedforcemixcanbeanalyzedusingrequirementsformilitaryoccupationsotherthanpilot,givensomefigurecomparabletothecrewratiothatrelatesmanpowertoaircraft.However,formostotheroccupations,theRCcanabsorbanappreciableproportionofNPSaccessions.Forthoseoccupations,therequiredratioofprior-servicerecruitstoreserveaccessionrequirements(xintheequationsabove)willbemuchlessthan1,asitisforAFRpilots,orperhapsevenlessthanthe0.57weassumedforANGpilots.Thus,thepilot-basedanalysisislikelytoprovidethemosttightlyconstrainingresult.

ImplicationsfortheForceMix

AnupperboundontheproportionofthetotalforceintheRC,relatedtopersonnelflow,canbedeterminedifotherrelatedparametersareknown.TheseotherparametersarelikelytovarybymissionorMDSandalsobydifferencesbetweentheANGandAFRintheirperceivedabilitytoabsorbinexperiencedUPTgraduates.Accordingly,asdepictedinFigure5.2,theconstraintwillalsovarybymissionorMDSandbycomponent.Inthenotionalexamplesprovidedhere,thefighterforce-structureconstraintvariedfrom28percentfortheAFRto42percentfortheANG.

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Figure5.2LocusofthePersonnelFlowConstraintontheForceMix

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ChapterSixCostPaststudieshaveshownthatoperationsandsupportcostsforRCflyingunitsaregenerally,butnotuniversally,lowerthanthecostsofsimilarlyequippedactiveunits.A1990DoDreporttoCongressontotalforcepolicycomparedthecostsof11unittypesfoundinboththeACandRCandfoundlowercostsintheRCforallbutonetypeofunit(DoD,1990).Palmeretal.(1992,p.49)foundthatcostsintheRCarelowerthanthoseintheAClargelybecauseRCunitsuselessfull-timemanpowerandflyfewerhoursperyear.

Inthischapter,wewilldemonstratethatusingtotaloperationsandsupportcostsforACandRCunitsisnotsufficientinitselftoindicatetherelativecostadvantagesofonecomponentovertheother.Unitoutputsmustalsobeconsidered.Theappropriatebasisforcomparingcostsamongcomponentsiscostperrelevantoutput.

Relevantoutputswillvaryindifferentcontexts.Formeetingthedemandsofmajortheaterwars(MTWs),wherefullmobilizationofreserveforcescanbeassumed,therelevantoutputisatrainedandreadyunit.Inthiscontext,totaloperationsandsupportcostsperunitareappropriateformakingAC/RCcomparisons.ThisisthecontextandtheapproachusedinmostAC/RCcostcomparisons.Formeetingthedemandsofsmall-scalecontingencies(SSCs)ahigh-tempocontextwithmoreorlesscontinuousoperationsthatfallbelowthethresholdformobilizationofreserveforcesrelevantoutputwillbemission-dependent.Forfighterunits,forexample,itmightbethenumberofdeployedaircraft-daysperunitoftimethataunitcansupport.Forairliftunits,itmightbeflyinghoursdevotedtoproductive(i.e.,movingfreightandpassengers),asopposedto

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training,missions.WewillsuggestthattheleastcostlyforcemixformeetingMTWdemandsmaynotbetheleastcostlymixformeetingongoingSSCdemands.Thus,foragivenbudgetconstraint,force-mixdecisionmakersmayhavetomaketradeoffs.

Forseveralreasons,thischaptercontainsmoredetailsthantheprecedingchapters.First,inaddressingcost,weoftensawsignificantdifferencesinperspectivebetweentheACandtheRC.TocountersubjectiveestimatesofrelativeACandRCcosts,werelyonconcreteinformation.Second,asmentionedabove,weproposenewapproachesforevaluatingcostsinlightofthekindsofdemandsgeneratedbySSCs.Wethoughtthatconcreteexampleswouldhelptomakethecaseforthesenewapproaches.

MeetingMTWDemands:Force-StructureAvailability

ConventionalapproachestocomparingACandRCcostsforairforceshavegenerallyattemptedtocapturetheoperatingcostsofsimilarlysizedandequippedsquadrons.TheimplicitpremiseofthesecostcomparisonsisthatareservesquadronoperatingagivenMDSisequivalenttoanactivesquadronoperatingthesameMDSforsomecost-relatedpurpose.Thatpurpose,presumably,isutilizationoftheunitinanMTW,whentheoptiontomobilizereserveunitsmakesthemfullyavailableduringaperiodofsomeduration.Thus,tomeetMTWdemands,thecostofprovidingatrainedandreadyunitisthepeacetimeoperatingcostoftheunit.

Itmaybeusefultodiscussthesecostsonaperprimaryaircraftauthorized(PAA)basisratherthanaper-unitbasis,becauseunitsofthesameMDStypeoftenvaryinthenumberofPAAtheyareassigned.Anotherrefinement,pursuanttoourrecommendedcost-per-outputapproach,wouldconsiderdesignedoperationalcapabilities(DOCs),whichcanalsovaryacrossunitsofthesametype.Some

unitsare,bydesign,morecapablethanothers.

CostComparisonComplexities

Costcomparisonsbetweenactiveandreserveunitsarequitecomplex.Costanalystsmustclassifycostsasdirectversusindirect,fixed

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versusvariable,andrecurringversustransitional.Thesedistinctionsmaybeunderstoodasfollows:

Directcostsareincurredwithintheactivitybeingcosted,whereasindirectcostsareeitheroverheadcostsorcostsincurredbyotheractivitiestosupportthecostedactivity.Foraflyingsquadron,directcostsincludepayandotherpersonnelcostsofindividualsassignedtothesquadron;petroleum,oil,andlubricants(POL)consumedbythesquadron;andotheroperationsandmaintenancecosts,suchasconsumablesuppliesandparts.Indirectcostsincludeheadquartersstaffsoflargercommandstowhichtheunitisassigned,accessionandtrainingcostsneededtosustainthepersonnelstrengthsoftheunit,depotmaintenance,medicalsupport,andotherbasesupport.

Fixedcostsarethosethatwouldbeincurredwhetherornottheunitisintheforcestructure,whereasvariablecostsarethosethatareincurredonlyiftheunitisintheforcestructure.Alldirectcostsarevariable,whereasindirectcostshavefixedandvariablecomponents.Forexample,headquartersstaffsizesareunlikelytobeaffectedbytheadditionorsubtractionofagivenunit.

Marginalcostsarethosefixedandvariablecoststhatareincurredasaresultofaunitbeingpartoftheforcestructureor,conversely,thosecoststhatcouldberemovedfromtheUSAFbudgetwithoutaffectinganyotherorganizationiftheunitunderanalysisweredisestablished.

TotalcostsincludethemarginalcostsplusaproportionalcostofthesupportstructureallocatedfromtheoverallUSAFoverheadcosts,suchasheadquarters,theacquisitionorganizations,andmedicalorganizations.Totalcostdevelopmentistheobjectiveofactivity-basedcosting,whichisreceivingmuchattentionbutforwhichastraightforwardmethodologyisnotavailabletoanalystsmakingforce-structureadjustments.ThisapproachisusedforsettingDoDreimbursementratesforvariousoutputs,suchasairliftorsealift.

Thereisarecurring,orsteady-state,costlevelforongoingoperationofaunit.However,establishingordisestablishingaunitwillentailsometransitionalcostsorsavings.

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Thereisnoonecombinationofthesecostcategoriesthatisappropriateforallpurposes.Forexample,whencomparingthecostofalternativeforcestructures,suchasplacementofaunitintheACorRC,analystsshouldcomparethemarginalcostofanACorRCunit,includingdirectandindirectvariablecostsandexcludingfixedcosts.Inpractice,itisoftendifficulttoidentifyandexcludethefixedcomponentofindirectcosts,resultinginoverstatingmarginalcosts.However,ifthecostanalystistryingtodeterminethefullcostofaunit,suchasforsettingareimbursementratetorecovercostsfromanotheragency,fixedcostsshouldbeallocatedtotheunitandincludedinthecostestimate.Forquickcomparisonofmanyoptions,analystsmustgenerallyconfinetheirattentiontorecurringcostsonly.However,astheoptionsbecomeconcrete,theproperapproachistoconsidertransitionalcostsaswell.Thisrequiresanalyststodevelopcostsforaseriesofpost-decisiontimeperiodsandtodiscountthemtothedecisionpoint.However,transitionalcosts,especiallyforindirectcosts,maybedifficulttodetermine.

Toaddtothecomplexity,categorizingcostsasdirect/indirect,fixed/variable,andmarginal/totaldependsontheunitofanalysis.IfoneisconsideringthemarginalcostofaddingordeletingsquadronsfromtheACortheRC,thesquadronistheunitofanalysis.Allcostsincurredwithinthesquadronareregardedasdirect,variablecosts.Ataless-aggregatelevel,onecouldconsiderincreasingordecreasingthenumberofPAAinasquadron.Inthatcase,thePAAwouldbetheunitofanalysis.Certainsquadronoverheadcostswouldberegardedasfixed;costsrelatedtothenumberofPAAintheunitwouldberegardedasdirectandvariable.Atanevenless-aggregatelevel,thenumberofflyinghoursperPAAcouldbetheunitofanalysis.CertainownershipcostsofaPAAwouldberegardedasfixed;costsrelateddirectlytoflyinghourswouldberegardedasvariable.Inthisstudy,wegenerallytreatthesquadronastheunitofanalysis.

CostComparisonResults

SeveralrelativelyrecentstudiesbyDoD(1990),theInstituteforDefenseAnalysis(IDA)(Wilsonetal.,1992),andRAND(Palmeretal.,1992)havecomparedthecostsofselectedunittypesintheACandRC.FindingsareshowninTable6.1.Itisnotclearthattheauthorsofthesestudieshavesucceededinisolatingthemarginalcostsof

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Table6.1RecurringPeacetimeCostsforSelectedUnitTypesPreviousCost

ComparisonStudies(Costsin$millions/annualflyinghours[FH])

Unit Crew Active ANG AFRType PAA RatioSource Cost FH Cost FH CostF16 24 n.s.aDoDb 64.8 8134 48.8 5064 51.6 4682F16C/D 24 n.s. IDAc 91.7 8134 58.7 5064 62.4 4682F16 24 n.s. RANDd 63.6 unk 36.0 unk 38.4 unkKC135 10 n.s.DoD 36.3 2840 44.2 3500 42.1 3801KC135 10 1.27IDA 47.5 2840KC135 10 1.5 IDA 51.1 3500 54.2 3801KC135 10 n.s. RAND 35.0 unk 30.0 unk 32.0 unk

(tenant) (tenant)KC135 10 n.s. RAND 34.5 unk 48.0 unk

(host) (host)an.s.=notspecified;unk=unknown.bSource:DoD(1990),Table5.CostsindicatedareinFY1992dollars.cSource:Wilsonetal.(1992).ThispaperisrelatedtoDoD(1990).Itincludesthesamedirectandaverageannualequipmentcostsplusinfrastructurecosts.dSource:Palmeretal.(1992).CostsindicatedareinFY1993dollars.

unitoperation,oreventhattheyintendedtodosoineverycase.Almostcertainly,theseestimatesincludesomeallocationsoffixedcosts.

Althoughthereappearstobesomeconsistencyamongthecostsreportedbyvariousstudies,therearesignificantsimilaritiesanddifferencesintheunderlyingdata.TheDoDandIDAstudieswerecompanionpieces.1TheDoDtotalcostfiguresarecomposedofdirectunitcosts,definedaspersonnelcosts,operatingcosts,andsomethingakintoadepreciationcostforunitequipment.TheIDAtotalcostincludestheseelementsplusanallocatedinfrastructurecost.TheRANDfiguresincludedirectcostssuchaspersonnelandconsumables,butalsodepotmaintenanceanitem

thattheIDAreport

1TheDoDstudygroupdidsomeofitsownanalysisandcommissionedseveralsupportingstudiesbyfederallyfundedresearchanddevelopmentcenterswhosereportsweretobepublishedseparately.TheIDAstudywasoneofthose.

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includesininfrastructurecostsandindirectcostssuchasbaseoperatingsupportandtraining.

Thesearepeacetimecosts.IntheeventofanMTW,mobilizationofRCunitswouldmaketheirpayandflyinghourscomparabletoACunitsandhigheroperatingtemposwoulddriveupthecostsofbothACandRCunits.

PaststudieshavegenerallyshownthatRCunits,flyingfewerhoursandrelyingtoasignificantextentonpart-timelabor,arelesscostlythanACunits.TheF16datashowninTable6.1aretypicalofthesestudies.TheKC135,alsoshowninTable6.1,isananomalyintheseearlierstudies,RCKC135unitsweregenerallyfoundtoflymorehoursandthereforetobemorecostlythanACunits.

TheofficeoftheDeputyAssistantSecretaryoftheAirForceforCostandEconomics(SAF/FMC)maintainsaunitcostingmodelanddatabasecalledSABLE(forSystematicApproachtoBetterLongRangeEstimating)thatcanbeexercisedtoobtaincurrentcostestimates.DataobtainedfromtheSABLEmodelareshowninTable6.2.

AllcostsshowninSABLEarevariablevaryingasafunctionofPAA,flyinghours,orauthorizedpersonnelstrengths.However,itislikelythatsomeoftheunderlyingfactors(suchasinstallationsupportcostsperperson)haveallocatedfixedcostsembeddedwithinthem.2

TheSABLEdatashowthatRCcrewsgenerallyflyfewerhoursthanACcrews,andinsomecaseshavelowercrewratios,resultinginlowerannualO&ScostsperPAAfortheRC.(Aswithearlierstudies,thesedatashowthattheKC135Risanexceptiontothegeneralrule.)

2Duringpreparationofthisreport,someRCrepresentativesweinterviewedwereskepticalthatpaststudiesortheSABLEmodelaccuratelycapturethecostadvantages(apart-timeworkforceandaless-elaboratesupportstructure)inherentinRCoperations.Wenote,however,

thatSABLEcostfactorsaredesignedtotakesuchdifferencesintoconsideration.Personnelcountsandcostsaredifferentiatedforactive-dutyanddrill,ratedandnonrated,officerandenlisted,andmilitaryandcivilianpersonnel.Theper-capitainstallationsupportcostfactorishigherforACunits.Activepersonnelincurseveralcategoriesofcost(permanentchangeofstation[PCS],medical)notpresentforRCpersonnel.WefindnoostensiblebasisfordiscreditingSABLE-generatedcostcomparisons.

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Table6.2RecurringPeacetimeCostsforSelectedUnitTypesSABLEModel

(FY1997$)

UnitType Component PAA

CrewRatio

AnnualFlyingHours(FH)

FHperCrew

AnnualO&SCosts

AnnualO&SCost

perPAACostperFH

F16C Active 18 1.25 6,426 286 $46.1M $2.6M $7,174F16C ANG 18 1.25 4,230 188 $32.7M $1.8M $7,730F16A AFR 15 1.25 3,689 197 $31.1M $1.2M $8,432F15C Active 18 1.25 5,670 252 $64.6M $3.6M $11,393F15E Active 18 1.25 6,246 278 $69.9M $3.9M $11,191F15A ANG 18 1.25 3,888 173 $46.7M $2.6M $12,011A10 Active 12 1.5 5,304 295 $31.2M $2.6M $5,882A10 ANG 18 1.25 4,770 212 $34.0M $1.9M $7,128A10 AFR 12 1.25 2,993 199 $25.5M $2.1M $8,520C130E Active 16 2 10,304 322 $58.2M $3.6M $5,648C130E ANG 8 1.75 3,120 223 $25.6M $3.2M $8,205C130E AFR 8 1.75 2,841 203 $22.2M $2.8M $7,814C141B Active 16 1.8 16,192 562 $103.1M $6.4M $6,367C141B ANG 8 2 2,928 183 $34.8M $4.3M $11,885C141B AFR 8 2 2,772 173 $31.9M $4.0M $11,508C141B AFR(Assoc) 16 1.8 4,990a 173 $23.9M $1.5M $4,790KC135RActive 12 1.27 3,672 241 $29.3M $2.4M $7,979KC135RANG 10 1.5 3,500 233 $35.9M $3.6M $10,257KC135RAFR 10 1.27 2,940 231 $27.3M $2.7M $9,286KC10 Active 12 2 7,164 299 $64.7M $5.4M $9,031KC10 AFR(Assoc) 12 1.5 3,740 208 $41.8M $3.5M $11,176NOTE:DataweredevelopedfromtheSABLEcostmodelmaintainedbySAF/FMC.PAA,crewratios,flyinghours,andoperatingandsupport(O&S)costswereextractedfromSABLE.Threeoftheratiosreportedinthetable(flyinghourspercrew,costperPAA,andcostperflyinghour)werecomputedforthisanalysisusingdataextractedfromSABLE.ThecostperPAAandcostperFHreportedherearetotalunitcostsperPAAorFH.TheyshouldnotbeconfusedwithSABLElogisticscostfactorsthatareexpressed

onaper-PAAorper-FHbasis.aSABLEindicateszeroflyinghoursforaC141Bassociateunit.Tocalculatethecostperflyinghour,weassumedthatAFRassociateunitcrewswouldflythesamenumberofhoursasAFRnon-associateunitcrews.

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However,costsperflyinghouraregenerallylowerforACunits,perhapsbecauseofeconomiesofscale.

DifferencesinDesignedOperationalCapabilities

RCunitsinsomecaseshavenarrowerDOCsthancomparablyequippedACunits.ThedifferencesinDOCsarenecessarybecausetheRCunits,withfewerannualflyinghourspercrew,areunabletotrainadequatelytothewiderrangeofcapabilitiesfoundintheACunits.Ideally,acost-per-outputapproachtocostcomparisonswouldaccountforthesedifferencesincapabilityinthecontextofprovidingreadyunitstomeetMTWdemands.However,wewereunableinthescopeofthisresearchtodevelopanapproachforcomputingacostpercapability.Capabilitiesarenotuniforminmanyimportantrespects.Forexample,somearemorecostlytodevelopthanothersandsomemaybemorevaluabletoendusers(warfightingcommands)thanothers.Anexplicitcost-per-capabilitymeasurewouldhavetoaccountforthislackofuniformity.Lackingsuchanapproach,decisionmakersconsideringalternativeAC/RCmixesmustsubjectivelyweighrelativecostsandcapabilitiesofACandRCunits,particularlyinthefaceoftheoftendifferingcapabilitiesamongvariousMDSoflike-missionaircraft.

AStrategyforOptimizingForce-StructureAvailabilityAndCost

SincetheannualoperatingcostsofRCunitsaregenerallylessthanthoseofACunits,cost-effectivenessinmeetingMTWdemandsisachievedbyplacingasmuchoftheforcestructureintheRCaspossible.Forfighterunits,forcestructureisgenerallymeasuredinFWE,calculatedasthenumberofPAAintheinventorydividedby72(thenumberofaircraftinanotionalwingconsistingofthree24-PAAsquadrons).TheforcestructureisoptimizedbyplacingjustenoughforcestructureintheACtomeetrequirementsthatareincompatiblewithRCemploymentandplacingtheremainderoftheforcemixin

theRC.TheforcemixattheendofFY1997was13ACFWEand7RCFWE,buttheQuadrennialDefenseReviewdeterminedthatthemixcouldshiftto12ACFWEand8RCFWE(Cohen,1997,p.30).

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MeetingSSC,OOTW,andOtherPeacetimeDemands

InadditiontoprovidingreadyforcesforMTWs,ACandRCunitsprovideforcesforSSCsandOOTW.Inthepast,theforcestructurerequiredtomeetthesenon-MTWdemandswasconsideredtobealesserincludedcasewithintheMTW-relatedforcestructure.However,itisbecomingapparentthatoperatingtemposimposedbySSCsandOOTWareplacinggreatstressesonthecurrentforcestructure.TheforcestructurethatisbestformeetingMTWdemandsmaynotbebestformeetingSSCandOOTWdemands.Accordingly,itisappropriatetocomparetherelativecostsofACandRCunitstomeetthesenon-MTWdemands.

InanythingotherthananMTWscenario,widespreadmobilizationofRCunitsisunlikely.Thus,asdiscussedinChapterFour,RCavailabilitytogenerateproductiveoutputinsupportofSSCandOOTWdemandsismorelimitedthanthatoftheAC.Forcost-comparisonpurposes,theappropriatecost-per-outputapproachistodividetheannualoperatingcostbyadenominatorthatrepresentsaproductiveoperationaloutputinanSSC(nonmobilization)environment.Forexample,thedenominatorforfightersmightbethemaximumnumberofdaysdeployedforcontingencyoperationsthattheunitcanbeexpectedtosupport.Forairliftunits,thedenominatormightbeproductiveflyinghours.Inthefollowingparagraphs,wedevelopexamplesofhowthesecostcomparisonsmightbedevelopedforfighterandairliftassets.Similarpeacetimeoutputmeasuresandcostcomparisonscouldbeconstructedforothermissionsandweaponsystems.

MeasuringPeacetimeFighterDeploymentCapacityandItsCost

AsdiscussedinChapterFour,ThalerandNorton(1997)estimatedthatof120totalTDYdaysavailableperyear,ACfighteraircrews

have70daysperyearavailableforcontingencyoperations.3ThalerandNortonalsopostulatethatRCcrewsareavailablefor50daysofTDY

3ThalerandNortonpostulatethataircrewsinEuroperequireslightlymorenoncontingencyTDY(60days),leavingslightlyfewerdaysavailableforcontingencies(60days).

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peryear,ofwhich15daysmaybeusedforoverseascontingencies.Foranentiresquadron,thenumberofavailabledayspercrewismultipliedbythenumberofcrewsintheunit.For24-PAAsquadronswithacrewratioof1.25,thisyields1500deployedaircrew-daysperyearforanACunitand450foranRCunit.

Informationaboutdeployableaircrew-dayscanbecombinedwithsquadronoperatingcostsandotherfactorstodeterminethecostofadeployedaircraft-day.Assumingthatdeployedunitsoperateatthesamecrewratioasattheirhomebases,itappearsthatACunitscanprovide1200daysofdeployedaircraftoperationsperyearwhereasreserveunitscanprovide360.(Availabledeployedaircrew-daysmustbedividedbythedeployedcrewratiotodeterminethenumberofavailabledeployedaircraft-days.)Dividingtheannualoperatingcostsofafighterunitbythesefiguresyieldsacostperdeployedaircraft-day.4AsrecapitulatedinTable6.3,usingtheSABLE-reportedF16CunitoperatingcostsshowninTable6.2,thecostperdeployedaircraft-dayforanACunitis$51,250.ThecomparablecostforanANGunitis$121,111.

MeasuringPeacetimeAirliftProductiveCapacityandItsCost

Forairliftunits,contingency-deployedaircraft-daysmaynotbetheappropriatemeasureofusefuloutput.Amoreappropriatemeasuremightbethecostperproductiveflyinghour.Inthismeasurement,productiveflyinghoursarethosedevotedtoJointChiefsofStaff(JCS)-directedmissions,channeltraffic,andspecialassignmentairliftmissions(SAAMs).Table6.4providesthecostcalculations.Notethatthistabledependscriticallyupontheassumptionoftheproportionofflyingdevotedtoproductivemissions.WehadnoimmediateaccesstoempiricaldataasabasisoftheratesusedinTable6.4.Werelied,instead,onroughestimatessuppliedbyacolleaguefamiliarwithactiveandreserveairliftoperations.Unlesstheseestimatesarewidely

inaccurate,datasuggestthatACunitsprovidetheleast

4AnnualoperatingcostsofbothACandRCunitsmightriseasaresultofaprolongedcontingencydeploymentforreasonssuchasincreasedflyinghours,transportationofunitpersonnelandotherassetstoandfromthetheaterofoperations,andincreasedconsumptionofmunitions.Webaseourcostcomparisonsonpeacetimeoperatingcosts,butamorerigorouscostanalysismightconsiderthelikelychangesinoperatingcostsassociatedwithtypicalOOTWandSSCdeployments.

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Table6.3CostperDeployedAircraft-Day,F16Squadrons

AC ANG1.TDYdaysperyearpercrewmember 120 502.TrainingandothernoncontingencyTDYdaysrequiredperyear

70 35

3.AvailablecontingencyTDYdaysperyear(line1minusline2)

50 15

4.PAA 24 245.Crewratio 1.25 1.256.Contingency-deployeddaysperyear(line3×line4×line5)

1500 450

7.Contingency-deployedaircraftoperationdaysperyear(line6dividedbyline5)

1200 360

8.Unitoperatingcostsperyear(Table6.2) $61.5Ma$43.6Mb9.Costpercontingency-deployedaircraft-day(line8dividedbyline7)

$51,250$121,111

a18-PAAunitcost($46.1M)linearlyscaledto24-PAA.b18-PAAunitcost($32.7M)linearlyscaledto24-PAA.

Table6.4CostPerProductiveFlyingHour,C141Squadrons

RC

ACIndependentlyEquipped Associate

1.FlyinghoursperPAAperyear(Table6.2)

1,012 347 312

2.Proportionproductive(JCS-directed,channel,SAAM)(roughestimates)

80% 50% 50%

3.ProductiveFHperPAA(line1×line2)

810 174 156

4.AnnualcostperPAA(Table6.2) $6.4M $4.0M $1.5M

5.CostperproductiveFH(line4dividedbyline3)

$7,901 $22,988 $9,615

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expensivelift,followedbyRCassociateunits.However,anassociateunitmustbepairedwithanACunit.Incontrasttothesepairings,independentlyequippedairliftunitscostfarmoreperproductiveflyinghour.

AStrategyforOptimizingDeploymentCapacityandCost

ProvidingthegreatestcapacityforSSC,OOTW,andotherpeacetimeoperationsatagivenbudgetlevel(or,equivalently,minimizingthecostforagivencapacity)requiresforcemixesdifferentfromthosethatoptimallymeetMTWdemands.Tomeetnon-MTWdemands,theoptimalmixinfighterMDSsplacesjustenoughoftheforceintheRCtosatisfysocialandpoliticalconsiderationsandtheremainderintheAC.Theoptimalmixformeetingnon-MTWairliftneedssplitstheforceevenlyintoACandRCassociateunits.

TradeoffsbetweentheConflictingDemands

Aforcemixthatoptimallymeetsnon-MTWdemands(byminimizingtheproportionoftheforceintheRC,subjecttosocialandpoliticalconstraints)maynotprovideaforcestructurelargeenoughtomeetMTWdemands.Likewise,aforcemixthatoptimallymeetsMTWdemands(bymaximizingtheproportionoftheforceintheRC,subjecttomobilization-relatedavailabilityconstraints)maynotprovideenoughdeploymentcapacitytomeetnon-MTWdemands.

ConflictingDemandsforFighterForceStructure

WhenfacedwithaconflictbetweenMTWandnon-MTWdemands,decisionmakersmustweighthetradeoffs.Figure6.1illustrateshowthetradeoffscanbeconceptualizedandquantifiedforthefighterforce.ItprovidesinformationaboutpotentialalternativeFWEforcemixeswithcostsheldconstantattheleveloftheQDR-proposedmixof12ACandeightRCFWE.ItshowsthatasthenumberofRCFWE

increases(fromzerototenonthehorizontalaxis),thenumberoftotalforceFWEavailabletomeetMTWneeds(ontheleftaxis)alsoincreases.Inaddition,asthenumberofRCFWEincreases,thenumberofcontingency-deployedaircraft-daysthatcanbegeneratedtomeetnon-MTWneeds(ontherightaxis)declines.Notethatthe

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QDRforcemix,witheightFWEintheRCandatotalof20FWE,cangenerateanestimated51,800contingency-deployedaircraft-days.Holdingcostsconstant,eachincreaseofoneFWEintheRCresultsinadecreaseof0.7FWEintheAC,oranetincreaseof0.3FWEinthetotalforce.However,eachincreaseofoneFWEintheRCdecreasesthetotalforce'scapacityfordeployedaircraft-daysbyabout1480peryear(1080additionaldeployeddaysattributabletotheadditionalRCFWEminus2560deployeddaysattributabletothe0.7FWElostfromtheAC).Asanillustrationofhowthefigurecanbeused,consideraforcemixthatcontainedonlythreeFWEintheRC.ReadinguptotheFWElineandacrosstotheleftaxis,itcanbeseenthatthetotalforce,ifheldtothesamecostasthe20-FWEQDRmix,wouldprovideonly18.5FWEforuseinanMTW,ofwhich15.5wouldbeintheactiveforce.However,itwouldhaveacapacityfor59,200deployedaircraft-days.

TodeveloptheunderlyingdataforFigure6.1,wehadtomakeanassumptionaboutthemarginalcostofanFWEintheACandRC.Tosimplifyourcostcalculations,weassumedthatmarginalunitswouldbeequippedwithF16Cs,costedasshowninTable6.3.5

Inpractice,thelinearchangesincostassumedherewouldprobablyholdovermodestchangesfromthecurrentforcestructurebutnotformoreradicalchanges.Attheextremes,somecoststhatareconsideredfixedforsmallchangeswouldbecomevariable.Forexample,ifthecurrentAC/RCmixweretiltedmuchmoretowardtheRC,sustainabilityofRCpilotaccessionsfromACtrainedpilotlossesmightbecomeinfeasible,forcingtheRCtoincursignificantadditionalcoststotrainNPSpilotsandflythemenoughtoreachproficiencyintheirweaponsystems.

AComparativeLookatAirliftForceStructure

WehavenotanalyzedMTWversusnon-MTWdemandsforall

MDSs.However,sinceasignificantproportionofairliftcapacityisintheRC,wehavedevelopedanotionalapproachforconsideringthetradeoffs

5AnassumptionofF16Cequipageforthemarginalunitisreasonable,becauseF16sarebyfarthemostnumerousfighteraircraftinboththeACandRC.

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Figure6.1AlternativeEqual-CostForceMixes

inanairliftMDS.WeillustratetheapproachusingavailabledatafortheC141B.

ThemarginalcostofprovidingMTWcapacitycanbederivedfromTable6.2.ThedataindicatethatC141BRCunits,likefighterunits,arelesscostlythanACunits,allowingmoreforcestructuretobegeneratedforMTWpurposesbyshiftingtheAC/RCmixtowardtheRC.However,inairliftunits,thecostdifferencesbetweenassociateandindependentlyequippedunitsrequireamorenuancedanalysis.Forthispurpose,weconsideredtwocases.Inthefirstcase,wepairanACandRCassociateunitandobservethetotalcostofthetwounits(associateunitsmustbepairedwithACunits).Inthesecondcase,wedeterminethecostforprovidingthesamenumberofaircraftinRCindependentlyequippedunits.Inthefirstcase,a16-PAAACC141Bunit($103.1M)pairedwitha16-PAAAFRassociateunit($23.9M)hasatotalannualcostof$127M.Thesameforcestructurecouldbeprovidedbytwo8-PAAindependentlyequippedRCunits($34.8MforanANGunitor$31.9MforanAFRunit)atatotalcostof$63.8Mto$69.6M.Sincethemarginalcostoftheforcestructureinthe

independentlyequippedunitsislowerthanintheAC/associate

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unitpairing,greaterequipmentcapacityisgainedbyshiftingtheforce-structuremixtowardindependentlyequippedunits.However,independentlyequippedunitswouldprovideonly32crews,whereastheactive/associatepairwouldprovide58crews,permittingmoreintenseoperationoftheavailableequipment.

Formeetingnon-MTWdemands,Table6.4indicatesthatAC/associatepairingsprovidemoreliftcapacitythanindependentlyequippedRCunitsatagivenbudgetconstraint.Thus,thereisapotentialconflictbetweenMTWandnon-MTWdemandsifequipmentcapacityinanMTWscenarioismoreimportantthanaircrewavailability.

MakingTradeoffs

MakingthetradeoffsbetweenpotentialMTWcapacityandrealizedpeacetimecapacityrequiresbalancingtherisksandbenefitsinMTWandnon-MTWscenarios.Thetaskiscompoundedbyuncertaintyaboutthedemandsforcapacityineitherscenario.Analysiscanaidthedecisionprocessbyprovidingestimatesofexpecteddemandsandusingthemasabasisforquantifyingexpectedrisksandstresses(suchworkisbeyondthescopeofthisanalysis).

ImplicationsfortheForceMix

AsdepictedinFigure6.2,costconsiderationsargueforalargerproportionofthetotalforceintheRCwhencontemplatingMTWscenariosandasmallerproportionwhencontemplatingSSCandOOTWscenarios.

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Figure6.2CostConsiderationsintheForceMix

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ChapterSevenConclusionsOurmodelforgraphicallydepictingasetofforce-mixprinciplespresentedinChapterTwopostulatedafeasibleregionwithinwhicharangeofforcemixeswouldbeacceptableandwithinwhichcostconsiderationscouldprevail.Inexaminingtheavailableevidence,wefoundthatthelociofsomeoftheseconstraintsarecurrentlyunknowableandthatothersaremission-orcomponent-dependent.Wherepossible,wederivednotionalresultsusingmission-dependentvaluespertinenttothefighterforce.

TheresultsshowninFigure7.1depicttheANGcase,wherenotionalpersonnelflowconstraintsmightallowtheRCtooccupyupto42percentofthetotalfighterforce.Afeasibleregionisthuscreatedtotherightoftheminoritystatusconstraint.Thefeasibleregionmightbereducedifanavailabilityconstraintcameintoplayorifadecisionmakerweretosupplysomejudgmentallocusforthesocialidentification,embeddedness,andinvestment(IE&I)constraint.Withinthisfeasibleregion,cost-consciousdecisionmakerswouldgravitatetowarda42percentmixiftheywereprimarilyconcernedaboutpreparednessforMTWscenariosortowarda20percentmixiftheyweremoreconcernedwithmeetingcurrentcontingencydeploymentneeds.Itispossible,ofcourse,toweighcostmoreheavilythaneitherthepersonnelfloworsocialconstraints.Inthatcase,decisionmakersmightdrivethemixabove42percent,consciouslyacceptingadegradationinexperiencelevelsandreadiness.Alternatively,theycoulddrivethemixbelowthe20percentRCminoritystatusconstraint,possiblycompromisingRCmembers'capacitytoinfluencethevaluesandperceptionsofACmembers.

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Figure7.1NotionalValuesforForce-MixConstraints:AnANGCase

Ifpersonnelfloworavailabilitywereevaluatedusingdifferentparameters,thoseconstraintscouldconceivablylietotheleftoftheRCminoritystatusorsocialIE&Iconstraints.Therewouldbenofeasibleregion.Insuchacase,decisionmakerswouldhavetocompromisebetweenconflictingobjectives.ThemostlikelyoutcomewouldbetodeemphasizetheminoritystatusandsocialIE&Iconstraintsbecausethecaseforapplyingtheformerinthepresentcontextislesscompellingandthelocusforthelatterisunknown.

Weagainstressthatthespecificforce-mixresultsreportedherearenotional.Wherepossible,weusedinputvaluesthatwejudgedtobeapproximatelycorrect,recognizingthatwedidnothavetheresourcesinthisstudytoobtainorderiveanalyticallyrigorousinputs,especiallywhentheinputsarelikelytovaryacrossmissions.Also,becauseofvariationsacrossmissionsorMDSs,force-mixdecisionscannotbemadeintheaggregate.TheymustbemadeforeachmissionorMDSindividually.

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Althoughtheresultsreportedherearenotional,webelieveourresearchprovidestwoconcretecontributionstotheforce-mixdecisionprocess.Thefirstcontributionisaframeworkforintegratingtherangeofconsiderationsthatdecisionmakersfaceandforgainingperspectiveontheargumentsofferedbyvariousinterestgroupshopingtoinfluencetheforcemix.Thesecondcontributionisaroadmapformore-detailedresearchintospecificmission/MDSforcemixesorageneralmodelthatincorporatesmission/MDS-specificinputs.

Perhapsourmostsignificantfindingisthatcostconsiderationscancutinoppositedirectionsdependingonwhethertheforceisbeingoptimizedformajortheaterwarpreparednessorforpeacetimecontingencyoperations.Inourview,peacetimecontingencydemandsmustbegivenmoreweightinforce-mixdecisions,especiallyinMDSsexperiencinghighdeployment-relatedstress.

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