princetonpanel_europeandebtcrisis

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    Princeton, Oct 24th, 2011

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    Overcoming the crisis

    backwards induction approach:

    1. Diagnosis how did we get there?

    Run-up phase Crisis phase

    2. Give long-run perspective Banking landscape (ESBies, European FDIC, resolution,)

    Monetary framework

    Fiscal coordination

    3. Transition to long-run 2

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    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    25

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    25

    Jan 94 Jan 97 Jan 00 Jan 03 Jan 06 Jan 09

    Germany

    Italy

    Par Yield

    France

    Greece

    Spain

    Source: Eurostat

    Eurozone: 10 Y Sovereign debt yield

    3

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    80

    100

    120

    140

    160

    80

    100

    120

    140

    160

    Jan 96 Jan 00 Jan 04 Jan 08

    12-Mo. Moving Average HCPI for Eurozone(1999=100)

    Germany

    Italy

    Par Yield

    France

    Greece

    Spain

    Source: IMF

    Eurozone: Persistent Inflation Divergence

    4

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    Real interest rate gap

    Average rates 99-07 Germany Spain Greece

    Nominal interest rate 3.8% 3.9% 4.4%

    Inflation rate 1.8% 3.3% 3.5%

    -------------------------- ---------------------- ---------------------- ----------------------

    Real interest rate 2.0% 0.6% 0.9%

    5

    Rate for German savers > Rate for Spanish/Greek borrowers

    (Government)

    Risk charge for sovereign debt = 0

    Consequence: larger savings in Germany + capital outflows

    boost to Spanish economy & inflation

    Source: Bloomberg 5 year government note indices

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    Eurozone Accumulated Net Capital Inflows

    6

    -1200

    -1000

    -800-600

    -400

    -200

    0

    200

    400

    600800

    Q1 1994Q1 1997Q1 2000Q1 2003Q1 2006Q1 2009

    Germany

    Italy

    Billion

    France

    Greece

    Spain

    Source: Eurostat

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    German Foreign Claims

    8

    $0

    $50,000

    $100,000

    $150,000

    $200,000

    $250,000

    $300,000

    $350,000

    Jun.1991

    Dec.1992

    Jun.1994

    Dec.1995

    Jun.1997

    Dec.1998

    Mar.2000

    Dec.2000

    Sep.2001

    Jun

    .2002

    Ma

    r.2003

    Dec.2003

    Sep

    .2004

    Jun.2005

    Mar.2006

    Dec.2006

    Sep.2007

    Jun

    .2008

    Mar.2009

    Dec.2009

    Sep.2010

    BelgiumGreece

    Ireland

    Italy

    Portugal

    Spain

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    -20

    0

    20

    40

    60

    80

    100

    1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011

    Germany

    Italy

    Percent

    France

    GreeceSpain

    Source: OECD

    Belgium

    Ireland

    PortugalEurozone

    Eurozone: Accumulated GDP Growth

    9

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    Crisis diagnosis 1: Flight to safety

    Today: asymmetric shifts across borders

    Value of German bund/French debt increases German CDS spread rises, but yield on German Bund drops (flight to safety)

    Value of Italian/Spanish/Greek sovereign debt declines

    10

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    Crisis diagnosis 1: Flight to safety

    Today: asymmetric shifts across borders

    Value of German bund/French debt increases German CDS spread rises, but yield on German Bund drops (flight to safety)

    Value of Italian/Spanish/Greek sovereign debt declines

    11

    1

    2

    3

    4

    20

    40

    60

    80

    100

    120

    Apr 11 May 11 Jun 11 Jul 11 Aug 11 Sep 11 Oct 11

    German Sovereign 5Y CDS and 10Y Yield

    CDSSpread

    10Y Yield

    Par Yield

    Source: Bloomberg

    Basis Points

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    Crisis diagnosis 2: Diabolic Loop

    Contagion due to diabolic loop twin crisis

    Banks need risk-free asset for transactions (best collateral)

    12

    Trigger

    Bank insolvency

    (Ireland, Spain)

    Public debt/slow growth(Greece, Portugal, Italy)

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    Distortions - Inconsistency

    Sovereign debt is treated as safe asset

    Basel: Zero risk-weight (for own sovereign)

    ECB: Low haircut

    e.g. 10 year Greek bond has 10% haircut

    Concentration of sovereign risk in banks

    Inconsistency

    No-bailout clause

    Zero risk weight

    13

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    ESBies proposal

    1. Create safe asset

    With flight to quality correlation structure

    Remove pressure for capital flows across borders

    channel them across different tranches2. Appropriate risk weights + haircuts for sovereign debt

    Break diabolic loop

    Part of bigger proposal

    European FDIC, bank resolution, etc.

    14

    9 economists: www.euro-nomics.com

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    ESBies structure

    up to 60% of GDP (5 year average) from all Euro-members

    ESBies flight to quality/safety assetcoordination!

    Basel: zero weight

    ECB: preferred asset to conduct open market operations

    No control rights for junior tranche!

    15

    sovereign

    bonds ESBies

    Junior tranche

    A L

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    Flight to safety: in times of crisis

    Today: asymmetric shifts across borders

    Value of German bund/French debt increases German CDS spread rises, but yield on bund drops (flight to quality)

    Value of Italian/Spanish/Greek sovereign debt declines

    With ESBies: Negative co-movement across tranches Value of ESBies tranche expands due to flight to quality

    Value of Junior tranche shrinks due to increased risk Asset side is more stable 16

    sovereign

    bonds ESBies

    Junior tranche

    A L

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    How to create value?

    Flight to safety fluctuations are reduced

    No negative distributional effects away from Greece, Italy, towards Germany in times of crisis

    Can be used in current transition phase! ESBies liquidity premium in normal times (ex-ante)

    Estimates: 0.7% in normal times

    Shared across all euro-members

    Advantages in crisis times are much larger

    Especially for peripheral countries!

    17

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    Transition phase

    Give long-run perspective

    Phase in

    ESBies (market has to learn about junior tranche)

    Increase in capital requirements

    Swapexisting holding of sovereign debt for ESBies(at market prices after price adjustment due to ESBies proposal)

    Recapitalizationof banks Now smaller --- but there is no way around it

    mandated private (to avoid stigma) + public backup

    Similar to U.S. in spring 2009 after SCAP

    Has to be done in coordinate fashion otherwise free-riding18

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    Conclusion: Guiding Principles

    Reduce flight to safety capital flow fluctuations coordinate on new asset

    Isolate banks from sovereign risk - avoid diabolic loop Higher risk charges for sovereign debt are essential!

    Dont distort incentives for sovereigns Interest rate signal as corrective (market) force should remain intact

    Stable credibleand transparent rule for portfolio weights Fixed rule based on easily measurable units (e.g. (lagged) GDP or ECB key)

    Change require anonymity of parliamentary approval and go along withchange in voting power (change in ECB key)

    Avoid procyclicality Set tranching points conservatively (in good times) in order to have buffer for bad times

    note that correlation will shoot up in times of crisis!

    Extra Sweetener for transition phase Take advantage of liquidity premium

    Not a guiding principle

    Maximize size of ESBIES tranche 19