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Oxford‐Princeton GLF Programme May, 2012
Hongsheng Ren
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
ENTERPRISE HEGEMONY AND EMBEDDED HIERARCHY NETWORK: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PROCESS OF GLOBAL COMPACT GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
May 1, 2012
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Abstract
To understand and explain if the initiatives really attract enterprises
and how could they achieve the aims of making the enterprise self‐
regulatory, it must examine the motivations of the participants and if
they changed their behaviors after joining the initiative. This paper
investigates the determinants of Chinese enterprises attitude toward
the United Nations Global Compact using interview and statistical
analysis in the Chinese participants of the UNGC, the UNLN, and the
government officials. The paper assess the role of hegemony
enterprise and the embed hierarchy network in the UNGC governance.
Insourcing the hegemony enterprises and outsourcing the RSS institute
network and the regional political system, the UNGC also could achieve
the aim of global governance.
May 1, 2012
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Table of Contents 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. ‐ 4 ‐
2. Information, Leadership and the Political Process of Hegemonic Governance ........................... ‐ 8 ‐
1) What actors are in or out at key junctures? ................................................................................ ‐ 8 ‐
2) What then shape the process of self‐regulatory ....................................................................... ‐ 10 ‐
3. Membership, Interest and Preference .................................................................................... ‐ 12 ‐
1) Who are the self‐regulators? ..................................................................................................... ‐ 13 ‐
2) the Interest and Policy Preference ............................................................................................ ‐ 17 ‐
4. Leadership, Power and Influence ............................................................................................ ‐ 20 ‐
1) Insourcing: Enterprise Hegemony .............................................................................................. ‐ 20 ‐
2) Case Studies of Enterprise Hegemony Governance .................................................................. ‐ 22 ‐
5. Embedded Hierarchical Network ............................................................................................ ‐ 28 ‐
1) The Creating Network of the UNGC in China (2000‐2012) ........................................................ ‐ 28 ‐
2) The Creating Network of the RSS institute in Chinese Enterprises .......................................... ‐ 31 ‐
6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. ‐ 37 ‐
May 1, 2012
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1. Introduction
There are so many different institutional elements in global
governance. The UN, WTO, WB and IMF stand out as examples of
negotiation that among governments muster the will to enforce the
global governance agreements. In contrast, the agreements are expect
forcing to be executed by contentious cases and advisory proceedings
at international law level. Both of them try to governance the global
affairs by enforcement from states, however, many of our international
objectives cannot be met much more easily with compulsivity actions.
Since 1980’s, more and more “regulatory standard‐setting” (RSS) was
emerging. Those RSS institutions shape a new routine of global
governance‐‐‐‐‐‐ using privation regulatory to manage the world. The
global standard becomes the new source of governance power. But
without states support and some capture regulatory always happen,
the global standards also trap in a dilemma situation. The enforcement
coming from outside did not attain so much achievement, so some
great think tanker begin to consider a new approach of global
governance. Why do not make global self‐regulation?
After the then‐UN Secretary‐General Kofi Annan’s speech which
proposed the business leaders to initiate a Global Compact of shared
values and principles delivered on the World Economic Forum in Davos
in January 1999, the Global Compact was operatively launched on 26
July 2000. The Global Compact “as a network‐based and CEO‐led,
multi‐stakeholder initiative working globally and locally”1, is today the
1 Adnreas Rasche & Geoge kell, the United Nations Global Compact: Achievements, Trends and Challenges, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.1, 5.
May 1, 2012
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largest corporate responsibility initiative in the world, with currently
more than 9,000 participants in over 130 countries as of December,
2011. The UNGC believe that
“Never before in history has there been a greater alignment between the
objectives of the international community and those of the business world, such
as building markets, combating corruption, safeguarding the environment and
ensuring social inclusion, have resulted in unprecedented partnerships and
openness between business, governments, civil society, labor and the United
Nations.”2
Actually, the Global Compact received many critics from various
scholars from the day which launched. Fransen and Kolk believe that it
is very difficult to tell what it ‘good’ and ‘appropriate’ stakeholder, so
the assessment of the value becomes complicate and easy to fail to
attain the achievement.3 Because the Global Compact is less of self‐
assessment mechanism and as of a toothless initiative, the role of
business in global governance is limit.4 Especially, Danier Berliner and
Aseem Prakash insist that norms could shape firm’s policy only when
they get translated into concrete programs; the Global Compact try to
use the NGOs and INGOs by embedded network to fill its goals,
obviously it failed because “in the case of the Global Compact, IGO
networks appear to prefer more inclusive programs while INGO
2 UN Global Compact Office: United Nations Global Compact Corporate Citizenship in the World Economy, August 2008. 3 Luc W. Fransen & Ans Kolk, Global Rule‐Setting for Business: A Critical Analysis of Multi‐Stakeholder Standards, Organization; Sep 2007; 14, 5; pp.667‐684. 4 Lisa Whitehouse, Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Citizenship and the Global Compact: A New Approach to Regulating Corporate Social Power? Global Social Policy, 2003(3): 299‐318. Robert W. Nason, Structuring the Global Marketplace: the Impact of the United Nations Global Compact, Journal of Macromarketing, 2008 (28): 418‐425. Jorge A. Arevalo & Francis T. Fallon, Assessing Corporate Responsibility as a contribution to Global governance: the Case of the UN Global Compact, Corporate Governance, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2008, pp. 456‐470.
May 1, 2012
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networks place greater value on program integrity.”5 However, the
others totally don’t agree with that. They argue that firms’ ‘reputational
accountability’ will promote the rights of ‘global citizenship’; the
principles of the Global Compact encourage those global citizenships to
sign the Compact and got a good reputation.6 In some degree, the
Global Compact are creating the “soft law”, it could change the
business behaviors little by little.7 (Maybe this will make the standard
become blurring and lost its appropriate of norm). Forward step,
Andreas Rasche and George Kell argue that because of its CEO‐led
character, truly global, involving small and medium‐sized enterprises
and larger companies and enjoying wide government support, the
global compact could be considered a new style of cooperation
between the business community and the United Nations, but not as a
substitute for what governments seek to achieve through regulation, it
make corporate responsibility proactively embedded in organizational
processes and relates to concrete business practices and shaping the
CSR agenda in spite of the absence of stronger implementation and
specialization, and they believe that the changes in development are a
political, rather than a technical process, the Global Compact
governance is a strategy or idea, and it is unique than before.8 All in all,
5 Daniel.Berliner & Aseem. Prakash, From norms to Programs: the United Nations Global Compact and Global Governance, Regulation & Governance (2012), pp.1‐17. 6 Andrew Kuper, Harnessing Corporate Power: lessons from the UN Global Compact, Development, 2004, 47(3), pp. 9‐19. George Kell, the Global Compact Selected Experiences and Reflections, Journal of Business Ethics, (2005) 59, pp.69‐79. Lynn Bennie, Patrick Bernhagen & Neil J. Mitchell, the Logic of Transnational Action: the Good Corporation and the Global Compact, Political Studies, 2007 Vol. 55, pp. 733‐753. Patrick Bernhagen & Neil J. Mitchell, the Private Provision of Public Goods: Corporate Commitments and the United Nations Global Compact, International Studies Quarterly (2010)54, pp. 1175‐1187. 7 Angus Mercer, the Role of the Global Compact in the Creation of Soft Law, unpublished Dissertation, Social Science Library, University of Oxford. 8 Georg Kell & David Levin, the Global Compact Network: A Historic Experiment in Learning and Action, business and society Review, 2008 (108:2), pp. 151‐181. Jean‐Philippe Therien and Vincent Pouliot, the Global Compact: Shifting the Politcs of International Development? Global Governance, 12 (2006), pp. 55‐75. Georg kell, Anni‐Marie Slaughter and Thomas Hale, Silent Reform Through the Global Compact, UN Chronicle: Mar 2007; pp. 26‐30.
May 1, 2012
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they focus on two issues: first, whether ten principles of the Global
Compact are weak norms or shared norms? Second, what kind of the
program design is better?
Given the prominence of these debates, scholars obviously assume that
the ten principles and its program design are a kind of interactive
causality relations. Because of its blurring norms, so it is less
enforcement and easy to fail; or, because its shared norms, so it is not
fixed program and easy to accept. However, for the reason that the ten
principles of the Compact are just the principles at the value meaning
without standardization, so the Compact could not design the
governance regime by itself, the Compact will shape by the various
regional business and political environment. What’s more, they disused
the relationship between the Compact and the INGOs and NGOs
though whether the Compact receives supporting form the INGOs and
NGOs or not, but did not focus on the substitution relationship
between them. So, how did the principles encourage the firms sign the
Global Compact? How did the outside environment shape the process
of the Global Compact governance? Those questions are actually
needed to be investigated.
In this paper, the author tries to figure out that the path of Chinese
firms signing the Global Compact and how Chinese political did and
economic environment shaped the process of the Global Compact in
China.
Section 1, introduction; Section 2, discussing the determinants of the
UNGC governance; Section 3, discussing the motivation of the
Andreas Rasche & Georg Kell Edited, The United Nations Global Compact: Achievements, Trends and Challenges, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp.1‐21.
May 1, 2012
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participants of the UNGC; Section 4, discussing the structure of the
participants of the UNGC ; Section 5, explaining the outsourcing of the
UNGC; Section 6, conclusion.
2. Information, Leadership and the Political Process of Hegemonic Governance
The self‐regulatory institutions are viewed as RSS (regulatory standard‐
setting), and refer to these five tasks (Agenda‐setting, Negotiation of
standards, Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement‐ANIME) as
the regulatory process. 9 However, being as the principle initiative, the
UNGC does not focus on the process the governance step by step.
What’s the UNGC care about is the joining the program and build
networks among the participants. So, how could we understand the
UNGC framework and what factors will work and enforce the
participants implement its CSR? It should make clear two issues at here.
1) What actors are in or out at key junctures?
For the RSS institutions involve multi stake holders, it looks like any
actor of them could play a very important role in the regulatory process.
Actually, only the companies play the key role in the process because
the mechanism is designed on the basis of market‐based. Without the
companies’ activities in fact, the monitoring process is so easy cheated
by the indicators which the RSS designed themselves, especially in
some special field. For example, which chemical element of the paint of
the ship bottom will poison the ocean creature? Only very large
9 Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, ed. The Politics of Global Regulation, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University, 2009, pp.45‐46.
May 1, 2012
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shipping company which has long voyage history could give the answer
to the public. They are familiar with the biotype of ocean creature in
the route of voyage and which kind of fish will poison to death.
At the same time, because of its nature of initiative, RSS regulatory
means that that the government at domestic level and governance at
the international level by governments or inter‐government are
inefficiency in some degree. The companies face lower risk and cost of
not obeying all kinds of initiatives. From the economic rationale
prospective, the companies join the initiative by no means to pursue
the economic benefit.
However, the naming and shaming have so weak link to the joining the
initiatives. The Business‐Human Rights Resource Centre monitor the
UNGC participants by media, when they got some scandal of Chinese
companies and asked them to change their behaviors or explain the
reason, otherwise, the Business‐Human Rights Resource Centre‐the
UNGC partner‐ will publish the news on the website to “shame” on
them, more than 71% companies failed to response (more than 50%
companies in the world failed to response).10 When the agent of the
UNGC try to persuade the very big company of U.S.A to sign the UNGC
and hint that naming on them will benefit to the companies, but most
of them refuse to do that. As argued above, it believe that the
motivation of joining RSS institution does not generate inherently, it
origin from the outside forces.
Since the high information cost, “entrepreneurs will be most successful
in changing regulation where they can form a broad coalition against
defenders of the status quo. To this end, a shared set of new ideas
10 Interview, New York, April, 2012.
May 1, 2012
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about how to regulate will often be crucial.”11 The larger the company
is, the more specialization the company belongs to, the higher the
company monopoly the information of how to regulate in this industry.
Hegemonic enterprise has enough information in the game, and
absolutely has the hegemonic discourse and enforcement. So, the big
company plays the key role and normally acts as the leadership in the
industry.
Hypothesis 1 The dynamic of the enterprise’s signing the UNGC origin
from non‐economic factors (political reason). Different size of the
enterprise has different important role in the RSS institution. The most
important actors are the hegemonic enterprise in the regulatory
process.
2) What then shape the process of self‐regulatory
In attempting to fill the perceived gaps in government and international
governance, RSS agreements take on significant practical and political
challenges. 12 Generally, “we argue that influence in global private
governance is significantly a function of how commentary a country’s
domestic institutions are with the prevailing institutional structure at
the international level.”13 It means that the global initiative governance
will help domestic institutions to do better. As argued above, the
enterprise will be the one to fill the gap between the state and the
international governance. Different political status of the enterprises
11 Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, ed. The Politics of Global Regulation, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University, 2009, p 4. 12 Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, ed. the Politics of Global Regulation, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University, 2009, p.46. 13 Tim Buthe and Walter Mattli, the New Global Rulers, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, p 13.
May 1, 2012
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has different power in the local network of the UNGC (UNLN). The most
important actor is the hegemony enterprise among the multi
stakeholders in private regulation.
However, the enterprise has different influence under different political
system. Hierarchical and coordinated domestic system will empower
the enterprises of the whole country at global structure, the
fragmented domestic system will not.14 But, there is a very important
fact being ignored by that scholars‐‐‐‐‐‐how far the domestic system
shape the regulatory structure itself; and how did it shape the
regulatory process inside, not outside.
Recently, some scholars begin to emphasis on that fact, they
investigate how Chinese political context affects sub‐ and non‐state
actors participation in transnational climate governance by a
prospective of fragmented authoritarianism, 15 they are right if they
just discus the delegation of China government and the conflict policy
among the governmental units. But if discussing the regulatory
governance from the enterprise‐‐‐the most important player‐‐‐
hierarchical and coordinated domestic system will reflect the real
situation. For the reason is that Chinese enterprises have their own
special political system. The effectiveness of outsourcing of RSS
institutions and insourcing hegemon enterprises regulating the others
depend on the structure of the power of the participants in the regional
political system, and the regional political system will shape the UNLN.
14 Tim Buthe and Walter Mattli, the New Global Rulers, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, p 13 15 Thomas Hale and Charles Roger, Domestic Politics and Participation in Transnational Climate Governance, International Studies Association Annual Convention, April 1‐4, 2012, San Diego, CA.
May 1, 2012
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Hypothesis 2 Being as a principle‐based initiative, the UNGC need be
supported by the UNLN (outsourcing), and the regional political and
business environment will shape its’ local network regulatory process.
So, this paper’s strategy is to examine and evaluate the relationship and
interactive between the political structure of the actors and the
political system of the country.
3. Membership, Interest and Preference
As an initiative, the UNGC is an international agreement opening to
every unit if they would like to be a participant. The cost of signing
UNGC of the companies includes application letter, financial
contributions16 and the annual Communication on Progress (COP), that
is, integrate in its annual report (or in a similar public document, such
as a sustainability report) a description of the ways in which it
implements the principles and supports broader development
objectives.17Compare with the gigantic negotiation cost of joining WTO
and the voting right cost of offering fund to IMF, the cost of signing
UNGC is so immaterial by the asset specify perspective. And what’s
more, there is no qualification examination to the participants and
follow‐up investigation to their COP as well, it is different with the
16 Participating companies are asked, upon joining, to make an annual financial contribution to help support the work of the UN Global Compact. Suggested annual contribution levels are set as follows: USD 10,000 for companies with annual revenues of USD 1 billion or more; USD 5,000 for companies with annual revenues between 250 million and USD 1 billion; USD 500 for companies with annual revenues of less than 250 million. 17 The Corporate commitment: 1) make the UN Global Compact and its principles an integral part of business strategy, day‐to‐day operations, and organizational culture; 2) incorporate the UN Global Compact and its principles in the decision‐making processes of the highest‐level governance body; 3) engage in partnerships to advance broader development objectives (such as the MDGs); 4) advance the UN Global Compact and the case for responsible business practices through advocacy and outreach to peers, partners, clients, consumers and the public at large.
May 1, 2012
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certification RSS institution, for example, SA8000. The appliers are not
expected to change its behavior in order to sign the GC, even not
changed very quickly and deeply after signing the GC. So, it needs to
understand two puzzles at first: who are the members really want to
self‐regulate? Who are the important participants which the UNGC
encourage to sign the GC?
1) Who are the self‐regulators?
There are 275 participants, include 38 non‐business participants of the
GC from China as of March, 2012. By the GC, those participants could
be divided into three groups: company (more than 250 employees),
SME (less than 250 employees) and non‐business participants. It could
find the member expansion of the company and SME in China so
quickly, see the figure following,
May 1, 2012
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Data Resource: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC
By the figure, the SOEs could be considered that they have taken less
responsibility than the small one and the private enterprises take more
responsibility than others. What’s more, if it could get a conclusion that
the SMEs are more and more taking responsibility than the larger from
the following figure?
May 1, 2012
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Data Resource: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC
Actually, we cannot find out the meaning of the member expansion
from those two curves, because the classified like that is oversimplified
even the UNGC divided them into private and state‐owned enterprise
or SMEs and company at the same time. Especially, the companies
which have more than 1000 employees still be recognized as a small
company in China.18
Normally, Chinese companies are always classified by their capital
resource and are put into four groups: Central Government‐owned
enterprises (CSOEs), State‐Owned Enterprises (SOEs) supervised by
local governments, FDI, and private companies. By this standard,
CSOEs SOEs FDI PrivateNumber 18 13 41 153 Data Resource: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC; http://www.stats.gov.cn/;
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/index.html.
From this table, it could also conclude that the private companies have
more incentive to sign the UNGC and take more responsibility. Of
course, it is not the truth at all. In fact, different level participants have
different incentives to sign the UNGC. There are three different
explanations about that. First, implement responsibility. This could
account for the signing of the CSOEs and few other kind of company. As
18 Interview, Beijing, March, 2012.
May 1, 2012
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far as the CSOEs publish CSR report annually and they have already
accept the GRI, ISO 26000 standard, they also would like accept the
guide from the UNGC. 19 Second, articulating alternative discourses of
power. Partly reason to sign the UNGC is that the CEOs of the CSOEs
and some officials insist that the standard should not be supplied by the
Western countries, Chinese enterprises should acquire more right and
the work flats of UNGC provide so many changes to interact with IO,
NGO, Companies, and even the officials from other countries.20 Third,
use the logo of the UNGC.21 Most of the private companies and FDI,
many of SOEs are belong to this kind participants. What they care is
whether they could be the supplier of the MNCs, because some MNCs
force their supplier to sign the UNGC and the suppliers have no choice.
Sometimes, the local governments also force the companies supervised
by them to sign the UNGC as a governmental achievement.
What have happen after those participants signing the UNGC? By the
fieldwork in China in 2011 and 2012, we found out that there are three
different results. First, they didn’t change their behaviors at all. Most of
the private companies and SMEs even did not know the ten principles
of the UNGC in spite of having signed it. A manager of a small private
companies said, “I don’t care the environment and the global warming,
you see, the USA as a great power also escape it’s responsibility and
refuse the Kyoto Protocol, and the action of Canadian Government in
Durban Conference is so disguised. Why the UN require my so small
company to take the responsibility? ” Second, they changed, but a little.
This kind of participants are the larger company, include some public
19 Interview, Beijing, December, 2011. 20 National Energy Bureau of China: the Conference of Chinese Enterprises Go Out Strategy and CSR, December, 2011. CBRC & Tsinghua University: the Conference of China Bank Industry and CSR, January, 2012. 21 Interview, Beijing, December, 2011 & March, 2012.
May 1, 2012
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companies. However, the changes what they said are always donging
charity and planting trees, didn’t publish CSR report and seem not
familiar with the UNGC.22 Third, they changed a lot. Most of CSOEs are
in this kind of participant. However, they sign the UNGC, at the same
time they also accept the GRI, ISO26000, SA8000 and Equator Rules etc.
But, “it is so hard to say, which one changed our behaviors,” said by a
higher official of a CSOE.23
As far as the description above, in spite it is difficult to get the data to
identify how much the UNGC impact the CSOEs, but we could conclude
that the CSOEs are the only ones who want to play an important role in
the UNGC.
2) the Interest and Policy Preference
Needless to say, the CSR are becoming more and more important event
under the background of globalization, the governments, IO, NGO and
the business itself are all try to find a way to monitor the business
implementing the CSR. Because there are no compromises on how to
force the business implementing the CSR in international society, those
units carry out different policies achieving their aims. Because of the
openness and toothless of the UNGC, the participants are not expected
to change their behavior immediately, even after signed the Compact.
Since less internal motivation to change their behaviors, then whether
the participants changed their behaviors based on the external forces?
Whether the external constraints shape the process of self‐regulatory
under the UNGC? In China, different companies encounter different
policy constraints resourcing from outside.
22 Interview, Changsha, China, January, 2012. 23 Interview, Beijing, December, 2011.
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First, the CSOEs receive the pressure from China government, the
government believes that the better image of China enterprises is
beneficial to develop good relationships in international business
network, and promote the image of the whole country. 24 SASAC (State‐
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State
Council) and CBRC (China Banking Regulatory Commission) of China
command the CSOEs supervised by them must publish CSR report
before 2011 in 2008, and the central government hope these guidelines
which they prompt “are proposed to comprehensively implement the
spirit of the 17th CPC National Congress and the Scientific Outlook on
Development, and give the impetus to state‐owned enterprises (SOEs)
directly under the central government (referred to as CSOEs hereafter)
to earnestly fulfill corporate social responsibilities (CSR), so as to realize
coordinated and sustainable development of enterprises, society and
environment in all respects. ”25 Second, the SMEs receive the pressure
from its supply chains. For example, Schneider China announces that
Schneider supplier must be the participant of the UNGC if the company
wants to keep business relationship with it.26 Sometimes the local
governments also command the company which registered in its
domain to implement the CSR.27 Third, the companies in between,
always receive the pressure from the media. In fact, the media enjoys
24 Zhang Yanning, Vice Chairman of China Enterprises Association & China Entrepreneur Association, the discourse
on CSR in China international forum, June 29th, 2007. 中国企业联合会、中国企业家协会常务副会长张彦宁在
“2007 企业社会责任在中国”国际论坛的致辞,2007 年 6月 29日。Zhang DeJiang, Vice Prime Minister of
China, the discourse on CSR directors meeting of the central SOEs, December 19, 2011.张德江在中央企业负责人
会议上的讲话,2011 年 12月 19 日。 25 SASAC governmental file, Guidelines to the State‐owned Enterprises Directly under the Central Government
on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities, December 29, 2007. 国务院国有资产监督管理委员会文件: 《关
于中央企业履行社会责任的指导意见》,2007年 12月 29 日。 26 Interview, Beijing, December, 2011. 27 Interview Beijing, January, 2012.
May 1, 2012
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very much monitoring those companies. For example, Southern
Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) launched a competing to show whose CSR
report is the best among the list company.28
Based on those constraints, it could conclude that the SMEs which are
the suppliers of MNCs have strong incentive to sign the UNGC and the
CSOEs have the same situation. The others have least incentive to sign
the UNGC. Signing the UNGC and publish the COP of the GC means
nothing about whether the CSOEs achieved great progress in CSR.
However, the CSOEs have already changed their behaviors before and
after they sign the UNGC, because they use more rigid standard than
ten principles of the UNGC to implement the CSR and publish the CSR
report. There more than 500 companies published CSR report as of
2009 in China. It means that many large companies obey more rigid
standard than the UNGC. As far as the SMEs, few of them have CSR
section and expert, they did not know how to write a CSR report and
they also could not afford the cost to do it in some degree, the simple
COP without tooth is their best choice.
Briefly summarized, the paper account that the SMEs are not so
interested in CSR under the UNGC framework, they just want use the
logo and hope the COP of the UNGC as simple as possible and never
have enforcement. The companies which aren’t controlled by larger
companies than them don’t treat with the requirements of the UNGC
seriously. For the CSOEs, they think the ten principles of the UNGC as a
piece of cake; it is so easy to compete with. The CSOEs also prefer to
translate the ten principles into standards deeply, it is so easy to do
28 http://www.infzm.com/content/66879
May 1, 2012
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that for them and also hope stopping free take of the SMEs’ which only
signing a toothless agreement.
4. Leadership, Power and Influence
Given the debates in Section 3, it is surprising that the CSOEs which
have so small population of the participants of the UNGC are the actors
who really want to play the important role. From another perspective,
the CSOEs are just the ones which the UNGC want to cooperate with,
because only this kind of company could supply public product and
have enforcement power.
1) Insourcing: Enterprise Hegemony
As far as the UNGC is a principle based initiative, comparing with the
GRI, ISO26000 etc., and the COP which it supplies is too simple. At the
same time, the COP doesn’t like the GRI and SA 8000 are a kind of
private goods, the latter needs pay for some money to those NGOs
when the companies use it or get certification from them. The UNGC
try to supply public goods. However, only through providing public
goods to achieve the aim of self‐regulation, it is far away from the aims.
As far as a self‐regulation institution, the UNGC have four shortages,
those shortages make it produce limited influence on its participants.
First, the ten principles are still at the idea level, and it is very difficult
put them into practice. The COP of UNGC encourage its participants
creating themselves COP, and borrow the GRI indicator as the guider of
the COP. However, most of the larger companies and SMEs are clumsy
with how to create a COP by themselves. Just like a specialist of CSR
said, the UNGC should translate the ten principles into standard and
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then the SMEs could know what they should to do.29 Second, there are
so limited specialists of CSR in the UNGC. That’s the reason why the
UNLN and many companies don’t believe the UNGC; they knew the
UNGC is not that one who really could help them. Third, without
enforcement, few participants could change its behavior at last in spite
of that they sign the UNGC initiatively. But, the UNGC believe itself is
unique and they find a special way to deal with those problems.
The UNGC believes that “the Global Compact, unlike other multi‐
stakeholder schemes aiming at certification (SA 8000) or reporting
(GRI), is a principle based initiative asking participants to align their
operations and value chain activities with ten universally accepted
principles. Commitment to the Global Compact has to be endorsed by
the chief executive officer (CEO). This CEO‐led character makes the
initiative a leadership platform, which is based on a robust policy
framework for the development and integration of corporate
responsibility practices into a firm’s value and supply chain.”30
So, what the UNGC need to do is insourcing those tasks from its
participant. The best choice is the CSOEs. That is the reason why the
UNGC always put encouraging and canvassing the No. 1 enterprise of
different industry to sign the Compact into their agenda.
The CSOEs, as the representative of different industry, have three
virtues to the UNGC. First, as the biggest and monopoly enterprise in
one industry, the CSOE holds the most advanced technology, plentiful
information and knowledge in the field. They are familiar with which
field have potential hazards to human being and environment, and
29 Interview, Beijing, April, 2012. 30 Andreas Rasche & Georg Kell, the United Nations Global Compact; Achievements, Trends and Challenges, Cambridge University Press, 2010. p5.
May 1, 2012
‐ 22 ‐
have enough specialists who could standard the process of the
production. They also have the ability to standard the CSR in this field.
For example, COSSCO have enough information and technology about
the friendly environmental paints that painting the bottom of the ship
and avoid poisoning the creature in the ocean. Second, only the larger
enough enterprise could afford the cost of creating standard and
putting them into practice. Normally, SMEs even could not afford the
SA8000 certification fee, even do more about that.31 Third, the CSOEs
monopoly the market and technology, they have the power to choice
who qualifies as a supplier of them. It means that only the CSOEs have
the power of sanction.
All in all, the UNGC overcome its shortages and try to achieve the
monitoring aim by insourcing the CSOEs. Needless to say, it is a totally
different way to governance the business world.
2) Case Studies of Enterprise Hegemony Governance
The insourcing of regulation of the UNGC will empower its efficiency
and save the cost of governance, however, the power of the hegemony
enterprises is not always utilized at the same level. The next step is to
examine and evaluate the governance effectiveness of COSCO as a
hegemony enterprise that having structural power and Schneider
electric as a hegemony enterprise that having relative power.
COSCO: Hegemony Governance Subsidiaries32
31 Interview, Beijing, April 2012. 32 The case of COSCO based on the Global Compact: Implementing the United Nations Global Compact in china: Inspirational Case Examples; COSCO: COSCO Sustainable Development Report (2005‐2010); and COSCO website: http://www.cosco.com/en/index.jsp .
May 1, 2012
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COSCO is a large global enterprise group focusing on international
shipping logistics & ports, and shipbuilding and ship‐repairing
businesses. It is also a Fortune 500 enterprise of the world. COSCO
owns and controls over 800 modern merchant vessels with a total
tonnage of 51 million DWTs and, by the end of 400 million tons. COSCO
Group’s shipping lines cover over 1,500 ports in more than 160
countries and regions worldwide, and its fleet size ranks the first in
China and the second in the world. COSCO Group owns world’s most
advanced container ships with tonnage of more than 1000 TEU, Asia’s
No. 1 “semi‐submersible ships”, heavy lift ships for loading of super
large and heavy cargos, 300,000‐ton VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier),
and professional automobile ships.
COSCO Group developed its own sustainable development indicator
system, there are more than 670 indicators which developed under the
complex of the GRI, ISO 26000, SA 8000 and COP, reflect the key
interests of stakeholders. Based on those indicators are so easy to write
the CSR report of the enterprise and as guideline to the others in the
industry. There are more than 320 specialists of the CSR in shipping
industry consist of the promotion team of COSCO.
COSCO Group made a five‐year overall arrangement to fully implement
the Global Compact, fulfill social responsibility:
2005 Pilot projects at COSCO Group headquarters and COSCO Container Lines
2006 Expand the scope for implementation of the Global Compact to 15 companies, including logistics, shipping and ship‐repairing. COSCO UK as a pilot oversea.
2007 Expand to 20 second‐tier, shipping, logistics and ship‐repairing companies.
May 1, 2012
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2008 Expand to third‐tier companies.
2009 Expand to overseas companies.
2010 All second‐tier, shipping, logistics, port and shipbuilding and repairing companies.
Actually, COSCO is the most successful company to implement the
Global Compact in China.33 Just like Wei Jiafu, the CEO of COSCO, said
that COSCO Group has endeavored to fulfill its corporate social
responsibilities and to build a resource‐conservative and environment‐
friendly enterprise. COSCO Group Sustainability Report was chosen as a
notable COP by the UN Global Compact for the fourth consecutive year
in 2010.
Schneider Electric: Hegemony Governance Suppliers34
In spite it was considered as a new effort to make transnational
corporations better corporate citizens at the local, national and
international level, the UNGC actually have so weak impact on the
MNCs and its supplier’s whether at local or international level.
As the global specialist in energy management TM with operations in
more than 100 countries, Schneider Group’s 110 000 employees and
more achieved sales of more than 19.6 billion Euros in 2010 on the
world market. Schneider Electric joined the Global Compact in
December 2002 and has primarily worked to share this commitment
with its partners since 2003.The Global Compact brings companies and
non‐governmental organizations together under the aegis of the United
Nations to ‘unite the power of market with the authority of universal
33 Interview, Beijing, March 2012. 34 Data source: Schneider Electric Annual Report 2010.
May 1, 2012
‐ 25 ‐
ideals’. It has been recognized for almost 10 years by the main Socially
Responsible Investment ratings.
Schneider Electric announced that as a member of the UN Global
Compact, it aligns its operations and strategies with ten universally
accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labor, environment,
and anti‐corruption. However, without any standard indicator to
descript the change or achievement in CSR, it is so difficult to deliver
useful information to the society.
By the enforcement of Schneider, there are more than 70 its supplier
signed the GC since 2008. But, its supplier’s behaviors hardly changed
at all.35 China Network of the UNGC have been contacted with the
Schneider headquarter in Beijing, the response is that why they
encourage its suppliers to sign the GC, just because of the command
from Shanghai, an regional headquarter of Eastern China, actually,
themselves, the headquarter in Beijing, is just the General head in
China.
Discussion
Compare with those two case studies, we conclude that there are two
reasons could explain the success and the failure.
First, structural power and relative power have totally different
influence in the hegemony governance. Though COSCO and Schneider
are both the hegemony in each field, the situations that they face are
different. COSCO use it power to governance its subsidiaries and it
control their personnel, capital, technology and information, etc. this
kind of power normally belong to the structural power.
35 Interview, Beijing, December, 2011 & March, 2012.
May 1, 2012
‐ 26 ‐
The structure Power of Hegemony Enterprise
Schneider use its trade power to governance its supplier, what it could
control is the business relative, it has limited influence. Normally, it
belongs to the relative power.
The Relative Power of Hegemony Enterprise
Subsidiarie
Subsidiarie
COSCOTechnology
Capital
Personnel
Information
SchneiderSupplier
Supplier
May 1, 2012
‐ 27 ‐
Second, COSCO developed a series industrial CSR standard based on the
GRI, SA 8000, ISO 9001, ISO 26000 and COP etc. it holds the power of
discourse by using the network power of RSS institutions, and also
could supply the public goods to its cooperators. However, Schneider
only uses the limited knowledge from the COP and ISO 14001, and lost
the moral standpoint.
So, based on the cases study, it could infer that using the network of
the network and transferring the relative power governance to the
structural power governance will improve the efficiency of the UNGC
governance.
The Shift Power from Relative to Structure
That’s the reason why the UNGC start its work with encouraging the
larger companies to sign the UNGC.
Supplier
Hegemongy
Hegemongy
Hegemongy
Hegemongy
Subsidiarie
Subsidiarie
SubsidiarieSubsidiarie
May 1, 2012
‐ 28 ‐
5. Embedded Hierarchical Network
In this section, the paper focuses on the UNGC governance by
outsourcing of the RSS institution and the political and economic
system of enterprise in China. It also explains how external elements
shape the process of the UNGC governance in China.
1) The Creating Network of the UNGC in China (2000‐2012)
From the launching of the UNGC, there are many Chinese enterprises
signed the UNGC, and are more than 270 participants as of March,
2012. China Network did a series hard work in this period. It could be
divided into three stages.
First Stage (2001‐2008)
The Global Compact was formally introduced to China through a high
level meeting in Beijing held in December 2001, hosted by the China
Enterprise Confederation with the cooperation of the United Nations
system in China, UNDP and the Global Compact office. This historic
meeting was chaired by Mr. Chen Jinhua, former President of China
Enterprise Confederation/ China Enterprise Director Association
(CEC/CEDA), and Mr. Deng Pufang, President of the China Disabled
Persons Federation.36
As the employer organization of China and as an most important and
official business association, the CEC is devoted to promoting CSR
among Chinese enterprises from 2001. China Foreign Affairs Ministry
appointed CEC to charge the business of the UNGC in China, CEC
became the first national employer organization in the world to support
“Global Compact”, and plays a key role in promoting “Global Compact”
36 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NetworksAroundTheWorld/local_network_sheet/CN.html
May 1, 2012
‐ 29 ‐
and launched a lot of campaigns.37 In January of 2005, Global Compact
Promotion Office was established as a subordinate agency in CEC.38CEC
is the first national level enterprise organization which signed UNGC.
This official organization whose chairman is a minister‐level officer is
actively pushing forward the development of UNGC in China, and helps
UNGC establish UNGC China network.
Second Stage (2009‐2011)
In February 2009, UN Global Compact Office Executive Director Geogrg
Kell Signed an agreement with Beijing Rongzhi CSR Institute, a private
institute, to authorize Global Compact Network China under Bejing
Rongzhi CSR Institute as the only institute that’s responsible for
coordinating and conducting UN Global Compact relative activities in
China, hence promoting the development of UN Global Compact in
China.
Third Stage (2012‐ )
From the end of 2011, the UNGC reappointed the CEC not Beijing
Rongzhi as China network. On 28 November 2011, Global Compact
Network China was re‐constituted to establish a governance board to
serve the participants in China with a more structured management
system. Mr. Fu Chengyu, Chairman of Sinopec Group and board
member of the Global Compact was elected as the first chairman of the
Global Compact Network China board. The secretariat of the China
network is located at China Enterprise Confederation.39
37 Interview, Beijing, March, 2012. 38 http://gcp.cec‐ceda.org.cn/aboutus.html 39 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NetworksAroundTheWorld/local_network_sheet/CN.html
May 1, 2012
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Compare former two stages, the private institution and official
organization attained different achievements. Rongzhi have
encouraged more than 60% participants to sign the UNGC. See figure
below.
As a professional institute, Ronzhi have more specialists of CSR than
CEC (actually there are only one man charge for the China Network of
the UNGC), why did the UNGC prefer the CEC? There are two explains
about that: Mrs. Sun, the former China network reprehensive, believed
that the government just want get the power back; Mr. Han, the
director of the China network, insisted that the UNGC would like
develop the relationship with China government, and he doubt that the
private institute have its own interest and maybe couldn’t take the
work seriously. Actually, based on the figure above, it could find out
that most of the participants which Rongzhi encouraging are SMEs and
companies, few of them is CSEO, however, most of CSEO participants
was encouraged by the CEC. To encourage the most important
May 1, 2012
‐ 31 ‐
enterprise and very larger enterprise is the core target of the UNGC.
Obviously, the private institute can’t compete with the requirement of
the UNGC. That is the reason why the UNGC re‐back to the CEC.
2) The Creating Network of the RSS institute in Chinese Enterprises
From the COP of the UNGC standpoint, it could find that the COP is only
accepted by the SMEs, there are no CSOEs or larger companies using
the COP as a CSR report guideline because of its oversimplify. However,
the UNGC always try to build work flat for the very large companies and
would like organize the CEO of the leading enterprises conference. The
UNGC overcome the shortages by outsourcing the discourse hegemony
of the CSOEs and the hierarchical structure of Chinese enterprises.
Acknowledged that the COP of UNGC cannot help the participants
implementing the CSR, the UNGC made a connection between the GRI
Guidelines and the UNGC COP in 2007. They hope “the UNGC catalyzed
leadership and innovation in translating key corporate responsibility
commitments into organizational vision and action through its ten
principles. The GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines provides a
means for measuring progress and communicating performance against
the GC principles.”40 And the same thing happens between the UNGC
and the PRI (the Principles for Responsible Investment).41 Based on the
background of the UN, the UNGC builds up a network of the RSS
institutes. What needs to point out is that, what the UNGC to follow is
a To‐down route, based on the hierarchy nature of UN; it is so easy to
shape the process of the creating of the network of RSS institute. See
the figure following,
40The UNGC: Making the Connection: the GRI Guidelines and the Global Compact Communication on Progress, the United Nations Global Compact Office, June 2007. 41 UNEP Finance Initiative & United Nations Global Compact: 5 Years of PRI: Annual Report of the PRI Initiative 2011.
May 1, 2012
‐ 32 ‐
Data source: Georg Kell & David Levin, the Global Compact Network: A Historic Experiment in
Learning and Action, business and society Review, 2008 (108:2), pp. 151‐181.
The indicators of the standard of RSS institute are the source of the
power of governance. The CSOEs of China developed so many
indicators of CSR standard in different industries and build up their
hegemonic discourse in its own industry. See the table following,
The Hegemonic Discourse of CSOEs
B‐insurance GRI SA 8000 ISO 26000 ISO 14001 AA1000 CASS‐CSR Industry indicator
Sinopec
中国石化
CASS‐CSR 54 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 148 42 ‐
CNOOC
中国海油
‐ 132 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SGCC
国家电网
AA1000 121 ‐ + ‐ + + 29 150
May 1, 2012
‐ 33 ‐
CSG
南方电网
_ + ‐ + ‐ ‐ + ‐ 146
CHNG
华能集团
CASS‐CSR 126 ‐ + ‐ ‐ + 176 290
CDT
中国大唐
CASS‐CSR DNV
121 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ + 141 295
CHD
中国华电
CPI
中电投集团
Rongzhi 121 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
China Unicom
中国联通
‐ + ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
China Mobile
中国移动
‐ 121 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ + 24 ‐
Bao Steel
宝钢集团
‐ 122 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ + ‐ ‐
Shougan Steel
首钢集团
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
China Alco
中国铝业
‐ 96 ‐ 36 ‐ ‐ + ‐ ‐
COSCO
中国远洋
DNV 136 ‐ 193 ‐ + ‐ + 793
China Mimetals
中国五矿
DNV 121 ‐ + ‐ + ‐ ‐ ‐
CTS 香港中旅 ‐ 136 ‐ + ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Sinosteel
中国中钢
CASS‐CSR + ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ + ‐ ‐
CRCC
中国铁建
‐ + ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ + ‐ ‐
CDB 国发行 Ernst & Young
89 ‐ ‐ ‐ + ‐ + ‐
ZTC 中兴通讯 ‐ + ‐ + ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Data source: CSR or Sustainability Report, 2009‐2011.
Those CSOEs and the leading enterprises of the industry developed a
series indicator of the CSR and industry indicators depend on the
enterprise and the industry special situation. For example, the COSCO
developed more than 730 indicators in only in the general CSR but in
the shipping industry. ZTC, as the leading global provider of both
telecommunications equipment and handset devices, assessed 406 of
638 new suppliers in 2009 and 175 of 289 new suppliers in 2010.
However, most of the larger companies and all of the SMEs exploited
few indicators and write the CSR report in two pages. In spite of
published the CSR report or the COP, the larger companies and SMEs
May 1, 2012
‐ 34 ‐
frankly admitted that they did not change their behavior.42 It means
that the UNGC have weak impact to this kind of participants in China. In
November, 2011, the UNGC launched new China Network based on ten
CSOEs member board hope those hegemonic enterprise could
governance the UNGC events. And the China Network have ambitious
target with expand 20,000 participants by utilizing the supplier chains in
China before 2020. Is it possible? So it needs to do more inspect about
China enterprise structure.
The Political and Economic Structure of China Enterprises
Depending on network theory, “civil regulations employ private, non‐
state, or market‐based regulatory frameworks to govern multinational
firms and global supply networks,” 43 and of the alternatives, “non‐state
market driven governance systems deserve greater attention because
they offer the strongest regulation and potential to socially embed
global markets.”44 However, just like the discussed above, the special
character of the CSOEs‐‐‐a semi‐state and semi‐market actor‐‐‐‐‐take a
most important role in the process of self‐regulatory in China.
In China, just like her political system, Chinese enterprises also have the
character of hierarchy. On the top of the pyramid, it is the CSOEs, they
monopoly the market in some field and control the loan and debt by
the SOE banks. SOEs and entities directly controlled by SOES, accounted
for more than 40 percent of China’s non‐agriculture GDP.45 Compare
42 Interview, Beijing, December, 2011. Interview, Changsha, China, January, 2012. 43 Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, ed. The Politics of Global Regulation, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University, 2009, p 153. 44 Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can non‐state global governance be legitimate? An analytical framework, Regulation & Governance (2007) 1, 347‐371. 45 Andrew Szamossegi and Cole Kyle, An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China, U.S.‐China Economic and Security Review Commission Report, October 26, 2011.
May 1, 2012
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with thousands of millions SMEs, 122 CSOEs (China’s strategic and pillar
SOEs) have super monopoly in each industry. For example,
Industry Share of Revenue
SGCC, CSG, Huanneng, Datang, Guodian, Huadian, CPIC and Sinohydro
Power 70.6%
SINOPEC, CNPC, CNOOC &Zhen Rong Petroleum & petrochemical
45.3%
COSCO, Sinotrans & CSC, China shipping Company shipping 60.7%
China Mobile, China Telecom & China Network Telecom services 96.2%
Shenhua, CNCG, CCTEG Coal 12.9%
CSAHC, CNAHC, CEAHC, CTHC,CASHC Air transportation 76.2%
Shanghai Auto, Dongfeng, FAW, Changan, Beijing Auto, Guangzhou Autou
Automobile 74.0%
Baosteel, Anshan Steel, Wuhan Steel, Heibei Iron, Shougang
Crude steel production
17.6%
Policy Bank, State‐owned or controlled banks Banking 72.7%
Data Source: Andrew Szamosszegi & Cole Kyle, An Analysis of State‐Owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in
China, U.S‐China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, October 26,2011.
So, the CSOEs obviously have the special economic statues. At the same
time, they also have special political statue in China.
May 1, 2012
‐ 36 ‐
From the figure above, it could find out that the SOE banks and CSOEs
are at the core in the whole economic life. At the same time, different
Chinese SOEs have different political statues:
Minister level: CSOEs (122) and Policy bank (3), State Commercial bank
(5) and some Joint stock commercial bank (7);
Departmental level and lower: local SOEs (24, 9600 or so in 2011) and
local bank branch.
State Council
CIC CBRC Finance Ministry
Huijin SOE Bank
Local Branches
SASAC Local Government
Central SOE
Subsidiarie
Lo
cal
SA
SA
C
Local SOE
Subsidiaries
Pri
vat
e
Co
mp
an
Lo
cal
CB
RC
May 1, 2012
‐ 37 ‐
However, there are more than 5 million private enterprises without any
kind of political rank and never could control the monopoly.
So, there actually exists a hierarch system in Chinese enterprise. The
UNGC launched China Network exploit the CEC, which also operate by
hierarch structure from central government to local government, to
organize the CEO of the CSOEs, and it means that the UNGC plant its
idea into this special political and economic structure. With more and
more hegemon enterprise signing the UNGC, the gap of the single
hegemon enterprise governance will be completed by the others, the
relative power of governance will shift to structure power, an
embedded hierarch network will be created in the future we are
looking forward to seeing.
6. Conclusion
At the beginning of the UNGC launched, some scholars don’t believe it
will produce great impact on the corporate governance in the ten
principles, otherwise it create a new Global Development Commission,
a Global Issue Network or an international policing agency.46 However,
the UNGC finds a new way based on China case. These findings suggest
revisions to our practical understanding of the UNGC, of the role of high
regional official in local network, of the influence of hierarchical
network in idea diffusion.
46 The function of Global Development Commission is coordinating with the Secretary General, the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank, UNCYAD and the UNEP. Global Issue Networks would be coalition of interested nations, private companies, and NGOs, they would set standards and use online polling via the Internet to monitor the participants. The international policing agency is created to use some resources and power (for example ,WTO) to enforce global standards. William H. Heyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN Global Compact, and Global Governance, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 34. 2011. PP.501‐521.
May 1, 2012
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First, the dynamic of Chinese companies signing the UNGC origins from
political validity (or political legitimacy), in spite of holding different
aims: political participation or economic effectiveness. The larger a
company is, the more the enterprise has incentive of political
participation; the smaller the company is, the more the enterprise has
incentive of economic effectiveness. What the paper investigate is that
the CSOEs have to obey the image of the country and the public to keep
it political legitimacy and a good reputation, however the SMEs signing
the UNGC are forced by its trade partner in most of time.
Second, the UNGC try to change its participants’ behaviors by
outsourcing of RSS institutions and insourcing of hegemony enterprises,
however, only structural power of the participants could change other’s
behaviors in reality and the relative power of the participants (the
power of supply chain) have weak effectiveness. Only when an
enterprise enclosed by a structure and relative power network, that’s
the relative power is translate into the structure power, the enterprise
hegemony will work.
Third, the political structure of China’s enterprises shaped the form of
the China Network of the UNGC: it make RSS institutions systematic
and make the China Network functionalization.
By now, there are so many RSS institutions go to China, however, they
encounter different problems: as profit‐RSS institution, the GRI have
not yet established training program or they did not have this kind of
intention, and it is very difficult to find a right way to teach the
companies based on the nature of the region. As a certification
institution, the SA 8000 face very severe problem in China, it brings so
many “troubles” to the SMEs. On one hand, the MNCs bargain with the
May 1, 2012
‐ 39 ‐
SMEs to cut the cost, on the other hand they send the SA 8000 to
identify the suppliers. “The SA 8000 make the money and the MNCs
save the money, you see, the no profit space left for the SMEs. Because
the MNCs just want to buy a ‘responsible’ shirt by 2 dollars, however,
the cost of a ‘responsible’ shirt will increase to 3 dollars by the standard
of the SA 8000. For this reason, some SMEs closed in Quanzhou, Fujian
Province several years before. Unemployment and lower labor
standard, could you tell me which one is more responsible? Why did
not the MNCs pay one more dollar to take more responsibility? Or the
same question to the people who live in the developed countries.”47
ISO 26000 have same situation with the UNGC COP, it needs translate
the principles into standards and it is less practical function. The
launching of UNGC does not only mean that it supply a more principle
and less strict agreement, it means that the UNGC build up a RSS
system on the background of three declarations of the UN, it change
the anarchy regulation to the hierarchy regulation (basing on the UN),
it build up a network for the CSR network. In this regulation network,
the actors could find a best way to achieve the aim for self‐regulation.
At the same time, the UNLN active the local political systems and the
local political systems implant their gene into the UNLN. Why the UNGC
announced that the UNLN of China is the most successful case? It is not
because of the more striving they did, but for the “autonomous orbital
docking” the political structure of UNGC and political structure of China.
Prelude of the UNGC into China is the UNDP and UNGC meet with 8
minister or semi‐minister rank officials and CEO of the CSOEs, it shape
the form of the route of the UNGC into China. The political and
economic structures of Chinese enterprises are belonging to a kind of
47 Interview, Beijing, March, 2012.
May 1, 2012
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hierarchy structure, and the UNGC and Chinese enterprises are so easy
to capture each other. The result is that the UNLN have the
governmental and the international organizational function.
Last not the least, why does the UNGC have so weak effectiveness in
China? One for its so many substitutes (include the GRI, the ISO 26000,
the SA 8000, the Equator Rules, etc.); another is that UNGC is going to
bureaucratization in China. Because of the substitution effect, it is
difficult to assess effectiveness in any of these senses by measuring
real‐world impact: too many variables influence the outputs and effects
of regulation, and the counterfactuals are too complex.48 Because of its
bureaucratization, some enterprise will be forced to sign the GC with
few activities in CSR and many enterprise scare to run away. “We don’t
understand why the UNGC do those kinds of ‘superorganic’ things?
What the UNGC did is just unit the Declarations of the UN and produce
so called ‘ten principles’, it is ridiculous. For example, the new one‐‐‐
Children's Rights and Business Principles‐‐‐few people knew that. You
shouldn’t put everything on the shoulder of enterprises, you shouldn’t
require the enterprise to take the political responsibility which the
government should do, and the UNGC should be the political work flat
as an alternative of inter‐governments.”49 What’s more, with more and
more gradations being formed in the hierarchy, the cost of operation of
the UNGC will rocket up, that will become another problem which the
UNGC needs to consider seriously. All in all, there is a long way with
difficult challenges waiting for the UNGC.
48 Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, the Politics of Global Regulation, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009, p62. 49 Interview, Beijing, April, 2012.