This document provides an overview of some of the technical terms and concepts at issue in the Ayyash et al. case before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The information is presented to aid members of the public, journalists, and other interested parties in understanding the very complex evidence described in other public information documents produced by the Tribunal, such as the monthly STL Bulletin.

This document is provided for informational purposes only, based on publicly-available filings and resources. The Public Information and Communications Section makes no warranty or guarantee of its accuracy or completeness. Neither the parties nor the Trial Chamber nor the Defence Office has formally endorsed any of these contents. Due to lack of consensus among the parties, there may be multiple definitions for a given term, and some remain subject to litigation.

To inform us of any errors or omissions, please contact us at stl-pressoffice@un.org.

Table of Contents Telecommunications Data in Ayyash et al. . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Alleged Telephone Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Analyzing Cell Phone Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Telecommunications Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Communications Service Providers (CSPs) . . . . . . . . . . . 3Call Data Records (CDRs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Call Sequence Tables (CSTs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Cell Site Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Attribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Co-Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Dislocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Cellular Networks: The Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Cell Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Cell Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Start Cell / End Cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Best-Predicted Server Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Analyzing Cell Phone Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Azimuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Cell Dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Cell ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Cell Sector Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Cell Site Information (Basic Cell Information) . . . . . . 6Coverage Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Shape File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Tilt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Electronic Presentation of Evidence (EPE) . . . . . . . . . . 7Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Dokter van der Stamstraat 1, 2265 BC Leidschendam, NetherlandsFor more information please contact the Public Information and Communications Section: stl-pressoffice@un.org Tel : +31 (0) 70 800 3560 / 3828 and +961 4 538 100 (Beirut)

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Primer on Telecommunications Evidence

Guide to understanding the testimony in Ayyash et al.

Document provided by the Public Information and Communications Section of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

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“Principal Six”Members carried Red, Blue, and Yellow phonesAlleged Members: Mr Ayyash and unidentified Subjects 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 (note: Subjects 5 and 7 did not carry Yellow phones)

“Balance of Nine”9Members carried nine of the fifteen Blue phones (distinct from the “Principal Six”)Alleged Members: Unidentified Subjects 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 23, along with three other unidentified individuals

REDnetworkbAlleged Purpose: Preparing for the attack, including observing Mr Hariri’s movementsAlleged Members: The “Principal Six” (including Mr Ayyash)

Alleged Purpose: Planning the attack, including the surveillance of Mr HaririAlleged Members: The “Principal Six” (including Mr Ayyash) and the “Balance of Nine”

BLUEnetworkb

Alleged Purpose: Monitoring and coordinating attack preparations, including preparing the false claim of responsibilityAlleged Members: Messrs Ayyash, Merhi, and former Accused Mr Badreddine

GREENnetworkbAlleged Purpose: Preparing for the attack, including observing Mr Hariri’s movementsAlleged Members: Four of the “Principal Six” (Mr Ayyash and Subjects 6, 8, and 9), and nine other unidentified individuals

YELLOWnetworkb

Alleged Purpose: Coordinating the false claim of responsibilityAlleged Members: Messrs Merhi, Oneissi, and Sabra (additionally, “Associate Purple” tele-phones were in contact with the Purple group)

PURPLEgroupb

Telecommunications Data in Ayyash et al.

The Prosecution relies on telecommunications evi-dence to prove its allegations that former Prime Minis-ter Rafik Hariri was under surveillance by the Accused in the months before his assassination on 14 February 2005, that they carried out the attack, and that they prepared and delivered the false claim of responsibility for the attack.

Alleged Telephone Networks

The Prosecution alleges that five interconnected mobile telephone networks/groups, including two rel-evant subgroups, were involved in planning, preparing, and executing the 14 February 2005 attack. For ease of reference, the Prosecution has coded the networks/groups by colour.

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Analyzing Cell Phone Networks

Telecommunications Data

Information about mobile phones and networks

The telecommunications evidence (or data) presented by the Prosecution includes:

• call data records

• cell site information

• subscriber records1

Communications Service Providers (CSPs)

Mobile telephone companies

The telecommunications data presented by the Prosd-ecution came from three Lebanese (tele)communica-tions service providers:

• Alfa

• MTC/Touch

• Ogero2

Call Data Records (CDRs)

Information about phone calls (the metadata, not the con-tents of the calls themselves)

Call data records (CDRs) contain information that is routinely collected by the Lebanese communication service providers (CSPs), Ogero, MTC/Touch, and Alfa, for customer billing and systems management.3

These records are generated and maintained in the usual and ordinary course of business.4 According to the Prosecution, CDRs record details of telephone calls, including the cell sector used to place each call.5 (Note that cell site information is a separate type of evidence.6) For each voice or SMS call, two CDRs are produced – one for the caller and one for the recipi-ent.7 CDRs are normally only generated when a call actually connects.8

The Prosecution is using CDRs to aid in the attribution of phone numbers to specific individuals to demon-strate their movements during the indictment period, their contacts, and to ultimately link the Accused to the crimes charged in the indictment.9

Call Sequence Tables (CSTs)

Chronological sequences of calls for a specific number over a specified period of time, organized by the Prosecution for analysis

According to the Prosecution, call data records (CDRs) are “without further analysis largely unintelligible,” and must be organized for accessibility, presentation, and analysis.10 The Prosecution has created documents it refers to as Call Sequence Tables (CSTs) to help organize the vast and complex telecommunications data in the Ayyash et al. case. According to the Prose-cution, a CST presents a chronological and complete sequence of calls relating to a particular phone number (the “target” number) over a specified period of time.11 The data related to these calls consists of relevant call data records (CDRs)12 and cell site information

An excerpt from a call data record

An excerpt from a call sequence table

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(jointly referred to as the “underlying material”).13 For each call, CSTs therefore include:

• the other telephone number the target number was in contact with

• the time and date of the call

• the type of call (voice or SMS)

• the call’s duration

• information on the handset used by the target number (IMEI)

• the cell id and name of the cell sector used by the target number at the start of the call

• in certain instances, the cell id and cell sector used at the end of the call (“end cell” data), where that data was available and determined to be relevant.14

According to the Prosecution, reading a CST in con-junction with cell site data provides an indication of the approximate location where the target phone was used for each call.15

Cell Site Analysis

Tracking a phone’s movements over time based on the cell site the phone connects to during a call

According to the Prosecution, analysis of the data underlying the call sequence tables (CSTs) (or cell site analysis) can determine the approximate location and movements of a person from the location(s) of the cell tower(s) that a mobile phone has connected to.16

The Prosecution also uses cell site analysis to determine whether two or more mobile phones “co-locate,” that is, whether the mobile phones use “cell sites” in the same area at approximately the same time and/or travel the same route over the same timeframe, which would permit an inference that the user(s) of the mobiles were together.17 The Prosecution believes that cell site analy-sis can identify locations in which a phone, or multiple phones, have been used; follow a phone’s movements and identify a timeline of use; and identify contacts between different telephones.18

Part of cell site analysis involves the collection of cell site evidence (or “system-related telecommunications data”), including:

• precise locations and names of cell towers and the antennae mounted on them (e.g., azimuth/direc-tion and tilt), obtained from Lebanese telecommu-nications providers

• coverage maps and best-predicted coverage maps19

However, the Defence has objected to the Prosecu-tion’s cell site evidence throughout the proceedings on the grounds that it does not provide definite and precise information about a phone’s location during a call.20 It therefore considers cell site analysis flawed.

Attribution

Connecting a mobile phone to a person

Telephone attribution is the process of establishing that an individual used a particular SIM card (identi-fied by its International Mobile Subscriber Identity, or IMSI, and associated telephone number), over a speci-fied period of time (the attribution period).21

The Prosecution has used several analytical techniques in attributing mobile phones to individuals, including:

• “contact profiles,” i.e., phone numbers in contact with the target phone that contribute to the identi-fication of the user

• cell utilization analysis or “geographic profiling,” conducted by analyzing the call and cell site data to identify patterns of calls and movements

• the use (and change in use or “swapping”) of particular mobile phone handsets (as indicated by the IMEI), which is analyzed to determine if this information is relevant to the user’s identity

• text message content (if available), analyzed in rela-tion to other evidence about the Accused22

Co-Location

Attributing multiple phones to a single user

Co-location analysis is used as a form of attribution evidence where multiple phones are attributed to a single user. It is an analytical technique designed to determine whether an identified person consistently uses two or more phones, at least one of which is a mobile phone.23

Dislocation

The impossibility that a single person is using multiple phonesDislocation refers to a situation where two or more mobile phones are used at a distance apart that could not be physically traveled during the time between calls. When phones are “dislocated,” it means that they have to be in the hands of different users at the relevant time.24

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Cellular Networks: The Basics

A cellular network is a radio network covering a geo-graphic area, divided into “cells,” each of which cond-tain a fixed-location transceiver (known as a cell site or base station) providing coverage within the cell. When joined together, cells provide telecommunications coverage over large geographic areas, allowing cellular devices to communicate. Cells can be different sizes, and tend to be smaller in urban areas and larger in rural ones.25

Mobile phones communicate with cell sites through radio frequencies.26 When a user makes or receives a call on a mobile phone, the data is transmitted from the phone’s antenna to the nearest cell site, and routed onward to its destination through various points in the network.27

When these complicated processes occur, a great deal of data is generated28 (and used by telecommunica-tions providers for billing and other purposes).

Cell

A cell is a geographical area covered by the signal range of a cell site. To avoid interference and provide better service quality, different frequencies are used in neigh-bouring cells.29 Cell coverage can, however, overlap.30

When a phone call is made, the mobile phone con-nects to a cell, which in turn connects the phone to the network to complete the call.31 The strongest cell is known as the “best serving cell.”32 During a voice call, a mobile phone can connect to multiple cells.

When a cell fails, a mobile phone will be unable to connect to that cell and will fall back on the strongest cell in the immediate vicinity.33 Calls redirected from a failed or congested cell will be recorded as originat-ing in the cell the mobile telephone actually connected to.34

Cell Site

A cell site is a fixed-location transceiver consisting of a cell tower (mast) and radio equipment.35 It may also be referred to as a “base station.”36 A cell site can have a number of cell sectors, each with its own antenna.37

The location of a mobile phone during a call can be roughly determined (down to the area covered by the cell) by identifying the cell site that a mobile phone is connected to and looking up the longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates of that cell site’s location.38

When a phone call is made, the signal may switch from one cell site to another for a better-quality signal as the user moves locations.39

Cell Sector

The area covered by a given antenna on a cell site (cell tower) is called a cell sector.40 Each sector provides radio coverage over a proportion of the area of a cell site,41 measured in degrees.42 A cell site is typically divided into three sectors, which may or may not be equal.43

Theoretical cell sectors

Actual cell sectors

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Start Cell / End Cell

The first cell sector the phone connects to when the call begins is called the “start cell,” while the cell sector it is connected to when the call ends is called the “end cell.”44 For SMS messages, only the start cell is typically recorded.

Best-Predicted Server Coverage

The predicted (not actual) level of cellular signal at any given point on a map (without indication of where the coverage is coming from) is referred to as “best-pre-dicted server coverage.”45 It does not necessarily reflect actual coverage, because the landscape of the area may change and propagation tools and maps used to pre-dict coverage do not take into account certain types of “blockage” such as trees or newly-built buildings.46

Best-predicted server coverage can be represented in map form to show the area over which each cell site is predicted to emit the strongest signal.47 These maps are in the form of shape files48 that include mast locations and azimuth directions.49

Coverage is influenced by a number of factors, includ-ing the location in a cell sector from which a call is made, height of the antenna, topography, and sur-rounding buildings. A computer-generated algorithm based on these factors can be applied to generate the approximate predicted coverage of a cell site;50 accord-ing to Prosecution witnesses, the shape files generated through this process are approximations and can be 60-80% accurate.51 Coverage may overlap adjacent or other cell sectors.52 Actual coverage may be verified through techniques such as drive tests (measurement of cellular coverage using equipment driven or walked around an area).53

Analyzing Cell Phone Networks

Azimuth

Direction (in degrees from due north54) in which the cell sector antenna is pointing (and therefore the direc-tion/orientation of a cellular signal).55 Also known as the “bore.”56

Cell Dump

Collection of call data information from all cells cov-ering the area where a crime occurred,57 used to ana-lyze the telecommunications traffic that went through them at a given time58 to identify all mobile phones used at the scene of a crime.59

Cell ID

A unique identity number for each cell site on a cellular network60 (e.g., 041B for Alfa cell PORT1 in Beirut61).

Cell Sector Name

A short-form, easily recognizable identifier correspond-ing to a particular cell identity code62 (e.g., COLA1, COLA2, COLA363 in Beirut).

Cell Site Information (Basic Cell Information)

A set of data about cell sites and their physical loca-tions,64 consisting of the cell sector name, Cell Global Identity (CGI) or “cell identity,” geographic location (in the form of x-y coordinates or eastings/northings), azimuth direction, installation and removal dates, type, and predicted coverage maps.65 This data does not relate to individual users.66

According to the Prosecution, reading a call sequence table (CST) in conjunction with cell site data provides an indication of the approximate location where a target phone was used for each call.67 This assertion is contested by the Defence.68

Coverage Map

Coverage maps are shape files that show the predicted area of coverage by each cell sector.69 According to Prosecution witnesses, the coverage maps generated through this process are approximations and can be 60-80% accurate.70

The Defence has objected to how some of these files were generated in the Ayyash et al. case, and consid-ers them to be unreliable.71 In particular, the Defence notes that some of the coverage maps were produced using data from later years, and therefore may not accurately represent coverage for the years at issue (2004 and 2005).72

The Prosecution considers that the coverage maps are reliable on their face and that the Defence’s objections

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To better understand the legal terms used in this and other STL documents, please consult our trilingual Glossary of Legal Terms.

relate only to the weight the Trial Chamber will ulti-mately place on the coverage maps in its judgment.73

Shape File

A data format for Geographic Information System (GIS) software that spatially describes vector features such as points, lines, and polygons. It can plot geo-graphical features such as water, vegetation and “urban” features such as roads and can specifically plot cover-age for urban or rural areas. The layering of whatever

is plotted allows the production of maps with different selected features, such as an azimuth.74

Tilt

Degree of tilt of an antenna on a cell tower (and therei-fore angle of its signal),75 often referred to as “uptilt”76 or “downtilt.”77 Tilt can be adjusted to avoid another cell’s coverage or avoid coverage of an area a network does not want to cover (known as overshoot).78

Electronic Presentation of Evidence (EPE)

Because of the complex and technical nature of the evi-dence, the Prosecution is using specialized software to present its analysis of telephone activity. The software database contains five main types of evidence:

• mapping information (map of Lebanon)

• landmark information (points of interests and routes within Lebanon)

• cell site information, including locations and orien-tations of cell sites

• telephone call information, retrieved from call sequence tables

• attribution-related information79

While various forms of Electronic Presentation of Evi-dence software has been used in domestic jurisdictions, the EPE used at the STL was specifically designed for the Ayyash et al. case and to visually represent this type of data in this case. The STL was the first international criminal court or Tribunal to use EPE.80

Endnotes 1 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Decision on the

Admission of Call Sequence Tables Related to the Movements of Mr Rafik Hariri and Related Events, and Four Witness Statements, 31 October 2016, para. 3 [“CST Admission Decision (Movements of Hariri)”].

2 Ibid.

3 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Decision on Five Prosecution Motions on Call Sequence Tables and Eight Witness Statements and on the Legality of the Transfer of Call Data Records to UNIIIC and STL’s Prosecution, 6 May 2015, para. 2 [“Decision on 5 CST Motions”].

4 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Prosecution Motion For the Admission of Red Network-Related Call Sequence Tables and Related Statement, 28 January 2015, para. 2 [“OTP Red Network Motion”].

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Exhibit P550, p. 37.

8 Ibid., p. 38.

9 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Public Redacted Version of the Prosecution Motion for the Admission of Call Sequence Tables Related to the Accused Ayyash, 7 October 2016, paras. 16-17 [“OTP Ayyash CST Motion”].

10 OTP Red Network Motion, para. 13.

11 Ibid., para. 11.

12 Ibid., para. 2.

13 Ibid., para. 5.

14 Decision on 5 CST Motions, para. 2.

15 OTP Red Network Motion, para. 12.

16 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Decision on Four Prosecution Motions on Call Sequence Tables Related to Salim Jamil Ayyash, Hassan Habib Merhi, Assad Hassan Sabra, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, and Five Witness Statements, 31 October 2016, para. 7; OTP Ayyash CST Motion, para. 19.

17 OTP Ayyash CST Motion, para. 19.

18 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Corrected Version of “Prosecution Motion for the Admission of Cell Site Evidence,” 23 June 2015, paras. 9-10 [“OTP Cell Site Evidence Motion”].

19 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Reasons for Deci-sion Admitting Prosecution’s Cell Site Evidence, 26 October 2016, para. 6 [“Cell Site Evidence Decision”].

20 Cell Site Evidence Decision, paras. 6, 36-43, 45-49.

21 OTP Ayyash CST Motion, para. 15.

22 Ibid., para. 18.

23 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Redacted Amended Consolidated Indictment, 12 July 2016, para. 14(c).

24 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 20 April 2017 (Testimony of John Edward Philips—PRH435), p. 14, lines 3-9 [“Philips, 20 April 2017”].

25 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 20 August 2015 (Testimony of John Edward Philips—PRH435), p. 2, lines 10-16 [“Philips, 20 August 2015”].

26 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 18 August 2015 (Testimony of John Edward Philips—PRH435), p. 77, lines 17-18 [“Philips, 18 August 2015”].

27 Ibid., p. 77, line 16-p. 78, line 11.

28 Ibid., p. 58, lines 5-11.

29 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 26 August 2015 (Testimony of John Edward Philips—PRH435), p. 64, lines 7-11 [“Philips, 26 August 2015”].

30 Ibid., p. 34, line 18-p. 35, line 10.

31 Philips, 20 August 2015, p. 28, lines 4-18.

32 Ibid., p. 28, lines 11-18.

33 Philips, 26 August 2015, p. 54, lines 15-22.

34 Ibid., p. 23, line 7-p. 24, line 7.

35 Trial Hearing, 19 August 2015 (Testimony of John Edward Phillips—PRH435), p.36, lines 3-18 [“Philips, 19 August 2015”].

36 Philips, 18 August 2015, p. 77, lines 19-21.

37 Cell Site Evidence Decision, para. 26(b).

38 Ibid., para. 26(a); OTP Cell Site Evidence Motion, paras. 13-14.

39 Philips, 20 August 2015, p. 31, line 15-p. 33, line 9.

40 Philips, 19 August 2015, p. 40, lines 4-12; Cell Site Evidence Deci-sion, paras. 23(a), 26(b).

41 Philips, 19 August 2015, p. 39, line 24-p. 40, line 3.

42 Cell Site Evidence Decision, para. 23(a).

43 Philips, 19 August 2015, p. 41, line 25-p. 42, line 7.

44 OTP Cell Site Evidence Motion, para. 14, footnote 15.

45 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 20 July 2016 (Testimony of PRH705), p. 88, lines 2-20 [“PRH705, 20 July 2016”].

46 Ibid., p. 94, lines 4-18.

47 Ibid., p. 88, lines 7-20.

48 Cell Site Evidence Decision, para. 6.

49 Ibid., para. 16.

50 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Public Redacted Version of Annex A to “Sabra Defence Response to ‘Prosecu-tion Motion for The Admission of Witness Statement Signed by PRH707’”, dated 26 February 2016, 28 April 2016, p. 4.

51 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 16 February 2016 (Testimony of PRH707), p. 80, lines 8-22 [“PRH707, 16 February 2016”]; STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 21 April 2016 (Testimony of PRH707), p. 37, lines 6-14 [“PRH 707, 21 April 2016”]; STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 9 May 2016 (Testimony of PRH705), p. 16, lines 3-6 [“PRH705, 9 May 2016”].

52 Cell Site Evidence Decision, para. 6.

53 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 5 May 2016 (Testimony of PRH705), p. 93, lines 6-11 [“PRH705, 5 May 2016”].

54 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 8 September 2016 (Testimony of Andrew Fahey—PRH263), p. 21, lines 14-15, [“Fahey, 8 September 2016”].

55 PRH705, 5 May 2016, p. 80, lines 8-16.

56 Fahey, 8 September 2016, p. 21, line 14.

57 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 31 August 2016 (Testimony of John Edward Philips—PRH435), p. 32, line 24-p. 33, line 8 [“Philips, 31 August 2016”].

58 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 8 May 2017 (voir dire of Mr Andrew Donaldson – PRH230), p. 35, lines 22-24.

59 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 5 April 2017 (Testimony of Gary Platt—PRH147), p. 74, line 25-p. 75, line 6 [“Platt, 5 April 2017”].

60 Decision on 5 CST Motions, para. 2, footnote 14.

61 Cell Site Evidence Decision, para. 23(f ).

62 Decision on 5 CST Motions, para. 2, footnote 14; OTP Cell Site Evidence Motion, para. 13, footnote 11.

63 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 8 February 2017 (Testimony of PRH147), p. 13, line 22; p. 67, line 5; p. 11, line 22.

64 OTP Red Network Motion, para. 2.

65 OTP Cell Site Evidence Motion, para 13.

66 Ibid., para 2.

67 OTP Red Network Motion, para. 12.

68 See, for example, STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Response to the “Prosecution Motion for the Admission of Cell Site Evidence” dated 12 June 2015, 6 July 2015 [“Oneissi Cell Site Evi-dence Response”].

69 Cell Site Evidence Decision, para. 22.

70 PRH707, 16 February 2016, p. 80, lines 8-22; PRH707, 21 April 2016, p. 37, lines 6-14; PRH705, 9 May 2016, p. 16, lines 3-6.

71 Cell Site Evidence Decision, para. 7.

72 Oneissi Cell Site Evidence Response, paras. 6, 18-27.

73 Cell Site Evidence Decision, para. 59.

74 Ibid., para. 26(b).

75 Ibid.; PRH705, 5 May 2016, p. 80, lines 20-25.

76 Philips, 19 August 2015, p. 99, lines 16-19.

77 Ibid., p. 99, lines 2-7.

78 Cell Site Evidence Decision, para. 26(b); PRH705, 5 May 2016, p. 80, lines 20-25.

79 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL-11-01/T/TC, Trial Hearing, 16 September 2015 (Testimony of Andrew Fahey—PRH263), p. 24, lines 4-13.

80 STL, Seventh Annual Report (2015-2016), 11 March 2016, p. 19.

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