EPISCOPAL CHURCHPEOPLE. for a FREE SOUTHE~RN AFRICA E c s A Phone: (212) 477-0066

339 Lafayette Street New York, N.Y. 10012

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#28 20 December 1985

THE ANGOLA WAR

There are growing indications that the South African Defence Force is about to launch another invasion into .Angola. Troops , armor and artillery are being massed on the northern Namibia border and as the stocy below says SADF units are how in southwestern Angola.

In the southeast, UNITA is girding for a renewed campaign against the army of the People's Republic of .Angola.

The Pretoria regime is desperately working to draw the United States into the southern Africa conflict.

Pretoria has over the years conducted its repeated crackdowns on dissident South Africans as well as attacking neighboring states during holiday pe­riods. Christmas and the New Year are at hand. Keep eyes and ears fo­cussed on southern Africa.

-~retoria troops go back into.Angola

:By Victoria Brittain · drawal, pr~sumabfy preferring · Two battalions of South Afri· to concentrate its forces fur·

can troops ·have ·invaded south- the~ east .where an. olfensi.ve ern Angola's Cunene province agamst Umta formations, reif!· and are occupying the de- forced by . several. South Afn· stroyed towns of· Cuamato and ·can battalions, raged through· Calueque, according to Ango- out August and September. Ian military sources. . . After hellvy losses on both

The South Afri~ail attack on Sides durmg a battle near the Angolan border guards at Mavmga s~ wee~~ ago •.. ~~w· Calueque dam came on Decem- ~outh Afnc~- military lnitia· ber 2 and left 14 Angolan sol- tives. began, .mcludmg ~he up­diers dead, the sources said. gradmg of Umta equipment.

· The South African forces The South Afr~c~s are be­moved to Cuamato ·four days he~ed to be ~vmg ~entron later artillery to Umta. Until now

· . . . Umta has been using 106 mm The South Afncan mthtary eannon with a ·range of three to

formally anne •lced the ~nd of , four miles. Kentron artillery .their four. year occupation of would give· them a range more southern Angola on May 17 m than twice as great a ceremony . pre.si.ded over by South Africa's determination General Gent VIl~oen, but sev- to continue a sporadic . air war eral hundred soldiers were left after the intervention with Md· at Calueq.ue for another month rage fighter bombers over the be_fore Wlthdrawu~g to the Na- .Mavinga battiefield was shown ~Ibian bord~r. Five South Af. clearly last month when· a Mi· ncan battalions remamed at rage fighter brought down a the border and have made nu- Soviet plane on a regular food m~rous small attacks before ·supply run to Cui to Cuanavale this larger one. 200. ~iles inside Angola. Unita

There has been a state of said m Lisbon. that their guer-. permanent military tension on rillas brought down the the border and regular· recon· Antonov. ·

· naissance fiights . over Cunel!e Operations against scattered from. ~outh Afncan bases m Umta groups in the east are Namibia. cont.inuing after the . retaking

The ;Angolan army did not of Cazombo near the Zaire bor­move tnto Cunene in force · der in September disorganised· after the South african with· a Unita base and supply route.

THE GUARD IAN Thursday November 2l 1985

Pretoria's arntour 'on Angola border'

Dy our Foreign Elaff South Africa has massed

20.000 men and 150 tanks on the Angolan border in prepara· tion for . a new invasion. ac­·cording to a senior Angolan army officer.

The force would be the big­gest Soutl~ An·ican army de· ployment since Pretoria's Oper­ation Askari two years ago which attempted to push north from areas of Angola's Cunene province. Last year. South Af· rica claimed to have with· drawn its ground troops rrom Angola, although the Angolans have repeatedly said that an unspecified number of troops have continued to fight inside their country.

The new invasion. if it takes place, would be the second Phase of a South African ef­fort to .save its ally, Unita,

from a recent .series of counter-offensives by the Ango­lans. In September. South Afri­can air strikes and attacks by its ground forces along with Unita troops, some of whom were brought in by South Afri­can planes, managed to turn the Angolans back near Mavinga.

Word of the.new massing of troops in northern Namibia came rrom Major Luis Faceira, the commander of the fifth po­litico-military region of Lubango. He said that ·the South African force consisted of 150 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, 300 mortars, several hundred armoured personnel . ca.n-iers, and 80 planes and I helicopters. ·

The troops were ranged in three brigades, 18 infantry I battalions, and two landing and assault battalions.

----------------------------------------1

GUESS WHO'S COMING TO THE U.S.A.?

Jonas Savirnbi is due to come to the USA next month. The UNITA leader's appearance in Washington in January ~9~6 coiJ;cides with ~e re~sernbling of Co~gress whe::e. among its top foreign policy deCJ.s~ons ~11 be on leg~slat~on that would g~ ve bo:th rrdl~ terry and non-military aid to the dissident Angola group.

Meanwhile, behind the scenes , the Reagan administration is pursuing its own methods of supplying military hardware to UNITA - covertly. During the Christmas and New Year holidays American voters can face their Senators and Representatives directly in their home districts to argue against this misadventure in the southern Africa war.

A6 L THB NBW YORK TIMBS, MONDAY. DBCBMBBR 16, 1985

·Conservatives Push for U.S .. Aid to Angola· R~bels

, .,,._ -~V!...I tv L...l 1, ,.._.,UI'ILJM I IU I'IUV I::IVIUL.;;.n I~UV

Botha's ·British IIi WHEN the Pretoria regime imposed protected by a white minority regime in new restrictions on the Press a week ago, OLIVER TAMBO; president of the African Pretoria. It is for this reason that we are it was in the hope that by pushing the being· asked to "'"Jisarm ourselves and ugly reality of apartheid violence out of National Congress, ends his. two-week visit leave the Borha regime with a monopoly sight, the issue of South Africa would to Britain convinced that time is running of arms. drift out of the minds of the interna- · · . It is also strange that those .who tiona! public. out for the traditional supporters of white present us with this demand are the

P. w. Botha's hopes will not be rule l'n s·outh Afrl'ca as opposl'tl'on to samepeoplewhoopposetheimposition realised. The question· of apartheid will · ' of sanctions against apartheid South not drop out of world politics. On the apartheid grows. Africa. The fact of the matter, however, contrary, millions of people in many is that the failure to impose sanctions is countries, including the Unit!!d King- the surest guarantee that our country

. dom, will continue to act in their various democratic South Africa and, therefore, we must renounce violence. The British will be torn apart by a bitter armed ways to help bring about genuine change to the abolition.of the pernicious system Prime Minister has even managed to · conflict which will be very costly in in South. Africa. . of racism, we cannot accept the reach the extraordinary conclusion that · terms both of lives and property.

The real problem that the Botha suggestion that we should think and the violence of South African society This is for. the simple reason that as regime faces in this country is not one of function within the racial parameters set cannot be ascribed to the. apartheid long as the apartheid regime has the televi~ion pictures. The question· is how by the social order we seek to destroy. system; In her remarkable view we, the· material resources to maintain its long Pretoria can continue to count on The security and happiness of all the victims of tyranny, are to blame for the machinery of repression, so long will it the open or tacit support of its· people of our country can be guaranteed violence unleashed against us. use that machinery to protect the system traditional allies. To put the matter in only by the birth of a democratic The argument that we should not use of white minority domination. another way, those in the UK who have society. Any arrangement which per- violence to achieve the political objec- The unprecedented anti-apartheid given and continue to extend aid and petuates racial divisions and privilege is rive of a democratic South Africa ought, rally in London last weekend was more comfort to racism in South Africa and a prescription for continuing tensions surely; to be preceded by 'th!! demand than ample demonstration that the increasingly having to answer the and conflict. that the Pretoria regime should not use British public has understood the vital question whether these old positions We consider it a matter of utmost violence to maintain the system of white , importance of sanctions as a peaceful

. serve their interests. importance that our white compatriots minority rule. This demand is, of way of helping to bring about It is now possible to state the matter . should be persuaded to recognise the course, not made, because those who are democratic change in South Africa.

in these terms because significant correctness of this proposition. Accor- · against our tak!flg up arms aceept it as Hopefully,. in the end, the British sections of the British establishment dingly, we would like to see as many perfectly legitimate that the white Government will heed the views of the­have, at last and in their own interests, whites as possible involved in the minority should use force to maintain public and abandon the delusion that come · to the conclusion that the struggle to bring about such. a demo- itself in positions of power. British jobs and property are best apartheid system in South Africa inust cratic society. White South Africans The· spurious 'principle' that it is secured by a bloody civil war,in ~th go. should see themselves not as part of the impermissible for us to use violent Afrtca. . · . ·

But having come to that conclusion,· problem but as part of the solution. means to liberate ourselves cannot be It would be legitimate for any reai:ler. many of these leading Britons still Spurious , principle • . s~sta~ed eithe~ by logic or ·by the . of this news~aper to pose the questio~: ·.·. entertain the notion that change should _ · •· , , histoccal practice of even· the ·present' · why ~hen, g~ven all that we, have said, 1 be effected in a manner that is By particii>ating in the democratic~. British ·Government. If the· Britisn·'' Botha' should fear that he is losing and comfortable for them. They pray that struggle as agents of change, our white · Government were indeed guided by will lose his traditional allies. Having the new South Africa that must compatriots will help to break down the· ·such a principle, then the Lancaster spent a fortnight talking to a broad inevitably come into being will conform racial barriers which divide our country House conference which resolved the cross-section of leading British public to their conception of what a just South and contribute to· the formulation of a Zimbabwe question should never have personalities, including the leaders of all African society should look like. In solution that accords with the interests taken place. After all, the Patriotic the parties represented in Parliament · other words,. the recognition of the of all our people, both black and white. Front was continuing its armed struggle·. (with the exception of the Conser­legitimacy of our cause is not accompa-· Sadly, many prominent British people even as the new Zimbabwe constitution vatives),. the anti-apartheid mov~m~nt, nied by an equal acceptance of our right dismiss this perspective as • idealistic.'· ·Was being negotiated in London. t~de uniOnists, ):lankers, mdustriahsts, to decide the ways and means by which · They cannot conceive· of the white. . The problem is not that we are edt tors_, . academics, local gove~e~t to liberate our.;elves as well as the population acting other than as a white ·violating some principle. What is at authonttes, and so on, one thwg IS content of that liberation. group in defence of exclusive white · issu~ is ·that ·we have- refused to clear.

Thus we arrive at the ironic position interests. What is presented as realism ' surrender and submit to white minority This is that the series of don'ts that whereby the oldest democracy in the is, to us, encouragement of the wllite. · rule. Denied all constitutional means to . we are presented with are a last ditcll . ' world seeks to persuade us that population of our country to continue to· , bring about change, we were expected. attempt to postpone reaching the democracy is bad for our country. see themselves not as South Africans but to sit back and wait on the magnanimity inevitable conclusion that Britain must Grave misgivings are expressed about as white South Africans, . with a ... of our rulers to take pity on us. . take decisive action to isolate apartheid

. our adopting the' British model 'of one recognised international right to main- That, of course, we could· not and South Africa and support the ANC and. person one vote in a unitary State. tain their· privileged positions. This does shall not do, in much the same way as the democratic majority in our country. Rather; it is suggested, we should opt . nothing_ to advance the process of the peoples of Europe could not but take Since those at the top still hide for aJederalsystem. It is clear to us that change wourcountry. On the contrary, up arms when.the Nazis imposed their .behind excuses to run away from these 75 years after theformation of the Union it is· an. argume~t enco~:~raging the tyrannical rule on so m,any countries. inevitable conclusions, ~he British of South Africa, important political and · perpetuation of raCial conflict. · Like them, we have no choice but to people are acting from below to make bn~iness circles in the UK still refuse to · The perspective which ceritres the- .. fight and to sue for victory. Many of · those objectives a reality. Their actions, tum their backs on the idea of white process of change in our country on the those who reject- this position do so combined with those of our people in . privilege. · need to accept a white veto also finds because they think that British interests. South Africa will leave Borha's

But :is a movement committed to a expression in the persistent demand that in South and southern Africa are best traditional allies with very few choices.

WHAT ttoU . : ·' DONI KNOW;· WON'T HURT us .• ~ .· . . ·· -

8 Weekly Magazine of the BBC nm LISTENER 7 NOVEMBER 1985 . I Ttl!! Utn!NeR 7 NOVEMBeR t98S

John B~ake & John Smithson: Botha's dilemma

South Africa's implacable Conservatives

John Blake and John Smithson report on the right-wing backlash in South

~Africa.

' W by have you bought a gun?' we asked Peter Willimott, an English expatriate now living in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. He grinned sheepishly as he weighed his new Smith & Wesson .45 automatic from hand to hand: 'I was thinking of taking a trip back home to visit Birmingham or Brixton.' He dissolved into laughter and so did the other dozen white South Africans who had joined the local Sun­day morning gun club. As more and more white South Africans are taking precautions to defend themselves against the spread of black unrest into their own privileged suburbs, there is evident satisfaction in troubles beyond their frontiers. Any challenge to their apartheid way of life is countered with reference to one or other examples from a catalogue of world chaos or foreign calumny-the Ethiopian famine, the one-party state in Zimbabwe, British race riots or, of course, the conspiracy of the internation­al media. The ostrich is a South African bird.

Mrs Thatcher said in the House of Commons last week: 'The apartheid system must come to an end and I think we are going the right way of getting it to come· to an end, through the method of negotiation.' If she believes that international persuasion will change tbe minds of South Africa's white minority, she fails to take into account their determination to main­tain their way of life. Last week the ruling National Party lost a by-election to the ultra right-wing Herstigte National Party. Both the HNP and the other extremist conservative party increased their share of the vote. It seems the government's constituency is in no ·mood for reform. They are determined to resist the inter­nal unrest, believing strongly that black revolu­tion will be contained by detentions without trial granted by the state of emergency. Equally, they are determined to resist outside pressure, either the 'methods of negotiation' advocated by Mrs Thatcher or more far-reaching econ­omic sanctions. When President Botha vigorous" ly rejected 'prescription from abroad', in a speech last week, he accurately echoed the voice of the majority of South Africa's whites who he hopes will keep him in power. 'Whai has abroad got to do with us?' says Helene van Dalen, who runs the Conservative Party in Uitenhage with her husband Leon 'Are we telling England how to govern their 'people? It is our affair, we have· to cope with it. We will do it our way. We are going to live our lives as . we used to live them.' . Uitenhage is 15 miles from Port Elizabeth. It ~~ one of the towns in the Eastern Cape Pro­VInce, founded on the front line of historical

confrontation between white settlers and the descending tribes of native Xhosa pastoralists. Now Uitenhage's whites see themselves as the barometer of South African politics. 'We are the seed-box of South Africa, something that happens here will later spread to cover the whole country,' says Jacobus van Niekerk, Minister of the Dutch Reform Church in Uitenhage's working-class white district De Mist. His congregation are Afrikaners, the de­scendants of Dutch, French and German im­migrants who first settled in South Africa in the 17th century. Their farmer forefathers (Boers) trekked from the English-dominated Cape to find land on the frontier with African tribes. When drought and land starvation forced them to seek work in the towns of the growing industrial economy of the Twenties and Thir­ties, they became, in one of the strange contra­dictions of South Africa's political vocabulary, 'poor whites'. It was their interests, in part, at least, that institutionalised apartheid (job re· servation, segregated housing and education, etc.) was designed to defend. Their vote was the bedrock of the National Party, which came to power in 1948, and they have supported it ever since. No\v, however, their blind faith in the National government is shaken by any prospects of 'reform'.

'I don't know what to expect of the govern­ment any more,' says Reginald van Rooyen, a retired shop steward from the car factories. 'The government just allows the blacks to swamp all the towns and every week you hear of old people being murdered. If they come

and live here among us, what is going to happen to us? Why can't the blacks develop separately? What is wrong with that?'

Uitenhage is represented in Parliament by a Nationalist MP, but the recently formed Con· servative Party has strong support. The Con-

1 servatives are implacably opposed to the con· · cessions President Botha's Nationalist govern- . ment has so far offered South Africa's non- 1

white population. They campaigned against laSt 1

year's new constitution which set up the tri­cameral Parliament with its separate white, coloured and Asian chambers, even though the non-white chambers have minimal powers. Any further reform, such as a fourth chamber for blacks,let alone one man, one vote, in a unitary state, is anathema to most factions of the white ruling group. Uitenhage's mayor, an Afrikaner lawyer. Joseph Kitching, says, ·we will defend ' with our lives what we've got because we've got : nowhere else to go.' !

Uitenhage's 30,000 whites, outnumbered four i to one by other races, are typical of the people ; who would have to vote on whatever deal' international pressure groups may think they l can wrencb from South Africa's apartheid reg- : ime. Helene van Dalen of Uitenhage's Con-i servatives says: 'The blacks are used to il! primitive way of life; they don't understand our ways. They do the labouring in South Africa because they are not capable of doing the. thinking. Blacks are only in a job position in South Africa, they are not part of the popula_. lion as the white, Indian or coloured groupS.':

President Botha says he. will press on with ··

reform but the mood of the white constituency

leaves him little room for manoeuvre

The theory of 'separate development', the apartheid rationale of 'divide and rule' which · denies the possibility of non-racial society, is} still recited as a creed by the Conservative Party. 'Blacks have government in their homeland5-they can't expect to have a vote i.i threatened by outside or internal pressures and their homeland 8s well as in the land they arci he clamps down on increasing black dissent working.' ! with the brutal state of emergency.

In previous centuries, · when Boers were The case of Barry Erasmus, the white adviser attacked by the indigenous population, they appointed earlier this year to negotiate with· drew iheir ox-wagons around them in a circle Uitenhage's blacks, shows the irppasse. Presi­or 'laager'. Now whites feel besieged again an~ dent Botha's Cabinet want him to establish a ranks of the laager are broken at peril. During black council for the township. No sooner had the recent boycott of white-owned business, he begun discussions with black representatives one white shop did a roaring trade. It was than many of them were detained. By Septem· .owned by a local rugby her?• Cheeky Watson, ber the newly built black council chamber was who had turned down SPt;Jngbok ~lours be·, being used to billet the troops who patrolled cause he wanted. to play his sport With blacks, the townships daily. Erasmus tries to hide his and ~oloure~. His reward .from the black com-.·~ embarrassment. By South African standards he l!'umty for hu act of conSCience was an ~xemr; is a liberal Nationalist. 'I will grant blacks a lion ~om the boycott, but for the wh1tes hisl place in the sun as long as I can have my behaVIOUr "Yas an act of. treachery that could' place.' He enthuses about the government's not be f?rg~ven. A. few weeks ago he told us; plans to Jet the blacks hold leasehold rights on '11te wh1tes are trying to get me out of town. property he sees the relaxation of regulations ~ince then Watson's home .in Port Elizabeth, about th~ numbers of black people allowed to JUS! down the road from Uatenhage, wa~ fire- seek work in towns as a great step forward. He bombed _and destroyed. It would. be foohs~ to , envisages a time when white people will grant underes!1mate the strength ?f Afrikaner feehn~. blacks a vote in the fourth chamber (on a

In sptte of the by-election ~et~acks, Presa· franchise restricted by property, wealth or edu­dent Botha says he'~ press o!l With reform'; bui cational qualifications), but when asked t~e mood of the whale constituency affo~ds him whether white people would ever be prepared

/ w:~:n~~~;; ~po=:~~r~~~~e~h:~ ~~~ ~ar;~:~ .~:.t~~. ~f d:~~:~h~~::. ~e a:~:~~ planation of the curious double-talk of their i their feelings well. The Conservative candidate rhetoric. President Botha tells the world thatl Leon van. Dalen is defiant: 'We are prepared to a~~eid is a thin~ o! the past-!hat &!I blacks go to the very end to defend what is ours. My Wlthm So~llh '\f?ca s . boundanes ~II have forefathers fought for this country. If it is South African atizenshap and that his Presi- . necessary, we will fight as well.'

i dent's Council is urge!ltiY considering methods' :John Blakt and John Smithson reported from South of _black representatiOn at both local 1nd ! A[riaJ in 'Whitts Only' for Granada Ttlevision's national levels-but at home he has to rea5sure World in Action". his electorate that their way of life will not be

1

_ _ ..

/

IButhelezi hasn't got majority urban Zulu support, shows poll

JNKATHA supremo Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, 57, is a tough­minded, shrewd politician of e1t0rmous energy and matching ambition who should never be under­estimated, but, as the situation in South Africa deteriorates, there is a tendency in some quarters to exaggerate his power.

The Sunday Times did so recently when it headlined a report on a scathing attack on the African National Congress by Buthelezi: "Zulus line up against ANC."

Beeld followed suit shortly afterwards when it published a cartoon showing heavily-armed ANC guerrillas shivering in fear as Zulu warriors approached on the horizon.

But Buthelezi does not command the

the UDF and black consciousness radicals who shared the UDF stand on key issues without endorsing its specific ideological stance.

Zulus living outside the core Zulu territory of Natal-KwaZulu constitute a numerically important sector of the . six million-strong Zulu people. The majority of people in Soweto are Zulus.

Orkin's findings indicate that Buthelezi's support among urban blacks is almost exclusively confined to Zulus.

Among the small proportion of non­Zulus in Natal it is 14 percent. Elsewhere it is only 3 percent

Summarising his findings in . a sentence, Orkin said: "Buthelei.i delivers a minority of Zulus in Natal,

By PATRICK LAURENCE

a smaller minority of Zulus elsewhere and a negligible proponion of non­Zulus."

Extrapolating from these results, he concluded: "If Buthelezi gets power it mC!I!lS black civil war."

There is, of course, a concrete reason why conservative whites, whether in the business community or in the ranks of the National Party, tend to exaggerate Buthelezi's power and to magnify the number of supponers he will "deliver" in the event of an internal settlement.

It is manifest, Orkin contended, in the " moderate" political profile of Buthelezi loyalists.

lnkatha members are less inclined to

WEEKLYMAIL, October11.to0ctober17, 1985 5

favour socialism than ANC-Tutu­UDF (70 percent against 77 percent) , markedly less disposed to endorse strike action (40 percent against 80 percent) and economic pressure including disinvestment (barely <>ver 40 percent to nearly 70 percent) and '!fe significantly Jess prone to approve of "armed struggle" (less than 10 percent against a natimfal average of more than 70 percent for the ANC and UDF).

These traits strongly commend Buthelezi to white businessmen and politicians casting about anxiously for a leader with whom to make a deal, as the spectre of continuing violence anfl insurrection haunts them.

Buthelezi has moved sharply towaid the capitalist camp as his relations

Support for the political

·strategies ·of Buthelezi, Tutu, the UDF and ANC at September 1985

with his erstwhile colleagues, the ANC, ~ave become increasingly acnmontous.

In a significant recent speech Buthelezi clearly pinned Jnkatha's colours to the capitalist mast.

'"I think many black people are influenced to think that the best-way to establish an EI Dorado here is through a socialist future," he declared.

"I have myself come to the conclusion that despite its faults the free enterprise capitalist system is the best economic system which man has ever devised."

An interesting, and perhaps even signficant feature, noted by Orkin is that Buthelezi, judging from these remarks, is markedly more pro­capitalist than even his followers.

support of all Zulus or even,r,---~~~~~----~~~~--------~==========~~~-7 .. ~-~--~.7"'~--=--~--~--~-~---~-~--=--~--=-~~~~~~------~------------------------­according to a recent survey conducted by sociologist Mark Orkin I and the Institute of ·Black Research, a ! majority of urban Zulus. Those \ findings were demonstrated \ empirically on the same day as · Buthelezi's verbal assault on the ANC.

On that day an Inkatha impi armed ! with spears and kerries left Umlazi - t where Buthelezi and King Goodwill i Zwelithini were speaking at a King Shaka commemoration meeting -for the neighbouring township of Larnontville, where it was attacked by pro-United Democratic Front youth. Six people died in fighting, which vividly illustrated that even within the heart of Zulu-dominated KwaZulu­Nata! Buthelezi's political sovereignty

· is challenged. Orkin's' survey of 800 urban blacks i

in 10 key metropolitan a>~as shows that in Natal-KwaZulu Buthelezi does not command majority support among urban blacks.

Buthelezi and Inkatha drew support from 34 percent of the respondents against 19 percent for the ANC, 8 percent for Bishop Desmond Tutu and ·10 percent for the United Democratic Front and movements which see eye to eye with it on key issues of the day such as strikes, disinvestment and "armed struggle."

Noting that the anti-Buthelezi Cl1Il1p drew a combined total of 37 percent, Orkin commented of urban blacks in Natai-KwaZulu: '"Even here, Buthelezi can only deliver a minority. Even in his own territory Buthelezi represents a minority."

Orkin's appraisal does not, of course, take accoun· Jf rural Zulus who almost certainly inchne stronglv toward Buthelezi and Inkatha. But hi's survey does establish that it is facile to equate Butheltzi a.~d Inkatha with "the Zulus."

Outside of ;o.;atai-KwaZulu Buthelezi·s sup;Jnrt amonc. urban Zuiu-5peaken. is markedlv le~s. Orkin fnunc. ln the critic-ali)·· irnport.an: PWV area. Buthclezi won support from ll pen:em of the respondents, a~a;nst 29 percem for the ANC, J3 percent for Tutu and 13 percent for

:and. o errnrta•t:ne•scenespetsuasto~~/ · That --"--~~~t•~a-ss!>ef:n,;a,:;pr:tna~paJ:;

target -of . . . have against . . . .. . •expres'sed :&sap-• 'been arr~sted .in large ntimbeis: at pointirientcovef' .the ;a:ctions :Of the · South Mritan · facilities here .·arid ~ cliief miniStei :Of theZu1uhomeland, ~ound:the nation. .. . . . · ·~- ·' ·. . . , ····~ whoni he described as .~on\the pay.: I

, , ·,The ~emons~tors-cont~ng ~af:tro1(~f f!i~:?<>u~:Afii<:3ri',gc:>vern~ ! the policy .P~oVIdes comfort to the .· .ment~ : · ··. _ . , . •

-:tf'!t11 la!ll NaspfHmy· r·

What Role' for Buthele.zi?' -. · · tut·WASIIrNtroNPost I ' \ J\ .• •· --··• ------ --. --

, CI\PII TOWN-The Fin~nr.lal Mail has' named · scsslncnt bY the l'lnanclnl Mail: "lncte~singly 111 ~ 1: . ch.lei, who mnlle biiick~ lecl proud :,..hen he toyeil ~ros.~ M a ~l~p in thn lncc to millions of Zulus. II

Gat.sha !luthclczi its "Man ol the Year," an landwheretherclsmtK:htodespalrnbntlt,andHttle!:· wlth.lhe whlte-rtin government over Its proffer he Is a p~rt of the negoti~tions, he m~y ~eriously honor that win come as no surprise to the Rc~. th.at gives rise to hope, buthelcrl ••. holds oot the ol a homeland, never quito! saying yes, never tomplic~tc matters, since he Is so mtK:h out of step ':t 1\llan Oncsak. lie had virtually predicted It' In nn prospect ol an occonlmodatlon being stnK:k be- . dearly iillylng no, hns not grown beyond the with the leadership ou sn many key Issues. Would ~ interview some days earlier. . tween South Africa's different race 11roups. , · ·slattts ol tribal leader: . · llocs.1k ~cccpt that a'"cs.'ment? :·

We were talking about resistance bj whiles, , "In enunciating the politics of compromise, he · "II you look nt nil the major liber~tlon move· "It Is only a dileinma," he soy~. "if you tnke nar-. both in Snnth l\lrk:n and the West, to the Idea of c.1rrles with him the hope of mtK:h of white South ·ments, you Win nnd that thc)l cui across tribal row clhno-nalionali~m.seriously, which Is the only, real demonar.y here. ll<~es.1k s.1id he expected 1\frlca nnd certainly' that of a. slreablc group ·of lines," says the Rev. Mkntshwn, who, like Ou- basis upon whkh lluthelezi works. lie Is a chief of whites wotlld attempt to "•lo • snrt of L.1ncaster · moderate blacks and other peovlc of <\!lot." lhelezl,ls a Zulu. the Zuht~. a plat!omt provided hint by the govem-llousc drnl" (the amngcmcnt wheteby whites Itt Thai Is one view. There Is another that I ilcattl Out even If only as lender of the' country's big-. ment through the rreation of the homeland of Zimbabwe ·were given a reserve of parliamentary lrom nonwhites from one ehd of this cotmtry to the gcst tribi), shouldn't butlielezl have a virtually nu- l<waZuht, at a lime when black people arc moving scats lor which blacks cannot compete). Titen: • other. For the "''kc ol perspective. I should make tomatlc seat nt the anticipated negotiation~? · nway lrom cthnicity.

"I mn even convinced th~t. at this morncnt,lltcy clear that I did not visit the ntral areas of Natal, Mlmts'hwn hesitates, then says: "Let's put It this "At A time when all of us nre Inking more and have alr.,mly chosen their black lender who, when where buthe!ezi h:ts his largest and most loyal lol- · way. I want to be very lair. I would like to sec to more rl~ks to challenge the government, he is still lhr nmmr.nt orrives, they will try to foist off upon lowing. I should note, ton, thnt while I did not sec sec Gatsha Duthelezl re!lign·lmmediately. and un- gelling his mohcy froni the government And finds u~. I'm thinking of Gatslm !lulhclczl, who scelllS to Chief Duthclezl during this trip, In our previous r.ondillonally, ,from bantustan politics n'tid join aU . himself ou the wrong si<lc of every single 'issue: on have '"'''n chosen by them In !;(lite of the lad that · conversatlqns he has COil)C across as a proud mari \. truly prof!rcssivc orgnnb:ations In the struggle. It is the ls.~ue of disinvestment, on the is.~ue of how it is v<•ry rlcnr th.1t In this country he h.1.• neither who, whUc out of step with the rest of the black only after that that I personallY would Hke lo see confrontation with the government Is to be con-the support nor the respect of black people. leadership here, tnlies n position because he be- hhn take nn activl: part In the negotiation.~:· dueled, on' the issue of recognizing the central

"1\ud yrt, over the past year or sn, the libetal Ueveslt to be In the htterest of his JlCO(lle, not be: ·: I heard similar Ideas ~rom Asla'ns In Johannes- tole of the Nrlcan National Congress, on nllthe~e r.lt·mrul in this r.ouutry, business people, have gone. cause he Is under orders from the govenunent. .\ 1 :· burg, blacks In Snweto nnd from my,hotel umld, a, hnportnnt l~sucs, he is on the other side. lie Is n to cxlrnonlinary lengths to make ·us unllerstand ,Still, it must be 9akl that It lslnc~easlnl!ly dllfl.. , Z~ lrom Natal. The consensu~ sccmil to be thnt· pro-capitalist, pro-Western 1\frlcan chief, and how imporlanl nnd even how h•dispensable Gntshn cult to find blacks hert! who suppbrt thfs once• lit some llOfnt ~helczl stopped toying with whites .bl~ck people are no longer Interested." llutlwlrzi Is lnr the future o!thls country." popular chlel. TheiRev, Smang~llsq. Mkntshwa, . nitd !ftntled plnylng footsie with them., · That is harshly put, but surprisingly close to

Whiles, I nm sure, do not thinli of themselves as Pretoria-based secretacy ol the Sout~etri' Afrltftli ·, .but' even If he has fnllcn from gmre, doesn't the what black peqplc here seem to feel. In the view of manipulative oo much as grateful lor the "reason- Catholic Bishops'· · Conrerence, . ~!ierl~ • flu· controverslitl thk!f present some~hlng of a· dilemma the Financial Mail, Duthelet.l "occupies what re-ahlcnr,;.q" of a man like Outhelet.l, chief ol !rome 6.5 · lhele1.l as "a reader that Is wasted.''. .. lor the black JeadershljJ? rr he Is rejected by them mains olthe middle grOWld in South Nr!Ca.'' In the millioit z,llus. Many <?f them would endorse this as- • The reference, he SAys, Is to the lnct t~at the as pnit' of ihe negotiating process, It may co1nc view of blacks, he Is lltcrely standing in the way.

' '• i I . 1•, TUE.~IIAY, DECF.MOtR 10, 19115 A21

, I . '· I, ,•·

~::-:.· -. --~---- .

ll

ince· where· violence has mtensiffedc itr. reo-. cent weeks, be· said the unrest wa~r~subsi<f.'i ing" due to efforts by police and the ~ tary. "We will ev~mtually normalize- the-sit~_· uatioos.~ le Grange promised.: '·. · 'i -· ·. SOuth African unrest bas. been. Ptishecf'Off the front page iir recent· weeks- not· only byi

J competing news from. elsewhere but by the ;, numbing repetition ·of the violence;. now- iir ~ · its 14th month. . .But while attention-hils. de-;! clined. the level of violence. bas · not:· il ·' Squeezed into submissimr irr: tile- Vaal;; Tri-!r j angle south of Johannesburg: ~iifitsti; [ began;: it has spread into neW' areas.such 3311( ; ~the western and .. nortbeastem CaPe and the.;

· part city of Durban.. : -- , . . __ ~ .: Both the number. and frequency of. deaths.

·.bas risen steadily, according to. figures-com-:_ . piled by the· South African Institute: of. Race-;

Relations. From Sept. 3, 1984. wht!ll'riotin!fi·;

· i broke: ~ut in· ilie: v~ t~;;;tii: tl;~-. _ ~- end af that year.~ institute reported 149c , deaths,. or 0.9c per day~ There were. 31-z:'

more-deaths. between-Jm& :E and: the<emer­

Arnsted,~leader leada with~ .AfzicaA police-armed with shotgaus alter-they· broke.up.a.s&udetd;··. · · ., gency decree ofJuly 20', or I.6 per:: day. . .·. rally y81terday in the w:~subarft.olCap&Town.. The youth'wmothers&tem!Mto i~J&erren.OII!hi& bellaJ;>.:: Between JulY-21: and Oct.;. 7. the Institute

_ . . . . . . . : .. - •·· · recorded 278 moredeatbs-3.5 per day, or ·. · --· ~- .... : · "·" ' ·· . · ... - - --. · : .. .. ·' ·• • •. .,-, -- ;.•~:.o moz:e, than double the. rate before the de-

.Soutk Afri/~a'"s·: Costly Critckd~';.:;, ~==· · Elner~ency.: FailS to Qtielt Unrest,. NarrmwPolitical: Chasm· , ,, .. ·. ·1 try: Six ~-were: killed;cincJuding the .

0' . : . . . . ...... ·. - ...... , _ _._ .,, : i' whitesoldierwhowasstabbedtodeath.y~·-,.-_.. ; :.:.... . • Atfu~:csiiin~tiine;:.theem~cy-tnggered:a>j terday;. __ .; <,-_·_-. _ .·. ·

By Gleim Frankel l tough: reaction-from' South: Africa'a:.intemationa!. ·-1 : . The fiv~bladr:-deatbs;included one who-. -._-v...;p-. · bankers audits putative friends in -the·Westthat ~: j. . was ~urned,• br< a: mob... one whose ,charred::

JOHANNESBURG-Nearly· three months. after it took effect, Soudl Africa's state of emergency de­cree. has. beCome- a pciliticai albatross that has not: .

· · significan~ reduced black: unrest yet cannot be j, readily~ ..

· revealed:justhow·wlnerable-this.eountryis-tll'the;_·: remams were' diScovered: ?Y ~ce. and economie sanctions its leaders- once· diSmissed· off.;..~ :! tliree-apparently. shot by police;. including a handedly; · .. . · . . . · · ,.,~: '1 .13-year-<Jld boy- whose-death is. under inves... .. . Meetings with western creditors: to reschedule-· I'

debt :pa~ra.th3t:SouttrAfm:a,troza. lllst\' · Orr its surface,. the.· sweeping decree- and: the.

. 4',960--arrests' tba~ have follow~ have NEWS; _ bet!1l' ~- dra- matt~ demonstratloll" of ANALYSIS' . state' power. as steady• and unyielding- . ·

as the drone·ofarmored personnel carriers lumber· ing thrOugh the dusty streets of black townships.

But when historians recall this moment in South African history; they may hear a different sciund. :-­thatoi binges &owly turning, of a door closing on an era of unchallenged white domination and reopening. on a new·and·imcertain:ageofconstant upheavals..

Today another: of the milestonew that have marked• the- conflict wait recorded· with· the · an· nouncement of thedeatltaf a white soldier; the first killed since: the .Army was sent into the townships a year ·ago; in· a' c1aslr with: rioters outside- Port Eliz. ~-·'- . . . . ...... , ....

aueua.; The emergency was designed to restore a calm

that would allow South Africa's;white·rulers ta car-·

. ry on ~th their measured policy oi self~ proclaimed; "refornt.':' . . · .. · · · . · ·

But since: tlle.decree took effect- JulY' 21' in; 36'" -cities-and towns, the daily rate of. deaths. resulting

. from: politicahiolence has mare than doubled,.ideo­logic3llines have hardened between white and black.· •

·and between: the· government's. supporters and. its._ opposition;. and the plight. of moderates- on botlt sides has worsened. · ..

Rather than setting. the· stage- for peaceful .. change, the crackdown· on- opponents. has--shrunk further the already ·limited possibility that blacks .. would come· to the govemmenes carefully con- · trolled bargaining table. .

The reform program itself, revealed during the- i past two months in a painfully slow and reluctant: I rhetorical dance of veils by· the country's aging po­litical strongman, has. fallen far short of black .aspi:.: I rations.. .

month: are duC' ta begilr im.two- weeks,. and,:· . officials undoubtedlY would like to be·able-to_:_ offera firmiclelrofwiwmthe-esnergeucy,;wilk_ bee suSpencielt. But- the; government: .u-,

. faces. five- parliamentary' by-elections· Oct;:· · 30 and· cannot be seen to be easing ita-.

stance againstopponeots until: the. violence: eases. fodear of. white· voter backla;sh-- .

"They are not in: control af the: Sl~;,.­and they do oot.know where they are'g~g_:: which. ia a very dangeroua state.. af affairs;, said Anglican Bishop Desmond:Tutu_6f):he goveroment- he opposes.. "If they- lift· the: state of emergency;. it wil[·seem:·as.i£; they;' are giving in to pressure:.n . ' . · ; · :

Criticism of the emergency ts. not !imitedc to- longstanding: opponents~ like<· Tu~ laSt, ........................ · ........... --.. ~ ... ·-· .,) ,--·--.····-. ·yean-!'felli'etPeace·raureate:-BiisineSs· read· ers. whO; at: first cautiously welcomed the

: mi!II8Uiel!i long> since- have had' a : public cbaD&e- of Jteart;;.So· have• some af the gov­'emment's traditional suppo~ · · ;;: ; "It:. was,- bungled. rigbr: from · the. begiJl.o'· · iliug;!' said: Piet M~ .. m ~-an«t ~.

uninist:: for the: influential-: ~ guage newspaper Beeld; who• originally had: welcomed the decree as an unfortunatecne-o cessity; "It lias not only gotten us some-very bad international publicity, but it has.simply served to aggravate matters here:

Some· Cabinet ministers are believed to share that View, although. none will say so .. publicly: Law and 0n1er Minister. Lotiis te G!ange did not respond to a written request:

·. for comment on- the emergency arid when. it. 'miihtend..Butiu:a speech Friday night in

. QueenstoWil', a town in· eastem Cape. Prov- ... -···,I

. ~. i .. :

ligation. Six policemen· were injured. as was · a policemen's wife. · ·

· The emergency decree was designed to . crush' the< unrest. by- giving- poii£e,. broatt .. · powers of arrest in designated areas. But.~ many contend· that· use of the decree has.·­only exacerbated the situation and contrib--. uted to an atmosphere of fear of violence in ·many tOWDSbips.-

Soweto, the country' slargest black urban ·area;. was relatively peaceful before the de-- -, cree; But in recent weeks, following a police. ·" crackdown on school boycotts, several-of its- :•. sections· have- become the scene of daily:O: nmning battles-. between rock-throwing,:.,: youths:and security fotces and between the--· •'

· yonths and blacks branded as collabOrators< with white rille. . ; ·. :- --'(

"People are being shot, the schools-are in"' ·-- --

;chaos, the ·- garbage isn't being ; picked up because the local govem-1 menf can't function;' said Nthato Motlana, a respected Soweto civic: leader. He says the local black of­ficials· whom the government spon­-sored and sought to promote as community spokesmen silently. have· Jbdicated. fearing. for their own lives.. i

Tutu, Modana· andi- other blaclc. , moderates, having failed to per- ,; suade>- the- government;. to bargain. ; with authentic black leaders-such as. ;j imprisoned nationalist Nelson. Man- l deJa;. say their voices:• are- being. .: drowDed out' byc~noaMadical. call8.. \ 1'11eY" ~' it: is; radical' leader i

__ . S~Tshwetlfs demands _at r~ent. ~ • funeralsdcm blacks.; to: Jmm. whited ·

areas.. iathe; tJzan, T'utll's p1eaaL for. j n~ 1f.iat· 3111! Capturing tlie, ~ imagimitione-aadotlai~ ofa;newo. : g(!llerltioa ofbla&:k~ • -:. . ;

Somer-.:iJi. the:c:Jmo&, the-~!1 of a: molution.- JOe. ~ eiriled~ ' miJit:aJ;y' str3tegist. ot- the- Afric:au.. Natiooal.F COn~ t:he leading: black. resistance-~ spoke in an. interview:eadiertbia.year of a convergeuc:e-. of_~ key. elements::. an-awakening_: of defi.<-'lceiilside t!Je,_.

Tnt: WAstnNGTON POST

townsbips. at the, same. moment form," said, Bothao. ~and to f!llllllret there is a crisis of confidenc:e within the necessary stability without: the· white community; The· result.. · which reform will be undermined by he believes, is a situation as ripe for- violence anchevolution:' revolt as. the shah's·.Irano.. But Botha's cryptic language-and

But there is at least one critical, finger-wagging style have- given difference between Pretoria. and little hope to black: moderates. His Teilran;. The shah's army- shared·· recent offers to restore citizenship, the same Moslem culture and val- to blacks. and to ~improve" South ~ ues as his opponents. When the mob Africa's notorious pass laws have came,. his soldiers killed dozens of not deflected attention from what prote;:;ter~, but evP.nt!1nH:.- they m_,nv consider, the· re::1f i~ue~ th~ turned against the shah. . end of the white monopoly on po-

There is no-such shared comrnu- litical power~ nity of values between South Afri.. His. Port Elizabeth speech also ca's .. predominantly white security . containedi a. not-so-veiled:- threat forces. and· its black rioters; despitec against. black moderates. who have' their joint profession of Christian-- refused to embrar.e his offers. ity. Instead;. most' whites see their. ~-will ~leo expected to make a privileges- and.. their future. directly choice.:" Botha. warned;. "Leaderl! threatened> by.- black aspiratioos-.. It· · caDJIOt_ pay-· lip,service to- the Prim­is impoesibJe to envisage a situatiom: ·· ._ of negotiation: while at the­w~ the. security forces · YIQUidi: • same- time attempting' to, cover side, with. blacks agaiJJst the>-whiteo.-· their.rears.againstradic:alelements goYeriiiDellt;. . . · :. · whiclulooot--want to negotiat&..One<·:

. . · In ilia; Port-Elizabedli~htOfk' .canaot. sene; t__.lll8lltels> at> the;-'weebi; ~ Pi'esideatt· Pletel:!" VP.:·' . ~~ ' . Botba Jllllde, ~ tbat'bis govern..: :-' ' While:-: it. iS lllllllilm wba&! the im.. IIIC!IIt~c:oatiauedtat~--, mediate future: balds.-~

· on- O!liJCIIIil;iclaod--restatecLhis .view c. beJie9e, ~tile- go¥eniJJIIlllt: _. that measures. sudt 3$ tbe>.-~ tuail)' wilt~~aod;Iift. &enc:r -a:li8CelllarY'COIIIJI"''I''<· ' .. theemergeacy;:in:order to-ea~&in­tohis:reformprogram;o. . '- . · temadoaat·-~on-South.Ar.

. --~~-by _our securil:rforces;;,, nc:a.,altbougtt.fewexpectitto ha~ · ";: ~ anr-t!ssentiat expreM)y. to. proo.c : pen·SOOD. · teet the;, procesa;, of peacefuL re.--: Othera anticipate a furtbet c:rac~r:,-

~ .~ ~ . .:· • ·"· . . -. .. . . I

'l'UtSDAY, Ocroii£R 15, 1985.

uowa<lnd feaa: that tile goftiW will: tum· iocrealiuglr to- the--secu-­rity option as it see& its reform pro-,­gram .. faltering. Helen·~ Suzman;. ao_ white-- longtime- opposition member oi Parliament;. warns of. a new- maao­sive-~offorce..Motlana<~ of •an· em of aJmost· pennaaeut nn-· rest:· -

Tutll says. the ~t may: yet succeed in temporariJy c:rqshiug the unrest; but he belie'les· the vic­tory will proveo honow. "Y011 may. get ~ of sorts;. but that sta- -bility is superficial. it is brittle. sjm.,. ply:- IJecaase;> yell( are- not dealingi'

with: the. root-cause..':' he: saicL.. "Y ou.i: can. ton:e.c:bildre!r!tO<.gooto.school;:_:: and•.you-: in3yibe<tlu:iUed: that' classes;: • are- back;. to<. normaL Bili thfi' ~ cause: is the7<hate·Bantu [segregat..­edl .W!catiou; aad::atthediist opo-- . portnnity-they w!ll boycott -againr ' '

Im. a Gallup- POll•· rele8sed: Friilap!j : . nearly:-.~- at~ the; urbani~ whites SQfftJed- said: they-belilmd; : ·. blaclHnajority" rulet wouJcii, I1IMifl' : comeoto•Soutlt·Afiic:a..A few weelcsi ago,;, a: difflnnt· !llnef' ~ that'SO'perc::eut:ct urlar!Haclatwilli'i.: settle-mroothiag_Jesa.:TJia,gap.~ tween> ~twO> statilltics- is: the--•. chasm>~wbiteintra ·sanee: and blic:k aspilations;. It:iwalsottlle!; ~ at the< conflic:t: that has.,

FOREIGN: SOUTH AFRICA'S ALTER-PRESIDEN'T New Statesman 29 November 1985

-----. ------·

that Mandela would, of course, be welcome. A while after Pik Botha's visit to

Mozambique, which was largely concerned with patching up last year's Nkomati accord which, after months of denial, Pretoria has flnally admitted was being violated by South Mrica, the Financial Mail in Johannesburg carried a well-sourced 'flyer' from the corridors of power. What if, the Mail asked, Pretoria decided to release Mandela and fly him out to Zambia?

' THE ANC and Mandela himself, through his wife Winnie, have rejected this option. Any release must be unconditional, they say. Pretoria, though, badly wants to get rid of this albatross. Even South Mrica's international creditors have joined the ranks of those demanding the release of Mandela and other political concessions before they are prepared to reschedule South Mrica's considerable foreign debt. Their motivation is in no way derived from moral imperatives. But Western bankers realise that only political reforms can restore economic stability to the country.

The position being taken by the ANC does not rule out an exchange of signals with Pretoria. A top ANC source said unofficially this week that it was up to the Botha government to create 'a climate conducive to talks about talks'·. This required concrete action, he said. Signals alone wouid :lei

convince the ANC of Pretoria's seriousnt:sl.. Pretoria could create the necessary climate by

~ releasing all political prisoners unconditionally; ~ by lifting the state of emergency that now ~ blankets much of the country; by releasing

~...-____________ __. 13 emergency detainees; by pulling its troops out

BOTHA EXTENDS DELICATE FEELERS HOWARD BARRELL reports on the negotiating positions behind the week's 'will they, won't they' rumours of the release of black leader Nelson Mandela (above)

Harare WHILE JOURNALISTS scurried around southern Africa last week, boosting the local air charter business and running up embarrassing expenses in their attempts to be wherever it was that Nelson Mandela would be after he had been freed, another drama was being played out behind the scenes.

The Southern African government was sending direcf and clear signals to the leadership in exile of the outlawed African National Congress.

The message was as follows: The Pretoria government acknowledged that it alone could not now cope with the growing political and economic crisis in the country of which

Mandela is the alter-president; it had taken a decision in principle to release not merely Mandela but all political prisoners; but it was having difficulty in deciding how to do this. The implication of this message was that the South Mrican government needed a softening in ANC postures in order to carry through the policy that it now saw was necessary.

Details of the South Mrican government signals were given to me at the weekend by well­placed sources in the Frontline States. For its part, the ANC has declined to conflrm or deny the receipt of these signals. The South Mrican government has denied the story and called it part of a 'disinformation' campaign. Pretoria added that it had no plans to release Mandela, who at 67 has now been in jailfor 23 years.

The evidence contradicts this. About three months ago, according to my sources, Pik Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, requested the Mozambican President Samora Machel to ask the.Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda what his attitude would be if Pretoria released Mandel a and immediately put him on a flight out to Lusaka. Kaunda, a flrm friend of the ANC and host to its headquarters, replied

of the black townships; and by suspending political trials immediately.

The AN C, said this source, could then move to hold full consultations with those now in South Mrica's jails and with leaders of the legal political organisations and trade unions inside the country. The AN C, as a matter of principle, would not begin talks with the Botha government without flrst holding the~e discussions. The fact of any talks between the ANC and Pretoria would have to be public knowledge. .

Has the South Mrican government shut off this process . by taking Mandela from his hospital bed in Cape Town's Volkshospitaal last Saturday and returning him to his cell at Pollsmoor Prison?

There is a school of thought which maintains that it hasn't. What Pretoria has done is to remove Mandela from the view of the battery of· journalists who had cordoned off the hospital while delicate feelers are exchanged. For his part, Mandela has signalled that he will not be a captive negotiating partner. He will negotiate ouly within the framework of; he ANC and the broad legal democratic movement.

The precedent provided by the process wl1ich turned Rhodesia into Zimbabwe suggests that any process of negotiation in South A:rica will be protracted and combined with continued political violence. Whatever Pretoria's embarrassment .or the ANC's coyness, the signs are that process is, however, now started -however haltingly. 0

E c s A 339 Lafayette Street New York, N.Y. 10012

Hambe Kahle, Comrade Benjamin.

Your martyrdom will not be in vain. VictoryisCertainl

BENJAMIN MOLOISE EXECUTED. 18 OCTOBER 1985

All the armies that ever marched, All the parliaments that ever sat have not Affected the life of man on earth as that one Solitary life. I am proud to be what I am. The storm of oppression will be followed by The rain of my blood. I am proud to give my life,, My one solitary life.

(The last poem written by Benjamin Moloise -) (soldier of the Afrioan National Congress. )