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. - UICLASSlfiED THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
.~ • .f:o.,.",!~~ ~:~.,r~
Presidential Review Memorandurri/NSC-IO
TO:
SUBJECT:
The Vice President The Secretary of State The Sec reta.ry of Defense
ALSO: The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Director, A rms Control and Disarmament
Agency The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence The U. S. Representative to the United Nations
Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review (U)
I hereby direct that a comprehensive examination be made of overall U. S. national strategy and capabilities. This examination will consist of two parts to be done concurrently.
One part of the examination will be conducted by the Policy Review Committee., under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Defen5e. It will define a wide range of alternative military strategies and construct alternative military force postures and programs to support each of these military strategies. Among other topics, this segment will consider: military force levels; technological developments with regard to new weaponry; alternatives to our reliance on foreign bases; deterrence at reciprocally lowered strategic levels; viability and de sirability of the "triad" posture. This portion should also evaluate the relative ability of the U. S. and its allies to achieve U. S. objectives in specified military contingencies. It will identify the key is sues fo r Presidential decisions, including the budgetary implications of each of these posture$.
The other part will be a dynamic net assessment conducted by the Special Coo rdinatiori Committee unde r the chainnanship of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It will consist of review and comparison of the ove rall trends in the political, diplomatic, economic, technological, and milita ry capabilities ofthe United States, its allies, and potentia
" , " ~ fir. · t ~ ~ ~l "" r 1 .,' I ~mc. ~ ~S· f~~r· n i ~l~~u~ri(U
2
adversaries. It will evaluate the objectives and national strategies that may be pursued by our principal potential adversaries and examine the alternative national objectives and strategies appropriate to the United States.
This two-part analysis should .identify for Presidential decisions alternative national strategies and the major defense programs and other initiatives required to implement them. The two parts should be carefully coordinated with one another. In 'tt4er to achieve this, I have directed the Assistant to the PresidentfNational Security Affairs to develop additionally more detailed terrn.s of reference for this analysis.
'These terrn.s of reference will be presented for rn.y review by February 24. I also want interim. reports to allow further guidance as the study progresses. A summary of the entire report, not to exceed 70 pages, should be' subrn.itted for NSC consideration not later than June 1, 1977; the final version should be corn.pleted by June 15, 1977.
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UNCLASSIFIED ~
4QPSEORE+ Ve 41~{ t:f.e Ire n c'&Aii cl I ~i/I CA-J
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PRM/NSC-IO
MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE REVIEW
FINAL REPORT
COPY t ~ OF tP$O COPIES.>
UNCLASSIFIED
. lDP SECRtf ~~'fv 0"': O).t>"-
•
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I.
II.
. .
PRK/NSC-10
HILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE .POSTURE REVIEW
FINAL REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose
B. Assumptions
C. HaJ or Issues
D. Li mi ta t I.ons of the Report
E. Organization of the Report
CURRENT CAPABILITIES
A. Purpose and Cautions
B . US-USSR Worldwide Conflict
. Central Europe
NATO Flanks
. Non-European Operations
US-USSR Nuclear Conflict
C. Other Con~lngencles
HI dd I e East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Korea
UNClASS!FIED
iECREt
1-1
1-1
1-2
1-2
1-3
I-Jt .
11-1
i 1-2
11-2
II-Jt
II-Jt
11-5
11-6
11-6
11-7
11-8
I if'. ~ . ' j jJ,...:.:. , .... I i .. - .... ~ .. ~ ~ - .• -:" ~:J , ric t.;
-££mrtf}E~~T4M:-I II • ALTERNATIVE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRATEGIES (AI MS)
A. I nt roduct I on ; 111-1 f"'J";'~~".>q.:;.;':.~f''' .· "~ ... ,.,,,N"'"'·
B. Methodology 111-1
C. Content of AIMS 111-2
• D. Forces to Support AIMS 111-7
General Purpose Forces 111-7 ,.
Strategic Forces 111-12
E. Costs of AI MS 111-18
F. ComparIson Overview 111-22
G. ComparIson of AIMS: DImensions 111-22
Deterrence and the Nuclear DimensIon 111-22
The NATO-Warsaw Pact Dimension 111-23
Non-European Dimensions 111-25
H. Comparison of AIMS: . Impllcat Ions 111-27
SovIet Reactions 111-27
Foreign Policy ImplicatIons 111-28
Arms Control I mp lie at i on s 111-32
FI sea I Impl icatlons 111- 31t
DOffiest i c ImplIcatIons 111-It2
I. Coo.'Iparl son of AIMS: Non-HIlI tary I mp I erne n ta t Ion 111-It2
InitIatIves
IV. EVALUATION OF AIMS
A. I n t rod uc t I on IV-l
B. QuestIon One IV-2
C. Question Two IV-7
D. Question Three IV-l0
E. QuestIon Four IV-IS
F. QuestIon Five IV-20.
G. QuestIon Six ~tt)£#f-lAt- IV-21t
UNGLAS~ 1~': ! ~~
UNCLASSIFiEC
EXECUT I VE SUMMARY""
Purpose. The purpose of the PRM-IO Force Postures Study Is to elicIt policy guidance from the President on key Issues pertaining to natIonal milItary strategy. The scope of this study Is Intentionally broad. It partakes of all, but exhausts none, of the numerous topics and factors whIch enter Into the determination of national mIlitary strategy. It Is desIgned to provide a solid basis for further detailed work on defense force structure and program Issues, using either the lntergency process or the normal PPBS decisIon process, as appropriate.
Ayproach. In order to develop alternative Integrated military strategies (AIMS. Substrategy building blocks were constructed to Identify a range of options In each of five analytical areas:
1. NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict In Europe {Including the NATO Flanks and the North Atlantic}.
2. Operations outside Europe during a NATO-WP war.
3. East Asia.
it. Peacekeeping activities and potential local wars.
5. US-USSR nuclear conflict.
The major Issues in each analytical area, or conflict category, were isolated. Then~usin9 this building block technique, the substrategies shown below were developed to focus on what the US should achieve as well as the threats to that achievement.
IlATo-WP III (URor(
orrSITTl1Ic; ATTAClS
.lllCT DU(II1(
1I111T lOSS
(lASTIC TUNllL
fllNll(
Summary of Substrategies
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lillITU ACTlOil
lLOUCU 'lLS[JC(
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(If AA SUf'( 1I oal TT
UTAIII \I'S rOlc[ AriAKTACOU
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Altern.tlve Integr.ted Milltiry Str.tegles (AIMS) were formul.ted from tne .n.lytlc.l .re. substr.tegles by excludIng unwork.ble combinations of substr.tegles. EIght fln.l AIMS were selected for det.lled evalu.tlon In terms of their milltlry, economIc, pollticil (both In technlc.1 and domestic) .nd .rms control ImplJ.catlons. Each AIMS .ddresses In • dIfferent wlY the major millt.ry Issues facing the United States. The range of AIMS Is Intentlon.lly broad so that they will provide a comprehensIve Ina'ytlc.' framework for ev.luatlon of the major elements of defense polIcy.
The composition of the eight final AIMS In terms of their .nalytical .re. substr.tegles Is shown In the table below:
UTO!IIP cO""11 ct I" (w, ...
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'''.et "'tfI .. : "'1 .... 11 •• t. .."ul,,"lllt,
.,,,.nl,.. IttMIl' : ,.~ ... nK' ... 'act ""II. "'."" .• 14"v,1 "'tl.,. ","'IC 1)04 41"1",, t.,.,' .." ... fl_I,. ,vttel"'dllUy
AlTUXAT.wt . ... T(C ..... rlO ".LlrUy STurH.U (A."')
"'rotl ... , 0.. ..... rlfro,.. I us uBI V . lI.f C.4 Ad I.,.
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lalt •• t ....
lIa.U'Io<t ...
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a' ... A • •• .... "'''' ,,. ••• -w:.t
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E.ch of these strategies has a specific rationale for lInking building blocks Into coherent AIMS, as summarized below.
2
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