Presented by Rui Nunes TS-CSE-AAS

Controls, Safety and Engineering Databases

LHC Experiments Safety Systems Review14 February 2007

Fire Detection and Evacuation SystemsSummary

Presented byRui Nunes

TS-CSE-AAS

14 Feb 2007 LHC Experiments Safety Systems Review 2


Topics

• List of concerned systems• Main characteristics• Status of installation• Open Issues



List of Systems

• Automatic Fire Detection (AFD)– AFD in surface buildings– AFD in underground caverns– AFD in electronics racks

• Audible Emergency Evacuation system– Surface buildings– Underground caverns

• Rack Extinguishing is out of scope of TS/CSE/AAS services



Automatic Fire Detection (AFD)

• Surface Buildings– Location

• Most surface buidings are equipped with AFD – as per list of buildings elaborated by LHC TCC – Or subsequent requests by Experiments

• Control panel located in SR building with remote IHM in SY– Alarm Transmission

• AL3 SCR via CSAM, AL2 CCC via CSAM/TIM– Safety actions

• executed directly when applicable• Ventilation, power cuts, other• Evacuation is triggered when applicable as required by NS3

(multistory building)




• Underground Caverns– Location

• Most underground caverns are (or shall) be equipped with AFD– List from LHC TCC and decribed in LHC Eng. Spec

• Control Panel located in Service caverns in accessible areas (when possible) with Remote IHM in SY surface building

– Alarm Transmission• AL3 SCR via CSAM, AL2 CCC via CSAM/TIM

– Safety Actions• Not yet clearly defined (none implemented )• Triggering of LHC Audible Emergency Evacuation

– NO automatic triggering in the LHC installations– In the Experimental areas this shall be left to the criteria of

the GLIMOS (but coherence would be nice)• Detection in suspended barracks include a warning buzzer as

required by the NS3




• Electronic Racks– Location

• Racks to be equipped are chosen by Experiments– US, UX, etc....

• Detectors between the turbines inside the racks– Different types in UX and US due to radiation– Performance tests are conclusive– Radiation tests were not conclusive

• Control Panel located in Service caverns in accessible areas (when possible)

– Alarm Transmission• NO AL3, AL2 CCC via CSAM/TIM

– Safety Actions• No safety actions are taken directly• To be taken by DSS (e.g. on the racks power supply)



Audible Emergency Evacuation

• Surface Buildings– Location

• Multistory buildings according to NS3• Buildings on request from the Experiments


– Note: same control panel as the Surface Building AFD



Audible Emergency Evacuation

• Underground Caverns– Location

• All experimental and service caverns are equipped with sirens and pushbuttons

• Control panels located in the SR building with remote IHM in the SY building.


– Safety Actions• An audible alarm and visual flashes are being installed on the Top of pit

Lifts (ECR) to signal to users that an evacuation is ongoing.• This system does not perform safety actions• This system does NOT have flashing lights in the underground

• Note: This system is the same that gives the BIW before sending beam into LHC



Status if the installation

• Automatic Fire Detection– Is being (has been) installed in case by case in agreement

with the experiment contact persons

– ATLAS UX15 installation is particularly complex and is still under study for location of equipment and air-sampling tubes location

• Audible Evacuation System– Is existing in all LEP caverns and is being (has been)

renovated according to the schedule for each experiment– ATLAS UX15 has a temporary installation– CMS installation under study



Open Issues

• SAFETY ACTIONS– A clear responsibility for safety actions definition is

necessary for all alarm systems on site– Who controls the coherency?– Who manages configuration & changes?– Who implements?– Who validates?

• PROCEDURES– Action procedures need to be defined for the different

scenarios• Who does what and when?• Who takes the operational decisions?


Thank you for your attention

Questions?

(hopefully answers too…..)


LHC Experiments Safety Systems Review14 February 2007

ODH and Flammable Gas Detection SystemsSummary

Presented byRui Nunes

TS-CSE-AAS



Topics

• List of concerned systems• Main characteristics• Status of installation• Open Issues



Automatic Gas Detection (AGD)

• Flammable Gas & Oxygen are gases. They are detected by the same system with different type of sensors

• Surface Buildings– Gas Buildings (SG, SGX)– Surface galleries

• Liaison between SH (compressor buidings) and SD (pit bulidings)

• Underground Caverns– Service and Experimental caverns




• Surface Gas Buildings– Location

• SG/SGX are equipped with flammable gas sensors as required by the Flammadle Gas Code G

• Control panels are in located in electrical zone of SG building


– Safety actions • executed directly when applicable

– Ventilation, gas distribution electrovalves, power cuts, etc..

• Sirens and flashing lights in SG building are activated




• Surface Galleries between SH & SD– Location

• Network of galleries equipped with ODH sensors• Control panels are in located in SD or convenient location

for cabling and access– Alarm Transmission


• Sirens and flashing lights are activated– inside the galleries – At the top of the stairs going into galleries

• No other safety actions are executed



Underground Caverns

• Service & Experimental Caverns (same principle)– Location

• FG detection in mixing areas• ODH detection where applicable• Control panels located in Service Caverns with remote IHM in SY

building– Alarm Transmission


• In case of FG – same as surface (gas cut, gas extraction, flash, sirens, etc..)

• In case of ODH – Flashing lights are activated in the vicinity– LHC audible evacuation system is triggered on simultaneous

detection of TWO sensors



Status of the installation

• Only ATLAS is installed– UX15 is particularly complex

• Mobile detectors & mobile flashes left to the users discretion are particularly worrying

• ODH sensors in “fosse” under detector and near dewar• FG detection in 4 mixing racks

– USA15 • ODH and FG installed

• Other Experiments are under preparation



Open issues

• No “MASTER PLAN” (or Engineering Specification) for experimental areas.

– We “discover” as we go. It would be better for execution if we could plan in advance.

• Safety systems are NOT part of process control– Systems that detect loss of helium have been interlocked against our wishes

within ODH system and create confusion

• Same open issues as for AFD and EVAC– Safety actions matrixes need approval and configuration management– Procedures for intervention are not clear for all involved and mostly are not

written

• Risk of conflicting safety actions with Automatic Fire Detection– Especially for ventilation


Thank you for your attention

Questions?

(hopefully answers too…..)

Documents

Presented by Rui Nunes TS-CSE-AAS