Presented by:Robert M. Szozda

Uranium – 233 Disposition ProjectDesign Integration

Work PerformedUnder DOE Contract No. DE-AC05-04OR228600

Isotek Systems, LLC Includes:

DuratekNuclear Fuel

ServicesBurns and Roe

DOE Project Management

Nuclear Facility Operations

Waste Management

Facility Shutdown

Uranium and Special Nuclear Materials Processing

Commercial Nuclear Facility Operations

Safeguards and Security

Facility and Equipment Design

Engineering, Procurement & Construction Management

Problem

Uranium, including highly enriched uranium and 233U stored in a Manhattan Project vintage facility.

Uranium, including highly enriched uranium and 233U stored in a Manhattan Project vintage facility.

Continued 233U storage in Building 3019A at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory represents a significant liability to the Department of Energy

Continued 233U storage in Building 3019A at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory represents a significant liability to the Department of Energy

Situation

Solution: Department of Energy Initiated the U-233 Project to:

Eliminate the costs associated with storage of fissile material, criticality controls, and security

Eliminate the costs associated with storage of fissile material, criticality controls, and security

Reduce long-term facility operating cost and prepare the material for safe low-cost long-term storage

Reduce long-term facility operating cost and prepare the material for safe low-cost long-term storage

Provide medical isotopes for cancer research and treatment

Provide medical isotopes for cancer research and treatment

U-233 Project Work Phases

Work is divided Into three distinct phases

Design

AuthorizationBasis

Safeguards& Security

Operational Readiness

Review

233U Processing

Blenddown

Staging

SafeShutdown

Phase 1

Bldg 3019OperationsTransition

Ongoing S&M

Building 3019 Modifications

Phase 2

Phase 3

3 yrs5.5 yrs

6 mo

Disposition at WIPP/NTS

A Short History of the Building 3019 Complex

National Repository for 233U since 1962

National Repository for 233U since 1962

Pilot plant for numerous chemical recovery processes

Pilot plant for numerous chemical recovery processesOriginally constructed

to separate Plutonium from Graphite Reactor spent fuel

Originally constructed to separate Plutonium from Graphite Reactor spent fuel Chemical explosion in 1950s

spread Pu, some of which is now fixed in place by coating

Chemical explosion in 1950s spread Pu, some of which is now fixed in place by coating

A Short History of 233U

Released from DOE Defense Programs inventory as excessReleased from DOE Defense Programs inventory as excess

Made by neutron irradiation of natural thorium (Th-232) – possible alternative to enrichmentMade by neutron irradiation of natural thorium (Th-232) – possible alternative to enrichment

Characteristics of 233U Present Design Challenges

Dose: 1 ml sample is 2-4 R/hr at 1 cm, some canisters 300 R/hr due to 232U daughter 208Tl, that emits a 2.6 MeV gamma-ray

Dose: 1 ml sample is 2-4 R/hr at 1 cm, some canisters 300 R/hr due to 232U daughter 208Tl, that emits a 2.6 MeV gamma-ray

Physical properties require heavily shielded hot cells with extensive contamination, radiation, criticality, and security controls

Critical Mass (Relative)Critical Mass (Relative)

235U 233U/239Pu

Specific Activity (9.6 x 10-3 Ci/g)Specific Activity (9.6 x 10-3 Ci/g)

10-6

10-4

10-2

100

235U

233U

239Pu

Material form include oxide powder, oxide monolith, metal, and fluoride salts

Material form include oxide powder, oxide monolith, metal, and fluoride salts

The monolith represents more than 2/3 of the material and contains about 19% cadmium and 3% gadolinium.

The monolith represents more than 2/3 of the material and contains about 19% cadmium and 3% gadolinium.

Organic materials are not expected; if present will be removed during pre-treatment.

Organic materials are not expected; if present will be removed during pre-treatment.

Current packaging: double containment, stainless steel, aluminum, welded/bolted, glass, plastic, vermiculite.

Current packaging: double containment, stainless steel, aluminum, welded/bolted, glass, plastic, vermiculite.

Characteristics of 233Uin Building 3019A

Some Representative Canister Types

Summary of 233U Downblending & Dispositioning

In-process Storage

Inner Container

Crush

Dissolution

Package Retrieval1 at a time

Un-package& Inspect

Empty

container

Measure BurialPackage Sortingin Tube Vaults

Pre-treatment

Calcine

233UDepleted Uranyl nitrate

Enrichment Down Blending

Interim Storage

ShieldedOverpack

Denitration

NOx Scrubber

233U

238UUranyl Nitrate

Uranyl Nitrate

Uranyl Nitrate

Less than 1% fissile

UO3Concentrator

Package for Transport to WIPP and to NTS

Accountability

Controls are Part of theDesign Basis

Shielding designed for < 0.5 mR/hr for occupied work areas

Shielding designed for < 0.5 mR/hr for occupied work areas

Pipes and tanks limited to 4 inches in diameter

Pipes and tanks limited to 4 inches in diameter

Slab tanks or sumps limited to 1 inch depth

Slab tanks or sumps limited to 1 inch depth

R/hrmR/hr

Major Capabilities Added toBuilding 3019A Include

New shielded hot cell with manipulators for canister opening, pretreatment, and dissolution

Adding equipment to existing shielded cell for NMC&A measurement, and downblending

New shielded hot cell with manipulators for canister opening, pretreatment, and dissolution

Adding equipment to existing shielded cell for NMC&A measurement, and downblending

Major Capabilities Added toBuilding 3019A (cont.)

Adding equipment for denitration and product packaging

Installing new analytical labs, shielded glove boxes and a process off-gas scrubber

Adding equipment for denitration and product packaging

Installing new analytical labs, shielded glove boxes and a process off-gas scrubber

Key Technical Issues Addressedin Design Phase

• Dissolution rate

• Denitration technology

• Radon hold-up in off-gas systems

• Product packaging

• Security prior to and during processing

• Dissolution rate

• Denitration technology

• Radon hold-up in off-gas systems

• Product packaging

• Security prior to and during processing

Downblending Process

Depleted Uranium

Approximately 210 MTU needed for testing and processing:

2 MTU in 201126 MTU per quarter beginning in 2012

Approximately 210 MTU needed for testing and processing:

2 MTU in 201126 MTU per quarter beginning in 2012

The DU must meet transportation regulations.The DU must meet NFS license conditions relative to fission product and transuranic attributes in incoming material: Less than 0.25 millicuries of fission products per gram of uranium Less than 10E-6 grams of plutonium per gram of uranium Less than 1.5E-5 grams of transuranic materials (including plutonium) per gram of uraniumThe DU must exhibit less than 0.1% insolubles when dissolved in nitric acid.

The DU must meet transportation regulations.The DU must meet NFS license conditions relative to fission product and transuranic attributes in incoming material: Less than 0.25 millicuries of fission products per gram of uranium Less than 10E-6 grams of plutonium per gram of uranium Less than 1.5E-5 grams of transuranic materials (including plutonium) per gram of uraniumThe DU must exhibit less than 0.1% insolubles when dissolved in nitric acid.

ESH&Q Integrated fully into project designESH&Q Integrated fully into project design

ESH&Q Status

Safety AnalysisNuclear Criticality

Safety

Training

Emergency Preparedness

Quality Assurance

Waste Management

Environmental Protection

Occupational Safety & Health

Radiological Control

“The IA Team concluded that Isotek is ready to assume operation and management activities for Building 3019 Complex contingent on completion of the M2 List of open items and resolution of the two IA pre-mobilization findings.”

“The IA Team concluded that Isotek is ready to assume operation and management activities for Building 3019 Complex contingent on completion of the M2 List of open items and resolution of the two IA pre-mobilization findings.”

Proficiencies included: “it was obvious that integrated organization was working well” “Isotek management’s approach, communication, and attitude are exemplary”

Proficiencies included: “it was obvious that integrated organization was working well” “Isotek management’s approach, communication, and attitude are exemplary”

Independent Assessment (IA)

“. . . I have reviewed the evidence of completion for these M2 items and found it complete. . . This concludes actions by the IA Team.”

Julie Wallen, IA Team Designee

“. . . I have reviewed the evidence of completion for these M2 items and found it complete. . . This concludes actions by the IA Team.”

Julie Wallen, IA Team Designee

Integrated Safety Design

Implemented the 10 CFR 830 requirements for integration of safety basis with the design and operation of the modifications to the existing facility following ISMS:

First integrated design meeting in December 2003 Major integrated design meetings about every 60 days UT-Battelle personnel for facility knowledge and experience NFS personnel for process design and operations experience BREI personnel for nuclear facility upgrade experience Merrick personnel for hot cell design experience Designated Operations Manager with nuclear facility upgrade

experience Supporting safety staff with DOE facility safety and operations

experience

Design concepts reviewed for technical feasibility of meeting both defined DOE safety requirements and safety requirements resulting from safety analysis of the modifications following ISMS Core Functions.

Implemented the 10 CFR 830 requirements for integration of safety basis with the design and operation of the modifications to the existing facility following ISMS:

First integrated design meeting in December 2003 Major integrated design meetings about every 60 days UT-Battelle personnel for facility knowledge and experience NFS personnel for process design and operations experience BREI personnel for nuclear facility upgrade experience Merrick personnel for hot cell design experience Designated Operations Manager with nuclear facility upgrade

experience Supporting safety staff with DOE facility safety and operations

experience

Design concepts reviewed for technical feasibility of meeting both defined DOE safety requirements and safety requirements resulting from safety analysis of the modifications following ISMS Core Functions.

Defined Design Requirements

ESH Design Expectations provided to all personnel from December 2003 to about August 2004

Early definition of hazardous chemical design expectations including Waste Acceptance Criteria

Established a Work Smart Standards Set

10 CFR 830 requirements

DOE O 420.1A design for nuclear safety, fire protection, nuclear criticality prevention, and natural phenomena resistance

DOE G 420.1-1 for nuclear safety defined design requirements

Early definition of fire protection requirements from DOE-STD-1066

Early independent review of DOE O 420.1A nuclear criticality design requirements with DOE criticality safety branch

Integrated defined design requirements from DOE G 420.1-2 for natural phenomena hazard mitigation, using DOE-STD-1020

ESH Design Expectations provided to all personnel from December 2003 to about August 2004

Early definition of hazardous chemical design expectations including Waste Acceptance Criteria

Established a Work Smart Standards Set

10 CFR 830 requirements

DOE O 420.1A design for nuclear safety, fire protection, nuclear criticality prevention, and natural phenomena resistance

DOE G 420.1-1 for nuclear safety defined design requirements

Early definition of fire protection requirements from DOE-STD-1066

Early independent review of DOE O 420.1A nuclear criticality design requirements with DOE criticality safety branch

Integrated defined design requirements from DOE G 420.1-2 for natural phenomena hazard mitigation, using DOE-STD-1020

Operations Design Input

Essential that Operations is Integrated Early in Design

System Owner and Operator Ensures appropriate integration between

various support organizations

Safety Analysis

Nuclear Criticality Safety

Environmental Safety & Health

Radiation Protection

Essential that Operations is Integrated Early in Design

System Owner and Operator Ensures appropriate integration between

various support organizations

Safety Analysis

Nuclear Criticality Safety

Environmental Safety & Health

Radiation Protection

Operations Design Input

Essential For Design Team to Understand the Hazards and Required Controls

High Rad Levels – Dose Mapping needs to be Completed at the Conceptual Stage

Involve Operations and Maintenance Staff in the Design Hot Cell Technicians

Manipulator Repair Personnel

Single Point Failure

Remote Work – Mock Up as Much as Possible even the Simple Activities

Operations Design Input

Experience Pays High Dividends Site Specific Experience – ORNL, Y-12, LANL,….

DOE Department Experience – EM, NE, NNSA, ..

Isotope Specific Experience – U-233

Chemical Processing Experience – Uranium Processing – NFS

Remote Operations

The more Unique the System, The Higher the Return on Experience

Complete Job Hazard Analysis as early as possible

Experience Pays High Dividends Site Specific Experience – ORNL, Y-12, LANL,….

DOE Department Experience – EM, NE, NNSA, ..

Isotope Specific Experience – U-233

Chemical Processing Experience – Uranium Processing – NFS

Remote Operations

The more Unique the System, The Higher the Return on Experience

Complete Job Hazard Analysis as early as possible

Lessons Learned

Communication, Communication, Communication Site visits ~ 1 day of pay

Integrate Design at the Conceptual Stage Denitration

Strong ES&H is necessary for Complex Systems Establish Design Basis Early

Evolves with Design

Establish Operations interface for all disciplines and systems System Engineers Operations Supervisors Technical Support Personnel

Communication, Communication, Communication Site visits ~ 1 day of pay

Integrate Design at the Conceptual Stage Denitration

Strong ES&H is necessary for Complex Systems Establish Design Basis Early

Evolves with Design

Establish Operations interface for all disciplines and systems System Engineers Operations Supervisors Technical Support Personnel

Lessons Learned

Multiple Design Firms – Establish a Single Design Process

Work Closely with Your Customer Early Design – Be Conservative

Involve All Disciplines (Rad Protection, Crit. Safety, Env., ES&H, …)

Reveal All – All Things Are Discovered – Just a Matter of When

Make Progress on Big Issues Early

Stay Informed – Rules, Expectation, Approach, Regulation Changes Daily

Multiple Design Firms – Establish a Single Design Process

Work Closely with Your Customer Early Design – Be Conservative

Involve All Disciplines (Rad Protection, Crit. Safety, Env., ES&H, …)

Reveal All – All Things Are Discovered – Just a Matter of When

Make Progress on Big Issues Early

Stay Informed – Rules, Expectation, Approach, Regulation Changes Daily