Preparing for REDD: Forest Governance Challenges in Peru's Central Selva

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Preparing for REDD: Forest GovernanceChallenges in Peru's Central SelvaJoel N. H. Scriven aa Environmental Change Institute, School of Geography and theEnvironment , University of Oxford , Oxford , United KingdomAccepted author version posted online: 06 Jan 2012.Publishedonline: 23 May 2012.

To cite this article: Joel N. H. Scriven (2012) Preparing for REDD: Forest GovernanceChallenges in Peru's Central Selva, Journal of Sustainable Forestry, 31:4-5, 421-444, DOI:10.1080/10549811.2011.588483

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Journal of Sustainable Forestry, 31:421–444, 2012Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1054-9811 print/1540-756X onlineDOI: 10.1080/10549811.2011.588483

Preparing for REDD: Forest GovernanceChallenges in Peru’s Central Selva

JOEL N. H. SCRIVENEnvironmental Change Institute, School of Geography and the Environment,

University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

Recent rises in levels of tropical deforestation across the PeruvianAmazon, along with the country’s interest in pursuing a reducedemissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD)agenda, raise important questions regarding levels of forest gov-ernance and institutional capacity in the region. This researchadopts a political ecology approach to examine forest governancein Peru’s Central Selva region. Semi-structured key informantinterviews were carried out in Lima, Oxapampa, and communi-ties across the western buffer zone of the Yanachaga-ChemillenNational Park. The region’s history highlights the nature of theexploitative activities which lead to the present institutional andfloristic conditions, while a geopolitical dichotomy has played animportant role in preventing the formation of a common vision forregional development. The state authorities are found to be criti-cally under-capacitated for their remit, while NGO efforts in thearea appear disperse and uncoordinated. National market forces,along with national Amazonian settlement policy, are found tohave the greatest influence on land use. The relative lack ofstate presence, inappropriate institutions, and extractive economysuggest that the region is currently institutionally unequipped to

This research is funded jointly by the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) andthe Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) on an interdisciplinary studentship.

This article was presented at the Yale Student Chapter of the International Society ofTropical Foresters’ (ISTF) 14th annual conference, entitled “Conflict and Cooperation: Toolsfor Governing Tropical Forests,” March 2009. The author thanks Damien Catchpole andYoshie Yoshioka for their help with field logistics; John Cole, Diana Liverman and YadvinderMalhi for their comments on the original manuscript; and three anonymous reviewers whoprovided insightful comments and suggestions.

Address correspondence to Joel N. H. Scriven, Environmental Change Institute, Schoolof Geography and the Environment, Oxford University, South Parks Road, Oxford, OX1 3QY,United Kingdom. E-mail: [email protected]

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422 J. N. H. Scriven

undertake and govern a REDD initiative. Through studies like theone presented here it is possible to gain a thorough understandingof local governance workings to ground and contextualize REDDin local realities.

KEYWORDS reduced emissions from deforestation and forestdegradation (REDD), governance, institutional capacity, politicalecology

INTRODUCTION

Forests provide humanity with a wealth of benefits—known as ecosystemservices—including the sequestration and storage of vast quantities of car-bon (C), the latter estimated at 500 PgC (1PgC = 1 GtC = 1015 gC) in livingbiomass and 700 PgC in soil organic matter (Malhi, Meir, & Brown, 2002).The counterpoint to this service, however, is the release of considerablevolumes of carbon emissions as a result of deforestation and forest degra-dation, which now account for 12–17% of anthropogenic CO2 emissions,second only to fossil fuel combustion (Solomon et al., 2007; van der Werfet al., 2009). Forests continue to be cleared because their financial worth isgreater as timber and crops than standing: a historical market logic reflectiveof the lack of value assigned to ecosystem services and their provision.

In an attempt to reverse the loss of undervalued natural services throughthe alteration of economic incentives, the past decade has seen the accel-erated development of markets and payments for ecosystem services (PES;Gómez-Baggethun, de Groot, Lomas, & Montes, 2010). A forest conservationmarket mechanism—“reduction of emissions from deforestation and forestdegradation,” or REDD—has emerged at the forefront of these develop-ments (Auckland, Moura-Costa, & Brown, 2003; Canadell & Raupach, 2008;Gullison et al., 2007; Niles, Brown, Pretty, Ball, & Fay, 2002). The funda-mental concept underscoring REDD is that of making forests more valuablestanding than felled through the economic valuation and sale of the carbonservices they provide. REDD also offers an attractive and unique form ofclimate change mitigation due to the co-benefits it is able to generate intropical developing countries, such as poverty alleviation and biodiversityconservation (Pagiola, Arcenas, & Platais, 2005; Stickler et al., 2009; Venteret al., 2009).

Although it is a relatively new concept, REDD has already mobilizedsignificant attention and potential resources for land use and forestry man-agement (Gullison et al., 2007; Laurance, 2007). Incentivized by the prospectof accessing forest carbon funds from multilateral organizations such asthe World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF; http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org) and the United Nation’s REDD Programme(UN-REDD; http://www.un-redd.org), many stakeholders are evaluating

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Forest Governance in Peru’s Central Selva 423

their capacities and reviewing relevant experiences in a process now widelyreferred to as “REDD Readiness” (Johns et al., 2009). On the basis ofthese evaluations, governments, non-government organizations (NGOs),and private actors can evaluate their ability to reduce emissions and takeappropriate action to establish an enabling framework for REDD deals.

Much of the conceptual and practical development of REDD to date hasfocused on global and national architectures (e.g., Ebeling & Yasue, 2008;Miles & Kapos, 2008; Strassburg, Turner, Fisher, Schaeffer, & Lovett, 2009),and the major challenge now is the engagement and integration of the mech-anism at the sub-national, or local, level (Harvey, Zerbock, Papageorgiou,& Parra, 2010; Phelps, Webb, & Agrawal, 2010b). To maximize the util-ity of local REDD and maximize the realization of its potential co-benefits,context-specific knowledge of its engagement with local institutions, popu-lations, landscapes, and economies is crucial (Phelps, Guerrero, Dalabajan,Young, & Webb, 2010a). Among the many challenges facing REDD method-ologies is the development of appropriate multi-level governance systemsto manage the technical and financial elements efficiently and equitably(Campbell, 2009; Canadell & Raupach, 2008; Skutsch & McCall, 2010). Yetwith a large number of factors influencing the effectiveness and outcomes offorest governance (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006; Brown, 2001; Ostrom, 2007),it is clear that deeper analyses of governance arrangements are now needednot just for REDD but simply in order to allow the numerous actors tomake better decisions about forest governance and management at a varietyof scales (Agrawal, Chhatre, & Hardin, 2008). Now, prior to the setting ofinternational rules, is a critical time for enhancing knowledge and learninglessons surrounding the local engagement of REDD.

This article focuses on the governance challenges facing REDD in thePeruvian Amazon. Emissions from deforestation in Peru, a country coveringthe Amazon’s western frontier as it meets the Andean highlands, are pro-jected to become the fifth highest globally, at 41 MtC/yr (Strassburg et al.,2009). While land use allocation policies in the Amazon have served toprovide some protection, deforestation and degradation threaten to isolateprotected areas such as national parks (Oliveira et al., 2007). Nevertheless,state and non-state enthusiasm for REDD in the country continues to grow,with interested parties meeting regularly as the Peruvian REDD Group (2008)and NGOs beginning to develop pilot projects. This critical mass of inter-est raises important questions regarding the levels and appropriateness ofexisting forest governance arrangements and institutional capacity acrossthe region. Peru offers a particularly salient case for the examination ofREDD governance challenges given the World Bank’s external review of thecountry’s submitted REDD Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) concluding thatthe document:

1. does not provide a full vision of the challenges faced by Peru in respectof REDD;

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2. does not provide information on existing capacity to monitor andimplement REDD;

3. requires a more detailed analysis of key issues in forest law enforcementand forest sector governance (FCPF, 2008).

This article aims to address these knowledge gaps through a locallygrounded analysis of forest and land use governance along Peru’sAmazonian frontier, taking a case study from the “Central Selva’ region toevaluate the extent to which REDD would be practicable under the currentstructures. To this end, this research adopts three primary lines of inquiry.First, in recognition of the central importance of the history of forest gov-ernance arrangements in understanding outcomes (Agrawal et al., 2008),the role of past processes in influencing current land use and governancearrangements in the region is questioned. Second, this work builds on thework of others in a Latin American context (cf. Corbera & Brown, 2008) inexamining the extent to which political structures enable or inhibit forestprotection and sustainable use. Finally, given the claims that global forestpolitics have to a large extent been recently shaped by non-state actors(Arts & Buizer, 2009), this article analyses the differing local-scale roles ofnon-state actors in the region in bringing about land use changes. A criticalknowledge gap in the literature is addressed in this article through its focuson local perspectives of governance and drivers of land use change, linkingthe findings back to address their implications for REDD.

This work adopts a political ecology approach in its study of powerrelations in land use governance and institutions, combining multiple scalesand incorporating state and non-state actors. While not constituting a coher-ent theory per se, political ecology provides a useful toolkit for analysinghuman-environment interactions (Bryant, 1998; Paulson, Gezon, & Watts,2003). By combining material nature with human agency and politicaleconomy, political ecology examines the social, cultural, and historicalfactors which shape human responses to the environment; patterns ofresource use; and the multi-scalar workings of political and economicforces (Blaikie, 1985; Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987). At its most fundamen-tal, political ecology uncovers the specific ways in which environmentalchange and ecological conditions are products of political process (Bryant &Bailey, 1997). Here, a political ecology approach will serve to highlightconflicts in the form of struggles over meanings as well as land andresources, and places emphasis on understanding the historical constructionof present circumstances (Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987; Bryant & Bailey, 1997).The resulting political ecology thus guides this analysis toward issues ofimportance by providing a theoretical basis for the analysis of complexhuman-environment relations alongside multi-level governance structures.By linking the local political ecology of forest and land use to the emergingREDD agenda, this article addresses an issue missing from the academic

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literature, and provides a timely analysis for policy makers and practitionersto apply towards the improvement of REDD efficiency.

STUDY AREA AND METHODS

A case study for this research is taken from Peru’s central inland region,or Central Selva; the Yanachaga-Chemillen National Park and its bufferzone, which lie in the region of Pasco, province of Oxapampa; and dis-tricts of Oxapampa, Huancabamba, Pozuzo, and Villa Rica. At a distanceof 250 km from the national capital, Lima, Yanachaga-Chemillen NationalPark straddles the eastern flank of the Andes, its cloud forests reaching analtitude of 3,000 masl. The Park covers an area of over 122,000 ha andforms part of a protected area complex which additionally encompassesthe Yanesha Communal Reserve (covering 35,000 ha), running along theeastern border of the Park; and the San Matias-San Carlos Protection Forest(covering 145,000 ha), beginning at the southern border and extendingsoutheastwards and northwards, as illustrated in Figure 1. This is a siteof particular current land use governance and REDD interest, due to itsrecent proposal as a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve (at the time of data collec-tion this proposal had been sent to UNESCO for evaluation) and a pledgeof C2 million (US$2.7 million) from the German Environment Ministry toreduce deforestation in the area.

Key informant semi-structured interviews (n = 23) were carried outbetween July 2008 and August 2009 in Lima, Oxapampa (the provincial cap-ital) and communities in the western buffer zone of Yanachaga-ChemillenNational Park. State, NGO, and private sector interviewees were selectedthrough a stakeholder analysis “snowballing process” (cf. Grimble & Chan,1995), where individuals interviewed were asked to identify other individu-als and institutions with a stake in local and regional land use governance.Land users were selected by random sampling in the study area. Findingsfrom interviews are reported here anonymously, revealing only the affilia-tions of respondents, shown in Table 1. Secondary data from the publishedand grey literature were used to unravel the historical context of forestgovernance in the region.

FINDINGS

Modern History of Forest Governance in the Central Selva

The second half of the 19th century marked the beginning of permanentoccupation of the Central Selva, prior to which immigration to the regionhad been limited by the absence of adequate colonial administration andconflicts among early colonizers (Ortiz, 1969). As post-independence eco-nomic recovery began in the 1840s, state policies encouraged colonization

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FIGURE 1 The Yanachaga Conservation Complex. Darkest shade indicates the Yanachaga-Chemillen National Park; to its east the Yanesha Communal Reserve; to the far east and souththe San Matias-San Carlos Protection Forest; light shade surrounding protected areas indicatesthe buffer zone of the Conservation Complex.

by Europeans, resulting in road construction and the establishment oflarge estates, whose produce satisfied the needs of coastal cities and pro-vided goods for export (Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola[CIDA], 1966). Legislation in 1845 (Peruvian Congress, 1845) declared indige-nous communities to be the owners of the lands they occupied, andcolonists to be the owners of lands on which they settled, a policy whichultimately resulted in conflicts between the two groups (United NationsEnvironment Program [UNEP], 1987). The administrations of Ramón Castilla(1845–1851 and 1855–1862) most notably established immigration agree-ments with Germany and Austria, the resultant first wave of which arrivedfrom Antwerp in the Central Selva in 1859, establishing the town of Pozuzo.The colonists built in their Tirolean style, planted coffee in agroforestrysystems, and cleared large areas of forest for cattle raising (UNEP, 1987).Successive German colonists arrived and, with suitable land becoming

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TABLE 1 Affiliations of Interview Respondents

Informant Sector Institution Date

1 State Pasco Regional Government, Oxapampa 11/11/20082 State Pasco Regional Government, Oxapampa 11/20/20083 State Police Department, Oxapampa 11/03/20084 State Forestry & Wildlife Authority, Oxapampa 10/16/20085 State Protected Areas Authority, Oxapampa 10/27/20086 State FONDEBOSQUE, Oxapampa 11/14/20087 State Mayor of Oxapampa 11/11/20088 State Yanachaga-Chemillen Management Committee 06/19/20099 NGO ProNaturaleza, Oxapampa 10/29/2008

10 NGO ProNaturaleza, Oxapampa 10/29/200811 NGO ProNaturaleza, Lima 07/07/200812 NGO Instituto del Bien Comun, Oxapampa 10/17/200813 NGO Instituto del Bien Comun, Oxapampa 10/20/200814 NGO PROSOYA (Association for the Promotion of Support

to Youth and the Communal Development),Huancabamba

10/30/2008

15 Private Oxapampa sawmill 11/11/200816 Private Oxapampa sawmill 11/11/200817 Private Reforestation company, Pozuzo 07/01/200818 Private Forestry consultant 08/26/200919 Private Conservation consultant 07/08/200820 Land user Community of San Alberto (adjacent to Oxapampa) 10/25/200821 Land user Community of San Alberto 11/20/200822 Land user Community of Navarra (15km north of Oxapampa) 11/10/200823 Land user Community of Navarra 11/21/2008

scarce, traveled southwards to found Oxapampa in 1890 and Villa Rica in1920.

Up until the completion of a trans-Andean road in 1919 (Tarma–SanRamon–La Merced), the only profitable products, exported by pack animal,were coffee and sugar. Small quantities of fine woods, principally Spanishcedar (Cedrella odorata) and mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla), were alsotransported in this manner; but the road made large-scale selective forestextraction feasible, rapidly changing the floristic structure of the region’sthen-accessible forests (UNEP, 1987). European immigrants and their descen-dants monopolized economic activity—primarily timber extraction and cattleranching—until 1960, while allowing indigenous communities to carry outsubsistence farming on colonized lands (Smith, 1981).

In 1969, under the military rule of Juan Velasco, the Government’s agrar-ian reform eliminated all large private holdings, converting the majority intocooperatives owned by former workers (Hudson, 1992). However, follow-ing the mixed success of the cooperatives, the majority were convertedto individual private holdings in the 1980s under the second Presidencyof Fernando Belaunde. This administration was notable for its desire tocolonize the Amazon to stimulate the national economy, encouraging

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landless coastal and Andean peasants to migrate and settle in the “under-populated” Amazon. One result of this policy was the Pichis-Palcasu SpecialProject (Proyecto Especial Pichis-Palcasú, PEPP), involving road construc-tion, the establishment of wood-processing plants, and the settlement of150,000 people in the Palcasu Valley of the Central Selva (Southgate &Elgegren, 1995).

In 1981, the United States Agency for International Development(USAID), keen to support Peru’s return to democracy, financed an eval-uation of the resources in the valley. The study concluded that a largeproportion of the area would be inappropriate for agriculture and that, asplanned, the PEPP would have a negative impact on the region, and in par-ticular on the indigenous communities (Southgate & Elgegren, 1995). ThePEPP’s focus was subsequently changed to the establishment of a method-ology for sustainable forest management and agroforestry. This strategywas accompanied by a territorial ordering of the Project area involving theallocation of land categories based on their “greatest capacity,” and a sub-sequent official titling of lands to native communities and colonists (Rada,Franco, Fernandez-Baca, & Romano, 2005). One component of the Project,the Program for Rural Development in Palcasu (Programa de DesarrolloRural, PDR Palcasu), made the PEPP the first initiative in the PeruvianAmazon to include in its design a clear and defined environmental protec-tion requirement; and in 1986 led to the creation of the Yanachaga Complex,encompassing the National Park, Communal Reserve, and Protection Forest.

A corollary of the colonization policies and development efforts wasthe large-scale migration of Andean peasants and subsequent settlement ina spontaneous and disorganized fashion, primarily along roads and tracksmade by timber extractors, leading to the exportation of Andean farmingpractices to the Central Selva (Bebbington, 1990). Whereas in the highlandsa 3- to 5-ha parcel often maintains a family and produces surplus yields, thenutrient-poor, thin soils of the Central Selva, often on slopes, are susceptibleto erosion and leaching, and require several years lying fallow to recovertheir productivity (UNEP, 1987). Andean practices of burning all vegetationin a parcel prior to planting therefore quickly exhausted agricultural land,leading to the expansion of the area cleared on the following cycle and anacceleration of deforestation.

The 1980s, known as the lost decade across Latin America, saw the riseof the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), a Maoist guerrilla movement, inPeru. This in part resulted from, and certainly acted to reinforce, a periodof economic turmoil brought about in large part by burgeoning nationaldebts. Sendero took control of large areas of the Central Selva, displacingindigenous communities and closing rural markets in an attempt to endsmall-scale capitalism and starve Lima of produce (Vargas, Coronado, &Heise, 1993). During this time, USAID terminated their presence in the area,but continued their work through the funding of a partnership between the

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Peruvian NGO ProNaturaleza (Fundacion Peruana para la Conservacion dela Naturaleza, Peruvian Foundation for the Conservation of Nature) and TheNature Conservancy (TNC), for management of the National Park.

Following the considerable decrease in guerilla activity since the arrestof Sendero’s leader in 1992, commercial agricultural activity in the CentralSelva grew to the present levels—where several thousand boxes (eachapproximately 0.06 m3 in volume) of produce are exported to Lima on aweekly basis. The most recent official figures for the Province of Oxapampa(total size: 1,813,480 ha) place the population at 78,108 (Pasco RegionalGovernment, 2006), and estimate agriculture to cover an area of 32,419 ha(Pasco Regional Government, 2007). Among the results of this populationincrease and agricultural expansion have been high levels of deforestation,almost exclusively by slash and burn practices, as well as extreme degrada-tion of the large majority of remaining non-protected forested areas due tohistorical and ongoing timber extraction.

Regional Context of Forest Governance in Central Selva

REGIONAL “DIVORCE”

The Region of Pasco is notable for its geography, straddling both Andeanand tropical forest biomes. The Region is subdivided into three provinces,Pasco and Daniel Alcides Carrion in the west and Oxapampa in the east, asillustrated in Figure 2. The primary Pasco Regional Government is based inthe Andean city of Cerro de Pasco, at an altitude of 4,800 m, while a decen-tralized Regional Government office is located in Oxapampa, at 1,800 m. Thediversity encompassed by the Region presents a wide diversity of culturesand ecosystems, though the differential needs and priorities of the provinceshave caused a political rift and presented a barrier to a common vision forregional development.

The distinct provincial histories and economies serve to highlightthe construction of this regional geopolitical “divorce” (Informant 1). TheRegional Capital, Cerro de Pasco, has been a focal mining center since thediscovery of silver in the region in the early 1600s. Although this resourcewas largely exhausted by the Spanish, it remains an active extractive cen-ter for other metals and minerals such as copper and zinc. In contrast,Oxapampa’s economic history is dominated by timber extraction, relativelyrecently being succeeded by agricultural production feeding the Lima mar-kets. Therefore, whereas the Andean provinces favor the development ofregional policies and investments supporting mining activities, the decentral-ized Oxapampa Regional Government favor those promoting the agriculturaland—in order to capitalize on their protected areas—tourism sectors. Thisraises critical questions as to the distribution of REDD funds amongdecentralized State bodies, highlighting the need to resolve inter-regional

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FIGURE 2 Pasco Region and its provinces; territorial jurisdiction of the Oxapampa FFS officeshown in darker shade (adapted from Bronder, 2008).

development agenda conflicts before resources can be targeted efficientlytoward REDD-conducive region-wide activities.

BUDGETARY INCREASE AND REGIONAL CAPACITY

As part of the national decentralization drive under President AlejandroToledo (2001–2006), a change in the tax system gave regional governments agreater share of mining proceeds. In Pasco, this led to a three-fold increase inthe regional budget for the execution of projects which “surprised the institu-tions” because “they were not ready to administrate such volumes of money”

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(Informant 2). This is felt to be largely down to a technical knowledge deficitamong the Regional Government staff in their ability to design medium- tolarge-scale civil engineering projects, and further compounded by high staffturnover rates and lengthy administrative and consultative processes. Thecurrent system thereby favors populist projects such as temporary roadimprovements rather than long-term, region-wide endeavors such as sew-erage systems and treatment plants. Moreover, with attempts being madeto direct available resources toward pressing regional health issues, amongthem the highest national rates of childhood morbidity (Informant 2), landuse and forest governance issues have, to date, been largely sidelined at theregional level.

Private Land Use Governance

LAND USE CLASSIFICATIONS

The Peruvian State classifies private lands into five categories:

● A: Harvested crop: whole plant may be planted and removed (e.g., corn).● C: Permanent crop: product or part of plant may be removed (e.g., coffee).● P: Pasture: suitable for cattle pastures.● F: Forest exploitation: trees and forest products may be removed but forest

cover must remain.● X: Protection: nothing may be removed.

Where landowners have forest cover over A, C, or P lands, they mustfirst be granted land use change permission from the State forest regula-tor, INRENA’s (Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales, National Institutefor Natural Resources) Forestry and Wildlife Department (Forestal y FaunaSilvestre, FFS), a representative of which is then obliged to oversee therequested change. Although the classifications allow for clear-cutting onlands designated A, C, and P, the law requires that 30% of these lands mustremain as arboreal cover (while not defining “arboreal cover”). Further, whileA, C, and P lands are granted by the State to individuals as private property,areas of F and X are granted as “sessions in use,” remaining the propertyof the State. Examples of areas which would be assigned as X are allu-vial forests—to prevent erosion and run-off into waterways—and hilltops.However, the origins and enforceability of the land use categories call intoquestion their value and applicability, with important implications for forestprotection efforts.

The territorial ordering of the Central Selva undertaken following thePEPP in the 1980s divided lands and assigned their greatest capacity basedon aerial photographs from the 1970s, with very little ground-truthing car-ried out to endorse the allocated categories (Informant 5; Informant 9). This

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method and the subsequent divisions of land have drawn wide criticismfrom state and non-state actors alike (Informant 1; Informant 6; Informant14; Informant 18), with one Oxapampa employee of INRENA FFS concludingthat the classifications are “practically meaningless” and very difficult toapply in practice when in the field (Informant 4). An illustration of thedisparity between the classifications and ground realities can be drawnfrom the work of the State entity for the promotion of forest development,FONDEBOSQUE (Fondo de Promocion del Desarrollo Forestal). This institu-tion maintains a forest species nursery and demonstration plot in Oxapampa,sells plantlings, and offers forest plantation consultation services to landusers. In a notable case during a field consultation, a FONDEBOSQUE engi-neer found land legally classified as A on a steep slope within the NationalPark buffer zone—having been erroneous classified through the aerial pho-tography technique. As a result, and despite advice to the contrary, the landuser was able legally to clear the forest and establish a monoculture pineplantation (Informant 6).

This, and numerous similar cases, has resulted in criticism ofFONDEBOSQUE by NGOs as well as other State bodies, who allege thatFONDEBOSQUE’s primary objective is the promotion of exotic forest speciesplantations (Informant 2; Informant 5; Informant 9; Informant 10; Informant21). The recent completion of an Ecological-Economic Zoning (EEZ) of theProvince of Oxapampa, based on remote sensing and GIS technology, ishoped to enable the improved planning of future projects (Informant 1;Informant 2). Nevertheless, the social, economic, and logistical complexityof re-categorizing lands likely poses a logistical as well as legal barrier to theconceptualization of sustainable land use practices under REDD.

LAND USE COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEABILITY

Other than the appropriateness of the land use classifications is the localauthorities’ capacity to enforce their compliance. INRENA FFS is the entitywithin the Ministry of Agriculture responsible for the sustainable use of forestresources and wildlife through regulation and supervision. FFS has a localoffice in Oxapampa, the personnel of which are responsible for the oversightof forestry-related activities over four districts: Oxapampa, Chontabamba,Huancabamba, and Pozuzo, covering roughly 18,000 km2 (shown in grey inFigure 2). These regulatory responsibilities encompass both extractive activ-ities and land use changes. In order to carry out any extractive activities—offorest or non-forest products (such as orchids or nuts)—from private or con-cessioned land, owners must submit a management plan to the local FFSoffice. Following review, FFS authorizes or prohibits the proposed activities.A similar process of management plan submission applies for land usechange proposals; for example, where a land owner wishes to remove for-est covering land denominated as A in order to plant a crop. If the land use

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change permission is granted, FFS are then required by the Forestry Law of2000 to make a field visit to oversee the activity and ensure it is carried outwithin regulatory parameters.

Yet this broad remit is not reflected in the capacity assigned to FFS bythe Ministry of Agriculture. The Oxapampa FFS office employs two people:one forest technician and an assistant. Because one person must remainin the office to attend to visits and correspondence, this apportions a fieldcapacity of one person to cover an area of 18,000 km2. To do this, theoffice is allocated one motorbike for field inspections and an inadequate fuelbudget (Informant 1; Informant 4). This minimal field capacity has resultedin few visits taking place to oversee land use changes or ensure compliancewith land classifications (Informant 1; Informant 11; Informant 12; Informant13; Informant 20), with an FFS employee admitting that “99% of people burnwithout authorization” and that it is not practical to fine offenders “becausewe would have to do it with almost all of the people” (Informant 4). Thislack of oversight has on several occasions meant that fires have previouslyspread uncontrollably and cleared whole hillsides of forest (Informant 14).

Staffing details reveal further shortcomings. The technician is paid∼$400 per month, a salary described “not enough to live on” in order tosupport his wife and children (Informant 12). Moreover, since the techniciancarries out field inspections unarmed and receives no insurance in case ofaccident or injury, there are widespread allegations of corruption and briberyfor allowing the passage of illegally extracted timber, rather than attempt-ing to sanction the perpetrators and risk violent confrontation (Informant 1;Informant 2; Informant 5; Informant 12; Informant 20). In the case of findingillegally harvested timber, the FFS technician has previously had to borrow atruck from a NGO in order to transport it (Informant 12). When the law hasrequired sanctions or penalties for groups or individuals caught extractingillegally, the same NGO has had to pay for the fueling of police vehicles inorder for them to accompany the FFS technician to the field.

This acute lack of capacity and resources has been felt by local landusers, among them claiming that widespread deforestation and forest degra-dation have taken place due to the lack of authority and capacity of theinstitutions (Informant 20; Informant 23). Yet other land users even claim tobe unaware of the existence of INRENA, since they have never visited theircommunity (Informant 22). These capacity shortcomings also reflect salientimplications for REDD governance. The lack of comprehensive land usemonitoring facilities increases the demands of a REDD initiative due to theabsence of a governance baseline to build from, suggesting that consider-able time and resources would be required to design an original, functionalmonitoring regime. Additionally, a critical psychological barrier to REDD hasbeen shaped by the disjuncture between the population and the State in landuse matters, which would require bridging before land users respond to andengage in regulated REDD activities.

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PROPERTY TITLING METHODOLOGY

The Central Selva’s colonial history and proximity to Lima have resultedin high levels of property ownership relative to other Amazonian regionsof the country, with land prices close to populated centers such asOxapampa having increased incrementally since the consolidation of privateland ownership and rise in interest in reforestation plantations. However,lands in more remote parts of the region, such as the community ofAgua Salada at the northernmost point of the western buffer zone of theNational Park, have only recently been officially surveyed, delimited, andtitled.

The institution responsible for property titling is the Agency for theFormalization of Informal Property (Organismo de Formalización de laPropiedad Informal, COFOPRI), with the titling process beginning with theland user requesting a survey from this agency. When a COFOPRI tech-nician arrives at the land they are responsible for defining the bordersof the area to be titled using a hand-held GPS, before returning to theoffice to formalize the agreement and produce a land title certificate. YetCOFOPRI are alleged to have titled land areas using inaccurate methods(Informant 5; Informant 8; Informant 18; Informant 20), in the commu-nity for Agua Salada resulting in privately titled areas overlapping with theNational Park boundary by up to 50 ha (Informant 5). This in turn broughtabout a lengthy conflict between land users, the protected areas authority(Servicion Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas, SERNANP) Oxapampabranch, and COFOPRI, with the State taking legal action against 10 land usersfor invading protected land. The case was ultimately ruled in favor of theland users, allowing them to retain the land titled to them (Informant 7), butthe episode resulted in a severe degradation of relations between commu-nity members and State institutions. In an effort to avoid future conflict, theSERNANP Oxapampa branch undertook a new delineation of the NationalPark boundary in November 2008. This incident serves to highlight an oper-ational deficiency in COFOPRI, as well as the lack of communication andcoordination (in this case the interchange of mapping data) between stateinstitutions in the region. In this respect, REDD efforts face the dual chal-lenges of improving coordination between State land use institutions andreconciling State-community relationships.

Protected Area Governance

SERNANP is the entity responsible for the management of protected areasacross the country. At the national level, SERNANP formerly sat withinINRENA (as Areas Naturales Protegidas, ANP), in the Ministry of Agriculture,but in 2008 was transferred into the newly formed Environment Ministry.The State took charge of the management of the Yanachaga Complex in1996, previous to which it was administered by ProNaturaleza. Until 2009,

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the SERNANP branch in Oxapampa solely administrated the three protectedareas of the Complex (covering a total of 302,000 ha) with a budget for onlythe Park. The passing of SERNANP into the Environment Ministry had theeffect of empowering the protected area agenda and raising their nationalprofile (Informant 8; Informant 18), translating down to the Central Selvain the form of each protected area (Yanachaga-Chemillen National Park,Yanesha Communal Reserve, and San Matias-San Carlos Protection Forest)receiving an individual manager. Nevertheless, a lack of regulatory fram-ing of this process led to a series of hierarchical conflicts between thethree managers, stemming from power struggles over overall control of thearea as the Yanachaga Complex. Meanwhile, the local field capacities of theprotected area authorities remain minimal—five guards maintaining respon-sibility for the monitoring of all three areas. Moreover, with the farthestpoints of the San Matias-San Carlos Protection Forest 1-day’s drive awayfrom the SERNANP office in Oxapampa and a very limited fuel budget, theprotected area guards are finding that there is a “constant illegal extractionof wood, on a daily basis” in those areas which they are unable to monitor(Informant 5; Informant 7; Informant 10). In contrast, very little illegal extrac-tion takes place within the National Park boundaries since its proximity toOxapampa ensures more effective monitoring and deterrence (Informant 1;Informant 5).

An illustration of the inefficiencies in protected area enforcement ispresented through a case where illegal timber extraction was intercepted inthe San Matias-San Carlos Protection Forest. In the event, the only powerthe park keepers could exert was upon the offenders was to record theirnames and addresses, to be sent to the central SERNANP office in Limafor follow-up. The park keepers then proceeded to carry the timber to thenearest road and from there to the Oxapampa office, taking the entire teamof park guards 1 month to complete. The lack of storage facilities forcedthem to stack the timber in the vehicle shelter, moving the vehicles intothe open. With no procedure in place to deal with decommissioned tim-ber, in 2008 the timber had been in the yard for 5 yr, compounded by theaccelerated deterioration of their vehicles due to constant subjection to thetropical heat and rain. This example is illustrative of a wider institutionalfailing in the region, namely the lack of communication and collaborationbetween the two state land use governance institutions in Oxapampa, FFSand SERNANP, in tackling illegal extractive activities. There appears to bea clear divide between the two institutions in addressing forest governancewithin and outside of protected areas, and no evidence of the two collab-orating to tackle the issue in the region together (Informant 3; Informant 8;Informant 18). The shortcomings of SERNANP Oxapampa appear furtherexacerbated by the position of branch director being cyclical and politicalin nature (Informant 1; Informant 8). The position carries a relatively lowsalary (around $700 per month) but provides a stepping stone to other State

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appointments, which has resulted in a string of incumbents holding thepost for an average of 2 yr before moving on. The position is also politi-cally appointed, with the SERNANP office director alleged to only be there“because he helped the Regional President win the election” (Informant 1).This situation is likely to have hindered the development of an effectivelong-term vision and management plan for the institution.

The analysis of protected area governance arrangements offers impor-tant lessons for REDD efforts. The first is the disconnect between SERNANPand FFS in the monitoring and tackling of illegal activities in protected areasand their buffer zones. Although these two institutions now belong to sepa-rate ministries at the national level, REDD efforts would likely benefit from astrengthening of the connection between the two at the local level throughthe establishment of bilateral land use governance procedures. The secondlesson for REDD here is the need for a long-term Regional conservationvision and committed leadership.

Roles of Non-State Actors

NGOS

There are a number of NGOs in the Selva Central region which have beeninvolved with forests, conservation, and other environmental issues. Themost resource-intensive initiative to date was the inclusion of Yanachaga-Chemillen National Park in TNC’s Parks in Peril program, partneredby ProNaturaleza. In 2005, this program culminated in the submis-sion to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) of a proposal for a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)afforestation/reforestation (AR) project over the region. Yet the proposalwas rejected due to a lack of methodological clarity (Informant 19) and TNCended their presence in the area. Meanwhile, in the late 1990s and early2000s, other NGOs such as Missouri Botanical Gardens and the Institute forthe Common Good (Instituto del Bien Comun, IBC) had established a pres-ence in the area, and there began a general and important shift in the focusof NGO work which reflected global conservation policy from “fortress” tocommunity-based conservation (Informant 1; Informant 19). A major partof this shift was a change of focus of NGOs from the collection of sci-entific data to the elaboration of projects with a greater focus on localpeople and social development. This is exemplified by efforts to propose theYanachaga Complex as a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve. The first effort wasled by ProNaturaleza, almost exclusively focusing on conservation benefits,under the name “Selva Central Biosphere Reserve.” This proposal focused onthe environmental conservation benefits that this status would bring about,but was rejected by UNESCO. Subsequently, a second effort was led by IBC,in consultation with the local indigenous associations ANAP (Apatyawaka

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Nampitsi Ashaninka Pichis) and FECONAYA (Federacion de ComunidadesNativas Yaneshas), and the regional and municipal governments, under thename ‘Oxapampa-Yanesha-Ashaninka Biosphere Reserve,” highlighting theinvolvement of indigenous communities and the cultural benefits of theconservation program. Nevertheless, other than in this proposal grassrootsand indigenous NGOs and associations have had little impact on land usegovernance.

The extent to which the benefits of the shift in the focus of NGOwork toward community-based conservation have been felt by land usersin the region appears less certain. While some land users have experiencedsome benefits from reforestation projects initiated by conservation NGOs(Informant 20), many others have experiences various projects come andgo with little lasting effect (Informant 22; Informant 23). The overall effecton land user attitudes appears to be a jaded and indifferent view of NGOsand their ability to make a lasting difference through their work. Perhapsthe most significant role NGOs have played in the region is the generationof scientific data which the local State authorities would have no techni-cal capacity to commission by their own means (Informant 1; Informant 2).This information fed directly into the work of the regional government asit created the provincial EEZ, on the basis of which long-term developmentplanning decisions may be taken. Therefore while the shift in NGO foci fromscience to social issues has provided an important recognition and inclusionof indigenous populations in regional land use planning, the considerableshift away from the generation of scientific data presents a challenge to thegeneration of sound REDD baseline and monitoring data.

PRIVATE SECTOR

Since colonial times the private sector, encompassing the trade of timber,wildlife, and agricultural produce, has dominated and shaped the fate ofthe forests in the Central Selva (Bebbington, 1990). At the peak of theregion’s timber production industry in the 1950s, there were 28 sawmillsin Oxapampa, of which 2 now remain working at half capacity (Informant15; Informant 16). As roads over the Andes to the coast were improvedand paved, agricultural land expanded to feed Lima’s growing demand forfresh produce. In the contemporary trade system, intermediaries drive trucksalong the road within the boundary of the western buffer zone of the Parkseveral times a week. Land users harvest and package their produce inwooden boxes, stacking them on the roadside in anticipation of the buy-ers. These intermediaries set the price per box, according to supply anddemand factors, and pay land users accordingly. The price offered to landusers can vary each week and is non-negotiable, placing the producers inthe powerless position, unconscious of each harvest’s return. This in turnsparks rushes to clear areas to plant different types of produce when word

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reaches land users that alternative products are fetching higher market prices(restricted to plants which can grow at altitude), hindering the developmentof longer term land use planning strategies. The power held by intermedi-aries is also alleged to have given rise to corrupt and nepotistic practices(Informant 21; Informant 22; Informant 23), where producers are offereddifferent prices according to their relationship with the intermediary.

Over the past 40 yr, boom-and-bust cycles have shifted land use pro-duction patterns in response to market demands from pumpkin (Cucurbitaspp.) to rocoto (Capsicum pubescens) to granadilla (Passiflora ligularis),each having distinct impacts on forests and land use. For instance, rocoto iswidely believed by land users to grow best on freshly cleared primary for-est (Informant 12; Informant 20; Informant 22), and thereby acts as a directagent of deforestation. Granadilla, on the other hand, is able to grow on pre-viously cleared areas such as cattle pastures (Informant 13; Informant 20),but requires a large number of wooden posts (∼600 per hectare) to suspendthe vines on, so acts as an agent of considerable forest degradation.

The land use production and trade systems in place, in conjunctionwith the relative lack of State presence and regulation, have resulted intwo notable outcomes. Firstly is the deforestation and degradation of allbut the most inaccessible forested areas, with cropland—following for-est burning—encroaching higher up hillsides with each passing season(Informant 6; Informant 13; Informant 16). Secondly, this system has pro-duced a form of private sector land use governance, where land usersrespond to the market and influence their surrounding landscape andforests accordingly. This latter aspect is being reinforced and exacerbatedby the influx of investment in exotic tree species plantations, which in itselfrepresents a response to a national market demand for construction tim-ber (Informant 15; Informant 17). A thorough understanding of local landeconomies and trade patterns are essential to the conceptualization of sub-national REDD initiative. By understanding the motivations and economicsbehind land use changes, contextualized alternatives can be offered to localpopulations.

DISCUSSION

The overarching aim of this article was to examine the local-scale forestgovernance challenges to REDD initiatives in the Central Selva, adoptinga political ecology approach for the examination of human-environmentrelations. With Peru’s REDD R-PIN falling short on identification of spe-cific challenges facing REDD implementation and governance, this articlesought to (a) depict historical constructions of current forest governancearrangements, (b) examine how political structures influence land use, and(c) analyze the role of non-state actors in bringing about land use changes.

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Political ecology guided the analysis to untangle institutional linkages, socialrelationships and their impacts on land and forest use, while providing acritical recognition of scale and improving explanations of both societaldynamics and interrelations of social and ecological systems (Mauro, 2009).To this effect, political ecology illustrates how environmental changes inthis frontier region of the Peruvian Amazon are intrinsically linked to politi-cal and economic processes which will influence the engagement of REDDinitiatives.

This analysis identifies weak structures and institutions in the gover-nance of land use and forests. Of the three bioregions in Peru—coast,highlands, and rainforest—the Amazon has historically been the mostremoved from state influence (Gray, 1997). This work illustrates that thisapparently remains the case even in the closest tropical forest region to thehighly centralized capital. The case study region’s modern history highlightsthe nature of exploitative activities which led to the present institutional andecological conditions, while Pasco’s geopolitical rift has played a significantrole in preventing the formation of a common vision for modern regionaldevelopment. Despite the region being targeted as a model for Amazoniandevelopment in the 1970s and 1980s, the more recent decentralization effortshave served to overwhelm the local authorities rather than empower themand kick-start a surge in infrastructure construction.

State presence in the region consists of a series of social relationshipsof power which are frequently changing, with administrations which waxand wane with elections, a territory far from under the State’s control anda seemingly distant relationship with civil society which fluctuates betweenconflict and indifference. For REDD to truly succeed, a key component isthe wide engagement of civil society—including consultation, disseminationof information, and benefit sharing. The current general lack of trust andeffective communications between the local population and the State presentsignificant governance challenges for REDD engagement.

There are several similarities and contrasts between FFS and SERNANP.They are both provided with minimal resources by the Ministry ofAgriculture and the Environment Ministry, respectively, a situation whichhas prevented them from covering and fulfilling their geographical andlogistical remits. This has led to moderate levels of governance in areasproximate to their offices in Oxapampa, but entirely inadequate coverage,monitoring, and regulation of forests and land uses further afield. SERNANP’scomparatively greater field capacity of five park keepers—to FFS’s one fieldtechnician—appears misplaced, given FFS’s responsibility to regulate andoversee all land use changes and extractive activities on all private landsacross four districts. There also appears to be a critical lack of communi-cation between the two offices at present. The mandates of both of theseinstitutions are central to effective REDD governance: conserving protectedareas and ensuring compliance with land use regulations. State-led REDD

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would therefore greatly benefit from reinforcement strengthening of, as wellas improved coordination between, the two institutions.

A lack of collaboration is also reflected by the network of NGOs in theregion, which appear to have followed their own agendas in pursuit of cen-tral office mandates. This, in concert with inconsistent funding, has resultedin short-term projects and in turn in local populations experiencing initiativescome and go without a significant lasting impact and ultimately becomingskeptical of the ability of NGOs to improve their livelihoods. While the mostsignificant contribution of the conservation NGOs may have been the provi-sion of local data which has informed province-wide land zoning, the shiftaway from data-generation may slow the conceptualization of scientificallyaccountable REDD.

Land users are heavily reliant on national agricultural and timber mar-kets for their livelihoods. The whims of the Lima market are felt locally,historically causing cycles of planting and harvesting products fetching thehighest prices at the time. The system in place for the buying and sell-ing of produce on the roadside puts the land users in a position wherethey are powerless to negotiate and easily the subjects of corrupt inter-mediaries. Because prices can vary substantially across seasons and evenweeks, land users are often not in a position to be able to plan investmentsand land uses adequately, and are therefore vulnerable to becoming fixedin cycles of poverty. Effective and transparent REDD theoretically presentsan opportunity to rework this cycle through the provision of alternativelivelihoods (cf. Springate-Baginski & Wollenberg, 2010), yet the extractive,market-focused mindset which has been shaped among local inhabitantsover time could prove to be among the most robust challenges.

The findings of this study suggest that the Central Selva region is cur-rently institutionally unequipped to undertake and govern a REDD initiative.With German funds for the reduction of deforestation being anticipated, itis critical that project developers put careful thought into both the actorsand institutions to be benefitted, as well as and the means of capital distri-bution. Over protected area lands, it is clear that more capacity is requiredfor effective governance of all three protected areas. Over private lands, itis the land users who shape the fate of the forests based on land economy,and a seriously under-capacitated FFS who are responsible for regulatingthese activities. Policy approaches for REDD over private lands must there-fore consider the choice they face between carrot and stick strategies—toeither reward them directly for their efforts in reducing deforestation ormore closely regulate activities and sanction accordingly.

The complexity and multi-scalar nature of sub-national REDD requiresclose attention and response to local scale processes if it is to deliver onits full potential for climate change mitigation, biodiversity conservation,and poverty alleviation. By exploring the ways in which local agentsand processes respond to and engage with national and regional forces,

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analyses such as this one allow a granular scale understanding of thedistinct challenges facing the mechanism’s effective and efficient localimplementation.

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Documents

Preparing for REDD: Forest Governance Challenges in Peru's Central Selva