Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in COIN, 2010

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Foreword

The term counterinsurgency (COIN) is anemotive subject in Germany. It is generallyaccepted within military circles that COIN is aninteragency, long-term strategy to stabilise a crises

region. In this context fighting against insurgentsis just a small part of the holistic approach ofCOIN. Being aware that COIN can not beachieved successfully by military means alone, itis a fundamental requirement to find a commonsense and a common use of terms with all civilactors involved.

However, having acknowledged an Insurgency tobe a group or movement or as an irregular activity,conducted by insurgents, most civil actors tend toassociate the term counterinsurgency with thecombat operations against those groups. As aresult they do not see themselves as beinginvolved in this fight. For that, espescially inGermany, the term COIN has been the subject ofmuch controversy.

Germany has resolved this challenge with twosteps. First, in national discussions, the termCOIN was replaced by the paraphraseestablishing security and state order in crisesareas (Herstellung von Sicherheit und staatlicherOrdnung in Krisengebieten). Secondly, Germanyhas redefined the term insurgency as the processof destabilisation caused by political, economicand/or social grievances, which affects both the

effectiveness and legitimacy of the governmentalsystem; this process is exacerbated by insurgentactivity. This definition in contrast to theunderstanding of insurgency as a group ormovement or as an activity focusses on the realchallenge in COIN-missions and leadsautomatically to a much clearer understanding ofCOIN. It must be a main aim to enable ourcivilian co-actors in theatre to accept the COIN-apporach as a foundation for fruitful cooperation.

The present document does not constitute adirective. It is meant to convey information,

stimulate reflection on the topic and providepoints for discussions. It describes the role of landforces at the tactical level, addresses the divisionsof capability development and instruction/trainingat Army schools and training centres, and followsinternational and national basic concepts currentlyunder development1.

1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency(COIN) AJP-3.4.4, KonzeptionelleGrundvorstellungen zum militrischen Beitragzur Herstellung von Sicherheit und staatlicherOrdnung in Krisengebieten (Basic Conceptual

Guidelines for the Military Contribution toEstablishing Security and State Order in CrisisAreas) and Joint Operational Guidelines 01/04Counterinsurgency (COIN).

The document is divided into three parts:

Part A provides the basic conceptualframework as needed to give a betterunderstanding of the broader context. It

specifically describes the overall interagencyapproach to COIN.

Part B shifts the focus to the militarycomponent of the overall task describedpreviously.

Part C contains some guiding principles tostimulate discussions as well as a list ofabbreviations and important referencedocuments.

The key messages of the Preliminary Basics forthe Role of the Land Forces in COIN are:

An insurgency can not be countered bymilitary means alone.

Establishing security and state order is a long-term, interagency and usually multinationalstrategy (no military operation) in which thegovernment of the country affected byinsurgency has the lead while the othernations and international organisationsperform a supporting role.

The militarys contribution to implementingthis strategy is, in principle, a cross-service

support task for the Bundeswehr. The general approach to describing the role of

the land forces is through the Triumvirate ofCLEAR HOLD BUILD.

This document specifies the tasks to be performedby the land forces in support of COIN. All thesetasks are mentioned in the Army Regulation(HDv) 100/100 however, this documentdeliberately assumes a different systematicapproach to emphasise the individual tasksparticularly relevant to COIN. As a result, it ismore in line with the Allied Joint Doctrine for

Counterinsurgency (COIN) AJP-3.4.4 currentlyunder development, which will be useful for thedialogue with Allies.

The Preliminary Basics for the Role of LandForces in COIN will be adapted once thepreviously mentioned international and nationalbasic concepts are available. By the same token,Army Office Section I 1 (1), bearing overallresponsibility for this document, welcomes anysuggestions for improvement. In the fullness oftime this document will be superseded by theproduction of command and control regulationsfor the Arms and Services.


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Contents

Part A - Understanding the Overall Context

1. Insurgency and Insurgents .............................................................................................. 1

1.1 Definition ........................................................ ................................................................ ......................... 11.2 The root causes of insurgency.................................................................. ................................................ 11.3 Characterisitics of INS ..................................................................... ........................................................ 11.4 Means of destabilisation.............................................. ........................................................................ ..... 11.5 Possible INS weak points......... ...................................................................... .......................................... 21.6 Conclusions....................... ................................................................ ....................................................... 2

2. Establishing security and state order in crisis areas..................................................... 3

2.1 Definition ........................................................ ................................................................ ......................... 32.2. Characteristics............. ................................................................ ............................................................ 32.3 Support by international actors ................................................................... ............................................. 32.4 The role of armed forces .................................................................... ...................................................... 42.5 The significance of the information environment .................................................................. .................. 42.6. Summary ..................................................... ........................................................... ................................. 5

Part B The Military Role in Establishing Security and State Order in crises areas

3. Principles of the military role in establishing security and state order....................... 7

3.1 Principles and overview ................................................................... ........................................................ 73.2 CLEAR .................................................... ........................................................... ..................................... 83.3 HOLD ........................................................ ....................................................... ....................................... 83.4 BUILD ....................................................... ........................................................... ................................... 93.5 What is SHAPE?....... ........................................................... ............................................................... ..... 93.6. Summary ..................................................... ........................................................... ............................... 10

4. Military operations and measures ................................................................................ 114.1 Enabling/supporting measures ..................................................................... .......................................... 114.2 Eliminating a threat......................................................... ......................................................... .............. 134.3 Creating a safe and secure environment................................................... .............................................. 154.4 Consolidating a safe and secure environment ................................................................ ........................ 16

5. Tactical tasks................................................................................................................... 19

5.1 General tasks during land operations ................................................................. .................................... 195.2 Combat tasks..................................................... .............................................................. ....................... 215.3 Control tasks ...................................................... ............................................................. ....................... 215.4 Consolidating ........................................................... ................................................................. ............. 225.5 Other tasks .................................................... ........................................................... .............................. 22

6. Contributions and training provided by the forces..................................................... 23

6.1 Land forces in general....... ........................................................... .......................................................... 236.2 Contributions by land forces .................................................................. ................................................ 246.3 Contributions made by Special Forces...... ................................................................ ............................. 446.4 Contributions made by Air Forces ....................................................... .................................................. 446.5 Contributions by Naval Forces..................................................... .......................................................... 47

Part C Annex

C1 Guiding principles on the conduct of military measures to establishing security and state order .......... 48C2 List of abbreviations................................................................ ............................................................... 49C3 Reference documents and recommended reading ..................................................................... ............. 51


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PartAUnderstanding the OverallContext

1. Insurgency and Insurgents

1.1 Definition

For the purpose of this document, insurgency2 isthe process of destabilisation caused by political,economic and/or social grievances, which affectsboth the effectiveness and legitimacy of thegovernmental system; this process is exacerbatedby insurgent activity.

For the purpose of this document, aninsurgent

(INS) is a person carrying out or supportingirregular activities as part of insurgency. INS areusually members of a group or supporters of amovement; although their motives usually differ,they are united in the aim of extending orpreserving the state of instability.

1.2 The root causes of insurgency

The wide range and scope of insurgent activitymake it very hard to give a single generaldescription. There is often a combination ofcauses that lead to insurgency, such as poverty,

unemployment, a poor level of education, ethnic,social, political or religious prejudice, conflicts orextremist tendencies but also inner-governmentaltensions and irregularities or wars between states.It is thus primarily social, economic and politicalgrievances that make parts of the population thinkthat the government lacks the ability or legitimacyto establish or preserve state order and/or toprovide the population with basic supplies andservices. As a result, the government will be atrisk of losing its legitimacy and effectiveness aslaw enforcement authority or - if it has lost themalready - it will eventually lapse into chaos and

anarchy.It is against this background that INS are given theopportunity and motivation for armed struggle,which further accelerates the destabilisationprocess outlined above.

2 These definitions result from the nationalcomments on the Allied Joint Doctrine for

Counterinsurgency (COIN) - AJP-3.4.4 Ratification Draft 1 dated 29 January 2010.They are of preliminary character until adoptedby the Bundeswehr Terminology Committee.

1.3 Characterisitics of INS

INS are intent on destabilising state structures orpreventing their establishment. Their motives maybe of materialistic, ethnic, religious, political,national-separatist or spiritual nature. These mainmotives may be used as an excuse to justifyviolence, legitimise the insurgent organisationsclaim to leadership and the leadership itself, andto mobilise supporters. INS may also infiltratefrom abroad, pursuing completely different goalsthat are not related to the situation in the countryconcerned.

INS are often difficult to identify as they minglewith the population and/or receive support fromparts thereof. They usually do not feel bound byinternational humanitarian law or national law.Besides, complying with universal internationallaw and human rights may be a closed book to

them. Nevertheless, INS are bound by their ownvalues and standards, which are often linked tocustoms that are observed unconditionally,sometimes ignoring the consequences to life andlimb, which strikes us as outlandish.

To realise their interests and achieve theirintentions and goals, either directly or at leastindirectly, INS are open to all potential courses ofaction, including operations in the informationenvironment.

Although their organisational structure must beanalysed on a case-by-case basis, the majority of

INS organisations are characterised by a smallnumber of authoritarian, charismatic leadersamong whom tensions and rivalries may occur.INS organisations are rarely homogeneous. EveryINS organisation needs material resources. Inmany cases, financial support comes from externalorganisations or individuals, often even fromforeign states. The resulting dependencies maylead to internal conflicts and reveal moralcontroversies within the INS organisation.

1.4 Means of destabilisation

Usually INS neither have the resources nor thewill to take rapid and direct action against a stateand its allies by military means. But they do havea wide range of means of destabilising statestructures.

INS often employ covert and / or irregular tactics,even at the political level, with the objective ofundermining the populations loyalty to the stateand gaining support for their own cause.

For this purpose, they may use propaganda todirectly address the population, discredit thegovernment and draw a positive image ofthemselves. Whilst at the same time, however,they may also terrorise the population tointimidate and subjugate it.


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By acts of sabotage and attacks and by takinghostages, INS expose the inability and weaknessof the government and demonstrate their ownability to act. Their motive for this is not so muchto inflict objective material losses on the state butto spread fear and chaos among the population and

office holders. This effect is subsequentlymagnified by media coverage and propaganda.

International actors, too, become a target for INSattacks for their support of government authorities(cf. Chapter 2.3). From the INS point of view, thefact that the populace has no emotional ties withthe international actors and the resultingpossibility to discriminate against them asenemies, spies, occupying forces etc. often favourthe subsequent exploitation of media andpropaganda purposes.If the maintenance of state structures actually

dependes on the presence of international securityforces, INS will probably seek to undermine thelatters sustainability. Since the sustainability ofdemocratically authorised forces hingesparticularly on the approval of the people in theirhome countries, their population may iself becomea target group for INS, i.e.

indirectly by deliberately causing losses onthe part of the forces employed, or

directly by threatening to commit or actuallycommitting terrorist attacks on the sendingnation itself.

INS will therefore always seek to influence publicopinion in the sending nations by leveraging themedia.

1.5 Possible INS weak points

The increasing use of force is often (not always)in conflict with the values represented by INS. Itjeopardises the bond of trust between INS and thelocal population.

Information activities3may help increase or createthis awareness among the population and thusisolate INS in the long term.

By revealing their material dependencies, INSmay be discredited amongst the population.

The consistent channelling of funds or freezing ofassets and the curbing of arms smuggling mayimpair INS capability of action.

Deliberately exacerbating factional and powerstruggles between rival INS groups may createinsecurity and incapacity among INS.

3 Information activities are measures intended toproduce a particular effect on informationand/or information systems (e.g. individuals,organisational structures, processes).

The involvement of INS in organised crime oftencontradicts the values and moral standardsclaimed by INS. If this fact is conveyed to thepopulation, the position of INS will be weakened.

1.6 Conclusions

INS are a symptom of insurgency and not thecause.

INS activities in their entirety are primarilyaimed at producing effects in the informationenvironment; causing objective materiallosses is usually of secondary importance.

The relation between the state and the INSorganisation is one marked by rivalry. INSfeel less bound by legal and ethnic constraintswhile the state and its allies mostly havebetter resources.

Establishing security and state order requiresto successfully fight the root causes of aninsurgency, primarily by civilian means.

It is the population and its attitude that decidewhether insurgency will prevail.Consequently, analysing the situation in theinformation environment is key to theplanning of counterinsurgency activities.

International actors operating against INSthemselves or merely against INS objectives,i.e. actors seeking to establish security andstate order, must prepare to face considerablethreat posed by irregular forces conducting

covert operations.


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2. Establishing security and state order

in crisis areas

2.1 Definition

For the purpose of this document, establishingsecurity and state order in crisis areas is theentirety of political, economic, social, legal,executive and psychological measures taken bycivilian actors4 and / or military forces toeliminate the causes of an insurgency. 5

2.2. Characteristics

Historically, operations against insurgencies wereoften understood as the fight against INS(counterinsurgency or counterguerilla operations,translated into German as Aufstands- undBandenbekmpfung), which is a one-dimensional

approach. Ignoring the actual causes of conflictusually led to cycles of violence and counter-violence and not to a viable and sustainablesolution to the problem.Instead, the establishment of security and stateorder is seen today as a comprehensive,interagency, medium or long-term strategy aimedat sustaining or rebuilding the populationsconfidence in the state system and at improving itsliving conditions. This means above all to satisfyits basic needs (food, clothing, security).

Countering an insurgency requires establishing

and maintaining public security. This includesreliably protecting the population from attacks andassaults by INS and, in addition, establishingand/or strengthening functioning state institutionsthat are recognised and respected by localpopulation.

In parallel with working on the issue of publicsecurity it is necessary to eliminate the socio-economic causes of insurgency, for example, bylaunching education and employmentprogrammes, activities for infrastructure andeconomic development, job-creation measures oranti-corruption initiatives.

4 Civilian actors as defined in the Subconcept forCivil-Military Cooperation in the Bundeswehr(TK ZMZBw) are governmental andnongovernmental organisations on the onehand, and the population, state structures andrelevant groups on the other.

5 This definition results from the nationalcomments on the Allied Joint Doctrine for

Counterinsurgency (COIN) - AJP-3.4.4 Ratification Draft 1, dated 29 January 2010. Itshall be preliminary until adopted by theBundeswehr Terminology Committee.

This may also be aimed at minimising and/oreliminating the existing or potential factors ofdiscontent6 to remove the breeding ground forinsurgency. Causes of discontent are insufficient

food supplies, water supply, waste water disposal, hygiene,

health care,

housing (protection from the weather),

energy supplies

security (protection from violence).

This shows that the military component inestablishing security and state order is but onetoolto be used together with other "civilian"instruments. It is only in a comprehensive,interagency approach that the root cause(s) ofinsurgencies can be tackled (see Figure 1).Establishing security and state order is primarilythe responsibility of nonmilitary actors andorganisations.

2.3 Support by international actors

In crisis areas the states themselves are oftenincapable of countering the socio-economiccauses and the threats posedby INS since theyneither have sufficient resources nor effective,well-organised state institutions. In this case, thestate concerned may request support from theUnited Nations or other organisations and/orindividual states.

6 Factors of discontent are categories derivedfrom International Humanitarian Law on theProtection of Civilians in Times of War and onthe Protection of the Victims of ArmedConflicts (Geneva Conventions), which

describe basic supplies and services providedto the population. Guaranteeing/reaching thelocal minimum standards in these categories isa matter of priority.


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The sending nations will provide support byoffering advice and guidance to shape the strategyfor establishing security and state order and willthen implement this strategy in cooperation withthe authorities of the state in question. But theywill only act on a temporary basis and on behalf of

the state concerned and hand over responsibilityas soon as possible. Wherever possible,international actors should confine themselves to asupporting role, helping the people to helpthemselves. Excessive direct assistance andreconstruction aid will create a dependency that iscounter-productive and contrary to buildingconfidence between the population and thegovernment. Encouraging the local people to takethe initiative and helping them to successfullyimplement their own projects will not onlyimprove their self-confidence and trust in thegovernment and its organisations but also raise the

Acceptance of foreign actors in the country.

On no account must international actors be theycivilian or military assume the attitude of anoccupying force. They often have a culturalbackground that is completely different from thecustoms, values and standards in the countryconcerned. Establishing security and state orderwill, however, be particularly effective ifinternational actors adopt a policy that is in linewith the local customs and standards and thereforelikely to create consensus. For this reason, theymust have a high level of cultural awareness.

Decision makers, in particular, need advice oncultural matters tailored to the special features ofthe country of deployment.

One major challenge connected with this isconsistent and coordinated multinationalcooperation between the international actors andthe local authorities.

Much needed coordination may be complicated bythe fact that international actors are considerablyrestricted in their actions by the nationalrequirements of the sending nations.

2.4 The role of armed forces

Some of the tasks connected with theestablishment of security and state order can onlybe performed by armed forces with specialcapabilities and equipment needed for thispurpose. Among these tasks are, to varyingdegrees, the collection of information, theestablishment and maintenance of public order,and the protection of the population, governmental

institutions and critical infrastructure.Effective protection cannot be given by adopting apassive wait-and-see strategy. On the contrary, thearmed forces must be proactive based on soundanalysis, elimination of the threat and, wherenecessary, deter it by a show of force.

Basically, this is a task for local police forces. Ifthey are not available or lack the requiredcapabilities, armed forces will be employed. Ahigh level of INS threat or acute shortcoming ofthe local police may result in armed forces beingmainly or even exclusively employed for a limitedtime.

The military role in establishing security and stateorder (Figure 2) generally includes the followingmeasures:

Eliminate a threat

Create a safe and secure environment

Consolidate the safe and secure environment

Carry out enabling/supporting measures

If the host countries armed forces are not strongenough, the state may request internationalassistance or support as specified under Chapter

2.3. The potential commitment of German armedforces in support of establishing security and stateorder in the country of deployment is described inPart B of this document.

2.5 The significance of the information

environment

The attitude and demeanour of the population arekey to establishing security and state order. Whatis of crucial importance in this regard is thepopulations perception of INS and at the sametime its perception of government actors and theirsupporters.


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The strategic significance of the informationenvironment, especially with regard to producingregional and global strategic effects, encouragesINS to concentrate their efforts in this field tocompensate for their inferiority in other areas.

Transparency, media coverage and politicalprocesses help INS reach their goals. They feelless bound by restrictions in their choice of meansthan the actors in the country of deployment andtheir allies who follow constitutional law. Actualor even alleged misconduct of government andinternational actors and undesired side effects ofmilitary and police measures (civilian casualties,violation of cultural norms and values) but alsoactivities of INS themselves are exploited for theireffects in the information environment toinfluence, if possible, all persons in the country ofdeployment, in the sending nations and elsewhere.

INS have recognised the potential of theinformation environment and use it to theirbenefit. They capitalise on the fact thatinternational forces on operations are exposed topermanent media coverage. In contrast to the largenumber of positive events, misconduct of thechain of command and negative side effects of theconduct of operations will rapidly trigger globalfeedback. This may have a negative impact on theacceptance of the use of military means - both inthe country of employment and in the sendingnations of international actors.

All efforts to establish security and state order

must therefore be planned and implementedagainst the background of how they might beperceived by the public. The attitude anddemeanour of the population can be influenced bymilitary information activities and civilian publicrelations work. Emphasising positive events anddevelopments is a first step to stabilise apopulation traumatised by violence and terror.Although this cannot make up for the absence ofpublic security and economic rebound nor for thenon-satisfaction of primary and secondary needs,it may reinforce positive developments andalleviate negative effects. Viewed as such,

information activities and public relations workare key to establishing security and state order.This includes gearing civilian and above allmilitary activities towards the effect they have inthe information environment. At the same time, itis crucial to completely deny the effective use ofinformation by INS. In this context, however, therights to freedom of opinion and freedom of thepress must be observed.

2.6. Summary

Establishing security and state order isprimarily a civilian responsibility which isaimed at maintaining, restoring andestablishing a stable state system in the longrun.

This requires above all to provide a safe andsecure environment focused on giving thepeople a subjective sense of security. Militaryforces can make a contribution to this goal.

The key to success in establishing securityand state order is to implement amultinational, interagency informationstrategy and consistently gear all activitiestowards the desired effect to be achieved inthe information environment.

The long-term goal is to improve theeconomic and social conditions, e.g. byraising the level of education, creating newjobs, providing incentives for economicgrowth, improving the infrastructure ordeveloping an appropriate political culturebased on consensus.

The short-term goal is to carry out measuresthat produce an immediate visible effect forthe population, i.e. measures that create apalpable difference in their living conditionssuch as the provision of emergencyaccommodation, clothing and sufficient food.

With the threat inherent to INS, establishing

security and state order may require activeand offensive measures to counter INS inorder to prevent or impede them from takingviolent action.

If a state has not enough forces and assetsavailable to counter an insurgency it mayrequest assistance from the internationalcommunity or from individual states andorganisations. In any such case action takento establish security and state order must beaimed at stabilising state structures and layingthe foundation for the rule of law, enabling

the state to take control of its own affairs.


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Figure 1 Interagency approach to establishing security and state order in crisis areas.

Figure 2 Military component as an integral part of the interagency approach


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PartBThe Military Role in EstablishingSecurity and State Order3. Principles of the military role in

establishing security and state order

3.1 Principles and overview

The military role in establishing security and stateorder in crisis areas involves an interagencystrategy which must be planned and implementedby the Armed Forces as a whole, at multinationallevel and, as a matter of principle, in cooperationor with the approval of the responsible localsecurity forces.

For the purpose of restoring governmental powerin the country of deployment it is crucial toclosely cooperate with local security forces(police, armed forces, intelligence community).Depending on their level of readiness, the securityforces must be increasingly integrated intooperations and ultimately take over responsibilityin its entirety (e.g. partnering7). This is anindispensable prerequisiste for successfullyconcluding the military deployment which is not

to be confused with the successful completion ofall measures taken in support of establishingsecurity and state order in crisis areas since thesemeasures must continue even after our own forceshave terminated their military commitment. In thisrespect, the withdrawal of own forces from thecountry of deployment is but one part of theobjective in the process of establishing securityand state order in crisis areas.

The key to success in establishing security andstate order with regard to the military role in thisprocess is the population and/or its subjectiveperception of the situation. Analysing the needs of

the population against its cultural background isthus of great importance.

The focus of all military measures is to uphold orbuild and enhance the populations confidence inthe security forces and/or governmental structures.

This means that the military commitment is notprimarily aimed at achieving a tactical successagainst INS. The intended effect of any actionmust follow the subjective perception among thepopulation, which must be the prime measure ofits worth. Whatever channels of communicationare available must utilised for this purpose. In this

context, information operations have an importantfunction. The aim of any action is to gain and

7 See AJP-3.4.4 (RD2), No. 0580.

maintain the support of the local population. Forthis purpose, it is crucial to effectively implementthe protection of the population who must feel thatthe security forces exercise and live up to theirresponsibility for the people. This requires strongand sustained presence throughout the area,

geared to personal contacts with the populationeven if this increases the risk for friendly forces atleast temporarily. This presence is usually ensuredby smaller, independent units widely dispersed inthe area and tailored to the demands of the givensituation/mission.

The leaders of these mixed subunits (platoon orpatrol leaders) must have the equipment and theskills to exploit the entire range of means andcapabilities available and integrate them intocurrent operations. Besides they must know howto conduct talks for the purpose of collectinginformation.With the subunits operating independently, everysoldier must be prepared to take quick decisionswith far-reaching consequences that go beyond hisscope of responsibility.

As a result, there is a need for cultural awarenessand responsible action at all levels and for theconsistent application of the principle of missioncommand. Depending on their responsibilities, thesoldiers must be familiar with and understand the

operational environment, this means the cultural,economic, social and political background.

Ultimately, however, the peoples security canonly be guaranteed if the forces are determined toprovide lasting protection from attacks by INS.This may require to weigh the demands ofprotectionof the population against those of forceprotection.

One particular feature of the military role inestablishing security and state order is that overallsuccess cannot be achieved at one crucial pointbut depends on the overall impact of individual

successes and failures at local level.This underlines the importance of small,sometimes dismounted units and subunits.


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For the purpose of establishing security and stateorder in crisis areas military leaders will task theirsubordinates to take the following measures:

Eliminate a threat

Create a safe and secure environment

Consolidate the safe and secure environment,and

Carry out enabling/supporting measures.

On operations, these measures will not be takenseparately but concurrently even at local level.

The local character of the military role inestablishing security and state order in crisis areasresults from the proportionate relation of thepreviously mentioned measures on the ground. Itis summarised by the threesome of CLEAR,HOLDand BUILD(see Figure 3).

Figure 3 CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD

3.2 CLEAR

CLEAR is when INS control an area and/or are soaggressive that friendly forces, population and/ormembers of governmental organisations are underpermanent threat and constantly subject to hostileacts and as a result it is not possible to maintainenduring civil order.

The objective in CLEAR is to force INS into thedefensive and to prevent them from taking actionagainst friendly forces, civilian organisations,governmental structures or the population.

This allows friendly forces to gain the scope ofaction needed to enforce public order. Onecriterion for success in CLEAR is that friendlyforces can manoeuvre freely while keeping therisk at an acceptable level.Actions/operations in CLEAR are primarily aimedat eliminating threats by resticting INS courses ofaction or denying them the capability to takeaction. This is to gain control of the area andensure friendly forces freedom of action.8

8 See Chapter 4.2 Eliminate a threat.

In this situation, any action by friendly forcesagainst INS, their structures and safe havens ismainly offensive by nature.

To avoid jeopardising the overall success of

establishing security and state order it must beensured that uninvolved people do not come toharm and that collateral damage is avoidedwherever possible. On the one hand, offensivemilitary action may be tactically successful in thatit causes considerable harm to INS but on theother hand it may alienate the population from thesecurity forces and provoke resistance against thestate system. This must be avoidedat all costs.

Any action must therefore be judged not only byits physical effect but also by the repercussion onthe information environment and thus by its

psychological impact on both the population andon INS. It is indispensable to interlink offensivemeasures and information activities.

3.3 HOLD

HOLD begins when allied forces and/or civilianactors can manoeuvre freely in an area and haveassumed control of the largest part thereof.

The objective in HOLD is to create a safe andsecure environment which is the prerequisite forimproving the peoples situation in political,social and economic terms.

Accordingly, actions in HOLD are focused onoperations and measures intended to create andpreserve a safe and secure environment9. Theseoperations or measures are aimed at increasing orstabilising the subjective sense of security amongthe people, at dispelling its fears of terror andviolence, and at building confidence in thegovernment and its security agencies. Althoughactions in HOLD may at least initially still beaccompanied by direct operations or measuresagainst INS, the focus is on the effects producedamong the population.

9 See Chapter 4.3 on measures to create a safeand secure environment.


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It is important to demonstrate commitment andresolve in the area and to enforce or establishpublic order to give the population a sense ofsecurity while deterring INS. This may alsoinclude performing police or police-like tasks ifthe responsible forces are not available in

sufficient numbers. If necessary, the populationmust be informed in advance about the reasons forany restrictions or inconvenience this may cause.

Blatant deficiencies in supplies to the populationmust be remedied by military resources, if needbe, because wherever friendly forces exercisecontrol they will be held responsible for anyexisting grievances. In this context, the principleof helping the people to help themselves must beapplied as early as possible to counter a possible

sense of categoric entitlement among thepopulation, enhance the self-esteem of the localsand prevent local economic developments frombeing impeded.

In the end, HOLD also involves the need todefend the control gained over the area againstattacks from INS, if necessary.

All in all, it is of increasing importance in HOLDto consistently enhance civilian freedom of actionand to support their activities. Military meansalone are insufficient to ensure security for morethan a limited period of time. Increasingly

drawing on civilian commitment will stabilise thesituation and allow the transition to BUILD.

3.4 BUILD

BUILD begins when perceivableregional securityhas been established and public order achievedand when a positive development of the livingconditions becomes apparent that is when securitymust to permanently consolidated.10

10 See Chapter 4.4 on measures to consolidate asafe and secure environment.

The objective in BUILD is to enable theresponsible non-military authorities to provide forpermanent local security and public order withoutexternal support, and thus to terminate the militarycommitment to establishing security and stateorder.

In this phase the military activitities focus onsetting up and consolidating national securityforces in the country of deployment. They mayhave to be trained, advised and sustainablyqualified to perform control and supervisoryfunctions independently and reliably. Thisincludesto win and retain / secure the confidenceof the people. If multinational police forces arenot available, this task may also be fulfilled byfriendly military forces.

The troops on the ground will gradually cease tobe the mainstay of operations, confining

themselves to an observer role.They will remain a passive guarantor of securitywho is almost invisible in public life.

The crucial criterion for a successful BUILDphase is the independence of the local securityagencies.

3.5 What is SHAPE?

In the concept of the current NATO mission inAfghanistan, the previously mentionedtriumvirateof CLEAR HOLD BUILD is preceded by the

SHAPE phase which basically serves to pave theway for the CLEAR HOLD BUILD approach.

The SHAPE phase is primarily aimed at setting upand subsequently augmenting not only friendlyforces and assets but also and above alllocal/national security forces. In concrete terms itis about establishing, training and integratingthese forces into the conduct of friendlyoperations. This enhances the sustainability offriendly forces and, in addition, improves theprofessionalism of the local/national securityforces and gives operations a national face. The

cooperation between friendly and local/nationalforces opens up additional sources of information.


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With regard to INS, operations in the SHAPEphase are primarily conducted to

identify/localise INS,

identify the main reasons and causes for thebacking and support that INS receive from

(parts of) the population, drive a wedge between INS and the rest of the

population,

reveal that INS goals and courses of actionprejudice the interest of and are detrimental tothe population,

restrict INS freedom of movement andfreedom of action (including impairment oftheir communication capabilities), and

isolate INS.

On the whole, the spectrum of tasks performed bythe armed forces in the SHAPE phase comprises:

Support in establishing and traininglocal/national security forces and cooperationin the conduct of operations;

Comprehensive information activities;

If required, the establishment of safe areasand the protective surveillance of flows ofpeople;

Show of commitment throughout and controlof the area (if possible, in cooperation with

local/national security forces). In this respect,it is important to establish, develop andmaintain contact with the local population.This is the only way to win confidence,counter prejudice against foreign soldiers andultimately gather information;

Protection of individuals andobjects/installations;

Support of national authorities in performingsovereign duties;

Assistance in performing administrative tasks,implementing reforms and conducting

elections; Support of civilian organisations by providing

protection and security and/orsupplies/services.

The focus of SHAPE will thus be onenabling/supporting and consolidating measures11.

Demonstrating commitment throughout the areaand maintaining contact with the populationexposes deployed forces to threats by INS that arein fact directed at governmental organisations.Besides the troops themselves may become thetarget of INS attacks.

3.6. Summary

The military commitment to establishingsecurity and state order is intended to supportor strengthen the state structures of thecountry of deployment; the multinationalmilitary forces are not occupying forces.

In this context military measures must not beconsidered in isolation but have to be in linewith the interagency strategy.

Successful military measures to establishsecurity and state order always require astrong visible commitment throughout thearea based on personal contact with thepopulation even if this increases, at leasttemporarily, the risk for friendly forces.

The mainstay of the military commitment toestablishing security and state order areusually smaller, independent subunits widelydispersed in the area and tailored to thedemands of the given situation.

Any military action or inaction has an impact

on the information environment, especiallybecause of the omnipresence of the media.

Although it may be necessary to directly fightthe INS, the focus is always on gaining thesupport and approval of the population.

Military means can weaken INS but theycannot destroy them. The root cause ofinsurgency, i.e. the political, social and/oreconomic grievances and the resultingresentment among parts of the populationagainst governmental institutions, must bealleviated or removed above all by non-

military measures.

11 See Chapter 4.1 on enabling/supportingmeasures and Chapter 4.4 on measures toconsolidate a safe and secure environment.


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4. Military operations and measures

The military role in establishing security and stateorder in crisis areas comprises the followingmeasures:

Eliminate a threat Create a safe and secure environment

Consolidate the safe and secure environment,and

Take enabling/supporting measures

4.1 Enabling/supporting measures

All military actions and operations must becontinually backed by enabling/supportingmeasures. In addition to combat service supportand command support which are important for anymilitary operation but not specifically necessary

for the establishment of security and state order,special importance must be attached to militaryintelligence, operations in the informationenvironment, and civil-military cooperation.

Military intelligence

The early detection of changes in public opinion,of the realignment of forces and preparation ofINS activities is crucial for the planning andimplementation of both civilian and militarymeasures. For this purpose, comprehensive andcurrent information must be available. It enhancesthe effectiveness of any friendly action andoperation and considerably contributes to theeffective protection of civilian and military actors.For this reason, friendly information andintelligence, to include that of other military,governmental and civilian elements, must beincorporated into a permanently updated situationpicture based on comprehensive situationassessment.

The information needed by the commander mustbe provided in a targeted manner to theappropriate levels by using all assets available.The results achieved by deployed intelligence and

reconnaissance assets as part of continuous andarea-covering reconnaissance activities arecomplemented by the observations andinformation of friendly forces performing othertasks in theatre as well as by thefindings/information of the military intelligenceorganisation. Gauging the public opinion at anearly stage is especially effective through face-to-face communication.

The focus here is on:

The intent, capabilities, TTP12, motivation,structures of the different local pressure groups

The intent, capabilities, TTP, motivation,structures, networking, strength, weapons and

equipment of INS groups The opinion, attitude, demeanour and needs of

the population

Local decision-making processes, powerstructures and channels of communication

Political, commercial, religious, ethnical and/orsocial structures of power and order, to includethe relevant actors in theatre

The conduct, reputation and courses of actionof local security forces and of security forcesdeployed

Possibly imminent or existing security threats

Perception of the different actors among thelocal population

Evaluating/analysing the usually diverse andample supply of intelligence and any otherinformation is a particular challenge. This must beachieved by a sufficient number of situationanalysis personnel. Any important evaluation andanalysis work that cannot be done for lack ofpersonnel must be carried out at the home basefollowing the REACHBACK concept.The evaluation of the influencing factors must

also involve open sources (OSINT

13

) and civilianexperts.

As part of the situation assessment all availableintelligence is systematically incorporated into acurrent, comprehensive and accurate situationpicture which provides the basis for the estimateof the situation and information to thecommander. The situation assessment ends withthe military security estimate and comprisesrecommendations for the further course of action.The analysis of the military intelligence situationincludes exercising a controlling influence onintelligence and reconnaissance for the purpose ofoptimising the results produced (situation picture,estimate of the situation). The intelligence madeavailable to the subordinate units must be tailoredto their needs, taking into account that the unitlevel does not have the personnel required toanalyse and process extensive documentation.

Information processing is the original task ofS2/G2/J2/CJ2 elements, military intelligencecentre and geoinformation service at HQ level.

12 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.13 Open source intelligence


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If information or assumptions need to beconsolidated or verified, friendly forces will beemployed to perform concrete intelligence andreconnaissance missions to enhance the situationpicture. Information that cannot be collected byfriendly intelligence and reconnaissance forces is

gathered by submitting an RFI14 to the highercommand to improve or consolidate theoperational picture. Intelligence andreconnaissance operations can be conductedconcurrent with other missions. It is thereforealways recommended that friendly forces beordered to meet concrete informationrequirements in addition to other missions.

Operations in the information environment

With the population and its subjective sense ofsecurity at the centre of all activities, special

importance must be attached to the informationenvironment to establish security and state order.Any action taken reverberates in the informationenvironment, which may be perceived andassessed differently both by the population and byINS. This varying perception is often moreimportant to achieving the strategic goals than theactual, objective tactical effect of an action. Forthis reason, it is essential to influence theinformation environment and not to yield it toINS. Operations in the information emvironmentmay enhance positive efforts and alleviatenegative side effects. At the same time, enemy

information activities and/or active exertion ofINS influence on the information environmentmust be prevented, put into perspective, impededor restricted.

Operations in the information environment areaimed at influencing the situational understanding,the will and capabilities of INS and other mission-relevant actors for the purpose of ones ownmission accomplishment through the coordinatedemployment of adequate military assets. In thisconnection, information operations are of

particular importance.

14Request for Information

Information operations help the commander seethe information environment as his scope of actionand understand it in its overall context anddynamics. The personnel in charge of informationoperations coordinate military informationactivities and advise the commander on any

effects and consequences in the informationenvironment. This is based on the interagencyinformation strategy coordinated at political level,which defines the type and purpose of theoperation and the goals to be achieved in theinformation environment.

As a matter of principle, information operationsand their specific, coordinated activities in theinformation environment serve the purpose of

influencing the decision-making process andthe behaviour of relevant actors in favour ofone's own objectives (key leader engagement),

weakening the will and capabilities of INS towage conflict, and

preventing enemy information activities fromhaving an impact or at least reducing theirimpact not only on ones own situationalunderstanding and capabilities but also on theunderstanding and perception among thepopulation.

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)

CIMIC is aimed at the cooperation with civilian

actors, i.e. civilian authorities, governmental/non-governmental, national and internationalauthorities and organizations, and with thepopulation in the country of deployment.

The key functions of CIMIC, i.e.

shaping civil-military relations, providing civilian authorities and actors with

information, advice and support, and contributing to the command and control

process and supporting the operation,

are performed by CIMIC staff elements andCIMIC forces. CIMIC functions related to the

(civilian) medical and health services are fulfilledby the service personnel and assets of theBundeswehr Medical Service.

Integration, support, advice and information ofcivilian actors are provided in compliance with therelevant security provisions. Wherever possible,this is coordinated with ones own military intentsand plans.

Other German ministries

Establishing security and state order is aninteragency task which requires appropriate and

targeted cooperation at equal terms. All personsinvolved need to be aware that they pursue thesame goal and must coordinate their assets toavoid undesired overlaps/duplication of effort, and


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achieve synergetic effects. It is important to shareexpertise and to provide assistance and support atall times. Besides it is of importance to draw onthe experience of other ministries.

If military operations and actions may have anegative impact on other, civilian measures (orvice versa), these (military or civilian) operationsneed to be adapted accordingly.

CIMIC makes a major contribution to theoverarching, appropriate and targeted cooperationwith other German ministries and theirsubordinate agencies. The basis for thiscooperation must be built at home at the earlieststage possible. Wherever possible, regular contactat and between the appropriate levels must beestablished, common situational awarenesscreated and, in addition, common goals defined,courses of action coordinated and potential fields

of cooperation identified.International civilian actors

These actors include governmental (GO15),nongovernmental (NGO16) and international(IO17) organisations which support the country ofdeployment in establishing security and state orderand/or provide humanitarian assistance.

These organisations have a positive effect onestablishing security and state order and musttherefore, as far as possible, be supported andprotected against any type of attack.

All information gathered by civilian actors must

be evaluated for its reliability as part of thesituation assessment.

Civilian cooperation with military forces iscoordinated by CIMIC personnel. The scope forcooperation should, in principle, be driven by thegoals defined, the willingness to cooperate and theloyalty of the civilian actors.

In this context, consideration must always begiven to the requirements of military security forforce protection.

Local civilian actors

As a matter of principle, local politicians/officialsand dignitaries (mayors, religious representatives,judges etc.) and, as the case may be, unofficialleaders and rulers are integrated into and/orinformed about the conduct of operations and areinvited to join negotiations and exchange viewsand ideas. Without the general willingness todisclose relevant information, the necessaryconfidence cannot be achieved. Even in thecontext of this type of cooperation special caremust be exercised when selecting the informationto be transmitted in order to avoid any jeopardy tofriendly forces. In this process, operations security

15 Governmental Organisations16 Non-Governmental Organisations17 International Organisations

(OPSEC18) measures are a matter of course and italso goes without saying that directives on andorders for the transfer of military intelligence andthe handling of personal data must be compliedwith.

Involving local civilian actors may provideadditional security and support among thepopulation since they act as multipliers. Whatneeds to be given due consideration, however, isthat their goals and intentions may conflict withthe overall objective of establishing security andstate order because local rulers may not beinterested in strong, efficient state structures thatwould necessarily restrict their sphere ofinfluence.

For this very reason it is important to enter intodialogue with the local chiefs, build confidenceand seek common solutions. If this cooperationdoes not exist, local chiefs may feel threatenedand turn to INS.

4.2 Eliminating a threat

Operations to eliminate a threat are primarilydirected against INS. They are conducted toactively counter existing or potential threats, thatis, in particular, to fight covertly operatingadversaries and their lines of supply andcommunication. In the context of establishing

security and state order such action will becomenecessary if or when INS activities have becomenumerous enough to either restrict or totallynullify the freedom of action of friendly forcesand civilian relief and law-and-orderorganisations.

Operations to eliminate a threat can also beconducted prior to a potential rise of INS that isbefore INS take offensive and massive action.

Within the overall strategy, they must beorchestrated sensitively. Using military forcecarries the risk of producing a counterproductive

effect in the long run although, on the other hand,a tactical success will neutralise a current threat.

18Operations Security


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If, at the end of an operation, the local populationis alienated from friendly forces or responds withincreasing opposition (e.g. as a result of casualtiesamong uninvolved people), the operation will notonly be useless but even detrimental. As early asin the planning phase, operations to eliminate a

threat must therefore be combined withinformation activities or operations to positivelyshape the information environment or at leastmitigate potential negative effects. Besides theymay have a negative impact on the provision ofsupplies and services to the local people or thework of civilian organisations.

To avoid or minimise such risks it is necessary toassess the interaction of military and civilianmeasures as early as possible during operationalplanning.

It is especially in operations to eliminate a threat

that we must not lose sight of the purpose of ouraction. The fight against INS is not an end initself. The objective is not to destroy INS but, firstand foremost, to deny them the will and capabilityto fight, which is a precondition for establishing asafe and secure environment.

Operations to eliminate a threat may be:

Attack

Attacks are always conducted according to theprinciples of offensive action.19The military forceused in an attack is actively and directly aimed atINS to either seize terrain or destroy enemy forcesand their infrastructure. Enemy forces will,wherever possible, be apprehended to be detained.Larger groups of enemy forces can be encircledand subsequently be engaged or forced tosurrender. Surprise and quick, resolute action arethe key to success. Ambushes, for example, are anappropriate means to destroy or detain anidentified enemy by exploiting the element ofsurprise.Reconnoitred and identified targets can beengaged by long-range fire support assets(artillery, air support). With hardly any effective

means to defend themselves, enemy forces will besurprised by friendly fire. At the same time,friendly forces will be saved and not exposed toany threat.The special operational procedure of combatpatrol operations is applied to reconnoitre, weardown, harass, fix or deceive enemy forces.

Given a favourable situation and appropriateconditions, even smaller units with inferiorcombat power can momentarily seize enemybuildings, areas, infrastructure or facilities in araid by exploiting the element of surprise.

19 See German Army Regulation 100/100 Chapter14.

Once the overall situation has been assessed, theattack is continued by pursuing fleeing,withdrawing or evading INS until they are fixed,detained or destroyed.

The purpose of doing this is to exploit a friendlysuccess in combat or to prevent the enemy fromaccomplishing his hit-and-run strategy afterlaunching an attack.

Relief operation

If friendly forces are isolated or encircled it maybe necessary to conduct a relief operation.Friendly forces operating in wide areas may easilylead to local superiority of enemy forces.

Isolated situations may also occur as a result ofother incidents/events such as technical failures,encirclement caused by a demonstration etc. Onthe whole, there is a wide range of threats

conceivable that lead to isolated situations. For therelief of friendly forces it is therefore of specialimportance to hold reserve troops available.

Moving members of GO/IO/NGO to safety

Situations may degenerate to the extent that theprevailing threat will deny civilian members ofGO/IO/NGO to stay in a particular area for aspecific time. Friendly forces must be prepared tomove such personnel to a safe place, if necessary.This may require reserve forces to be employed.

Evacuation/rescue of hostages

Non-combatant evacuees or friendly forcesdetained and/or held hostage by enemy forces canbe liberated by personnel earmarked for nationalrisk prevention. Such operations must besupported.20

Searching and seizing INS

Seizing areas without coherent resistance is oftenpossible because INS evade approaching friendlyforces and/or resort to covert operations.

Therefore occupying an area will not be enough toensure control by friendly forces. Furtheroffensive operations will be necessary to breakirregular resistance and allow friendly forces andcivilian actors in the area to gain freedom ofaction.INS operating covertly and waging armed strugglefrom the underground must be actively engaged toensure that friendly control of the area can becomeeffective. This means that covertly operating INSmust be targeted for active search operations.

20 See German Army Regulation 100/100 Chapter25.


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For this purpose, compound forces and assetsmust be employed to identify the INS structureand network and subsequently encircle, fix anddefeat INS, or apprehend them to be detained byappropriate measures such as interdiction andsearches. In doing this, the inward and outward

movements of the people to and from a definedarea are denied for a limited period of time and thearea is intensively combed for INS and/or INSmateriel as well as wanted criminals.

If the terrain does not allow the forces to takeinterdicting measures, if not enough personnel areavailable for this purpose or if the situation makesany such action seem unnecessary, the operationmay also be limited to systematically searchingbuildings/combing terrain and seizing INS (search& destroy).

Operations of searching and seizing INS may also

be conducted by using a tight-woven network ofcheckpoints or patrols. Any such measures willonly rarely bring about tactical success since theycan be reconnoitred in advance or sidestepped byINS and yet they are effective in that they deny orrestrict INS freedom of action.Operations of searching and seizing INS maytarget both individual, currently wanted personsand less clearly defined groups or materiel (e.g.weapons). Depending on the situation, terrain andforces available, several operations may beconducted sequentially (in sections) orsimultaneously (in one single effort).

Snatch operations

Snatch operations are conducted against clearlyidentified targets (individuals and storagefacilities/hiding place for materiel) by exploitingthe element of surprise.

They are usually preceded by a longreconnaissance phase. Unlike an attack, thisoperation is, in principle, aimed at detainingenemy forces and/or seizing enemy materiel.

Wherever possible, local security forces should beinvolved in the operation and cultural practices of

the population be taken into account.

4.3 Creating a safe and secure environment

Operations and measures to create a safe andsecure environment are primarily aimed atproducing effects among the population. The keyobjective is to considerably enhance the localpopulation's sense of security.

This requires to restore and/or enforce publicorder in close cooperation with local securityforces.

If the local security forces are not yet capable ofassuming this responsibility, the military forcesmust prepare to perform police and police-liketasks as well. But any such action should alwaysbe carried out in close consultation with the localsecurity forces. What is important is to establish

positive, personal contact between friendly forcesand the population. It is only on the basis of arelationship characterised by mutualunderstanding that confidence and credibility candevelop.Operations and measures to create a safe andsecure environment may include:

Protection of the population and infrastructure

Areas under the control of friendly forces, toinclude the local population living in these areas,must be protected from attacks by INS or other

armed forces. This must be appropriately andvisibly prepared to give the population the feelingthat its protection is sustainable and credible.If necessary, protection must also be provided tocivilian organisations operating in the country ofdeployment.

The robustness and resolve of friendly forces mustleave no reason to doubt so as to avoid a declinein confidence among the people. To create anormal, safe and secure living environment it isimportant for the population to overcome its fearof INS, their violence or even their takeover ofpower. Ultimately, this may also imply thatparticular areas or the population must bedefended against attacks. This may require theweighing up the demands of the people'sprotection against those of force protection. Theconduct of defensive operations is governed bythe principles described in Chapter 15 of GermanArmy Regulation 100/100.

Show of Commitment

By showing commitment 24 hours a day, ifpossible, friendly forces will not only substantiallyraise the level of security but also enhance the

subjective sense of security among the population.


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They are the point of contact for the localpopulation and discourage people from resortingto violence or committing a crime by their merepassive presence. It is only by their show ofcommitment throughout the area that contact canbe established with the population, and the

commander can be provided with a permanentlyupdated situation picture. Measures and operationsintended to show presence underpin the claim fora safe and secure environment and help buildconfidence.

Showing commitment throughout the area islargely achieved by a network of

mounted and dismounted and, to a limitedextent, also aerial patrols,

combat outposts, checkpoints.

Establishing public order

If the local security forces are unable to maintainor establish public order independently, militaryforces will have to train or actively support themin performing their tasks if no other forces areavailable for this purpose. This may also includethe performance of police tasks but always incooperation with the local security forces.Operations to establish public order require anetwork of patrols, checkpoints and combatoutposts, which is also necessary to demonstratecommitment. In this case, however, friendly

forces take an active role by monitoring andenforcing the observance of public regulations.Besides, military forces may also be employed toreinforce the observation posts of the localsecurity forces. In addition, operations to establishpublic order may include monitoring borders andoperating border stations.During public order operations it is of importanceto deploy and, if necessary, rapidly reinforcesmall, independent subunits operating throughoutthe area. The strategy of deploying but large unitsfor reasons of protection will only have an isolatedeffect and give INS and other criminals the space

and opportunity to (re)organise.

Operations to establish public order also comprisecrowd and riot control duties21(CRC22).

21 See CRC Concept, Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr,18 January 2007, and StreitkrftegemeinsameAusbildungshilfe Einsatz zur Kontrolle vonMenschenmengen und gewaltttigenAusschreitungen in Einstzen der Bundeswehrim Ausland (Joint Training Manual for Crowd

and Riot Control during BundeswehrOperations Abroad), Director of Joint Training,12 November 2007.

22 Crowd and Riot Control

Supporting the provision of basic supplies and

services

If the country of deployment or other actors arenot able to supply the local population with food,clothing, emergency accommodation and medicalemergency assistance that are sufficient and

adequate from the humanitarian point of view,measures will have to be taken by the militaryforces in the areas controlled by them to providethe people with basic supplies and services. Thisis not only a matter of course and a humanitariannecessity but also an effective measure to gainsupport among the population.

Capacities permitting, the Bundeswehr MedicalService - in addition to the medical support of thearmed forces - may as force effectors beactively involved in the medical assistance to thepopulation and contribute to the above measures

to win the hearts and minds.Relief measures beyond emergency care must, asa matter of principle, be taken carefully technical assistance is generally not a task of thearmed forces. Active development or constructionefforts by friendly forces incur a risk of makingthe country of deployment dependent, impedingits drive for independence and of delaying thesuccessful completion of international measures toestablish security and state order. For this veryreason, any support or assistance should primarilybe based on the principle of help for self-help.

4.4 Consolidating a safe and secure

environment

Military measures to consolidate a safe and secureenvironment are primarily aimed at enabling thelocal security agencies to assume their ownresponsibility for security and state order. Besides,the multinational forces must strengthen and trainthe local armed forces to a point where they cantake military measures and perform tasks withoutsupport by multinational entities. The buildup andtraining of local troops and security forces aretherefore key elements of the multinational exit

strategy.


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The principle of conducting joint operations

Multinational forces contribute to consolidating asafe and secure environment especially byconducting operations always together with localarmed forces.

This gives local forces the opportunity to learnfrom the concepts and approaches of multinationaltroops and apply what they have learnedaccording to their understanding.

The conduct of joint operations, however, must beadapted to the given equipment and trainingstandards.

Local armed forces must be involved in operationsat least at the lowest levelthat is as passiveobservers. As a next step, they can activelyparticipate in operations under the guidance andcontrol of the multinational forces and

increasingly perform key functions. Ultimately,the security forces will be able to conductoperations independently and on their ownresponsibility with friendly forces playing anadvisory role only in planning and execution,which will finally be restricted to a meresupervisory function.

Apart from that, multinational efforts toconsolidate a safe and secure environment may beindependent of the actual conduct of friendlyoperations. They cover initial and follow-ontraining and/or advice to local, regional and/or

national security personnel and, in particular,armed forces to consolidate and strengthen them.

Training and development programmes

At the earliest stage possible friendly forces willbegin to train and develop the local armed forces,for instance by inviting them to training courses inGermany, offering in-theatre training andadvanced training to security forces, or providingon-the-job training. In doing so, they must takeinto account that the local forces are usually morefamiliar with the culture of the country and canbetter assess the situation on the ground.

Local people must not be forced to adopt theviews of the friendly forces.

Operational training and mentoring teams

Operational training and mentoring teams may beemployed to support national military and localsecurity forces; they will provide advice at therelevant levels on measures and operationsconducted independently and as the case may be- train them to help themselves. This implies thatthe training and mentoring teams will deploytogether with local military forces on operationsthey may conduct, which may include combataction.

Such tasks call for particular skills andqualifications by forces that have been preparedand trained accordingly.

In addition to their training and mentoringfunctions these teams are the liaison elementbetween international and local armed forces.


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Figure 4: Overview of the military role in establishing security and state order in crisis areas

Figure 5: Overview of the tactical tasks performed by the land forces in support of establishing securityand state order in crisis areas


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5. Tactical tasks

Operations and measures intended to eliminate athreat, to create and consolidate a safe and secureenvironment as well as enabling/additionalmeasures (for an overview see figure 4) are

conducted according to the command principle ofcomposite force operations that is, in interactionwith various national or multinational assets attactical level, under unified command, and with acommon objective. The tactical tasks to be carriedout in this context (overview see figure 5) can besummarised as follows:

general tasks during land operations,

tasks in the category of combat,

tasks in the category of control,

tasks in the category of consolidation, as wellas

other tasks.

This kind of categorisation allows a betteraccentuation of individual tasks/bundles of taskswhile aspects relevant to establishing security andstate order are duly observed.23

5.1 General tasks during land operations

The general tasks during land operations definedin part E of German Army Regulation (HDv)100/100also apply to the military contribution toestablishing security and state order. In the

following, however, some special aspects and/orfocal areas will be pointed out.

Intelligence and reconnaissance

Intelligence and reconnaissance remains a crucialtask even in the context of the military role toestablish security and state order, ensuring thatinformation requirements are met and theprotection of own forces is improved.

Every soldier contributes to intelligence andreconnaissance. Besides the fact that theenvironment is permanently monitored inparticular regarding new developments talks

with the population, local security forces and withcivilian state and non-state organisations each heldat their respective level considerably contribute tothe development of the military intelligencesituation. Therefore, interpreters are often requiredto be employed even at lower levels.

23 Following the command principle of compositeforce operations, tasks of the combat, controland consolidation categories as well as theother tasks may well be conducted in parallel

and during one single operation. An operationto eliminate a threat may therefore runconcurrent with a combat mission, efforts toexercise control, and consolidation measures.

The military leader on the ground will regularlybrief his soldiers on what to pay special attentionto. Particularly after concluding tasks withpersonal contact with the population the relevantmilitary leader will, as a matter of principle, holdan after-action review to ask his soldiers about

their impressions and information.

Protection24

Protecting forces and installations on operations isa general operational task at all levels of commandwhere responsibility rests with each militaryleader. The aim is to sustain operational readinessof the forces and consequently ensure ownfreedom of action.Active and passive self-protection in general arepermanent operational tasks of all forces and willremain unchanged even against the background of

the military role in establishing security and stateorder in crisis areas. Every soldier must bevigilant in all situations, observe his environmentand identify and report changes in the situation atan early enough stage (situational awareness).

The requirements of protecting own soldiers, onthe one hand, must permanently be weighedagainst the need for contact with the populationand the inherent hazard. Excessive routine andgetting stuck in the daily rut within a seeminglypeaceful environment can lead to boredom orcause failures in procedures. Commanders at alllevels must prevent that.

Operating in the information environment

The desired effects of information activitiescontribute considerably to successfullyestablishing security and state order. Informationactivities are not rigidly associated with particularassets but may be performed by all forces. Withintheir scopes of capability all forces have dialoguesat their respective levels to promote moreunderstanding of military operations in generaland to convey the value and possibilities ofconsensual conflict resolution. Dismounted forces

address the local population to achieveunderstanding, mutual respect and peacefulsolutions to end conflicts. By doing so, theycontribute to the development of mutual trust andto the protection of friendly forces. This requiressufficiently developed communicative skills andintercultural competence.

Furthermore, soldiers must be given guidelines asto what to say in conversation while on a missionto improve their security and confidence.

Pocket cards containing key information areavailable for distribution among the troops. Allsoldiers must assimilate this information enough

24 Protection as defined in German ArmyRegulation (HDv) 100/100, chapter 34.


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to hold conversations as set out in their pocketcards. In this context they must also be aware ofthe significance of appropriate facial expressions,gestures, and wording and use them duringconversations.

Using the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)

In electronic warfare (EW), the electromagneticspectrum (EMS) is available to military andcivilian users as well as adversaries (INS) toalmost the same extent. Hazards from the EMSusually appear in the form of

active optronic components (LASER) formeasuring, reconnaissance, target marking,weapon guidance and dazzling purposes ;

active and passive electronic components(radio, radar) for reconnaissance, detection,

and command and control; radio or optronic components for triggering or

jamming of weapons or ammunition (mines,IED25, fuses);

the employment of active electronic andoptical components for jamming anddeception;

the use of passive electronic components forprotection by means of sensor-controlledautomatic protective installations.

Moreover, the EMS is used for communication

purposes. In this context, further threats may ariseif

opposing forces use the EMS to coordinateattacks and/or to make arrangements, and

friendly means of communication are jammedby electronic components.

If the threat posed by the utilisation of the EMS isnot identified and countered at an early enoughstage, the INS will benefit from it. This is why theEMS is such an integral part of the military role inestablishing security and state order. The aim is tosustainably support their own conduct ofoperations by taking measures to use the EMS aseffectively as possible, to protect friendly forcesand to impair the opponents capabilities ofutilising the EMS. Electronic warfare measurescomprise:

electronic protective measures

electronic support measures(see chapter 6.2.17), and

electronic countermeasures(see chapter 6.2.17).

25Improvised Explosive Device

Electronic warfare personnel will advise themilitary leader on planning and conducting suchmeasures.

Electronic protective measures encompassactivities and procedures of employment,operation by friendly forces, and technology in thefields of communication and detection/commandand control installations. They ensure that theEMS can still be utilised by friendly forces evenwhen exposed to enemy electronic warfaremeasures, which is why they constitute anessential contribution to the own command andcontrol capability, effective engagement as well assurvivability and protection. Electronic protectivemeasures also extend to laser protection of opticsand eyes as well as steps to reduce platformsignatures in all detectable ranges of the EMS. Inthis context electronic protective measures are keyingredients of signature management.

Terrain reconnaissance

On their return from tasks outside military campsand installations, friendly forces will immediatelyreport their findings on the condition of routes,bridges and defiles, particularly to update currentmaps at the relevant operations centreaccordingly.


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5.2 Combat tasks

The tasks to be performed in the category ofcombat comprise conventional forms of militaryforce, applied directly to destroy opposing forces,namely INS, and to seize or hold ground. Inprinciple, the traditional terms of conventional

combat shall apply. Combat tasks are e.g.:

seizing

destroying

securing

defending

holding

containing

fixing

pursuing

directing fire support

providing fire support

conducting combat patrol operations

encircling

5.3 Control tasks

Control tasks cover forms of military tasksperformed to supervise an area and particularlythe population therein and to control theirbehaviour. The main tasks required in this contextare:

Conducting patrolsPatrolling26 is a task given to a subunit usuallyperformed with at least three vehicles.Conducting patrols is an essential key element ofthe military contribution to establishing securityand state order. A distinction must be madebetween heavy (armoured), medium (protected)and light (unprotected) patrols. Furthermore,patrols can be conducted mounted and dismounted(with combat vehicles in the immediate vicinity,e.g. in small towns) or on foot (e.g. in terrainunsuitable for vehicles). The patrol commandermay have combat and service support assets

attached to his subunit.

26 See German Army Regulation (HDv) 100/100,Nos. 13060, 13105, 13108.

The core mission of the patrol is mobile areasurveillance while demonstrating ones presenceon the ground. By doing so, information on andcontact with the population may be gained, whichmay add to the situation picture. Unlike scoutteams, patrols usually proceed openly and visibly

so as to deter INS and to have a reassuring effecton the population.Depending on their operational directives, patrolsmay take on other tasks independently andwithout prior planning.

Operating checkpoints

Operating a static checkpoint27is a task given to asubunit which may be reinforced as necessary.Checkpoints serve to check persons and vehiclesalong a route. They may also be set up to channelcivilian traffic.

There are permanent and temporary checkpoints.The soldier in charge of operating the checkpointmay have combat support and combat servicesupport forces attached to his subunit.The underlying principle of a checkpoint is tocheck either continuously or at random persons or vehicles passing its location; that is, tocheck the relevant personal particulars and tosearch a person and/or vehicle for illegal objects(e.g. weapons, explosives, contraband goods,drugs) or wanted persons (e.g. wanted criminals,war criminals, ringleaders).

Operating/reinforcing facilities of local securityforces/police stations

Depending on the given mandate, facilities oflocal security forces (police stations) may beoperated and/or reinforced by friendly forces,unless and as long as original police forces areavailable only in insufficient numbers orcompletely unavailable. In situations like this,such forces are usually employed at a staticfacility and on

Documents

Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in COIN, 2010