Predicting Frames - CMU · PDF filePredicting Frames Baruch ... results that were generally discouraging for the prediction of individuals' choices, ... ratio of the values will be

Journal of Experimental Psychology:Learning, Memory, and Cognition1983, Vol. 9, No. 1, 103-116

Copyright 1983 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0278-7393/83/090t-0103$00.75

Predicting Frames

Baruch FischhoffDecision Research, A Branch of Perceptronics, Eugene, Oregon and

Medical Research Council, Applied Psychology Unit, Cambridge, England

Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) "prospect theory" has demonstrated that theway in which a decision problem is formulated, or "framed," can have strongand predictable effects on the perceived attractiveness of the options it offers. Attimes, the relative attractiveness of two options may be reversed as the result ofa reframing that should make no difference at all, according to traditional eco-nomic theories of choice. To predict people's behavior with the theory, one mustbe able to predict what frame they will impose on a particular problem. Theseven studies reported here explored different ways of predicting frames, withresults that were generally discouraging for the prediction of individuals' choices,generally encouraging for the prediction of group choices.

With their "prospect theory," Kahnemanand Tversky (1979; Tversky & Kahneman,1981) have provided a significant new toolfor the analysis of choices made under con-ditions of uncertainty. The primitives of thisdescriptive theory of decision making are avalue function, v(x), which attaches a sub-jective worth to each possible outcome of agamble or prospect, and a weighting func-tion, ir(p), which expresses the subjective im-portance attached to the probability of ob-taining a particular outcome. The attractive-ness, V, of a gamble that offers a chance ofp to gain (or to lose) x and a chance of q togain (or to lose) y would equal -ir(p)v(x) +ir(q)v(y).

One important feature of the value func-tion is that it assesses outcomes in terms ofthe change they represent from some refer-ence point, which could represent one's cur-rent status, one's anticipated status, or someother psychologically significant point. A sec-ond feature is that the function is steeper forlosses than for gains, meaning that a givenchange in one's status hurts more as a loss

This research was supported by the Office of NavalResearch under Contract N00014-82-C-0643 to Percep-tronics, Inc.

I wish to thank to Ruth Beyth-Marom, Daniel Kahne-man, Don MacGregor, Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky, Tho-mas Wallsten, and three anonymous reviewers for com-ments on earlier drafts of this article.

Requests for reprints may be sent to the BaruchFischhoff, Decision Research, A Branch of Perceptron-ics, 1201 Oak Street, Eugene, Oregon 97401.

than it pleases as a gain. A third feature isthat it is concave above that reference pointand convex below it. Such negatively accel-erated curves mean, for example, that thesubjective difference between gaining (or los-ing) $10 and $20 is greater than the differencebetween gaining (or losing) $110 and $120.

Perhaps the most notable feature of theprobability weighting function is the greatimportance attached to outcomes that willbe received with certainty. Thus, for example,the prospect of losing $50 with probability1.0 is more than twice as aversive as the pros-pect of losing the same amount with proba-bility .5. For intermediate (i.e., noncertainty)values, the weighting function is somewhatinsensitive to changes in probability. For ex-ample, a .5 chance of winning $50 would notbe 25% more attractive than would be a .4chance of winning $50.

The nonlinearities of the value and prob-ability weighting functions mean that peo-ple's choices should be sensitive to the wayin which decisions are formulated or"framed." In their expositions, Kahnemanand Tversky have offered powerful demon-strations of how the same decision problemmay be framed in ways that are formallyequivalent in terms of classical (utility the-ory) models of choice behavior but that pro-duce reversals of preference that can be pre-dicted on the basis of prospect theory.

In these demonstrations, each decisionproblem is presented in a format that is con-sistent with one particular frame. The pros-

103

104 BARUCH FISCHHOFF

pect theory analysis proceeds under the as-sumption "either that the original formula-tion of prospects leaves no room fgr furtherediting, or that the edited prospects can bespecified without ambiguity" (Kahneman& Tversky, 1979, p. 275). In such studies, thetheorist's ability to control the way in whichstimuli are presented and interpreted is cru-cial to being able to predict how the variousportions of a stimulus will be integrated intothe production of a response (here, a choice).In order to predict behavior in less controlledsituations, one must be able to anticipate howproblems will be represented and what framespeople will use to interpret them.

The present studies examine people'schoices between prospects on which it is pos-sible to impose several different frames whoseusage should lead to different choices of op-tions, according to prospect theory. Thesestudies ask, in effect, how do we predict whichframe people will adopt, so that we can thenpredict their choice? (in accordance with thetheory). Because it is so difficult to study si-multaneously the interpretations that peoplegive to stimuli and the (decision) rules thatthey use to evaluate and choose betweenthose stimuli, these studies assume the truthof prospect theory and use it to discern whatinterpretations have been given. This re-search strategy cannot lead to rejection of thedescriptive validity of the theory, for any fail-ure is seen as lying with the interpretation.Nonetheless, repeated difficulty in finding theinterpretation needed to make the theorywork can suggest limits to its practicality (aswell as to the imagination of the interpreter).

Basic Study

Although prospect theory allows consid-erable latitude in framing, it is by no meansmute with regard to the formulations thatpeople will adopt:

Prospect theory describes two phases in the choice pro-cess: an early phase of editing and a subsequent phaseof evaluation. The editing phase consists of preliminaryanalysis of the offered prospects which often yields a sim-pler representation of these prospects. (Kahneman &Tversky, 1979, p. 274; emphasis added)

The three central editing operations are (a)coding, describing each outcome in terms ofchanges from a neutral reference point (usu-

ally one's current asset position); (b) segre-gation, isolating riskless components of riskydecisions (e.g., a gamble that either gave$300 with .8 probability or $200 with .2would be "naturally decomposed into a suregain of $200 and the risky prospect" [Kahne-man & Tversky, 1979, p, 274] of winning$100 with .8 or $0 with .2); and (c) cancel-lation, "discarding of components that areshared by the offered prospects"1 (Kahneman& Tversky, 1979, p. 274). :

However, as indicated by the word oftenin the quote above, the theory, although notmute, is deliberately not altogether explicitabout how these editing operations are per-formed. Regarding coding, the reference point"can be affected by the formulation of theoffered prospects and by the expectations ofthe decision maker" (Kahneman & Tversky,1979, p. 274) and, hence, need not be one'scurrent asset position. The segregation op-eration will only be carried out where theriskless component is "readily seen" by de-cision makers. It would not occur, for ex-ample, where people were overwhelmed bythe surface structure of a problem. Regardingcancellation, "a pair of prospects can be de-composed into common and distinctive com-ponents in more than one way, and differentdecompositions sometimes lead to differentpreferences" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979,p. 271).

The present studies consider three framesthat reasonable individuals might impose onor derive from the decision problem de-scribed in the introductory< section of Table1. The three "ways one might attempt tothink about the problem" attempt to capturethese three perspectives:

Frame 1. Here, one accepts the problemas it is presented in the description, perform-ing no editing beyond the necessary act of

' In addition to these three substantive operations,there are also three neatening or stylistic operations: (d)combination, adding the probabilities associated withidentical outcomes. Thus, a gamble that gave one $200with .25 probability,$200 with .25,;or $0 with ,5, wouldbe translated to receiving $200 with .5 and $0 with .5;(e) simplification, rounding of probabilities or outcomes;(f) detection of dominance, eliminating from further con-sideration any choice option that is inferior to some otheroption in all respects. These operations are not consid-ered here.

PREDICTING FRAMES 105

choosing a reference point (coding). Thepoint chosen is the present situation (no liveslost yet).

In terms of the theory, the value ofthe sure-loss option is simply V(B) =7r(l)t)(-50) = u(-50), given the conventionthat TT(!) = 1 and 7r(0) = 0. The value of thegamble option would be: F(A) =7r(.5M-40) + 7r(.5M-60), or F(A) = 7r(.5)[v(-40) + u(-60)]. Option A will then bepreferred to Option B if ir(.5) [u(-40) +v(-60)] > t>(-50) or, equivalently, if7r(.5) < t;(-50)/[i>(-40) + v(-60)] (remem-bering that the sum in brackets is negative,which results in reversal of the inequality '•when it is used as a divisor). Given the con-vexity of the value function for losses, theratio of the values will be greater than .5. Oneway of seeing this is to note that convexitymeans that t>(-50) is closer to u(-60) thanto u(-40). Hence, twice u(-50) will be morethan the sum of v(-60) and v(-40). Giventhe assumed shape of the probability weight-ing function, 7r(.5) will be less than .5, mean-ing that the inequality holds. Hence, prospecttheory predicts that anyone adopting thisperspective will be risk seeking, in the senseof preferring a gamble to a sure thing withthe same expectation.

Frame 2. Here, one first isolates and thencancels the certain loss of 40 lives that is com-mon to both options. Having done this, oneproceeds to evaluate a sure loss of 10 (more)lives and a gamble involving equal chancesof losing 0 and 20 (more) lives.

Despite this cancellation procedure, theevaluation and comparison of the two pros-pects would be similar to that for the pros-pects as seen from Frame 1. The value of thesure-loss option is K(B) = ir(l)i>(-10) =v(-10). The value of the gamble option isF(A) = 7r(.5MO) + ir(.5)u(-20) = 7r(.5)i;(-20).Option A will be preferred to Option B if7r(.5)u(-20)> u(-10) or, equivalently, if7r(.5) < u(-10)M-20). Given the convexityof the value function for losses, the right-hand side of this inequality will be more than.5 (because losing 20 lives is not twice as badas losing 10). Given the shape of the proba-bility weighting function, the left-hand sidewill be less than .5, leading to a preferenceof the gamble (Option A) for those adoptingthis frame.

Table 1Basic Stimulus

A civil defense committee in a large metropolitan areamet recently to discuss contingency plans in the eventof various emergencies. One emergency under discussionwas the following: "A train carrying a very toxic chemicalderails and the storage tanks begin to leak. The threatof explosion and lethal discharge of poisonous gas is im-minent."

Two possible actions were considered by the commit-tee. These are described below. Read them and indicateyour opinion about the relative merits of each.

Option A: Carries with it a .5 probability of containingthe threat with a loss of 40 lives and a .5 probabilityof losing 60 lives. It is like taking the gamble:

.5 lose 40 lives

.5 lose 60 lives.• Option B: Would result in the loss of 50 lives:

lose 50 lives.

Here are three ways one might think about this problem:1. This is a choice between a 50-50 gamble (lose 40

or lose 60 lives) and a sure thing (the loss of 50 lives).2. Whatever is done, at least 40 lives will be lost. This

is a choice between a gamble with a 50-50 chance ofeither losing no additional lives or losing 20 additionallives (A) and the sure-loss of 10 lives (B).

3. Option B produces a loss of 50 lives. Taking OptionA would mean gambling over a .5 chance to save 10 livesand a .5 chance to lose 10 additional lives.

Frame 3. Here, one realizes that the best(in the sense of least bad) outcome that onecan guarantee is losing 50 lives. Taking thisguarantee as something in hand, the sure-lossoption now involves staying put; the gambleis over saving 10 lives or losing 10 more. Sucha focus on the minimax outcome could bemodeled by prospect theory in one of twoways, the first of which seems much moreplausible: (a) shifting one's reference pointto the 50 lives that one has written off or (b)canceling 50 lives lost from both prospects.In either case, the sure-loss option becomesF(B) = u(0) = 0, whereas the gamble is nowF(A) = 7r(.5X 10) + 7r(.5)t)(-10). Here OptionA will be preferred to Option B if7r(.5)[i;(10) + u(-10)] > 0 or, equivalently, ifu(10) > v(-10). However, because the valuefunction for losses is steeper than is the valuefunction for gains, the loss of 10 lives shouldloom larger than should the gain of 10. Hencethose who adopt this perspective should pre-fer the sure loss to the gamble (i.e., OptionB to Option A).

Although all three of these frames can bemodeled by prospect theory, it is not clear


that they are equally attractive. For example,if one believes that people tend to be captiveof whatever superficial problem representa-tion they receive (e.g;, Slovic, Fischhoff, &Lichtenstein, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman,1981), then the most natural of these framesshould be Frame 1, which seems most com-patible with the problem description andwhich requires the least editing before theprospects can be evaluated. Similar consid-erations would suggest that the relative pop-ularity of Frames 2 and 3 might depend uponwhether cancellation (2) seems more or lessnatural than reference points shifts (3).

Experiment 1 explores these questions byasking subjects to rank the frames in termsof naturalness. Whatever the overall resultsof this popularity poll, one would expect thegamble option to be preferred by( subjectswho judge Frames 1 and 2 as most natural,whereas the sure loss will be preferred bythose (few or many) subjects who judgeFrame 3 to be most natural.

Experiment 1

The first study presented the problem ap-pearing in Table 1. Participants were askedto indicate (a) the phrasing that seemed tothem to be most natural, (b) the phrasing thatseemed least natural, (c) the option that theywould select, and (d) the strength of that pref-erence (on a 4-point scale). According to thepresent interpretation of prospect theory,those who adopt Frames 1 and 2 should alsoprefer the gamble option (see Option A inTable 1), whereas those who adopt Frame 3should prefer the sure-loss option (see OptionB in Table 1).

MethodSubjects received a one-page form labeled "Civil De-

fense." After presenting the problem appearing in Table1 verbatim, the form asked them:

Which of these three phrasings seems to be the mostnatural way of thinking about this problem?

1. 2. 3. (circle one)

Which of these three phasings seems to be the leastnatural way of thinking about this problem?

1. 2. 3. (circle one)

Which option would you select?

Option A.Option B.

How strong is your preference for the alternative youjust checked? Check one:

Slight preference DModerate preference DStrong preference DVery strong preference D

For this study and the following ones, the relevantform was one of several given in a self-paced sessioninvolving unrelated judgmental tasks. Subjects were re-cruited through advertisements in the University of Or-egon student paper and a state employment service of-fice. Typically, subjects recruited this way are dividedevenly between men and women, with men averagingabout 24 years in age and women about 21.

In the present study, 42 individuals received the formdescribed above, while another 42 received a simplerform omitting the discussion of the three ways of lookingat the problem.

Results

The bottom row of Table 2 presents theoption choices of subjects who received thesimple form, which had no discussion of orquestions about frames. Of these 42 individ-uals, 36 preferred the gamble to the sure loss.Such risk seeking in the realm of losses isquite contrary to standard utility theory,which assumes that large losses receive dis-proportionate weight, leading to risk aver-sion. This pattern of preferences is, however,quite compatible with prospect theory, as-suming that a frame such as 1 or 2 is adopted.From these option preferences, one wouldexpect Frame 3 to be much less popular thanFrame 1 or 2, with Frame 3 being adoptedby about 15% of all individuals.

Table 2Frame and Option Preferences in Experiment 1

Option preference

Frame preference

Subjects with long formChoice as most natural

123

Choice as least natural123

All subjects

Subjects with simpleform

Gam-ble

121212

119

1636

36

Sureloss

402

0336

6

Total

161214

11121942

42


The right-hand column of the top sectionof Table 2 shows the popularity of the frames,as judged by subjects receiving the long form.The frames were judged equally attractive,from the perspectives of choices as most nat-ural frame and choices as least natural frame.

According to these popularity ratings, onethird of all subjects in the long form groupshould prefer the sure-loss option, beingthose subjects who preferred Frame 3. How-ever, as the remainder of the table shows, thesure-loss option was just as unpopular withthe long form as with the simple form; only6 of 42 subjects preferred it, Moreover, thesure loss was no more popular among sub-jects who found Frame 3 to be most natural,nor was it any less popular among subjectswho found Frame 3 to be least popular.

The strength of preference ratings pro-vided no additional information. If the verbalratings are converted into a scale from 1(slight preference) to 4 (very strong prefer-ence), mean ratings were approximately 2.2for all frame and option preferences.

Experiment 2

In Experiment 1, prospect theory providedno guide to predicting subjects' choice pref-erences on the basis of their frame prefer-ences. Although general principles of exper-imental design might prompt one to prefera pair of options that are more balanced interms of their overall attractiveness, the un-popularity of the sure loss still does not ex-plain the relative naturalness of Frame 3 orthe lack of a relation between frame and op-tion choices.

One aspect of the experimental manipu-lation to which these difficulties might beattributed is the fact that the civil defenseproblem is initially presented in a mannerthat seems most compatible with Frame 1.Perhaps that perspective leads readers to aninitial preference for the gamble. When askedabout the most natural frame, one third ofthe subjects may still like Frame 3; however,as far as choices go, their minds have alreadybeen made up in favor of the gamble indi-cated by Frame 1. Experiment 2 tests thishypothesis by offering revisions of the basicform that used initial presentations morecompatible with Frames 2 and 3.

Method

Three new forms were created. One initially describedthe options in a manner that seemed to reflect Frame2:

Option A: Would result in the loss of at least 40 lives.However, it does offer a .5 probability of containingthe threat with the loss of 40 lives. On the other hand,there is also a .5 probability of losing 20 additionallives. It is like taking the gamble:

.5 lose no more lives (in addition to losing

.5 lose 20 more lives. 40 lives)Option B: Would result in the loss of 50 lives.

lose 50 lives

A second new form tried to capture Frame 3 in its de-scription of options:

Option A: Would result in the loss of 50 lives.lose 50 lives

Option B: Carries with it a .5 probability of saving 10lives compared with Option A and a .5 probability oflosing 10 lives. It is like taking the gamble:

.5 saving 10 lives

.5 losing 10 additional lives.

Because the Frame 3 form reversed the order of theoptions for the sake of a less awkward presentation, anew version of the original form was also devised. Thisform was identical to the original except that the orderof the options was reversed to facilitate comparisons withFrame 3. Contrasting this order-reversed form with theoriginal form should reveal whether the order in whichoptions are presented affects their attractiveness.

A total of 155 individuals judged either one of thesenew forms or additional copies of the original long form(from Experiment 1).

Results

Order reversal. Reversing the order of theoptions in the Frame 1 form made no dif-ference in either frame preference or optionpreference. With each order, subjects weredivided approximately equally in terms ofwhich frames they thought were most naturaland least natural. With each order, most sub-jects found the sure-loss option to be less at-tractive; 16.7% picked the sure loss when itwas presented first, compared with 20.8%who picked it when it was listed second (Z =.54). The two groups were pooled.

Alternative problem presentations. Theleft-hand side of Table 3 shows the percentageof subjects judging each frame to be mostnatural, within the three experimental groups,each of which received an initial problempresentation designed to be particularly com-patible with one of the frames. These natu-ralness ratings suggest that the presentationmanipulation was only mildly successful. All


Table 3Frame and Option Preferences in Experiment 2(Civil Defense Problem)

% of subjects % of subjectschoosing choosingframe as sure-loss'

most natural option

Framepresented n 1

Frame Framepreference preference

Ave1

1 114 32 35 33 25 15 18 192 46 22 37 41 10 12 26 173 37 30 22 49 27 25 17. 22Ave% 29 33 38 23 15 20 19

Note. The number of subjects involved in each cellequals the entry in the left-hand part of the table mul-tiplied by n for that row and divided by 100, For example,38 people (33 X 114/100) were presented Frame 1 andpreferred Frame 3; 7 of these 38 chose the sure-loss op-tion, producing the 18% in the corresponding cell on theright-hand side.

three frames received a higher proportion of"most natural" ratings in the formulationdesigned to highlight them than with the twoother formulations. However, this differenceapproached statistical significance only withFrame 3 (Z = 1,47). Regarding choices ofleast natural frame (not shown), Frames 1and 2 were as likely to be rated least naturalin the forms designed to highlight them asin the other forms. Frame 3, however, wasmuch less likely to be rated least natural inthe form highlighting it (13.5% vs. 33.8%,Z = 2.42).

The weakness of this manipulation reducesthe likelihood that the pattern of results ob-served in Experiment 1 was due to the par-ticular problem wording used there. People'sframe preferences seem to be relatively in-dependent of the frame they see first. Therobustness of those frame preferences alsoreduces the chances that subjects' optionchoices would be altered by the present ma-nipulation.

As the right-hand side of Table 3 shows,the sure-loss option was as unattractive hereas it was in Experiment 1, garnering only 19%of all choices, half of what it should havereceived had it been preferred by all subjectswho preferred Frame 3. The popularity ofthe sure loss was unrelated to either the frame

that subjects received (right-hand column) orthe frame that they preferred (bottom row).Indeed, it was chosen by only 17% of the sub-jects who both received and preferredFrame 3.

Experiment 3

Although participants in Experiment 2 sawthe problem in only one formulation, theyread descriptions of all three frames prior tochoosing an option. Conceivably, this readingexercise weakened the experimental manip-ulation by diluting the impact of the frameused in the problem description. Experiment3 examines this possibility by reversing theorder of the option-preference and frame-preference tasks, so that subjects will haveseen only one formulation at the time theymake their option choices. One possibledrawback of this ordering is that subjects willnot have made a deliberative choice betweenframes when they choose options. However,before considering further which order is su-perior, it is worth seeing whether order makesany difference.

MethodForms were identical to those used in Experiment 2,

except that the option-selection task preceded the nat-uralness-judgment task. That task was moved to a sep-arate page in order to reduce the chances that subjectsmight still read about the three frames prior to selectingan option. All three forms presented the sure loss first.As an indirect manipulation check, subjects were askedlater in the experimental session to remember which ofthe three frames they had received and which optionthey had selected. Eighty-two individuals judged this setof forms.

Results

Responses in Experiment 3 were, in gen-eral, very similar to those observed in Ex-periment 2. The sure loss remained unpopu-lar; it was chosen by 26.8% of subjects (com-pared with 19.3% in Experiment 2). Asbefore, it was no more popular among sub-jects who received the Frame 3 version; it wasselected by 27.6% of those subjects comparedwith 26.4% of subjects receiving Frame 1 or2. Nor was the sure-loss option any morepopular among subjects who judged Frame3 to be most natural after making theirchoice; it was chosen by 24.0% of those who


preferred Frame 3 and by 28.7% of those whopreferred the other frames.

In addition to showing the robustness ofExperiment 2's results, Experiment 3 pro-vided some subsidiary information aboutframe judgment. Postponing the naturalnessjudgments had no effect on subjects' (mini-mal) propensity to judge the presented frameas being most natural; 36.6% did so here,versus 36.0% in Experiment 2. Nonetheless,when asked unexpectedly after 40 min. ofunrelated tasks to remember which of thethree frames had been used in their problemdescription, 75.0% did so correctly (com-pared with the 34.0% that would be expectedby chance). When asked after the memorytask which frame they now preferred, 75.3%expressed the same preference as they hadearlier. This consistency of preference wasquite similar for those who had initially pre-ferred Frames 1, 2, and 3 (71.4%, 76.7%, and77.3%, respectively). Although these recalltasks focused additional attention on theframe that was presented, they did not in-crease its popularity: Still only 36.0% of sub-jects judged the presented frame to be mostnatural. Apparently, people do attend toframes; however, their frame preferences arenot readily manipulated.

Ninety-one percent of subjects remem-bered which option they had chosen. Thispercentage was somewhat higher among thosewho chose the gamble (94.6% vs. 81.0% forthose who chose the sure loss, Z = 1.86), per-haps reflecting a somewhat weaker strengthof preference among subjects choosing thatoption.

Experiment 4

A natural question to ask at this junctureis how general these results are. Experiments4, 5, and 6 test their generality by varyingdifferent parameters of the research design.Experiment 4 replaces the civil defense con-text with analogous options using dollars. Itasks, in effect, whether there is somethingspecial about losses of life that makes people'schoices insensitive to frames. Although thelead examples in Tversky and Kahneman's(1981) presentation of framing effects in-volved losses of life and subsequent examplesused dollars, they did not undertake any sys-tematic variation of the kinds of stakes.

MethodForms comparable to those used in Experiment 2 were

created by replacing all losses of life by losses of an equiv-alent number of dollars. Instead of the civil defense in-troduction, subjects were told simply to "imagine thatyou are faced with two unattractive options." Onehundred and seventeen individuals judged these forms.

Results

Two versions of the Frame 1 form wereagain used. Again, reversing the order of op-tions had no discernible effect. In both cases,approximately one third of subjects chose thesure loss. Their choices of most and leastnatural frame were essentially identical.Hence, responses to those two forms werecombined.

The left-hand side of Table 4 shows framepreferences as a function of frame presented.As before, frame preferences were quite ro-bust, showing little response to frame pre-sentation. Frame 2 was somewhat more pop-ular when its formulation was used; Frame1 was somewhat less popular. There seemsto be some shift in the overall popularity ofthe different frames with the two kinds ofstakes. Frame 1 was, judged most popular29% of the time in the lives context, com-pared with 40% with the dollars context (Z =2.05). Frame 3's share of choices as most

Table 4Frame and Option Preferences in Experiment 4(Dollar Problem)

% of subjects % of subjectschoosing choosingframe as sure-loss

most natural option

Framepresented n 1


Ave1

1 38 29 32 39 36 17 40 32 -2 40 43 43 15 41 24 0 283 39 49 18 33 26 0 23 21Ave% 40 31 29 34 17 26 27

Note. The number of subject involved in each cell equalsthe. entry in the left-hand part of the table multiplied by« for that row, divided by 100. For example, 6 people(15 X 40/100) preferred Frame 3 when they were pre-sented Frame 2; none of these 6 preferred the sure loss,producing the 0% on the corresponding cell on the right-hand side.


popular dropped correspondingly from 38%to 29% (Z = 1.62). If robust and common,such context dependency could further com-plicate the task of predicting what framespeople will adopt (and what choices they willmake).

Given the reduced popularity of Frame 3,one would expect the sure loss to be even lesspopular here than it was in the lives context.However, it was actually somewhat morepopular, being chosen by 26% of subjectshere, compared with 19% in Experiment 2(Z = 1.49). Perhaps limiting one's losses is amore attractive (or palatable) option whenthose losses are dollars rather than lives.

As shown by the right-hand side of Table4, there was again no relationship within ex-periments between option choice and eitherframe preference or frame presentation.

Experiment 5

For subjects who are unversed in prospecttheory, it is necessary to devise a verbal equiv-alent of each frame, both for presenting theproblem in a particular formulation and forinquiring about the naturalness of each frame.One possible concern about Experiments 1-4 might be that the manner in which eachframe was described verbally somehow failedto capture its formal properties. Experiment5 used different descriptions designed to high-light the reference point in each frame andto increase the similarity between the waythat each frame was described and the waythat the corresponding problem descriptionwas formulated.

In Experiments 1-4, neither frame pref-erence nor frame presentation predicted op-tion choice. If one could choose which ofthose two variables would be related to op-tion choice, frame presentation would be themore useful predictor. As an experimenter,one can control which frame is used. As anobserver, one might hope to discern the framelatent in the presentation of a real-worldproblem. Even if option choices were relatedto frame preferences, we know so little abouthow those preferences are determined thatit would be difficult to exploit that relation-ship. The modest shifts in the overall popu-larity of Frames 1 and 3 between the dollarsand lives contexts suggest that these prefer-

ences may not even be stable across contentareas. Experiment 5 explored the stability offrame preference by presenting each subjectwith both a dollars and a lives problem (bothusing the same new frame formulations).

MethodThree new civil defense forms were created, each cast

in the perspective of one frame. Because the order inwhich options were presented had no effect in Experi-ments 2 and 4, the same ordering was used here for eachform (sure loss first).

In the description of the "three ways one might thinkabout the problem," Frame 1 was left unto, uched. Frame2 was changed nominally to mention the sure loss first.Frame 3 was reworded to make the reference point moreindependent conceptually of the sure-loss option. It read:

Frame 3. One can guarantee that no more and noless than 50 lives will be lost. Option A assures that thatwill happen. Option B means gambling over a .5 chanceto save 10 lives and a .5 chance to lose 10 additionallives.

The Frame 1 form was unchanged except for this re-wording of the frame descriptions.

The introduction of the Frame 2 form was changedin order to accentuate the 40 lost lives that were commonto both options. Specifically, a sentence was added statingthat "Forty people's lives are going to be lost whateveryou do." The option descriptions were then changed to:

Option A: Would result in the loss of 10 additionallives.

lose 10 additional lives.Option B: Offers a .5 probability of containing thethreat with the loss of 40 lives. On the other hand,there is also a .5 probability of losing 20 additionallives. It is like taking the gamble;

.5 lose no additonal lives

.5 lose 20 additional lives.

Analogous changes attempted to" highlight the refer-ence point in the Frame 3 form. To the introduction wasadded "Fifty lives are in imminent danger." The optionswere described as:

Option A; Would constrain the loss of life to those 50people. That is, it would result in

saving 0 liveslosing 0 additional lives. ;

Option B: Carries with it a .5 probability of saving 10of those people whose lives are,in danger and a .5probability of losing 10 additional lives. It is like takingthe gamble:

.5 saving 10 lives

.5 losing 10 additional lives.

A set of three forms for the dollars context was con-structed making comparable changes. Each subject re-ceived a dollars form using the same frame some 15 min.after completing the civil defense form, following severalunrelated intervening tasks. This within-subjects designwas intended to give some preliminary idea of the con-sistency of option and frame preferences across these twodomains. However, given the transparent similarity of


the two tasks and the proximity of their presentation,the comparisons must be treated cautiously.

A total of 127 individuals completed these forms, withroughly equal numbers receiving each frame formula-tion.

Results

Civil defense. The left-hand side of Table5 reports the frame preferences of subjectsshown each form. Over all forms, the re-wordings reduced Frame 3's share of mostnatural judgments from 38% to 25% (Z =2.41) while increasing selections of Frame 1(from 29% to 34%, Z = 0.94) and of Frame2 (from 33% to 41%, Z= 1.45). Whetherthese changes suggest small or large sensitiv-ity of frame preference to verbal represen-tation depends on how large one judges thepresent wording changes to be. The attemptto increase the similarity between the framedescriptions shown to all subjects and theproblem descriptions designed to captureeach frame was moderately successful. Eachframe was judged to be more natural by sub-jects whose problem description was in-tended to match that frame than by subjectsreceiving one of the other two problem de-scriptions. Overall, 45.7% of subjects pre-ferred the frame they saw.

The right-hand side of Table 5 shows op-tion choice as a function of frame given andframe preferred. Even though the popularityof Frarhe 3 dropped by one third (comparedwith Experiment 2), the popularity of thesure-loss option increased from 19% to 30%of all choices (Z = 2.20). Within Experiment5, the frequency of choosing the sure loss wasunrelated to the frame used or to the framechosen as most natural (or to choices of leastnatural—not shown).

Dollars. Although they should be used,cautiously, responses to the dollar forms weresimilar to those seen with the civil defenseforms in the present study and the dollarforms of Experiment 4: (a) In Experiments2 and 4, the sure loss was more popular withthe dollar problem than with the civil defenseproblem (31% vs. 19%). Here, the respectivepercentages were 40% and 30%. (b) The in-creased popularity of the sure loss wasachieved without a corresponding increase inthe popularity of Frame 3. (c) There was norelation between frame preference and op-

Table 5Frame and Option Preferences in Experiment 5

% of subjects % of subjectschoosing choosingframe as sure-loss

most natural option

Framepresented n 1


Ave1

Civil defense problem

123Ave %

434143

51153534

28593741

21272825

36334037

25251923

33451731

33322630

Dollars problem

123Ave%

404142

63395050

18392427

20222623

44385747

14315033

38332732

38344840

tion choice, (d) As with the civil defenseforms, Experiment 5's rewording increasedFrame 1's popularity (from 40% to 50% of"most natural" choices), (e) As with the civildefense forms, all three frames were mostoften judged most natural by subjects whoseproblem had been presented in terms of thatframe.

The only deviation from this pattern ofsimilarities was that subjects who receivedthe Frame 3 form chose the sure-loss optionmore often than did subjects who receivedthe other forms (48% vs. 36%, Z= 1.27).Although this change is in the anticipateddirection, given the welter of comparisonsshowing no difference or modest changes inthe opposite direction, it is hard to attributevery much significance to it.

Consistency. Comparing responses to thedollars and the lives versions revealed that thegreat majority of subjects also preferred thesame frame for both problems (69.0% vs.' the36.8% that would be expected by chance).Their option choices were somewhat less con-sistent, with 63.1% choosing the same optionboth times, compared with 54.0% expectedby chance. If one assumes that subjects ad-dressing the dollar problem had no memoryof the civil defense problem, these resultsmight be taken to indicate that they had more


stable (or better articulated) frame prefer-ences than option preferences. If one assumesthat subjects remembered everything, the re-sult at least indicates that they did not feelcompelled to be consistent.

Experiment 6

An implicit assumption of the precedingexperiments is that people interpret the nat-uralness question as an enquiry regarding theframe that they themselves have used. Con-ceivably, however, they might have inter-preted it as a judgment of consensus (howmost other people would judge the problem)or of normative status (how the problemshould be considered). Because prospect the-ory is not a normative theory, it makes nostatement as to which frame subjects shoulduse. That does not mean that subjects do notdecide spontaneously that the experimenterhas some "right answer" in mind when ask-ing about naturalness. If subjects did inter-pret "most natural frame" as "proper frame,"then the absence of any relationship between.frame and option preference would mean re-jection of prospect theory as a normativeguide (a finding that would not trouble ad-vocates of the theory unless one believed thata descriptively valid theory must be norma-tively appealing). Or, one could argue thatsubjects did give the theory normative status,but were unable to follow its dictates in link-ing a frame preference with an option choice.To clarify the meaning of the naturalnessjudgment, subjects in Experiment 6 wereasked explicitly about what frame had guidedthem.

MethodForms were identical to those of Experiment 3, except

that subjects were asked "which of these three phrasingsmost closely captures the way in which you thoughtabout the problem when making your choice betweenthe two options." Following description of the threeframes, this question preceded the two questions re-garding the most and least natural ways of thinking aboutthe frame. In all, 180 subjects participated, with ap-proximately equal numbers receiving forms that em-phasized each of the three frames.

Results and Discussion

In the aggregate, the frame-you-used word-ing produced patterns of results like those

produced by the most-natural-frame word-ing. Again, only a minority of subjects (41.7%)chose the frame highlighted in their ques-tionnaire. Pooling across the three forms,each frame again had a substantial body ofadherents, with Frames 1, 2, and 3 chosenby 18.3%, 45.6%, and 36.1% of subjects inExperiment 6, respectively, compared with28.0%, 41.5%, and 30.5% of subjects in Ex-periment 3, x2(2) = 3.22, p > .10.

The sure-loss option was for some reasona bit more popular here than in Experiment3; it was chosen by 35.0% of subjects com-pared with 26.8% (Z = 1.33). Preference forthe sure loss was, however, still unrelated tochoice of frame. It was chosen by 35.4% ofthose who reported using Frame 3 and by34.8% of those who reported relying onFrame 1 or 2. Thus, subjects either did notknow what frames they used or did not useprospect theory to translate that frame intoa choice. The sure loss was chosen slightly,but not significantly, more often by thosewho received Frame 3 than by those who re-ceived Frame 1 or 2 (42.6% vs. 31.1%,Z = 1.54).

As mentioned, subjects chose the most(and least) natural frame after pointing to theone they used. The juxtaposition of thesetasks would seem to force subjects to findsome way to distinguish between the "mostnatural" frame and the one they had just re-ported choosing (otherwise, why would theybe asked two separate questions). Becausetheir sequential position renders the natural-ness judgments suspect, they are reportedonly cursorily. In general, they looked muchlike those observed elsewhere; The presentedframe was chosen by a minority of subjects(40.0%) as most natural, and there was norelation between frame preference and op-tion preference, x2(l) = -34. Some 51.6% ofsubjects chose as most natural the frame thatthey reported using (compared with the31.1% that would be expected by chance).Even among these "consistent subjects," whomight be seen as having the most robustframe preferences, there was no relation be-tween frame and option choice.

Experiment 7All of the forms used in Experiments 1-6

have involved one particular gamble, albeit


presented in a variety of ways and contexts.The "hidden story" of these studies has beenthe persistent popularity of the gamble rela-tive to the sure loss, independent of the frameused or preferred. One step toward establish-ing the generality of the present results is clar-ifying the generality of that aversion to surelosses (or preference for risk seeking). Ex-periment 7 varies the parameters of the civildefense problem, always keeping the sure lossequal to the expected value of the gamble.

If we had more detailed knowledge of theshapes of the value function and the proba-bility weighting function, it would be possibleto derive precise predictions regarding theway in which these changes should affect theoption preferences of individuals adoptingvarious frames. Conversely, one could use thechanges in option preferences observed withsuch changes in the options as a means toassess the shapes of the functions. As suchdetailed analyses are beyond the scope of thepresent article, the new problems will be ex-ploited primarily as indicators of the robust-ness of the preference for risk seeking ob-served above.

Method'

Eight variants of the basic pr6blem were created andpresented to groups of approximately 40 subjects drawnfrom the same pool as the previous studies. The problemsare described on the left-hand side of Table 6. The "gam-

ble parameters" are the probabilities and magnitudes ofthe two outcomes of the gamble; "sure loss" is the mag-nitude of the sure loss, which was always set equal to theexpected value of the gamble. The variations may bebriefly described as:

• Problem 1 changes the gamble's outcomes from 40and 60 (in the basic problem) to 0 and 100, This changeraises the maximum possible loss considerably but alsoprovides a .5 chance of escaping with no loss at all.

• Problem 2, like Problem 1, offers the chance of noloss at all with the gamble. However, the maximum pos-sible loss and sure loss were both raised considerably.

• Problems 3 and 4 use the gamble losses of Problems1 and 2, respectively. However, they shift the gamble'sprobabilities for (no loss, loss) from (.5, .5) to (.8, .2).The sure loss is correspondingly reduced by a factor of2[/2.

• Problems 5 and 6 use the gamble losses of Problems3 and 4 but reduce the probability of the loss outcomeeven more. The sure loss is also reduced.

• Problems 7 and 8 are like the basic problem in of-fering no hope of escaping without loss. They differ fromthe basic problem in the variance of the gamble's out-comes.

These problems were all presented in the same formatas was the basic problem. Alternative frames were neitherused nor asked about because the present data were col-lected some years ago, prior to the development of pros-pect theory. Subjects were, however, asked how the num-ber of lives lost with the sure-loss option would have tochange for them to change their preferences. Specifically,they were asked (where A represents the gamble):

1. If you chose A over B, how few lives would haveto be lost in the certain-loss option (B) before you wouldtake it?

I would choose B if "only" lives were lost forcertain.

2. If you chose B over A, how high could the life tollin the certain-loss option go before you would shiftto A?

Table 6Option Preferences for Variations of Civil Defense Problem

Problem description Preferences

Problemnumber

12345678

Basic"

Total

Gamble parameters

Pi

.5

.5

.8

.8

.99

.99

.5

.5

.5

Li

0000001

2540

Pi

.5

.5

.2

.2

.01

.01

.5

.5

.5

£2 -

100100,000

100100,000

100100,000

997560

Sure loss

5050,000

2020,000

11,000

505050

n

393439364146393842

312

% ofsubjectschoosingsure loss

39

1311294

131814

13

Mdn switching value

Chosegamble

2500

1000

501

25

—

Chosesure loss

5175,000

2560,000

537,500

7560

—

Note. P = probability; L = loss of lives.* Results from simple form of Experiment 1—not included in totals.


I would shift to A if the certain loss with B rose tolives.

Such judgments could, in principle, be used to pa-rameterize the various curves in prospect theory. How-ever, they are used here only to get some idea of howstrong subjects' preferences were for the options theychose.

Results

Choices. The clearest pattern in Table 6is the preponderance of subjects who pre-ferred the gamble in every variation of thiscivil defense problem. Sure-loss choicesranged from 3% (Problem 1) to 29% (Prob-lem 5), averaging 12.5% over all conditions.This suggests that the results obtained withthe particular values used in the basic prob-lem were not unrepresentative of what wouldhave been obtained with a wide variety ofother values. Although such consistency ofoption choices does not guarantee that therelations between choices and frames wouldbe the same with all these problem variants,it does suggest that replication of Experi-ments 1-6 with different parameter values isnot the most promising way to explore theeffects of framing.

Both because the variations in resultsacross problems are fairly small and becausethe problems were not designed to discrim-inate between frames, a detailed expositionis inappropriate here. Attention to a few ex-amples may help show the kind of predictionsthat prospect theory makes in such cases(whatever frame is adopted) and the modestsupport for those predictions that is foundhere. For example, contrast Problem 1 withthe basic problem; The convexity of the lossfunction means that reducing LI from 40 to0 should have more impact than increasingL2 from 60 to 100. As the sure loss is thesame in both cases, the gamble should bemore attractive in Problem 1, which it is (Z -1.88). Similar logic leads one to expect thegamble to be more attractive in Problem 7than in the basic problem, which it is not.On the other hand, compare Problems 1 and7: Adding a first life lost to LI should do moreto reduce the gamble's attractiveness in Prob-lem 7 than subtracting 1 life from the 100associated with L2 does to increase it. Prob-lem 7's gamble is, indeed, less attractive (Z =1.70). Within the limits of the present methodand sample sizes, the combination of the ba-

sic problem with 1 and 7 suggests that qual-itative effects, such as crossing the thresholdfrom 0 to 1 life lost, may be more importantthan quantitatively large changes.

As a final example, consider the contrastbetween Problems 5 and 6. The relativelygreat popularity of the sure loss in Problem5 is surprising because of the relatively greatweight given both to the first unit of loss andto outcomes known with certainty. Prospecttheory would presumably account for thispopularity by noting that small probabilitiesare overweighted, meaning that a substantialportion of subjects gave enough weight to P2(equal to .01) to compensate for the aver-siveness of the sure loss. In Problem 6, theprobabilities remain the same, but the stakeshave escalated considerably. The great drop-off in support for the sure loss (Z =3.16) sug-gests that the value function for losses ismuch less steep in the 1,000 to 100,000 rangethan it is in the 1 to 100 range.2

Strength of preference. The switching val-ues, indicating the value that the sure losswould have to assume for subjects to changetheir preferences, offer some hints as to thestrength and nature of subjects' preferences.In general, those who chose the gamble ini-tially were very reluctant to switch. WithProblem 1, for example, the median switch-ing value of 2 means that they wanted to havethe sure loss cut by 96%, from 50 to 2. WithProblems 3, 5, 7 and 8, the median subjectwanted the sure loss reduced to LI , the lesserof the gamble's possible losses, before switch-ing. If taken literally, these responses wouldreflect risk seeking in the extreme. It remainsto be seen, however, whether numerical judg-ments, such as switching values, will proveas robust as the categorical judgments of op-tion preference. Two specific qualificationsof the present method are that (a) these werevalues for switching, not values indicatingwhen the two options were equally attractive;

2 Alternatively, one could argue that something aboutthe size of the stakes makes the .01 probability muchmore likely to be considered an impossibility in Problem6 that in Problem 5. Such an influence of values onprobability weighting is not only intellectually unsatis-fying but also is at odds with the great importance thatpeople seem to attach to unlikely, but potentially cata-strophic, events (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979).


(b) these judgments were given by individualswho had already made an explicit commit-ment to one option. Nonetheless, it seems asthough these subjects were willing to incurquite large risks in order to avoid a sure lossof life.

So few subjects chose the sure loss that itis difficult to reach any firm conclusions onthe basis of their switching values. It appears,though, that these individuals were much lessdogged in their choices. For most problems,only a,modest increase in the sure loss wasneeded for these subjects to switch to thegamble. In no case was a subject willing tolet the sure loss rise to the value of £2 beforeswitching.

Like subjects in Experiments 1-6, thesesubjects also indicated the strength of theirpreference for the chosen alternative on a 4-point scale. These ratings provided the samepicture as did the switching values. For sevenof the eight problems, subjects who preferredthe gamble were more confident in theirchoices than were subjects who chose the sureloss. Over all problems, the .mean preferenceswere 2.5 versus 1.9, respectively (using thesame scoring system as in Experiment 1).

Discussion

If one assumes that people adopt Frames1 or 2, then the present results provide strongsupport for one of prospect theory's strongestpredictions. According to the theory, peopleshould and, according to these data, peopledo prefer the gamble to the sure loss. More-over, they do so despite a variety of changesin parameters, context, wording, instruc-tions, and order of presentation. Althoughthese variations do not exhaust all possibili-ties, they do cover several local ranges fairlywell.

This prediction (and set of behaviors) runscontrary to the predictions of the standardexpected utility model. That theory appliesno weighting function to probabilities andassumes that people are risk averse for losses.From that perspective, the expected utility ofthe gamble will be equal to .5w(-40) +.5w(-60), whereas the expected utility of thesure loss will be simply u(—50). Risk aversionassures that the average of w(-40) and w(-60)will be less than w(-50). Hence, people will

prefer the sure loss, which has less negativeutility.

Why, however, should one assume thatpeople adopt Frame 1 or 2 rather than Frame3? Frame 3 is not only a fairly popular per-spective among subjects but also quite a le-gitimate one from prospect theory's point ofview. Indeed, one could not even treat sucha perspective within expected utility theory,which assumes that prospects are evaluatedby looking at their effect on one's total assetposition, not by comparison with a referencepoint reflecting where one could be by ac-cepting a sure loss.

According to Tversky and Kahneman(1981):A diversity of factors determine the reference outcomein everyday life. The reference outcome is usually a stateto which one has adapted; it is sometimes set by socialnorms and expectations; it sometimes corresponds to alevel of aspiration, which may or may not be realistic.(P. 456)

In this light, the present studies can be viewedas having explored—and established—whatreference point people tend to adopt in thissort of problem. The robustness of this dom-inant perspective is perhaps demonstratedmost clearly by the negligible impact of tryingto present the problem so as to accentuateFrame 3's perspective. Unlike some of theproblems used as demonstrations by Kahne-man and Tversky (1979; see also Fischhoff,Slovic, & Liechtenstein, 1980; Tversky &Kahneman, 1981), this kind of problem doesnot evoke labile preferences. If one wishedto extract a general principle, it might be thateven though shifts to a minimax loss refer-ence point are theoretically possible, they arenot commonly undertaken. That is, peopledo not readily adapt to absorbing losses. Sucha principle would be one step toward devel-oping the substantive theory of how peoplerespond to particular decision problems thatis needed to give prospect theory greater pre-dictive validity.

The difficulty with this interpretation isthat it does not account for the fact thatFrame 3 was judged to be the most naturalperspective by roughly one third of all sub-jects in each condition of Experiments 1-6.Nor does it account for the absence of anyrelation within those studies between framepreference and option preference. Indeed, to


the extent that overall preference levels forFrame 3 did vary across experiments (from23% to 38%), its popularity was negativelycorrelated (7 = -.80) with variations in thepopularity of the sure loss (from 14% to 40%).Clearly, one would like to be able to predictpeople's choices from their appraisal of whatframe seems to fit a problem best, particu-larly when those naturalness judgments seemquite robust (as suggested by Experiment 5).If one can only infer frames from preferencesafter assuming the truth of the theory, oneruns the risk of making the theory itself un-testable. The dissatisfaction that many peoplehave with utility theory often arises from ob-serving the convoluted lengths to which onemust go in reinterpreting decision problemsso as to find something whose utility peoplewere maximizing (Fischhoff, Goitein, &Shapira, 1981).

One quick way to dispel these doubts is todismiss naturalness judgments as a researchtool, arguing that people cannot introspectaccurately about the factors influencing theirdecisions and choices. An analysis of the sit-uations in which introspections are more andless likely to be accurate is beyond the presentarticle (see, e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1980;Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Smith & Miller,1978; White, 1980). Tversky and Kahne-man's (1981) feeling that "individuals whoface a decision problem . . . are normallyunaware of alternative frames and of the po-tential effects on the relative attractiveness ofoptions" (p. 457) might be seen as supportingthe mistrust of introspections about decision

processes such as those studied here. If oneaccepts prospect theory, then the present re-sults might encourage one to agree withthem.

References

Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. Verbal reports as data.Psychological Review, 1980, 87, 215-251.

Fischhoff, B., Goitein, B., & Shapira, Z. The experiencedutility of expected utility approaches. In N. Feather(Ed.), Expectancy, incentive and action. Hillsdale, N.J.:Erlbaum, 1981.

Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. Knowing whatyou want: Measuring labile, values. In T. Wallsten(Ed.), Cognitive processes in choice and decision be-havior. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1980.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. Prospect theory. Econo-metrica, 1979, 47, 263-292.

Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. Telling more than we canknow: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psycholog-ical Review, 1977, 84, 231-259.

Slovic, P., Fischhoif, B., & Lichtenstein, S. Rating therisks. Environment, 1979, 21(3), 14-20, 36-39.

Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. Responsemode, framing, and information-processing effects inrisk assessment. In R. Hogarth (Ed.), New directionsfor methodology of social & behavioural science: Ques-tion framing & response consistency, No. 11. San Fran-cisco: Jossey-Bass, 1982.

Smith, E. R., & Miller, F. S. Limits on perception ofcognitive processes: A reply to Nisbett & Wilson. Psy-chological Review, 1978, 85, 355-362. '

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. The framing of decisionsand the psychology of choice. Science, 1981,211,453-458.

White, P. Limitations on verbal reports of internalevents: A refutation of Nisbett & Wilson and of Bern.Psychological Review, 1980, 87, 105-112.

Received; June 17, 198 l rRevision received May 24, 1982 •

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