4
Practice exam no. 1- for fun and learning - ECOS2201 The following set up applies for the next two questions. 1. There are two firms in market that simultaneously set their production quantities of a homogenous good. Market demand is given by P = a – bQ, where P is market price and Q is market quantity. Let the output of firm 1 be denoted by q 1 and the output of firm 2 be denoted by q 2 . Each firm has constant marginal costs of c. In the Nash equilibrium of the game, what is the output level of firm 1? (a) * 1 3. a c q b = (b) * 1 3 a c q b = (c) * 1 3( ) 2 a c q b = (d) * 1 2 c a q b = 2. In the Nash equilibrium, what is firm 1’s profit? (a) 2 1 ( ) 9 a c b π = (b) 2 1 ( ) 3 c a b π = (c) 2 1 ( ) a c b π = (d) 1 (3 3) a c b π =

Practice Exam 1 Answers

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

Economics

Citation preview

  • Practice exam no. 1- for fun and learning - ECOS2201

    The following set up applies for the next two questions.

    1. There are two firms in market that simultaneously set their production quantities of a homogenous good. Market demand is given by P = a bQ, where P is market price and Q is market quantity. Let the output of firm 1 be denoted by q1 and the output of firm 2 be denoted by q2. Each firm has constant marginal costs of c. In the Nash equilibrium of the game, what is the output level of firm 1?

    (a) *1 3.a cq

    b =

    (b) *1 3a cq

    b=

    (c) *13( )

    2a cq

    b=

    (d) *1 2c aq

    b=

    2. In the Nash equilibrium, what is firm 1s profit?

    (a) 2

    1( )

    9a c

    b =

    (b) 2

    1( )

    3c a

    b =

    (c) 2

    1( )a c

    b =

    (d) 1(3 3 )a c

    b =

  • 3. Both Carol and Jackie produce a homogenous product. They both have zero marginal costs and simultaneously choose output. The market demand curve for the product is P = 1 - Q, where Q total output. In equilibrium what is the output of Carol and Jackie?

    a.qj = qc = 1/3

    b. qj = qc = 1/2

    c. qj = qc = 1/4

    d. qj = , qc = 1/4

    e. None of the above

    12. Both Carol and Jackie produce a homogenous product. They both have zero marginal costs. Jackie chooses her output first; having observed qj, Carol then chooses her output level. The market demand curve for the product is P = 1 - Q, where Q total output. In equilibrium what is the output of Carol and Jackie?

    a.qj = qc = 1/3

    b. qj = qc = 1/2

    c. qj = qc = 1/4

    d. qj = , qc = 1/4

    e. None of the above

    4. Both Carol and Jackie produce a homogenous product. They both have zero marginal costs. Jackie chooses her output first; having observed qj, Carol then chooses her output level. The market demand curve for the product is P = 1 - Q, where Q total output. Which statement is true?

    a. The choices of each firm are strategic complements.

    b. It is not possible to say whether the choices of the two are strategic complements or substitutes given the above information

    c. All of the above.

    d. The choices of each firm are strategic substitutes

    e. None of the above.

  • 5. A way of softening price competition between rivals is to

    a. lower marginal cost

    b. increase product differentiation

    c. lower the transport costs of consumers

    d. increase a firms capacity

    e. none of the above

    6. Both Carol and Jackie produce a homogenous product. They both have zero marginal costs and simultaneously choose price. Consumers buy from the cheapest seller; if both prices are the same consumers evenly split between the vendors. In equilibrium what is the price of Carol and Jackie?

    a. pc = pj = 0

    b. pc > pj = 1

    c. pc = pj >0

    d. All of the above

    e. None of the above.

    Short answer

    1. Use the Hotelling model to show how product differentiation can help firms increase the prices they charge to consumers.

    2. Review the model of deterrence and accommodation from lectures. If an investment makes an incumbent tough, the two firms choices are strategic substitutes and the incumbent wants to accommodate entry, what is the appropriate strategy?

    3. What are the advantages of opening a network to rivals? What are the disadvantages?

  • 4. Review the hold-up problem. How will this affect a firm