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Elena Kochetkova

National Research University Higher School of Economics-Saint-Petersburg/

University of Helsinki

"Finnish-Soviet trade in the 1950s-60s: interests and tools of Cold War actors"

Introduction

In the late 1950s, the managing director of Finnish company Rauma-Repola Paavo

Honkajuuri stated that “Russian trade orders made it possible for us to launch a serial production

of [pulp making] machinery which before had been produced as a single- piece”.1  Indeed,

following WWII, Soviet Union was an attractive export market for Finland, a capitalist country

which had unusually close trade connections with the socialist state. Soviet trade played a

remarkable role in Finnish economic growth prior to the end of the USSR in 1991. Trade with

Finland was also beneficial for the Soviet economy, as it provided advanced technologies and

techniques. For the Soviets, trade with Finland acted as „a window‟ to Western technology.2 

For Finland, the Soviet Union was a large socialist and ideologically driven partner on

the other side of the Iron Curtain. For the Soviet Union, Finland was a small neighboring

capitalist state with a close relationship to Western rivals. The high-level economic organizations

in both countries tended to stress the political and cultural significance of cooperation between

capitalism and socialism. However, they provided more rhetorical pronouncements regarding

friendly cooperation and the co-existence of capitalism and socialism than descriptions of details

and practicalities.3 The Finnish-Soviet economic cooperation was, thus, influenced by political

rhetoric, but behind the macro level of state relations there was a set of interests and actions of

individuals. In practice, actors from both sides used their own tools to achieve goals such as

making profit, competing for export increases, and purchasing or selling at the most beneficial

 price. Definitely, the context set by the Cold War shaped these tools and forced economic actors

to deal with political and ideological factors. Yet, as current scholarship illustrates, these factors

were not primary.

Many recent papers stress the importance of the micro level analysis, but trade practices

in the early stages of Finnish-Soviet relations in the post-war era are still a marginal topic. Pekka

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Sutela considers methods of communication between Finnish and Soviet individuals involved in

trade activities, mostly in later periods.4 Niklas Jensen-Eriksen examines influences of the Cold

War realities on Finland and in particular a role of COCOM in Finnish external economic

 politics.5  The particular specific position of Finland between East and West as well as

 peculiarities of political relations and their influences on trade is examined by Tatiana

Androsova.6 Other authors, in particular Sari Autio-Sarasmo, investigate practices and channels

of scientific-technical cooperation and technology transfer from Finland to the Soviet Union.7 

However, interests and tools for realizing trade and technical cooperation as employed by

individuals in the two different systems during the early years of the Cold War requires more

attention.

While touching on the macro level context, in this article I will focus on local actors in

Finland (companies and traders) and in the Soviet Union (representatives of state trade and

research organizations and specialists of enterprises) in order to understand their interests and the

 business tools developed in the trade dialogue between different systems on the practical level in

the age of the Cold War. Primarily, I am interested in Finnish imports to the USSR and their

roles both for Finns and Soviets. I will examine the first period of Finnish-Soviet trade in order

to look at how these tools were developed and what interests prevailed. This analysis will

contribute to understanding the Cold War on the micro level as well as activities of various

actors cross the Iron Curtain.

This article is grounded in examples coming from the forestry industry, one of the

significant fields of Finnish-Soviet trade. Forestry industry products and equipment were among

key items in the reparations that Finland paid to the Soviet Union after the war of 1941-44.8 

These reparations preceded technology transfers and trade contacts, and defined the possibilities

for Finland in terms of exporting its goods. Compared to other imports, forestry was not the

largest, but still intensive, and a number of Finnish forestry industry companies were involved in

the trade with the Soviet Union. In broad terms they specialized in a vast range of fields, from

logging to ready-made products, and records of their activities provide a rich set of examples for

the strategies used by Finnish actors in trade to the East. From the Soviet side, trade with Finland

offers examples of how state trade organizations (such as those involved into exporting and

importing) and research establishments and enterprises (such as end users of imported items and

those who manufactured products for export) conducted their affairs. My aim is not to draw a

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comprehensive picture of the trade structures between two blocs, but to explore the role and

meaning of industrial, trade, and research organizations based on the case of forestry. Doing so

shows how trade functioned below the state leaders. In this article, I will also try to identify the

interplay of political factors and business interests at the macro and micro level.

The major sources of this article are the documents of different organizations held in

Finnish and Russian archives, many of which are examined here for the first time.9 Empirical

data are found in the correspondence of Soviet and Finnish institutions, such as letters of the

heads of the State Committee on Science and Technology of the USSR (responsible for

cooperation from the Soviet side) to Finnish enterprises and vice-versa, and letters from Finnish

 producers to Soviet enterprises, among others. Other valuable sources include reports by various

actors, especially from Finnish engineers regarding their visits to Soviet research institutions and

factories, reports of Soviet engineers who visited Finnish enterprises and research

establishments, and the reports of the Finnish-Soviet Trade Chamber on exhibitions, among

others. Some conclusions can also be drawn from analyzing the protocols and minutes of

negotiations between Finnish and Soviet company management, traders, engineers, etc.,

especially negotiations of yearly and five-year trade agreements. These materials enable me to

draw a picture of the activities of different actors and institutions and their methods of

communication. In addition, I study periodical literature, including published reports of Soviet

specialists, translated professional articles, newspapers and descriptions of Western technologies,

as well as some data from oral interviews given by Finnish producers, though of slightly later

time.

In the first part of this article, I briefly investigate the meanings and images of trade at the

macro level. Then, I explore opportunities and limitations set by organizational aspects of

Finnish-Soviet trade in order to show the general context of traders` activities. In the following

 parts, I examine Finnish-Soviet trade on the micro level, from exhibitions, advertising and the

specifics of the negotiation processes.

Politics and trade of neighboring countries on the macro level

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Intensive trade relations between Finland and Russia have a long history. In the

nineteenth century, when Finland was part of the Russian Empire, it delivered many products to

Russia, in particular manufactured from its forests. After Finland gained independence in 1917,

relations with the Bolshevik Russia became complicated and entailed a significant decrease in

trade. The tensions between two states, which were on divergent political paths, resulted in two

wars. As a consequence of the final conflict, Finland had to deliver industrial goods, machinery

and raw materials as part of reparation payments. Simultaneously, trade activities were

developed between the two countries. In 1950, Finland signed a five year trade agreement with

the USSR, becoming the first market economy to have long agreements with a planned economy.

After the war, Finnish forestry enterprises introduced more diverse products, such as new

types of paper, cellulose, and cardboard. From this period onward, Finnish firms were among

key suppliers of forestry machinery, raw and ready-made products for the Soviet Union which, at

the same time, was becoming more dependent on foreign products. A cursory look at the

statistics proves that compared to other European countries Finland was the leader in Soviet

imports of forest industry products and machinery in the 1950s-60s, with some interruptions. For

instance, in 1958 Finland exported paper products equal to slightly less than 12.5 thousand

Soviet rubles while Austria, the second large paper importer to the Soviet Union that year,

delivered products worth to 3.3 thousand.10

  In general, in these years the volumes of Finnish

exports to the USSR were growing more much faster than to other countries.11

 

To a large extent, purchases from Finland served the purposes of Soviet modernization,

which was significantly based on active participation of Finnish producers. Trade activities were

closely connected with various forms of technology transfer. In particular, trade enabled

communication between engineers. This included exchanges of literature and trips by Finnish

specialists to the Soviet Union, where they helped Soviet engineers install Finnish machinery and

facilities. An example of this is the modernization of the Svetogorsky pulp and paper group of

factories which were partly renovated on the basis of supplies from Finnish companies like

Rauma-Repola and Ahlström. In addition, Rauma-Repola contributed to the construction of a

giant Baikal plant launched in 1966 to produce bleached pulp used in the military manufacturing.

Close trade contacts between two countries were put into political context, and the need

for good political relations was stressed at the highest level. In describing trade activities, both

Finnish and Soviet officials used ritualized wordings regarding the importance of Finnish-Soviet

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relations for both sides. Similar rhetoric was used in speeches by Finnish officials (though,

 probably not as frequently as of Soviet ones) who stressed that the border was a decisive factor

in the relationship between the two countries as well as advocating friendship and a good

neighborhood. Because of geographical proximity, the border was a useful concept that both

sides often used when explaining the meanings of trade and cooperation in fields like science,

technology, and culture. Thus, when explaining the Finnish-Soviet trade to Western partners on

negotiations with EFTA, Finnish Trade and Industry Minister Ahti Karjalainen said that “it is

natural that the Finnish trade with the Soviet Union is relatively large and will remain so because

the Soviet Union is a neighboring country.”12

  He added that, ”the arrangements agreed upon

 between Finland and the Soviet Union are based on their neighboring relations.13

For Finnish

 political actors, the border was an explanation for close connections between a capitalist and

socialist economy and gave official justification of trade developed after the war. On the state

level, the Finnish government stressed the border as necessitating good relations. The Finnish

view of the border helped support the official rhetoric seen in Finnish-Soviet political discourse

and to some extent explain the reasons of intensive trade connections with a socialist state.

In contrast, the Soviets offered a view of the “peaceful” border and good neighborhood

not as a reason, but as a consequence of well developed trade that enabled both countries to

 benefit.14

 Soviet authorities usually stressed good relations were a consequence of wise political

leadership during the Cold War, and as evidence of peaceful co-existence. In fact, “Soviet trade

was always politically more important than it probably was economically. Consequently, it was

used not only as a tool for economic improvements, but also as a tool of gaining and using

 political power.”15

  Interestingly, on the institutional level Finland was often perceived as a

socialist state in terms of its close connections and significance for the Soviet Union. Thus,

archival documents on trade with Finland are kept in folders titled “Cooperation with socialist

countries.”16

  For example, materials of the State Committee on Science and Technology, a

leading institution to supervise Soviet foreign scientific-technical and trade contacts with foreign

countries, are housed in collections divided between such as “Western countries” and “Socialist

countries”. Finland  material is rarely kept in “Western folders,”  probably because of bilateral

trade organization and more intensive (compared to other capitalist countries) communication

with the Soviet Union.

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To a certain extent, changes in the relations between the states influenced Finnish-Soviet

trade. Historian Tatiana Androsova argued that drops in the volume of exports and imports can

 be explained by deteriorating political relations when the Soviet government decreased or

detained trade goods.17

  Thus, compared to 1957, the volume of Finnish imports to the Soviet

Union decreased significantly in 1958, when the Soviet government withdrew the ambassador

after a change in the Finnish parliament saw an increase of politicians hostile to the Soviet state.

In 1961, a new crisis (the so called “note crisis”)  began after the Soviet leadership sent a

diplomatic note to Finland insisting on closer war cooperation.18

 Still, the Soviet side was not

very much interested in decreasing trade volume which was beneficial in economic terms.

In addition, Finnish state actors had considerable economic interest in Eastern trade,

 beyond rhetoric and despite a variable political situation. At the opening of the Finnish industrial

exhibition in Moscow in 1960, the aforementioned Karjalainen stressed that a “good

neighborhood always contributes to both countries. This is definitely the Finnish opinion.”19

 For

Finland, this included commercial interests, in conjunction with possibilities for developing its

domestic labor markets. As Karjalainen argued, the development of Eastern trade would provide

more jobs in Finnish shipbuilding, metallurgic and timber industries and enable “the growth of

the economy of our country.”20

In practice, indeed, Soviet trade was of importance for actors at

all levels involved in the trade with the Soviet Union. It allowed import of products not

sufficiently produced in Finland, especially crude oil and oil products. In the late 1950s, oil

supplies constituted up to one fourth of the Soviet export to Finland, being a means of payment

for Finnish products and technologies.21

The volume of oil significantly increased due to the

opening of large oil reserves in Western Siberia. Finland also received metallurgic products and

facilities, including Soviet help in building some factories, in particular in 1961 of a metallurgic

factory in Rautaruukki.22

 

As historian Pekka Sutela notes, based on a vast number of interviews, Finnish traders

“have always joined the official Finnish-Soviet praise of mutual benefits of bilateral trade.” At

the same time, these traders knew that “the role of the politicians has been overplayed in public

consciousness.”23

 The primary interest in cooperation for both sides, at lower hierarchical levels

was economic, not and not significantly penetrated by political concerns. Both treaties on

supplies signed by Finnish firms and Soviet export organizations, and reports and addresses

 produced by Finnish trade representatives attest to interests in economic benefits and cast the

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Soviet Union as a client and partner. For example, in his book a specialist of Rauma-Repola,

Väinö Lassila described Soviet factories and Soviet engineers without ideological rhetoric or

 politics. He refers to the Soviet Union as a client which purchased the products of this Finnish

company.24

 Another Finnish specialist stated that Finns and Soviets never discussed the politics

in their communication.25

 This attests to the fact that Finnish local actors engaged in the Soviet

trade were interested in the economic benefits of cooperation and saw the Soviet market as

increasing exports. In their turn, Soviet representatives (both from trade organizations and

enterprises) considered Finland as a source of valuable knowledge and techniques which could

help Soviet modernization. It is therefore important to examine what possibilities and constrains

the Cold War created and how Finnish and Soviet actors sought to achieve their goals in the

context of Finnish-Soviet relations.

Possibilities and Limitations of the Finnish-Soviet Trade

In 1961, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev argued that ”differences of social and

 political systems do not hinder the development of friendly and beneficial relationships between

the Soviet Union and such countries as Finland.”26

  This was true for Finnish-Soviet trade

relations, although the Cold War put restrictions on the economic ties between socialist and

capitalist blocs. One of them was the activities of CoCom or the Coordinating Committee for

Multilateral Export Controls created in 1949 for controlling the flows of strategically important

 products from West to East.27

 However, as Alan Dobson says, by the late 1950s embargo control

 began to weaken and became more symbolic than enforced. This was because the Soviet Union

needed to increase its war-making capacity and embargo hindered technology transfer and

”im pede[d] Soviet technological advances and economic growth.” Embargo restrictions

remained as an effective means of signaling East-West tensions.28

 

Being an associated member of CoCom, Finland sold some materials used by both

military and civilian spheres in the Soviet Union. Archival materials show that the Soviet Union

 purchased equipment for producing bleached cellulose, which was used in the production of gun

 powder and military aviation.29

  Some forestry appliances were of strategic nature, or, in

terminology of political scientist David Baldwin, they had a high fungibility - in different

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conditions the same products could be used either for civilian or military purposes.30

 The Soviet

government and producers were aware that Finland gave the Soviet Union “large opportunities

for receiving not only Finnish industrial experience, but also achievements of American,

Canadian and Swedish industries since Finland has had business with them for a long time. ”31

 In

the age of confrontation between the two blocs, a neutral Finland opened a window to the

Western economic and technological achievements inside the Iron Curtain. Indeed, Finnish

forestry industry was heavily based on Western techniques, since Finland had longstanding

contacts with American, Canadian, Swedish and other foreign companies. In other words, the

Finnish-Soviet cooperation was a means for gaining transfers of technologies from a world

relatively closed for the Soviet Union.

Many trade constrains were set not by the Cold War, but rather derived from cooperation

 between countries of different technological and economic levels. Finnish-Soviet trade was

organized as a clearing trade, meaning that deals between the governments were made with no

 payment in hard currency, i.e. national money did not cross the state borders.32

 In this exchange

of goods, the overall costs of Finnish products were to correspond to the cost of Soviet ones

evaluated in a non-convertible currency. Such kinds of payments were fulfilled by the Bank of

Finland and the Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade (Vneshtorgbank). Trade items were defined by

five-year trade agreements, and additional treaties were signed every year to specify the items

 based on current situation and the needs of each country.

On the one hand, this stance simplified organizational challenges by creating a sort of

stability, defined by trade agreements that were worked out on the governmental level.

On the other hand, clearing rules put limits on possible benefits for the Finnish side. Both at the

state and companies` level, this meant that the volume of Finnish-Soviet trade depended on

Finnish “possibilities to accept Russian products.”33

  As the head of the trade office of the

Ministry of Social Affairs Osmo Kopola said, “the scarcity of the Soviet import makes it

impossible to find enough consumed products for Finland,”34

  These specific possibilities of

Soviet exports and a dearth of products “were  serious obstacles, which effectively limited the

growth of Finnish-Soviet trade.”35

 

Indeed, the variety of Soviet products offered for clearing import to Finland was not very

large, and the Soviet Union usually paid for technologies and advanced foreign equipment and

machinery with agricultural and raw products.36

 In the first decade of post-war trade, the Soviet

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Union offered large quantities of agricultural products for export to Finland. In particular, it was

Soviet grain which replaced German supplies right after the war and, thus, met the Finnish

needs.37

 But by 1954, several Finnish organizations were willing to reduce by half the imports of

Soviet wheat. Before that the Soviet share in grain imports was quite formidable compared to

others: it was as three times more than from the USA.38

 In the late 1950s, grain lost its position

as the main item of export and was replaced by oil. At the same time, the Finns aimed to arrange

imports of scarce and critical raw materials such as charcoal, silver, and magnesium metals,

among others. The small Finnish market could not consume large amounts of agricultural

 products, while the Soviet Union aimed to receive a great deal of machinery and manufactured

 products in exchange for raw materials. Negotiations not lead to outcomes desired by the Finnish

side, however, as Finland wanted to increase imports of Soviet cars and petrol.39

 As a result,

Finnish authorities tried to find markets for the re-export of Soviet imports.40 This problem was

likely well understood in the Soviet Union, as in the late 1950s it agreed on paying for part of

Finnish supplies in hard currency, or 40 million rubles every year.41

 

In the forestry industry sector, offers of producers were collected by cartels which

represented the sector in negotiations. From the Soviet side, trade was supervised by the Ministry

of Foreign Trade through state foreign trade associations specialized in different fields. In the

forestry industry these were  Mashinoimport   to purchase machinery and equipment,

Tekhnopromimport   for imports of facilities for pulp industry, and others. Despite the high

meaning of trade at the inter-governmental level, this middle level played a crucial role in

 practical arrangements. Thus, for instance, “government-level trade agreements often simply

codified agreements already reached on the company level. Prices, in particular, were agreed at

company level.”42

 Most Finnish companies had special offices on trade with the Soviet Union,

which created different tools and mechanisms in their dialogue with “the big partner .”43

 Not only

was their communication with representatives of trade associations crucial, but also their

contacts with heads of Soviet enterprises and engineers. Soviet engineers made recommendations

for managing organizations which, in their turn, communicated with associations. The micro

level was, thus, a basic stage in trade, and contacts between Finnish producers and Soviet

consumers were crucial in the trade dialogue.

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Exhibitions

One important means of influencing on exports by making personal contacts with Soviet

actors were exhibitions. Despite the Cold War, starting from 1956 the number of foreign

exhibitions organized in the Soviet Union increased. To a large extent this was a result of

liberalization of Khrushchev`s time and a turn to more intensive cooperation with Western

countries in science and technology.

Although much has been written about foreign exhibitions in the Soviet Union and their

ideological and cultural meanings, economic meanings of industrial trade shows require more

explanation.44

 Exhibitions were an arena not only for ideological battles or cultural transfers, but

also for the possibility of realizing economic aims despite the Cold War. As the historian of

technology Karen Freeze wrote in her paper on Czechoslovakian technologies, “innovative

technology, usually displayed at trade fairs, world`s fairs and other special venues, served as an

ambassador” to the West.45

 One meaning of exhibitions was as a place to advertise and promote

 production as well as establish economic ties with potential consumers. Exhibitions were a

 playground for communications of those who displayed (Finnish producers) and those who

consumed (Soviet trade and managing organizations and final consumers or factories and

engineers).

The first Finnish industrial exhibition was held in Moscow in 1946 after the Finnish-

Soviet Trade Chamber was founded. The aim of this organization was to develop economic

connections through exhibition activities, meetings and seminars as well as issuing informational

materials. Between the 1950s and 1960s, several large general and specialized or thematic

industrial exhibitions of Finland were organized in Moscow. The largest one, held in 1960,

displayed products from ninety six participating Finnish companies, a large part of which

included the forestry sector.46

  The Finnish Minister of Trade and Industry Ahti Karjalainen

opened the exhibition by saying explicitly about its economic purpose and pointing out that

Finland aimed to offer goods, represent Finnish export in the Soviet Union, as well as to show

what Finland could sell. Apart some official rhetoric, he stated that “exhibitions should be a shop

window where you can see and choose goods you like”.47

 This was addressed both to citizens,

local producers and officials engaged into export activities.

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As usual, exhibitions entailed diverse activities related to trade. They were an important

ground for establishing contacts on the local level, in particular at meetings with exporters and

specialists, lectures and discussions on topics related to productions in Finland and the Western

world in general. This enabled Finnish producers to communicate with the Soviets responsible

for factories and research institutions, who were the end users of Finnish products. Although

consumers could not make direct decisions on purchases, they could influence trade by making

recommendations to the State Committee on Science and Technology which then made

centralized suggestions for export and import. Such recommendations included technology to

 purchase, places to visit in Finland to learn about new technologies, and individuals to invite to

Soviet research institutions for presentations.

Although on the state level bilateral trade with the Soviet Union provided a certain degree

of stability, Finnish companies perceived the Soviet Union as a market for which they had to

compete among each other and with foreign firms.48

  Since bilateral trade put limits on the

quantity of imported goods and Finnish companies were to supply corresponding quantity of

export products, firms aimed to develop connections with the Soviets.

The politics of Soviet leadership in the mid-1950s-60s contributed to this competition for

the Soviet market.49

 Because of liberalization under Khrushchev, as well as increasing contacts

with the capitalist world, foreign exhibitions became significant events in the life of Soviet

citizens (especially in large cities like Moscow) as well as possibilities for the Soviet economy

and modernization open for technology transfer. In Khrushchev`s period, the number of foreign

exhibitions held in the Soviet Union increased significantly compared to the previous decades.

Thus, between 1946 and 1961 there were 132 exhibitions held in the USSR of which 103 were

organized between 1958 and 1961.50

 

Starting from the mid-1950s, some Finnish newspapers published articles expressing

anxiety and encouraged Finnish producers to develop more active presence at Soviet exhibitions.

Thus, in 1955 one Finnish newspaper proposed that Sweden was willing to significantly increase

its exports to the Soviet Union, in particular using exhibitions as a tool for opening the Soviet

market to Swedish industrial production. In addition, the article expressed its strong concern

since the Soviet Union had an interest in Swedish industrial products.51

 Another example can be

found in an untitled document from the Finnish-Soviet Trade Chamber, regarding an exhibition

held in 1958, which stated that ”since other countries that held their exhibitions before are

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interested again in further exhibiting as well as aim to expand their presence in the Soviet

market, the Finnish exhibition should gain more meaning and be better prepared in order to

compete with others”.52

 

Exhibitions, and the first class quality of Finnish products, had an impact on Soviet

specialists and ordinary citizens who visited them. They revealed a need for better consumer

goods, a fact made clear in Soviet letters, comments, and feedback given about exhibitions. They

mostly addressed to Finnish furniture, notebooks and other consumer goods (not exhibited so

much as machinery and equipment). In the National Archive of Finland I found a letter written

 by a Soviet woman had visited the Finnish exhibition in 1960 twice. Apart from some praising

comments on the exhibition and Finland in general (and this opinion about the country and

Finnish people was definitely formed by the visit) on behalf of the all Soviet people she stated

that “we, the Soviet people, like the Finns, are interested in friendship, peace and increase of

trade and cultural contacts.”53

 She also expressed her interest in Finnish products, hoping that the

Soviet Union would purchase them in the future.54

  Exhibitions were a useful tool for promoting

 products even among citizens, who could not make any decision on supplies, but could purchase

some products at the exhibition. Some visitors said about this, also noting that the higher quality

of Finnish production derived from market economy which allowed competition between

 producers.55

 

At the same time, Soviet engineers were among the visitors, and some research

institutions and factories organized group visits to exhibitions. They were professionals who

could compare Soviet and Finnish products and implicitly influence Soviet imports. Thus,

exhibitions were important both for exposing Soviets to new consumer goods and for presenting

the possibilities of Finnish industry.

Advertising and first-hand contacts between small actors

Exhibition activities were closely connected to advertising the products purchased by the

Soviet Union. The Soviet system did not encourage explicit commercials in the country, but

allowed some advertizing of foreign exhibited goods. In addition, we can find other forms of

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 promotion among Soviet heads of enterprises, engineers and representatives of trade

organizations in communications that took place during business trips and negotiations.

While preparing for exhibitions, Finnish companies were allowed and even encouraged to

advertise their products by publishing posters, preparing announcements on radio and in special

 brochures, postcards and newspapers, all in the Russian language.56

  These options were

 proposed by the Soviet government, and promoted by the Soviet-Finnish Trade Chamber.

Traders could use not only information on products but applied slogans and attractive titles,

sometimes referring to foreign quality. For instance, one of such advertisements prepared by

Converta, the association of Finnish paper and cardboard producers57

, advertised paper packages

that could be very suitable for different uses. The slogan used in their advertisement brochure for

the exhibition in 1960 said that “your products in our boxes will feel like a nut in a nutshell .”58

 

Advertisements also referred to the volume of trade with the Soviet Union as well as to the

foreign partners. Usually, they contained attractive pictures, appealing to topical issues like

cosmos and planets, which were very popular in the USSR after the country‟s space successes.

Another advertisement, however offered by a Finnish cloths producer pictured a man sitting in a

 pullover, saying that “such pullovers are exported even in the USA.”59

 Here we see two tools

used in addressing Soviet consumers. The first one is using attractive slogans and pictures, the

means of capitalist commercials. The second one is referring to reliability of companies and their

trade connections with the Soviet Union and Western states. The advertisements were distributed

among Soviet research institutions and industrial organizations as a guide to visiting exhibitions

and learning more about Finnish production. Advertisements were usually printed in special

 brochures and specialized journals and newspapers such as “ Ekonomicheskaya gazeta”

(Economic newspaper), “ Lesnaia promyshlennost ̀” (Forestry Industry), “Sovetskaya torgovlia”

(Soviet Trade), among others. These periodicals also published news on exhibitions and

overviews of separate exhibits and products.

Interestingly, the Soviets also prepared advertisements for their products shown at

exhibitions abroad. For instance, an industrial exhibition in 1959 held in Helsinki was

accompanied brochures and advertisements issued through different channels. These materials

were expected not to show the ideological superiority of the Soviet Union, as was stressed in the

Soviet exhibition in New York in 1959. Activities in Finland seemed to meet the expectation of

Finnish consumers and were of very practical and economic nature. Thus, Soviet trade

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representatives in Helsinki translated of short films for TV, emphasizing that the films should

“contain no hint on political propaganda” and indicate that the films were sponsored by Soviet

exhibition in Helsinki.60

 Also, to Finnish visitors in the Soviet Union, the Soviets advertised a

wide range of products and services, ranging from Aeroflot flights to vodka and fish.61

 These

materials were published by the Finnish-Soviet Trade Chamber in special leaflets and journals.

They contained both visual advertisements and short articles on specific products, such as cars,

describing the volume of cars or cameras sold abroad.

The Finnish-Soviet Trade Chamber also organized lectures, master classes and

demonstrations of products. At the fourth Finnish exhibition in 1960s alone, there were 25

 presentations hosted by Finnish experts on timber processing, the technology of making pulp and

 paper, among other topics. About six thousand Soviet specialists from different institutions and

enterprises visited these lectures.62  In 1964, several Finnish forestry companies, such as Enso-

Gutzeit, Paperituote, Tampella and others, took part in a lecture series in Moscow at the State

Committee on Forestry, Pulp and Paper and Wood Processing Industry and Forestry Planning

Committee (Gosleskomitet pri Gosplane SSSR). The programme included lectures on the

technology of packaging in Europe in the last decade, practical instructions by Finnish experts on

designing storage containers, as well as one-on-one consultations on individual technologies

 presented in lectures.63

 These consultations were a method of direct contact between Finnish and

Soviet actors and helped promote Finnish products and technologies, especially machines and

equipment. Exhibitions, thus, helped enable Finnish traders overcome the barriers created by

 bilateral trade organized on the highest level. As representatives of the Central Union of Finnish

Woodworking Industry stressed to the purchase department of the Union in 1958, after visiting

the Soviet Union overcoming bureaucratic barriers and contacting enterprises dir ectly “would

give the purchaser a possibility to examine the techniques in practice as well as learn more about

how it was produced.”64

 

Another possibility for promoting Finnish products was communication between Finnish

traders and Soviet producers and specialists during business trips made by Finns to Soviet

factories and research institutions as well as visits by Soviet engineers to Finland. These trips

were organized as part of trade and scientific-technical cooperation, and these forms of

cooperation were usually connected to each other. Although the number of such trips was not

large, they were important in terms of “opening”  up trade with Soviet consumers, otherwise

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relatively closed by the Iron Curtain. Representatives of Finnish companies traveled to Soviet

industries and factories to meet with chief engineers and officials of Soviet trade organizations.

They discussed what techniques and raw materials were required, and what products Soviet

enterprises did not produce sufficiently, among other questions. Thus, in 1961 a group of

delegates from three Finnish companies  –  Finpap, Converta and Enso-Gutzeit, all members of

Finnish Union of Paper Industry –  visited several Soviet paper plants. A large part of the trade

trip was devoted to creating further contacts with local administrations and leading staff in order

to “spread information about the quality of our paper” and other products, among other things.65

 

Their programme included meetings with planning departments of factories which were

responsible for providing information to central planning institutions.

On the one hand, the outcome of these trips could be found in promotion of new

technology and equipment ready for export, which was a way of influencing based on consumer

request. Finnish delegates demonstrated their products, showed their quality, and explained

 possibilities of imports.66

  On the other hand, Soviet specialists with whom Finnish traders

communicated could offer their factories for visits, although the final decision was always made

 by the Soviet-Finnish scientific-technical commission. Reports prepared by Finnish visitors

treated Soviet factories as consumers, noting how they exploited Finnish techniques already in

use, their plans for modernization, as well as which equipment, technical details or materials

these factories required. Some reports argued that these trips opened up new perspectives on

what Soviet enterprises actually required. These trips broke up some of the informational

isolation created by the Iron Curtain, in particular increasing Finnish knowledge about how

Soviet production and consumption was organized. For example, in 1961 a delegation of

representatives of Finnish Union of Paper Making Plants got to know about how the new

organization of Soviet industries functioned after the creation of large administrative units

( sovnarkhozy). In particular, they noticed that these administrations had more power than they

imagined before.67

 Some reports illustrate that meetings revealed other things hardly accessible

without direct contact. Thus, in his report to the Soviet Union in 1957 Ilkka Tapio told that the

vice chair of Eksportles, the organization responsible for exporting timber, that there was such a

lack of products in the Soviet Union that it could purchase everything that Finland manufactured.

However, he added that no one in the leadership recognized that and Finnish delegates should

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not rely too much on what they saw. In other words, the lack of products they observed did not

mean that the Soviet leadership would consider that in their imports.68

 

Soviet engineers and officials who visited Finnish factories were another target audience

for advertisement. During their visits they received advertisements and information on the

companies they travelled to. After their trips, they had to submit these materials to their

institutions and the State Committee on Science and Technology, as well as prepare reports,

which were often long and brimming with technical details. An important part of the reports was

a list of recommendations, which usually included a section on the need to purchase equipment.

This was sometimes negatively perceived by Soviet officials who aimed not only to buy foreign

 products, but also build own machinery on the basis of sample techniques and transferred

technologies. For instance, representatives of the Soviet Ministry of Forestry complained that

instead of describing technologies, specialists just recommended to purchase equipment for

industrial use.69

  At the same time, Soviet specialists often brought advertising brochures and

other materials which were used as a source of information about Finnish equipment available

for import.70

 Finnish trade, thus, opened a window to highly developed technologies which in

comparison to much Soviet manufacturing were seen as much better and attested to a high level

of Western development.71

 

Practices and obstacles of negotiating

Trips and exhibitions, thus, were a way of communication and negotiation between

Finnish traders and Soviet directors and specialists who could influence the decisions of Soviet

trade organizations. Direct negotiating happened in different forms: during the visits of traders

and specialists, at exhibitions, and while discussing annual trade treaties. As it was said above,

the actual negotiating was often fulfilled on the micro level between the Finnish traders and

Soviet consumers. Among other aims of business trips made by Finnish traders to Soviet

factories, negotiating the possible supplies and the quality of forestry products and machinery

was important.

While the visits within the sphere of scientific-technical cooperation implied that

delegates would examine Soviet factories and research institutions, in some cases they opened up

unexpected possibilities. Thus, in 1957, Finnish delegate Ilkka Tapio visited several Soviet

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 plants in different cities. While in Arkhangelsk he heard from his Russian guide that the Ministry

of Chemical Industry asked  Eksportles to seek sources of viscose pulp to purchase. Some days

later, Tapio managed to negotiate a meeting with the vice-head of the Ministry of Chemistry

 Novikov to discuss possible deliveries. Novikov argued that Finnish companies offered their

items at a higher price than countries like Sweden and Canada, who offered same quality at a

lower price. Tapio invoked the border and a long tradition of beneficial trade. Here we see him

appealing to the idea of the border, often stressed by officials as an important factor in trade. The

outcome of these negotiations is not clear, but it probably failed because the sides did not agree

on a price.72

 Still, this story illustrates that some questions were negotiated rather informally.

In most cases, however, the Finnish side was informed about Soviet plans or tried to

follow Soviet needs. The Archive of the Finnish Foreign Ministry contains many minutes of the

Finnish-Soviet trade negotiation meetings at the highest level. Among the materials attached to

the minutes I found a copy of an article published in the Soviet newspaper “Pravda” in 1956. The

article was written by the head of the Soviet Ministry of Forestry Georgy Orlov and dealt with

challenges the industry faced, in particular, on equipment the field required. The techniques and

repair parts listed in the article were underlined with a pen, and this information was probably

used during the negotiating as items offered for purchases.73

 

Finnish import to the Soviet Union implied negotiating on a number of principal issues

derived from different approaches and requirements of production. Standards were a critical

aspect in the process of negotiations, primarily because they were of great importance in all

spheres of Soviet production. In 1940, the decree of the Soviet Supreme Court resolved that

 producing bad quality goods was equal to the anti-state crime or sabotage (vreditel`stvo).

Consequently, this might entail restraint to prison for up to eight years.74

 Despite the post-Stalin

 period of liberalization, standardization remained very strict. If one looks at the Even small parts

or pieces of equipment were subject to detailed and thorough requirements, which can be seen in

special published volumes of standards In addition to the a special All-Union Research Institute

of Metrology, there were laboratories and committees on standardization in many industrial

research organizations.

In Finland there were some general standards, which were not compulsory, and firms

could choose if to follow them or not. There was a private organization on standards or the

Finnish Standardization Union, although many Finnish producers used their own standards. As a

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result, “Finnish and Soviet standards and standardization procedures are very different”, and this

created a number of difficulties in the import of flawed of Finnish imports to the Soviet Union.75

 

The Soviet state standard or GOST was “almost a law”, and “the Soviet Union was often

discontent with the quality” of Finnish products, in particular timber and wood.76

  In order to

meet the Soviet requirements Finnish producers were to manufacture goods specifically oriented

to the Soviet market. For instance, traders were to cut trees which met the GOST requirements.

In order to overcome differences in standards, a special group on standardization in the Soviet-

Finnish commission on scientific-technical cooperation was created to discuss these issues and

work on controversial questions.77

 

Language was a significant obstacle in communications between sides on the micro level.

As a rule, Soviet delegates resorted to interpreters and translators, though not always

 professionals in the forestry industry. In trade practicalities, the Soviet side required that

equipment come with instructions in Russian. Thus, when ordering machinery, Soviet

organizations asked about delivering tablets and signs in Russian.78

  In due course, Finnish

traders began to use the Russian language as a means of communications with Soviet partners.79

 

Conclusions

Broad-ranging Finnish imports were of importance for the Soviet Union on several levels

of meaning. First, the Soviet leadership expected them to help in the program of modernization

launched by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the mid-to-late 1950s. Purchased machinery

and hardware were necessary technologies for in replacing outdated Soviet equipment and for

updating production. At the same time, some Finnish firms provided Soviet enterprises and

research organizations with contemporary technologies and materials used in the military sphere.

The Soviet Union transferred a wide range of materials produced by forestry industries,

including the bleached cellulose used for production of gun powder, viscose cellulose important

for cloth industry, furniture, etc. Second, being a subject of modernization, the Soviet forestry

industry did not meet set tasks of plan fulfillment, and to some extent Finnish raw materials and

other goods filled in for a lack of products demanded by domestic consumption.

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For Finland, the period of 1950s-60s meant further development of trade connections

with the Soviet Union launched after the WWII during the Finnish payment of reparations. These

years developed bilateral trade connections, however, not presenting significant structural

changes. Two neighboring countries represented different blocs of the Cold War and different

industries and trade was organized with a particular control of the higher level, but many aspects

were negotiated at the micro level. Almost all the essential negotiating and advertizing happened

on the local level between Finnish traders and Soviet engineers, heads of factories and research

 boards. Looking at this communication opens up a mass of contacts despite the Iron Curtain.

The micro level evidences on the importance of economic interests. During the 1950s-60s

Finnish traders used a number of tools in fulfilling economic aims enabled by Khrushchev`s

liberalization. They meant active participation in exhibitions, search for direct negotiations with

Soviet end users during business and scientific-technical trips despite the Cold War and

ideological differences. Finland was willing not only to defend its economic independency, but

to gain as many benefits as possible. Advertizing, searching for direct contacts, and using the

Russian language were among the tools used to promote Finnish products and maintain exports

to the Soviet Union. Although the political situation influenced trade, for example by causing

decreases in trade volume during when relationships between the countries deteriorated, on the

institutional level trade was not perceived through a political prism. Indeed, Finnish traders saw

the Soviet Union as a business partner and a market for which they had to compete with other

countries. Interestingly, Soviet actors expressed the same lack of ideological drive and interest in

economic cooperation.

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1 Mashiny zhellulozno-bumazhnoi promyshlennosti –  finskaia spetsialnost`,” in Suomen

Elinkeinoelämän Arkisto (ELKA). Suomen puunjalostusteoliisuuden keskusliitto. Neuvostoliiton

kauppa, 1958-1961. Kansio 1765-1767.

2 There is a lot of evidence on that the Soviet government purchased foreign techniques and

technologies what proves the permeability of the Iron Curtain. See more in Anthony Sutton,

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1917  – 1930 ( Stanford, 1968); Sari

Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, “Introduction: The Cold War From a New Perspective” in

Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, eds., Reassessing Cold War Europe ( London-New

York, 2011), pp. 1-15, among others.

3 See, for example, Evgeni Am bartsumov, “Sovetsko-finliandskie otnosheniya –  otnosheniya

mira i dryzhby,” Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn` (Moscow), No 10, 1955, pp. 47-48; T. Barten`ev and

Yri Komissarov, SSSR –  Finliandia: orientiry sotrudnichestva (Moscow, 1978); Evgeni

Ambartsumov, “Sovetsko-finliandskie otnosheniya –  otnosheniya mira i dryzhby,”

 Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn` (Moscow), No 10, 1955, pp. 47-48.

4 Pekka Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union (Helsinki, 2014); Pekka Sutela, “Finnish Trade

with the USSR: Why Was it Different?” BOFIT Online, No. 7 (2005). See also Kari Möttölä, ed.,

 Finnish-Soviet Economic Relations (London: McMillan Press, 1983).

5

 Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, “CoCom and Neutrality: Western Export Control Policies, Finland and

the Cold War, 1949 –  1958,” in Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, eds., Reassessing

Cold War Europe ( London-New York, 2011), p. 52; Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, ”Just Rhetoric?

The United Kingdom and the Question of Western Economic Aid to Finland, 1950-1962,” in Jari

Eloranta ans Jari Ojala, eds., East-West Trade and the Cold War , (Jyväskylä, 2005), pp. 94-111.

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6 Tatiana Androsova, “Economic Interest in Soviet Post-War Policy on Finland// Reassessing

Cold War Europe,” in Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, eds., Reassessing Cold War

 Europe ( London- New York, 2011), p. 134; Tatiana Androsova, “Finliandia v planakh SSSR

kontsa 1940-h –  serediny 1950-h gg. Politiko-istoricheskii aspect,” Otechestvennaya istoriya,

 No. 6 (1999), p. 47. 

7 Sari Autio-Sarasmo, “Iron Curtain: From Stage to Cold War,”  European History Quarterly,

Vol. 41, No. 4 (2011), pp. 657-664; Sari Autio-Saramo, “Khrushchev and the Challenge of

Technological Progress,” in Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic, eds., Khrushchev in the Kremlin,

(London-New York, 2011), pp. 133-149.

8 Sakari Heikkinen, Paper for the World: The Finnish Paper Mills` Association –  Finnpap, 1918-

1996 ( Helsinki: Otava, 2000); Hannu Rautkallio, ed., Suomen sotakorvaukset 1944-1952:

 Mahdottomasta tuli mahdollinen (Keuruu, 2014).

9 The Finnish case is analyzed on the basis of materials of Finnish forestry companies located in

the Finnish Business Archive in Mikkeli. They are reports made by representatives of different

logging, timber, cellulose and paper firms on their trips to Soviet enterprises which were

consumers of Finnish products. Also correspondence between Finnish firms and Soviet import

organizations is used in this article in order to shed light on the Finnish approach to the Soviet

trade. Other sources include documents on organization of Finnish exhibitions located in the

Finnish National Archive.

10 Vneshnya torgovlya Soiuza SSR za 1961 g. (Moscow, 1962), p. 62; Vneshnya torgovlya Soiuza

SSR za 1964 g. (Moscow, 1964), p. 83.

11 Kari Alho,  Neuvostoliiton-kauppa Suomen kansantaloudessa. Elinkeinoelämän

tutkimuslaitos. Sarja B 50 (Helsinki, 1986), p. 19.

12 ”Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeri Karjalaisen lausunto EFTA- bulletinille,” 13 March 1961, in

Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja  (Helsinki, 1962), p. 69.

13

 Ibid., p. 85.14

  Alexander Rupasov and Andr ei Chistikov, ”Obraz Finliandii v sovetskoi presse

“khrushchevskogo desiatiletia,” in Mnogolikaia Finlaindia (Veliky Novgorod, 2004), p. 352.

15 Pekka Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union (Helsinki, 2014), p. 7.

16 Russian State Archive of Economy (GARF). Fond 9480.

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17 Tatiana Androsova, “Sovetsko-finliandskie otnoshenia v 1956-1962 godakh,” Voprosy istorii,

 No. 9 (2009), pp. 56-57.

18 See more in Osmo Jussila, Suomen poliittinen historia, 1809-2009, (Helsinki, 2009).

19  ”Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeri Karjalaisen avauspuhe Suomen IV teollisuusnäyttelyssä

Moskovassa,” 10 May 1960, in Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja, (Helsinki, 1960), p. 78.

20  ”Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välinen kauppa,” in Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja,

(Helsinki, 1959), p. 90.

21 ”Vienti, 1961 –  1965,” in Ulkoasian ministeriön arkisto. Signum 58. Ulkomaan kauppa ja

ulkomaankauppapolitiikka. Kotelo 112. 58 B. Neuvostoliitto.

22 ”Päätöskirja SNT-Liiton ja Suomen kesken joulukuun 5 päivänä 1946 tehtyyn tavatarnvaihto-

 ja maksusopimukseen,” in Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto. Signum 58. Ulkomaankauppa ja

ulkomaankauppapolitiikka. 58 B1, Neuvostoliitto, kotelo 104; ”Pamiatnaya zapiska. Kontrakt

Rautaruukki i Tiazhpromeksport,” in Rossiiskii Gosuderstvenyi Arkhiv Economiki (RGAE),

Fond 365, Opis` 2, Delo 359, List 64.

23  Sutela, P. Finland`s Foreign Trade: What Do Interviews Tell?// Gaps in the Iron Curtain:

Economic Relations Between Neutral and Socialist Countries in Cold War Europe. Ed. By G.

Enderle-Burcel et al. Krakow, 2009. P. 82.

24 Väinö Lassila, V. Konepajaryhmän kolme vuosikymmentä. 1952-1982 ( Pori, Rauma-Repola

oy, 1983).

25 Anonymous interview, held on 15.12.2012.

26  KPSS. S`ezd XXII, 1961. Stenographichesky otchet . T. 1 (Moscow, 1962), p. 48.

27 Frank Cain provides a deep investigation of conflicts between the USA and Britain on the

question about embargo. See more in Frank Cain, Economic Statecraft during the Cold War:

 European Responses to the Soviet Union Trade Embargo (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 5-6.

28 Alan Dobson, “From Instrumental to Expressive: The Changing Goal of the US Cold War

Strategic Embargo,” 

 Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2010), p. 109.

29  Neuvottelu 1. 20.9.1952// Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto. Signum 58. Ulkomaankauppa ja

ulkomaankauppapolitiikka. 58B1, Neuvostoliitto, kotelo 106.

30 David Baldwin,  Economic Statecraft  (Princeton, 1985), pp. 214-215.

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31 “Soobshchenie glavnogo spetsialista GNTK P.G. Istomina na 5-i sessii sovetsko-finliandskoi

komissii,” GARF, Fond 408, Opis` 1, List 136.

32  Jari Laurila, “Finnish-Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System: History and Lessons,”

 Bank of Finnish Studies, A:94 (Helsinki, 1995), p. 19.33

  ”Finska Pappersbruksföreninger. Raport, ”Besök i Moskva, Simferopol, Kiev och

Leningrad,” 3 July 1961, in ELKA.  Suomen puunjalostusteollisuuden keskusliitto.

 Neuvostoliitto. Kauppa, 1958-1961. Kansio 1765-1767.

34  ”Osmo Kopolan kirje,” 2 December 1952, in Ulkoasian ministeriön arkisto. Signum 58.

Ulkomaankauppa ja ulkomaankauppapolitiikka. Kotelo 112. 58 B. Neuvostoliitto.

35 Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, “CoCom and Neutrality: Western Export Control Policies, Finland and

the Cold War, 1949 –  1958,” in Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, eds., Reassessing

Cold War Europe ( London-New York, 2011), p. 60. 

36  Brenton Barr and Kathleen Braden, The Disappearing Russian Forest: A Dilemma in

Soviet Resource Management , (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987).

37 Juhana Aunesluoma, Paperi- patruunat. Metsäteollisuus sodassa ja jälleenrakentamisessa,

1939-1950. (Helsinki, 2007), p. 196.

38 “Pis`mo glavnomu konsulu Gunnar Palmroth,” 2 December 1952, in Ulkoasiainministeriön

arkisto. Signum 58. Ulkomaankauppa ja ulkomaankauppapolitiikka. 58B1, Neuvostoliitto. 117.

39  ”Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välinen tavaranvaihto vuonna 1954,” in

Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto. Signum 58. Ulkomaankauppa ja ulkomaankauppapolitiikka.

58B1, Neuvostoliitto, kotelo 110.

40  ”Osmo Kopolan kirje,” 2 December 1952, in Ulkoasian ministeri;n arkisto. Signum 58.

Ulkomaankauppa ja ulkomaankauppapolitiikka. Kotelo 112. 58 B. Neuvostoliitto.

41  ”Proekt,” 8 September 1959, in Ulkoasiain ministeriön arkisto. Signum 58.

Ulkomaankauppa ja ulkomaankauppapolitiikka. Kotelo 129. 58 B1 Neuvostoliitto.

42

   Pekka Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union (Helsinki, 2014), p. 4.43

  Interview with Kari Ketola, held on 27.11.2013 in Helsinki.

44 Susan Reid, “Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National

Exhibition in Moscow, 1959,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Vol. 9,

 No. 4 (2008), pp. 855-904, among others.

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45  Karen Freeze, “Czechoslovak Theater Technology under Communism,” Technology and

Culture, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2012, p. 443.

46  ”Finskyi torgovyi zhurnal”, no. 37, 1960, in ELKA Suomen puunjalostusteollisuuden

keskusliitto. Neuvostoliitto. Suomen teollisuusnäyttely Moskovassa, 1960. Kauppa, 1962-1963.47

  ”Kauppa-  ja teollisuusministeri Karjalaisen avauspuhe Suomen IV teollisuusnäyttelyssä

Moskovassa,” 10 May 1960, in Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja (Helsinki, 1960), p. 76.

48  Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, however, said about unpredictability of Soviet side, referring on

December 1954 when the Soviets claimed suddenly that they would not purchase Finnish

wooden houses, although in February these items were put into a five year trade treaty.

49 Kendall Bailes stressed that examined transfers primarily from the USA before the WWII

saying that the Soviet government comprehended competitive nature of capitalism and played

with capitalist firms in their competition with each other. See Kendall Bailes, “The American

Connection Ideology and the Transfer of American Technologies to the Soviet Union,”

Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1981), p. 434.

50 “Otchet otdela inostrannykh vystavok SSSR o rabote za 1946-1963,” in RGAE, Fond 638,

Opis` 1, Delo 566, List 15.

51 “KU, 29 November 1955,” in Kansallisarkisto. Suomalais-venäläinen kauppakamarin arkisto.

Hc:5. Teollisuusnäyttely (1957 –  1959).

52 ”Untitled letter”, 14 October 1958, in Kansallisarkisto. Suomalais-venäläinen kauppakamarin

arkisto. Hc:5. Teollisuusnäyttely (1957 –  1959).

53  ”Pis`mo posetitelnitsy vystavki” 22 May 1960, in Kansallisarkisto. Suomalais-venäläinen

kauppakamarin arkisto. Hc:6. Teollisuusnäyttely (1960).

54  Ibidem.

55  ”Poimintoja Suomen Moskovassa järjestämän IV teollisuusnäyttelyn vieraskirjoista,” in

Kansallisarkisto. Suomalais-venäläinen kauppakamarin arkisto. Hc:6. Teollisuusnäyttely (1960). 

56

  ‟Spravka stoimosti reklamy,” Kansallisarkisto. Suomalais-venäläinen kauppakamarin

arkisto. Hc:5. Teollisuusnäyttely (1957 –  1959).

57  Converta was a significant player in the Finnish Eastern trade. Its share in the whole

timber export to the Soviet Union constituted about 30-40 percent.

58“Chetvertaya finskaya promyshlennaya vystavka v Moskve s 11 po 22 maia 1960 g.,”  Finsky

torgovyi zhurnal , No. 37 (1960), p. 50.

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59 Ibid., p. 51.

60 ”Helsingissä syksyllä 1959 järjestettävän Neuvostoliiton näyttelyn mainonnasta ja siihen

liittyvistä mielenkiintoinnon herättämistoimenpideistä,” in Kansallisarkisto. Suomalais-

venäläinen kauppakamarin arkisto. Hc:5 Teollisuusnäyttely.61

 ”Mezhdunarodnaia vystavka,” in Кansallisarkisto 58. Suomalais-Venäläisen Kauppakamarin

arkisto. Hc:7 näyttelyt ja tuote-esittelyt SNTL:ssa (1964-1966), Kaupallinen aikakauslehti;

Кansallisarkisto 58. Suomalais-Venäläisen Kauppakamarin arkisto. He: Kaupallinen

aikakauslehti (1956-1979).

62  ”Otchet otdela inostrannykh vystavok SSSR o rabote za 1946-1963 gg.,” in RGAE, Fond

638, Opis` 1, Delo 566, List 15.

63 ”Suomalais-venäläinen kauppakamarin toiminta,” in Kansallisarkisto. 58. Hc:7 Näyttelyt ja

tuote-esittelyt STLT:ssa.

64 ”Osto-osasto, pis`mo dlia ostopäälikkö M. Niinima,” ELKA, Suomen puunjalostusteollisuuden

Keskusliitto. Osto-osaston tiedotus ostovaltuuskunnan Moskovan matkasta. Metsäteollisuus ry.

Materiaalivaliokunta.

65 ”Nils J. Lindbergs rapport över fabriksbesöken i USSR i samband med resan,” 9-23 June 1961,

in ELKA. Suomen puunjalostusteoliisuuden keskusliitto. Neuvostoliiton kauppa, 1958-1961.

Kansio 1765-1767.

66  ”Program under resa i Sovjetunionen,” 9-23 June 1961, in ELKA. Suomen

 puunjalostusteoliisuuden keskusliitto. Neuvostoliiton kauppa, 1958-1961. Kansio 1765-1767.

67 ”Finska Pappersbruksföreninger. Raport, ”Besök i Moskva, Simferopol, Kiev och Leningrad”,

3 July 1961, in ELKA. Suomen puunjalostusteollisuuden keskusliitto. Neuvostoliitto. Kauppa,

1958-1961. Kansio 1765-1767.

68 ”Selostus,” 10 September 1957, in ELKA. Suomen Puuteollisuusyhdistys.  

69 ”Obsuzhdenie otcheta, 1955 g.,” in RGAE, Fond 7637, Opis` 1, Delo 3256, List 28. 

70

  ”Doklad zamestitelya ministra lesnoi promyshlennosti SSSR O. Raeva o rezultath vyezdov

spetsialistov Ministerstva lesnoi promyshlennosti za granitsu v 1955-1956 gg. po voprosam

izuchenia zarubezhnoi nauki i tehniki,” in RGAE, Fond 9480, Opis` 2, Delo 527, List 239.

71 At the same time, advertisement opened a way for some non-economic influences to the Soviet

Union. I have not managed to find evidence of such influences via communication of Finnish

and Soviet representatives in the Soviet Union, but there are some data on the impacts on Soviet

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delegates in Finland. In particular, technical reports made by Soviet specialists who travelled to

Finnish factories within scientific-technical cooperation indicate that they reflected on

differences in living standards and conditions of work.

72 ”Selostus,” 10 September 1957, in ELKA. Suomen Puuteollisuusyhdistys.73

  ”Työpaperit, 1956,” in Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto. Signum 58. Ulkomaankauppa ja

ulkomaankauppapolitiikka. 58B1, Neuvostoliitto, kotelo 119.

74  Informatsionnyi ukazatel` standartov, No. 1-3 (1940), p. 1.

75 Suomi-NVTL: Tieteellis-teknisen taloudell inen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Raportti Suomen ja

 Neuostoliiton välisen yhteistyön metodologiaa koskevasta tutkimuksesta (Helsinki, 1980), p. 69.

76Voitto Pölkki, Venäjän puu. Puutulvasta puutulleihin (Hämeenlinna, 2008), p. 38. 

77 Suomi-NVTL: Tieteellis-teknisen taloudellinen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Raportti Suomen ja

 Neuostoliiton välisen yhteistyön metodologiaa koskevasta tutkimuksesta (Helsinki, 1980), p. 70.

78  ”Zakaz v AO Rauma-Repola, 1956,” in Rauma-Repolan oy:n arkisto. Poti kansio I. Vanhoja

sopimuksia SNTL:oon.

79  Interview with Kari Ketola, held at 27.11.2013 in Helsinki.