PUB PLC 290 Section 3 Migration Policy and Analysis

Spring 2013 School of Public Affairs UCLA

Randall K. Q. Akee Email: rakee@ucla.edu Office: SPA 6367; 5-6934

Class Meetings: Wednesdays 3:00 – 5:20 pm, room 4371 Office Hours: Wednesdays 12:00 – 2:00 pm Course Description: This course is intended as an introduction to migration policy and economic analysis of migration topics. We will focus primarily on the US, but there will be developing country applications and topics included as well. The course will explore the effect of migration on receiving and sending countries at the microeconomic level. Topics include self-selection, household dynamics, human capital investment decision-making, individual and group inequality, inter-generational effects, remittance decisions and effects, effect on receiving country labor force, assimilation effects. We will discuss current and important research in this area and relate it to existing and historical migration policy. Letter grading. Grading:

Your final grade will be based on three items: 1) class participation, 2) eight weekly discussion papers based on a current reading for that week, and 3) a final project—paper and oral presentation.

The elements will be weighted as follows:

Class participation: 30%

Class Participation: Full participation by all students is critical to developing understanding about these topics and examples. Participation means regular attendance, knowledge of the reading assignments, and participation in class discussions. Additionally, each student will be required to lead the discussion of a particular paper at least twice in the quarter. This can coincide with the selected paper for the weekly discussion paper (see below).

Discussion Papers: 30%

Discussion Papers: These one page write-ups (due at the beginning of each class) will include a one paragraph, brief summary of the research paper or article. It will then include additional points of commentary by the student. These items should include questions about importance of the question/research, methodology, suitability of data and additional concerns or research possibilities. These papers will be graded based on the quality and depth of analysis.

Final Project: 40%

Final Project: The final project will be a research project that provides some policy analysis on a migration-related topic using models, data and evidence. Students are encouraged to go beyond the articles, books and examples used in class for their analysis. I am interested in students providing a brief background of their specific topic. Second, there should be a clear discussion of the state of research and information on the area as it stands today. Finally, the paper should provide some ideas and questions about where and how this topic area could be expanded in the future through further research, theory or economic modeling.

The paper will be due on the final day of class (30% of the course grade). There will also be in-class presentations of no more than 15 minutes each that will be graded as part of the final project (10% of the course grade). Readings: Books: 1. Legrain, Philippe. 2007. "Immigrants: your country needs them" Princeton University Press, 374 pages - ISBN 0691134316 2. Kapur, Devesh and John McHale. 2005. "Give us your best and brightest: the global hunt for talent and its impact on the developing world" Center for Global Development. 246 pages - ISBN 1933286032 3. Özden, Çaḡlar and Maurice W. Schiff. 2007. "International Migration, Economic Development & Policy". World Bank. Paperback - 299 pages - ISBN 0821369350 Optional: 4. Morrison, Andrew R. and Maurice W. Schiff, Mirja Sjöblom. 2007. "The International Migration of Women". World Bank. 218 pages - ISBN 0821372270 Course Schedule:

I. Migration Theory and Models

Borjas, G. (1994). The economics of immigration. Journal of Economic Literature, 32(4), 1667–1717.

Card, D. (2005). Is the new immigration really so bad. Economic Journal, 115, F300–F323.

Clemens, Michael. 2011. “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?” Center for Global Development Working Paper 264.

Harris, J., Todaro, M. (1970). Migration, unemployment and development: a two-sector analysis.American Economic Review, 60, 126–142.

Lewer, J., & Van den Berg, H. (2007). A gravity model of immigration. Economics Letters, 99, 164–

167.

Mincer, J. (1978). Family migration decisions. Journal of Political Economy, 86, 749–773.

Sjaastad, L. (1962). The costs and returns of human migration. Journal of Political Economy, 70, 80–93.

Todaro, M. (1969). A model of labour migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries. American Economic Review, 59, 138–148.

II. Migration History in the US

a. Family Reunification. Chinese Exclusion Act. Country Quotas. Lottery Clark, X., Hatton, T., & Williamson, J. (2007). Explaining U.S. immigration, 1971–98. Review of Economics and Statistics, 89, 359–373.

Hatton, T., & Williamson, J. (1993). After the famine: Emigration from Ireland, 1850–1913. Journal of Economic History, 53(3), 575–600. Hatton, T., & Williamson, J. (1994). What drove the mass migrations from Europe in the late nineteenth century. Population and Development Review, 20, 533–559.

b. Different Migration Policies. Australia, NZ, Canada. Open Migration Policy.

 “Canadian  Exceptionalism”.  2012.  Migration  Policy  Institute.  Webpage  download:  www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/CanadianExceptionalism.pdf    Hawthorne, Lesleyanne. 2011. “Competing for Skills: Migration Policies and Trends in New Zealand and Australia” Executive Summary. Department of Labor, Australian Government. Webpage download: http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/competing-­‐for-­‐skills/at-­‐a-­‐glance/page-­‐1.asp

Meissner,  Doris  and  Donald  M.  Kerwin,  Muzaffar  Chishti,  and  Claire  Bergeron.  “Immigration  Enforcement  in  the  United  States:  The  Rise  of  a  Formidable  Machinery”.    Migration  Policy  Institute.  Webpage  download:  http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf    

c. Empirical Evidence. Relation to Migration Policy. Abramitzky, Ran and Leah Platt Boustan & Katherine Eriksson, 2012. "Europe's Tired, Poor, Huddled Masses: Self-Selection and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Migration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1832-56, August.

Blau, F. (1980). Immigration and labor earnings in early twentieth century America. Research in Population Economics, 2, 21–41.

III. Effects in the Receiving country

a. Displacement of Natives

Borjas, G. (1987). Immigrants, minorities, and labor market competition. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 40, 382–392.

Butcher, K., & Card, D. (1991). Immigration and wages: Evidence from the 1980s. American Economic Review, 81, 292–296.

Butcher, K., & DiNardo, J. (2002). The immigrant and native-born wage distributions: evidence from United States censuses. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56, 97–121.

Card, D. (1990). The impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami labor market. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 245–257.

Card, D. (2001). Immigrant inflows, native outflows, and the local labor market impacts of higher immigration. Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 22–64.

Friedberg, R. (2001). The impact of mass migration on the Israeli labor market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 1373–1408.

Hunt, J. (1992). The impact of the 1962 repatriates from Algeria on the French labor market. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 45, 556–572.

b. Effects on New Immigrants, Assimilation, Second Generation Effects.

Borjas, G. (1985). Assimilation, changes in cohort quality, and the earnings of immigrants. Journal of Labor Economics, 3, 463–489.

Chiswick, B. (1978). The effect of Americanization on the earnings of foreign-born men. Journal of Political Economy, 86, 897–921.

Livingston, G., & Kahn, J. (2002). An American dream unfilled: The limited mobility of Mexican Americans. Social Science Quarterly, 83(4), 1003–1012.

Trejo, S. J. (1997). Why do Mexican Americans earn low wages. Journal of Political Economy, 105(6), 1235–1268.

Trejo, S. J. (2003). Intergenerational progress of Mexican-origin workers in the U.S. labor market. Journal of Human Resources 38(3), 467–489.

c. Immigrant Enclaves and networks

Bauer, T., Epstein, G., & Gang, I. N. (2002). Herd effects or migration networks? The location choice of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. IZA Discussion Paper No. 551, August.

Munshi, Kaivan. 2003. “Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the US Labor Market.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 2:749–73.

McKenzie, David, Rapoport, Hillel, 2007. Network effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality: theory and evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics 84 (1), 1–24.

IV. Effect in the Sending country a. Who migrates? Self-Selection. Brain Drain. Brain Gain.

Abramitzky, Ran & Leah Platt Boustan & Katherine Eriksson, 2012. "Have the Poor Always Been Less Likely to Migrate? Evidence From Inheritance Practices During the Age of Mass Migration," NBER Working Papers 18298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Akee, Randall, 2010. Who's leaving? Deciphering immigrant self-selection from a developing country. Economic Development and Cultural Change 58 (2), 323–344.

Batista, Catia and Aitor Lacuesta, Pedro C. Vicente. 2012. “Testing the ‘brain gain’ hypothesis: Micro evidence from Cape Verde.Journal of Development Economics” Volume 97, pp 32-45.

Chiquiar, D., & Hanson, G. (2005). International migration, self-selection, and the distribution of wages:evidence from Mexico and the United States. Journal of Political Economy, 113, 239–281.

Cobb-Clark, D. (1993). Immigrant selectivity and wages: The evidence for women. American Economic Review, 83(4), 986–993.

McKenzie, David, John Gibson, and Steven Stillman. 2006. “How Important Is Selection? Experimental vs. Non-experimental Measures of the Income Gains from Migration.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 3906, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Mishra, P. (2006). Emigration and wages in source countries: Evidence from Mexico. IMF Working Paper WP/06/86, International Monetary Fund, March.

Orrenius, P. M., & Zavodny, M. (2005). Self-selection among undocumented immigrants from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics, 78(1), 215–240.

b. Households and Remittances

Clemens, Michael A. & Tiongson, Erwin R., 2012. "Split decisions : family finance when a policy discontinuity allocates overseas work," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6287, The World Bank.

Cox Edwards, A., & Ureta, M. (2003). International migration, remittances, and schooling: Evidence from El Salvador. NBER Working Paper No. w9766, June.

Gibson, John & David McKenzie & Steven Stillman, 2011. "The Impacts of International Migration on Remaining Household Members: Omnibus Results from a Migration Lottery Program," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 1297-1318, November.

Yang, Dean, 2008. International migration, remittances and household investment: evidence from Philippine migrants’ exchange rate shocks. The Economic Journal 118, 591–630.

c. Return Migration

Abramitzky, Ran and Leah Platt Boustan & Katherine Eriksson, 2012. "Europe's Tired, Poor, Huddled Masses: Self-Selection and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Migration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1832-56, August.

Dustmann, C. (1997). Return migration, uncertainty and precautionary savings. Journal of Development Economics, 52, 295–316.

V. Illegal and Illicit Immigration

Akee, Randall and Arnab Basu, Arjun Bedi and Nancy Chau. 2009. “Combating Trafficking in Women and Children: A Review of International and National Legislation, Coordination Failures, and Perverse Economic Incentives,”, Journal of Human Rights and Civil Society, Issue 2, Fall, pp. 1-24.

Hanson, G., Robertson, R., & Spilimbergo, A. (1999). Does border enforcement protect U.S. workers from illegal immigration?’ Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1), 73–92.

Hanson, G. H. (2006). Illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States. Journal of Economic Literature, 44(4), 869–924.

Hanson, G. H., & Spilimburgo, A. (1999). Illegal immigration, border enforcement, and relative wages: Evidence from apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border. American Economic Review, 89(5), 1337–1357.

Orrenius, P.M. (1999), “The Role of Family Networks, Coyote Prices and the Rural Economy in Migration from Western Mexico: 1965-1994.” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper 9910.

Orrenius, P.M. (2001), “Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Along the U.S.Mexico Border: An Overview.” Economic and Financial Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

Orrenius, P., & Zavodny, M. (2001). Do amnesty programs encourage illegal immigration? Evidence from IRCA. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper, October.