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Power, identity, modernity.Individualisation and destabilisation ina globalised worldUlf Bjereld a , Ann-Marie Ekengren a & Isabell Schierenbeck aa Department of Political Science , Göteborg University , SwedenPublished online: 15 Jul 2009.

To cite this article: Ulf Bjereld , Ann-Marie Ekengren & Isabell Schierenbeck (2009) Power, identity,modernity. Individualisation and destabilisation in a globalised world, International Review ofSociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie, 19:2, 263-272, DOI: 10.1080/03906700902833577

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MONOGRAPHIC SECTION

Power, identity, modernity. Individualisation and destabilisationin a globalised world

Ulf Bjereld*, Ann-Marie Ekengren and Isabell Schierenbeck

Department of Political Science, Goteborg University, Sweden

Introduction

In what is called, with an almost worn-out word, a globalised world, individualisation

and destabilisation seem to be the two most central traits in both politics and society,

internationally as well as within nation states. Destabilisation and individualisation

are rooted in the communicational revolution and the way in which this has changed

the prerequisites for the exercise of power and identity formation in today’s world.

The globalisation effects on different types of political power distributions are still

under scrutiny (Aday and Livingstone 2008). Some researchers argue for a

strengthening of democracy, while others have a much more negative view on the

effects of globalisation (Held et al. 1999, Bentivegna 2006). Some state that since the

depth of the communication revolution and the media situation tend to vary

significantly in different contexts, it is impossible to generalise their relationship to

democracy. Whether or not globalisation leads to structural and policy convergence

is still at the centre of debate (Graber 2003, Brundin 2008).

Theoretically, individualisation manifests itself on the international level as an

ever-stronger position of human rights, at the expense of state sovereignty (Risse et

al. 1999). Nationally, individualisation means, for example, an increased importance

of the specific competencies of the individual in the labour market and a decreasing

interest in collective political activities (Bjereld and Demker 2006, 2008). Inter-

nationally, destabilisation manifests itself as a loosening up of the sovereignty of the

nation state, increased importance of different types of transnational networks and a

weakened position of the state sovereignty-based international law (Berlin 2007,

Brundin 2008). Nationally, destabilisation means a loosening-up of the class

structures of the industrial society and of the traditional professional roles and

cleavages that came with the national and industrial revolutions (Bjereld and

Demker 2006, 2008).

In an ever-abundant discourse on globalisation it is only rarely that one finds

questioning of why and in what way the communicational revolution has contributed

to an increased destabilisation and individualisation of politics and society. Also,

there is still a lack of empirical research into the development of destabilisation and

individualisation over time. In this special issue the articles try to formulate and test

hypotheses about individualisation and destabilisation in politics and society.

Our aim is to increase our understanding of the communicational revolution’s

*Corresponding author. Email: ulf.bjereld@pol.gu.se

ISSN 0390-6701 print/ISSN 1469-9273 online

# 2009 University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’

DOI: 10.1080/03906700902833577

http://www.informaworld.com

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Vol. 19, No. 2, July 2009, 263�272

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significance to the exercise of power and identity formation in a globalised world.

The hypotheses � which will be developed more in the following � will take as their

starting point the three different ways in which the communicational revolution has

affected individualisation and destabilisation: by changing the significance of the

territory, by improving the possibilities for network cooperation both within and

outside nation state borders, and by increasing the significance of innovation and

flexibility as a means of productivity and competition.

The changing significance of the territory

Today it is both common and recognised to talk about the communicational

revolution.1 It is, however, more difficult to define its meaning. The communica-

tional revolution is based on two different forms of communicational development.

In the first form we, by communication, mean a means of transport (e.g. railways,

aeroplanes and cars). In the second form we mean a means of information

transmission, both as means of communication (e.g. telephones, fax machines,

e-mails) and as information availability (e.g. the Internet). Both of these forms of

communicational developments contribute to reducing � or at least changing � the

significance of the territory. Protests among social movements have been seen as

important examples of this latter form, for example coordination of protests towards

the WTO meetings, the EU summits and the US intervention in Iraq (Brundin

2008).2

By reducing the significance of the territory, the communicational revolution

becomes, out of necessity, a part of the discourse on globalisation. In a thorough

review of that discourse Jan Art Scholte identifies five different types of definitions

of the notion of globalisation: internationalisation (increased flows of goods, people

and ideas), liberalisation (deregulation of markets), universal reach of previously

local phenomena (Chinese restaurants, Gregorian time, etc.), modernisation (in terms

of Western rationality) and deterritorialisation (transformation of the social

geography: more supra-territorial areas, places and spaces) (Bauman 1998, Scholte

2000).

However, we argue that deterritorialisation is at another analytical level than the

other four definitions. Deterritorialisation can be viewed both as a cause of and as

a consequence of internationalisation and modernisation. With internationalisation,

liberalisation, the universal reach of different local phenomena and modernisation,

the significance of the territory for the exercise of power and identity formation will

decrease, or at least change. Therefore, we want to use a definition of ‘globalisation’

that emphasises such a decreased or changed significance of the territory. We chose

to use the definition of globalisation found in Jonsson et al. (2001, p.11; cf. Held

et al. 1999, Goldmann 2001), where globalisation refers to those ‘processes that are

not hindered by territorial boundaries and national jurisdiction and that, thereby,

change the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions.’3

The definition is, however, not unproblematic, since it is somewhat unclear if it

primarily refers to the processes (‘that are nor hindered by territorial boundaries and

national jurisdiction’) or to the consequences of the processes (changed spatial

‘organisation of social relations and transactions’), or perhaps to both the processes

and the consequences of the processes. When we use the notion of globalisation we

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refer to the consequences of the processes, i.e. the changed spatial organisation of

social relations and transactions.4

The decreased or changed significance of the territory threatens the nation state,

whose power rests on sovereignty over a delineated territory. The transnational

companies grow in both numbers and sizes, making it more difficult for the nation

state to exercise influence over them. Electronically linked financial markets areestablished, with an ever-increasing amount of transactions, resulting in the financial

circulations developing their own dynamic. Nation states, to a greater extent, tend to

join international cooperative agencies and supranational organisations. The

development and rise of the European Union has, for example, brought with it an

intense discussion about the problems of democracy and whether the modern

democracy presupposes the nation state (Thorn 2002, pp. 36�55). Non-governmental

actors � anything from terror networks such as al-Qaida to different NGOs � occupy

a successively larger space in international politics.

That the territorial sovereignty of nation states shows tendencies of loosening up

does not necessarily mean that the nation state is decomposing. The ‘internationa-

lisation’ of states, i.e. their memberships in multilateral agreements and suprana-

tional alliances, can be seen as a way of compensating for the loss of territorial

sovereignty in some areas by strengthening the role of states in other areas. The

Schengen agreement demonstrates how the nation states in the European Union are

trying, by political means, to take control of � or at least defend themselves against �global migration flows. The monopoly on violence of the nation state seems to

remain largely unabated � despite the challenge it faces from transnational terrornetworks. The international hegemony of the United States of America is maintained

not only by its economic strength, but also � as an extraordinarily important

component � by its military strength. Some argue, admittedly, that there is reason to

talk of a new world order, but that this is not characterised by the disappearance or

weakening of states � instead, it is characterised by ‘states relating to one another

along different principles than what was before’ (Ericsson 2001, p. 42).

Everything else being equal globalisation, in terms of changed spatial organisa-

tion of social relations and transactions, constitutes a challenge to the nation state. A

territorially-based sovereignty is not the most effective means of power in a world

where the possibilities and methods of transcending territorial boundaries have

become so many and easily available. At the same time, uniform actors that could

replace nation states as legitimate carriers of the monopoly on violence and

distributors of values are lacking within the foreseeable future. The loosening-up

of the sovereignty of nation states and the lack of credible challengers is a

manifestation of the destabilisation and individualisation that has followed in the

wake of deterritorialisation, and whose consequences for the exercise of power and

identity formation we shall investigate in the following sections (Bjereld et al. 2005).

Networks, innovation and flexibility

In his trilogy The information age, sociologist Manuel Castells launches a theory

wherein one of the basic thoughts is that the communicational revolution has made

network cooperation possible as being the most important form of organisation of

human activity, and created a new power geometry: the network society (Castells

1998a, 1998b, 2000).

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The term ‘network’ is used in an increasing number of contexts � sometimes as a

metaphor and sometimes as a scientific concept. Some claim that networks have

replaced the atom as the utmost symbol of science. The atom represents purity,

regularity and closeness, whereas the network stands for complexity, flexibility and

openness (Jonsson 1999, p. 218; Kelly 1995 quoted in Castells 1998a, p. 72f). The

common denominator in the different definitions of the concept of network is that

they aim at describing a reality with the aid of nodes and linkages between nodes. In

social networks, the nodes most often consist of humans, either in the form of

individuals or in the form of groups. Network analysis most often focuses on the

linkages between the nodes, i.e. relations between � rather than characteristics of �those individuals or collectives that are being studied (Jonsson 1999, p. 218). In the

study of politics, networks are often used to describe the relations between

organisational units which were previously considered as more independent or

autonomous.

The network society is characterised by, among other things, the transformation

of the mode of production, in both social and technical aspects. They are still

capitalist, but constitute a new form of capitalism that Castells calls informational.

The aspirations for productivity and competitiveness are the processes that govern

the informational, global economy. Productivity, Castells argues, mainly springs

from innovation; competitiveness mainly springs from flexibility.

The information technology is extraordinarily important in creating innovation

and flexibility in the production process. During informational capitalism, labour is

redefined in its role as producer, and differentiated along the characteristics of the

workers. The most important cleavage of labour is if it has the possibility of

redefining the qualification or characteristic that is needed for a certain task. Those

who have this capability also have the possibility of reprogramming themselves to the

constantly changing tasks of the production process. The others, Castells argues, are

allotted a certain task, and can � at least in principle � be replaced by machines or

with other humans.

In this new economy it is not only labour that is transformed, according to

Castells, but also capital. The most important principle is still production with the

highest possible profit, and private accumulation of the profit (on the basis of

property rights) � which is at the core of capitalism. The question is how this private

accumulation of profit is carried out. In this, the global financial markets take

absolute precedence. The profit margins on stock and currency markets are generally

significantly higher than in most direct investments in industry, for example. The

cause of this lies in the technical conditions under which finance capital operates

during the era of informational capitalism, viz. its obliteration of time and space by

technical means. The ability of finance capital to constantly fine-comb the world

market for finance opportunities, and being able to move capital from one alternative

to another in almost no time at all, sets capital in constant motion.

Since knowledge and information make up the basic material in the new system

of production, and education is the most important quality of the labour,

informational capitalism’s new producers become those knowledge-making and

information-processing agents whose contributions are the most valuable for, e.g.,

the individual company or the municipal or national economy.

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Individualisation and destabilisation

We argue that deterritorialisation, the growth of transnational networks and the

increased importance of innovation and flexibility as a means of productivity and

competitiveness principally have implied two considerable changes in the exercise of

power and identity formation in today’s world: individualisation and destabilisation.

The presence or absence of the individual in the network determines the extent of

power that the individual possesses or might exercise. Since the networks are

dynamic (or instable), and individuals can move in and out of these networks, there

are no longer any stable power elites. Characteristics belonging to the individual,

such as knowledge and education, become decisive for the corporations and for the

economy. What determines whether a specific individual fits into one of these

networks is the individual’s personal characteristics, knowledge profile, originality,

creativity and entrepreneurial skills. Since innovation, creativity and specialised

knowledge form the basis of productivity and the surplus-generating process, every

informational producer becomes a unique carrier of skills. This position as a unique

carrier of competencies creates power positions and self-interests and shapes the

informational producers into becoming global actors. A short-sighted profit on the

stock and currency markets becomes more important than long-term direct

investments. Cultures are no longer created and shaped by people who share the

same time and space, but by individuals who construct their own values on the

basis of their own experiences in a Hypertext that is constantly being rearranged.

One ‘is’ one’s experiences, and the experiences gives rise to the self. The

informational producers are part of transnational networks and build their

identities beyond the nation state. Communication is their territory and knowledge

their means of power. The state and the national identity become a burden for their

self-realisation.With individualisation on a more general level we mean that the individual

becomes a more important actor, at the expense of collective actors such as political

parties, state or church (Sorbom 2002, p. 51). Sociologist Ulrich Beck understands

today’s individualisation as a ‘loosening up of the industrial society’s ways of life’

and ‘their succession by the ways of life of others’ (Beck 1995, p. 134). He has also

warned about the concept being so ambiguous that it lacks analytical edge:

‘‘‘Individualisation’’ is a concept with far too many meanings, easy to misunder-

stand, maybe even a non-concept’ (Beck 1998a, p. 207). When Beck uses the concept,

in spite of this, he makes a distinction between individualisation as an objective

situation of life and individualisation as subjective consciousness (identity, personal

development) (Beck 1998a, p. 208ff).5

What do we mean by individualisation? By individualisation we mean a change in

society which implies that the power of individuals increases at the expense of the

collectives (Oscarsson 2005). This change in the distribution of power means that

individuals’ identities successively less and less are being determined by group

affiliation, and that dominant norms place the individual, not the group, in first

place.6

The concept of destabilisation implies that there is ‘something’ that is

destabilised. What, then, is this ‘something’? It should reasonably be an ‘order’ of

some kind. But what kind of ‘order’ ought it to be? Zygmunt Bauman argues that the

solid modernity has been replaced by a ‘floating modernity’ (Bauman 2002, 2003).

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The requirements of flexibility and mobility permeate societal and private life.

Employment contracts are becoming more and more short-term, uncertainty � in

both positive and negative meanings � has become epidemic and the norm of

permanent happiness is being replaced by the norm of episodic enjoyment. Changing

jobs becomes something positive and personally developing. Temporary relation-

ships gain increased legitimacy and divorces become part of everyday life. During

modernity, the workers started their careers at, e.g., Ford or Renault, and endedthem, most likely, at the same place. In this floating modernity one starts one’s career

at Microsoft, but one has no idea of where it will end.

What do we mean by destabilisation? By destabilisation we mean a transforma-

tion of society so that power elites become less and less permanent, and that power

becomes more difficult to define. This change in power relations also means that

individuals’ identities vary more and more over time, and that the dominant norms

place the temporary, not the permanent, in first place. Thus, we suppose that the

changing significance of the territory, the rise and growth of transnational networks

and the network society, as well as the increased importance of innovation and

flexibility as means of productivity and competitiveness, leads to an increased

individualisation and destabilisation with regard to power, identity and norm. But

these three factors can of course have differing significances according to the

situation, issue and context.

Our starting point is, after all, that deterritorialisation, the rise of transnationalnetworks and an increased importance of innovation and flexibility as means of

productivity and competitiveness have implied an increased destabilisation and

individualisation of politics and society. Therefore, it becomes an empirical issue

whether the communicational revolution has become so transgressive, that even

politics and society in the developing world have developed stronger elements of

individualisation and destabilisation. It is also relevant to discuss the question of

possible cross-tendencies, i.e. tendencies aiming at stabilisation and non-individua-

lisation of political and societal life. Are there, for example, areas where the

territory seems to have obtained an increased importance as a consequence of the

communicational revolution? Could, for example, transnational networks in

different types of situations be seen as a stabilising force?

There is a lack of interpretations and knowledge based on systematic empirical

studies when it comes to questions such as these. In this special issue we would like to

introduce five empirical chapters dealing with the concepts which have been

launched above, and which address this lack of knowledge. Here, we will give a

short introduction to them and try to relate them to the basic concepts.Marie Demker and Goran Duus-Otterstrom offer an analysis of the criminal

policy in Sweden during the last 50 years. Their starting point is the punitive turn

in Western criminal policy and to what extent this phenomenon can be explained

and understood in reference to the individualisation process. Demker and Duus-

Otterstrom argue that the punitive turn can be explained by an individualisation

process that also can be described as victim-centred. From the early 1960s the

political parties in Sweden showed an impressing consensus about penal welfarism.

But as in other Western countries this changed during the 1980s. In Sweden it

was mostly the Swedish Conservatives (moderaterna) who accentuated this

development. When the victim-centred discourse arose, this was used by the

Conservatives to push this development ahead even more than before. The authors

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conclude that the punitive turn in Sweden ‘happened as a result of criminal policy

becoming more victim-centred, but that criminal policy became more victim-

centred as a result of individualisation’. If they are right this means that crime is no

longer seen as an offence against society, but rather as one individual hurting

another individual.

Andreas Johansson Heino’s article focuses on the democratic implications of

individualisation and de-nationalisation on national identity formation. While

processes of individualism have increased, many democratic states have turned their

back on nationalism and abandoned the ideal of a common national identity (in the

name of multiculturalism and/or liberalism). However, the democratic implications

of these changes are uncertain. Johansson Heino analyses contemporary national

identity formation in Sweden, illustrated by a number of empirical cases. The

conclusion suggests that there is a trade-off between universalism and individualism,

i.e. processes of individualisation and de-nationalisation include a democratic

exclusion. Cultures understood as less individualistic and tolerant are becoming

the new significant others, thereby defining Swedish identity.

Douglas Brommesson’s and Henrik Friberg Fernros’ starting point is the

individualisation process in the international arena and the fact that human rights

tend to be a guiding star for state action. At the same time, this has led to a sharper

conflict between the norm of state sovereignty and peaceful coexistence on one side

and the human rights norm on the other. In their analysis Brommesson and Friberg-

Fernros focus on how different international reports argue on humanitarian

interventions. The overall individualisation process has been facilitated by a

destabilisation phase, where the international society to a greater extent has been

transformed into a world society. This transformation has among other things led to

greater willingness to argue in favour of humanitarian interventions when human

rights are threatened. The implication following from this is a loss of power for

states, and empowerment of individuals.

Daniel Berlin argues that the growing impact of non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) on global conventions is part of a structural power shift that takes place in

the context of the destabilisation of world politics. Environmental NGOs affect the

politics of global conventions by providing input, legitimacy or other good

demanded by states. Berlin’s article analyses the impact of environmental NGOs

on global conventions as a function of the political stakes and the NGO’s resources

such as expertise, prominence, independence and economy. Berlin’s study shows that

NGO’s economic resources are rather closely associated with the possession of both

prominence and expertise, and that independent NGOs are less influential than

organisations with extensive governmental funding. These findings are important to

the discussion of the role of NGOs in transnational democracy.

Jenny Wiik’s article focuses on professional journalism in a phase of

fragmentation. In the context of individualisation and destabilisation institutions

gradually lose their structural powers. What happens to the meaning of professional

ideals � as autonomy, objectivity, public service and scrutiny � when professions as

collective fundaments are declining? Wiik’s article indicates that the ideological

power of the professional discourse is not to be underestimated. Traditional

journalistic ideals have attained extensive support over time. Despite the process of

individualisation and destabilisation Swedish journalism is not de-professionalising.

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Instead, journalism is consolidating some central professional values and re-

organising around others.

Conclusion

The empirical analysis above focuses on the communicational revolution’s impact on

the exercise of power and identity formation in a globalised world. We argue that the

communicational revolution implies individualisation and destabilisation in the

exercise of power and identity formation. While the articles differ in research design,

methodological departure-points and empirical cases analysed they all address the

three hypotheses initially presented in this article. It is merely by empirical analysis as

such that we can understand why and in what way the communicational revolution

has changed the world.

What results can be synchronised from the articles in accordance with the

hypothesis initially stipulated? Whether or not globalisation leads to strengthening

of democracy and/or structural and policy convergence is still debated. The results

from the included articles postulate that � it depends. The communicational

revolution has different significance according to situation, issue and context.

However, the articles simultaneously show that changes do take place, on both an

international and national level. There is an increased individualisation and

destabilisation, but the state is still an important actor. For instance, Demker and

Duus-Otterstrom show that criminal actions are no longer seen as an offence against

society, but rather as one individual hurting another individual, and Brommesson

suggests that human rights norms have been upgraded and instead we have a world

community of individuals. However, Berlin’s article shows that organisations with

extensive governmental funding and not independent NGOs are still more

influential. Thus, the state is still a powerful actor using transnational networks

as additional channels of power. Wiik and Johansson Heino also point towards the

necessity to balance between the new world order and the old, between collectivism

and individualism. Wiik shows that today’s corps of journalists consolidate some

professional values and re-organise others, and Johansson Heino raises the issue of

Swedish identity formation navigating between universalism and individualism. The

changes are apparent, but also the clinging to old, pre-globalisation, values and

orders.

The presence or absence of the individual does have an impact on power and

identity formation, but at the same time this influence should not be overestimated.

Indeed the individual has become a more important actor; however, other actors (not

the state) have also entered the scene. Also, the collective can still be useful as an

affiliation, but maybe more to represent the other, the non-modern, non-tolerant, as

Johansson Heino suggests. Destabilisation is a fact, also from analysing the articles

above; however, here we also need a more modified picture. Certain power elites hold

out, as Wiik shows in her article on journalism, and Berlin talks about a ‘green elite’

heading NGOs in the international arena. Thus, the articles help us to understand

the complexity of the communicational revolution, but also point out the necessity of

more empirical studies in the field.

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Notes

1. Lipset and Rokkan’s well-known cleavages were based on those conflicts and opposedinterests that rose following the national revolution (centre�periphery, church�state), andthe industrial revolution (urban�rural, worker�capital). The national revolution was aboutthe power over the territory and the way in which to organise the political order. Theindustrial revolution was about the power over capital and the way in which to organise thematerial production.

2. It is not a matter of course that one should date the communicational revolution to ourspecific time. It is enticingly easy to experience the present as the most significant andrevolutionary of all times, all the while forgetting corresponding historical trends andevents. The Greek invention of the alphabet c. 700 BCE is undoubtedly one of the mostrevolutionary events in world history when it comes to enabling mass communications andinformation transmission. Development of the railways during the nineteenth centuryimplied a great advance for transporting individuals and goods. But the rise of the Internet� with its combination of quick transmission of vast amounts of information and itsavailability for large groups of people (at least in Europe and North America) � and theever-expanding possibilities of high-speed travelling � make it reasonable to claim achanging significance of the territory in relation to the exercise of power and identityformation.

3. The ‘processes’ that are mentioned in the introduction to the definition can be interpretedmore widely than Giddens’s ‘social relations’ and, therefore, do not exclude the possibilitythat e.g. economic and political systemic factors can play a decisive role in the process ofglobalisation (Giddens 1991, 1996).

4. Regarding the consequences of the processes there is no proper difference between Giddensand Jonsson et al.’s (2001) definitions of globalisation. Instead, the difference consists ofwhat is considered to lay the fundations of globalisation � the narrower ‘social relations’(Giddens) or the wider ‘processes’ (Jonsson et al.).

5. Beck also argues that both objective and subjective individualisation can be analysed interms of ‘emancipation’, ‘lost safety’ and ‘a new form of social belongingness’ (ibid).Anthony Giddens defines individualisation in terms of the individual, to a higher degree;being in control and defining his/her own biography.

6. Individualisation should not be understood as individuals necessarily thinking about theirown good instead of the common good. Individualisation only means an increasedimportance for individuals in relation to collective actors, and a greater independency ofindividual’s vis-a-vis social ties and traditions. How this increased importance and thisgreater independency is used � to assimilate their own or common needs � is anotherquestion.

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