Potential Futures for Syria in the Fog of War

A Red (team) Analysis Report

Potential Futures for Syria in the Fog of War [Volume 1 – Focus on the Syrian battlefield] – July 2013

Helene Lavoix

www.redanalysis.org

About the Author

Dr Helene Lavoix (MFin Paris, MSc PhD Lond) is a political scientist (International Relations) specialised in Strategic Foresight and Warning (SF&W) for conventional and unconventional security issues. She is the founder of Red (team) Analysis, advises institutional actors, researches commissioned reports and speaks at workshops and public conferences. She served as Senior Scientific Advisor to the Global Futures Forum (GFF -‐ a multinational partnership of intelligence and security organizations at unclassified level), after having been the coordinator of the GFF SF&W Community of Interest 2008-‐2011 and lead of the corresponding online community 2007-‐2008. She has taught SF&W at MSc level as Visiting Senior Fellow at the RSIS, NTU in Singapore 2010-‐2011. Prior to that, she served as an analyst in International Relations (Eastern Asia and Globalisation) for the European Commission, created and headed in Phnom-‐Penh the Cambodian branch of a NGO in the field of Development and worked in finance, as treasurer.

She is the author, among other publications, of “What makes foresight actionable: the cases of Singapore and Finland” (confidential commissioned report, US government, November 2010), “Enabling Security for the 21st Century: Intelligence & Strategic Foresight and Warning” RSIS Working Paper August 2010, “Constructing an Early Warning System,” in From Early Warning to Early Action, European Commission, ed. DG Relex, 2008, "Detailed chronology of mass violence – Cambodia (1945 – 1979),” Online Encyclopaedia of mass violence, 2008 and the editor of Strategic Foresight and Warning: Navigating the Unknown, ed. RSIS-‐CENS, February 2011.

About Red (team) Analysis

Red (team) Analysis (www.redanalysis.org) is a web platform devoted to anticipatory intelligence and strategic foresight and warning for world affairs. All readers can use the website to develop a better understanding of the world around them and the challenges ahead, while getting acquainted with anticipatory approaches. Citizens and practitioners can learn through practical cases how to identify critical issues for the future, and, more generally, how to foresee and warn. For advanced users, Red (team) Analysis presents real life cases that aim at improving anticipation through the exploration of tools and methodologies, the development of lab-‐type experiments, and the discussion of challenges to anticipation.

Cover Page Photo Credit: Front -‐ FSA rebels cleaning their AK47s in Aleppo, Syria during the civil war (19 October 2012). VOA News; Scott Bobb reporting from Aleppo, Syria, via Wikimedia Commons – Front and Back -‐ Enigma Machine, Part of the Photograph by Rama, Wikimedia Commons, CC-‐BY-‐SA-‐2.0-‐fr

This report by Helene Lavoix is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-‐

NonCommercial-‐ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

Potential Futures for Syria in the Fog of War

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Helene Lavoix A Red (team) Analysis Report July 2013

Executive Summary The Syrian war is a challenging problem for actionable strategic foresight and warning because, besides the humanitarian disaster, the risks to regional and global peace and stability continuously increase, because the conflict is redrawing the strategic outlook of the region while participating into a global paradigm shift, and, finally, because the fog of war makes our anticipatory task more difficult.

Furthermore, the situation in Syria is complex and fluid. Thus, it does not lend itself easily to oversimplification and demands permanent monitoring and agile policy so that decisions do not backfire and imply adverse strategic consequences.

The Syrian battlefield involves more than 1000 factions and groups, some more powerful than others. We are at this stage when the length of the war has created enough havoc and chaos to allow every willing clan to create its own localised guerrilla group, whilst the dynamics of the Syrian insurgency has not – or not yet or not completely – allowed a few groups to take real pre-‐eminence. Thus, all classifications should be taken with the utmost carefulness and what is true one day may well change the next.

Again this backdrop, five main types of Syrian actors and their “international backers” fight for power in and over Syria, namely the pro-‐Assad groups, the “moderate” opposition forces and the Muslim Brotherhood related groups, the Kurds in Syria, the Islamist groups fighting for an Islamist state in Syria, and, finally, the groups linked to a global Jihadi Front.

Three main scenarios (leading to ten sub-‐scenarios) for the future of Syria and prospects for peace within the next five years follow from this state of play. Some of the regional impacts are included within the scenarios (the full international consequences will be addressed in a second volume).

The Syrian scenarios will evolve, notably in terms of likelihood, from changes on the battleground and from interactions between all actors. Those scenarios are thus best understood as a dynamic and


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systemic set where one scenario can lead to another one according to events on the ground, as shown in the graphic below. The thickness of the arrow shows higher probability and shorter timeline: the thicker an arrow, the more likely and the quicker a scenario would evolve in a specific direction; alternatively a dotted line shows lower probability and/or longer timeline. Probability and timeline will evolve according to events.


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TABLE OF CONTENT

Executive Summary 1

Introduction 5

State of Play 6

Understanding the current state of play and the actors 6

Pro-‐Al-‐Assad Regime Groups 9

Political overview 9

Evaluating Pro-‐Al-‐Assad regime Forces 9

Syrian Forces 9

Foreign Forces 11

The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) and the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC) 12

Political overview 12

How many fighters belong to the SMC? 15

Moderates or all opposition forces? 15

What happened to the defectors? 16

The Kurds 17

Syrian Sunni factions intending to install an Islamist state in Syria 22

Sunni extremist factions with a global jihadi agenda 25

Scenarios: The future of Syria within the next five years 28

Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva? 29

Sub-‐scenario 1.1.: All but the Jihadis 29

Sub-‐scenario 1.1.1.: A fragile Syrian external peace 29

Sub-‐scenario 1.1.2.: Back to civil war – Jihadis’ advantage? 30

Sub-‐scenario 1.2.: All but the Salafis 30


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Sub-‐scenario 1.2.1.: An unlikely very fragile external peace 30

Sub-‐scenario 1.2.2.: Back to civil war – Salafis’ advantage? 30

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 1 30

Scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva 32

Scenario 32

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 2 34

Evolutions for Scenario 2 35

Scenario 3: A Real Victory in Syria? 36

Scenario 3 explanation 36

Scenario 3.1.: An Islamic al-‐Sham? 37

Scenario 37

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.1. 39

Scenario 3.2.: A Nationalist Islamic Syria? 40

Scenario 40


Scenario 3.3.: A Secular Syria? 41

Scenario 3.3.1. A Muslim Brotherhood’s Syria 42

Scenario 3.3.2. A Truly Secular Syria? 43

Scenario 3.4. Back to an Al-‐Assad Syria? 46

Scenario 46


Evaluating Forces on the Syrian Battlefield 50

The Syrian War – Bibliography and Sources 53

Photos and maps credits 59


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Introduction The Syrian civil war is more than two years old. In April, according to the AFP (4 April 2013) more than 60.000 had died (until November 2012), while 1.2 million had fled to neighbouring countries and 4 million were internally displaced. On 13 June 2013, the UN estimated that at least 93.000 people had died so far during the conflict (BBC News, 13 June). On 17 June, 1.64 million people were refugees in other countries, according to UNHCR ongoing estimates and Syria counted 4.25 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) according to USAID and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center).

The Syrian war is a challenging problem for strategic foresight and warning because, besides the humanitarian disaster, the risks to regional and global peace and stability continuously increase, because the conflict is redrawing the strategic outlook of the region while participating into the global paradigm shift, and, finally, because the fog of war makes our anticipatory task more difficult and complex.

We are facing three – related – sets of problems. First, we must deal with the war itself, where three, four or five types of Syrian actors and their “international backers” – or even more according to typologies, as we shall discuss below – and not two, fight for power. Second, we must prepare for the following peace while, third, evaluating and considering the still being redesigned strategic environment. The specific characteristics of the peace to come and of the future strategic environment will depend upon the length of the war, how it is waged and how it ends. The peace should be prepared to be made constructive, positive, and lasting, and the strategic environment conducive to interests, knowing that interests will vary according to actors, each trying to influence the overall situation to achieve its goals at best. Getting ready for the second period and succeeding there starts with actions taken during the war and with the fate of the war itself, according to three main scenarios and their sub-‐scenarios (eleven in total). As those scenarios are grounded in the current state of play, we shall first present the state of play, focusing on actors fighting in Syria before to move to the scenarios. To be complete, we would then need to present the international state of play and to revise accordingly the scenarios. This is planned for a forthcoming volume.

The scenarios would need to be regularly revised to include what is happening on the ground. Methodologically, on-‐going monitoring of the situation and related updating of scenarios may be the only way forward to deal with the fog of war. Here, as the content of this volume has been initially written under the form of posts published on the web on www.redanalysis.org between Mid April and July 2013 – also as a way to explore how to deal with foresight and warning under the fog of war -‐ crucial updates to the state of play are inserted in grey boxes.


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State of Play

Understanding the current state of play and the actors

Before to present the actors, it is necessary to make two preliminary remarks.

1-‐ Interestingly, in many analyses and reports on the war in Syria, one finds mention of only two or three groups of actors: the regime of Bashar al-‐Assad and the insurgency, to which are sometimes added the Kurds in Syria, who initially sat in an almost neutral position. Save for a few more detailed studies, which show how much more complex the situation is, “the insurgency” tends to be taken either as a broad umbrella label, or, more worryingly, as a monolithic bloc. A few interacting factors are probably at work here to explain this approach: • We are faced with cognitive biases, or more specifically with the problem of enduring cognitive

models in the face of new evidence, when the initial model was created early and with very few available evidence (Anderson, Lepper, and Ross, 1980). The tendency of our human brain to also overestimate “intentional centralized direction and planning” (Heuer, chapter 11, bias 2) is also probably at play.

• The difficulty to get information on the ground makes it even more complex to obtain reliable evidences that would ease our understanding of the situation on the battlefield. We should nevertheless underline, as noted in a recent EAworldview article, that the civil war in Syria is redefining how we get to know what is happening in the case of war, and it is thanks to the dedication of many, to a real crowdsourcing effort, and to the web and communication technologies that knowledge of the situation emerges. Compare, for example, with our blindness in past situations such as Cambodia. However, this also casts everyone in the role of collector of information and analyst (intelligence and scientific research roles), for which s/he has not been trained and that must be learned by trial and errors.

• Most probably, observers and analysts need to face conscious and unconscious deception and manipulation by fighting actors on the ground. Each group of fighters has an aim, as well as its own unconscious biases and partial vision and understanding of the situation. The story of each group, of each battle, be it told through written or video means or through interviews will reflect specific perceptions and goals, which must also be considered. The difficulty is very well underlined in the introductory paragraphs of a recent article by Matthew Barber on the excellent Syria Comment of Joshua Landis when he uses the new Syria Video facility to analyse “The Raqqa Story: Rebel Structure, Planning, and Possible War Crimes.”

• As a result, analysts are also actors in the Syrian war.


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• Furthermore, most of the time, the maps available in open source, however impressive the amount of details found on them, furthermore regularly updated (as the Wikipedia map shown here which describes the situation in Syria as of 23 March 2013) – only communicate part of the picture and could lead to partial conclusions.

They are nevertheless not only informative (and incredibly so most often) but also useful, as long as the reality of the situation is not forgotten, and one could build upon them to include the various broad types of fighting opposition.


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2-‐ Following Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi in his “Jihad in Syria,” and Phillip Smith, a central idea should be kept in mind regarding the Syrian civil war – and generally most civil wars: the situation is fluid, changing and much more complex to describe than any categorization could allow.

The Syrian battlefield involves more than 1000 factions and groups (Smith), some more powerful than others. It would seem we are at this stage when the length of the war has created enough havoc and chaos to allow every willing clan to create its own localised guerrilla group (Lund, 2013: 10), whilst the dynamics of the Syrian insurgency has not – or not yet or not completely – allowed a few groups to take real pre-‐eminence. Thus, all classifications should be taken with the utmost carefulness and what is true one day may well change the next. Alliances and participation in one group or another must also be considered as temporary. Those warring dynamics, yet, need to be observed and understood, because it is finally on the battleground that the destiny of Syria is being played out, while the interactions between international actors and this battleground progressively and incrementally impact the region and shape potential futures.

Keeping in mind the complex and fluid character of the situation in Syria we shall now present the current state of play and the various categories of actors fighting in and over Syria, namely the pro-‐Assad groups, the “moderate” opposition forces and the Muslim Brotherhood related groups, the Kurds in Syria, the Islamist groups fighting for an Islamist state in Syria, and, finally, the groups linked to a global Jihadi Front. Scenarios for the future follow from this assessment. The scenarios will evolve, notably in terms of likelihood, from changes on the battleground and from interactions between all actors.


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Pro-Al-Assad Regime Groups

Political overview

The regime and government of Bashar al-‐Assad has lost full domestic legitimacy (or there would not be a civil war) and a large part of international legitimacy, but it remains recognized and backed notably by China and Russia – both with veto power at the UN security council – Iran and Iraq. Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon opposed the Arab League’s “decision to give the opposition the vacant Syrian seat” (The Guardian, 26 March 2013), suspended since November 2011.

Evaluating Pro-Al-Assad regime Forces

Syrian Forces

The pro-‐Assad Syrian fighting groups are composed of the regular Army and the Republican Guards, as well as pro-‐Assad militias (both Alawite and composite – Sunni, Christian, Druze), all backed up by the Security Forces and the Police Force. All Alawites should not be considered as supporting the Assad regime, as shows the conference organised in Cairo on 23 March 2013 by Alawites promoting a “democratic alternative” (Reuters).

The details below are summarized from the excellent report by Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War (March 2013 for the ISW).

Regular Army and Republican Guards

According to Holliday, Al-‐Assad has a policy of only “electively deploying [t]his loyal core of military supporters.” As a result ”a working estimate of 65,000 to 75,000 loyal, deployable Syrian regime troops emerges” out of “the Syrian Armed Forces, a basis that includes over 300,000 troops (including Air Force and Air defence personnel)” (p.27). From this figure should be removed casualties, estimated by Holliday at 7620 killed and 30500 wounded by end of December 2012 (see table p.28), which represents approximately half of the regime estimated deployed troops, partially or completely

UPDATE 28 MAY 2013

� 24 May 2013 -‐ Bashar al-‐Assad accepts to be in Geneva 2 (e.g. Matthew Weaver and agencies, The Guardian)

�April -‐ May 2013: The Battle of Al Qusayr (Wikipedia article) see also, for example, Jamie Dettmer, ”Ferocious Battle Underway Over Syrian Border City” 29 May 2013, VOANews.


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compensated by recruitment (p.29). As underlined by Holliday and the International Crisis Group, those men are however a “hard-‐core nucleus of regime supporters”(p.29). A decentralization of command and control, allowing for flexibility and initiative by low-‐ and mid-‐level officers, according to local conditions, was implemented during the Summer 2012 (Ibid).

Security Forces: The Mukhabarat

(For a more detailed and clear explanation, read Holliday, Appendix 3) They are constituted of four intelligence services, whose “primary mission was to ‘monitor and intervene aggressively against potential domestic threats to the regime’ (Campbell, 2009).” (p.54) However, they are now acting more like militias than like intelligence services (p.30). In addition, each operates its own prisons. Each service is present throughout the whole territory with a branch in each province. Using an interview he realized, Holliday writes that “one former regime insider suggested it [The Mukhabarat] could be as large as 200,000 security officers and personnel, but this figure could include administrative personnel and informants and cannot be verified” (p. 55), and, most probably, not all of them are fighters. (p.30).

Militias or paramilitary forces

� The shabiha: A network of “Mafia-‐like organizations,” “made up of mostly Alawite criminal smuggling networks led by members of the extended Assad family” (p. 16), but also from other communities origins, when in areas without an Alawite population (p.17).

� Popular Committees, or Lijan sha‘biya becoming the National defense Forces, or Quwat ad-‐Difa‘a al-‐Watani: “Minority populations who have armed themselves to protect their towns and neighborhoods from anti-‐government fighters” (p.16). They started being trained and ”formalized” as The National defense Forces, or Quwat ad-‐Difa‘a al-‐Watani, in early 2013, with Iran’s support (p.31).

� The “People’s Army” or Jaysh al-‐Sha‘bi: “Institutional militias” have existed in Syria since the early 1980s (then named munazzamat sha‘biya before it became Jaysh al-‐Sha‘bi in the mid-‐1980s) (p.16). The “People’s Army” is composed of the best and most trustworthy fighters found in the previous two groups. It has been “trained and supported by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-‐Qods Force (IRCG-‐QF) and Lebanese Hezbollah” (p. 30). It was estimated to include 100.000 fighters at the end of 2011 (Holliday using van Dam, 2011, and IISS Military balance 2011). However, Holliday also mentions that Iranian Commander Mohammed Ali Jafari referred to “50.000 popular forces” in September 2012 (p. 30).

As underlined by Holliday, fear, reprisals, massacres and atrocities of minorities at the hand of extremists may only increase the number of people joining the various militias.

Iran’s action with the militias would support Smyth‘s point (2013), according to which Iran is also preparing for a post al-‐Assad situation by creating sub-‐networks within the Syrian Shia community, as


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well as by supporting other (Sunni) militiamen. Holliday suggested a similar Iranian role in a post al-‐Assad Syria (p.32).

Foreign Forces

To the Syrian forces must be added foreign groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, groups coming from Iraq with Iranian support such the Mahdi Army (Muqtada al-‐Sadr’s Liwa al-‐Yom al-‐Mauwud), Asa’ib Ahl al-‐Haq, Kata’ib Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force (Ammar Abdulhamid, 2013; Smyth, 2013).

The Hezbollah

At the end of May 2013, the Hezbollah fighters in Syria have been estimated to reach between 3000 to 4000 troops by the French foreign minister and 7000 troops according to General Idriss (Hezbollah fighters ‘invading’ Syria – rebel chief, BBC News, 30 May 2013).

Meanwhile, the leader of the Lebanese Forces (LF) party, Samir Geagea, estimates that the overall number of Hezbollah fighters does “not exceed 5000 soldiers”, as reported by Elie Hajj (Rethinking Hezbollah’s Role in Syria, 18 June 2013, Al-‐Monitor Lebanon Pulse). According to IRIB World Service (Iran English Radio), that would be using a NATO report (title and link not mentioned), “the Lebanese resistance group maintains a 65,000-‐strong army, which is difficult to confront.” (NATO concerned over Hezbollah’s might, 13 January 2013, IRIB).

Those fighters constitute a well-‐trained and serious force. As underlined by Nasser Chararah (Hezbollah’s Youth Strategy, 18 June, 2013, Al-‐Monitor Lebanon Pulse), “”Hezbollah had gone beyond being a huge militia, becoming a large military and professional force that follows a creative organizational and combat approach. This approach combines organizational conduct subjected to tight control and communications, and elite forces with a rich experience in the various types of guerilla fighting. The most prominent characteristic of this force is that a high percentage of its ranks consist of youth with specialized degrees, making it an educated army.”

Iranian forces

As we saw previously, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-‐Qods Force (IRCG-‐QF) have been training the People’s Forces since 2011 and most probably used as advisers. Mid-‐June 2013, according to Robert Fisk, Iran would have decided “to send a first contingent of 4,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Syria to support President Bashar al-‐Assad’s forces” (Robert Fisk, 16 June 2013, The Independent on Sunday).


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Other groups (mainly Shia)

Abu Fadl al-‐Abbas Brigade

According to Mona Mahmood, and Martin Chulov, ”interviews with serving and former members of the Abu Fadl al-‐Abbas Brigade suggest that upwards of 10,000 volunteers – all of them Shia Muslims, and many from outside Syria – have joined their ranks in the past year alone” (Syrian war widens Sunni-‐Shia schism as foreign jihadis join fight for shrines, 4 June 2013, The Guardian). The image on the right hand side was posted on their posted on their Facebook Page on 22 February 2013.

Iraq’s main Shia militias

We find notably Asa’ib Ahl al-‐Haq (Islamic resistance in Iraq – AAH / League of the Righteous) logo from their wesbite on the right hand side), Kata’ib Hezbollah and fighters from the Mahdi Army (Muqtada al-‐Sadr’s Liwa al-‐Yom al-‐Mauwud). The number of fighters on the ground in Syria is unknown.

The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) and the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC)

Political overview

An umbrella group of various opposition and fighting factions, of more or less moderate obedience, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (also translated as National Coalition for the Forces of the Revolution and the Syrian Opposition – Lund, 2013), which absorbed the previous Syrian National Council (Lund, 2013: 12), was formed in November 2012, pushed among others by the U.S. and Qatar. It was initially headed by Ahmed Moadh al-‐Khatib. It was recognized by many Western nations (see list on Wikipedia), by Turkey, by the Arab States of the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Oman), as the “legitimate representative of the Syrian people. The Arab League (except for Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon) recognised the Coalition as their “legitimate representative and main interlocutor”. This recognition was reasserted at the recent Arab League summit in Doha on 26 March 2013 (The Guardian).


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Since then, the united face of the Syrian moderate opposition – as well as its moderation – has been questioned notably by the election of Ghassam Hitto as Prime Minister of the interim opposition government, recommended by Mustafa Sabbagh, Secretary General of the Coalition, and supported by the Muslin Brotherhood and Qatar. As a result the president Al-‐Khatib resigned, confirming he was stepping down on 21 April 2013 (Al Arabyia and AFP), while some leaders in the opposition voiced their disapproval, including in the Free Syrian Army (FSA), refusing to recognize Hitto (e.g. AFP 24 March 2013).

The SNC created the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC) with Brigadier General Salim Idriss elected as Chief of Staff. The SMC is meant to integrate and lead the FSA and is organised according to five fronts (Eastern Front: Raqqa-‐Deir Ezzor and Al Hassakah -‐ Northern Front: Aleppo and Idlib -‐ Central Front: Homs-‐Rastan -‐ Western Front: Hama-‐Latakia-‐Tartus -‐ Southern Front: Damascus-‐Dar’a-‐Suwayda).


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A detailed report by the Institute for the Study of War’s Syria Analyst Elizabeth O’Bagy on this endeavour may be found here, but must be read in the light of the debate between Debeuf and Lund on the FSA.

The NC and SMC are those who receive “Western” aid, which is, officially, non-‐lethal, although, as monitored through crowdsourcing and explained in Chivers and Schmitt article for the New York Times (24 March 2013), military aid “from the C.I.A.” (mainly a consultative role) “Arab governments and Turkey” has found its way into Syria since early 2012. Meanwhile military training, on a small scale, “led by the US, but involves[ing] British and French instructors” would be provided in Jordan (Borger and Hopkins, 8 March 2013, The Guardian). It is thus crucial for the NC and the SMC to present a united front to the world, to reassure regarding their capacity to act and harness various groups and to reassert their moderation, because it is only under those conditions that they will continue to receive support or even increase its amount and change its nature. The fear from potential backers is that aid and weapons provided spread throughout groups and not only fuel the Syrian conflict but also favour regional spill-‐over, while also potentially finding their way back into Western countries, favouring violence in an environment made more volatile by the crisis.

The meeting of the Friends of Syria group in Istanbul on 20 and 21 April 2013 exemplifies those interactions. There, US Secretary of State John Kerry announced that a new non-‐lethal package to the SMC of up to USD 130 million would be added to the 117 million already given (AP, 20 April 2013). France and Great Britain push for changing the EU arm embargo on Syria; Germany is more reserved but announced it would accept it (Spencer, 21 April 2013, The Telegraph, EUbusiness, 22 April 2013), while The Netherlands would be more reserved (AP, 20 April) and Scandinavian countries would oppose it (EUbusiness, 22 April). Both France and the UK have let believe that they could decide to move forward even without a European agreement (Traynor, 14 March 2013, The Guardian). The EU also decided to ease its oil embargo on Syria to support the NC (EUbusiness, 22 April).

UPDATE 28 MAY 2013 -‐ THE ROAD TO GENEVA 2?

�The “EU Eases Ban on Arming Syrian Rebels” VOA , 28 May 2013,

�But the NC shows a disappointing inability to unite and include New member – read Matthew Barber for Syria Comments, 27 May 2013: “Brotherhood Figures Block Yaqoubi’s Appointment, Post-‐Confirmation“

�April -‐ May 2013: The Battle of Al Qusayr (Wikipedia article) see also, for example, Jamie Dettmer, ”Ferocious Battle Underway Over Syrian Border City” 29 May 2013, VOANews.


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How many fighters belong to the SMC?

Moderates or all opposition forces?

This is a crucial question, however a very difficult one. If we use David Ignatius estimates for the Washington Post, we read that “Idriss and his Free Syrian Army command about 50,000 more fighters, rebel sources say” (Ignatius, 3 April 2013). Lund (4 April 2013), in his comment on Ignatius’ article for Syria Comment, questions this estimates, considering the complexity and fluidity of the situation on the ground. O’Bagy, in her detailed report on the FSA does not include a global estimate.

Lund in his article on the FSA (16 March 2013) underlines that “If all the factions which have declared in favor of Idriss were added up, they’d count at least 50,000 men, perhaps many more.” However, as he stresses, those groups include some that belong too to other nexus, such as Suqour el-‐Sham that is part of the Syria Liberation Front (SLF) also known as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF). Thus, if we are looking at the number of fighters who are “moderate,” then one should substract from the 50.000 all those men who fight first for other groups, and thus are only very loosely affiliated with the SMC.

This is a crucial question, however a very difficult one. If we use David Ignatius estimates for the Washington Post, we read that “Idriss and his Free Syrian Army command about 50,000 more fighters,

UPDATE 8 JULY 2013

The Egyptian revolution of 30 June 2013 with the ousting of President Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, the refusal by the Muslim Brotherhood to join the new coalition and its call to fight had immediate implications for the SNC in Syria. Indeed the SNC was meeting in Istanbul to elect a new President. After the usual discussions and delays the Egyptian defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood most probably contributed, along other factors specific to Syria, to see the Saudi backed Ahmad Jarba elected, over the Qatar backed Mustafa Sabbagh, knowing that Qatar is a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, “the Brotherhood representative, Farouq Tayfour, was elected one of two vice-‐presidents of the Syrian National Coalition in a sign the group still retains influence in Syrian opposition politics.” (Erika Solomon, Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Reuters, 6 July 2013).

See also

� Jarba has to inspire Syrian opposition Gulf News, July 7, 2013

�Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syrian opposition head expects advanced weapons, 8 July 2013, Reuters.


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rebel sources say” (Ignatius, 3 April 2013). Lund (4 April 2013), in his comment on Ignatius’ article for Syria Comment, questions this estimates, considering the complexity and fluidity of the situation on the ground. O’Bagy, in her detailed report on the FSA does not include a global estimate.

Lund in his article on the FSA (16 March 2013) underlines that “If all the factions which have declared in favor of Idriss were added up, they’d count at least 50,000 men, perhaps many more.” However, as he stresses, those groups include some that belong too to other nexus, such as Suqour el-‐Sham that is part of the Syria Liberation Front (SLF) also known as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF). Thus, if we are looking at the number of fighters who are “moderate,” then one should substract from the 50.000 all those men who fight first for other groups, and thus are only very loosely affiliated with the SMC.

Keeping this in mind, the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICRS) gives the figure of 60,000 men as ”the most conservative estimate for the current [April 2013] size of rebel forces” in his Insight: European Foreign Fighters in Syria. At the opposite end of the spectrum, one finds an AFP article (13 April 2013) emphasizing that “experts say the Free Syrian Army comprises some 140,000 fighters”, but without mention of any source.

We should also consider all those small groups that are mainly local (see here), as it is not clear from given estimates if they are counted or not.

What happened to the defectors?

When trying to find estimates for the FSA and the SMC, counting forces seems to have proceeded according to two stages.

At the beginning of the war, during 2011 and part of 2012, observers and students of the Syrian war were focusing on defectors from the Syrian Army, who led the creation of the Free Syrian Army on 23 September 2011, under the leadership of Colonel Reyad Mousa Al-‐As’ad. Defectors, both soldiers and officers, were meant to join the FSA, which would constitute the core of the new security forces after the fall of the Al-‐Assad regime.

However, as underlined by O’Bagy (Ibid: 10-‐11), using a New York Times article (Liam Stack, 27 October 2011), one of the many problems the FSA had to face was that the command group led by Reyad Mousa Al-‐As’ad defecting officers were kept in an “officer’s camp” in Turkey that was located far away from the Syrian battlefield. This led to a disconnect between fighting troops and command. Meanwhile, most probably, many soldiers and officers defecting must have joined the forces on the ground. In the same New York Times article, Colonel Al-‐As’ad “would not specify the number of fighters, saying only that it was more than 10,000, and he was unwilling to disclose the number of battalions, claiming that the group had 18 “announced” battalions and an unspecified number of secret ones. None of his claims could be independently verified.”


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This figure of 10,000 would correspond to the estimated number of defectors given by “an American official” on 26 October 2011 (Nada Bakri, Defectors Claim Attack That Killed Syria Soldiers, NYT) and by “sources” (“Western Intelligence agencies”?) in a Haaretz’ article by Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel on 21 December 2011. However, by December 2011, Colonel Al-‐As’ad claimed that the FSA now counted 20,000 fighters (Safak Timur, AFP, Dec 1, 2011). The uncertainty regarding numbers is well summarized by a 2 December 2011 AlJazeera article: “The group is now believed to number between 1,000 and 25,000 divided over 22 battalions spread across the country.”

Then, observers stopped focusing on defectors and tried to give estimates for the troops fighting more or less loosely under the SMC, the FSA or as “opposition forces”.

Defectors, whatever their number, most probably joined not only the FSA or the SMC according to the time of defection, but also mobilizing or fighting groups according to their family, geographical and religious allegiances and to the fate of the overall force. The less the “structuring” command and control “center” has to offer (including in material terms, such as weapons, logistics etc.), the less it can show its power and strength, the more likely fighters will join or rather give a stronger allegiance to other factions. For example, as reported by Mona Mahmood and Ian Black for the Guardian (8 May 2013), FSA troops have increasingly defected to Al-‐Nusra during the first part of 2013 (note that defections to salafi-‐jihadis may be both real and hyped as bargaining chip to obtain more from external support).

The Kurds

The Kurds in Syria have their own agenda, which will determine their actions. As the other Kurdish communities in the region, their priority is to create a semi-‐autonomous Kurdistan where they live, notably in the NorthEast of Syria. Kurdish enclaves in Syria can also be found around Jarabulus – North – and Afrin – Northwest, North of Aleppo (Tejel, 2009: xiii).

As analyzed by Spyer, their recent history tells the Kurds in Syria that mastering their own destiny is the only way to live decently and according to their own way of life, thus benefiting for once from the bounty of their land, in terms of oil and crops (Spyer, March 9 2013). The Syrian Kurds’ objective was again reasserted by Sipan Hamo, commander-‐in-‐chief of the People’s Protection Committees or People’s Defense Units (YPG -‐ the armed wing of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), the main Kurdish political force in Syria, see below), in a


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statement on 4 April 2013: “We will not bargain with any side at the expense of the Kurdish people.” (van Wilgenburg, April 5 2013, AlMonitor).

The Syrian Kurds have already achieved an important part of their goal: they are largely the de facto main authority in regions of Kurdish settlement, notably in many cities along the northern border (see Wikipedia map below updated 12 July 2013 – yellow dots for Kurd-‐controlled cities – note that the map shows the progress the pro-‐Assad groups).

At the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the Kurds adopted a neutral position and, starting from mid-‐July 2012, Assad forces began withdrawing from Kurd territories, abandoning many cities to the PYD: “In total, by the end of the month, the Assad regime had withdrawn from fourteen Kurdish cities,


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including the major towns of al-‐Ma’abde, Ayn al-‐Arab, Ras al-‐Ayn, Dirbasiyeh, as well as the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh districts of the city of Aleppo.” Tanir, van Wilgenburg & Hossino, 2012: 11). Hasakah and Qamishly, however, as documented by Spyer in the case of Qamishly, remain largely under control of the Assad regime (Spyer, 9 March 2013). Spyer underlines that we are there seeing the usual strategy of the Assad regime, operative throughout the country: “Assad’s forces have conceded smaller towns and rural areas, while pushing forces into cities, like Qamishli, and holding them.”

The aim of the Kurds in Syria is now to make sure they will finalize and consolidate their authority and not lose what they have accomplished because of internecine struggles either within Syria or linked to regional Kurdish issues (see mapping of the actors below – click for a larger image), or through the incursions of other Syrian forces opposing their authorities, their values and thus not guaranteeing their right to a decent life.

The PYD is the main Kurdish political force in Syria and is linked to the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) through the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) (Tanir et al.: 9). Besides smaller independent Kurdish groups in Syria, its main opponent is an alliance of four political parties in Syria, funded by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the latter being led by Massoud Barzani, who is also the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) (van Wilgenburg, April 4 2013, AlMonitor). The PYD is, however, much stronger than its opponents, thanks notably to its armed wing, the YPG. Coercive forces are a crucial component of any political authority, whose strength and power depend upon the legitimate monopoly of violence and the ability to extract resources to accomplish its missions (see for further detailed explanations regarding political rule the Chronicles of Everstate).

The YPG, People’s Protection Committee, counts between 10000 (interview of Kurdish leader Salih Muslim for the Frankfurter Rundschau, 1 December 2012) and 15000 fighters (“Strategiewechsel der FSA und der islamistischen Kräfte: Krieg gegen Kurden” -‐ no source quoted -‐ 27 May 2013, Die Kurden), according to Wikipedia.

The KPD, trying to unite parties opposed to the PYD, formed in October 2011 the Kurdish National Council KNC, a political alliance of 15 groups including Kurdish political parties, youth groups, and independent figures, allegedly with the benediction of Turkey (Tanir et al.: 8-‐9, 19). It was however unable to assert an armed force on the ground, the KPD peshmergas and the Kurdish Syrian refugees they trained remaining in Iraq (Ibid).


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The fear to see Kurdish infighting derail their overarching aim, led to the Erbil Agreement signed on 11 July 2012 between the PYD, the People’s Council of West-‐Kurdistan (PCWK) (a previous PYD-‐sponsored failed attempt at uniting Kurdish Syrian groups) and the KNC, with the strong support of Barzani (Tanir et al.: 8-‐10, 19). Through this accord, the PYD and the KNC created the Supreme Kurdish Council (SKC), where they accept “to jointly govern the Kurdish areas of Syria” (Tanir et al.: 8-‐10, 19). If each party has five seats within the SKC, the PYD remains the leader through, again, its armed wing, and through alliances with left-‐leaning members of the KNC (van Wilgenburg, April 4 2013). Yet, some tensions linger and minor clashes between Kurds sometimes erupt, as in March 2013 (van Wilgenburg, April 4 2013).

The constitution of a de facto Kurd authority on the ground under SKC leadership with its YPG force was most probably operative in the decision by the Turkish Erdogan government to start peace talks in October 2012 with the PKK and their leader Occalan. A PKK friendly zone at Turkey’s backdoor would have indeed been potentially threatening, while escalating fighting would have been incompatible with the new regional role that Turkey seeks to achieve. The Turkish-‐Kurdish peace talks, if fraught


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with specific Turkish domestic difficulties, are progressing favourably to date (Tulin Daloglu, 3 April 2013, AlMonitor).

Meanwhile, this changed configuration favoured, on the Syrian battlefield, tactical cooperation between groups belonging to the FSA nexus and Kurds, whilst clashes beyond the Aleppo region started taking place between pro-‐Assad groups and Kurds (Natali, January 31 2013; van Wilgenburg, April 5 2013, AlMonitor; Hudson, April 18 2013, reuters). The Kurdish struggle against Global Jihadi groups in Syria such as Jabhat al-‐Nusra or groups supporting the creation of an Islamist state in Syria (forthcoming post) continues, as the objectives of those groups are incompatible with a Syrian Kurdistan (Natali, January 31 2013; Spyer, March 9 2013). Considering the FSA’s need to show a moderate, united and efficient face to increase foreign support (see previous post), we have here another factor for de facto cooperation between Kurdish forces and groups linked to the FSA nexus in the current strategic conditions.

The Iranian perception and consequent actions regarding the ongoing peace talks in Turkey is an element that should not be forgotten: Iran is a full player as it supports the Assad regime, as Kurds are settled on part of its territory and it is a major actor in the region. If, as suggested by Sinkaya (March 20 2013, AlMonitor), Iran fears that PKK armed forces, freed from actions in Turkey, contribute to renew the Kurdish struggle on their own territory, then Iran’s interest would be to see those forces joining with Syrian Kurds to save the Syrian Kurdistan, assuming the YPG accept them. This might imply that Iran would support further offensive by the Assad regime in zones under SKC control. Integrating peacefully and fully future ex-‐PKK forces within Turkey would be a way to assuage Iran’s fear and to avoid further escalation for this specific issue.

If the strategic environment is changing and is accordingly included into the actors’ decisions, it does not mean that alliances are becoming fixed. The tactical and local situations are also crucial, while the overall conditions remain fluid. As Tejel emphasises regarding the Syrian battlefield, “We cannot state that they are ‘enemies’ or ‘allies.’ It depends on the context, the moment, and local relations. In other words, if cooperation between YPG with the FSA is now a reality, it does not necessarily mean that we are witnessing a complete rupture…. Maybe or maybe not” (van Wilgenburg, April 5 2013).

UPDATE 26 MAY 2013

�The SLF would have declared war on The Kurds: “a statement signed by no less than twenty-‐one armed groups declared ”Kurdish defense units, YPG, are traitors because they are against our Jihad.”The goal, according to the statement, is a “pending the completion of comprehensive cleansing process”, liberation from “PKK and Shabiha”. The statement was published by the “Syrian Islamic Liberation Front” – Syria Report, 27 May 2013 – “Insurgents Declare War on Syrian Kurds“


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Syrian Sunni factions intending to install an Islamist state in Syria

The rise of the Syrian Sunni factions intending to install an Islamist state in Syria and of the next group, the Sunni extremist factions with a global jihadi agenda – as well as their mobilization power has been, first, eased by the protracted quality of the conflict and the despair it implied among Syrian people. It was then facilitated by the initial inability of the moderates to find support in the West, thus to demonstrate their power.

The first nexus is composed of more extreme Islamist groups – compared with those seen previously – and of “Nationalist Salafis” groups – to use Lund (2013:14) terminology, noting that scholar of Jihad in Syria, Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi questions the very dichotomy between Nationalist Salafis and Jihadi Salafis (see below update 8 July).


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Nationalist Salafis want to create an Islamic Sharia state in Syria. Lund (2013: 14) quotes Abdulrahman Alhaj, an expert on Syrian Islamism he interviewed in January 2013:

“When it comes to the salafis, we have to separate between two things. There are publicly declared salafi groups who have an experience of [armed] salafi work outside Syria, and who have a systematic salafi thinking. These groups, the salafiya-‐jihadiya [salafi-‐jihadism], are not many, but they affect people’s thinking.”

“The others are young, extremist people. They are Sunni Muslims who just follow this path because there is a lot of violence. Day after day, they come face to face with violence, so they adopt salafism, but they are not really part of the salafiya-‐jihadiya ideologically. Like Ahrar al-‐Sham: they are not part of the salafi-‐jihadi movement. There are of course real salafis among them, but mostly they are just extremist sunnis without a systematic salafi ideology. It’s very different from Jabhat al-‐Nosra.”

Within those groups one finds two major alliances, who are attempting to unite factions.

Syria Liberation Front (SLF) also known as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF) factions (Jabhat Tahrir Souriya or Jabhat al-‐Tahrir al-‐Souriya al-‐Islamiya)

It was created in September 2012 when some factions ended their associations with the FSA. The groups that are mentioned as belonging to the SLF are: two of Syria largest Islamist groups, Kataeb al-‐Farouq and Suqour al-‐Sham (Lund 2013: 16), Liwa al-‐Tawhid and Liwa al-‐Islam (Lund 3013: 27 using Noah Bonsey, Lund, 3 April 2013). According to Lund, most of the SLF factions are also now part of the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (Ibid: 13), despite their ideological

outlook, which also underlines again the pragmatic feature of affiliations and the shifting and lose characteristic of alliances, as suggested previously.

The SILF/SLF would count an estimated 37.000 fighters (Ignatius, 2 Avril 2013; see also Lund’s related comment, 3 April 2013).

Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) (Al-‐Jabha al-‐Islamiya al-‐Souriya)

It was created in December 2012 under the leadership of the more powerful Ahrar al-‐Sham. It initially included 11 factions, covering most of the territory (see mapping above), which were, in January and February

2013, reduced to 7 through the merging of various groups (Lund, 2013: 25-‐27). Since April 2013, the SIF counts one new member, the Haqq Battalions Gathering (Tajammou Kataeb al-‐Haqq) (Lund, May 3 2013). Between 10.000 and 30.000 fighters could be part of the SIF (Lund, 2013: 23).


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Talks between initial SIF groups and the SLF had taken place when the SLF was created, but failed for various reasons, from ideological to disagreements between groups.

Lund (Ibid: 17-‐19) qualifies the SIF as an Islamist “Third Way,” strictly salafist but also pragmatic, able to discuss with the West, and to cooperate on the ground with the SMC or with salafi-‐jihadi groups, while also criticizing the latter, as shows the 4 May 2013 statement by Ahrar al-‐Sham on “Jabhat al-‐Nosra’s recent declaration of allegiance to al-‐Qaida’s Ayman al-‐Zawahiri.” (Lund, 4 May 2013):

“It seeks to demonstrate a strict salafi identity, and makes no attempt to hide its opposition to secularism and democracy. but it also tries to highlight a streak of pragmatism and moderation, intended to reassure both syrians and foreign policymakers. In this way, it sets itself apart as an Islamist ”third way”, different from both the most radical fringe of the uprising, and from its Western-‐backed islamist mainstream.” (Lund, 2013: 17)

However, the SIF aims at establishing a Sunni Islamist Theocracy, allowing only some modicum of consultation and political freedom within the bounds of sharia law (Ibid: 19). It has already started working towards this goal when, as described by Lund (Ibid: 25), it develops a “humanitarian and non-‐military activity.” It does not only fight but also plays the role of a real political authority, which strengthens both its mobilization power and its resource-‐base. Thus, overthrowing the regime of Bashar al-‐Assad is only a step towards achieving its objectives, and the “Third Way” may only last temporarily, assuming the SIF continues its current course, and finds access to sufficient and secure resources and fundings (for details on funding see Ibid: 27).

For more details on the SIF and, among others, salafism in Syria, I highly recommend Lund’s report.

For an estimate of the overall fighters belonging to the “Salafis-‐nationalists” should be added the unknown number of fighters belonging to groups other than the SIF and the SLF.

UPDATE 26 MAY 2013

�The SLF would have declared war on The Kurds: “a statement signed by no less than twenty-‐one armed groups declared ”Kurdish defense units, YPG, are traitors because they are against our Jihad.”The goal, according to the statement, is a “pending the completion of comprehensive cleansing process”, liberation from “PKK and Shabiha”. The statement was published by the “Syrian Islamic Liberation Front” – Syria Report, 27 May 2013 – “Insurgents Declare War on Syrian Kurds“


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Sunni extremist factions with a global jihadi agenda

The last nexus is composed of salafi-‐jihadi groups (see mapping next page) or salafis groups with a global agenda, such as Al Qaida, and includes many foreign fighters -‐ Tunisian, Libyan, Iraqi, Chechen (e.g. Solovieva, 26 April 2013, AlMonitor; Kavkav center, 26 March 2013) and European. ICSR Insight estimates that “between 140 and 600 Europeans” from fourteen countries, “have gone to Syria since early 2011, representing 7-‐11 per cent of the foreign fighter total” (April 2013).

Jahbat Al-‐Nosra or Al-‐Nusra

Jahbat Al-‐Nusra (JAN) was created in January 2012 and declared a terrorist group by the U.S. in December 2012. It is seen “as the most effective fighting force in Syria” (Bergen and Rowland, 10 April 2013). In November 2012, Washington Post David Ignatius, using sources from the FSA, considered it included “between 6,000 and 10,000 fighters.”

However, other groups fighting in Syria have a global Jihadi agenda. Are those other groups actually included within the count for JAN or not? Furthermore we know of the presence of many foreign fighters. Are the latter counted within the figures given for JAN or not? Most importantly, are those

UPDATE 8 JULY 2013

�Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi in his meticulous analysis of the relationships between JAN and ISIS (see below), for the region of Raqqah (24 June 2013 for Jihadology), following common demonstrations, questions:

“In Raqqah itself, further evidence of an ISIS-‐JAN unity became clear in the counter-‐demonstrations on the ground. Here is one such video, featuring several youths holding the banners of Harakat Ahrar ash-‐Sham al-‐Islamiya (which, to recall, was the main group of battalions responsible for the rebel takeover of Raqqah in March), ISIS and the general flag of jihad.

… The recent developments should also debunk the false dichotomy posed by some commentators of ‘Salafist nationalist’ Syrian Islamic Front [SIF] groups like Harakat Ahrar ash-‐Sham al-‐Islamiya versus transnational jihadist groups (cf. my overview of statements put out by various factions on Sheikh Jowlani’s bayah to Sheikh Aymenn al-‐Zawahiri).”


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figures increasing or decreasing, and if they are increasing, which populations are mobilized?

Until the more recent successful offensive of pro-‐Assad groups (Spyer, 3 May 2013), the salafis nationalists and the global jihadis tended to be most successful militarily, seizing important locations and infrastructure, while they mobilized effectively, somehow along the lines of a “People’s War” (less the Maoist ideology).

This, in turn, prompted progressively the beginning of a change of policy regarding the delivery and type of aid given to the moderate factions by their supporting external powers. It also potentially started to soften the position of Russia, concerned by the development of jihadi terrorism, thus allowing for improvement in diplomatic talks towards negotiations, as explained by Putin in an interview with German broadcaster ARD (Ria Novosti, 5 April 2013).

ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and al-‐Sham) and JAN

In mid-‐April, Jabhat al-‐Nosra, answering to al-‐Zawahiri and then to Abu Bakr al-‐Baghdadi, leader of Al Qaida in Iraq (ISI, Islamic State of Iraq) who had declared wanting to create the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-‐Sham (ISIS – logo on the left handside) and as excellently summarized by Lund (4 May 2013) “promised to follow every order from Zawahiri as long as this does not


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contravene sharia law,” while refusing merging with ISI or ISIS (see for full detailed analysis and translated documents, Barber, 14 April 2013). Jabhat al-‐Nosra thus asserts an Al Qaida in Syria, in a nationalist move that is not without recalling salafi-‐nationalist groups, and stresses its aim to establish an Islamist state in Syria, “The Islamic State of al-‐Sham”. Al-‐Sham stands for Bilad al-‐Sham, i.e. The Levant (today’s Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and potentially the Hatay Province of Turkey). The choice of words could potentially indicate a wish to revise borders, although such aim would need to be proven.

UPDATE 8 JULY 2013

Aymen Jawad Al Tamimi evaluates the relationships between JAN and ISIS, where they sometimes designate the same entity, but not always, through meticulous and thorough regional analyses:

� Jabhat al-‐Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-‐Sham: Deir ez-‐Zor and the wider east of Syria;

� Jabhat al-‐Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-‐Sham in Raqqah: Demonstrations and Counter-‐Demonstrations;

� Jabhat al-‐Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-‐Sham: Deraa Governorate.

Unfortunately, no estimates of forces that would be specific to ISIS, according to cases are included. It might be very difficult if not impossible to evaluate them.


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Scenarios: The future of Syria within the next five years Now that we know and understand better the actors present on the Syrian battlefield, we may start outlining scenarios regarding first plausible futures for Syria and prospects for peace over the short to medium term, and second some of the regional implications of those scenarios, as the regional and even global geostrategic dimensions of the war in Syria are becoming clearer everyday. The regional and global impacts will be explored and revised, if need be, in volume 2.

The various scenarios constructed and detailed below are summarized in the following graph.

This “mapping” starts exploring ways to look at sets of scenarios as a systemic and dynamic whole. The thickness of the arrow shows higher probability and shorter timeline: the thicker an arrow, the


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more likely and the quicker a scenario would evolve in a specific direction; alternatively a dotted line shows lower probability and/or longer timeline. Probability and timeline will evolve according to events.

Scenario 1: Peace in Geneva?

The diplomatic talks promoting a negotiated settlement of the Syrian civil war are successful and negotiations start.

Sub-scenario 1.1.: All but the Jihadis

The actors brought around the table are the NC and the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SMC), the regime of Bashar al-‐Assad represented by a face-‐saving person for the regime and a person that would be acceptable to

all other parties (assuming such a person exist), the Supreme Kurdish Council (SKC) and the Salafi-‐Nationalist groups.

Sub-‐scenario 1.1.1.: A fragile Syrian external peace

An external peace can be brokered. We would have a very fragile peace including all actors except those fighting for a global Jihad. Considering the current level of escalation and the intentions of the most extremist factions, if we want to increase the likelihood to see a real positive peace – corresponding to many Western countries’ declared foreign policy vision, upholding the rule of law and human rights – last, then we need to make sure that the following elements are included: a strong presence and support of the international community (despite the public deficit challenge mentioned above), a properly devised strategic plan and real actions rather than unrealistic pledges that are inherently escalating when what must be stopped is also the “people”s war” efficient policy of the extremist factions.

Timing would also be of the essence once the peace is brokered, as speed and real efficiency are crucial. Notably, and considering the heightened sensitivity of a people having had to go through a civil war, as well as the religious environment, corruption and various dysfunctions within the peace-‐building intervening system, should be avoided.

It would thus be crucial to start working towards a proper plan to construct the peace as soon as possible, using all bilateral and multilateral cooperation channels. To make sure the peace-‐building


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process is properly implemented, actionable early warning and monitoring systems should be planned and constructed from the start.

The next five to ten years would remain a very delicate period with heightened risks of re-‐escalation towards war.

Sub-‐scenario 1.1.2.: Back to civil war – Jihadis’ advantage?

The negotiations fail and Syria falls again into civil war, but with changed conditions: the failure will have a price for each actor involved, according to the reasons for and conditions surrounding the failure. The global-‐jihadi groups would most probably benefit most.

Sub-scenario 1.2.: All but the Salafis

The actors brought around the table are the NC and the SMC, the regime of Bashar al-‐Assad represented by a face-‐saving person for the regime and a person that would be acceptable to all other parties (assuming such a person exist) and the SKC.

The Salafi-‐Nationalist groups (all or most of them), even those having linked to the SMC, would refuse to participate in the negotiations.

Sub-‐scenario 1.2.1.: An unlikely very fragile external peace

The negotiations succeed. The external peace that is brokered is even more fragile. The prospects for successfully implementing it would be greatly reduced. All the risks already present in the previous sub-‐scenario (1.1.1) would be heightened. With a level of power (resources, troops and actions) constant compared with sub-‐scenario 1.1.1., the likelihood of success would be inversely proportional to the policy and actions of the Salafi-‐Nationalist groups, ranging from only refusing to participate in the negotiations and settlement to actively denouncing and fighting them. To increase the likelihood of success, the level of power applied would have to be proportionally enhanced and the length of time during which this power would be necessary would have to be increased. In other words, more troops and more civilian personal, as well as more resources would have to be dedicated to Syria for longer.

Sub-‐scenario 1.2.2.: Back to civil war – Salafis’ advantage?

The negotiations fail and Syria is dragged again into civil war.

Scenario similar to 1.1.2 but with a very strong advantage for the Salafi groups, be they nationalist or jihadi.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 1

What could enhance the likelihood to see such a scenario happening? What are the supporting facts


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increasing the plausibility of scenario 1?

▪ The civil war in Syria drags on, with specific evolution and dynamics over the winter 2012/2013 favouring diplomatic talks between international powers (see end of last post);

▪ Fear by external actors to see further use and spread of chemical weapons,

▪ Heightened fear by external actors to see the Syrian conflict spilling over further, which was bound to happen considering its regional and global dimension, supported notably by the Al Qaeda nexus April statements, by the declarations of Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah acknowledging his group fights besides the regime of Bashar al-‐Assad (Black and Roberts, The Guardian, 30 April 2013), by the 3 and 5 May Israeli attacks on Syria (e.g. interesting analysis by Ben Caspit, 5 May 2013, AlMonitor), then by the 11 May 2013 terror attack on the Turkish town of Reyhanli, (Daloglu, 12 May 2013 AlMonitor), the latter linking too to the refugees issue and its destabilizing dimension for neighbouring countries.

▪ Difficulty to implement rapidly, efficiently and with a high likelihood of success any other solution. Lack of clear support in the domestic constituencies of potentially intervening countries, notably in the U.S., for those solutions, and possible polarisation of opinions, considering multiple diasporas and humanitarian disaster.

▪ Cost of intervention for intervening countries, considering the widespread problem of public deficits and the solutions usually chosen to face this challenge (reduction of public expenses and privatization of the state).

▪ Leading to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Secretary of State John Kerry announcement that Russia and The U.S. had agreed “to work towards convening an international conference to find a political solution to the conflict in Syria,” and thus to the continuation of diplomatic work in this direction (BBC, 7 May 2013), as well as to the ongoing diplomatic exchanges between concerned partied.

▪ Increased violence and multiplication of attacks -‐ to a point -‐ would not be an indication that talks will finally fail to bring about peace negotiations, nor that peace negotiations are breaking down, as actors will seek the strongest bargaining position possible at the negotiation table and this position is obtained through fighting. Renewed battles should be seen as (a dramatic) part of the overall negotiation process.

▪ Which Syrian actors must participate? Considering the diversity of actors on the ground, this point is particularly delicate, crucial and will most probably lead to many discussions, declarations, bargains and twists, as the two declarations below let us expect.


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Moaz Al-‐Khatib, ex-‐President of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) suggested “We refuse any radical thinking but this does not mean we can exclude them, they are Syrians and they have the right to speak up, and we need to enter into a dialogue with them. They are Syrians and for me a Syrian is worth more than the whole world” (Phil Sands, The National, May 9, 2013). It is most likely that an official participation by Salafi-‐Jihadi groups will be rejected by international powers as well as by part of the NC factions, however covert dialogue could take place between Syrian some actors. The question could also be asked for Salafi-‐Nationalist groups.

The surprising declaration by “Abdul Qader Saleh, commander of the Al-‐Tawhid Brigade,” member of the Syrian Liberation Front to “the Turkish news agency Cihan” accusing Israel to have destroyed weapons that were about to be seized by “the rebellion” and not arms that were about to reach the Hezbollah, thus to side with Iran and the Hezbollah to support Assad (Ynet, 13 May 2013) could signal an early hardening of the SLF (which had been suggested as possible by Lund, 2013: 27). This declaration might in turn prepare the ground for refusing the potential negotiations or for building a stronger bargaining position.

Scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva

The diplomatic talks fail and the international conference in Geneva does not take place or is a face-‐saving sham

Scenario

Considering the current forces on the ground and their balance, we would face a lengthening conflict (probably over years rather than months) with rising prospects of regional and global involvement and chaos. The scope and

depth of regional and global spill over would increase with the duration of the Syrian civil war, and, in turn, fuel it.

The spill over and contagion would most probably take four shapes (not mutually exclusive). First, we would face any action ranging from covert operations to war-‐like actions to war between states (all probably escalating towards wars). This aspect, in its less intense forms, is actually already operating,


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although the states involved are very cautious not to cross the line (in terms of official statement and language) that would force them into war, as shows, for example, the two Israeli raids on Syria and the way they are reported (among others, see the US apology for confirming Israeli strikes -‐ Jerusalem Post 19 May 2013) . The political part of this spill over is being continually enacted, reminding us of Von Clausewitz famous “War is the mere continuation of politics by other means.” Second, we would face a similar range of actions but between states and actors dubbed “non-‐state actors,” yet vying for state power). Those two forms of contagion are usually imagined or expected as occurring within the Middle East, lately enlarged to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This is however too narrow a view, as Russia reminded us on 17 May 2013 when it sent “at least 12 warships to patrol waters near its naval base in Tartous, Syria.” (Times of Israel, 17 May 2013) to underline the importance of its interest in Syria and in the region, as underlined, for example by Eldar (AlMonitor, 19 May 2013). The American debate over the type, value and wisdom of an American involvement in Syria is another obvious example of the way the Syrian conflict spills over beyond the region.

Third, countries welcoming Syrian refugees (1,52 million people on 20 May 2013 – UNHCR -‐ see detailed map below) will face a risk of destabilization stemming from the massive influx of people in countries that were not prepared for them, and were already sometimes facing difficult situations. Furthermore, refugees may be linked to fighting units and carry on activities linked to the Syrian war in the host country, thus heightening the risk of seeing those countries dragged into the conflict. Those factors and resulting tensions are already at work, notably in Lebanon (e.g. Euronews 18 May 2013), Jordan (e.g. C. Phillips, The World Today, Volume 68, Number 8/9), Turkey (e.g. Ibid., Krohn, The Atlantic, 17 May 2013).

A fourth, more unconventional, form of contagion must also be considered. As the crisis lengthens in Europe, European individuals attracted to Salafi-‐jihadi would increasingly travel to and from Syria (see ICSR Insight, April 2013), heightening not only the direct threat of terrorism within Europe (Europol TE-‐SAT 2013: 7, 20, 24) and possibly in the U.S. and Canada but also the spread of Salafi-‐jihadi cells. Considering the crisis and the “fragilising” policies of austerity and “externalization” – i.e. privatization of the state – (especially those concerning the legitimate monopoly of violence), actions by Salafi-‐jihadi cells could heighten the risk of polarization, for example by favouring further the rise and strengthening of already spreading right-‐wing extremist movements. Crisis-‐related unrest could be a favourable environment for violent actions from Salafi-‐jihadi cells, that would then feed into a more generalized political turmoil. The spread of Salafi-‐jihadi ideology in countries hit not only by the crisis but also by a lack of hope and vision as well as by denial – whatever the hardship and dangers faced by citizens – is not to discard. In this light, the novel vision promoted by the new Pope Francois 1st, warning against “the cult of money and the dictatorship of an economy which is faceless and lacking any truly human goal” (Squires, The Telegraph, 16 May 2013) might be considered as a potential counterweight.


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Similar heightened risks would exist for any country where nationals have found their way to fight in Syria, as for example, Tunisia (Sgrena, IPS, 6 April 2013), and increase with the fragility of the domestic political situation.

Until a real peace takes hold in Syria (and this is thus true too for scenarios 1.1.2. and 1.2.2., see previous post), it will be most necessary to use all anticipatory intelligence or strategic foresight and warning means, foreign policy instruments, and, ultimately, military intervention (which may also be seen as a de facto spill over of the conflict), to try preventing further spill over of the Syrian civil war, assuming this is still possible.

In scenarios 1 and 2, the efficiency of the support provided to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces will need to be intensely monitored, and aid – lethal and non lethal, official and covert – will have to be steered according to results and potential consequences. In scenario 1, this specific aid, as well as all support (see state of play, part I, II, III) given to specific parties should disappear once a peace agreement is signed. In scenario 2, all aid will need to be monitored in the framework of the types of involvement chosen by the various international actors.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 2

What could enhance the likelihood to see such a scenario happening? Events happening currently in the MENA region – and beyond – as well as on the Syrian battlefield must also be read with this dimension in mind. The potential spoilers below must be seen as related and most of the time feeding into each other.

▪ It is finally impossible to find a solution that would be acceptable to all permanent members of the UN Security Council.

▪ Crucial international actors seek to extract too many advantages from other nations – related or unrelated to the region – and diplomatic talks fail.

▪ Events surrounding the Syrian issue, be it on the battlefield or internationally, finally derail the diplomatic talks by prompting the withdrawal of too many important (because of their involvement with and in Syria or because of their power) international actors. For example, the 15 May 2013 UN General Assembly adoption of the text “condemning violence in Syria, demanding that all sides end hostilities” was judged by both China and Russia as unhelpful, but it may also be read, as underlined by Nashashibi (AlArabyia, 20 May 2013) as an effort to stress the importance of a peaceful solution to the conflict, of “effective representative interlocutors for a political transition,” and thus of the necessity of an international conference. It is also possible that the terror attack in the Turkish town of Reyhanli is part of an effort to derail diplomatic talks (e.g. Seibert, DW, 14 May 2013).


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▪ It is impossible to bring the regime of Bashar al-‐Assad to the negotiation table. Similarly, if it were impossible to find a person to represent the regime of Bashar al-‐Assad that would be acceptable to all parties, then, the international conference could not take place, or, if it were still happening, it would most probably only be a sham, i.e. all parties would not be represented or those accepting to sit at the negotiation table would not be representative of what is happening on the ground.

▪ A major surprise occurs that would change the international outlook on Syria and the war. The diplomatic talks could be terminated.

Evolutions for Scenario 2

Scenario 2 should lead either to Scenario 1 or to Scenario 3 (A real Victory in Syria, forthcoming). The main challenge we are facing here, as analysts, is to determine when one or the other will become likely or more likely. The timeline will depend upon what happens under the fog of war, knowing that the thicker the fog, the heightened the possibility for surprise. We shall thus have to constantly monitor the war situation, and, accordingly, revise – and improve – all possible scenarios. For example, a potential break up of Syria would then also have to be included as sub-‐scenario (for Scenario 1 and Scenario 3).

Scenario 2 could also, theoretically, lead to a Scenario 4, the invasion and annexation of Syria by an external power. However, considering the current international norms and settings, such a scenario is most unlikely and may be put aside. Should those norms change, or should the current international tension and crises bring about severe upheavals, then the likelihood of scenario 4 would have to be revised and the scenario developed. We may note an unintended side effect stemming from the international ban on war for conquest. If it improved greatly peace and stability, it also tends to remove an incentive on domestic actors to stop civil war: the warring factions do not risk to see an external actor use the fragility brought about by civil war to annex their territory, thus they can continue fighting.


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Scenario 3: A Real Victory in Syria?

Once the victory of one of the belligerents over all others happens, the victor is in a strong domestic position, and may start reconstructing a true peace. This scenario is derived from Edward Luttwak, “Give war a chance,” (Foreign Affairs; Jul/Aug 1999; 78, 4). Besides a real victory for one of the belligerents, Luttwak sees a second possibility that could lead to a true peace: the exhaustion of all belligerents. I shall not here take into account this hypothesis because in a short to medium term future, it

seems to be improbable, considering the multiple existing external involvements.

Considering the current state of play, scenario 3: A Real Victory in Syria, and its sub-‐scenarios are rather unlikely in the short-‐term. However, they are worth outlining because they bring analytical insight into dynamics and potential strategies to favour or counter one or the other possibility, according to interests, and because they could be relevant for the medium term. The chaos and beginning of “warlordism” that characterizes the Syrian situation, as emphasised by analysts, (e.g. Joshua Landis, 1 May 2013, Syria Comment; Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi, 14 May 2013, Jihadology; see also first post of the series on Syria) lead to the relatively small probability to see any of those scenarios (or rather variations on them) happening. Nonetheless, as for scenario 1: Peace in Geneva and scenario 2: No Syrian in Geneva, and besides signals indicating an improvement in the ambient disorder, we shall attempt to outline indicators that could be more specifically monitored for assessment of likelihood and timeline.

Scenario 3 explanation

The first years would still be difficult and the new government would have to develop novel ways to stabilize the situation, making sure the vanquished would not find a way back towards violence and war. The state administration would have to be reconstructed where it has been destroyed so that the mission of political authorities may be carried upon successfully. Yet, we are in a political configuration that is much easier than what we had in scenario 1. Indeed, war cannot truly be won on a given territory without fighting troops that are sufficiently united to enable proper strategy, operations and tactics, and without a population that is mobilized and/or controlled (the “support” given by the people can be achieved with more or less coercion, but needs to be there – see notably the literature


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on counter-‐insurgency, and also theories – and practice – of People’s war). Thus, achieving victory means that the victor has also succeeded in having an efficient monopoly of the means of violence (the winning fighting troops and the coercive apparatus within the population, ranging from mild to violent), as well as a way to extract surplus from the population in exchange for services (including waging the war).

As a result, winning the war implies that the fundamental processes underlying functioning political authorities have been implemented and mastered. The change from war and emergency to peace must still be achieved, while the new political authorities must consolidate their legitimacy, and those are crucial challenges, hence the difficult first years, but the foundations for succeeding are there.

How the stabilization from war to peace would be done, with which type of political authorities, and under which kind of regime, would vary with the victorious belligerent. The international impact would change accordingly, with, in turn, consequences on the Syrian domestic situation and the type of peace the victor would succeed in implementing.

Scenario 3.1.: An Islamic al-Sham?

Scenario

If the victorious groups were Salafi-‐Jihadi, they would create a theocracy, a strict Sharia state. If we refer to Jabhat al-‐Nusra’s April declaration (Barber, 14 April 2013, Syria Comment), then they would seek to create the Islamic State of Al-‐Sham, i.e. a political entity covering the Levant. If we refer to Abu Bakr al-‐Baghdadi, the leader of Al-‐Qa’ida in Iraq, then their objective would be to create the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-‐Sham (ISIS) (Ibid). As explained by Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi (14 May 2013) and by Lund (22 May 2013, Syria Comment), who also reviews other related analyses, we are currently under a thick fog of war as to what is happening within the Al-‐Qa’ida factions in Syria: we do not know exactly if there is strife between various groups, how important it is, and which side, if any, will win (see for an update, 8 July, p.27).

Whatever the reality that will emerge, and for the sake of this scenario, thus assuming that the victorious groups are Salafi-‐jihadi, the current territorial Syria (with or without the Syrian Kurdistan, according to the way the war would be waged on that part of the territory and won or lost there) would most probably be seen as the heart from which the war to conquer the rest of


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the Levant (with or without Iraq according to case) could be waged. The new Al Sham would thus be expansionist and carrying the Salafi-‐Jihadi aim that “seek[s] to establish an islamic caliphate that would encompass the entire Umma, or Muslim community” (O’Bagy, September 2012:17) through all means, from overt war to supporting terrorist networks and individual jihad abroad.

The caliphate or Khilafa is explained in and defined with different terms according to authors, yet similarities remain, notably expansion:

Dr. Reza Pankhurst “The most famous exposition of the Islamic theory of State was by the scholar al-‐Mawardi, who claimed that the establishment of the Caliphate was an Islamic obligation agreed upon by the scholars. His treatise al-‐Ahkam al-‐Sultaniyya (the rules of governance) remains one of the major classical references for Islamic political theory. In it, he explains that the ruler is either elected by the peoples’ representatives or through being nominated by the previous Caliph. The Caliph’s responsibilities include implementing the hudood (punishments explicitly proscribed in Islam for acts such as theft, rebellion, public acts of extra-‐marital intercourse), collecting and distributing the taxes according to the Sharia prescriptions, and to protect and expand the borders of the Islamic State.” Dr. Reza Pankhurst, political scientist and historian, specializing in the Middle East and Islamic movements, “Understanding Calls to a Caliphate,” 22 August 2011, Foreign Policy Journal.

Dr Usama Hasan “Khilafa (caliphate) for Islamists is the idea that they are duty bound to establish “Islamic states” – described by vague, theoretical, idealistic platitudes – that would then be united in a global, pan-‐Islamic state or ‘new caliphate’.” Quilliam Foundation researcher Dr Usama Hasan for BBC News, 24 May 2013

Raymond Ibrahim “Both historically and doctrinally, the caliphate’s function is to wage jihad, whenever and wherever possible, to bring the infidel world under Islamic dominion and enforce sharia. In fact, most of what is today called the “Muslim world”—from Morocco to Pakistan—was conquered, bit by bit, by a caliphate that began in Arabia in 632. A jihad-‐waging, sharia-‐enforcing caliphate represents a permanent, existentialist enemy—not a temporal foe that can be bought or pacified through diplomacy or concessions. Such a caliphate is precisely what Islamists around the world are feverishly seeking to establish.” Raymond Ibrahim, associate director of the Middle East Forum, 8 March 2011, Gatestone Institute.


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Despite the necessity for expansion, aggressive actions might also be delayed, or slowed, to allow first for consolidation at home.

However, if the rivalry between Salafi-‐Jihadi groups were to re-‐appear after a victory on the Syrian territory, then the chance for consolidating peace at home would be reduced because of internecine struggle, following, in essence on those that would be taking place currently. In the meantime, the potential for aggressive jihadi actions would be enhanced, as all groups would want to assert their Jihadi credentials and use them to ideologically motivate fighters, while probably also alienating part of the population, which would again contribute to lower the odds to fully stabilize the situation domestically.

The states directly threatened by an aggressive Al-‐Sham – and other similar regional entities – would have no other choice than to retaliate. The prospects for a regional and global conflagration would be heightened. Peace in Syria would have been short.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.1.

To date, the likelihood to see this scenario happening is summarized by Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi (14 May 2013): “In the midst of such chaos, I see it as unlikely that JAN [Jabhat al-‐Nusra] will either substantially advance its position or lose ground beyond likely strongholds in the north and east. While JAN may routinely be described as the most effective fighting force, it can be too easy to overstate the group’s actual size and influence. To sum up, I see an equilibrium of disorder developing. »

Using Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi’s article as well as Lund’s (22 May 2013), we can come up with a few indicators that should be followed, besides following the course of the war in Syria:

▪ The state of tension, from disagreement to split within Al-‐Qa’ida groups operating in Syria and between all Salafi-‐Jihadi factions.

▪ The evolution of the situation in Iraq, notably of Al-‐Qa’ida.

▪ The degree of acceptance of strict sharia law within the Syrian population, as well as within the larger regional and global Sunni population.

▪ The existence of viable alternatives, both materially and spiritually, for the population, including the persistence of hope: if no other models are provided besides an Islamic state of Al Sham and a caliphate, if people are desperate, then they may well find progressively new meaning and survival in a Islamic Al Sham (read on this the beginning of Reza Pankhurst’s article (22 August 2011).

▪ The capability of the Salafi-‐Jihadi groups first as belligerents then as winning rulers for sustained domestic control and coercion, on the one hand, for co-‐optation and persuasion on the other.


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Scenario 3.2.: A Nationalist Islamic Syria?

Scenario

If the victorious groups are Sunni Islamist and Salafi-‐Nationalist factions, then they would implement an Islamic state in Syria. According to Lund, and assuming those groups follow the January 2013 SIF’s official charter, they would “establish a state guided by sharia law at all costs, while also making some gestures towards moderation and tolerance for minority groups”,

(p.16) or in their own terms they would “… build a civilized Islamic society in Syria, ruled by the law of God” (p.19).

They would be opposed “to secularism and democracy” (p.17) because “Islamic Shari’a cannot be put to a vote” (p.20) however, “elections could still be used as a system to appoint representatives and leaders…” as long as modalities and potential parties are bound by Shari’ia.

Rather than adopting a confrontational position they would be “eager to reach a modus vivendi with the West”, as shows their willingness “to open communication channels” during the war. (p.18)

On the path to victory, as they would have given as much attention to war as to building the real foundations for an Islamic society (“the civilian movement, from which springs missionary, educational, humanitarian, media, political and [public] service [movements]” (19), once in power their task towards stabilizing peace would be eased. They would seek to maintain, expand and deepen those already existing structures and processes. They would focus on Syria and its needs.

Succeeding fully in building this type of peace in Syria would most probably be hardest and most challenging as far as non Sunni Islamist groups are concerned. How could the very different faith and ways of life be accommodated by a state abiding to Shari’a ? Could they be successfully integrated, and how? Or would this lead to renewed civil war, to multiple exoduses, and in the case of the Kurds to a semi-‐autonomous or fully independent Kurdistan?

Assuming that the best way to integrate those communities is not found, would this lead again to foreign involvement and, as a result to heightened possibilities for war?


The more pragmatic and more Syria-‐centric agenda of those groups, as well as the number of fighters (between 47000 and 67000 fighters if estimates (Lund, Ignatius, see State of Play) for the SIF and the SLF/SILF are added), and their structure, imply that this scenario is less unlikely than the previous one.


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However, considering the military strength of the Pro-‐Assad groups, as well as the rising regionalization of the civil war, it is still far from being likely.

Some indicators that could be followed as influencing the likelihood of this scenario:

▪ Continuing disunity and internecine struggle within the “moderate” opposition (NC) with impact on the capacity to garner support without and within and related consequence on military operations.

▪ Success or failure in the opening of communication channels with the West – and more broadly internationally – by such groups on the mode of what is done by the SIF, and in the ability to convince about their pragmatic, Syrian centric approach.

▪ Capacity of those groups to endeavour and succeed in providing the Syrian population with “public services” both according to the groups ideology and without creating any adverse reaction.

▪ Increasing regionalisation of the conflict and international wish to put an end to it.

▪ Change in the overall configuration of the external support.

Scenario 3.3.: A Secular Syria?

This scenario (or rather a variation around this theme) would be meant to happen if the victorious group is the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) and its corresponding fighting arm, the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC).

This would first presuppose that the various groups affiliated with the SMC succeed in uniting their forces to fight, while the NC would find a widely accepted way to elect representatives and to function. Notably, this would imply that internecine struggles, as were for example displayed during the last week of May 2013 (e.g. Barber for Syria Comments, 27 May 2013), between more secular and moderate groups, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Muslim Brotherhood – as well as their supports – stop, and that whatever alliances were made with various factions hold and are honoured. The NC and the SMC would also need to find a way to manage the “correct” support from their allies, i.e. enough and in the right manner to have sufficient fire power to fight successfully and to deliver to the population they seek to mobilize and who are under their authority, yet without creating an adverse reaction among Nationalists who could accuse them to sell Syria to foreign interests.

Considering the differences existing between the Muslin Brotherhood and other groups, we may imagine two possible sub-‐scenarios.


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Scenario 3.3.1. A Muslim Brotherhood’s Syria

Scenario

Assuming a NC with a Muslim Brotherhood strong leaning wins, and that it has achieved enough power over the fighting forces of the SMC, we would have a system that “supports democratic elections and many political freedoms while espousing a vision for a Syrian state that implements Sunni Islamic frames of reference for its legislation.” (O’Bagy, Jihad in Syria, Sept 2012 :17).

Indeed as Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi notes, the “Muslim Brotherhood’s conception of applying Islamic law [is] through gradual action…step by step, in order to facilitate understanding, studying, acceptance and submission” (for Syria Comment, 20

March 2013). If we turn to the text used as reference by Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi, we not only find a description of this needed gradual action, but also reference to the ultimate aim, the restoration of the Caliphate:

”We must not impose Islamic shari’a, forcing the people to adopt something about which they are ignorant and with which they are unfamiliar… If we do this, [various] ploys will be used to circumvent it, and there will be hypocrisy. [People] will exhibit Islamic [behavior] only outwardly…

“Noah, peace be upon him, received a clear sign, a stark vision, a prophecy, and mercy that his people did not understand… Noah could not force or impose [his faith upon the people]. He determined the principle of choosing [one's] faith [as a result of] persuasion and reflection, [instead of] oppression, authority, condescension, and coercion. …

“There is no other way but gradual action, preparing the [people's] souls and setting an example, so that faith will enter their hearts… Gradual action does not impose Islam at once, but rather step by step, in order to facilitate understanding, studying, acceptance, and submission.

…

“The Prophet, peace be upon him, acted in a gradual manner, by first preparing the people, and then [preparing] family, society, state, and finally the caliphate…

“I ask the honorable Al-‐Azhar to rally the Islamic streams in order to unite the Muslim word and effort, restore the caliphate, and prepare a practical


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plan to implement the law of Allah the Exalted. “ (Article on Muslim Brotherhood Website: Implement Shari’a in Phases, June 11, 2011; MEMRI, July 5, 2011, Special Dispatch No.3969)

This scenario can thus be seen as a mix of scenario 3.2. in terms of pace and pragmatic approach, being even ready for slower changes, with, at the beginning, a less strict view of what can be done or not, and of scenario 3.1. in terms of ultimate goal, but on a much longer timeframe, and certainly with different means.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.3.1.

This scenario, so far, seems to be quite unlikely considering the weakness and disunity of the NC and of the SMC. Furthermore, the very history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, implying, as explained by O’Bagy (Jihad in Syria, 2012: 11-‐13), the distrust of the population and the weakness of their presence and network within Syria, would make it even less likely, despite the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood within the NC today.

Some indicators that could be followed as influencing the likelihood of this scenario

▪ Strong external support (up to external intervention) compensating for absence of legitimacy, of support network and of presence on the ground and allowing to create one

▪ Ability to unite factions under Brotherhood’s leadership;

▪ Absence or disappearance of better alternative for various actors, notably the population

▪ Successful “hearts and minds” campaign within Syria to win over the population and build legitimacy.

Scenario 3.3.2. A Truly Secular Syria?

This scenario is unlikely, even utopic. Yet, imagining it will also suggest possible policy and strategy that could change the odds.

Scenario

To see a secular Syria rising from the ashes of the war would presuppose a victory of the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SJMCC or SMC), especially won by fighters affiliated with moderate or secular groups, while the ascendency of the Muslim Brotherhood within the political corresponding body, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) has waned.

As of today, it is thus even more unlikely than the previous scenario. First, the absence of coordination and of an efficient command-‐and-‐control structure, as analysed by Ignatius (7 June 2013, The Washington Post) in the recent loss of Qusair to the pro Al-‐Assad groups is a severe impediment.


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Second, the estimated weakness in numbers of fighters of the FSA (if Islamist and Muslim Brotherhood’s supported groups are not included) seriously constrains the possibility of victory (Ignatius, 3 April 2013 and Lund, 4 April 2013). Finally, the secular and moderate within the NC hardly have any external support, as the American and European hesitations show daily.

Nevertheless, let us imagine that dynamics change and that this utopian scenario becomes a reality, under a new type of leadership, successfully unifying and mobilizing the rebellion in a non-‐sectarian way. Building upon Matthew Barber’s series of three posts (27 May 2013 for Syrian Comment) focusing on Sufi Sheikh Muhammad al-‐Yaqoubi and how hopes to see him officially elected to the National Coalition were dashed at the end of May 2013, this leadership could be Sufi. Indeed, Barber underlines:

“An emerging Sufi current within the Syrian resistance could soon provide an alternative to Muslim Brotherhood hegemony and change the dynamics of the political opposition.” (Barber, 22 May 2013, Syria Comment)

Countries, such as the U.S., the U.K., or France, who look for a way to support a solution that would end the Syrian conflict, avoid a sectarian bloodshed and the prospect of a Syrian balkanization, respect democracy and fundamental rights, without favouring extremism, and further tensions or even war in the region, would have perceived backing such a current as an answer. Practically, and depending upon further investigation, interested actors would have worked with “the Movement for Building Civilization” or Tiyaar Binaa’ al-‐Hadara, which should be ”operating soon out of an office in Jordan” (Interview with Sheikh al-‐Ya’qoubi, Barber, 30 May 2013). As explained by Barber,

“Sheikh al-‐Ya’qoubi and other Sufi leaders have been building influence lately, working together for about six months to form an umbrella organization for rebel groups comprised of Sunnis and Sufis aligned with Syria’s mainstream values, rather than Islamist agendas. The organization is called the Movement for Building Civilization. He and his peers have produced a charter document which rebels groups can sign.” (Barber, 22 May 2013, Syria Comment)

Starting from the 200 groups with which the Sufi Sheikhs (ibid.), strengthened by the novel supports received, more groups would join under a fortifying SMC, which would be increasingly victorious, despite fierce battles. Meanwhile, the ascendency of the moderates within the NC would increase. According to Barber (Ibid., see also the series on Salafi and Sufi influences on Islam in Syria in Syria Comment, 2007), Sufi ulema enjoy considerable backing within the Sunni Muslim population in Syria. According to Sheikh al-‐Ya’qoubi, “probably one-‐quarter of the Syrian population is Sufi” (interview), which would represent 5.6 million people (on World Bank estimates for 2012).


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Such highly respected figures as

“Sheikh al-‐Ya’qoubi represent[s] the kind of moderate, traditional Islam that most Syrians are familiar with, the Islam challenged by both the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists. Though taking an unambiguous stance against the regime’s violence, injustice, and terror, he [Sheikh al-‐Ya’qoubi] also continues to exert his influence encouraging rebels to avoid terrorism through fatwas condemning tactics such as car-‐bombings, kidnapping, landmines, the killing of prisoners, and violence against non-‐combatants politically aligned with the regime… He maintains a very clear position defending the rights of all minorities, including those condemned by extremists as heterodox… He thinks Syria’s current family laws are just fine, and are already sufficiently compatible with the shari’a. He also believes that legal reform should not be pursued before a constitutionally-‐based committee can be formed which would tackle any needed changes, after the regime has fallen and a new Syrian government has been created.” (Barber, 22 May 2013, Syria Comment)

As a result, a strong mobilization of the Sunni population, starting from the Sufi core, would occur. Sectarian fears decreasing in general, the mobilization capabilities of other groups (including those allowing for the creation of Bashar al-‐Assad regime’s “People’s Army” or Jaysh al-‐Sha‘bi (see the excellent report by Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War -‐ March 2013 for the ISW) would progressively disappear. Step by step, non Sunni groups and people would start believing in and actively supporting the new vision of a secular, moderate Syria. Considering the influence of Sufism among Kurds in Syria (Paulo Pinto, Syrian Studies Association Bulletin, Vol 16, No 1, 2011), a reaffirmed common ground would be found and the Kurds would fully join the new forces.

Furthermore, building previous historical ties as explained by Weismann (excerpt reported by Joshua Landis, 11 May 2007), the new Sufi outlook could find common ground with both the Syrian Salafis and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and thus integrate them.

As a result, victory would truly mean a Syria where all people and groups are integrated, save for warlords and the most violent actors that would still need to be brought back within society. Syria could constitute a novel model of secular, yet spiritual, and predominantly Muslim polity. As such, it might also be perceived as a threat by other actors in other countries, who could also feel their own power, derived from other models, questioned. The new secular Syria would have to pay attention to such dangers, however without falling into the trap of paranoia.

Estimating Likelihood for Scenario 3.3.2.

Right now, if conditions do not change, and as underlined earlier, this scenario is quite unlikely.


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However, assuming the Movement for Building Civilization (or a similar initiative) succeeds in being born, then it has the potential for slowly and progressively changing the odds from highly unlikely to plausible and even probable. Most importantly, the right timing for each action will need to be respected, as many times underlined by Sheikh al-‐Ya’qoubi.


▪ Creation of the Movement for Building Civilization (or a similar initiative) with real linkages in Syria;

▪ Mobilization of the Syrian population, across groups and communities;

▪ Strategic, operational and tactical skills of the SMC under this new configuration and of the fighting groups affiliated with the Movement.

▪ Propaganda and deception aiming at fuelling fears and hatred (external and internal).

▪ Proper material support by various actors;

▪ Proper discussions and cooperation between supporters and the moderate forces leading to commonly agreed actions if any;

▪ Patience of external supporters;

▪ Actions against the proponents of a secular Syria by actors (external and internal) who are sponsoring other solutions for Syria;

▪ Regionalization of the war;

▪ Changes of situation for one of the external players (e.g. what implications may the events in Turkey have on the situation – current and prospects – in Syria?);

▪ Changes in the global and regional state of play.

Scenario 3.4. Back to an Al-‐Assad Syria?

Scenario

Despite the recent victory in Qusayr by the pro Al-‐Assad groups, and despite the strategic character of the city, this scenario seems to be unlikely, but not impossible, in a very near future.

To obtain complete victory, we may assume that the regime of Bashar Al-‐Assad would continue and even strengthen his current strategy of population displacement and use of foreign forces. However, this strategy has profound impacts that would make the construction of peace much more difficult: it


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favours sectarianism, the spiral of fear, hatred, and retribution, while destroying wealth and thus making it more difficult to deal with displaced people and providing for their return to normal life.

As underlined almost a year ago by Joshua Landis:

“The broader Alawite community fears the possibility of aimless retribution. To avoid this, Assad is likely to pursue the Lebanon option: turn Syria into a swamp and create chaos out of Syria’s sects and factions. It is a strategy of playing upon divisions to sow chaos.” (Creating a Syrian Swamp: Assad’s ‘Plan B’”, for Syria Comment, August 10, 2012)

Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War (March 2013 for the ISW, notably pp.19-‐23), provides for an account of the regime’s strategy in terms of populations’ displacement, aiming at separating “the rebellion” from a potential basis. According to him, starting from the months following the shelling of Homs in February 2012, it was increasingly pursued intentionally (p.19, also “Syria’s Mutating Conflict,” International Crisis Group, August 2012: 6-‐7). Before that, it would also have been done “at least in Alawite-‐majority coastal regions,” where “repeated clearance operations in coastal Sunni enclaves took place” (p.19). It is done in five ways:

▪ Use of artillery shelling on towns and neighbourhoods, or “scorched earth policy” (Holliday: pp.19-‐20, ICG: 6-‐9)

▪ Campaign of bulldozing neighbourhoods in Damascus and also Hama with assistance of paramilitary troops to expel people (Autumn 2012 – pp.21-‐22)

▪ Massacres of men, women, and children in Sunni villages and neighbourhoods across Syria by pro-‐regime militia, notably in areas close to Alawite villages and neighbourhood (pp.21-‐22). Holliday however underlines that “Although pro-‐regime militias have been primarily responsible for these killings, it is difficult to exonerate the regime of responsibility in most cases.” (p.21)

▪ Air power, including the use of helicopters and so-‐called “barrel-‐bombs” (improvised bombs constructed from oil drums and dropped by Syrian helicopters,” incendiary device aiming at better destroying buildings), the targeting of bakeries pp.22-‐25).

▪ Use of Surface-‐to-‐Surface Ballistic Missile (SSBM) against the population starting from January 2013 (pp.24-‐25).

As a result, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons increases exponentially. In April, according to the AFP more than 60.000 had died (until November 2012), while 1.2 million had fled to neighbouring countries and 4 million were internally displaced. On 13 June 2013, the UN estimates that at least 93.000 people had died so far during the conflict (BBC News, 13 June). On 17 June, 1.64 million


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people are refugees in other countries, according to UNHCR ongoing estimates and Syria counts 4.25 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) according to USAID and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center.

Everything being equal, for any student of Cambodia, the situation has an eerie feeling of déjà vu in terms of refugees (during the 1970-‐1975 war, during the Democratic Kampuchea – Khmer Rouge regime – and after), of emptying of cities and towns (by the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) -‐ the “Khmer Rouge” -‐ once victory was achieved) and violence against one’s own population. It is not by chance that Holliday uses in his report the term of “cleansing”. Hopefully for Syria and for Syrians, the comparison will stop there. Nevertheless, considering the very high tension in the country, not only since the beginning of the civil war, but also previously, as Syria has been under a state of emergency between 1963 and April 2011, the very destruction of the social fabric brought about by the way the civil war is waged, as noted by Lyse Doucet in her “Qusair – the Syrian city that died” (BBC News, 7 June 2013), it is hard to imagine how a victorious Al-‐Assad regime could rule by any other means than fear and again emergency, to remain positive and not to jump to hasty conclusions.


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The help and support of the victorious regime’s allies would then be crucial to avoid seeing paranoia, violence and retribution settling in.

Although it would be diplomatically complex, if not impossible, to implement, Syria would have to be brought back in the family of nations as quickly as possible for the same reasons. Any pressure would have to be exerted with the utmost caution while also and always thinking in terms of impact on civilian populations. Failure to do so could lead to very adverse consequences for the population. It could also have the potential to create a core block of states (Iran, Iraq, Syria) with whom relations, for many other countries, would be tense. Russia and China would then have the power to act as balancing weight.


if we consider the forces on the ground (forthcoming post), this scenario is the least unlikely of the last four we outlined. However, the likelihood to see a real and complete victory, followed by a peace, are still slim.


▪ the type of support granted to the various insurgent groups;

▪ the capacity of the insurgent groups to unite and be efficient;

▪ the way the insurgent groups will fight and mobilize the population, including succeeding or failing to protect them against the population displacement of the Al-‐Assad regime;

▪ the support and level of protection insurgent groups and civilian populations could obtain with certainty after victory;

▪ the level of threat, both external and internal, felt by the victorious power;

▪ the kind of support given to the new Syrian regime;

▪ the capacity to integrate again the new Syria in the international society of states;

▪ the way refugees and IDPs are reintegrated (and the support negotiated, i.e. granted and accepted);

▪ the power and wisdom of various trade networks in favouring sustainable and fair business;

▪ the interest and play of various organised crime networks in the situation in Syria.


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Evaluating Forces on the Syrian Battlefield Having an idea of the forces fighting on the battlefield in Syria is crucial to understand the state of play, to follow the course of the war, to evaluate the impact of the decisions taken by external players, and to estimate the likelihood to see one scenario (or one of its variations) happening. To obtain the best possible understanding of the theatre of war other elements such as training, armament, command and control situation, etc. should ideally also be considered. Yet, fighting women and men remain a crucial and foremost component.

Here is a synthesis of the various estimates found for each warring group (and previously presented in the state of play – see related section for references), as it is only when they are seen together that they take their full meaning. The graphics below aim first at summarizing and representing visually the relative scale of the various forces. Second, those forces are seen in the light of a Syrian population that would have grown increasingly divided along sectarian lines by the war, with consequences in terms of creating a future peace as well as in terms of strategies of mobilization and “population control”.

All forces on the Syrian battleground – high and low estimates


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Fighting Forces on the Syrian Battleground


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All forces in Syria compared with a population that would be seen through sectarian lenses

Sources: World Bank estimates 2012 for the overall population, UNHCR, 3 July 2013 count for the refugees, BBC News, 13 June for the number of people killed during the conflict, CIA World Fact Book

for the sectarian repartition.


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The Syrian War – Bibliography and Sources

This thematic bibliography on the Syrian war is updated, as possible, on www.redanalysis.org.

Casualties, refugees and internally displaced people

▪ UNHCR -‐ Syria Regional Refugee Response – Inter-‐agency Information Sharing Portal

▪ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center – Syria

▪ USAID – Syria

▪ Hannah Strange and agencies, Syria death toll reaches 93,000: UN, 13 Jun 2013 The Telegraph

▪ International Crisis Group, “Syria’s Mutating Conflict,” August 2012

▪ Syrian Refugees in Europe – Timeline 2011

New type of analysis and collection

▪ Joanna Paraszczuk, “Syria Feature: How “Independent Analysts” Are Breaking the Stories of the Conflict,” EA WorldViews, 2 April 2013.

▪ Syria video

▪ Syria Twitter List

▪ Syria Experts by Gian Marco Liuni (Twitter)


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The Syrian Civil War, mainly domestic, battlefield

General Resources and Blogs

Must Read

▪ Joshua Landis’ Syria Comment (regular, with weekly review of articles on Syria)

▪ Aymenn Jawad Al Tamimi Blog

▪ Institute for the Study of War – Syria Project

▪ Brown Moses Blog -‐ Notably weapons, forces.

▪ Middle East Research Institute -‐ Notably translations of original and noteworthy documents

▪ Jonathan Spyer Blog

▪ Syria Report

Other (and Occasional)

▪ Congressional Research Service Reports : the Middle East and the Arab World

▪ Syrian Revolution Digest (discontinued 13 June 2013)

▪ Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center – Syria

▪ EAWorldview -‐ Middle East and Turkey (Occasional)

▪ CFR – Syria

Causes of conflict

▪ Tim McDonnell, How Climate Change Worsened Violence in Syria, March 6, 2013, Mother Jones .

General Syrian War

▪ Blogs of War, Interview: Phillip Smyth on Syria, March 7, 2013.

▪ CFR, Mona Yacoubian on Syria’s Continuing Civil War, March 7, 2013.

▪ Syrian Civil War – Wikipedia

▪ Mona Yacoubian, selected articles, Stimson.

Actors

NC, SJMCC or SMC, and FSA*

*The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC), the Supreme Joint Military


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Command Council (SJMCC or SMC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA)

General

▪ Elizabeth O’Bagy, The Free Syrian Army, Middle East Security Report 9, Institute for the Study of War, March 2013.

▪ Asher Berman, “The Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade and The Capture of the UN Troops“,” Syria Survey, 6 March 2013.

▪ Ken Sofer and Juliana Shafroth, The Structure and Organization of the Syrian Opposition, Center for American Progress, May 14, 2013.

▪ David Ignatius, “In defeat at Qusair, Syrian rebels’ painful failings“, Washington Post, June 7, 2013.

▪ (3/07/2013) Robert King, Interviews with Syrian Army Defectors – The man who was there, December 2012, ViceBeta.

Muslim Brotherhood

▪ MEMRI – Article on Muslim Brotherhood Website: Implement Shari’a in Phases 5 July 2011.

Sufism

▪ Matthew Barber, Syria Comment

1. Sheikh al-‐Yaqoubi Elected to the NC—its first non-‐Brotherhood-‐aligned religious figure, Wednesday, May 22nd, 2013

2. Brotherhood Figures Block Yaqoubi’s Appointment, Post-‐Confirmation, Monday, May 27th, 2013

3. Sheikh Muhammad al-‐Yaqoubi Interviewed by Syria Comment, Thursday, May 30th, 2013.

▪ Series on Salafi and Sufi influences on Islam in Syria in Syria Comment, 2007.

▪ Paulo Pinto, Sufism among the Kurds in Syria, Syrian Studies Association Bulletin, Vol 16, No 1, 2011.

Pro Al-‐Assad Groups

▪ Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: from Counterinsurgency to Civil War, March 2013, ISW.

▪ “Hezbollah bites on granite in Syria“, 27 May 2013, (Last updated 28 May 2013 01:45), Anadolu Agency.

▪ Jeremy M. Sharp, Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime, August 9, 2011, CRS.


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▪ Kirk S Campbell, Civil-‐military relations and political liberalization: A comparative study of the military’s corporateness and political values in Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Pakistan, 2009, Dissertation.

▪ (2/07/2013) Suadad al-‐Salhy, Iraqi Shi’ite militants start to acknowledge role in Syria, Apr 10, 2013, Reuters.

▪ (2/07/2013) Mona Mahmood, and Martin Chulov, Syrian war widens Sunni-‐Shia schism as foreign jihadis join fight for shrines, 4 June 2013, The Guardian

Salafi and Sunni Islamist

▪ Aron Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: the Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front, UI Occasional Paper 17, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, March 2013.

▪ Ammar Abdulhamid, Syria 2013: Rise of the Warlords, Syrian Revolution Digest, 15 January 2013.

▪ Hania Mourtada and Rick Gladstone, Syrian Rebels Break With Group Over Qaeda Wing Alliance, New York Times, April 12, 2013.

Jihadi in Syria

▪ Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi, Jihad in Syria, Syria Comment, March 20, 2013

▪ Matthew Barber Islamic State Declared in Syria, Syria Comment, April 14th, 2013,

▪ Pieter Van Ostaeyen’s blog

▪ Aaron Y. Zelin, Insight: European Foreign Fighters in Syria, 2 April 2013, ICSR

▪ Aaron Y. Zelin, Evan F. Kohlmann, Laith al-‐Khouri, Convoy of Martyrs in the Levant: A Joint Study Charting the Evolving Role of Sunni Foreign Fighters in the Armed Uprising Against the Assad Regime in Syria, June 2013, Flashpoint Partners.

▪ “Kadyrov confirms several Chechens fight in Syria“, 6 May 2013, TASS, The Voice of Russia.

▪ Daria Solovieva, “Chechens Among Jihadists in Syria“, April 26, 2013, Al-‐Monitor.

▪ Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi, “Jabhat al-‐Nusra and The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-‐Sham“, 17 May 2013, Brown Moses Blog.

▪ Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi, “What Does “Moderate” Islamist Mean?“, November 17, 2011, The Jerusalem Post .

▪ Aron Lund, ”Is Jabhat al-‐Nosra breaking apart?“, May 22nd, 2013, Syria Comment.

▪ Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi, Syria: Jihad and the Battle for Qusayr, May 27, 2013.


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▪ Europol, TE-‐SAT 2013: EU terrorism situation and trend report

▪ Christopher M. Blanchard, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, July 9, 2007, CRS, Order Code RL32759

▪ Dr. Reza Pankhurst, Understanding calls to a Caliphate

▪ JIHADOLOGY: A clearinghouse for jihādī primary source material and translation service

Kurds

Websites

▪ MESOP – West Kurdistan

1. West Kurdistan (Syria): Kurdwatch Newsletter – April 2013

▪ Wladimir van Wilgenburg’s blog, Transnational Middle-‐East Observer

▪ Ekurd.net

Books, reports, posts and articles

▪ Tordi Tejel, Syria’s Kurds, Routledge, 2009 (pdf).

▪ Ilhan Tanir, Wladimir van Wilgenburg, and Omar Hossino, Unity or PYD Power Play?: Syrian Kurdish Dynamics After the Erbil Agreement, The Henry Jackson Society, 15 October 2012.

▪ Syria Report, “Insurgents Declare War on Syrian Kurds“, 27 May 2013.

▪ Alexandra Hudson, “Syrian Kurds fear increasing attacks from Assad forces“, April 18, 2013, Reuters.

▪ AFP-‐JIJI, “Kurdish militia decides to align with Syria rebels“, 23 April 2013.

▪ Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Clashes Break Out Between Kurdish Groups In Syria“, April 4 2013, Al-‐Monitor Iraq Pulse.

▪ Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Conflict Intensifies In Syria’s Kurdish Area,” April 5 2013, Al-‐Monitor.

▪ Tulin Daloglu, Turkey-‐PKK Talks Move Ahead, Al-‐Monitor Turkey Pulse, April 3, 2013, Al-‐Monitor.

▪ “Kurdish PYD leader details the real end game threat in Syria“ from an Interview with the Democratic Union Party, PYD, Co-‐Chairman Salih Muslim in Turkish paper Radikal… April 15,2013, The Mideastwire Blog.

▪ Bayram Sinkaya, Why Doesn’t Iran Want Turkey to Solve its Kurdish Issue? Author:, March 16, 2013 ORSAM (Turkey), re-‐posted on: March 20 2013, translated by Timur Goksel, Al Monitor.


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▪ Wladimir van Wilgenburg, Iranian Kurdish PJAK Leader: We are stronger, while Tehran regime in collapsing, 31 January 2013, Rudaw.

▪ Jonathan Spyer, The Kurds are for the Kurds, March 9, 2013, Weekly Standard.

▪ Jonathan Spyer, Erdogan’s Kurdish Gambit, May 17, 2013, Jerusalem Post.

▪ Ayub Nuri, Israel and Kurdistan: Two Nations, One Geography, 19/5/2013, Rudaw

Alawites

▪ Martin W. Lewis, (Historical Geographer, Stanford), “Confusion About Syria’s Alawites“, March 29, 2011, GeoCurrents.

Christians

▪ Jean Aziz, “Syria’s Christians Threatened by Ideology, Geography“, April 23, 2013, Al-‐Monitor Lebanon Pulse.

Maps

▪ Wikipedia, Syrian Civil War updated monthly

▪ Political Geography Now, Map Syrian conflict, regular updates

▪ @2wainu Twitter map October 2012 (see other twitter sources on map)

▪ NYT, Map of the Dispute in Syria, 12 March 2013

▪ Frontline, Early protests in Syria (Mid March until November 2011)

Some Primary Sources

▪ Syria video

▪ Syrian Observatory for Human Rights

▪ Pro Al-‐Assad regime site called Zanobia (arabic)

▪ Syrian documents

▪ Harakat Ahrar al-‐Sham al-‐islamiya

▪ Live Leak -‐ Channel Syria

▪ Syrian Liberation Front on Facebook

▪ (08/07/2013) Syrian Islamic Front on Facebook


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▪ SITE, a Washington-‐based group that tracks jihadist material online

▪ ICT Jihadis website monitoring group -‐ Insight First half of December 2012

▪ Kavkaz Center: Chechen internet agency (independent, international and Islamic)

▪ Haqq Battalions Gathering (Tajammou Kataeb al-‐Haqq) on Facebook

▪ Russian-‐language jihadist in Syria website

▪ JIHADOLOGY: A clearinghouse for jihādī primary source material and translation service

▪ Sheikh al-‐Ya’qoubi Facebook page

International Actors, Regionalization and the Syrian War

Forthcoming, volume 2.

Photos and maps credits p.1 Flags of Syria combined by Flag_of_Syria.svg: Zscout370 Syria-‐flag 1932-‐58 1961-‐63.svg: AnonMoos Flag_of_Libya_(2011_combined).svg: NetRolller 3D derivative work: —Spesh531, My talk, and External links, Public domain via Wikimedia Commons

p.7 & p. 18 Wikipedia – Template: Syrian civil war detailed map: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Syrian_civil_war_detailed_map

p.11 Hizbollah flag in Syria by Upyernoz from Haverford, USA, Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license via Wikimedia Commons

p.12 Abu-‐Fadel-‐Al-‐Abbas-‐Brigade image posted on their Facebook Page on 22 February 2013

p.12 Asai'b Ahl al-‐Haq (Islamic resistance in Iraq Asai'b Ahl al-‐Haq (AAH) / League of the Righteous) logo -‐ From their wesbite http://www.alahdalsadik.org/upload/permalink/4864.html

p.13 Syria Political Governorates Map 1976 by US government, Central Intelligence Agency, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

p.17 Kurdish inhabited area by CIA (1992) , via Wikimedia Commons

p.19 PYD checkpoint Afrin Syria By Voice of America News: Scott Bobb reporting from Afrin, Syria. [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons


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p.23 Posted on 28 June 2013 on the SLF Facebook Page

p.24 Syrian Islamic Front -‐ right brigade Ansar training camp. Posted on July 3 2013 on SIF Facebook page

p.25 Photo from "a video released by the outlet at the end of May of a JAN training camps in Deraa" http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z9FJWmq3vwU, Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi, "Jabhat al-‐Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-‐Sham: Deraa Governorate" 21 June 2013

p.26 ISIS logo from Youtube video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TpDOpH-‐sBPs&feature=youtu.be

p.27 ISIS fighter posted by Twitter account @al_khansaa2 on 17 June 2013 (Aymenn Jawad Al-‐Tamimi, Jabhat al-‐Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-‐Sham: Deir ez-‐Zor and the wider east of Syria, 27 June 2013)

p.29 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, accompanied by U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow on May 7, 2013. by U.S. Department of State, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

p.32 The site of the plenary session which adopted the first of the Covenant of the League of Nations on Feb. 14, 1919. A year later, the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations took place in the same room, 1919, by Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library Archives, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

p.36 [Victory]...depends on overwhelming striking force, 1939-‐1946, by S Whitear, The National Archives (United Kingdom), catalogued under document record INF3/138, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

p.37 Map of the Caliphate in 750 by Sheperd, William R. Historical Atlas. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911. 53. Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

p.40 Syrian Islamic Front Logo (Facebook page) via Wikipedia

p.40 Syrian Islamic Liberation Front Logo (Facebook Page) via Wikipedia

p.42 Muslim Brotherhood Emblem in the 1930s, Public Domain, via Wikimedia Commons

p.48 Displacements in Syria after March 2012 -‐ IDMC map


Documents

Potential Futures for Syria in the Fog of War