Postmodernism and Democracy Learning from Lyotard and Lefort.pdf

8/14/2019 Postmodernism and Democracy Learning from Lyotard and Lefort.pdf

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Postmodernismand Democracy:Learning from Lyotardand Lefort

PatrickF.McKinlayMorningside College

Jean-FrancoisLyotard'spostmodernapproachhas stumbled against the criticism thatit fails to gen-erateconcreteproposalsfor politicalaction or analysis. Focusingon his articulationof a politics ofthe sublime andhis unique interpretation f Kant'sCritiqueof Judgment, argue that Lyotard's den-tification of the differendopens new avenues of questioning the experimental and heterogeneouspotentialof democraticpractice.ClaudeLefortrephrases he significanceof the political and chal-lenges the mainstreamdemarcationof politicalscience. A postmodernanalysis of democracyrevealsa provocativeand compelling interpretation f its meaningthattestifies to its uncertainand indeter-minate character.An analysis informed by Lyotard and Lefort advocates alternative forms ofdemocraticpracticeand suggeststhe need for additionalresearchon instances of marginaldemocra-tic action oftenneglectedin researchon democratization.

In the last 15 to 20 years beginningperhapswith Salazar'scollapse andthetransition o democracy on the IberianPeninsula we have witnessed an extra-ordinaryglobal shift towarddemocracyand democratization.At the same time,both the communist and socialist Left has experienceda gradualbut sometimesdramaticerosion of political power,best exemplified by the fall of the SovietUnion and the transitionto liberal democracy in Eastern Europe. One mightarguethat we have watchedthe passing of a metanarrative,he undoing of theMarxist-Leninistorthodoxy.In this context,I want to consider what a postmod-ernperspectiveoffers to the analysisof contemporarypolitical questions.In spite of the apparent victory of a liberal-capitalist-Western orld order,there still is an opportunity orarticulatingan alternative o neoconservativism npoliticallife and neoliberalism npublicpolicy.Whiletherearea varietyof impor-tant voices in the Americandialogueon democratic heory,insufficientattentionhas been givento a numberof European cholars,particularlyhose in Francerep-resentative of noncommunistand postmodernapproaches. While the Frenchpoliticaland intellectualLeft has experienced remendous ragmentation,he con-text of internal dissent has also producedan impressive mix of perspectives.

I want to thankMarion Doro andCharlotteDaniels for commentingon earlierdraftsof this essay.An earlierdraftof this essay was presentedat the annualmeeting of the Society for Phenomenologyand Existential Philosophy at Seattle,WA, in October 1994.THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS,Vol. 60, No. 2, May 1998, Pp. 481-502? 1998 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819


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482 PatrickF McKinlayIn this essay, I focus on two of these thinkers. ClaudeLefortand Jean-FrancoisLyotard have advocated a noncommunist agenda in France for more than 40years.1 Lefort, in particular,concentrates on the characterof democracy as aform of society that enables criticalreflection and activism, which I demon-strateoffers a directionfor a post-Marxistprogressivedemocraticpolitics.At thesame time, I believe Lefort's work sharesa conceptionof thepolitical with thatarticulated by Jean-FrancoisLyotardin philosophical and aesthetic terms. Iarguethat bringingLyotard'swork on heterogeneityandjudgmentto bear on po-litical action presentsin microcosmthe task of reinvigoratingourunderstandingof democraticpolitics. While the two may not share the same specific project,Lefort and Lyotardadvocate a criticalreflectionabout thepolitical, which chal-lenges standardconceptions of politics and suggests new avenues of inquiryaboutdemocracy.The political must be distinguishedfrom politics because thelatterremains constrainedby the parametersof social scientific inquiry,whereasthe former invites a broader nterpretation f a realm of action and appearanceof civil society.Postmodernism,while recognizedas a legitimate approach o art, architec-ture, and literary theory, has stumbled against the criticism that it fails togenerateconcreteproposalsforpoliticalaction or analysis.In this paper,I do notclaim to presenta generalreconstructionof postmodernism.Postmodernismhasbeen appropriatedby so many different thinkers and disciplines it would befutile and against its deconstructive principle o identify one definitivepost-modem politics. As I have already suggested, I have a more modest goal: apossible interpretationof Lyotard'swork that suggests certain parallels withLefort.In its formulation, will begin to articulatean application f postmod-ernism or something akin to a political phenomenology of democraticpractice.The paperwill have the following structure.Although Jean-FrancoisLyotardhas writtenextensivelyon many concrete political issues, my firstfocus will beon his conceptionof postmodernismandhis articulationof a politics of the sub-lime that is the centerpiece of his interpretation f Kant's Critiqueof Judgment.2Second,insteadof conductinga systematic analysisof Lefort'swork,I will con-centrate on his conception of democracy.I believe a postmodern analysis ofdemocracyreveals a provocativeand compelling interpretation f its meaning.More specifically, f we begin to appreciate he uncertainand indeterminate har-acter of democracy, hen it becomes possibleto articulatealternative onceptions

'Both Claude Lefort and Jean-FrancoisLyotardwere activemembers of a working group, Social-ism au Barberie (roughly translatedas Socialism either/orBarbarism), hat broke with the FrenchCommunistPartyin the late 1940s and contributed o the articulationof a Marxistanalysisand ac-tivism that resisted the Party'sproclivities toward Stalinism and worked against all forms ofbureaucratizationn contemporary ociety. For more on Socialism au Barberie,see Lyotard 1993),Castoriadis 1988), and Howard 1988).2For examplesof Lyotard's xplicit politicalviews, see Lyotard 1993), a volume that coversmuchof Lyotard's areerand includes articles on the student movements in 1968, his reflections on theHolocaust,the Algerian war, the GulfWar,and a varietyof otherissues.


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Postmodernismand Democracy 483of democratic practiceand acknowledge otherwise invisible expressions of de-mocratic action. Building on the work of Lyotardand Lefort, I demonstrate hesalience of postmodernapproaches o the task of acknowledging,understanding,and evaluatingnew experiments n democratic heory and practice.

Heterogeneity and a Politics of JudgmentBritish and American readersof Jean-FrancoisLyotardhave been fortunate nthe last few years to have gained access to a number of his most recent booksand articles (1992, 1993, 1994). Although many political topics are treated inthese works, I am concernedonly with how Lyotard's onception of postmod-ernism challenges our categoriesfor reflectionon and definition of the political.

For instance, what can we learnfrom Lyotard's deas on the status of politics asa science? How does Lyotard'swork on Kant and aesthetics open new avenuesfor reflectionon politics, difference,and democracy?How is what he termsthedifferenda fruitful concept for thinkingaboutdemocracy?Finally, n what waysdoes Lyotard'swork fail to provide sufficient resources for a theory of democra-tic politics?The heartof Lyotard's xplanationof the postmoderncondition is the linkagebetween politics and difference. In the face of the totalization of a Hegelianspeculativemetanarrative,Lyotardadvocates a presentationof the unpresentable,a sustainedattention o difference andheterogeneity.This approach s consistentwith Lyotard'sNietzschean appealto an agonistics that resists the desire to re-duce all language games to one standard of evaluation, performativity (seeLyotardand Thebaud 1985; Lyotard1989). The postmoderndrawsourattentionto the instabilityof our criteria for judgment.This instabilitydoes not removeour ability to judge; rather he postmodern emphasizesthe faculty of imagina-tion, the effort to experimentandcreate againnew criteria orjudgment.Lyotardcalls this form of experimentation paralogy. His paralogical approach issummedup in a responseto JiirgenHabermas'effortto generatea consensusonthe possible moves in our language games:

Consensushas become an outmoded and suspectvalue. Butjustice as a value is neitherout-modednor suspect.Wemustthus arriveat an idea andpracticeof justice that is not linkedtothat of consensus.(1984, 66)

Lyotardrejects the modernistpretensionsof Habermas' model of universalpragmatics. Universal pragmatics assumes the counterfactualexistence of anideal speech situationwhereintruthclaims can be tested by groupsof individu-als unhindered by power relations resulting from systematically distortedcommunication.3Lyotarddeconstructs he linchpinof Habermas'project, hegoalof consensus. He arguesthatjustice cannot be assuredby a scientific analysis3Fora more detailed discussion of the ideal speech situation,see Habermas 1979, 1990, 1993, and1994).


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484 PatrickE McKinlayof language games because prescriptiveand descriptivediscourses have hetero-geneous and incommensurablerules. In The Postmodern Condition Lyotardexploresthe implicationsof attributingo modern science a drivetowardunivo-cal, prescriptiverules for research.Borrowing Wittgenstein's dea of languagegames, Lyotarddifferentiatesbetween denotativegames (knowledge) and pre-scriptive games (action). Lyotardcriticizesboth Niklas Luhmannand Habermasfor attempting o circumscribe he task of legitimationwith the principleof con-sensus.Accordingto Lyotard,his approachrests on two assumptions: irst,thatit is possible to determinea universalrule for a set of language games; second,that the goal of dialogue is consensus. In reference to the first point, languagegames are subject to heterogeneousand incommensurablesets of pragmaticrules. Second, Lyotard s interested n the search for dissensus, not consensus.4

The paralogicalgoal of social science, for Lyotard, s to continuepressing theclaims of an alternativenterpretation f society.As a counterpointo Habermas'vision of peaceful deliberationaboutvalidity claims, Lyotardrecognizes the al-ways contested terrainof justice. One may criticize his descriptionof justice asgames because this approachseems to trivialize he very serious mplica-tions of injustice. However,I believe both Habermasand John Rawls minimizejust how dangerous,violent, and uncooperativeargumentation boutjustice canbecome. For example, Lyotarddefines terroras a political economy that elimi-nates, or threatens to eliminate a player from a language game. A univocalepistemology implies that some approachesfail to meet the objective criteriaand, therefore,make prescriptiveclaims that distinguish,exclude, and silencecompeting paradigms. 5n Just Gaming (1985), Lyotard argues that sciencemust be aimed towardparalogy, oward finding new moves or alternative nter-pretations.Postmodernismdoes not seek final iterationbut maintainsa creativefocus on the denotativedescriptionof the world.While Lyotard eems to be em-phasizing only language games, his turn toward a politics of phrases in TheDifferend indicates a general concern with all forms of regulation,determina-

4Lyotard ocuses on dissensus rather han consensus because he is interested n breaking up thehegemony of one language game over another. ndeed, he search for dissensus is his response to thedifferend.Lyotardargues that a search for consensus risksplacing one standardor rule over andabove any new phrase, that is, forcefully legitimating the exclusion of alternative voices. InHabermas'defense, the goal of undistortedcommunication s precisely aimed at defending the rightof all interlocutors o continue participationn the discourse. What Habermasassumes but Lyotarddiscounts is that agreementon the conditionsfor free communicationare in principle identifiable.Lyotard, ollowing Adomo's pessimism afterAuschwitz, doubts the real possibility for rationalconsensus and expects the prospect forincommensurability etween phrases. See Lyotard 1989).

5David Carroll(1987) offersa very helpful insightinto the difference between forms of combina-tion of language games. Some combinationsead to the silencingof one language game to the benefitof another.Others, especially through he art of literature,allow a form of experimentationhatcon-tinues to attest to the heterogeneityof language games. Indeed, argues Carroll (1987), Lyotard'sultimate criticalproject s, itself, concernedwiththe impossible theorizingof the untheorizable,withlinking and combining elements, games, faculties, etc. that are fundamentally that is, categorically)incommensurable withoutdestroying heirincommensurability 163-64).


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Postmodernismand Democracy 485tion, and linkage of phrases.I agree with David Carrollthat this shift of termi-nology from language games to phrases moves the discussion away fromdistinctionbetween games to the problem of the linkages of phrases/gameswithone another(Carroll 1987, 164-65). Lyotard'sattentionto linkages exposes theproblem of the relation between phrases (any particularvoice) that may be si-lenced by that relationship. What is the rule that governs that interaction?Lyotardassesses the problem of linkages through his distinctionbetween themodern and the postmodern.The postmodern s distinct from the modern because it acknowledgesits ownlack of criteria.The constanttask for the postmodern s to decide what is just,what is obligatory.The obligatory enunciatesa prescriptive. For example, ac-cording to Lyotard, political science (since Hobbes) is modern, because itprimarily seeks denotative or descriptive knowledge and attempts to justify aparticular onceptionof justice on the basis of its descriptionof what is. Lyotardreturns again and again to modernity's logic of justice. Modernity has beencharacterizedby a set of competingmetanarratives r stories thatclaim univer-sal status and that grant all other stories their true meaning.A metanarrative,lacking a ground for its own legitimation for example, the progressiveemanci-pation of freedom and reason, the progressive emancipationof labor, or theenrichmentof humanity hroughthe progressof capitalisttechnoscience looksfor its legitimation n a futurethat has to be accomplished,an Ideaof humanity,or Habermas'projectof modernity(Lyotard1992, 17-18).A metanarrative eeks its own legitimationorjustificationof criteria n the re-duction and subjectionof anothernarrative.All of these cases assume that onediscourseor language game can be appropriatedor the purposeof supplyingajustificationfor anotherdiscourse.Lyotardcalls this situationthe differend.BillReadings gives a ratherhelpful gloss on the differend:

A point of differencewhere the sides speak radicallydifferent or heterogeneouslanguages,wherethe disputecannot be phrased n eitherlanguage without, by its very phrasing,prejudg-ing the issue for thatside, being unjust.Between two languagegames,two littlenarratives,wophrases,there is alwaysa differendwhichmust be encountered. 1991). xxx

An important ase of the differend nvolvesthe statusof judgmentbetweenthefacultyof understanding nd the facultyof reason. Muchof Lyotard's ecent re-searchhas concentratedon the problematic n Kant'scriticalphilosophybetweenunderstanding knowing)and reason(willing) and the abyss thatseparates hem(see Lyotard 1989, 1994). ForKant,the only means of traversing his divide isthroughreferenceto the facultyof judgment. However,both formerfaculties re-quire thatjudgment supply a demonstration,a presentationthat refers to thecriteria each respective faculty utilizes for its own justification.The faculty ofjudgment s, according o Lyotard,he locus of Kant'spolitics. Judgment s reflec-tive and indeterminate,because it does not rest on principles or on a method ofdemonstration.n the case of the faculties of understanding ndreason,one may


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486 PatrickE McKinlayattempt o link phrasesfromthe facultyof knowledge (description)with phrasesfrom the faculty of will (prescription)providing he mechanismby which the cri-teria for judgment are sedimented nto a specific and determinateconceptionofreality.Inone case of thedijferend,yotarddescribeshowthedemand hatthevic-tims of Auschwitz prove heir sufferingin clear, demonstrable erms deniesthem the possibility of provingtheirclaim (see Lyotard1989).Lyotard'sgoal then is to testify to the differend, o continuallyannounce itspresence.This is the task orobligationof philosophy.Philosophyorjudgmentre-quiresno rules; rather, t sets itself againstthe dominanceof anymetanarrative'spretension o dominance over otherlanguage games (Readings1991, 123).Atthis point it becomes clear what the political implicationsof judgment,the dif-ferend, and paralogy might be. Lyotardpresents an alternativeconception ofscience that does not merely seek regularityor maintenanceof dominantpara-digms;on the contrary,he advocates an experimentalattitude owardscience. Itis guided by the ever present obligationto announcethe limitations of represen-tative thought.This constant obligationis always watchful for instances where ametanarrative, discipline, or a traditionseeks to incorporateand discursivelysilence another.6Givingattention o the differend,wherever t occurs, places phi-losophy in the center of the searchforjustice. Lyotarddoes not assume there isa status quo of justice; rather,he understands hat in the modern world fullwith rules, procedures,andlegitimationsof the social order there is a constantneed for watchfulnessto what is ruled out by that order.The differendalwaysannouncesa political question:what are the implicationsof being together,oflinkages, of relationsbetweenaddressor,addressee,and referent?However, t would seem difficultfor Lyotard o advocate any particular poli-tics because that would simply repeatthe problemof the differend.Politics maybe understood as the strugglebetween genres (discourses, games, faculties,phrases). But, what is more, Lyotard nstructsus in the ambiguity of the differ-end. It testifies to the potentialfor one phraseto disarm anotherby forcing itto adapt to its own rules of discourse. Strippedof its own capacity for expres-sion, the weaker phrase is left with no voice to articulate njustices. What kindof struggleis this contest of phrases?Lyotard, mongothers fromthe New Left,has soughtto disavow the idea that everything s political. At the same time,the differendattests to the political. AnticipatingLefort somewhat,Lyotard's if-ferend indicates a space of presentation or that which cannot be presentedforlack of independentcriteria.The proof requiredof a cognitive phrase cannot beapplied to all phrases without the real chance of damage (tort) to the otherphrase. Lyotard reatsthe differendas a nonspatialreference to thatplace, site,eventof an interactionwheresomething s excluded, obscured,silenced in the at-

6Forexample, Kant'saestheticsdrawattention o the heterogeneityand multiplicityof discoursesand languagegames, as it acknowledges the incommensurability f the faculties of understandingand reason.


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Postmodernismand Democracy 487tempt to subsume t undersome other rubric.This political site, which is not nec-essarily a place, is an interaction hat often characterizes he task of what Lyotardcalls being together.

For Lyotard, he political exists where no determinantgrounds exist to judgebetween two incommensurablephrases. How is judgment and action possible inthis context, that is, where the standards f judgment are missing? To what extentdoes a forum exist for an open contestation of phrases? It is my argument hatLyotard'sapproach mplies both a radical commitmentto heterogeneityand anidea of democracy hattestifies to the differend. yotard s still critical of instanceswhere the people become the law, that is, cases proclaiming egitimacy for anyinjustice to the individualwho resists the general will (see Readings 1991, 110).In this context, one central task for political thought is the constant search forinstances where democracy inhibits, facilitates, embodies the contestation ofphrases, genres, discourses.At the same time, the journal editor or the policy-maker may ask: Do you have any concrete suggestions to make based on thisesoteric conception of democracy? If the postmodern political theorist saysYes, hen to what extent has she or he assumedthe existence of determinate ri-teria for judgment? Or, if she or he says No, then to what extent willpostmodernsdefer choice and action?It is in the context of this line of question-ing thatI wish to begin my parallelconsiderationof the work of Claude Lefort, apoliticaltheoristwho, Ibelieve, risks these questions,as well as some alternatives.

Lefort and the PoliticalLyotard'spolitics of the differendare not dissimilar from Claude Lefort'sef-forts to redefine the political as partof a revival of political philosophy.Lefortbelieves it is necessary to redefinethe political in light of certain momentousevents and changes in our era, especially the emergenceof totalitarianismandthe bureaucratization f the social realm. Lefort's work contributes o a philo-

sophicalreassertionof the political (la politique) in contrast o the concentrationon politics (le politique) by political science. Lefortarguesthatcontemporarypolitical science neglects the political.Concentration n behaviorandstrictlyob-jective facts-narrowly defined as political conceals and/or restricts thepotentialto graspthe meaning of events in the political realm. The distinctionbetweenthe political andpolitics clarifies the truncationof meaninginherent ncontemporaryanalysis.This problematicwithinpolitical science exemplifiesthequestionof legitimationof a language game.Thatis, politics as science faces thepostmoderncondition;it must attend to the dissolution of its criteriafor assess-ing political norms and practices. Lyotard'sattention to heterogeneity andparalogy complementsLefort'sanalysisand suggestsnew avenuesfor a reinvig-oratedtheorizationandpracticeof the political anddemocracy.Lefort attacksboth political science and many Marxist theorists for failingto confront seriously the political. For example, Left intellectuals banished


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488 PatrickF McKinlayfreedom romthe discourseof science to therealmof mere public opinion.Theyfailed to realize the importanceof the momentousevents of this centurysuch asfascism and Stalinism.Thinkingaboutthese eventsrequiresa certainfreedom fortheorists hemselves.Thus, reflectionabout heseevents demandsreflectiononthefreedomto do so. Lefort criticizes those scientists who forfeittheiropportunityto think aboutthese events by failingto engage in political philosophy.FollowingHannahArendtandRaymondAron,Lefortbelievesthatwe areobligated o reflecton the political in light of totalitarianism.7 oliticalphilosophyhas alwaysbeencommitted o reflectingon the differencebetweenfreedom anddespotism.Whiledespotism mayrefer to a specific regime, in the case of modernpolitical science,political philosophyhas the task of escapingthe servitudeof collective beliefsand to win the freedomto thinkabout freedom n society (Lefort 1988, 9-15).Against the claim that Lefort'sworkon totalitarianisms outdated, t is crucialto appreciate hat Lefort's analysis of formsof society requiresa generalex-aminationof the politicalrealmin all institutionalstructuresandpractices.Withthe end of the Cold War and the oppositionbetween communist East and capi-talist West, it remains necessary to critically reflect on the limitations of thecontemporarypolitical, economic, and social order. While both LyotardandLefort found significantflaws in the New Left, it at least initiated an analysis ofpolitics, institutions,and powerrelations that superseded he functionalismandvalue-neutral behaviorismthat characterizedsocial science in the 1960s and

'70s. Afterthe ColdWar,scholars in the postindustrialdemocraciesof the Northand/orWestface the challengeof criticallyreflectingon the politicalwithout thebenefit of a totalitarian other. 8Marxist thought was cut off from political philosophy because of its eternalsearch for the correct heory. Since democracyis bourgeois, Marxists failedto discernfreedomin democracy and, arguesLefort, they could not acknowl-edge servitude in totalitarianism. Freedom is a precondition for thinking,discerning, judging the difference between totalitarianismand democracy.Political science characterizesdemocraticsocieties in terms of institutions func-tionally defined), distinguishing politics from economic and juridicalactivities.Political science refuses to justify the basic presuppositionson whichsuch distinctions are based and thereby ignores the form of society in whichthis division of spheres appears and is legitimated.That is, political scientistsoftentreattheirsubjectmatteras simply given, without sufficientattention o thesocial and historicalmilieu.In order to study the political meaning of the way politics itself is circum-scribed, Lefort concentrates on the question of the constitution of the social7This activity of reflection s notunlike Arendt'sdiscussionof judgment where she argued hatone

can borrowfrom Kant'spoliticalwritings a path,not toward he assessment based onepistemic truth,but on a level of political reflection thatexceeds mereopinion (see Arendt 1982).8Lyotard nd Lefort would bothagree that we need to move beyond oppositionalthinking. Indeed,

Lefort would argue that thetotalitarian orm of society was not an absolute other o much as analternativemutation n the political and/or symbolic realm.


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Postmodernismand Democracy 489space or the form of society. In contrastwith political activity, he politicalis revealed

in the double movementwherebythe mode of institutionof society appearsand is obscured.It[the political] appears in the sense that the process whereby society is ordered and unifiedacross divisions becomes visible. It is obscured n the sense that the locus of politics (the locusin which parties compete and in which a general agency of power takes shape and is repro-duced) becomes defined as particular, while the principle which generates the overallconfiguration s concealed. (Lefort 1988, 11)

Lefort argues that political science obscures the foundation of society bybreakingit down into separatespheresand systems that distort its overall char-acter.In contrast,political philosophy considers the question, What is the natureof the differencebetween forms of society? Lefort points out that this has alwaysbeen the task of political reflection, at least since Plato's eloquent reflection onthe politeia. As we learn from Plato, not all actions in the political space carrytheir full meaningin their open expression;rather,he calls upon Socrates' inter-locutors to consider the implications of their design of the just city. Just asPlato'spoliteia was constructed or the purpose of examiningthe just individual,it is pertinent to consider the importance of justice and rights in Lefort'sandLyotard's espective reflections on the political.Political science conceals this question by means of its predeterminedcate-gories and distinctions. According to Lefort, political science cannot makedeterminate udgments about politics before a society is given a form: Givingthem [dimensions of social space] form implies both giving them a meaning[mise en sens] and staging them [mise en scene] (1988, 11). Lefort'sphenome-nological analysis focuses on what appears and how our mode of inquiry isintertwinedwith the objectof study. Meaningis attributed o a social space, asa spaceof intelligibilityarticulated n accordancewith a specificmode of distin-guishingbetweenthe real and the imaginary; rueand false; just andunjust; hepermissible and the forbidden;the normal and the pathological. Categorieswithin political science arestaged in thatthey contain thequasi-representationof [this space] as being aristocratic,monarchic, despotic, democratic,or totali-tarian Lefort 1988, 12). A society hasform to the extent that it carrieswith ita historicallyconstitutedself-understandinghat determines he criteria orjudg-ments, or what Lefort calls the markers of certainty. This criterionis itselfdependent upon its embodimentin the constitutionof authority, uch as in theking, the people, the party,or even the constitution.9This approach o the form of society rejectsthe conceptof the neutralsubject(orthe value-neutralobserver).Any positionof observation s boundup with the

9Lefort's ascination with the discussion of forms of society is reminiscent of HannahArendt'sanalysis of the Greeks (see Arendt 1958). Clearly,he borrowsfrom Arendt the Aristotelian pri-vate/public distinction. Lefort is critical of political science for becoming too dependenton themethodologies of the natural sciences and for implementing a functionalist mode of inquiry thatbracketsa hermeneuticsensitivity to the interrelatedness f institutions,social practices, and norms.For more on Lefort'srelation to Arendt, see Lefort (1988, 45-55).


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490 PatrickE McKinlayform of society thatproducesit andpresupposes ts own self-understanding.Toattribute o neutralobservers he possibilityof sheddingtheirrelation o the formof theirsociety wouldbe to rob them of the facultyof judgment:Let me say simplythatif we ignoredistinctions hatare basic to the exerciseof the intellect on

the groundsthat we cannotsupplytheircriteria,and if we claim to be able to reduce knowl-edge to the limits of objective science, we break with thephilosophicaltradition. f we refuseto risk making judgments, we lose all sense of the difference betweenforms of society. Wethenfall backon valuejudgments,eitherhypocritically,beneaththe cloak of a hierarchyn thedeterminantsof what we take to be the real, or arbitrarily,n the crude statementof prefer-ences. (Lefort 1988, 12)

Lefort'sview supportsmy thesis thatpolitical science has forfeitedits concernwithjudgment.In relying upon a neutralsubjectand the criteriaof objectivesci-ence, political science removes itself from the questionsof freedom, democracy,and different forms of society. It cannot ask the question,How shall we live to-gether? Lefort, not unlike Lyotard, is concerned about the forgetfulness ofmodernity. n Lyotard's erms, attention o the political requiresa constant sensi-tivity to the differend.That is, the denotative (objective) phrase does notacknowledgethe prescriptive(normative) phrase, claiming only to review thefacts of politics. n their own respectiveways, Lyotardand Lefort demand theactivityof judgmentin the political,judgmentthat cannot claim certainty,butal-ways announcesthe differend.

Learning from Different Forms of SocietyPolitical philosophy investigatestotalitarianismbecause it makes possible adeeper examinationof democracy.Totalitarianism esults from a mutation n thesymbolic order,specificallyin the changeof statusof power.In this form of soci-ety, the spheresof power, law, and knowledge collapse.10Power,embodiedin aperson or group, claims univocal authorityover the knowledge of the ultimateaims of societyandthe normsregulating ocial practices.This groupor party s thesole interpreter f the real world for society. In this situation,the state merges

with civil society.All social division is denied and the regime presents a self-representation f the society as a completely homogenous and transparent newhat Lefort calls the People-as-One. s such,all differencesof opinion, belief,ornorms are condemnedand obliterated.Society is regulatedas if there is nothingoutside the social and it has the authorityto penetrate any level of activity orthought.More thandespotism, otalitarianisms modern n character ince it com-bines a radicallyartificialist dea with a radicallyorganicistone.Thesocial bodymerges with a cyberneticand fullytransparent machine nd remainscaught n aprocessof permanentmobilization orthe productionof a new man. 10?While oth Lyotardand Lefort areconcerned withthe diffenendn every context,the most com-plete form of the differendoccursin totalitarianismwhere all discourses and phrasesare leveled bythe univocal criteriaof the metanarrativenstitutedby the regime.1For a more elaboratediscussion of Lefort'sanalysisof totalitarianism, ee Lefort(1986, 13-14).


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Postmodernismand Democracy 491It is quite feasible that the modern characterof totalitarianismmay be repeatedin contemporarydemocratic-capitalist egimes. The difference is that the eco-nomic sphere has apparentlyusurped both the social and political spheres. Allpolitical questionsarephrased and manipulatedwith respect to macroeconomicimperativesof optimum economic productivityand profitability-what Lyotardcalls the metanarrative f performativity.Lefort finds a deeper meaning of democracy hrougha contrastwith totalitar-ianism. Democracy is not reduced to a system of institutions,but is understoodas a unique form of society. Lefort believes we can learn much from AlexisdeTocqueville,who understoodhow moderndemocracyemergedfrom the back-groundof aristocraticsociety. Tocqueville's attentionto the difference betweenthe ancien re'gime in France and the new American form of civil society con-

tributes a historical perspective to Lefort's analysis. Lefort highlights a veryinterestingelement of Tocqueville'sstyle of inquiry:His explorations ead him to detect the ambiguitiesof the democratic revolution n every do-main, to make, as it were, an exploratory ncision into the lesh of the social.At every momentof his analysis,he looks at things from both sides, moves from one side of thephenomenon othe other,and reveals the undersideof both the positive-new signs of freedom-and the neg-ative-new signs of servitude.(Lefort 1988, 14; see also Lefort 1986, 183-209)

Lefort focuses on the visible, and invisibleor whatreveals itself and what re-mains hidden, in some particular phenomena.Throughout his discussion ofTocquevilleand democracy,Lefort shows how democracy s typified by ambigu-ity, a lack of fixity, a possibility for reversibility.Emphasizingthis exploratorytheme, Lefort and Lyotardwould agree that democracy is postmodern; t con-stantly opens itself to new forms and practicesof experimentation.12 Lefortsaysthis much in attributing o Tocquevillethe insight into a society faced with thegeneralcontradiction hat ariseswhen the social orderno longerhas a basis. Thiscontradictionunfolds in how the individualmay now, in a democracy,be free toactwithout old constraints,andyet mayalso be alone,poor,and faced withdisso-lution of her or his identity.The reins of powerno longerbelong to an arbitraryauthority. nstead, n a democracy,power belongs to no one. Thereis no determi-naterepresentation f authority,no foundation o any particularorm of society.It is in this space of contradictions and ambiguity that Lefort pushesTocqueville's analysis further claiming that there exist counterinfluencesindemocracy againstthe petrificationof social life. These effects are seen whereeach new expression responds to anonymity, in the struggle for rights not

'2Lefort and Lyotard both choose to articulate their concerns in explicitly phenomenologicalterms. More research remains to be conducted regarding Lyotard'sand Lefort's mutual debt toMauriceMerleau-Ponty.While Lefort often mentions the influence of Merleau-Ponty nhis thought,Readings (1991) argues that Lyotard'spostmodernproject and his defense of heterogeneitycan betracedto his connection with the phenomenologist: [T]here s a crucial shiftfromoppositionto het-erogeneityas characteristicof the sign. A heterogeneity,a difference that cannot be reduced to amatter of opposition within a structureor system, is what marks Lyotard'saccount of figurality aspost-structuralistr deconstructive 12-13).


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492 PatrickE McKinlaycaptured n formal law; by the diversityof interpretationshatemerge from thedissolutionof hegemoniccustoms andtraditions;andby the greaterheterogene-ity of-social life against the increasingdominance of the state over individuals.Examples of these countermovements o homogenization of the democraticcommunityare legion. The social movements of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980sdemandedgreaterattentionfor civil rights, women's rights, and a redefinitionof state objectives with respect to the environment.Lefort presents a view ofdemocracyaccentuating ts ambiguityandits capacityto preserve ndeterminacyagainstthe monolithic identityof totalitarianism nd totalizing thinking.Totali-tarianism attemptsto make everything determinate; t collapses all spheres ofknowledge, law, and power and conceives itself as a society withouthistory(Lefort 1988, 16). Against this fusion of perspectivesand voices, democracyisthe historicalsociety par excellence, constantly affirmingthe legitimacy ofconflictingand contrasting nterpretations nd actions.Democracy, ike totalitarianism, ignals a mutation n the symbolic order anda change in the status of power.In the monarchical orm of society, a theologi-cal-politicalmatrixgave the prince sovereign poweroverterritoryand madehimboth secularagencyand a representative f God. Powerwas embodiedin the per-son of the princeand by means of his dual status he mediated betweenmortalsand gods. While embodyingthe laws and yet standingabove them, the princealso represented he order of the kingdom.As a substantialunity,differentiationwithin the kingdomrested on an unconditionalbasis. Thepowerembodied in theprince gave the society itself a body and a clear criterionof meaning for the so-cial order (Lefort 1988, 17).3 Lefort'smythic interpretation f the substantivefoundations for monarchicalauthority s subjectto questions regarding ts his-torical adequacy, especially in light of the political and theological upheavalsdatingat least from the Reformation, f not the MagnaCarta.However,his ap-proach identifies the significance of locating the source of all legitimacy:political, theological, and epistemic.In democracy,argues Lefort,the locus of powerbecomes an empty place. Thisis the revolutionary eature of democracy; hat is, it limits the power of govern-ment to appropriatepower for its own ends and permanently o occupy and/orembodythe locus of power.The exercise of poweris subjectto the proceduresofperiodicredistribution r elections. Not merely a system of institutions, t repre-sents a controlledconflictwithpermanent ules.14 Democracy establishesthat noperson (or some abstractnotion of thepeople ) can be consubstantialwith the

'3From Lyotard'sperspective, Lefort concentrateson the break between the monarchicalprincipleand the emergence of the republicanprinciplein the Revolution. This break constitutes a differendbetween theirrespectivephrasesfor the foundationof authority.For a more detailed discussionofLefort's interpretationof the break between religious and political authority,see Lefort (1988,213-55).

14See Lefort's(1986) discussion of humanrights.


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Postmodernismand Democracy 493locus of power.It disentanglesthe sphere of law and the sphere of knowledge;that is, democracy nstitutesa permanentattention o the differend.o one phrase/regime/party/ideologymay occupy or appropriate he political realm and elimi-nate otherparticipants rom thatspace. Indeed, n the spirit of Lyotard's racticesof agonistic play and paralogy,Lefort understandsdemocracy as the institu-tionalizationof conflict, or whatAdam Przeworskicalls the institutionalizationof uncertainty 1986).Withthe disincorporation f the powerof the monarchicprinciple,the spheresof law and knowledge become independentof transcendentprinciplesof reasonandjustice. The autonomyof law is guaranteedby the impossibilityof establish-ing its essence in either knowledge or power. Justice and right developunhinderedby illegitimate constraintsandreston the constantdebate abouttheirfoundations.The sphereof knowledge maintains ts autonomy hrougha contin-ual process of reshaping the process of acquiring knowledge and with aninvestigation nto the foundationsof truth Lefort 1988, 18). That is, scientificand culturalreflection must remain distinct from the state.Another implication of the disentanglementof these spheres is that politicalconflict is now legitimateon its own grounds.Free of the determinate dentityof the princeor aristocracy,a new set of political actors enter the political stagewithout requiringsubstantive dentities. Lefort emphasizes the emergence of anindependentcitizenry, generallyled by the liberal bourgeoisie.Lefort describesthis possibility as the paradox of democracy,because while universalsuffrageallows the people to express theirwill, it also abstracts he citizen from all so-cial networks to become a statistic. While Lefort seems to privilege multipartydemocraticcompetition,the emphasis is on contestation,not parties. Powerissubordinated o the conflict of collective wills. Lefort admits that democraticinstitutions have been used to mask citizens' access to power, knowledge, andrights, and to legitimize the accumulationof state (or organizational a a RobertMichels) power often in the form of bureaucraticpower. Nonetheless, democ-racy makes a virtue of its indeterminacy.Unlike the pluralists,he recognizeshow it always holds the potential for a totalitarianmutationthat seeks to reoc-cupy the political space and embody a transcendentsource of legitimacy forpower, law, and knowledge.Pluralistsand pragmatistsalike do not fully appre-ciate the precariousbalance that democracystrikes.Democracy is the societywithout a body that erects a stage of the political where competitioncan takeplace. For Lefort:

Democracy is instituted and sustained by the dissolution of the markersof certainty.It inau-guratesa history in which people experience a fundamental ndeterminacyas to the basis ofpower, law, and knowledge,and as to the basis of relations between self andother,at everylevel of social life. . ..

It is this which leads me to take the view that, without actors being awareof it, a process ofquestioning s implicitin social practice, hatno one hasthe answers o the questionsthatarise,and that the work of ideology, which is always dedicated o the task of restoringcertainty,can-not put an end to this process. (1988, 19)


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494 PatrickF McKinlayDemocracy requires he conditions thatwill constantlyprotect the possibilityfor disputeand contestation.Criticaldiscourse is the matterof democraticactionandany attempts ojudge determinately ome political questionmust be exposedto rigorous analysis. [M]oderndemocracyinvites us to replacethe notion of aregime governedby law,of a legitimatepower,by the notion of a regimefoundedupon the legitimacy of a debate as to what is legitimate and what is illegiti-mate-a debatewhich is necessarilywithoutany guarantor nd withoutanyend(Lefort 1988, 39). Debateand contestationmust alwaysremainopen and unhin-dered.Lefort is resolutethat no one serves as a finaljudge or arbiter,even thedemocraticmajority.

The negativeis effective: it does awaywith the judge, but it also relatesjustice to the exis-tence of a public space-a spacewhich is so constituted hateveryoneis encouraged o speakand to listen withoutbeing subjectto the authorityof another, hateveryoneis urgedto willthe powerhe has been given. This space, which is always indeterminate,has the virtueof be-longing to no one, of being large enough to accommodateonly those who recognize oneanotherwithin it and who give it meaning,and of allowingthe questioningof rightto spread.As a result,no artifice can preventa majorityfrom emergingin the here and now or fromgiving an answer which can standin for the truth. And the fact that every single individualhas the rightto denouncethatanswer as hollow or wrongis the one thing which confirmsthevalidityof the articulationof tight and opinion, of the irreducibilityof conscience to the rightto have an opinion; in the event, the majority may prove to be wrong, but not the publicspace. (1988, 41)

The existence of a public space where the individualhas the rightto call themajority wrong implies the necessity for a robustconception of humanrights.With respectto the public space, no final criteria for judgmentcan be enunci-ated, even by the majority.Lefort borrows Arendt'sconception of the publicspace as a place for a political agonistics. While Arendt's analysis did notclearly assess the very exclusive conditions of the Greekpolis, Lefort'streat-ment places universalhumanrights squarelyat the heart of his description ofdemocracy.In another ext where he criticizesMarx'sfailurein On theJewish Questiontoappreciate hat rights may not simply be an extension of bourgeois individual-ism, Lefortarguesthat humanrights express he refusal to allow civil society tobe absorbedby the state and they provide a basis for opposition to the es-tablished order (Lefort 1986, 22, 244, 250). Lefort presents an excellentillustrationof the differendwhen describingthe way totalitarianregimes havedealt with dissidentsdemandinghumanrights.The dissidentsarguedthey werenot interested n politics -in presentingsome new programof government,ofstartingan opposition party, etc.; rather, hey were looking merely for the guar-anteesfoundin democraticnations(e.g., freedomof speech, assembly,religion).What is remarkable s that the regimes did not persecutethem for having thewrong opinions,but for attempting o establish some space that is not restrictedto the pole of the state(Lefort 1986, 241-42). A totalitarian tate cannot toleratean expressionof any idea that is not linkedto the publicly sanctioned definition


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Postmodernismand Democracy 495of truth.5Concern for humanrights contributes o democracy a constantwatch-fulness against the state (or other actors) from seizing the -public space andrestrictingpolitical debate. Lefort calls human rights the generativeprincipleof democracy because they animate its institutions and engender laws. Rightscannot be dissociated from an awarenessof rights and this is more likely if theyare declared,when power guarantees hem in law (Lefort 1986, 260). Rights donot remain defined by this institutionalization; ather, Lefort points out howawarenessof rights always spursnew reflectionon rights and to new movementstowardnew concerns. New social movementshave often been associatedwith at-tempts to change political society (Lefort 1986, 262). While I am notconcentratingon the topic of social movements, Lefort makes some provocativesuggestions regarding he appropriate trategyfor social movements to follow.Successful ones do not aim at complete power but ratherat specific goals. Whatis paradoxical s that across the spectrumof these movements, Lefort arguesthatthere is a very significant marriagebetween the idea of legitimacy and the rep-resentation of particularity.I believe that Lefort opens the possibility forunderstanding ow a politics of difference and identity can contributequite con-structivelyto a broaderand much more inclusive form of democracy,which isbuilt on cooperationand coalition building,but which still attests to the hetero-geneity of the community(s) (Lefort 1986, 264).16Continuing his elaboration of the generative relation between human rightsanddemocracy,Lefort forcefully demands hateven the liberalwelfare statecan-not be held responsible for the defense of human rights and for granting civilsociety full autonomy (1988, 23). Lefortpresentsthe foundation for a rigorousconception of citizenship that attributesresponsibility for the protectionof thepublic space to its participants.This connection between human rights anddemocracyprovides a more formal articulationof Lyotard's oncernwithjusticeand the differend.While both thinkersreject all totalizing projectsthat seek toestablish the criteria for establishingthe best society, they work to articulatehow a democraticform of society, which lacks permanentmarkersof certainty,can remain committedto a constantawarenessof humanrights and the occur-rence of the differend.Lefort reasserts he connection between philosophyandpolitics, between hedemandfor thought,which would takeresponsibility or an inquiry nto the veryessence of thinking, and the demand for interventionin public life throughspeech and action (Lefort 1983, 93-94). Lefort demands thatthoughtbe opento the dynamicof democracyand the experiencethat it establishes of ultimateindeterminacy n the basis of social organizationand of an interminabledebateupon Law (Lefort 1983, 93-94). Philosophymustrespondto the indeterminate

'5For a specific empiricalanalysis of the failure of official discourses in Eastern Europe,seeBermeo (1992).'6Formore discussion of a post-Marxistapproach o social movements,see Laclau and Mouffe

(1985).


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496 PatrickE McKinlayspaceof creation hat comes into existencein a democratic orm of society.If themarkersof certainty have been dissolved,then political philosophy has the taskof exploringanddefendingthatspace of uncertainty.

Lyotard & Lefort:Judging DemocracyThere is a kindred spirit in Lyotard's onceptions of paralogy and discursiveagonisticsand Lefort'sconceptionof democracy.Both thinkersadvocate the es-sential roles experimentation and indeterminacy play in the politics oflegitimation and the legitimation of the political. Neither Lyotardor Lefort be-lieves that injustices will never occur, that no one will try to assert a specificdefinitionof the spaceof the political.As in the conduct of normalscience, al-

ternative voices and experimentalattitudesmeet with continuous opposition.What is unique is thatLyotardand Lefort describe the way in which the politi-cal, as it becomes expressedin various fields of inquiry, s alwaysthreatenedbydiscursivepracticesaimed at limiting and abolishingconflict.Any effort to ex-press a program of appropriationor revolution only repeats the totalizingprojectof stemming regionalor disciplinaryresistance. 7Lefort and Lyotardposit the possibility of a democracybased on heterogene-ity and difference. Because it creates a locus of powerthat is empty, democracydoes not privilegethe developmentof any set of standards. nstead,according oLefort, the indivisibilityof the social is yielded throughthe test of alterity.Inotherterms,the worldpresentsitself thus from the vantage point of each uniquelocus. Impossibleto encompass,it neverthelessrequiresdebate about what is le-gitimate and what is not, as well as, in each individual, a ceaseless effort atjudgment (Lefort 1990, 10). The parallelswith Lyotard's onceptionof judg-ment without criteria are significantbecause they suggest a substantialshift indemocratic hought.Lefort remindsus thatdemocracyshouldnot be ashamedofits ambiguities,but rather hat it is possible to denounce relativismwithout giv-ing up the relativismthattotalitarianism trove to destroy.How is this possible?How can wejudge without criteria?How can we denouncerelativismand defendit at the sametime?At this juncture,the critics of postmodernismseem certain of victory.Theportraitof democracy ust presentedseems to robthe theorist of any opportunityfor describing any specific practicesor institutionsfor democraticpolitics. Fur-thermore, the emphasis on relativism and the maintenanceof alterity suggeststhatthereis no room for compromise,andprobablyno impetusfor action. How

'7Readings (1991) stronglyendorses such a reading of Lyotard: The importance of Lyotard'swork is not that it gives post-structuralisma decidablepolitical dimension that it had otherwiselacked. Rather,Lyotard's efusal to thinkthe politicalas a determiningor determinatemetalanguage,as the sphere n which the truemeaningof false metalanguages suchas 'aesthetic'value)is revealedas 'political effects', pushes him towardthe deconstructionof the representational pace of thepolitical (87).


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Postmodernismand Democracy 497do Lyotard and Lefort add anything different than a pragmatic approach todemocracy?One of the standard riticisms leveled againstpostmodern heory is that it failsto address concrete concerns and propose specific possibilities for action. Thelinkage to literary criticism tends to indicate that postmodernism s reactiveandeven, in Habermas' 1991) terms, conservative. Withrespectto the politi-cal, however, this criticism misses the markbecause neither Lyotardnor Lefortrecommends an aesthetic approach o the differend.The differend n politicscircumstances of unfreedom where the space of the political has beenoccupied testifies to the obligation of the critic to announce the offense. Boththinkers advance recommendations or alternative orms of expression that ex-ceed the dominantmetanarrative,whether t be an ideology, a normal science, ora limiting genre of discourse. Lyotardprivileges the potential for the faculty ofimaginationto achieve the level of judgment, especially through art and litera-ture. Adorno had similar hopes for certain forms of musical composition andabstract art. Lefort describes the space of the political, not unlike Arendt orMerleau-Ponty,n terms that emphasize the exploratoryand experimentalpoten-tial that political actions may demonstrate.Inhis descriptionof Tocqueville's mpressionsof American democracy,Lefortseems to assume that republicanrepresentativepractices exemplify the hiddenpotentialfor Americanpolitical action. In view of his work, I would arguethatrepresentativeor republicandemocracy is only one form of society and thatLefort gives insufficient consideration of the nature of direct or participatorydemocratic practice. More than republican forms, participatory democracydemonstrates he overall commitment o expanding and experimentingwith dif-ferent forms of democratic practice. Tocqueville's assessment of democracyinAmerica acknowledgesthe many different orms of participationand describes ademocraticculture.This approach its with Lefort'sphenomenological reatmentof the political in a democraticform of society; it refrains from imposing strictdisciplinaryor functionalcategoriesonto variousphenomenaandrealms of po-litical action.Thenext step is to identify events or new incisions into the flesh ofthe political where a differendcan be announcedandwhere the indeterminacyofcriteriademand udgment.Lefort's failure to elaboratea more participatorydemocracymay be the resultof the combinationof his bias with respect to formal democraticpractice inFrance and his dependence on Arendt's distinction between the public and theprivate sphere.Lefort-tries o combine a tauntingcritiqueof functionalismwithhis own conceptionof the separationbetweenthe spheresof knowledge, power,and law. Lefort does not concede the movement towardmore openly normativeresearchin political science that marksthe tensions between objective analysisandprescription.This awareness s most obvious in researchon democratization,wherestudentsof democracyare more forthcomingwith their ideologicalbiasesandpredilections.Futureresearchneeds to continue this trend.


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498 PatrickE McKinlayRefusing to focus on politics, a postmodernapproach o democracydraws at-tention to instances of localized experimentation. It maintains an openconsiderationof new contexts of political activity.Postmodernismdoes not sim-ply make everything political, uch that it is empty of meaning.It does so bycalling attention to the difficulties these marginalizedgroups encounterin at-tempting to voice their claims because the system of representationdoes notunderstand, ee, or hear their concerns as such. Rather, n searchingfor newsites of political action, postmodernismempowers ocalized and often marginal-ized groupswithin a public forum for expression.This connection with local pockets of resistancedemonstratesanotherparallelbetween Lyotardand Lefort. Lyotard'sconception of the differendrespondstothe voicelessness of phrases that are constrainedby a dominant anguage game

or metanarrative.ndeed,one can recognizethe differend n nondiscursivecon-texts wherever one confronts situations of domination.Lyotard has found aprofound way of identifying the same events that Foucaultdescribedin termsof disciplinary practices or normalizing discourses. Both Lyotardand Lefortdescribe a political question: To what extent is democracy compatible withindeterminacy?Democracy as an empty locus of power is only temporarily inhabited bygroupsunder the auspices of institutionalmechanisms thatperiodically providefor renewal and removal.Lyotardand Lefort, respectively,have described howattending o differendswithin the political requiresa simultaneouscommitmentto institutions-such as regular and free elections, humanrights, and localizedpolitical participation and to practicesthatare indeterminatelydefined,whichalwayscontest the normalizationof political discourse,the select statusof priv-ileged groups, and the subordinationof right to power. In Lyotard'sterms,democracyconstantlyrespondsto the differend,alwaysprovidinga space for anarticulationof the phraseor genrethat does not conform to the particularimita-tions of a metanarrative r a dominant anguage game. It is important o stressthat Lyotard'sattentionto the differend is not restricted o linguistic practices.Indeed, both Carroll (1987) and Readings (1991) point out that Lyotardresistsdefinitionof the currency of the differend only in terms of language games.His own early work, Discours, figure, (1971) works against a dialectical logicbased on a structuralist onception of language. Rather,Lyotard ooks for op-portunities for phrasing torts, damages, and resistances that may not berepresented n the language games of the dominantmetanarrative r even themedium of speakingtaken up by the dominant phrase. Instead, Lyotardhopesto expose opportunities or representation f what cannotbe represented n thediscursive terms of the dominating anguage. Lyotardencouragesus to look forwhat is notsaid, what is left out of our descriptionsof the state of affairs.Hisis a constant attention to the unrepresented,he unrepresentable,precisely be-cause it exceeds the conditions of proof and presentation demandedby thedominantparadigmor language game.


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Postmodernismand Democracy 499The impositionof a master-narrativeerpetuates njustice becauseit constitutesa denialof theimagination, a denial of the right to respond, to invent, to deviate from the norm-in otherwords, the right to little narrativeshatare rootedin difference rather hanin the identity es-tablishedby the grand narrative. Lyotard1977)

For Lyotard, ustice is defined as the absence of the threat of being able tomake a move n a language game, that is, that the game or relations betweenspeakers not only always maintains a reactive tolerance, but defends the verypossibility of difference and experimentation.As Lefort's descriptionof the pri-macy of human rights demonstrates, democracy defends the potential ofspeaking and acting in the public sphere, so long as it does not restrict he sameactivityof anothercitizen.Announcing the Differend: Toward a More Inclusive Civil Society

Lyotard'sand Lefort's respective work on the differend, he political, and theconstantquestionof political judgment contributes wo avenuesfor reflectiononthe condition of contemporarydemocracy.First, given the indeterminacyof cri-teria for judgment, democratic heory and practiceneed to grantgreaterattentionto the occurrence of the differend.This question is of particular mportance nthe United States today given the intensity of rancorousdebate over issues offamily values, personalresponsibility, irtue,andpolitical correctness,all of whichcan be identifiedas battles in the culturewars. While it is not in the scope ofthis paper to present a detailed analysis of the implicationsof the culture warsfor the politicalor for democracy, thinkthatwe can identifythe differend n theway that various groups, on both the so-called political Right and Left attackeach other and a varietyof individuals,groups, and classes with the goal of un-dermining the addressee's capacity to iterate a response and a legitimatedefense. Most debate on these issues refer eitherto the veracityof the empiricalclaims madeby these groups or, to the quasi-empiricalqualityof public opinionresearchto generate statistical evidence to buttresseach respective discourse'sclaim to majoritarian tatus.A Lyotardian esponsewill demand an analysis ofhow that data s manipulatedojustify changesin socialpolicy.How do claimsof empiricalproof legitimateactionin thepolitical sphere?Do ourrepresentativeinstitutionscede the task of decision to procedures,mechanisms, operatives hatare unable to digest and acknowledge opinions, feelings, arguments, signs,phrases that cannot be articulated n terms legitimized by those institutions?Second,while we might emphasizethe problems besettingcertain marginal-ized groupswithinthe communitywho often confrontthe insurmountableaskof contesting in the political realm, the differendalso calls attentionto thoseevents that arevoid of anymode of expressionin ourrepresentativenstitutions.Lefort'sdefense of the generativequalityof rights shows how continuousatten-tion to the defense of rights leads to the possibility for new awareness ofdifferends. In contrast to a pluralist concentration on the competition for


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500 Patrick E McKinlayinterests n the public sphere, Lefort believes the distinguishing eaturesof thesenew movements do not represent interests but rights. These movements areunique because they are not seekingto seize powerand transform he existingre-lations of power, but are working to establish some relative relations ofautonomyin civil society, againstthe increasingclutches of state- and market-driven culturalpower.The ideas that both Lefort and Lyotardadvocate not only present a radicalreconceptualizationof democraticpractice,but have been implementedin cer-tain polities and political forums. First, we have substantial evidence of newforms of political activity both domestically and internationally hat representthe heterogeneity and differenceencouragedby Lyotardand Lefort. The peaceand antinuclear ocial movements of the early 1980s demandeda role in the po-litical conversation connected to defense policy and spending. In parts ofWesternEurope,the GreenPartyachieved certain levels of success at both thefederal andthe provincial evel. The Greens'political activity widenedthe scopeof discourseregardingenvironmentalpolicy.Much of the literatureon Europeansocial movements stresses the failure ofboth the movements and the organized political Left to formulate a workingcoalition. What these argumentsdid not consider is the special problem theMarxist or labor narrativecreatedfor these groups, who found that their con-cerns could not be articulated n the languageof class struggleand traditionalclass conflict issues. We have learned thatthis coalition will not develop out ofa vacuum but requiresa new broaderpolitical vision fromrespectiveadvocates.In many cases, classic grand coalitions will work against the adequate expres-sion of these alternativeperspectiveson postindustrial ociety. In contrast,morereal spaceforpoliticalactivism can be excavated romthe debris of conventionalpolitics. A positive example is in evidence all over the United States where thereligious Right is seizing the agendaof local political races. The scope of theirpolitical activism has turnedfrom broad nationalstrategiesto limited and oftenhighly specialized contests. If we look simply at the formal institutions ofdemocraticpolitics, there are at least 80,000 elected offices in the United Statesalone. This does not even begin to consider the extensive possibilities for ac-tivism within local debatesregardingzoning, environmentalpolicy, and schooladministration.It would no doubt surprise contemporarycritics of modernAmerican democracythatmuch of what Tocquevilleobserved still holds true.There seems to be a protractedproblematicinvolved in the negotiation be-tween new social movements, new trends in identity politics, and the oldbulwark of Left activism, labor.A postmoderndemocratictheory approachesthese issues without the pretensionof a conception of a grand coalition. In-stead, it concentrateson the acknowledgmentof identities and difference thatattestto the diversityand heterogeneityof the political realm. It looks first to-ward the creation and maintenance of a spirit of inclusion whereby acontestationof opinions can occur.It will be within the context of this agonis-


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Postmodernismand Democracy 501tics of experimentationand diversity that new coalitions may form for limitedand localized initiatives.The terrainof the political, especially within advancedcapitalism,is a complex texturedspace which is highly chargedwith the prej-udices of capital,both local and international.At the same time, no one body,party,or interest has managedto occupy fully the space of representation.Apostmodern democraticpracticewill move to exploit the remaining opportuni-ties for new experiments that redefine the role of political action and it willsupporta politics of difference that responds to the differend and opens newspaces for identityand cooperation.Manuscript ubmitted6 November1995Final manuscript eceived 18 May 1997

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502 PatrickE McKinlayLyotard,Jean-Francois. 1992. The PostrnodernExplained. Minneapolis:University of Minnesota

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College, Sioux City,IA 51106.

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