7/30/2019 Poster Roberts RoME 7.29.10

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The ProblemIt may seem that existingandfuture people have a moral

status that the merely possible lack. Why else would we say

that (I) ending the life of an existingperson (or, at some

future time, afuture person) is ordinarily wrong but

(II) preventing apossible person from ever living at all

ordinarily isnt? The cases, however, undermine this idea.

They show that we are compelled to accept instead the

Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons (MSMPP).

According to MSMPP, the merely possible are morally

significant in the same way you and I are; to the extent our

losses matter morallycount against acts that impose them

and in favor of acts that avoid themso do theirs.

MSMPP seems to undermine the distinction between (I) and

(II). And it also seems to ground a powerful argument

against early abortion. According to that argument, the early

abortion is often wrong in virtue of what it does, not to the

human embryo or early human fetus (or the pregnant woman

or her partner or other existing or future persons), but rather

to the merely possible person it prevents from ever existing.

The power of the argument lies in the fact that, if correct, it

stands even ifthe human embryo and early human fetus

(perhaps because they are not thinking things) are notpersons and have no moral status in their own right.

The problem is to show how we can retain both MSMPPandthe distinction between (I) and (II). Variabilism, I

argue, solves that problemand, in doing so, provides a

foundation for a defense against the Argument Against Early

Abortion.

Three CasesPreliminaries. * plus italics means indicated person neverexists at indicated world. Bold means indicated person does

or will exist. Never existing implies a zero wellbeing level.

Leaving a person out of existence often imposes a loss on

that person (where loss here is shorthand for claim that a

particular existence is better fora person than never existing

is). Green dotted arrows and red solid arrows indicatelosses in wellbeing from one world to another.

Case 1. Mere Addition

a1 at w1 a2 at w2 a3 at w3

(w1=actual)

+10 Kate Kate Kate, Jaime

+1 Jaime

0 Jaime*

A good theory will imply: Jaimes loss at w2 counts

against a2; Jaimes loss makes the otherwise permissible

a2 wrong not just at w2 but at the actualw1 as well

even though Jaime is merely possible relative to w1.

(Otherwise analysis has no action-guiding force.)

Solution: VariabilismWe may wantto say that Ann has a priority that Bob lacks

(perhaps on the ground that Ann alone is actual, or that we see

evaluate the actual a1, or that Ann alone exists in both w1 and

w2). But Cases 1-3 show that we cant. MSMPP Premise(1)is true. Premise (2) isnt problematic. Loss here is just

shorthand for talk about the betterness-forrelation; and just as

hard to deny that it is often better forus that we exist than that

not, so is it hard to deny that that claim holds for the merely

possible as well.

The culprit is Premise (3). Cases 1-3 show only thatsome of t

losses incurred by the merely possible matter morally. We can

infer that alltheiror all ourlosses matter morally. At leas

the option of saying thatsome of their losses matter morally an

somedont has not been foreclosed. Moreover, thats just the

option Cases 1-4 together suggest. We should be deciding, not

who matters morally and whodoesnt, but which losses matter

morally and which dont. From that perspective, the rule for

deciding which do and which dont seems obvious: mattering

morally is a function ofwhere a loss is incurred in relation to th

person who incurs it. That is:

Variabilism. A loss incurred at a world where the

person who incurs it does or will exist has fu l l moralsignif icancefor purposes of evaluating the act thatimposes that loss and the alternative acts that avoid Bu ta loss incurred by a person at a world where thatperson never exists has no moral signif icanceforpurposes of evaluating the act that imposes that lossthe alternative acts that avoid it.

Implications: Red solid arrows signify morallysignificant losses; green dotted arrows signify lossethat arent morally significant; and the loss incurred the merely possible person as a result of the earlyabortion has no moral significance at all.

Queries: Does Variabilism make the mistake of ignoringgains?What are the implications for the choices that led to yourcoming in

existence? For the Asymmetry? Does the nonidentity problem

challenge Variabilism?

Melinda A. RobertsDepartment of Philosophy and Religion, College of New Jersey

RoME IIIAugust 2010

Does the Moral Status of Merely Possible People Imply that Early Abortion Is Wrong?

Case 2. Double Wrongful Life

a1 at w1 a2 at w2

(w1=actual)

0 Cal* Dee*

-10 Dee Cal

A good theory will imply: Cals loss at w2 counts against a2

and in favor of a1; it makes the otherwise wrong actuala1

permissible.

Case 3. Addition Plus

a1 at w1 a2 at w2 a3 at w3

(w1=actual)

+10 Etta+9 Etta

+5 Etta, Fen

0 Fen* Fen

A good theory will imply: Fens loss at w2 counts against

a2; it makes the otherwise wrong actuala1permissible.

ResultsFrom Case 1: Some losses incurred by merely possible persons

count against the acts that imposes those losses; they can make an

otherwise permissible merely possible act wrong.

From Cases 2 and 3: Some losses incurred by merely possible

persons count, not just against the merely possible acts that impose

those losses, but also in favor of any actualact that avoids those

losses; they can make an otherwise wrong actualact permissible.

Since to say thatsomeof a persons losses bear on the moral

evaluation is surely to say that that person has some moral

significance, MSMPP is inescapable!

Argument Against Early AbortionPremise 1. MSMPP is true; merely possible people are morallysignificant; just as ourlosses count against the acts that impose

those losses and in favor of any alternative acts, so do theirs.

Premise 2. Any early abortion that prevents a merely possibleperson from coming into an existence worth having (and not into a

wrongful life) imposes a loss on that person.

Premise 3. If MSMPP is true, then that lossthe loss imposed by

any such early abortioncounts againstthat early abortion.

Conclusion. Any early abortion that prevents a merely possibleperson from coming into an existence worth having imposes a loss

on that person that counts againstthat early abortion.

Further conclusions. In determining the permissibility of theearly abortion, any otherwise plausible permissibility theory will

take that morally significant lossjust as it will take any other

morally significant lossinto account. We can anticipate that the

early abortion will be deemed wrong whenever the (ordinarily very

deep) loss incurred by the merely possible person isnt

counterbalanced by the (ordinarily relatively minor) losses the

pregnant woman or others will incur if the pregnancy continues.

An Objection: If the above argument is sound,then, in the Base Case, Bobs loss in w1 counts against a1, just

as Anns counts against a2. But that seems false.

Case 4. Base Case

a1 at w1 a2 at w2

(w1=actual)

+100 Ann Bob

0 Bob* Ann

A goodtheory will say that Bobs loss doesnt have anything

like the moral weight that Anns does.

Aperson? Afour-and-a-half week-old (est.)orphan kitten.

A non-person? A 10 mm [0.39 inch]embryo from an ectopic pregnancy,still in the oviduct. This embryo isabout five weeks old (or from the 7thweek of pregnancy). Wikipedia,retrieved March 15, 2010.

Sources: Gustaf Arrhenius (on person-affecting restrictions), JohBroome (on Neutrality Intuition), Caspar Hare, Rivka Weinberg, Jo

Parsons and Jan Narveson (on Moral Actualism), R.M. Hare

(golden rule argument against abortion), George Sher (on R.M.Hare), Elizabeth Harman (on Actual Future account of why agents

has reasons against early abortion in world where pregnancy

continues), Jeff McMahan (on the Asymmetry and on Order of

Presentation account of why abortion can be wrong because worse

for some and better for none than fetal injury), Peter Singer (on Prio

Existence View and Asymmetry), David Benatar (on disvalue of

existing), Ingmar Persson (on Asymmetry), Alan McMichael (on

problem for actualism about possible worlds), Derek Parfit.

References and poster pdf: www.tcnj.edu/~robertsmContact: robertsm@tcnj.edu

http://www.tcnj.edu/~robertsmmailto:robertsm@tcnj.edumailto:robertsm@tcnj.eduhttp://www.tcnj.edu/~robertsm