1.4. POST CONFLICT RELATED ISSUES

During the past almost two decades the operations were followed by long post-conflict international presence in what is called “nation-building” in UN language or “stability and reconstruction” in NATO/Coalition terminology. Among the relevant exceptions to that, could be mentioned the first war from Iraq, “Desert Storm” and Somalia, after a failed short operation and the domestic stability is still evolvingdramatically. Currently, the post-conflict ongoing operations are those from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), under UE (Berlin Plus) command, Kosovo (KFOR and EULEX), under NATO and EU respectively, Afghanistan (ISAF) under NATO, and Iraq as a Coalition led by US that is almost finished. The challenges of terrorism, proliferation of armament and failed states indicate that this tendency will continue. In order to succeed, the stabilization and reconstruction missions following combat operations need advanced planning and important manpower, donations and big infusion of money. The failure to previously process of organization of this phase of conflict could have, as proved, serious consequences including important loss of humans. Persisting violence and instability following the declared end of combat operations create new challenges for international organizations as we experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.

MAIN PROVOCATIONS Stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) phases are very difficult to define considering it complexity of different circumstances. Situated between combat operations and classic state assistance simultaneously developed are creating barriers and require a combination of skills for both civilians and military involved, being in position to deal with a large range of issues. In order to create a safe and secure environment theyhave to address in parallel support for state institutions reconstruction, political and social transition, establishment of public security and rule of law, rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic recovery. In many cases, all these are taking place within a hostile environment

that requires continuation of military operations including combat. Therefore, the trustiness and support of the local population are vital to enable the role of the military. As a consequence, S&R involve military and civilian activities over the full spectrum of the conflict. A large number of international institutions and NGOs play different roles with amplitude in different stages during transition period. The multinational military forces normally play a lead role in providing initial security conditions in order to facilitate civilian institutions and agencies to developing their activities. The prolongation of unstable state will obviously create difficulties for military operations as well as for civilian organizations. At all stages, close coordination of international organizations, NGOs and the military, as part of a comprehensive approach is a prerequisite of success. In all cases, negotiation and diplomacy for dealing the state reconstruction are needed. Moreover, the terrorism with all forms of its network activities as we face inIraq and Afghanistan even complicates and creates vulnerabilities in addressing stability and proper conditions for a long lasting reconstruction.

PARTICULARITIES OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS INPOST-CONFLICT PHASES Military operations abroad have two dimensions: first,combat operation targeting the enemy and taking control within a state or a given area, these phases being usually called according to the goals, “winning the war”; and second, following the declared end of combat operations, phases of stabilization and reconstruction, called “winning the peace”. While the first is exclusively depending to the military command, preparedness, capabilities, commitment and assets, the second is more depending on civil institution both governmental or nongovernmental ability to manage the state reconstruction and the way of using financial resources to restore normalcy and provide the populace with social increase state. As we stated, the post-combat phase require a change in rules of engagement and a more preoccupation for a close cooperation with local administration for maintaining basic services and care for local peaceful population, while continuing to engage the remaining of the

enemy, destroy their infrastructure and monitoring ceasefires. The period between end of war and the conduct of reconstruction could be shorter or longer pending on the way in which the civil structure have been prepared in terms of planning and establishment of programs and the negotiation with the remaining local institutions to take charge or to provide with advice from behind. During this period, the leadership vacuum must be bridged by military with the main responsibility for maintaining public order, security, safe environment, and emergency services in an immediate post- combat state. In order to be able to smoothly manage this period, the military need specific doctrines, skills,techniques,and appropriate command abilities for that mission. Nevertheless, this stage, stabilization and reconstruction figures out a significant difference between the employment of peace-keeping forces under UN “blue helmets” and the same combat forces who have done the previous combat operation. In other words, the employment of the same forces who “won the war” for “winning the peace” afterwards. The most important difference comes out from the equipment and assets of the two types of forces, for facing the enemy or remaining hostile organized structures and from the rules of engagement that are less permissive for UN peacekeepers. For the national forces engaged in multinational operations other than UN peacekeeping like we experienced in Afghanistan led by NATO or Iraq under a Coalition command, the lessons learned to be taken away, refer to: – stability and reconstruction has to be perceived and properly treated as important as high-intensity combat operations and require special doctrines, skills and training; – planning the stabilization period require specific missions for both combat and reconstruction participation while having the right combination and size of troops to provide for sustained operations; – the forces itself should be properly trained, prepared and equipped for a large spectrum of missions, from combat to stabilization and reconstruction; the rules of engagement have to be exercised in order to avoid the collateral losses of innocent civilians; – equipment applied should include the right emerging technology that suitable may face the challenges: armored vehicles with biometric identification, explosive detection, UAVs, night-vision devices, etc;

– special education programs within institutional framework, under adapted doctrines to train both military and civilians for Civ-Mil cooperation during stabilization operations; the leaders should take in account that the future generation of military officers has to understand that the stabilization phase require core missions similar and not adjunct to combat ones; – national legislation should be tailored to enable the military to carry out missions with no caveats. Moreover, the central strategic structure and join operational command should have a special office or specialized personnel with the required competencies to organize, monitor, coordinate, advise and supervise the military while take part in stabilization missions according to national and international legislation of war. Ill-prepared forces can create difficulties in the ongoing stabilization missions, unnecessary fatalities amongcivilian, losses among the own military and even could change the desired shape of the mission. Intelligence community plays a larger role during stabilization and especially human intelligence is needed to be involved on a larger scale among the civil local community. One more thing to mentioned, with a crucial role during stabilization and reconstruction in every post-conflict operation is international financing. It has huge contribution in providing essential services for the populace, rehabilitation of the economy, and improvements of infrastructure. The normal straight-ahead framework for raising money is donor conferences that bring together international institutions, bothgovernmental and nongovernmental, and developed nations. The lack of consolidated projects in the preparation of these conferences will result in lost opportunities for reconstruction and can even compromise the success of the mission. For a comprehensive coordination of this endeavor the main role to play is dedicated to UN who has already the right bodies to organize all the related issues to support and reconstruction. As an overall conclusion, the previous experiences have shown that the more successful the diplomatic and development efforts to prevent and mitigate conflict, the less likely it would be for the multinational military forces to manage the difficult, long lasting and costly post-conflict missions.

CHAPTER 2PARTICULARITIES OF MILITARY ACTIONS DURINGSTABILITYAND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. FOREWORD OPERATING BASE

Land Forces require strategic and operational capacity to deploy and immediately conduct operations anywhere with little or no advanced notice. Current operations proved the necessity for the troops to be able to deploy rapidly and to engage extended campaigns. These operations require soldiers and units with expeditionary capabilities that is one of the main characteristics of the NATO deployable forces. Commanders and organizations should also care about proficiency at force projection, protection, and sustainment. In order to achieve this, apart from special equipment and military assets as air strategic lift capabilities the military itself require an expeditionary mindset to prepare them for short notice deployments into uncertain, often austere environments. The planners’ methodology and training goals for developing skills of the military have to provide the capability to operate against complex, adaptive threats operating anywhere. The distance across which any Nations can project decisive military power is its strategic reach. This multifaceted reach combines joint military capabilities, air, maritime, space, special operations, and cyber with those of the other instruments ofnational power. Land forces capacity complement those of other Services. Army forces can increase the joint force’s strategic reach by securing and operating bases far from their peace time location. However, it depends on joint-enabled force projection capabilities to deploy and sustain them across intercontinental distances in order to respond to non-Article 5 according to the NATO strategy. In some cases, land forces use strategic lift to deploy directly to an operational area. In many instances, land operations combine direct deployment with movements from intermediate staging bases located outside the operational area. Access to bases and support depends upon the Nation’sdiplomatic and economic power as well as its military capabilities.

MOBILE MANEUVER IN OPERATIONS The most difficult situation during entry operation is operational maneuver from strategic long distance combining global force projection with maneuver against an operationally significant objective directly from the home territory into the operational area. A good example is the intervention that took place in 1992 in Somalia through debarkation followed by rapid and incisive development of operation on the ground. InAfghanistan, for many years the mission of the coalition was focused on capital Kabul and two other locations Bagram and Kandahar where the airports are available and provide with isolated ground from crowded villages and cities suitable for setting long lasting bases. From there the maneuver was organized to different other locations situated at long distances that made difficult to establish force protection, logistics, maintenance and accommodation for temporary rest of the soldiers. When NATO took over the mission the first decision was to extend the operation across the whole territory and many bases were required. The availability of bases in a region extends the strategic reach of Land forces. Bases near the operational area increase opportunities for successful operational maneuver from strategic distance. These operations originate from outside the operational area, often using intermediate staging bases.

EXPEDITIONARY ABILITY Expeditionary forces are configured for immediate employment in austere conditions. They do not depend on existing infrastructure; they adapt as the situation evolves. Commanders prepare to transition to sustained operations, assimilate new capabilities into force packages for follow-on operations, or disperse until otherwise required. As a result, the force composition varies throughout the campaign based on the dominant element of full spectrum operations. Expeditionary capability is more than the ability to deploy quickly. It requires deploying the right pool of forces to the right place at the right time. It provides force commander with the possibility to deter an adversary or take decisive action if deterrence fails. Forward deployed units, forward positioned capabilities, peacetime military engagement, and force projection, from anywhere in the world, and all

contribute to expeditionary capabilities.

FORCE PROJECTION Force projection is the military component of power projection. Speed is paramount if we consider that forceprojection is a race between friendly forces and the enemy or situation. The side that achieves an operational capability first can gain the initiative. Thus, it is not the velocity of individual stages or transportation means that is decisive; it is a combat- ready force deployed to an operational area before the enemy is ready or the situation deteriorates further. Force projection encompasses five processes: mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. These processes occur in a continuous, overlapping, and repeating sequence throughout an operation. Force projection also requires detailed planning and synchronization while the staginglocation for the future base is very important. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration focus on reassembling deploying units and quickly integrating them into the force. It is the critical link between deploying and employing forces.

Effective reception, staging, onward movement, and integration establish a smooth flow of personnel, equipment, and material from ports of debarkation through employment as reassembled, mission-capable forces. A deploying unit is most vulnerable between its arrival and operational employment, so protectionis vital.

ENTRY OPERATIONS Whenever possible, land forces seek an unopposed entry, either unassisted by the host nation. An assisted entry requires host-nation cooperation. In an assisted entry, initial-entry forces are tailored to deploy efficiently and transition quickly to follow-on operations. In an unassisted entry, no secure facilitiesfor deploying forces exist. The force commander should deploy balanced force packages with enough combat power to secure an adequate lodgment and perform reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

BASING

A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported. The base includes installations and facilities that provide sustainment. Bases may be joint or single Services areas. Units located within the base are under the tactical control of the base commander. Land forces typically rely on a mix of intermediate staging bases, lodgments (subsequently developed into bases), and forward operating bases to deploy and employ land power simultaneously to operational depth. These bases establish and maintain strategic reach for deploying forces and ensure sufficient operational reach to extend operations in time and space.

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASES An Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) is a tailorable, temporary location used for staging forces, sustainment and/or extraction into and out of an operational area. At the intermediate staging base, units are unloaded from inter-theater lift, reassembled and integrated with their equipment, and then moved by intra- theater lift into the operational area. For land forces, ISB may be located in the operational area. They often are located in the supported combatant commander’s area of responsibility. However, they are always established outside the range of enemy fires and beyond the enemy’s political sphere of influence.

LODGMENTS A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations. Identifying and preparing the initial lodgment significantly influences the conduct of an operation.Lodgments should expand to allow easy access to strategic sealift and airlift, offer adequate space for storage, facilitate transshipment of supplies and equipment, and be accessible to multiple lines of communications. Typically, deploying forces establish lodgments near key points of entry in the operational area that offer central access to air, land, and sea transportation hubs. The time required to establish a lodgment depends on the extent and condition of the civil and military infrastructure present in the operational area.

FOREWORD OPERATING BASES A forward operating base is an area used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities. Such bases may be used for an extended time. During protracted operations, they may be expanded and improved to establish a more permanent presence. The scale and complexity of thebase, however, directly relates to the size of the force required to maintain it. A large base with extensive facilities requires a much larger security force than a smaller, austere base. Commanders should analyze whether to expand and improve a forward operating base against the type and number of forcesavailable to secure it, the expected length of the forward deployment, and the force’s sustainment requirements.

Forward operating bases extend and maintain the operational reach of Army forces, providing secure locations from which to conduct and sustain operations. They not only enable extending operations in time and space; they also contribute to the overall endurance of the force, an essential element of the Army’s campaign capability. Forward operating bases allow forward-deployed forces to reduce operational risk, maintain momentum, and avoid culmination. Typically, forward operating bases are established adjacent to a regional distribution hub, such as a large airfield (civilian or military), rail terminal, or major highway junction. This facilitates movement into and out of the operational area while providing a secure location through which to distribute personnel, equipment, and supplies. However, forward operating bases may be located in austere locations with limited access totransportation infrastructure. In such cases, maintaining the base for extended periods is unlikely.

FOB represents in fact a temporary, improvised base, set in an isolated area, away from urban environment and from circulated routes. It has no infrastructure and generally faces poor life conditions.

The main conditions while building a FOB are: − protecting fence by sandbags surrounding the perimeter of the area where the base is disposed;

− high observer positions for watching the ground outside the base in order to prevent any surprising attacks; − avoiding high buildings, hills or mountains in the neighborhood of the base where the enemy can set sniper positions or observe the activities inside; − creating covert shelters bunkers for emergencies during attacks with mortars; − delimitating sensitive areas like dining facilities or accommodation tent zone protected by improvised means like containers, bull dozers or heavy tracks; − very reliable communication system for permanently contact with the mother base for asking the needed supplies or for medical support and evacuation or for rapid intervention by air in case of attacks when overwhelmed;- Loudspeakers for early warning the personel in care of any

emergencies occur. Normally the capacity of FOB is company level and supplies are provided by helicopters or by wheels when the conditions allow that. The advantages of FOBs are mainly because of largely spread delivered presence of troops everywhere within the area of responsibility for patrol missions, force protection across many routes, route clearance, dry-gap-crossing mobility operations and support for other forces that might carry out long missions in the area.