Possibility of Knowledge

8/10/2019 Possibility of Knowledge

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The Possibility of Knowledge

Quassim Cassam

ABSTRACT: I focus on two questions: what is knowledge, and how is knowledge possible The

latte! is an e"ample of a how#possible question$ I a!gue that how#possible questions a!e obstacle#

dependent and that the% need to be dealt with at th!ee diffe!ent le&els, the le&el of means, of

obstacle#!emo&al, and of enabling conditions$ At the fi!st of these le&els the possibilit% of

knowledge is accounted fo! b% identif%ing means of knowing, and I a!gue that the identification

of such means also cont!ibutes to a p!ope! unde!standing of what knowledge is$

'$ Int!oduction

I(m going to be add!essing two questions he!e$ The fi!st, which I will call the )what(

question is: what is knowledge The second, which I will call the )how( question is: how is

knowledge possible'As well as attempting to gi&e answe!s to these questions I want to sa%

something about the !elationship between them and the p!ope! methodolog% fo! answe!ing them$

B% )knowledge( I mean p!opositional knowledge, the knowledge that something is the case$ I am

going to suggest that the standa!d app!oaches to the )what( and )how( questions a!e defecti&e and

that the ke% to answe!ing both questions is the notion of a means of knowing$ In b!ief, m% idea is

that the wa% to e"plain how knowledge is possible is to identif% &a!ious means b% which it is

possible and that the identification of the means b% which knowledge is possible cont!ibutes to a

p!ope! unde!standing of what knowledge fundamentall% is$

To b!ing m% p!oposal into focus, I would like to sta!t b% outlining some cont!asting

app!oaches$ *ne standa!d app!oach to the )what( question is the anal%tic app!oach$ This suggests

that to ask what knowledge is is to ask what it is to know that something is the case$ +This is

taken to be a question about the t!uth conditions !athe! than the meaning of statements of the

fo!m )S knows that p($Suppose, fo! e"ample, that I know that the cup into which I(m pou!ing

coffee is chipped$ The anal%tic app!oach sa%s that a good account of what it is to know this will

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be an account of the necessa!% and sufficient conditions fo! knowing that the cup is chipped, and

that the p!ope! methodolog% fo! identif%ing these conditions is conceptual anal%sis, concei&ed of

as a fo!m of a!mchai! philosophical !eflection$ The idea is that b% anal%sing the concept of

knowledge into mo!e basic concepts one disco&e!s necessa!% and sufficient conditions fo!

knowing that the cup is chipped and the!eb% e"plains what it is to know that something is the

case$

The familia! p!oblem with this app!oach is that it is actuall% &e!% difficult to come up

with necessa!% and sufficient conditions fo! p!opositional knowledge that a!e both non#ci!cula!

and co!!ect$-As .illiamson points out, the!e seem to be counte!e"amples to e&e!% e"isting

anal%sis and it(s not clea! in an% case that a complicated anal%sis that somehow managed not to

succumb to the usual counte!e"amples would necessa!il% tell us &e!% much about knowledge is$

But if we conclude on this basis that the pu!suit of anal%ses is )a degene!ating !esea!ch

p!og!amme( /.illiamson +000: '1 then anal%tic epistemolog% lea&es us without an answe! to

the )what( question$

*ne !eaction to these difficulties has been to a!gue that the fundamental mistake of

anal%tic epistemolog% is that it focuses on the concept of knowledge !athe! than on knowledge$

Acco!ding to 2o!nblith, fo! e"ample, )the sub3ect matte! of epistemolog% is knowledge itself, not

ou! concept of knowledge( /2o!nblith +00+: '1 and )knowledge itself( is a natu!al kind$ This

implies that we should go in fo! a natu!alistic !athe! than an anal%tic app!oach to the )what(

question$ Specificall%, the p!oposal is that if knowledge is a natu!al kind then we should e"pect

wo!k in the empi!ical sciences !athe! than a!mchai! conceptual anal%sis to be the ke% to

unde!standing what it is$ But knowledge isn(t a natu!al kind$ The!e a!e too man% disanalogies

between knowledge and genuine natu!al kinds fo! this to be plausible, and in p!actice those who

t!% to )natu!ali4e( epistemolog% eithe! end up igno!ing the what question altogethe! o! answe!ing

it on the basis of 3ust the kind of a!mchai! !eflection that anal%tic epistemologists go in fo!$5

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If this isn(t bad enough, the )how( question seems no less int!actable$ *ne wo!!% is that

we can(t e"plain how knowledge is possible if we don(t know what knowledge is, so if we can(t

answe! the )what( question then we can(t answe! the )how( question eithe!$ The standa!d

app!oach to the )how( question is the t!anscendental app!oach, acco!ding to which the wa% to

e"plain how knowledge is possible is to identif% necessa!% conditions fo! its possibilit%$ 6et it is

ha!d to see how this helps$ .e can see what the p!oblem is b% thinking about scepticism$

Sceptics ask how knowledge of the e"te!nal wo!ld is possible gi&en that we can(t be su!e that

&a!ious sceptical possibilities do not obtain$ It is not an answe! to this question simpl% to d!aw

attention to what is necessa!% fo! the e"istence of the kind of knowledge which the sceptic thinks

we can(t possibl% ha&e$78o! e"ample, it might be t!ue that knowledge !equi!es a knowe! but this

obse!&ation lea&es us none the wise! as to how knowledge of the e"te!nal wo!ld is possible$

9et(s ag!ee, then, that we still don(t ha&e satisfacto!% answe!s to m% two questions$ So

whe!e do we go f!om he!e .e could t!% defending one o! othe! of the standa!d app!oaches

against the ob3ections I ha&e been discussing but this is not what I want to do he!e$ As I ha&e

al!ead% indicated, I belie&e that a diffe!ent app!oach is needed so now would be a good time to

spell out what I ha&e in mind$ *ne of the featu!es of m% alte!nati&e is that add!esses the )how(

question fi!st and then mo&es on to the )what( question$ The significance of doing things in this

o!de! should become clea!e! as I go along$ In the meantime, let(s sta!t b% taking a close! look at

the )how( question, and about what is needed to answe! it$

+$ ow is 2nowledge ;ossible

The fi!st thing to notice is that what I ha&e been calling )how( questions a!e !eall% )how#

possible( questions$ This is wo!th pointing out because the!e a!e how questions that a!en(t how#

possible questions$a3o! became ;!ime

>iniste! in '??0 and asking how it was possible fo! =ohn >a3o! to become ;!ime >iniste! in

'??0$ To ask how >a3o! became ;!ime >iniste! is to ask fo! an account of the stages o! steps b%


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which he became ;!ime >iniste!$@The!e is no implication that it is in an% wa% su!p!ising that he

became ;!ime >iniste! o! that the!e was an%thing that might ha&e been e"pected to p!e&ent him

f!om becoming ;!ime >iniste!$ The!e is such an implication when one asks how it was possible

fo! >a3o! to become ;!ime >iniste!$ The implication is that the!e was some obstacle to such a

thing happening, and this is what gi&es the how#possible question its point$ 8o! e"ample, one

might think that the fact that >a3o!(s social and educational backg!ound ought to ha&e made it

impossible fo! him to become ;!ime >iniste!$?The fact is, howe&e!, that he did become ;!ime

>iniste!$ So what one wants to know is not whethe! it happened, because it did, but how it could

ha&e happened, how it was possible$

*n this account, how#possible questions a!e obstacle#dependent in a wa% that simple how

questions a!e not$'0*ne asks how is possible on the assumption that the!e is an obstacle to the

e"istence o! occu!!ence of $ .hat one wants to know is how is possible despite the obstacle$

The most st!iking how#possible questions a!e ones in which the obstacle looks like making the

e"istence o! occu!!ence of not 3ust su!p!ising o! difficult but impossible$ In such cases the

challenge is to e"plain how something which looks impossible is ne&e!theless possible$ *ne wa%

of doing this would be to show that the obstacle which was thought to make impossible isn(t

genuine$ This would be an obstacle#dissipating !esponse to a how#possible question$ In effect,

this !esponse !ebuts the p!esumption that isn(t possible and the!eb% dep!i&es the how#possible

question of its initial fo!ce$ Anothe! possibilit% would be to accept that the obstacle is genuine

and to then e"plain how it can be o&e!come$ This would be an obstacle#o&e!coming !esponse to a

how#possible question$

.e can illust!ate the distinction between dissipating and o&e!coming an obstacle b%

tu!ning f!om B!itish politics to ;!ussian epistemolog% and looking at one of 2ant(s man% how#

possible questions in the fi!st C!itique$ The question is: how is mathematical knowledge

possible .hat gi&es this question its bite is the wo!!% that mathematical knowledge can(t be

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accounted fo! b% !efe!ence to ce!tain p!esupposed basic sou!ces of knowledge$ The two

p!esupposed sou!ces a!e e"pe!ience and conceptual anal%sis$ Assuming that mathematical t!uths

a!e necessa!il% t!ue ou! knowledge of them can(t come f!om e"pe!ience it must be a p!io!i

knowledge because e"pe!ience can onl% tell us that something is so not that it must be so$

Assuming that mathematical t!uths a!e s%nthetic it follows that conceptual anal%sis can(t be the

sou!ce of ou! knowledge of them eithe!$ So if e"pe!ience and conceptual anal%sis a!e ou! onl%

sou!ces of knowledge then mathematical knowledge is impossible$ 9et(s call this appa!ent

obstacle to the e"istence of mathematical knowledge the p!oblem of sou!ces$ It is the p!oblem

which leads 2ant to ask how mathematical knowledge is possible because he doesn(t doubt that

s%nthetic a p!io!i mathematical knowledge is possible$

An obstacle#dissipating !esponse to 2ant(s question would dispute the assumption that

neithe! e"pe!ience no! conceptual anal%sis can account fo! ou! mathematical knowledge$ 8o!

e"ample, conceptual anal%sis can account fo! it if mathematical t!uths a!e anal%tic !athe! than

s%nthetic$ Alte!nati&el%, the!e is no !eason wh% mathematical knowledge couldn(t come f!om

e"pe!ience if the t!uths of mathematics a!en(t necessa!% o! if it is false that e"pe!ience can(t tell

us that something must be so$ ach of these dissipationist !esponses to 2ant(s question amounts

to what might be called a p!esupposed sou!ces solution to the p!oblem of sou!ces in each case

the possibilit% of mathematical knowledge is accounted fo! b% !efe!ence to one of the

p!esupposed sou!ces of knowledge$ But this isn(t 2ant(s own p!efe!!ed solution$ is solution is

an additional sou!ces solution since it in&ol&es the positing of what he calls )const!uction in pu!e

intuition( as an additional sou!ce of knowledge b% !efe!ence to which at least the possibilit% of

geomet!ical knowledge be accounted fo!$''This an obstacle#o&e!coming !athe! than an obstacle#

dissipating !esponse to a how#possible question because it doesn(t dispute the e"istence of the

obstacle which led the question to be asked in the fi!st place it accepts that the obstacle is, in a

wa%, pe!fectl% genuine and t!ies to find a wa% a!ound it$'+

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The onl% sense in which const!uction in pu!e intuition, the use of mental diag!ams in

geomet!ical p!oofs, is an )additional( sou!ce of knowledge is that no account was taken of it in

the discussion leading up to the !aising of the how#possible question$ It isn(t additional in the

sense that geomete!s ha&en(t been using it all along$ B% identif%ing const!uction in intuition as a

means of acqui!ing s%nthetic a p!io!i geomet!ical knowledge 2ant e"plains how such knowledge

is possible$ In gene!al, d!awing attention to the means b% which something is possible is a means

of e"plaining how it is possible %et the means b% which something is possible needn(t be

necessa!% conditions fo! its possibilit%$ Catching the u!osta! is a means of getting f!om 9ondon

to ;a!is in less than th!ee hou!s but not a necessa!% condition fo! doing this$ So if all one needs in

o!de! to e"plain how something is possible is to identif% means b% which it is possible then the!e

is no need to look fo! necessa!% conditions$

But is it plausible that the identification of means of knowing suffices to e"plain how

knowledge is possible Dot if it is unclea! how one can acqui!e the knowledge that is in question

b% the p!oposed means$ 8o! e"ample, one wo!!% about 2ant(s account of geomet!% is that what is

const!ucted in intuition is alwa%s a specific figu!e whe!eas the !esults of const!uction a!e

supposed to be uni&e!sall% &alid p!opositions$ ow then, is it possible fo! const!uction to deli&e!

knowledge of such p!opositions Acco!ding to 2ant the!e is no p!oblem as long as const!ucted

figu!es a!e dete!mined b% ce!tain !ules of const!uction which he calls )schemata($ As he puts it,

the single figu!e which we d!aw se!&es to )e"p!ess( the concept of a t!iangle because it is

)dete!mined b% ce!tain uni&e!sal conditions of const!uction($'

8o! p!esent pu!poses the details of account a!e much less inte!esting than its st!uctu!e$

.hat we can e"t!act f!om 2ant(s discussion is the suggestion that his how#possible question

needs to be dealt with at a numbe! of diffe!ent le&els$ 8i!st the!e is the le&el of means, the le&el at

which the possibilit% of mathematical knowledge is accounted fo! b% identif%ing means b% which

it is possible$ Second, the!e is the le&el of obstacle#!emo&al, the le&el at which obstacles to the

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acquisition of mathematical knowledge b% the p!oposed means a!e o&e!come o! dissipated$ But

this still isn(t the end of 2ant(s sto!%$ e thinks that e&en afte! the p!oblem of accounting fo! the

uni&e!salit% of mathematical knowledge has been sol&ed the!e is a fu!the! question that natu!all%

a!ises$ This fu!the! question is: what makes it possible fo! const!uction in intuition to occu! and

to be a sou!ce of mathematical knowledge

This last question conce!ns the backg!ound necessa!% conditions fo! the acquisition of

mathematical knowledge b% const!ucting figu!es in intuition$ .hat it seeks is not a wa% !ound

some specific obstacle but, as it we!e, a positi&e e"planation of the possibilit% of acqui!ing a

ce!tain kind of knowledge b% ce!tain specified means$ .e ha&e now !eached what can be called

the le&el of enabling conditions$'-2ant(s p!oposal at this le&el is that what makes it possible fo!

mental diag!ams to deli&e! knowledge of the geomet!% of ph%sical space is the fact that ph%sical

space is sub3ecti&e$'5If space we!e a )!eal e"istence( in the Dewtonian sense it wouldn(t be

intelligible that intuiti&e const!uctions a!e capable of deli&e!ing knowledge of its geomet!%$ That

is wh%, acco!ding to 2ant, we must be t!anscendental idealists if we want to unde!stand how

geomet!ical knowledge is possible$ So this looks like a thi!d e"planato!% le&el in addition to the

le&el of means and that of obstacle#!emo&al$

In fact, the distinction between the second and thi!d le&els isn(t a sha!p one in this case$

If space we!e a !eal e"istence then that would be an obstacle to the acquisition of geomet!ical

knowledge b% means of const!uction$ This makes it appea! that what happens at the le&el of

enabling conditions is much as e"e!cise in obstacle#!emo&al as what happens at the second le&el$

6et the!e a!e othe! how#possible questions in connection with which the!e is a sha!pe! distinction

between the second and thi!d le&els, and I now want to e"amine one such question$ In an% case,

we shouldn(t be !eading too much into 2ant(s account of geomet!% because it isn(t as if we still

think about geomet!% in the wa% that he thought about it$ In pa!ticula!, if geomet!ical knowledge

isn(t s%nthetic a p!io!i then we don(t ha&e 2ant(s !easons fo! wo!!%ing about how it is possible$


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But I now want to show that the basic f!amewo!k of his discussion can be used to think about a

!ange of diffe!ent how#possible questions$

As we ha&e seen, sceptics ask how knowledge of the e"te!nal wo!ld is possible gi&en that

we can(t be su!e that &a!ious sceptical possibilities do not obtain$ Take an o!dina!% p!oposition

about the e"te!nal wo!ld such as the p!oposition that the cup into which I am pou!ing coffee is

chipped$ ow is it possible fo! me to know that this is the case The ob&ious answe! would be:

b% seeing that it is chipped, o! feeling that it is chipped, being told b% the pe!son sitting opposite

me that it is chipped, and so on$ Seeing that the cup is chipped, which is a fo!m of what E!etske

calls )epistemic seeing(, looks like a means of knowing that it is chipped$ '7But now we come up

against the sceptic(s obstacle$ The sceptic thinks that I can(t co!!ectl% be said to see that the cup

is chipped unless I can eliminate the possibilit% that I am d!eaming, and that I can(t possibl%

eliminate this possibilit%$'


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cup is chipped$'?pistemological !equi!ements mustn(t ha&e unacceptable consequences, and it

is an unacceptable consequence of the sceptic(s !equi!ement that it makes it impossible to know

such things$ To the e"tent that knowing that one isn(t d!eaming is a !equi!ement on an%thing in

this a!ea it is a !equi!ement on knowing that one sees that the cup is chipped, not a !equi!ement

on seeing that the cup is chipped$

It is cont!o&e!sial whethe! these attempts at obstacle#dissipation a!e successful but let(s

assume fo! p!esent pu!poses that the% a!e$ So we now ha&e the idea that epistemic seeing is a

means of knowing about the e"te!nal wo!ld, though ob&iousl% not the onl% means, togethe! with

the suggestion that the!e isn(t a genuine obstacle to knowing about the e"te!nal wo!ld b% such

means$ This is a p!esupposed sou!ces solution to the p!oblem of sou!ces since pe!ception is a

p!esupposed sou!ce of knowledge of the e"te!nal wo!ld$ .e !each the le&el of enabling

conditions when we ask what makes it possible to see that the cup is chipped and the!eb% to

know that it is chipped$ .e don(t ha&e to ask this question but we can ask it$+0e!e, then, a!e

two 2antian thoughts: in o!de! to see that the cup is chipped I must be able to see the cup, and

the cup itself is an ob3ect$ To see an ob3ect I must be able to see some of its spatial p!ope!ties so

the enabling conditions fo! seeing that the cup is chipped include possession of a capacit% fo!

spatial pe!ception$ The% also include a capacit% fo! catego!ial thinking on the assumption that

one couldn(t see that the cup is chipped if one lacked the concept cup and that one couldn(t ha&e

this concept if one lacked a !epe!toi!e of catego!ial concepts such as substance, unit%, plu!alit%

and causalit%$+'

The identification of these enabling conditions fo! epistemic seeing isn(t an e"e!cise in

obstacle#!emo&al in the wa% that 2ant(s account of the enabling conditions fo! the acquisition of

geomet!ical knowledge is an e"e!cise in obstacle#!emo&al$ It is t!ue that when a necessa!%

condition fo! a pa!ticula! cogniti&e achie&ement isn(t fulfilled the &e!% fact that it isn(t fulfilled

becomes an obstacle to that achie&ement but it still doesn(t follow that the point of talking about

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enabling conditions must be to deal with some p!e#e"isting obstacle$ 8o! e"ample, the!e is no

such obstacle to seeing the cup is chipped that is dissipated o! o&e!come b% the obse!&ation that

it wouldn(t be possible to see such a thing without a capacit% fo! spatial pe!ception$ The

question, )what makes possible(, is an e"planation#seeking question, and the!e is mo!e to

e"plaining what makes possible than showing that the!e is nothing that makes it impossible$

To sum up, we now ha&e a multi#le&els f!amewo!k fo! dealing with how#possible

questions in epistemolog%$ .hen we find ou!sel&es faced with a how#possible question which

asks how knowledge of a ce!tain kind is possible, we sta!t b% identif%ing means b% which it is

possible to acqui!e this kind of knowledge$ This is what I ha&e been calling the le&el of means$

Then we set about t!%ing to !emo&e obstacles to acqui!ing knowledge b% the p!oposed means$

This is the obstacle#!emo&ing le&el$ 8inall%, we might ask what makes it possible to acqui!e

knowledge b% the suggested means and this takes us to the le&el of enabling conditions$ So how

does this wa% of app!oaching how#possible questions diffe! f!om the t!anscendental app!oach

The main diffe!ence is in the significance that the two app!oaches attach to necessa!% conditions$

The t!anscendental app!oach t!ies to e"plain how knowledge is possible b% !efe!ence to its

necessa!% conditions and I ha&e al!ead% e"plained wh% this isn(t !ight$ Dobod% would think that

e"plaining how it is possible to get f!om 9ondon to ;a!is in less than th!ee hou!s is a matte! of

identif%ing necessa!% conditions fo! getting f!om 9ondon to ;a!is in less than th!ee hou!s and it

is no mo!e plausible that e"plaining how it is possible to know that p, whe!e p is a p!oposition

about the e"te!nal wo!ld o! othe! minds o! whate&e!, is matte! of identif%ing necessa!%

conditions fo! knowing that p$ In both cases, means !athe! than necessa!% conditions a!e the fi!st

thing we should be looking fo!$

This is not to den% that necessa!% conditions ha&e a pa!t to pla% in a multiple le&els

f!amewo!k$ nabling conditions a!e, afte! all, necessa!% conditions but this doesn(t mean that a

multiple le&els e"planation of the possibilit% of knowledge is a t!anscendental e"planation$ The

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necessa!% conditions which figu!e in t!anscendental e"planations a!e uni&e!sal in scope$ 8o!

e"ample, the!e is the suggestion that the pe!ception of space is a necessa!% condition fo! the

acquisition of an% empi!ical knowledge, !ega!dless of the specific means b% which it is

acqui!ed$++6et it seems unlikel% that the !ole of spatial awa!eness in coming to know that p b%

hea!ing that p o! !eading that p will be an%thing like its !ole in coming to know that p b% seeing

that p$ De&e!theless, seeing that p, hea!ing that p and !eading that p a!e all wa%s of acqui!ing

empi!ical knowledge$ .hat this suggests is that the necessa!% conditions which figu!e in

t!anscendental e"planations a!e e"cessi&el% gene!al$ The same isn(t t!ue of the necessa!%

conditions which figu!e in multiple le&els e"planations because these conditions can be means#

specific$ The!e is no commitment in this f!amewo!k to the idea that the backg!ound necessa!%

conditions fo! knowing that p b% seeing that p a!e bound to be the same as the backg!ound

necessa!% conditions fo! knowing that p b% hea!ing that p the% might be but needn(t be$

If, as I ha&e been claiming, the t!anscendental app!oach to e"plaining how knowledge is

possible isn(t the !ight one wh% has it been so popula! *ne e"planation is that showing that we

know is sometimes confused with e"plaining how we know$ So, fo! e"ample, if we ha&e

e"pe!ience, and knowledge of the e"te!nal wo!ld is necessa!% fo! e"pe!ience, then it follows that

we ha&e knowledge of the e"te!nal wo!ld$ But e&en if this t!anscendental a!gument is con&incing

on its own te!ms it doesn(t e"plain how we know what it claims we do know the thesis that

knowledge of the e"te!nal wo!ld is necessa!% doesn(t e"plain how it is possible gi&en all the

obstacles that ha&e been thought F mistakenl% as it tu!ns out# to make it impossible$ That is wh%,

if we a!e se!ious about e"plaining how knowledge is possible a diffe!ent app!oach is needed, one

which emphasi4es means !athe! than necessa!% conditions$

$ .hat is 2nowledge

.ith this discussion of how#possible questions in the backg!ound let us now tu!n to the

)what( question$ I want to defend the suggestion that that an effecti&e wa% of e"plaining what

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knowledge is is to identif% &a!ious means b% which it is possible, and that the notion of a means

of knowing the!efo!e has as la!ge a pa!t to pla% in !elation to the )what( question as in !elation to

how#possible questions$ A good wa% of seeing the fo!ce of this suggestion would be to note that

when we claim to know that something is the case the!e is a fu!the! question to which we a!e

)di!ectl% e"posed( /Austin '?


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detail, the basic idea is that if H is an 8>S* then the infe!ence f!om )S Hs that p( to )p( is

deducti&el% &alid, as is the infe!ence f!om )S Hs that p( to )S knows that p$ In these te!ms, )sees(,

)!eg!ets( and )!emembe!s( a!e all e"amples of 8>S*s and a!e the!efo!e also all e"amples of

)wa%s of knowing( in .illiamson(s sense$ In othe! wo!ds, if I see o! !eg!et o! !emembe! that the

cup is chipped then the cup is chipped and I know that it is chipped$ 6et onl% seeing that the cup

is chipped is a wa% of coming to know that it is chipped, of acqui!ing this piece of knowledge it

would be distinctl% odd to sa% that I came to know that the cup is chipped b% !eg!etting that it is

chipped o! e&en b% !emembe!ing that it is chipped$ .a%s of coming to know a!e the!efo!e a!e

sub#class of .illiamson(s )wa%s of knowing(, and the p!esent p!oposal is that what is needed to

answe! a how#did#%ou#come#to#know question is !efe!ence to a wa% of coming to know !athe!

than to a me!e )wa% of knowing($

ow does this help with the )what( question Suppose we ag!ee that an account of what

p!opositional knowledge is will need to be an account of what it is fo! a sub3ect S to know that p$

a&ing !e3ected the idea that e"plaining what it is fo! S to know that p is a matte! of coming up

with non#ci!cula! necessa!% and sufficient conditions fo! S to know that p we can now a!gue as

follows: gi&en that if S knows that p the!e must be some wa% in which S came to know that p,

what it is fo! S to know that p can be unde!stood b% !efe!ence to the diffe!ent wa%s in which it is

possible fo! someone like S to come to know something like p$+5Since the!e might be countless

wa%s of coming to know that p the notion of a wa% of coming to know that p is open#ended$ The

claim is that we get a fi" on what it is to know that p b% identif%ing good answe!s to the question

)how do %ou know( on the fi!st of Austin(s th!ee !eadings of this question$ In othe! wo!ds, we

e"plain what p!opositional knowledge is b% listing some of the wa%s of acqui!ing it fo! e"ample,

we e"plain what it is to know that the cup is chipped b% listing some of the wa%s of coming to

know that the cup is chipped$

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.a%s of coming to know that p a!e means of knowing that p so we a!e now in a position

to see wh% the notion of a means of knowing matte!s$ .hethe! one is conce!ned with what it is

to know that p, with how one knows that p, o! with how it is possible to know that p it is difficult

to e"agge!ate the impo!tance of the notion of a means$ =ust as we ha&e e"plained how it is

possible to know that p b% identif%ing means of knowing that p so we a!e now e"plaining what it

is to know that p b% identif%ing means of knowing that p$ The identification of means of

knowing that p is the!efo!e a means e"plaining what it is to know that p 3ust as it is a means of

e"plaining how it is possible to know that p$ So the position is not that one fi!st t!ies to figu!e out

what knowledge is and then t!ies to figu!e out how it can be acqui!ed$ Rathe!, one figu!es out

what knowledge is b% figu!ing out how it can be acqui!ed$

To get a feel fo! this p!oposal conside! the question )what is c!icket($ An effecti&e wa%

of answe!ing this )what( question would be to desc!ibe how c!icket is pla%ed$ Since can one lea!n

what c!icket is b% lea!ning how it is pla%ed it(s no good ob3ecting that one can(t unde!stand how

c!icket is pla%ed unless one al!ead% knows what it is$ Simila!l%, it(s no good ob3ecting that one

can(t unde!stand how knowledge is acqui!ed unless one al!ead% knows what it is$ "plaining

what knowledge b% desc!ibing how it is acqui!ed is like e"plaining what c!icket is b% desc!ibing

how it is pla%ed$+7In neithe! case is an answe! to the )what( question p!esupposed and in neithe!

case can the )what( question be answe!ed b% coming up with necessa!% and sufficient conditions$

.e wouldn(t t!% to e"plain what c!icket is b% specif%ing necessa!% and sufficient conditions fo! a

game to be a game of c!icket and we shouldn(t t!% to e"plain what knowledge is b% specif%ing

necessa!% and sufficient conditions fo! a belief to constitute knowledge$

The )means( app!oach which I ha&e been !ecommending might need supplementing in

&a!ious wa%s$ 8o! e"ample, knowledge can be !etained and t!ansmitted as well as acqui!ed so a

fulle! pictu!e of what knowledge is might need to sa% something about some of the diffe!ent

wa%s of !etaining and t!ansmitting it as well as some of the diffe!ent wa%s of acqui!ing it$ It

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might also need to be !ecogni4ed that the!e a!e some things that we can(t know because the

obstacles to knowing them can(t be o&e!come o! dissipated$ ;e!haps some p!opositions about the

distant past a!e like this$ And e&en in the case of things that we a!e capable of knowing, some

wa%s of coming to know them might be mo!e basic than othe!s$ 8o! e"ample, seeing that the cup

is chipped might count as in some sense a mo!e basic wa% of coming to know that it is chipped

than !eading in a newspape! that it is chipped$

8inall%, mo!e needs to be said about the distinction between good and bad answe!s to

how#did#%ou#come#to#know questions$ A good answe! to one such question might be a bad

answe! to anothe!$ 8o! e"ample, )b% const!ucting a figu!e in pu!e intuition( might be a good

answe! to )how did %ou come to know that the inte!nal angles of t!iangle a!e equal to two !ight

angles( but a bad answe! to )how did %ou come to know that the cup is chipped($ Acceptable

answe!s to a how#did#%ou#come#to#know question a!e dete!mined b% the natu!e and content of

the p!oposition known, and this has a bea!ing on the distinction between empi!ical and a p!io!i

knowledge$ To see that p is to know that p b% empi!ical means$ That makes one(s knowledge

empi!ical$ To know that p b% const!ucting a figu!e in pu!e intuition o!, if the!e is such a thing, b%

!ational intuition is to know that p b% non#empi!ical means$ That makes one(s knowledge a

p!io!i$ Since means of knowing a!e the ke% to the )what( question and some means of knowing

%ield empi!ical knowledge while othe!s %ield a p!io!i knowledge one would e"pect an adequate

answe! to the what question to take account of the distinction between empi!ical and a p!io!i

knowledge$

But none of this changes the basic pictu!e of knowledge fo! which I ha&e been t!%ing to

make a case$ >eans of knowing, o! of coming to know, !emain at the cent!e of this pictu!e and

this is a !eflection of the wa% in which att!ibutions of knowledge a!e di!ectl% e"posed to how#

did#%ou#come#to#know questions and, in p!oblematic cases, to how#possible questions$ 6et it is

a!mchai! !eflection !athe! than empi!ical science that e"poses the links between )what(, )how(,

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and how#possible questions and it is a!mchai! !eflection !athe! than empi!ical science which

!e&eals that all th!ee questions can be answe!ed b% d!awing on the notion of a means of knowing$

Since anothe! name fo! this kind of a!mchai! !eflection is )philosophical !eflection( the

methodological mo!al should be ob&ious: if we want to know what knowledge is and how it is

possible the!e is no bette! wa% of p!oceeding than to do what I ha&e been doing he!e:

philosoph%$+


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Refe!ences

Austin, =$ 9$ /'?


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St!oud, B$ /'?@-1, The Significance of ;hilosophical Scepticism /*"fo!d: *"fo!d ni&e!sit%

;!ess1$

St!oud, B$ /+0001, )Scepticism and the ;ossibilit% of 2nowledge(, in nde!standing uman

2nowledge /*"fo!d: *"fo!d ni&e!sit% ;!ess1$

.illiamson, T$ /+0001, 2nowledge and its 9imits /*"fo!d: *"fo!d ni&e!sit% ;!ess1$

'@


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'The )what( and )how( questions a!e two of the th!ee questions which ila!% 2o!nblith desc!ibes as being among the

cent!al questions of epistemolog%$ The thi!d question is ).hat should we do in o!de! to attain knowledge( /2o!nblith

'???: '5?1$

+This wa% of thinking about the )what( question is suggested b% Al&in Goldman$ See Goldman '?@7: -+$

Goldman emphasi4es the distinction gi&ing the meaning and gi&ing the t!uth conditions of )S knows that p( in the

concluding pa!ag!aphs of )A Causal Theo!% of 2nowing(, o!iginall% published in '?7< and !ep!inted in Goldman '??+$

-Gettie! '?7 p!o&ides an ea!l% illust!ation of some of these difficulties$ Gettie! shows that the t!aditional 3ustified#t!ue#

belief anal%sis of knowledge is inco!!ect because t!uth, belief and 3ustification a!en(t sufficient fo! knowledge$ Gettie!#

st%le counte!e"amples to the t!aditional anal%sis can be dealt with b% beefing up the notion of 3ustification but this

th!eatens ci!cula!it%$ As .illiamson points out, )if someone insists that knowledge is 3ustified t!ue belief on an

unde!standing of M3ustified t!ue beliefN st!ong enough to e"clude Gettie! cases but weak enough to include o!dina!%

empi!ical knowledge, the p!oblem is likel% to be that no standa!d of 3ustification is supplied independent of knowledge

itself( /+000: -1$ This is onl% a p!oblem fo! those anal%tic epistemologists who a!e looking fo! a !educti&e definition of

knowledge in te!ms of mo!e basic concepts$

5Quine is someone in the natu!alistic t!adition who effecti&el% igno!es the )what( question$ See Quine '?7?$ In cont!ast,

2o!nblith doesn(t igno!e it$ e claims that knowledge !equi!es !eliabl% p!oduced t!ue belief and that he doesn(t a!!i&e at

this conclusion b% anal%sing the concept of knowledge$ 6et in claiming that )knowledge is, su!el%, mo!e than 3ust t!ue

belief( /+00+: 5-1 he seems to be !el%ing on some fo!m of a!mchai! !eflection at an% !ate, it is ha!d to see how it can be

an empi!ical question whethe! knowledge is o! is not mo!e than 3ust t!ue belief$ As fo! the emphasis on !eliabilit%, this is

2o!nblith(s e"planation: )If we a!e to e"plain wh% it is that plo&e!s a!e able to p!otect thei! nests, we must appeal to a

capacit% to !ecogni4e featu!es of the en&i!onment, and thus the t!ue beliefs that pa!ticula! plo&e!s acqui!e will be the

p!oduct of a stable capacit% fo! the p!oduction of t!ue beliefs$ The !esulting t!ue beliefs a!e not me!el% accidentall% t!ue

the% a!e p!oduced b% a cogniti&e capacit% that is attuned to its en&i!onment$ In a wo!d, the beliefs a!e !eliabl% p!oduced$

The concept of knowledge which is of inte!est to us he!e thus !equi!es !eliabl% p!oduced t!ue belief( /+00+: 5@1$ .hat is

obscu!e about this passage is the t!ansition f!om the penultimate sentence to the last sentence$ The!e might be empi!ical

g!ounds fo! att!ibuting !eliabl% p!oduced t!ue beliefs to plo&e!s but the fu!the! question is whethe! !eliabl% p!oduced

t!ue beliefs constitute knowledge$ 2o!nblith doesn(t e"plain how this can be established on empi!ical g!ounds$ If belief,

t!uth and !eliabilit% a!e sufficient fo! knowledge then att!ibutions of !eliabl% p!oduced t!ue beliefs to plo&e!s a!e, de

facto, att!ibutions of knowledge but what, apa!t f!om a!mchai! !eflection, can tell us that belief, t!uth and !eliabilit% a!e

sufficient fo! knowledge 2o!nblith doesn(t sa%$ *n the unde!l%ing issue of whethe! knowledge is a natu!al kind,

knowledge doesn(t ha&e an%thing !ecogni4able as a !eal essence in the wa% that natu!al kinds like gold and wate! ha&e

!eal essences$ 8o! 2o!nblith, howe&e!, natu!al kinds a!e )homeostaticall% cluste!ed p!ope!ties( /+00+: 7'1 and this is the


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basis of his identification of knowledge as a natu!al kind$ I don(t ha&e the space to go into this he!e$

7This needs to be qualified$ E!awing attention to what is necessa!% fo! knowledge of the e"te!nal wo!ld might help to

defuse scepticism if it can be shown that the necessa!% conditions do not include the knowledge that the sceptic(s

possibilities don(t obtain$ This is what I !efe! to below as an obstacle#dissipating !esponse to scepticism$ The fact

!emains, howe&e!, that necessa!% conditions pe! se a!e not to the point$

% account of how#possible questions is much indebted to E!a%(s

&aluable discussion$

@Cf$ E!a% '?5cEowell '??@: +@#? fo! something along these lines though >cEowell is ca!eful not to claim that it is possible

to meet the sceptic(s !equi!ement on the sceptic(s own te!ms$

'?This is a &e!sion of what Baldwin calls G$ $ >oo!e(s a!gument f!om )diffe!ential ce!taint%($ See Baldwin '??0: +7?#

oo!e '?5$

+0.e don(t ha&e to ask it because it(s not ob&ious that an e"planation of the possibilit% of knowledge of the e"te!nal

wo!ld which doesn(t talk about enabling conditions is incomplete$


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+'*ne could see a chipped cup without ha&ing the concept cup but seeing that the cup is chipped is a diffe!ent matte!$

.illiamson uses a diffe!ent e"ample to make the same point in .illiamson +000: @$ 8o! a defence of the idea that

empi!ical concepts p!esuppose catego!ial concepts see 9onguenesse '??@$

++See St!awson '??< fo! a suggestion along these lines$

+The!e is a mention of )wa%s of coming to know( in St!oud +000$ St!oud !ema!ks that )the!e a!e countless wa%s of

coming to know something about the wo!ld a!ound us( /+000: 1 but that what we seek in philosoph% isn(t 3ust a )list of

sou!ces($ I am mo!e s%mpathetic to the idea that an open#ended list of sou!ces is p!ecisel% what we need if we want to

unde!stand )how we get the knowledge we ha&e F to e"plain how it is possible( /ibid$1$

+-See .illiamson +000: -#? fo! mo!e on the notion of a facti&e mental state ope!ato!$

+5This is not unlike .illiamson(s suggestion that )knowing that A is seeing that A o! !emembe!ing o!O$ that A, if the

list is unde!stood as open#ended, and the concept knows is not identified with the dis3uncti&e concept( /+000: -1$ The!e

is much mo!e on .illiamson, and on the diffe!ences between his app!oach and mine, in Cassam, fo!thcoming$

+7The analog% isn(t pe!fect$ The!e a!e lots of wa%s of acqui!ing knowledge but it isn(t t!ue in the same sense that the!e

a!e lots of wa%s of pla%ing c!icket$

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Documents

Possibility of Knowledge