Portrayal of John Major's Conservative Party on European Policy between 1992 and 1997

THOMAS COLLINS

PORTRAYAL OF JOHN MAJOR’S

CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ON

EUROPEAN POLICY BETWEEN 1992

AND 1997

Figure 1. John Major from Spitting Image

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the final requirements in the BA Honours degree in

Global History and Politics

March 2014

University of Winchester

1

Table of Contents

Illustration – Page 2

Abstract – Page 3

Acknowledgements – Page 4

Introduction – Page 5

1st

Chapter - Conservative Party attitudes to Europe:

Winston Churchill to John Major – Page 9

2nd

Chapter – Major’s Party leadership – Page 16

3rd

Chapter – National Newspapers - Page 24

Conclusion – Page 31

Bibliography – Primary Sources – Page 34

Bibliography – Secondary Sources – Page 38

Appendix – Page 40

2

List of Illustrations

Figure 1. John Major from Spitting Image 2010

Daily Telegraph, ‘John Major Spitting Image puppet for sale’, 6 May 2010,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/7685464/John-Major-

Spitting-Image-puppet-for-sale.html

3

Thomas Collins

PORTRAYAL OF JOHN MAJOR’S CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP ON

EUROPEAN POLICY BETWEEN 1992 AND 1997

Abstract

This study’s purpose it to examine the portrayal of the Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister

John Major on the Conservative’s European policy between 1992 and 1997. This has been achieved

through an analysis of the views from former members of Major’s cabinet during this period, the

right wing leaning national press during this period and also the views of historians and political

commentators of this period. Overall, it aims to demonstrate how and why John Major is today and

was then seen as being the personification of a weak party leader and also Prime Minister, not just

by the national press but also his former Conservative colleagues and historians.

4

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors William Sheward and Mark Allen for their guidance and

continuous help throughout the process of writing this dissertation. I would also like to thank both

the History and Politics staff as a whole for the last three years at the University of Winchester.

I would secondly like to thank Paul Goodman, for being able to interview him for my dissertation,

which was hugely beneficial to this dissertation.

I would also like to acknowledge John Wade, Sylvia Fones and Benjamin Tibbert for the grammar

support they gave me throughout the lengthy proof reading process.

Lastly I would like to thank all my family and friends who have supported me both throughout my

degree, but most important the completion of this research.

5

Introduction

‘From the moment I first crossed the threshold of Number 10 as prime minister I had dreaded the

political impact of Europe on the Conservative Party’1

John Major, 2000.

Effective leadership and party unity are frequently cited as two of the Conservative Party’s

strength’s2, the third being the Conservative’s economic management, the three main reasons for its

electoral success under Margaret Thatcher. John Major’s government however is marked by the

absence of party unity over the Conservatives European policy under a weak party leader and Prime

Minister, but also an arrogant political party3, which piled the pressure onto him following his small

majority election victory of twenty one in 1992. He is often portrayed as the personification of weak

leadership4, a leader who was unable to impose order on his party. Major’s Conservative

government was considered to be administratively incompetent; the parliamentary party was

viewed as being ideologically divided5, particularly over Europe and Conservative parliamentarians

were perceived to be sleazy and untrustworthy6.

British government policy in regards to her relationship with the European Union (EU) has

and continues to affect political party unity. The Labour party suffered from it in the 1970s with

Harold Wilson’s 1975 referendum on EEC membership, but the party which been plagued most of all

by Europe is the Conservative Party, especially during the Major government of 1992 to 1997. Under

his government the Conservatives had lost their reputation for internal discipline and loyalty as the

party went into convulsions over the question of further integration within the EU7. Whether the

issue had been Britain’s entry into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), ‘Black Wednesday’ in 1992,

or the Maastricht Treaty and the Social Chapter in 1993, there evolved splits in the party, which had

plagued Major’s leadership. The Conservative debate over Europe was and remains today under

David Cameron’s party leadership a poison within the party, which resulted in national newspapers

and also Conservative party members challenging both Cameron and Major’s capabilities to lead his

party and the country. Although Cameron’s government is a coalition between the Conservatives

and the Liberal Democrats, Cameron has the full support of the Conservatives in the cabinet on

1 John Major, The Autobiography (London, 2000) p.583

2 Timothy Heppell, The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major 1992 to 1997 (Ceredigion, 2006) p.V

3 Hywel Williams, Guilty Men: Conservative Decline and Fall 1992-1997 (London, 1998) p.1

4 Ibid.

5 Brendan Evans and Andrew Taylor, From Salisbury to Major: Continuity and changes in Conservative Politics

(Manchester, 1996) p.248 6 Ibid. p.2

7 Phillip Norton, The Conservative Party Leader (London, 1996) p.78

6

European Policy8, whilst Major’s government was completely divided about the direction of its

European policy, highlighting the extensity of problems that Major faced whilst leader and Prime

Minister.

This study is split into three chapters which have different focuses but all contribute to the

examination of Major’s portrayal of his party leadership on European policy. Chapter one provides a

contextual backdrop of the Conservative Party and its attitudes towards Europe, from Winston

Churchill’s leadership up to John Major. The chapter then gives a brief history of the Conservative’s

policy towards Europe from 1992 to 1997 in order to form context and to understand the current

debate surrounding this topic. Chapter two examines the political environment Major had between

1992 and 1997. This chapter will highlight the split in the Conservative Party over Europe,

particularly between the Thatcherites and One Nation conservatives. But the chapter will also

explain that Major was left in a very difficult position after the 1992 General Election, following a

majority of only twenty one9. Finally, chapter three analyses how some sections of the national press

between 1992 and 1997 represented Major as a leader. They will cover the right wing political

leanings, the most significant newspaper industry being those of News International, which through

The Sun and The Times gave an extremely negative perception of Major as a leader, by supporting a

Thatcherite Conservative eurosceptic agenda.

It is necessary to examine the research to argue whether or not Major was a weak or strong

Conservative Party leader. In order to achieve a broad overview of the issue, the primary sources

that are utilised include newspaper articles which draw upon contemporary issues and analysis from

a non-academic approach, although newspaper articles are at times sensationalist, thus cannot

always be historically accurate. They will have use here to see how influential they were in opposing

or supporting Major's leadership, and disseminating information from his opponents, both key

figures and backbenchers. The Daily Telegraph for electronic reasons was unable to be researched at

the British Library’s in both Colindale and St. Pancras, the paper which was a huge supporter of

Major’s government and would have been hugely beneficial to this dissertation, highlighting the

problems of accessibility with newspapers.

This dissertation requires analysis and critique of these documents, through secondary

sources attained through independent research, in order to gain reliable assessment which can be

used in arguments for the portrayal of Major’s party leadership. Academic sources such as journals

and books will provide this study with opinions of respected researchers to ensure the topic relates

8 Personal interview with Paul Goodman, August 6 2013

9 Timothy Heppell, The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major 1992 to 1997 (Ceredigion, 2006) p.312

7

back to specific issues. This dissertation also includes an interview from Paul Goodman, one of the

editors of Conservative Home, although it offers a real insight into how Conservative Party members

saw Major as a leader, Paul Thompson argues that interviews can contain a mix of reliable and

unreliable, verifiable and unverifiable information10

.

The greatest contribution to my dissertation on the portrayal of Major’s leadership on

Europe is Timothy Heppell’s The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major 1992 to 1997 who has

written extensively on how Major was portrayed as a leader and also his leadership style, which

included comparisons to Margaret Thatcher’s style of leadership. Heppell comes to the conclusion

that Major was a weak party leader, as do many other sources this dissertation uses agrees upon.

Although saying that Heppell argues that the behaviour of the eurosceptics (cabinet and

backbenchers) and the small majority government Major had following the 1992 general election,

left himself in a rather fragile position, highlighting that external factors played a role in his weak

portrayal as party leader.

Autobiographies, biographies and speeches of Major’s cabinet on the other hand are a

strength to this dissertation as they show the ideological differences and personal attitudes towards

John Major as a party leader. However these sources tend to be biased politically, especially those

coming from the right of the party, i.e. John Redwood or Norman Lamont attacking his leadership.

Whereas, those from the left of the Conservative Party such as Michael Heseltine or Kenneth Clarke

defend Major’s European policy and leadership. The ideological divisions as highlighted in their texts,

once again emphasise the tough political environment John Major found himself in.

The dissertation’s key findings is that the right wing press portrayed Major as a weak party

leader between 1992 and 1997 on the issue of Europe, in that sense, is it fair that Major’s leadership

style should be defined by the press? News coverage was repeatedly critical about Major’s lack of

eurosceptic policy11

and lack of leadership, particularly The Times and The Sun, newspapers owned

by News International. The right wing press continued to scrutinise Major’s European policy, by

suggesting Michael Portillo12

or John Redwood13

was far more suitable to lead the Conservative

Party, by possibly uniting the party on Europe, which may have possibly stopped the continuous

distractions of party splits on Europe. Another key finding in relation to Major and the press is that

he was fearful of the press, he was so desperate to be liked14

and dreaded what editors such as

10

Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford, 2000) p.240-241 11

David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1997 (London, 1997)p.105 12

Paul Eastham, ‘Cometh the hour, cometh the man?’, Daily Mail, February 10, 1993, p.6 13

Peter Riddell, ‘Pro –European Tories are losing the battle’, The Times, June 21, 1995, p.1 14

Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and its holders since 1945 (London, 2000) p.437

8

Kelvin Mackenzie15

of The Sun would write about him in newspaper articles. This somewhat

emphasises this image that Major was both a fragile party leader, but also Prime Minister.

In order to contextualise these complex discussions, it is necessary to first offer a brief

history of the Conservative Party’s attitudes towards Europe and the issues Major faced as party

leader towards Europe. This is the rationale behind the first chapter: The Historical Context of the

Conservative Party and Europe.

15

Michael White, ‘Leveson inquiry: Kelvin MacKenzie tells it like it was at the Sun’, The Guardian, Monday 9

January 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/09/leveson-inquiry-kelvin-mackenzie-lobbing

9

Chapter 1 – Conservative Party attitudes to Europe: Winston Churchill to John Major

This chapter provides an explanation of the nature of the Conservative Party’s attitudes

towards Europe from Winston Churchill’s leadership to John Major’s. It will explain that from Harold

Macmillan up until Margaret Thatcher’s later years as Prime Minister, the Conservative Party was

fairly united on membership on the (European Economic Community) EEC. The final section of the

chapter covers the issues faced by Major when he was Prime Minister, particularly the consequences

of ejection from the (Exchange Rate Mechanism) ERM and the Danish rejection of the 1992

referendum on the Maastricht Treaty.

Winston Churchill is regarded as being one of the founding fathers1 of the EU, alongside the

likes of Monnet and Schuman. This is partly because of his wartime role as liberator of Europe from

Nazi Germany; but also on his campaign to achieve European unity and prevent future war. His

campaign for European unity was formally launched in Zurich on the 19th

September 1946 where he

demanded that a “United States of Europe”2 must be built. This was not the first time however

Churchill had made this reference to a “United States of Europe”; in an American periodical in 1930

Churchill stated “the conception of a United States of Europe is right. Every step taken to that end

which appeases the obsolete hatreds and vanished oppressions…is good in itself”3. The reference

made to vanished oppressions was of the Soviet Union, which was a threat to Europe in the 1930s

and remained so in 1946 with its large amounts of investment in nuclear weapons.

However, Churchill’s foreign minister Anthony Eden did not want Britain to be precluded

from its Commonwealth by being in a united Europe4 and Churchill himself described Britain’s

position as “being with Europe, but not of it”. The Conservatives at this time was the ‘party of

Empire’, this can be portrayed as the Empire (Commonwealth) vs Europe, which is a view amongst

Conservatives even today such as David Davis5. Both references highlight the euroscepticism in the

Conservative Party during Churchill’s leadership, and Churchill’s quote in particular indicates the fear

of Britain losing her sovereignty. Although having said that, the Conservative Party saw the Schuman

plan in 1950 being a real benefit to Britain’s economy. The Schuman plan was the founding father of

the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – the first embodiment of what is now the European

1 Kenneth Clarke & Ben Patterson, The Conservative Party and Europe (London, 2011)p.1

2 Ibid. p.1

3 Saturday Evening Post, February 1930.

4 Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London, 1960) p.337

5 ‘David spoke at The People’s Pledge Campaign for a EU Referendum ‘, David Davis MP, October 15, 2011,

http://www.daviddavismp.com/david-davis-events/david-spoke-at-the-peoples-pledge-campaign-for-a-eu-

referendum/

10

Union (EU) – was supported by a variety of free market Conservatives such as Edward Heath and

Margaret Thatcher. Burkean Conservatives such as Julian Amery who feared for Britain’s sovereignty

with the possibility of Britain being part of a united Europe, however argued that the Schuman Plan

had an “Imperial interest”6 for Britain. However, there was a large consensus in the Conservative

Party that European unity would be beneficial to Britain, although there was a fear of Britain losing

sovereignty to Europe.

By the time Harold Macmillan became leader of the Conservative Party, 1957, the EEC had

only just formed. The EEC was at this point, a free trade bloc, most Conservatives were pro-free

market, saw this as a benefit to the UK economy, particularly the then Secretary of State for Industry

and Trade, and future Prime Minister, Edward Heath. The Bow Group, being the Conservative’s

largest Think Tank during the 1960s, was very supportive of Britain’s application to join the EEC: “It is

important to recognise that, though the Common Market is concerned almost exclusively with

economic affairs, it aims at European political unity”7. Rapprochement was seen as a reason why

Britain should join the EEC, European political unity was fundamental when considering the threat of

the Soviet Union, it was a strategic opportunity to strengthen Britain’s international defences. The

majority of Conservatives under the leadership of Macmillan were supportive of entry into the EEC,

even though the application was vetoed by the French President Charles De Gaulle; there was still a

consensus that Britain should be a member of the EEC.

Under the leadership of Edward Heath however, tensions within the Conservatives began

over Britain’s entry into the EEC, but this was only a minority, most notably Enoch Powell. When

Britain first applied in 19628 up until its reapplication during Harold Wilson’s Labour government,

Powell was fully supportive of membership, even if British sovereignty was lost, as long as free trade

was received in return. However, from Powell’s speech on the ‘Rivers of Blood’ in 1968 onwards, he

was viewed by some as a maverick in the party. To him sovereignty being lost and the possible rise

of “immigration”9 after EEC entry became a threat to Powell, and some other minor Conservatives.

As a result Powell argued that Conservative eurosceptics should vote Labour in the 1974 General

Election, following Britain’s entry in 1973, to gain a referendum on the EEC, as Labour unlike the

Conservatives had promised an in/out referendum on Britain’s membership of the EEC. But the

overall consensus amongst Conservative voters was that Britain should be a member: out of 6,433

6 Kenneth Clarke & Ben Patterson, The Conservative Party and Europe (London, 2011) p.3

7 Ibid. p.36

8 Enoch Powell, The Common Market: the case against (1971) p.9

9 Daily Telegraph, ‘Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech’, 6 November 2007,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643823/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-of-Blood-speech.html

11

members, 4,775 said yes, 730 were no and 848 were either unrecorded or recorded as undecided10

.

These results emphasise that entry into the EEC from the voters perspective was not a threat, even

though Enoch Powell was writing various amounts of propaganda arguing otherwise. Under Heaths’

leadership there was a majority agreement that some powers were to be sent to Brussels, however

sovereignty was a minority interest at this stage, free trade and European political unity was.

Britain’s entry into the EEC was widely supported by Conservatives, even Margaret Thatcher who

voted yes to Britain’s membership in the 1975 referendum.

At first Margaret Thatcher’s European policy seemed to be a continuation of Edward Heaths

which was further integration, but also reform. However, Thatcher described the EEC as

“shameless”11

for demanding more money from the UK, particularly for the controversial Common

Agricultural Policy (CAP) which implemented agricultural subsidies for EEC countries which in 1979

accounted for 81% of the budget.12

Although, many pro-Europeans, such as Ken Clarke the editor of

the text Conservative Party and Europe, saw the renegotiation of the budget as a pro-European

reform13

.

The signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 led to Thatcher expanding the single

market, which would make the European market more open and thus in eyes of Conservatives more

competition, would benefit the UK economy, in particular the financial sector. There is some

suggestion that Thatcher adopted a eurosceptic approach by her demand for treaty changes, most

of which demanded less regulation, thus protecting UK businesses. However this suggests that

Thatcher was the architect of the SEA14

, to promote the European market.

Thatcher’s Bruges speech of 1988, however, created divisions within the Conservative party

over Europe15

:

Certainly we want to see Europe more united and with a great power of Common purpose.

But it must be in a way that preserves the different traditions, parliamentary powers and a

sense of nation pride in one’s country

Although this view is regarded as being eurosceptic, both Clarke and Paterson agreed that

this view was not out of line with the Conservative Party. Her speech goes on to argue budgetary

discipline, the need to reform the CAP, opening of financial markets, rejection of protectionism and

10

The United Kingdom and the European Communities (HMSO, July 1971) 11

Kenneth Clarke & Ben Patterson, The Conservative Party and Europe (London, 2011) p.113 12

Ibid p.112 13

Ibid 14

Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain in Europe from Churchill to Blair (London, 1998) p.332 15

Kenneth Clarke & Ben Patterson, The Conservative Party and Europe (London, 2011) p.153

12

the strengthening of Europe’s contribution to the defence of the West. All of these ideas were

mainstream Conservative policy, although many within the Conservative Party, particularly the more

right wing Conservatives, saw this as a rejection of the EEC as a whole16

.

This speech saw the rise of the eurosceptics; the Bruges speech saw the formation of the

eurosceptic Conservative think tank Bruges Group, a future pressure group for Major. A group of

well-known cabinet MPs, such as Peter Lilley, Michael Portillo, John Redwood and Francis Maude (3

of whom known as Major’s “Bastards”17

) who had set up the “No Turning Back” Think Tank in 1985,

it also adopted a Eurosceptic agenda. Thatcherite journalists working for The Times and The Daily

Telegraph had become increasingly Eurosceptic18

as a result of Thatcher’s changing perception of the

EU.

Although saying this, many Conservatives such as Kenneth Clarke, Douglas Hurd and Michael

Heseltine remained pro-European, the latter calling for a leadership election in 1990 as a result of

the party divide over Europe, (but partly the Poll Tax) due to Thatcher’s inability to unite the party

over Europe19

. Thatcher fell four votes short of a required victory, which resulted in her resignation

as party leader, thus demonstrating the rebellion and the rise of Tory Europeanism20

, a rebellion

which would split the Conservative Party dramatically between 1993 and 1997.

Thatcher had unintentionally changed some Conservative attitudes to Europe, which divided

the Conservative Party, and had leaded to resignations in the party, most notably Geoffrey Howe.

The Conservative European policy during Major’s leadership was conducted in the shadow of

Thatcher’s Bruges speech, the fear of the government losing sovereignty to the EEC. The change in

Conservative attitudes created by Thatcher had in the long term had disastrous effects for Major’s

government.

The rationale for this segment of the chapter is to offer a historical context of the problems

encountered Major whilst he was leader. These problems include the ERM crisis, the Danish

rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, divisions in the cabinet and lastly the leadership election of 1995.

The arguments made here is to complement the next two chapters, the next chapter Major’s cabinet

ministers viewpoint of Major’s leadership will be analysed and the following chapter being the right

wing leaning newspapers portrayal of Major. Thus, this section is highly beneficial to the

dissertation.

16

Ibid. p.153 17

John Major, The Autobiography (London, 2000) p.343 18

Anthony Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics (London, 2002) p.72 19

Hugo Young, The Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London, 1998) p.373 20

Ibid. p.374

13

The ejection from the ERM in 1992 proved to be the antidote for the rift in the Conservative

Party over Europe. This had resulted in the destruction of the economic policy strategy in the Major

government. The Conservatives had entered the 1992 General Election campaign with a clear

commitment to Britain’s membership of the ERM and it established the foundation of their

economic policy strategy21

. The former Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke, a vocal supporter of

Britain’s entry into the ERM blamed the Eurosceptic Chancellor Norman Lamont for Britain’s ejection

by announcing that Britain ‘didn’t have an economic policy’22

, thus embarrassing both Lamont and

Major. The enforced withdrawal from the ERM also encouraged the eurosceptic wing of the

Conservative Party to argue that it was Britain’s entry into the ERM that prolonged Britain’s

economic recession. The ERM suggested to the eurosceptics that injection into it meant closer

integration, they believed integration weakened Britain’s economy, thus possible future integration

intensified their doubts.

But most importantly from Major’s point of view, it had damaged his economic credibility as

a leader of the Conservative Party. The Conservatives reputation for having a strong hold on the

nation’s economy had been damaged, and were compared to the previous Labour governments

which saw the devaluation of the pound in 1967, the IMF crisis in 1976 and the 1978-79 Winter of

Discontent. From ‘Black Wednesday’ as the ERM was now known as being, the Conservative Party

and Major’s governing competence had been shattered. Consequently, continuous talk of Major’s

ability to lead his party, with the likes of Lamont, Portillo and Clarke rumoured to challenge Major as

leader of the party. The policy failure of Britain’s entry into the ERM had resonated Major’s

Conservative government for the next five years of parliament23

. This resulted in the sacking of

Lamont as Chancellor, which was partly due to the influence of both the big three (Kenneth Clarke,

Douglas Hurd and Michael Heseltine) and also media scrutiny of Lamont.

Major’s problems with the Conservatives European policy were to continue following

Denmark’s referendum rejection on the Treaty of the European Union in June 1992. The

Conservatives European policy had been altered to that of Major’s predecessor, Margaret Thatcher

who opposed an integrationist EU, whereas Major wanted Britain to be at ‘the heart of Europe’24

.

Thatcher had criticised Major’s gullible behaviour in believing that Britain could constructively

engage with Europe, as did many other Conservatives such as Norman Lamont, Michael Portillo,

Peter Lilley and Michael Howard who argued that the Treaty of the European Union (EU) should

21

Timothy Heppell, The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major 1992 to 1997 (Ceredigion, 2006) p.155 22


Peter Dorey, The Major Premiership (Basingstoke, 1999) p.200 24

Timothy Heppell, The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major 1992 to 1997 (Ceredigion, 2006) p.172

14

have been renegotiated. The four cabinet ministers argued for renegotiation of the Treaty as it

would prevent the Conservative Party from further conflict25

. However Major rejected this notion as

it would consider abandoning both the Treaty and also the EEC, which Major believed was not in

Britain’s interests. The Europhile advocates in Major’s government, Heseltine, Hurd, and Clarke who

fully supported Major’s position on Europe, they too opposed referenda and renegotiation. Major

had stuck to his principles and embraced the view of the Europhiles, even though their perspective

on Europe was a minority within the cabinet, a decision which would damage Major’s leadership.

The passing of the Maastricht Treaty through the House of Commons was described by John

Major as being “the longest white-knuckle ride in recent politics”, which eventually came to a

successful end in July 1993 Major with his government carrying a confidence motion by the

comfortable margin of thirty-eight votes26

. However, during this time Major had come close to

resignation and the Conservative Party had become significantly split over the issue of Maastricht,

whereby the rebels were rallied by both Norman Tebbit and Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher had

successfully divided the party ideologically by declaring that “One Nation Conservatism” meant “No

Nation Conservatism”27

, thus stirring the split between both the cabinet and also backbenchers –

Thatcherites vs One Nation. The Thatcherites being the right wing of the Conservative Party, whom

tended to be eurosceptics and rather hostile to the EU project. Whereas One Nation Conservatives

are more right of centre, but considered by Thatcherites as being on the left of the Conservative

Party, traditionally being a One Nation Conservative meant you were Pro-European, and with the

examples of Heseltine and Clarke were in favour of Britain joining the Single Currency.

The decision to not renegotiate or have a referendum on Maastricht led to the formation of

the Referendum Party, funded by James Goldsmith, which like UKIP is to the Conservatives today,

offered a real threat in stealing a crucial percentage of votes. The Thatcherite, eurosceptic print

media, such as The Times and The Sun portrayed Major as this rather ‘weak, devious and

contradictory’ Prime Minister28

. This resulted in the News International declaring its support for John

Redwood in the 1995 leadership election and eventually announcing its support for the Labour Party

in 1996. Major’s reaction to the Danish referendum result had proven to be a defining moment as

Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister, and if he had agreed to a referendum or renegotiation

‘his premiership could have turned out very differently’29

.

25

Philip Stephens, Politics and the Pound (London, 1996) p.205 26

Kenneth Clarke & Ben Patterson, The Conservative Party and Europe (London, 2011) p.187 27

Ibid. p.187 28


Anthony Seldon, Major: A Political Life (London, 1997) p.296

15

By assessing the development of Conservative Party attitudes towards Europe from

Macmillan to Thatcher’s leadership, there is a further understanding as to what resulted in the party

splits over Europe, which was Thatcherism. The analysis of Major’s troubles in his party over Europe,

particularly the ERM crisis and the attitude towards the Maastricht Treaty, provides this dissertation

with a historical context for the following chapter on Major’s leadership.

16

Chapter 2 – Major’s Party leadership

“We give the impression of being in office but not in power”1

Norman Lamont, 1993.

This chapter will analyse the political environment that John Major faced during his time as

Conservative Party leader between 1992 and 1997. The chapter will firstly evaluate the powers of a

Conservative Party leader, examine Major’s leadership style and then compare his leadership to that

of Margaret Thatcher’s. This will provide a contextual backdrop of his leadership; it will argue that he

undoubtedly faced difficult problems whilst being Prime Minister such as a small majority

government, the ERM crisis, but mainly following on from Thatcher’s legacy which played a vital role

in portraying him as a weak leader.

A Conservative Party leader is placed at the ‘apex of the internal structure of the

Conservative Party’2 , but their powers are derived of the conservative admiration of authority and

hierarchy as well as from the formal powers bestowed upon a Conservative Party leader3. However,

there is inconsistency in regards to the relationship between the Conservative Party and the

parliamentary Conservative Party; the powers of policy design and appointment can enable either

strong leadership or constraint, leaving the leader vulnerable as they do not possess the security of

tenure4. This highlights that we should not view the relationship between the Conservative Party and

the parliamentary party as simplistic and independent, but rather subtle and interdependent.

Despite this, there is considerable emphasis placed upon the role of a Conservative Party

leader, and considerable powers invested into them to enable them to offer an effective leadership5.

Their hierarchal mentality ensures a fondness for a strong and assertive style of leadership; the

parliamentary Conservative Party expects the leader to ‘impact a sense of direction. If things go well,

the leader is praised. If things go badly, the leader is blamed’6. Although, a strong leadership has also

resulted with inherent tensions, as in what happened with Thatcher in 1989 and 1990, and also

arguably Major in 1995, ‘the leader is expected to listen and the failure to do so may result in a

leadership election’7.

1 Norman Lamont’s resignation speech in 1993 whereby he questioned the quality of Prime Ministerial and

Conservative Party leadership displayed by John Major, can be found in Anthony Seldon, Major: A Political Life

(London, 1997) p.378 2 Timothy Heppell, The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major 1992 to 1997 (Ceredigion, 2006) p.52


4 Phil Cocker, Contemporary British Politics and Government (Liverpool, 1993) p.128


6 Ibid.p77

7 Timothy Heppell, The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major 1992 to 1997 (Ceredigion, 2006) p.52

17

Thus, the relationship between the Conservative Party and the parliamentary party is

conditional; that conditionality is based on the leaders ability to construct a policy that maintains

party discipline and unity, but most importantly electoral strategy8. The policy position that the

leader has chosen must simultaneously retain the endorsement of socio-economic groups that

traditionally form the basis of electoral support, but also institutions within and outside the

Conservative Party that mobilise support, I.E Newspapers, such as News International9. However, in

order to fully understand the Conservative Party leadership environment for John Major, one must

examine his historical legacy as party leader, which the chapter will now analyse.

One must understand the political environment that Major was under whilst he was Prime

Minister and leader of the Conservative Party in order to get a better sense of why he was portrayed

as being a weak leader. The majority government that Major gained following the 1992 general

election was rather small, twenty one majority10

. The tiny majority continued to fall following the

losses in By-Elections such as Newbury in 1993, Christchurch 1993, Eastleigh 1994, Perth and Kinross

1995, Littleborough and Saddleworth 1995, South East Staffordshire 1996 and finally Wirral South in

199711

. The fact that the government now had an ever falling majority gave the backbenchers

unprecedented power to make trouble12

.

The implications of a small majority for Major was that he was put under detrimental

pressure from both the right and the left of his party to reposition the party ideologically to achieve

a higher majority government in the next general election. For example, disaffected Thatcherites

were remorseless in their complaint of a left wing Tory government with Ken Clarke, Michael

Heseltine and Douglas Hurd having key roles in the government13

. The Thatcherites pressurised

Major to appoint and promote more economic ‘dry’, Eurosceptic, social Conservatives – Major

stated in his autobiography that George Gardiner, the Chairman of the right wing 92 group ‘was

keen to tell me which minister should be sacked as ideologically unsound’14

. This highlights the

influence that backbenchers have on a small majority government, with the best example being the

Maastricht rebellion in July 1993 whereby the Major government was defeated due to twenty-three

rebellious Conservative parliamentarians, which highlighted how a small majority government can

easily be defeated.

8 Ibid.52

9 Brendan Evans and Andrew Taylor, From Salisbury to Major: Continuity and changes in Conservative Politics

(Manchester, 1996) p.53 10


House of Commons Information Office,‘By-election results: 1992-97’, September 2003, p.4-5 12

Andy Mcsmith, Kenneth Clarke: A Political Biography (Exeter, 1994) p.231. 13

Hywel Williams, Guilty Men: Conservative Decline and Fall 1992-1997 (London, 1998)p.32 14

John Major, The Autobiography (London, 2000) p.247,357

18

By autumn 1992 the authority that Major had within the Conservative Party and his

legitimacy to be party leader had been damaged. The ejection from the ERM on the 16th

September

1992 had stimulated the debate about the leadership of the Conservative Party. In the immediate

aftermath of such a colossal policy failure Major did contemplate resigning as leader of the

Conservative Party: ‘My instinct was clear: I should resign’15

. Major had ultimately decided to

remain in office, and arguably pinned the blame on ‘Norman Lamont’ for the ejection of Britain’s

membership from the ERM16

as according to Redwood’s political adviser Hywel Williams following

his sacking in May 1993. This suggests the lack of responsibility from Major, thus creating the sense

that he was a weak party leader. On the other hand, sacking a Chancellor is an extremely

controversial decision to take and to do so highlights Major’s political nerve to make tough

decisions. The period between ‘Black Wednesday’ up until the General Election defeat for Major in

1997, saw him unable to reclaim the authority and legitimacy as Conservative Party leader which he

had between 1990 to the General Election of April 1992.

Furthermore, Major was dealt a poor hand as a result of the ‘poisoned chalice’17

that

Thatcher’s legacy left behind, i.e. the divisions in the party over Europe. Michael Heseltine, who

stood against Thatcher in the 1990 leadership election blamed Thatcher for Thatcherite members of

the cabinet continuously dominating cabinet meetings on the matter of Europe18

. Heseltine goes on

further to argue that it was the cabinet, not the press, where the majority of pressure to make a

change of ideological direction in the party came from19

. The formal discussions amongst colleagues,

particularly between Lilley, Portillo and Redwood very much undermined Major’ leadership,

particularly with the attendance of the No Turning Back think tank in June 1992, which was

Thatcherite think tank that was extremely hostile to the Maastricht Treaty20

. Major saw this as a

rebellion from his own government towards the government’s European policy, therefore an attack

on the government, which created the phrase “bastards” after a ITV interview in 1993 towards Lilley,

Portillo and Redwood.

Additionally, what frustrated Major most of all were leaks from his government to the press,

and the Portillo incident on the 1st

May 1994 was seen as breaching the doctrine of collective cabinet

responsibility. Portillo had argued that Britain under a Conservative government would never sign up

15

Ibid. p.334 16

Hywel Williams, Conservative Decline and Fall 1992-1997 (London, 1998) p.40 17

Michael Foley, John Major, Tony Blair and the Conflict of Leadership: Collision Course (Manchester, 2002)

p.28 18

Michael Heseltine, Life in the Jungle: My Autobiography (London, 2000) p.519 19

Ibid. 20

Michael Gove, Michael Portillo: The Future of the Right (London, 1995) p.255

19

to a single currency, this was seen by Major as a clear attack on his consensual style of leadership21

.

Although Major was angry at the comments and received an apology from Portillo, he feared sacking

Portillo because of the damage it may have done to Party unity and also to his own position which

was fairly volatile at this point, this once again highlights the disadvantages of holding a small

majority government. In fairness to Portillo however, he felt as well other eurosceptics did within

the government that similar deviations made by Pro-Europeans had gone unpunished22

, such as Ken

Clarke’s comments calling the eurosceptics in the cabinet “silly”23

, which according to Michael Gove,

biographer of Michael Portillo, was deliberately provoking the sceptics.

The chapter will now analyse the leadership style of John Major, whereby the perception

that he was overly sensitive to criticism, lacked a political nerve, and he delayed decision making will

be examined. Firstly however, Major’s social and educational background was profoundly different

to that of any previous Conservative Party leader. He had left school with few qualifications and had

not attended university, whereas many Conservatives within the party traditionally were educated

at Oxbridge24

. Major’s limited educational qualifications had his generated distaste for elitism within

policy discussion, which had fuelled his sense of social vulnerability25

. This had created a lack of inner

confidence and ‘self-pity’26

as Paul Goodman argued, whereby Major became overly obsessed with

his own image according to Redwood’s political adviser Hywel Williams, where Major feared his

negative public image in the press27

, which will the next chapter will analyse. He became paranoid

even believing that the print media criticism of him was motivated by intellectual snobbery due to

his lack of education qualification, thus demonstrating his weakness as a leader28

.

The assumption that Major lacked the necessary political nerve to be the leader of the

Conservative Party was largely based upon the negative interpretations of his reaction and conduct

during and after the ERM crisis29

. Bill Jones argues that Major possessed a fairly thin skin for a

leading political figure and as the next chapter will highlight, Major was prone to over-sensitivity

after press criticism. The disgust that the right wing print media heaped upon him in the immediate

aftermath of Black Wednesday according to Hugo Young ‘drove a reasonably balanced man into a

21

Anthony Seldon, Major: A Political Life (London, 1997) p.457 22

Ibid. 23

Michael Gove, Michael Portillo: The Future of the Right (London, 1995) p.255 24

Robert Blake, The Conservative Party: From Peel to Major (London, 1998) p.384-386 25


p.28 26

Personal interview with Paul Goodman, August 6 2013 27

Hywel Williams, Guilty Men: Conservative Decline and Fall 1992-1997 (London, 1998)p.32 28

Noel Malcolm, ‘What Verdict of Major’, Daily Telegraph, June 23 1997, p.26 29

Bill Jones, Political Issues in Britain Today (Manchester, 1994)p.4

20

species of neuroticism’30

. Major’s frustration over the ERM was most notable in the “Bastards”

outburst in 1993 (which was a reference to Portillo, Redwood and Lilley) and also that Major was

“going to fucking crucify the right for what they have done”31

, which was a private conversation to

one of his cabinet ministers regarding the Maastricht rebellion in 1993. It is entirely legitimate to

note that Major did operate under extreme duress and was prone to sessions of depression and self-

doubt32

. The stresses of managing such a fractious Conservative government occasionally

manifested themselves in bouts of irritability.

However, there are two key incidents that highlight that Major did possess political nerve

regarding European policy. Firstly, he displayed a remorseless commitment to ratifying an inherently

integrationist Maastricht Treaty, which would create the pillars of a Monetary Union and a political

union, which was against the instincts of a predominantly Eurosceptic Conservative Party33

. Given

that Major had opportunities to abort the European treaty, and to remove the three line whip of

backbench MPs as Redwood demanded34

, Major had demonstrated the single-mindedness as

Thatcher showed over the Falklands 1982 and her monetary policy from 1979 onwards. But it also

highlighted Major’s coolness under pressure and ensured that the parliamentary passage of the

Maastricht Treaty was secured by 199335

. In the aftermath of successfully securing the Maastricht

Treaty, Major sarcastically stated that he did not “understand why such a complete wimp like me

keeps winning everything”36

, thus demonstrating that he was ignoring the weak portrayal of his

leadership, showing his inner resilience to his critics.

The other key incident that portrays Major’s leadership as strong was his decision to

provoke a contest for the leadership of the Conservative Party in June 1995, to take on the right

wing of the Conservative Party, but also more specifically Thatcherism. Michael Heseltine, the

Deputy Prime Minister regarded Major’s decision as a far braver decision than any Margaret

Thatcher had made37

, showing the ideological and personal differences both Thatcher and Heseltine

had. But yet, calling the leadership election showed Major’s political courage and the nerve of the

political gambler. This bold, but also desperate tactic to hold onto the leadership of the Conservative

Party represented a fine example of Major’s desire to remain in office, indicating that he did possess

30


Anthony Seldon, Major: A Political Life (London, 1997) p.434-437 32

Mark Stuart, Douglas Hurd: The Public Servant (London, 1998) p.297 33


John Redwood, Singing the Blues: The Once and Future Conservatives (London, 2004) p.128 35


Ibid. 37

John Major, The Autobiography (London, 2000) p.623

21

the nerve for the highest office38

and was not prepared to avoid political confrontation. The fact that

Major quite comfortably won his leadership contest on the first ballot by 218 votes to 89, compared

to Thatcher’s small margin win of 204 to 15239

, suggests that Major was far more popular within his

party compared to Thatcher. The final point in regards to the leadership contest is that it was Major

who made the choice to hold the leadership contest, rather than as we saw with Heseltine and

Thatcher, it was Heseltine who championed Thatcher. This once again indicates the support he had

from the vast majority of his cabinet whilst he was party leader and Prime Minister40

.

The second strand to the critique of the political leadership of Major was that he was

politically indecisive and avoided political confrontation. It is the perceived failings in decision

making that contributed to the perceptions of poor political judgement and weakness in political

leadership style. The accusation that he delayed decision making and avoided political confrontation

was most apparent in his approach to development of European Policy and his style of cabinet

management41

. In regards to the formulation of European policy, the legalisation of the Maastricht

Treaty highlighted him delaying critical decisions. It dates back to 1991 and 1992 where the

negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty began. Major had attempted to diffuse the sovereignty

dilemma in the party by securing opt outs from Economic and Monetary Union and the Social

Chapter (under the influence of Michael Howard)42

according to Paul Goodman, who argued that

Howard like Portillo, Lilley and Redwood sympathised with the eurosceptic backbenchers. Although

the legislative adoption of Major’s stance constituted a strategic avoidance of a decision that would

ultimately have to be made43

, the tactical manoeuvrings from Major merely delayed facing the

inevitable problems (e.g. backbench rebellions). Thus Major was ‘merely putting off the day of

reckoning’44

, highlighting his fear of his backbench MPs, partly as a result of his small majority in

government.

However, Major’s leadership can be seen as one of pragmatism. His cabinet management

style was based upon consensus, deliberation and informality. Following the immediate aftermath of

the downfall of Thatcher in 1990, Major recognised that there had to be an emphasis on recovery,

38

Robert Cranborne revealed the inherent complexity of Major’s personality and the pleasure that he derived

from being the leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister, when describing the rationale for his re-

election: “He Major was absolutely determined to say as long as he could” BBC, The Major Years, 5th October

1999 39

BBC, ‘Heseltine: Political CV’, Thursday, 27 April, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/727824.stm 40





David Baker, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, ‘The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht: Conservative

Divisions and British Ratification of the Treaty of the European Union’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 47, No.1

(1994) 43.

22

consolidation and unity within the party, which ultimately required him to produce a Cabinet

management style based on widening participation and sharing responsibility. Norman Lamont, the

former Chancellor who took the blame for the ERM45

crisis in 1992 argued however that during his

time in government, Major had replaced the Thatcher’s style of cabinet management based on

resolution with minimal consultation and participation, with a mode based on maximum

consultation and participation without resolution: ‘When everyone had spoken John ended the

discussion abruptly without conclusion “we don’t seem to be agreed then” and then we moved onto

the next item46

. Major’s lack of assertiveness and inability to secure resolution fuelled the

accusations and contributed to the erosion of respect for him, as shown with the “bastards” going

behind Major’s back to attend eurosceptic events.

A critical interpretation of Major’s leadership could argue that the cabinet management

adopted was the result of existing internal cabinet tensions, yet by acknowledging those internal

tensions his cabinet management style was legitimizing further dissent47

. Thus, the consensual and

deliberative style of cabinet management that Major displayed according to ex-Chancellor Lamont

was perceived to be ineffective and contributed to the perceptions of his weakness in political

leadership style. Major has defended his cabinet leadership style in that he could see no alternative

of conducting his Cabinet without endangering resignations, such as David Heathcoat-Amory’s in

1996 which the press believed48

weakened Major’s European policy.

After examining the leadership style of John Major, the chapter will now compare his style of

management to that of Margaret Thatcher’s, which will explain why in the following chapter the

likes of The Sun and The Times continuously ridiculed Major’s leadership when comparing it to

Thatcher’s. In regards to Major’s style of leadership, he was guided by a pragmatic form of

leadership, whereby he desired to construct a common sense solution rather than an ideological

doctrine. He was instinctively motivated by a desire to operate efficiently and effectively through

tactical adjustments, with the example of delaying the Maastricht vote in 199249

. He displayed a soft

and responsive political leadership style, as opposed to an ‘uncompromising and unresponsive

political leadership style’50

which according to historian Timothy Heppell was Thatcher’s leadership

45

The fact that Lamont was blamed and sacked in 1993 for the ERM crisis highlights that Major’s sharing

responsibility idea was not as convictional, compared to Thatcher’s divide and rule style of cabinet

management. 46

Norman Lamont, In Office (London, 1999) p.318-319 47


p.55 48


Bill Jones and Lynton Robins, Half a Century in British Politics (Manchester, 1997) p.79 50

Timothy Heppell, The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major 1992 to 1997 (Ceredigion, 2006) p.266

23

style. Major was a group orientated political leader who was reluctantly aggressive and his

idealization of the consultative process was a reflection of his desire for consensus and cohesion,

which was not always achieved, particularly on European policy, i.e. Maastricht.

Thatcher on the other hand argued in her political biography The Downing Street Years that

what Major lacked in leadership was ideological conviction51

. She argues that Major’s style of

leadership i.e. pragmatism, hindered coherence and vision. As Thatcher had become the first

Conservative Party leader and the first Prime Minister to have an –ism attached to their name

acknowledged her political ambitions and her political leadership style which summarised her self-

proclaimed status as a conviction politician. It had also provided a standard by which all of her

successors as party leader would be judged by, thus Major was faced with enormous pressure of

expectation. In effect, her political ambitions and leadership style amounted to a frame of reference

against which Thatcher and her followers in Major’s cabinet (Portillo, Lilley, Howard, Michael

Forsythe and Redwood) evaluated Major and found him lacking52

. Foley concludes that Major found

himself tangled up in a web of asserted requirements for strong leadership, radical vision and

personal power. He was repeatedly admonished for not developing the same aura of leadership

authority that Margaret Thatcher had executed53

, Foley also observes Major had the pressure of

‘emulating achievements of his predecessor and adjusting to the divisions and constraints generated

by the manner of Thatcher’s removal’54

.

In conclusion, Major’s weak portrayal of his leadership was a result of the small majority and

ideological differences in the government. The idea that Major avoided political confrontation and

did not have the political nerve to lead the Conservative Party can be challenged by the fact that he

held a leadership contest in 1995 and also his determination to get the Maastricht Treaty through

the House of Commons even though the Treaty received vast amounts of hostility from the

Conservative right and the right wing press. In this sense, maybe the personification of a weak party

leader which Timothy Heppell and Hywel Williams argue is wrong to make.

51

Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, 1993) p.731 52


Michael Foley, John Major, Tony Blair and the Conflict of Leadership: Collision Course (Manchester,

2002)p.59 54

Ibid. p.7

24

Chapter three – National Newspapers

“He (Major) wants to be liked, he cares deeply about what the papers say about him”1

Anonymous senior civil servant, 1999.

The rationale for this chapter is to highlight the impact the right leaning national press had

on the portrayal of John Major’s party leadership on Europe. Between 1993 up until 1997 the press,

whether they be leaning on the left or the right, were consistently criticising Major’s leadership on

Europe, particularly following the ERM crisis which brought about a new brand of euroscepticism in

Britain. What newspapers offer as a primary source is they distribute the views of key figures within

the government and also backbenchers, whereas secondary sources do not always contribute to

research. This chapter will also indicate how important the newspapers owned by News

International, such as The Sun, The Times and also The News of the World, were in portraying Major

as a leader with a ‘weak reputation’2.

Prior to the General Election of 1997 Conservative support was confined to the Daily

Express, Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph, with The Times advocating a vote for eurosceptic3

candidates of any party. Although the Mail supported the Conservatives in the 1997 general

election, the change of editor to Paul Dacre changed the stance of the Mail to a more eurosceptic

position, thus piling the pressure onto Major. On the other hand, the Labour Party had the full

support of The Sun, Daily Star, The Financial Times, The Guardian, The Independent and also The

Daily Mirror4. Thus the majority of the press were in favour of a Labour victory, demonstrating the

pressure Major was under from the press between 1992 and 1997, with newspapers from both the

left and the right attacking the Conservative government.

On the day of the General Election, 9th

April 1992, The Sun had rounded off a comprehensive

electoral assault on the Labour Party by placing their leader’s head in a lightbulb beside the headline

“If Kinnock wins today will the last person to leave Britain please turn out the lights”5. This headline

allegedly played a pivotal role in the 1992 General Election, Conservative victory. However, between

1992 and 1997 News International was very critical of the Conservative Party, but more specifically

its leadership – John Major and also those that had ousted Margaret Thatcher from office back in

1 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and its holders since 1945 (London, 2000) p.437

2 Lesley White, ‘Cold and cagey, the challenger without charm – John Redwood’, Sunday Times, Sunday July 2

1995, p.1&16 3 David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1997 (London, 1997)p.156

4 Ibid

5 The Sun, 9 April 1992, p.1

25

1990: Michael Heseltine, Kenneth Clarke and Douglas Hurd who Pro-Europe stance – somewhat

highlights how The Sun remained a Thatcherite newspaper.

Before examining the national newspapers owned by News International what should be

recognised is that John Major feared the press. An anonymous Civil Servant during John Major’s

government argued that Major cared deeply about the national press’6 portrayal of him, once again

highlighting his weak personality as a party leader. But also, according to Kelvin Mackenzie –

Murdoch’s favourite newspaper editor - Major had phoned him to ask how The Sun would cover the

ERM debacle in 19927. Mackenzie’s response to this was “I’ve got a bucket of shit on my desk, Prime

Minister, and I'm going to pour it all over you"8 – somewhat highlighting the political influence and

power the press had during Major’s government. Major feared that, The Sun in particular

considering its popularity on a national level, would criticise the Conservatives economy policy,

which they did, and the Conservative government never really recovered from the ERM crisis

electorally, but also internally within the party. However, Major was right to fear the The Sun,

particularly when News International decided to work with the Labour spin team – Alastair Campbell

and Peter Mandelson, indicating that Major’s belief that he was the target of “ruthless and

orchestrated mass media campaign to undermine his authority”9 was right.

The first newspaper owned by News International that should be looked at is The Sun due to

it having the highest circulation of any popular press of approximately 3.93 million in 199710

. In 1997

Trevor Kavanagh explained why The Sun ditched the Tories prior to the general election by

describing Major as being weak for calling Portillo and Redwood (two Conservatives that The Sun

endorsed to become the next leader) as “bastards”11

. Kavanagh being sympathetic towards Portillo

and Redwood demonstrates the Thatcherite ideology The Sun had/has, it seems the lack of ideology

and Thatcherite beliefs that Major had was also an important factor for The Sun opposing his

leadership. Kavanagh then goes on to explain that Major’s failure to deal with the bickering in his

party on Europe, made it impossible for The Sun to support him as a party leader. This very much

highlights Trevor Kavanagh’s endorsement of the political viewpoint of that of Murdoch, thus

demonstrating the influence Murdoch had on his editors.

6 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and its holders since 1945 (London, 2000) p.437

7 Michael White, ‘Leveson inquiry: Kelvin MacKenzie tells it like it was at The Sun’, The Guardian, Monday 9

January 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/09/leveson-inquiry-kelvin-mackenzie-lobbing 8 Ibid

9 Robert Taylor, Major (London, 2006) p.106

10 James Thomas, Popular Newspapers, the Labour and British Politics (Abingdon, 2005) p.127

11 Trevor Kavanagh, ‘Why we had to ditch the tired Tories – Election’, The Sun, Tuesday 18 March 1997, p.6

26

On the 2 February 1997 before this article was written, Major revealed in a Leveson inquiry

in 2012 Murdoch attempted to pressure him into adopting a more eurosceptic European policy or

otherwise Murdoch would no longer support the Conservatives or Major12

. This inquiry highlights

that Britain’s relationship with Europe was a big issue for The Sun and also Murdoch, which resulted

in The Sun endorsement for the Labour Party in March 1997. Major’s rejection of Murdoch’s

lobbying to have a eurosceptic European policy does indicate however that he was a strong willed

person and leader. Major would have known that by adopting the support of Murdoch he would

have had an electoral advantage by The Sun’s endorsement, however he stuck to his principles,

showing signs of a strong willed leader.

However, even prior to the private conversation between Major and Murdoch on the

Conservatives European policy, The Sun still portrayed Major as being a weak party leader,

particularly a year before the lead up to the General Election in 1997. The newspaper article from

The Sun highlights its discontent for pro-European Tories and also comes from Trevor Kavanagh who

wrote that not only Conservatives but also The Sun had wanted Kenneth Clarke to be sacked as

Chancellor, as Norman Lamont in 199313

. Kavanagh argued that Major should show some “steel”, (a

phrase relevant to that of Margaret Thatcher –‘Iron lady’) which suggests that Kavanagh believed

Major was a weaker party leader than Thatcher was. The Minister who supposedly told Major to

sack Clarke was Michael Portillo, a Conservative minister that The Sun sympathised with and wanted

as the next Conservative Party leader.

The Times and The News of the World which are/were owned by Rupert Murdoch were also

critical of Major’s party leadership over Europe. The Times in particular did not endorse a political

party in the lead up to the 1997 General Election, but endorsed constituent MPs who were

eurosceptic, highlighting that it was hostile to Major’s European policy. The Times was very critical of

Major’s leadership and had even endorsed John Redwood in the 1995 leadership election. The

reasoning behind The Times endorsing Redwood in 1995 was because John Major was too “nice”

which gave him this “weak reputation” and as a result “a discipline problem”14

in the Conservative

Party, and the newspapers owned by News International continuously compared Major’s leadership

style to that of Thatcher’s.

12

BBC, ‘Leveson Inquiry: John Major reveals Murdoch's EU demand’, 12 June 2012,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18405629 13

Trevor Kavanagh, ‘Go to war on EU and axe Clarke – This is our only hope Ministers warn Major’, The Sun,

Saturday May 11, 1996, p.11 14

Lesley White, ‘Cold and cagey, the challenger without charm – John Redwood’, Sunday Times, July 2 1995,

p.1&16

27

The Conservative Party splits over the Maastricht Treaty between 1992 and 1993 received

vast amounts of coverage by the national press and The Times remained supportive of the

eurosceptics. Although, The Times supported the eurosceptic right of the Conservative Party, it took

a hard line on Major’s lack of control of his eurosceptic cabinet members such as Michael Portillo

and Peter Lilley15

. The article explained that Michael Portillo “did not make a statement” on

supporting Major’s policy. Michael Portillo has recently explained that he was always hostile to the

EU16

, demonstrating that The Times was right in believing Portillo was a critique of Major’s European

Policy. But The Times still wanted to see a Conservative government with self-discipline, and the

reason for that lack of self-discipline in the party according to Robin Oakley and Phillip Webster was

Major’s leadership style. An interview with Douglas Hurd explains that Hurd wanted Major to get a

“grip”17

over the cabinet splits – highlighting that even Major’s political allies during his government

beginning to lose confidence in him.

Another article by the Times explains how there was both “anger on the left and right. He’s

marched us up and down the hill so often people don’t know what regiment they are in any

longer”18

. This supports the view of that from Martin Holmes, one of the leading directors of the

Bruges Group, in that Major pursued a policy of compromise in order to keep his party together19

.

Although Holmes was a member of the Bruges Group which is a Thatcherite and eurosceptic think

tank which was highly critical of Major’s leadership on Europe, especially the three line whip on the

Maastricht rebels. There is clear evidence that he focused more upon the threat to his party

leadership rather than a concise European policy, thus highlighting why he was portrayed as a weak

party leader.

Although owned by Rupert Murdoch, the article written by Woodrow Wyatt for the News of

the World just before the general election in 1997, endorsed the Conservative Party and Major’s

party leadership, suggesting that he was hedging his bets on The Sun being successful in removing

the Conservatives from office. Woodrow Wyatt was very close to Rupert Murdoch in the media, and

Wyatt was also close friends with Margaret Thatcher and was a huge admirer of her whilst she was

Prime-Minister, so for him to be endorsing Major as Prime Minister and also a Conservative Party

15

Phillip Webster and Robin Oakley, ‘Europe split haunts Major far from home – Maastricht Treaty, The Times,

June 11 1992, p.1 16

The Huffington Post UK, ‘Leave European Union, Criticises Cameron's Insincerity On Referendum’, 8th

May

2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/05/08/michael-portillo-uk-eu_n_3240187.html 17

Phillip Webster and Robin Oakley, ‘Europe split haunts Major far from home – Maastricht Treaty, The Times,

June 11 1992, p.1 . 18

Phillip Webster and Nicholas Wood, ‘Major faces rebellion over Europe climbdown, The Times, March 29

1994, p.1 19

Martin Holmes, John Major and Europe: The Failure of a policy 1990-97, Bruges Group (London, 1997) p.1

28

leader is quite a paradox, considering his political allegiances. Wyatt explained that Major not only

showed “wise statesmanship” over the Maastricht Treaty, but the fact that Major “didn’t object to

Tory candidates giving their opinions on the Single Currency”20

, with the exception of Portillo in

1994, shows a party leader who was willing to compromise and therefore managed his party

effectively. Whereas, traditionally, conservatives would rather see their leader hold a firm line on

party management, somewhat suggesting that Major was trying to modernise the party in allowing

two different perspectives on Europe.

Both the Daily Express and the Mail have been and remain today as traditionally endorsing

the Conservative Party and it will be seen from this section of the chapter how the two papers

attempted to both defend Major as a party leader, whilst also attacking the rebels in the party,

whether that be the backbenchers or Major’s cabinet ministers. The Mail in particular describes the

eurosceptics in one article, prior to the Maastricht vote in 1993, as “the barmies” – referring to the

Conservative backbenchers that rebelled against Maastricht, “the devils” – former cabinet ministers

who are eurosceptic such as Norman Lamont, but most notably, Margaret Thatcher and also “the

bastards” – the phrase which was used by John Major in describing his eurosceptic rebels within his

own cabinet21

. The most interesting thing about this article is that unlike The Sun and The Times,

Thatcher is criticised for mobilising the rebels, according to Paul Eastham and Gordon Greig, for

having “reckless” behaviour for being a traitor to her leader. What this article in particular highlights

is the commitment the Mail had to the Conservative Party’s leadership, whereas today we see a very

sensationalist and populist Mail. But also, whilst The Sun and The Times were very supportive of

Michael Portillo, who was a Thatcherite and also a eurosceptic, the Mail described Portillo as being

an “assassin”22

and feared him because the press knew very little of him. The picture drawn of

Michael Portillo in the article portrays a rather smug look about him, somewhat suggesting that the

Mail feared that he could be the next Conservative Party leader.

However, there is also a negative image that is portrayed by The Mail in that John Major

failed to control the right wing eurosceptics of the Conservative party. Christopher Bell argues that

his lack of leadership of his eurosceptic backbenchers left him in a crisis and that the three line whip

on Maastricht was not good enough23

. Gordon Greig also states how Major failed to control both the

europhiles and eurosceptics in the Conservative cabinet, specifically, Ken Clarke, Michael Portillo and

20

Woodrow Wyatt, ‘We must have Major at the Euro controls – Opinion’, News of the World, Sunday April 29,

1997, p.51 21

Gordon Greig and Paul Eastham, ‘Now Major bites back at those bad apples in his party’, Daily Mail,

September 22 1993, p.10-11 22

Paul Eastham, ‘Cometh the hour, cometh the man?’, Daily Mail, February 10 1993, p.6 23

Christopher Bell, ‘Rebels plunge Major into Europe crisis’, Daily Mail, February 10 1993, p.1

29

Michael Howard24

. Michael Heseltine argues that the Daily Mail had become dramatically more

eurosceptic under its editor Paul Dacre and critical of John Major as both a Prime Minister and a

Conservative party leader. Its previous editor however David English was a europhile25

and more

sympathetic towards Major’s leadership and his European policy. This highlights the influence both

the owners and the editors have on newspaper stories, thus a politically influenced opinion rather

than fact. But on the whole, The Mail was supportive of Major’s leadership, a vast contrast to that of

The Times and The Sun.

The Daily Express similar to the Daily Mail was also defensive of Major’s leadership as party

leader, with Simon Jenkins arguing in 1993 that the behaviour of the Maastricht Rebels “made him

sick”26

at the way they were using the Conservatives small majority to give them unprecedented

power over the government. The Express explained that when Portillo made comments about

opposing the single currency on national TV back in 1994, Major showed a “tough stance”27

towards

Portillo, whatever that tough stance was, we do not know – showing the weakness of this article as a

source. But Major was backed by Ken Clarke for holding this tough stance, indicating the fierce

political relationship between Clarke and Portillo. Major was also supported by the Daily Express

during the leadership election in 1995, by describing the decision to keep Major as party leader as

“clear cut”28

, showing the contrast in support Major had with the right leaning newspapers, when

you had The Sun and The Times supporting Redwood’s campaign, whereas The Mail and The Express

defending Major as leader.

When comparing the second chapter to the third chapter, it is very clear that it was the right

leaning press that was the dominant force in portraying John Major as a weak party leader.

Considering the difficulties that Major faced whilst in government such as a small majority and

rebellious backbenches, a divided party on Europe left from Thatcher’s legacy and also the ERM

crisis in 1992, it was always bound to be difficult for Major to fully manage his party. Although

historically, Major’s leadership can be seen as being strong and convictional, particularly on ratifying

the Maastricht Treaty and passing it through the House of Commons, even though the policy

received vast amounts of scrutiny, from both his own party and the press. Peter Dorey and Michael

Foley agree with this view that the largest impediment to Major’s leadership was in fact the national

press. Some of the tabloid press for example argued that he lacked intellectual edge to run a bath29

,

24

Gordon Greig, ‘Major has rivals to Left, Right and Centre’, Daily Mail, August 31 1993, p.11 25

Michael Heseltine, Life in the Jungle: My Autobiography (London, 2000) p.518 26

Simon Jenkins, ‘What Major should tell the rebels’, Daily Express, July 22 1993, p.8 27

Patrick Hennessy, ‘Major pulls Portillo into line’, Daily Express, Wednesday May 4 1994, p.2 28

Martin Bentham and John Ingham, ‘a clear-cut choice’, Daily Express, July 5 1995, p.3 29

Peter Dorey, The Major Premiership (Basingstoke, 1999) p.216

30

whereas the broadsheets believed that he had been promoted beyond his natural level30

, somewhat

highlighting the elitist behaviour from the press, showing the different viewpoints from the press

and Conservative ministers and historians.

This chapter highlights the scrutiny the Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister John

Major was under from the press, particularly both The Sun and also The Times, who were incredibly

hostile to both the Conservative Party’s European policy and also his party leadership. The editor of

The Sun, who happened to be a Thatcherite, Kelvin Mackenzie portrayed Major as being a fragile and

politically weak Prime Minister, which created the idea that he was the personification of a weak

party leader. The traditional Conservative newspapers such as the Express and Mail however were

defensive of Major and even at times critical of Thatcher’s influence on the cabinet and

backbenchers towards Major. However, Paul Dacre’s appointment as editor of the Daily Mail

created this critical perception of Major’s leadership and European policy, thus highlighting the

pressure Major was under from the right wing press.

30


p.195

31

Conclusion

This dissertation has examined the portrayal John Major’s party leadership of the

Conservative on its European policy between 1992 and 1997. By doing so it has examined the views

of the right leaning national press, perspectives of those within the cabinet at the time and also

historians and political commentators of his government. The aim of this dissertation was to

challenge the idea that John Major was a weak party leader, following Timothy Heppell and Hywel

Williams describing him as the personification of a weak party leader1.

What this dissertation has demonstrated is how Major was viewed by different

political and historical perspectives. The Tory left such as Heseltine for example have argued that

Major was a strong willed Prime Minister, who made the brave decision in opting to hold a

leadership contest in 1995 to fight off the eurosceptic Thatcherites in the government. Whereas, the

Tory right with the examples of Lamont and Redwood have argued that Major avoided

confrontation, whether it be with his cabinet or his backbenchers. The other point of view comes

from the press, whereby one can argue the right wing tabloid press created the image that he was a

weak party leader. Both Peter Dorey and Michael Foley make the argument that it was the press

who were to blame for creating the negative image of his leadership. The fact is that Major was

ideologically different to Thatcher and was not a well-educated person, unlike most Conservatives

within the cabinet and other former leaders, was not Oxbridge educated and the press played on

this as highlighted in the second and third chapters.

The initial chapter examined the historical context of the Conservative attitudes

towards Europe from Churchill to Major, which highlighted the development of euroscepticism.

During Churchill’s government the scepticism of a United Europe was dominated by the

Conservative fear they would no longer be the party of the Commonwealth/Empire. The scepticism

of Europe developed however into a fear of losing sovereignty as highlighted from Enoch Powell’s

fear of mass immigration as a result of a borderless Europe. Under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership

however, the eurosceptic movement feared the loss of both political and economic sovereignty

following the movement towards a monetary union in Europe, as highlighted in Thatcher’s Bruges

Speech2. The latter development of euroscepticism is one that dominated the Conservative Party

during Major’s government between 1992 and 1997, with the likes of Michael Portillo, Peter Lilley

and John Redwood being extremely hostile to the ERM, as highlighted by Portillo’s GMTV comments

in 1994. The Thatcher years also highlighted however the splits in the Conservative Party developing,

1 Hywel Williams, Guilty Men: Conservative Decline and Fall 1992-1997 (London, 1998) p.1

2 Kenneth Clarke & Ben Patterson, The Conservative Party and Europe (London, 2011) p.153

32

with Thatcher clashing with the Michael Heseltine and Kenneth Clarke (amongst others) over

European policy.

The second chapter however emphasised the political environment John Major

faced during his leadership between 1992 and 1997. An ever falling majority government , the ERM

crisis and the consistent comparisons with Thatcher’s style of leadership and ideological legacy, left

him in a difficult position. The chapter highlighted the different European perspectives in both the

party and cabinet over Europe, particularly the right wing Thatcherites and the Tory left One Nation

Conservatives, which ultimately left Major in a position where he had to compromise between the

two. But, one must recognise that Major made some important political decisions which ultimately

challenged the idea that he was a weak party leader. The sacking of Norman Lamont in 1993, the

continuous commitment to pass the Maastricht Treaty through the House of Commons in 1993,

even though he was under pressure from the Tory right and the press to veto it and lastly his

decision to hold a leadership contest to challenge the eurosceptics in 1995.

When comparing chapter two to chapter three, it was comprehensively the

national press which created the perception that Major was a weak party leader, specifically The Sun

and The Times, which seemed to be hostile to anything that was not Thatcherite or eurosceptic.

Major was seen as being a weak party leader because he of social and educational background

whereby he did not attend Oxbridge, but mainly because he did support a Thatcherite agenda in the

cabinet and show hostility to the Maastricht Treaty which was what Rupert Murdoch had lobbied

him to do. The constant pressure from both The Sun and The Times in trying to persuade Major to

adopt a eurosceptic European policy and his objection to do so shows the personality of a strong

Prime Minister and this should acknowledged.

Overall, the press created the perception that Major was a weak party leader

between 1992 and 1997, but to consider the political environment he faced, whereby he was dealt

with a poor hand. The ideological differences between the right and the left in the party and cabinet,

left him a small majority government which gave backbenchers unprecedented power, the

consistent comparison to Thatcher’s leadership style and the social insecurity suffered by Major

which was developed by the press, ultimately portrayed him as a weak party leader. The fact that he

rejected the calls from Murdoch and the eurosceptic backbenchers to reject the Maastricht Treaty,

his decision to sack Norman Lamont as Chancellor who had support from the right of his party for

taking the UK out of the ERM and also Major gambling his leadership on an election in 1995,

suggests from my point of view, that was a far stronger leader than what his detractors, especially

the press made him out to be. The fact that Major quite comfortably won his leadership election in

33

1995 compared to Thatcher’s in 1990, demonstrates that he was a more popular leader within the

Conservative Party than Thatcher was. Thus, this dissertation seriously challenges the concept of

Hywel Williams, Timothy Heppell, The Times and The Sun that Major was the personification of a

weak party leader, when he clearly was not.

Word Count: 10485

34

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40

Appendix: Chronology of Key Events 1992 to 19971

1992

9 April – Conservative Party wins General Election and secure a parliamentary majority of twenty-

one.

2 June – Treaty of European Union rejected in Danish Referendum. Major Government delays

parliamentary passages of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill

3 June – Eighty-four Conservative backbenchers sign an Early Day Motion calling for a fresh start to

European Policy.

3 September – Major Government uses £10 billion to support the value of sterling within the

Exchange Rate Mechanism.

16 September – Sterling is withdrawn from the Exchange Rate Mechanism.

4 November – Major Government survives paving motion vote (319-316) to recommence the

parliamentary passage of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill.

1993

17 March – Lamont Budget: Increases in taxation, including Value Added Tax on domestic fuel.

27 May – Chancellor Norman Lamont leaves the Major Cabinet. Kenneth Clarke appointed

Chancellor; Michael Howard appointed Home Secretary.

22 July – Major Government defeated (316-324) on Social Protocol vote on the European

Communities (Amendment) Bill due to the dissenting votes of twenty-three Conservative

parliamentarians.

23 July – Major government hold a confidence motion to their stance on the social protocol; win the

vote by forty votes. One Conservative MP, Rupert Allason, fails to support the Major Government

and has the Conservative whip withdrawn.

25 July – John Major caught on camera referring to Cabinet colleagues as ‘Bastards’.

2 August – Britain ratifies the Treaty of European Union.

8 October – John Major delivers his Back to Basics Speech to the Conservative Party Conference.

1994

29 March – The Major Government forced into a humiliating U-turn on the blocking minority in the

European Council of Ministers. Conservative MP, Tony Marlow, demands that John Major resign as

Conservative Party leader.

1 Chronology of events adapted from Dorey, 1999, Heppell 2006 and Butler and Kavanagh, 1997.

41

9 June – European Election Result: Labour 62; Conservative 18; Liberal Democrats 2.

21 July – Tony Blair elected as leader of the Labour Party.

3 November – Major Government abandons plans to privatize the Post Office in face of potential

Conservative backbench rebellion.

26 November – Major Government survives confidence vote on EU Finance Bill by 330 votes to 303.

Eight Conservative MPs rebelled, Richard Body voluntarily resigns the Conservative Whip in protest.

1995

24 April – Conservative Whip restored to eight of the nine whipless Conservatives.

22 June – John Major resigns as leader of the Conservative Party but not as Prime Minister. He

announced that he is a candidate in the forthcoming Conservative Party leadership election.

26 June – John Redwood resigns from the Major cabinet to contest the leadership of the

Conservative Party.

4 July – John Major re-elected leader of the Conservative Party. John Major 218 votes, John

Redwood 89 votes, 22 abstentions.

7 October – Conservative MP, Alan Howarth, joins the Labour Party.

29 December – Conservative MP, Emma Nicholson, joins the Liberal Democrats.

1996

22 February – Conservative MP, Peter Thurnham, resigns from the Conservative Whip.

21 May – John Major announces that in retaliation for the European Union ban on exports of British

beef his government will veto all European Union decisions requiring unanimous export.

12 October – Peter Thurnham joins the Liberal Democrats.

1997

18 March – John Major calls General Election for the 1st May.

1st May – Labour Party wins General Election with a parliamentary majority of 263.

42

Key Figures2

Rt Hon, Kenneth Clarke – Secretary of State for Education and Science from 1990 to 1992, Home

Secretary from 1992 and 1993 and then Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1993 to 1997.

Rt Hon, Michael Heseltine – Challenged Margaret Thatcher for the leadership of the Conservative

Party in 1990. From 1992 to 1995 he served as President of the Board of Trade, and from 1995 to

1997 he held the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and First Secretary of State.

Rt Hon, Michael Howard – He was the Environment Secretary from 1992 to 1993, and Home

Secretary from 1993 to 1997.

Rt Hon, Norman Lamont – Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1990 and 1993 and in 1993

rejected to move to the Department of Environment following his dismissal as Chancellor.

Rt Hon, John Major – Prime Minister between 1990 and 1997.

Rt Hon, Peter Lilley – From 1990 to 1992 entered the cabinet as Secretary of State for Trade and

Industry, but then promoted to Secretary of State for Social Security from 1992 to 1997.

Rt Hon, Michael Portillo – In 1992 entered the cabinet as Chief Secretary to the Treasury up until

1994, from 1994 to 1995 he was the Employment Secretary and then from 1995 to 1997 he was the

Secretary of State for Defence.

Rt Hon, John Redwood – From 1992 to 1993 he was Minister of State for Local Government at the

Department of the Environment; in 1993 he was Secretary of State for Wales until his leadership

challenge in 1995 where he resigned.

Rt Hon, Margaret Thatcher (Baroness Thatcher) – Prime Minister between 1979 and 1990 and her

active intervention ensured the leadership election victory of John Major in 1990 and then

eventually William Hague in 1997.

2 Adapted from Williams, 1998

43

Documents

Portrayal of John Major's Conservative Party on European Policy between 1992 and 1997