–1–

IssamNajm,President

SusanGorman-Chang,VicePresident

AndrewKrowne,Treasurer

GabrielKhanlian,Secretary

DavidBalen,SignerAsaadAlnajjar

CheriDerohanian

JasonHector

AlexKim

BeckyLeveque

JenniferMilbauer

January31,2017 Submittedviaemailto: Alisocomments@conservation.ca.govAttn:AlisoCanyonComprehensiveSafetyReviewDepartmentofConservationDivisionofOil,Gas,andGeothermalResources801KStreet,MS24-02Sacramento,California95814Re:CommentsontheFindingsfromtheGasStorageWellSafetyReviewandtheProposed

PressureLimitsfortheAlisoCanyonStorageFacilityTheopinionsexpressedinthisdocumentarethoseofthePorterRanchNeighborhood

Council,andnotnecessarilythoseoftheCityofLosAngelesToDepartmentofConservation:The Porter Ranch Neighborhood Council (PRNC) appreciates the opportunity to submitthesecommentstotheDepartmentofConservationontheSafetyReviewcompletedbytheDivisionofOil,Gas, andGeothermalResources (DOGGR) for theAlisoCanyongas storagefacility operated by the Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas). The PRNC iscomprisedof11publiclyelectedrepresentativesofthePorterRanchcommunitywithintheCity of Los Angeles. As you are well aware, Porter Ranch is the community of 30,000citizens of the State of California who endured through four months of the worst gasblowout accident in the United States, and who continue to endure through episodes ofuncontrolledgasreleasesfromtheAlisoCanyongasfacility.ThePRNChasreviewedthedocumentsreleasedbyDOGGRonTuesday,January17,2017,regarding the SafetyReviewandwishes to address fourmain areasof concern regardingthefindings:

1. Theadequacyofthetestingconducted2. Theriskofaseismically-inducedfailure3. Thedeterminationofthemaximumfieldpressure4. AcceptableMethaneRelease

PorterRanchNeighborhoodCouncil

–2–

Weaskthatyouseriouslyconsiderourconcernsanddotherightthingbythepeopleofourcommunity.AdequacyofWellIntegrityTestingThe document titled Requirements of Comprehensive Safety Review of the Aliso CanyonNaturalGasStorageFacilitydescribesthewellintegritytestingthatwasrequiredbyDOGGRinaccordancewith therequirementsofSB380. Table1 lists the tests conducted,and thedefectthateachtestisdesignedtodetect.Table1–NamesandFunctionsofTestsConductedundertheRequirementsofSB380

Test Name WhatitDetects1 TemperatureLog Thistestisdesignedtodetectgasleakingoutofthewell

casingduringthecourseofthetest2 NoiseLog Thistestisdesignedtodetectgasleakingoutofthewell

casingduringthecourseofthetest3 CasingWall

ThicknessTestAsitsnameindicates,thistestlooksforthinningofthecasingalongitsdepth.

4 CementBondLog Thisissonictestdesignedtodetectlossofbondingbetweencementandthesteelcasing,aswellasbetweenthecementanchorandthecaprockoverthereservoir.

5 Multi-armcaliperinspection

Thistestlooksfordeformationsinthewallgeometryandshapeontheinsidecasingwall.

6 PressureTest Thistestincludespressurizingtheinteriortubingandthecasingannulusspacewithwaterandmonitorlossofpressureovertime.

Atfirstglance,thesetestsappearimpressive.However,wedrawyourattentiontothefactthatnoneof these testshasanyability todetectahairline fractureoracorrosionpit in thecasing,especiallyifthefractureorpitdoesnotpropagatethefullthicknessofthecasingwall.Even if the hairline fracture propagates the full thickness of the casing, the pressure testwasconductedwithwater,whichdoesnothavethesensitivityrequiredtoquantifygasleakacrossthecasing.Inotherwords,gascanpassthroughcracksthatwatertakesmuchlongertopassthrough,whichwouldnotregisterasalossofpressureduringthepressure-test.Therefore,whilethesetestsarebetterthanwhatwasrequiredbefore,theyfallveryshortofthegoalofensuringthesafetyofthesewells.Thesecasingshavegonethroughdecadesofstresses from earth movement over multiple earthquakes that we know about, andnumerousseismicactivitiesthatwedon’tevenknowabout.Weshouldalsonotforgettherecklesspracticeofwithdrawinggasthroughtheannularspacebetweenthecasingandthetubingoverdecadesofoperation. It isourunderstandingthatthispracticeisactuallynot

PorterRanchNeighborhoodCouncil

–3–

allowed in gas production wells, but somehow that requirement did not extend to gasstoragewellsuntiltheSS25wellfailure.Wearehopingthattheroot-causeanalysiswouldbeabletodetermineifsuchstressesarein the casing. For this reason, it is imperative that the root-cause analysis be completedbeforethewellsareusedforanygasinjectionorwithdrawalfromthefield.SeismicIntegritySeismicstandardsaretypicallylimitedtofacilitiesandstructureswhosefailurecouldresultindirectharmtothepublic,and/orthelossofcriticalfacilities.Ironically,theydonotapplytogaswells.FortheAlisoCanyonfacility,whiletheseismichazardremainsunchanged,theseismicriskhas increaseddramaticallysincetheopeningof the facility in1972. Notonlyduetothesevereagingofthewells,butalsobecauseofthesignificanturbandevelopmentaroundthefacilityandtheimpactofseismicfieldfailureonthecommunity.Considering the consequence of a well failure in the absence of a down-hole blow-offpreventer valve, some reasonable seismic code must be applied. At a minimum, thereshouldbeanevaluationofhowmuch lateral loada casingand tubingcanwithstand, andhowmuchofanup-thrustcantheytoleratebeforetheyfail.A“straw”thatis6,000ftlong,whether8-inchesor3-inchesindiameter,couldnotpossiblywithstandthelateralforceinany seismic zone, let alone in California. Indeed, the National Labs team stated in theirreport to DOGGR in relation to casing strain as a result of formation deformation fromseismic activities that “TheSouthBelridgeFieldnearBakersfield,Californiahasundergonesignificant compaction and has a high percentage of wells that have failed from casingdeformation.”TheNationalLabsteamthenstatesthat“…amoregranularreviewofthesite-specific ground shaking hazard associated with the Santa Susana fault system will providebetterinsightintotheseismichazardatAlisoCanyon”.Finally,theNationalLabsteamstatesthat “We…believe that detailed structural analysis of the Aliso Canyon wellbore designsincorporatingtheresultsfromaPSHAandPFDAoftheSantaSusanaFaultSystemwillbetterinform the risk management process for operation of Aliso Canyon”. With the abovestatements,wedonotseehowthefacilitycanbeallowedtoreopenandresumeoperationbefore a seismic risk analysis is completed. Anything short of such analysis is playing“RussianRoulette”withthehealthofthepeopleinourcommunity.Weurgeyounottoignorethisfact,andtocommissionaseismicanalysisofthewellsbeforetheyareusedforgasinjectionorwithdrawal.Justbecausethisisnot“typically”done,doesnotmeanitisnottherightthingtodo.Itisourunderstandingthattherewillbefluidintheannularspacebetweenthetubingandthecasing,andthatitwillholddownthegasifthereisafailureatthebottom.At2,926psi,it takesawater columnof6,700 ft toexert anequal amountofdownwardpressure. Werealizetherearechemicaladditivestotheliquidtomakeitheavier,sowedonotknowhow

PorterRanchNeighborhoodCouncil

–4–

farlowertherequireddepthwillbe.However,wewanttodrawyourattentiontothefactthat this liquidpressureonlyprevents thegas fromlifting theplugat thebottomifgas isreleased below the plug. However, it does not prevent the gas from escaping into theannularspaceifthereisabreakinthetubinganywhereabovetheplug. Oncethisoccurs,thecasingwillbeunderthefullpressureofthefield,andtherewillbenothingthatcanbedonetoreleasethatpressurewithoutrepairingthetubing.Amorecatastrophicfailurethatresultsinthefailureofboththetubingandthecasing,suchasaseismicevent,wouldalsoresult in other uncontrolled gas blowouts identical to that of SS25. Therefore, the heavyliquidwilldonothingtopreventgasreleaseinaseismicevent.Thisisanotherreasonwhyadown-holeblow-offpreventervalveisabsolutelynecessary.DeterminationofMaximumFieldPressureIndeterminingthemaximumfieldpressure,DOGGRreliedonthereportbyGeoMechanicsTechnologies, which was commissioned by SoCalGas. It is noted that GeoMechanicsTechnologies did not do a single test of any sample of the cap rock, or any numericalmodelingofthestressesundervariousfieldgasstoragevolumesandrepeatedinjectionandwithdrawal thathashappenedover thedecades. Theysimplyreliedon information frominjection tests data conducted in past years, and stated that, since the pressure appliedduring these tests was higher than the 3,000 psi pressure under which the field hadoperatedinthepast,thena3,000psioperatingpressureisacceptable.Inessence,sincethefieldoperatedat3,000psi in thepast, there isnoreasonnot tocontinueoperating itat thesame pressure. We note that the report by GeoMechanics Technologies, Inc. has thefollowingstatementatthebeginningofit:

“NeitherGeoMechanicsTechnologies,membersofGeoMechanicsTechnologies,noranypersonactingonbehalfofGeoMechanicsTechnologiesmakesanywarrantyorrepresentation,expressorimplied,withrespecttotheaccuracy,completeness,orusefulnessoftheinformationcontainedinthisreport.”

Basically,thesingleentitythatdidthestudywaspaidbytheGasCompanytodoit,didnothave a single sample of anything to work with, and then put a disclaimer to disavowthemselves fromanything thatcomesoutof theiranalysisandrefuse tostandbehind theaccuracy, completeness, and usefulness of anything they have in their report. We do notunderstandhowDOGGRacceptsthisstandardforitsdecision.Wealso find it immenselydisappointing that theNationalLabs teamsimply followed thesame rationale and concurred with the same number without any further analysis. TheNationalLabsareexpertsat conductingRiskAnalysisonnatural andman-madesystems.Wedonot understandhow theNational Labswould completely ignore the RiskAnalysiscomponenttothisdecision.

PorterRanchNeighborhoodCouncil

–5–

Tothatend,westronglydisagreewiththeone-dimensionalapproachtothisdecision,andurgeDOGGRtostepoutofitstypicalengineeringapproach,andimplementariskanalysisapproach to thisquestion thatgoesbeyondthe fracturegradient calculation,andasks thequestion about the “cost of being wrong”. In other words, this determination is notsupposedtobelimitedtoanengineeringcalculation,butshouldalsoincludeaRiskAnalysiscomponentthatassessestheimpactoffailureonthesurroundingcommunity.Thismustbeanintegralpartofthisdecision.TheoutcomeofthisanalysisisthentobeincorporatedintothesatefyfactorrequiredunderSB380.PerFigure2intheGeoMechanicsTechnologiesReport,apressureof2,926psicorrespondstoa storageofabout86Bcf inAlisoCanyon! Thismeans thatDOGGR isgiving thegreenlighttoSoCalGastostoreasmuchas86Bcfofgasinthereservoiriftheysochoose,whichisthefullcapacityofthereservoir!Thisfindingseemstohavebeenmadewithcompleteandutterdisregardtothefactthattherewasacatastrophicwellfailurejustoverayearago.Itisasifnothinghashappened.WeremindDOGGRthatthisanalysiswasnotsupposedtobejust about the caprock, but also about the wells and the pressure that the wells canwithstand. We fail to understand how DOGGR accepts the notion that the wells can beoperatedatthesamemaximumpressureunderwhichtheywereoperatedbeforethewellblowout.Another factor not considered is the potential impact of past (and possibly ongoing)frackingpracticesinthefieldonthecaprockandoverlayinggroundcover.AcceptableMethaneReleaseIn the letter from Mr. Ken Harris of DOGGR to Mr. Rodger Schwecke of SoCalGas datedJanuary17, 2017, attachment1 includes23 requirements for the SoCalGas to implement.Requirement #23, in essence, states that the CPUC and DOGGR accept the release of gasfromthefacilityintotheatmosphereatarateashighas250Kgofmethaneperhour,whichtranslates into6 tonsofmethanegasaday. ThePRNCstronglyobjects to thisallowance.The Community cannot tolerateANY release from the facility, andwedo not understandwhyweevenhavetomakethisstatement.IfSoCalGascannotpreventanyreleasefromthefacility, then we expect the CPUC and DOGGR to conclude that this facility should not beallowedtooperate.SummaryThePRNCurgesDOGGRtoconsiderthefollowing:1. The tests conducted on the wells, while they represent an improvement over past

requirements,theyfallfarshortofsecuringandensuringthesafetyandintegrityofthewellsagainstanotherblowout.

PorterRanchNeighborhoodCouncil

–6–

2. DOGGRshould commissiona thorough structural and seismic analysis toquantify theriskofseismicfailureanditsconsequences.Itisimperativethataseismicanalysisofthewellsandtheformationbecompletedbeforethefieldisallowedtoresumeoperation.

3. DOGGRshouldnot limit thepressuredetermination toanengineeringcalculation,butshouldalsoincludeathoroughRiskAnalysis.WithouttheRiskAnalysiscomponent,thepressurelimitdeterminationisincomplete.

4. The PRNC categorically rejects the notion that as much as 6 tons of methane can bereleased into the community every day from the Aliso Canyon facility. We do notunderstandhowthiscanbeacceptabletotheCPUCandDOGGR. If thisfacilitycannotcontainitsgasrelease,thisshouldbeaclearindicationtotheCPUCandDOGGRthatthisfacilitycannotbeallowedtooperate,andmustberetired.

Inthefinalanalysis, thePorterRanchNeighborhoodCouncil findsDOGGR’swillingnesstogive the Gas Company the green light to refill the Aliso Canyon facility with 100% of itscapacity to be completely unacceptable, and a slap in the face to the people who livedthrough the well rupture disaster. We ask that DOGGR takes this decision back to thedrawingboardandincorporateaRiskAnalysiscomponenttoitbasedonthehistoryofthefield, theageof the field,and the impactofpotential failureon thepeoplewhoare in theunenviablepositionoflivingnexttothisfacility.RespectfullyYours,PorterRanchNeighborhoodCouncil IssamNajm,Ph.D.,P.E.Presidentcc: TheHonorableEdmundG.Brown,Jr.,Governor,StateofCalifornia Mr.TimothySullivan,ExecutiveDirector,CaliforniaPublicUtilitiesCommission SenatorHenryStern,California27thDistrict Mr.DanteAcosta,CaliforniaAssemblyMember,38thDistrict Ms.KathrynBarger,Supervisor,LosAngelesCountyBoardofSupervisors Mr.MitchellEnglander,Councilman,LosAngelesCityCouncil Mr.EricGarcetti,Mayor,CityofLosAngeles Mr.SteveKnight,UnitedStatesRepresentative,CA-25 Mr.BradSherman,UnitedStatesRepresentative,CA-30