politics, public opinion, and the u.s.-indonesian ...s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/ file1 the national bureau of asian research nbr special report #25 | november 2010 THOMAS B. PEPINSKy

the national bureau of asian research

nbr special report #25 | november 2010

politics, public opinion, and the u.s.-indonesian comprehensive partnership

By Thomas B. Pepinsky

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the national bureau of asian research

nbr special report #25 | november 2010

THOMAS B. PEPINSKy� is Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University. He is a specialist in Southeast Asian political economy and is the author of Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes (2009), among other works. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

Politics, Public Opinion, and the U.S.-Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership

Thomas B. Pepinsky

EXECUTIVE SUMMARy�This essay discusses the U.S.–Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership with respect

to Indonesian public opinion and the challenges of political accountability in Indonesia’s young democracy.

Main arguMent The U.S.–Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership will be an important tool for realizing U.S. national interests in Southeast Asia and the Muslim world. To do so, though, the partnership must appeal to the Indonesian public, something that existing policy has failed to do. Despite the fact that Indonesian public opinion has not been sympathetic to the United States in recent years, this essay shows that Indonesians’ preferences align in important ways with U.S. interests. That public is represented, however, by a democratically elected government that falls woefully short in various measures of accountability and good governance. The main priority for U.S. policymakers must be to strengthen Indonesia’s democratic institutions to create a truly accountable political system. Such a political system will better promote the realization of common U.S.–Indonesian interests.

Policy iMPlicationsThe U.S. can take advantage of President Obama’s personal popularity among Indonesians to strengthen relations between these two democracies. If the U.S. understands that the Indonesian public prioritizes clean and effective governance, and is on the whole favorable to moderate politics, democracy, and international economic integration, then these can become a new platform for U.S.–Indonesian bilateral relations. If U.S. policymakers prioritize the strengthening of domestic political accountability within Indonesia, this will increase the likelihood that the U.S.–Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership will yield tangible results that benefit both countries.

3Politics, Public oPinion, and the u.s.-indonesian coMPrehensive PartnershiP u PePinsky

Relations between the United States and Indonesia are set to enter a new era in the coming months with the conclusion of an ambitious new “comprehensive partnership” agreement announced by the Obama and Yudhoyono administrations during President Obama’s November 2010 visit to Jakarta. The comprehensive partnership is a framework for

furthering bilateral cooperation on trade, security, educational, and environmental issues. Its provisions include, for example, a pledge to promote bilateral trade by reducing tariffs; expanded military cooperation to combat terrorism, piracy, and other mutual threats; and educational exchange between university students in both countries.1 Although a new international partnership with Indonesia will hardly register for most Americans, closer relations with the United States are important news for the Indonesian public. The agreement raises the stakes for Indonesian and U.S. policymakers alike to get the “optics” right, ensuring that the Indonesian public supports its government’s more cooperative relationship with the United States.

That domestic public opinion can shape Indonesia’s foreign policy is a relatively new development. Though the New Order regime (1966–98) certainly took note of public stances on basic foreign policy issues, democratization has substantially increased politicians’ incentives to follow public opinion more closely. In the years since the country democratized, politicians have no doubt become increasingly sensitive to the contours of public opinion in their country.2 The same cannot be said, however, for U.S. policymakers charged with Indonesian affairs.3 To the extent that policymakers do take Indonesian public opinion into account, it is as something to be managed, not something that can further U.S. interests in Indonesia. This is a mistake. Given that the ability of this new partnership to transform U.S.-Indonesian relations will depend on the extent to which Indonesians approve of the partnership, U.S. policymakers will need to be sensitive to public opinion. To do that, in turn, U.S. policymakers need to understand Indonesian attitudes, not only toward the United States but also toward the Indonesian government itself.

Understanding the latter is important because the future of the comprehensive partnership will depend in no small part on the Indonesian government’s ability to govern effectively while at the same time representing the interests of its citizens. After more than a decade of democracy, Indonesians and foreign observers alike are increasingly realizing that the Indonesian government faces substantial problems of governance, in particular in providing basic physical infrastructure, fostering a stable environment for investment and economic growth, and protecting the rights of all Indonesian citizens.4 Moreover, Indonesia’s democratic elections have not delivered the type of political accountability hoped for by many. In democratic Indonesia, politicians take note of public opinion in order to manage their election campaigns, but once elected, these politicians are far less beholden to mass public opinion in matters of policymaking and governance. While this is a problem that is endemic to all countries and political systems, the disconnect between public

1 “U.S.-Indonesia Joint Commission and Bilateral Meeting,” U.S. Department of State, September 17, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147309.htm; and “Fact Sheets: The United States and Indonesia - Building a 21st Century Partnership,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, November 9, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/fact-sheets-united-states-and-indonesia-building-a-21st-century-partners.

2 See Marcus Mietzner, “Political Opinion Polling in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Catalyst or Obstacle to Democratic Consolidation?” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land, en Volkenkunde 165, no. 2 (2009): 95–126.

3 Donald Emmerson observes, for example, that under the Bush administration, U.S. policymakers did “not really take into account Indonesian public opinion.” Donald K. Emmerson, “Garuda and Eagle: Do Birds of a (Democratic) Feather Fly Together?” Indonesian Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2006): 4–10.

4 At the level of macroeconomic policy, Indonesian policymakers have done quite well over the past decade. The problem is that this has not translated into successful policies for enhancing international competitiveness through stable and clear business regulations, dependable infrastructure, the absence of corruption, and so on. See Haryo Aswicahyono, Kelly Bird, and Hal Hill, “Making Economic Policy in Weak, Democratic, Post-crisis States: An Indonesian Case Study,” World Development 37, no. 2 (2009): 35470.

4 nbr sPecial rePort u noveMber 2010

opinion and actual governance—the stuff of politics between elections—is particularly striking in contemporary Indonesia.

Attuned to these concerns, this essay outlines an underappreciated challenge that the United States faces in forging a comprehensive partnership with Indonesia that will realize U.S. foreign policy interests. The essay argues that despite the fact that Indonesian public opinion on the whole has not been particularly sympathetic to the United States throughout the past decade, the key to achieving U.S. goals is nevertheless to understand that the real target of the comprehensive partnership is not the Indonesian government but rather the Indonesian people. Viewed this way, U.S. and Indonesian interests are for the most part aligned. At the same time, because the comprehensive partnership is by necessity a government-to-government project, the partner in the relationship is not the Indonesian public but rather the Indonesian government. Here, despite some agreement on regional security and counterterrorism, it has proven challenging to prevail on the Indonesian government to undertake many domestic reforms that are in U.S. interests and that would likely have strong constituencies within Indonesia. It is the disconnect between Indonesian mass public opinion and Indonesian governance that generates these challenges. Thus, the United States faces two paradoxes: Indonesian public opinion is rather unsympathetic to the United States but is the key to forging a successful comprehensive partnership with Indonesia; and the Indonesian government—democratically elected by that same Indonesian populace in free and fair elections—is a substantial obstacle to the proposed comprehensive partnership.

The implications of this perspective are twofold. First, the successful realization of a comprehensive partnership between the two countries will depend at least as much on the successful completion of domestic political and economic reforms within Indonesia as on the status of bilateral relations. Second, as a consequence of the previous point, U.S. interests will be best served by helping to strengthen domestic political accountability within Indonesia as part and parcel of the comprehensive partnership agreement that is finalized between the two governments.

This essay develops this argument in several steps. The first section analyzes the customary way that U.S. policymakers have approached Indonesian public opinion, focusing on Indonesians’ views of the United States and U.S. foreign policy. After establishing that Indonesians’ views of the United States have recently been quite negative but that they are also quite volatile, the essay turns to the question of how Indonesians view their own government. Section two shows that Indonesians’ demands on their own government are wholly consistent with U.S. interests in the region, and, in doing so, demonstrates that one potential bugbear for U.S.-Indonesian relations—the new assertiveness of political Islam—is less consequential than often is believed. From there, the essay identifies the constraints that Indonesia’s political system places on popular accountability and representation as key challenges to the U.S.-Indonesian partnership and concludes by outlining a concrete strategy for the United States to overcome these obstacles.

indonesian Public opinion toward the united statesOne way to approach how mass public opinion in Indonesia will shape the future U.S.-Indonesia

comprehensive partnership is to examine Indonesians’ perceptions of the United States. Viewed through this prism, there is little cause for optimism. The past decade has not been kind to the image of the United States abroad, and Indonesia is no exception. Polls conducted in summer 2008

Very favorable Favorable Unfavorable Very unfavorable Don’t know0

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f i g u r e 1 indonesian public opinion of the united states, saudi arabia, and china

s o u r c e Lembaga Survei Indonesia, May–June 2008. See footnote 5 for more information about this survey.


show that only 23% of Indonesians held either a favorable or very favorable opinion of the U.S. government.5 The percentage holding a favorable or very favorable opinion of the American people was only slightly higher, at 36%. This is particularly striking when compared to Indonesians’ opinions of people from Saudi Arabia and China (see Figure 1).

It is perhaps not surprising that Indonesians have high opinions of Saudis. But it is noteworthy that public opinion in a country that has long considered the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to be a regional competitor, if not a direct security threat—and where the descendents of Chinese immigrants have faced substantial bias—nevertheless views Chinese people on the whole more favorably than Americans.

A snapshot from 2008 may not be representative of how events in both countries have shaped Indonesian public opinion toward the United States. Favorable views toward the United States declined precipitously after the onset of the war in Iraq (see Figure 2). Since 2008, however, attitudes have changed once again, with the United States’ standing rebounding dramatically after the election of President Barack Obama, who as a child lived in Jakarta for several years.

The current period, therefore, appears to be an auspicious one for a comprehensive partnership that Indonesians will support. But the same surveys that show higher favorability ratings for the United States among Indonesians in the wake of Obama’s election also show that Indonesians

5 This and the other figures in this essay, unless otherwise noted, are drawn from a nationally representative survey of Indonesians taken in May–June 2008 by the Lembaga Survei Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Institute). Further background on the survey, its methodology, and the raw data is available from the author upon request.

f i g u r e 2 indonesian public opinion of the united states, 2002–2010

s o u r c e Adapted from Pew Research Center, Key Indicators Database, http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1&country=101.

B

B

B

B

B B

B

B

B

J

J

J

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J J

J

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J

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

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J Unfavorable


have very high expectations for the Obama administration.6 Such expectations are bound to lead to disappointment, much as they have for many Americans, as Indonesians realize that Obama does not represent an immediate clean break from every unpopular policy inherited from his predecessor. Most Indonesians, after all, still strongly oppose many U.S. policies, including the continued U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Figure 3) and support for Israel. Popular reactions in Indonesia to Obama’s recent visit have confirmed this, with prominent Indonesian lawmakers and public intellectuals expressing support for Obama and his visit but carefully noting that U.S. policies in the Middle East remain at odds with most Indonesians’ priorities.7 It is clear that many Indonesians, a large majority of whom are Muslim, feel a particular sympathy for the Iraqis, Afghans, and Palestinians and perceive U.S. foreign policy as responsible for their plight.

Recent swings in Indonesian public opinion toward the United States—negative under President George W. Bush, improving dramatically with the election of President Obama, and now deteriorating once again—suggest that Indonesian public opinion is fickle, or at least too unstable to warrant much consideration from U.S. policymakers planning for long-term bilateral relations. As a principle, U.S. foreign policy should emphasize enduring interests that persist across

6 Richard Wike and Kathleen Holzwart Sprehe, “Indonesia: The Obama Effect,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, March 17, 2010, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1529/indonesian-views-america-image-president-obama-trip.

7 Norimitsu Onishi, “In Jakarta Speech, Some Hear Cairo Redux,” New York Times, November 10, 2010.

f i g u r e 3 indonesian public opinion and the wars in iraq and afghanistan


Strongly support

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Invasion of Iraq

Occupation of Iraq

Invasion of Afghanistan

Occupation of Afghanistan


administrations despite the particular responses that periodic crises engender.8 If Indonesian public opinion responds only to the latter, though, would this not render any effort to approach Indonesian public opinion from the perspective of enduring U.S. interests moot? Moreover, given the opposition of Indonesians to U.S. policy in the Middle East and Central Asia, it might seem that there are few options for U.S. policymakers even if they were to take Indonesian public opinion into consideration. What is the point of heeding public opinion if it is incompatible with the current key issues in U.S. foreign policy?

Those are the wrong conclusions to draw; rather, policymakers should understand that Indonesian public opinion is sensitive to U.S. foreign policy and, at the same time, that Obama’s popularity gives the current administration an unprecedented opportunity in Indonesia. Despite the continued reservations identified above that many Indonesians express regarding U.S. policy in the Middle East, most Indonesians nevertheless were delighted to welcome Obama to Indonesia.9 In the wake of his short visit, Indonesians remain optimistic about the new emphasis on bilateral ties between the two countries.

8 To clarify, long-term durable interests are what foreign policy should emphasize. Whether this actually happens is a different question. Condoleezza Rice has argued, for example, that the Clinton White House formed policies “crisis by crisis, day by day” rather than having a “disciplined and consistent foreign policy that separates the important from the trivial.” See Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 48–62. For a classic statement that state interests do exist and that they affect foreign policy, see Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

9 “Obama Speaking to Muslims, Shortens Indonesia Trip,” Reuters, November 9, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6A70ZJ20101109.


It is important to recognize that the central points of contention that Indonesians have with regard to U.S. foreign policy (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel) are certainly off the table—future U.S. policy changes in these countries will come in response to events on the ground, or to American public opinion, not to any other considerations. The mistake is to assume that these are the only policies that matter in Indonesians’ opinions of the United States. There are areas where Indonesian public opinion is not as hostile to current U.S. policies, and U.S. policymakers can focus on these areas of overlapping interest in order to forge a new cooperative partnership that Indonesians will support. The clearest example comes from the convergence in interests between U.S. and the Indonesian public opinion with respect to what the Indonesian government should do to make the country a stable, inclusive, and prosperous industrializing country. Recent surveys indicate that Indonesians want a clean, capable, and responsive political system that provides security, opportunity, and prosperity for all people. Thus, rather than focusing on areas of foreign policy incompatibility, U.S. policymakers should focus on the Indonesian government’s relationship with its own citizens.

indonesian Public opinion and domestic governance issuesPublic opinion regarding domestic political issues, much like public opinion toward other

countries, can be volatile and highly dependent on short-term issues and concerns rather than on deeply held principled beliefs about politics and policy.10 But even a snapshot of public opinion at one point in time can reveal the basic contours of mass preferences over government policies. This in turn can help to identify the areas in which Indonesian public opinion is compatible with U.S. foreign policy interests.

Are Indonesian mass preferences compatible with U.S. interests for the region? In the case of Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country by population, the role of Islam in Indonesian politics stands out from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy. Observers of Indonesian society have often remarked on the more conspicuous role that Islam has played in society and politics over the past 30 years.11 This is not to say that Islam was previously unimportant or marginal in the country, for various Muslim social and political groups have long been politically consequential in Indonesia.12 Instead, the claim is that Islamic practice and symbolism—observable through personal dress, identity, and conspicuously pious behavior—have become more publicly visible. The open question is whether this “reflowering”13 of Islam in Indonesia is politically consequential in ways that could affect U.S. foreign policy interests. Survey results indicate that many Indonesians fear that U.S. foreign policy is hostile to Islamic interests. Moreover, the fact that Indonesians have such positive

10 There is a long-running debate on whether to interpret public opinion on foreign policy attitudes as reflecting enduring beliefs and preferences or as more transient and malleable. For an important recent contribution in the context of American public opinion toward war, see Adam J. Berinsky, In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), especially 213–14.

11 Among the many political analyses of the Islamic reassertion and its consequences, see R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation,” Journal of Asian Studies 55, no. 3 (August 1996): 613–34; and Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

12 See, among others, Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945 (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958); Greg Fealy, “‘Rowing in a Typhoon’: Nahdlatul Ulama and the Decline of Parliamentary Democracy,” in Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, ed. David Bourchier and John Legge, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia 31 (Clayton, Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994); and Michael Francis Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

13 This term is borrowed from an analysis of similar trends in neighboring Malaysia in Judith Nagata, The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam: Modern Religious Radicals and Their Roots (Vancouver: University of Vancouver Press, 1984).


views of Saudi Arabia, a country that the vast majority of Indonesians will never visit and whose citizens most Indonesians will never meet, is prima facie evidence that Islam plays a fairly basic role in their views of identity and foreign policy.

If Indonesians see their own government primarily through the lens of their faith, then that would challenge the contention that U.S. interests and Indonesian public opinion toward the Indonesian government are at all compatible. Although both the second Bush administration and the Obama administration have made it clear that U.S. foreign policy is not hostile to Islam, the United States faces a difficult road to repairing relations with the Muslim world.14 The Obama administration’s outreach efforts have thus far had no discernable effect on relations with the Muslim world, although it is probably still too early to tell whether they will be successful or not. Moreover, the United States would be hard pressed to help the Indonesian government meet its citizens’ demands for a more Islamic state—and even if there were a scenario in which the United States could do so, it is hard to imagine how this would further U.S. interests. However, if Islam is just one among many factors in the formation of Indonesian public opinion toward the government and what it should do, then there may be other overlapping interests between the United States and the Indonesian public. The United States need not focus exclusively on repairing its relationship with the Muslim world, or on helping the Indonesian government meet the demands of a populace that cares primarily about religion, but instead could focus on areas where U.S. interests and Indonesian public opinion agree.

The best way to examine Indonesians’ attitudes toward their government is to examine what they think their government’s priorities should be. Such an approach encourages respondents to choose from among the many things that they might want their government to do in order to identify what issues they consider the most important and what issues they consider merely desirable. This approach does not deny that many in the country hold negative views about U.S. foreign policy but instead asks Indonesians the affirmative question of where the Indonesian government should direct its efforts. The same 2008 survey outlined above asked Indonesians to choose their three most important priorities from a list of eighteen different options spanning economic policy, social policy, security, environmental policy, and other areas.15 The results of the survey indicate that far and away the dominant concern is “popular welfare,” named as a top-three priority by 61% of respondents. Other top priorities include providing free primary education, lowering unemployment, stabilizing prices, and defending Indonesia’s territorial integrity (see Table 1).

Just as important are what Indonesians ranked as low priorities: implementing Islamic law and adopting active policies to protect popular morality. Fewer than 2% of respondents ranked either option as a top-three priority. To repeat, this in no way implies that Indonesians are unconcerned with religion: most Indonesians consider themselves to be pious Muslims and expect their political leaders to be pious as well. Most are also sympathetic to Islamic law, at least as an abstract concept, and desire that it play a larger role in contemporary Indonesian politics than it currently does (see Figure 4).

Islam thus clearly matters to Indonesians: it shapes individual and collective identities and influences people’s perception of what government should be like in Indonesia. Nevertheless,

14 Matt Spetalnick and Jeff Mason, “Obama Makes Call for Religious Tolerance,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6893FX20100910. 15 Further discussion is available in Thomas B. Pepinsky, R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani, “Testing Islam’s Political Advantage: Evidence from

Indonesia” (paper presented at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, September 3–6, 2009).

Policy Support (%)

increase popular welfare 61.7

Provide free primary education 38.8

decrease unemployment 37.1

stabilize the prices of basic goods 27.5

defend the integrity of the indonesian state 21.5

eliminate corruption 18.7

Provide free health care for the underprivileged 18.1

decrease inequality across classes 11.4

implement laws fairly 11.3

Manage natural resources properly 11.2

improve the welfare of farmers and fishermen 9.8

develop domestic infrastructure 6.3

improve government social service provision 6.3

combat crime 3.4

implement islamic law 2.3

Protect moral values 1.7

Protect the environment 0.9

Protect minority groups 0.6

t a b l e 1 Popular support for various government policy priorities


f i g u r e 4 Popular views of islam, law, and politics


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compared to other political issues, moral and religious politicking is a top priority for only a small fraction of Indonesians.

The takeaway from this discussion of Indonesian public opinion toward domestic politics is that whatever hostility toward the United States and U.S. foreign policy may exist among Indonesians, their domestic policy concerns are focused on familiar issues that are common to many newly industrializing countries: prosperity, security, and opportunity. As the next section argues, the upshot of these findings is that from the perspective of the United States, most Indonesians’ political priorities are wholly compatible with long-term U.S. interests.

convergent interests, divergent trendsA strong, democratic, and economically dynamic Indonesia is exactly what U.S. policymakers

should want to see. Such a country is likely to seek cooperative relations with its neighbors, to integrate well into the global economy, to play an assertive role in counterterrorism and anti-piracy efforts, and to protect the rights of its citizens—all priorities for U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The following sections consider these issues in turn.

Peaceful and Cooperative International RelationsU.S. interests in Southeast Asia prioritize regional stability as the basis for achieving all other

goals. This is a point of agreement among those who see U.S. policy as driven by a desire to create a region of liberal trading states, by those who see Southeast Asia as a sideshow vis-à-vis more pressing concerns about the rise of China,16 and even among those who see U.S. policy in the region as driven by a narrow focus on economic interests.17 Whatever the motivations, a singular precondition for stability at the regional level is the absence of international conflict. From there, regional stability depends on a host of factors, including the existence of multilateral institutions that foster cooperative relations across countries and regular forums for discussing bilateral issues.

Indonesia under the authoritarian Suharto regime was a close U.S. ally whose foreign policy during the Cold War was highly compatible with U.S. interests in regional stability under a U.S.-led alliance.18 After the end of the Cold War and with the arrival of democracy in Indonesia, this did not change: Indonesia remains interested in maintaining stable and peaceful interstate relations in Southeast Asia. Although the country’s foreign policy does not welcome collective security arrangements under the leadership of a power outside the region (such as the United States or China), it does favor security cooperation under existing regional forums.19 The United States may worry about being frozen out of some of these regional organizations, but the product of these organizations will likely be a form of security and stability that is nevertheless compatible with U.S. interests.

16 Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia,” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 81–126.

17 Mark Beeson, “U.S. Hegemony and Southeast Asia,” Critical Asian Studies 36, no. 3 (September 2004): 445–62. 18 On the origins of U.S.-Indonesian relations under Suharto, see Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and

U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). 19 Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia and Regional Security: The Quest for Cooperative Security” (presented at the Institute of Defence and Strategic

Studies, Singapore, 2002).

f i g u r e 5 indonesian public opinion toward trade and globalization

s o u r c e Adapted from World Public Opinion, “Muslims Positive About Globalization, Trade,” August 27, 2008, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/btglobalizationtradera/528.php.

Globalization’s effect on Indonesia

Trade’s effect on Indonesia’s economy

Trade’s effect on Indonesian consumers

Trade’s effect on job creation in Indonesia

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Indonesian public opinion only serves to reinforce the pro-stability outlook of the country’s foreign policy, for it opposes none of these developments and in fact welcomes most of them. Being more concerned with issues of prosperity and security at home, Indonesians do not directly prioritize stable and cooperative international relations. Still, Indonesians favor democracy, with three out of four respondents in our survey considering it the best form of government for the country. Likewise, most Indonesian respondents in a recent World Public Opinion survey express favorable views of trade and globalization (see Figure 5).

Most Indonesians, moreover, believe that the government should address negative aspects of globalization not by eliminating trade but “through an international, cooperative effort integrating labor and environmental standards into agreements on international trade.”20 Contemporary research in international relations has shown that the three pillars of international peace are democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions.21 Given that research shows that democracies that trade with one another and participate in regional and international institutions do not fight wars, deepening multilateral cooperation among democratizing countries such as Indonesia should enhance regional security.

20 “Muslims Positive about Globalization, Trade,” World Public Opinion, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/btglobalizationtradera/528.php.

21 Bruce M. Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).


Assertive Counterterrorism and Anti-Piracy PoliciesA second priority for U.S. policy in Southeast Asia concerns what Justin Hastings calls “what

goes on below the surface and at the periphery of Southeast Asian countries’ territories: activity by illicit nonstate groups such as terrorists, maritime pirates, smugglers, and insurgents.”22 These groups all share the common feature of operating outside the realm of formal state authority and are problematic for U.S. interests for similar reasons. Terrorist organizations—which in contemporary Indonesia include Islamist militant groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)—threaten regional stability and aim to overturn Indonesia’s pluralist democracy. Insurgent movements and paramilitary groups pose a less serious threat today, but in the past they threatened both the territorial integrity of the Indonesian state (in the case of the insurgent Free Aceh Movement) and the country’s sometimes-fragile social peace (in the case of the paramilitary group Laskar Jihad).23 Piracy, by contrast, threatens vital sea lanes in Southeast Asia, most notably the Malacca Strait between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula but also in the South China Sea. Beyond just disrupting trade, though, piracy also plausibly affects international security by providing the mechanisms through which terrorist networks can operate.24 Smuggling networks may do the same.

Democratic Indonesia’s record in counterterrorism operations is laudable, as Obama himself noted during his recent visit.25 Having always been among the most effective of the state’s security agencies, Indonesia’s counterterrorism forces ramped up efforts to detain terrorist suspects and disrupt terrorist networks in response to the deadly Bali bombings of 2002. The main agency responsible is the police force’s Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88), established after the Bali bombings, which is trained and equipped in part by the United States and is widely ranked among the more effective counterterrorism units in the world.26 Although sporadic terrorist incidents continue, JI and its offshoots have been unable to repeat the dramatic bombings of 2002. Several key ringleaders have been killed, while others have been arrested. Terrorism expert Sidney Jones notes that Indonesia’s national police force is still highly corrupt and that the most violent extremists have never enjoyed much support among Indonesians.27 But Indonesian law enforcement efforts have on the whole succeeded in containing terrorist activity by that small but highly motivated fringe of Indonesian extremists. Indonesians, furthermore, support the activities of Densus 88 and related state security organs.

Indonesia’s record in combating piracy and smuggling has been far less admirable. This is because piracy and smuggling do not pose a major threat to the national government’s ability to rule as well as because piracy and smuggling are far less visible concerns than high-profile incidents such as terrorist attacks against foreign tourists. These two factors make piracy and smuggling less pressing concerns for the Indonesian government than they might otherwise be. Yet, Indonesia’s poor anti-piracy and

22 Justin V. Hastings, “Threats from the Periphery: The Challenge of Terrorists, Smugglers, and Pirates in Southeast Asia’s Border Regions” (paper presented at the Asia Policy Assembly, Washington, D.C., June 18, 2010), 1.

23 For background on the Free Aceh Movement, see Anthony Reid, ed., Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). For a discussion of Laskar Jihad, see Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia,” Indonesia 73 (April 2002): 145–69.

24 This argument is made in Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Security, Adelphi Paper 388 (New York: Routledge, 2007).

25 “Obama Lauds Indonesia as a Model of Religious Tolerance,” CNN, November 9, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-09/world/indonesia.obama_1_united-states-and-muslims-indonesia-largest-muslim-population?_s=PM:WORLD.

26 Bill Guerin, “Another Success for Detachment 88,” Asia Times, June 16, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IF16Ae01.html. For a more critical overview, see Muradi, “The 88th Densus AT: The Role and the Problem of Coordination on Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia,” Journal of Politics and Law 2, no. 3 (September 2009): 85–96.

27 Sidney Jones, “What Is the State of Indonesia’s Fight Against Terror?” CNN, August 12, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-12/opinion/jones.indonesia.cleric.terror_1_indonesian-democracy-indonesian-government-jemaah-islamiyah?_s=PM:OPINION.


anti-smuggling record is also a consequence of the fact that smuggling and piracy belong to the very fabric of social life in some parts of Indonesia, constituting substantial parts of the informal economy in many border areas.28 Because the informal sector employs more than 60% of the labor force,29 millions of Indonesians are linked either directly or indirectly to such illicit activities. Any attempt to eliminate smuggling and piracy will thus generate a fierce backlash and likely prove unsuccessful unless done in ways that mitigate social and economic dislocations. This has proven beyond the capabilities of any Indonesian government, democratic or otherwise.

That said, though some Indonesians probably view pirates and smugglers as folk heroes of sorts,30 it is unlikely that many Indonesians actually favor piracy and smuggling as ways of life. Rather, they support piracy and smuggling because opportunities in the formal economy can be hard to find. Their interest in maintaining such a way of life thus originates in the uncertainties of Indonesia’s emerging economy. As noted above, Indonesians look to their politicians to deliver prosperity, security, and economic opportunities, and most Indonesians would probably not resort to the informal economies of piracy and smuggling if they had access to alternative means of making a living. In this regard, U.S. interests in policies that counter piracy and smuggling fit together nicely with what Indonesians desire from their government.

Protecting Citizens’ RightsCritics of the United States are quick to note that despite its stated commitment to protecting

human rights, U.S. foreign policy priorities have often been at odds with this commitment.31 Nevertheless, successive U.S. administrations have emphasized that the protection of human rights around the world is an “important national interest” that the United States actively supports through bilateral arrangements as well as through multilateral institutions.32 Rather than weigh in on which perspective is correct, this essay concedes that U.S. national interests are multifaceted and that foreign policy has at times abandoned its concern with human rights in the interest of what were perceived to be more pressing concerns. Nonetheless, it is still the case that since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the fall of the Suharto regime, the United States has defined its foreign policy interests in Indonesia as deeply linked to the country’s progress on civil, political, and human rights. These asserted national interests are consequential: the best-known example is the suspension of direct U.S. military aid to Indonesia due to the complicity of Indonesia’s special forces (Kopassus) in human rights violations in then-occupied East Timor (today independent Timor Leste).33

28 Hastings, “Threats from the Periphery”. 29 Abdul Khalik, “Informal Sector Helping Indonesia Cope in Global Downturn,” Jakarta Post, February 12, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.

com/news/2008/12/02/informal-sector-helping-indonesia-cope-global-downturn.html. 30 See, for example, the discussion of the Iban figure Chulo in Benedict Sandin, The Sea Dayaks of Borneo Before White Raja Rule (London:

MacMillan, 1967), as cited in Eric Tagliacozzo, “Navigating Communities: Race, Place, and Travel in the History of Maritime Southeast Asia,” Asian Ethnicity 10, no. 2 (June 2009): 97–120. Chulo, who organized “feared ‘piratical’/headhunting raids,” represented a mentality of popular resistance among dislocated indigenous peoples facing the pressures of modernization on the island of Borneo.

31 See, for example, Joe Stork, “Human Rights and U.S. Policy,” Foreign Policy in Focus, March 1, 1999, http://www.fpif.org/reports/human_rights_and_us_policy.

32 “Human Rights,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/. 33 Charles “Ken” Comer, “Leahy in Indonesia: Damned If You Do (and Even If You Don’t),” Asian Affairs: An American Review 37, no. 2

(April–June 2010): 53–70. On the abuses themselves, see Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur, Laporan Akhir: Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur [Final Report: Investigating Committee on Human Rights Violations in East Timor] (Jakarta: Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia, 2000). For background on the Indonesian military’s operations in Timor Leste, see Douglas Kammen, “Notes on the Transformation of the East Timor Military Command and Its Implications for Indonesia,” Indonesia 67 (April 1999): 61–76.


f i g u r e 6 indonesian public opinion toward democracy and pancasila

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In contemporary Indonesian politics, human rights remain a critical issue. There are several areas of concern. The first area comprises the most basic rights such as physical security and freedom from discrimination. The second encompasses civil and political rights, including the rights of citizens to mobilize, to voice dissent with their government, and to participate in free and fair elections. There are others areas of concern for individual rights as well. In some of these areas the United States has identified key signs of progress, but in other areas the protection of individual rights remains weak.34 While Indonesia has made its greatest strides in electoral reforms, the state has been the least effective in reforming the judiciary and protecting certain minority populations (in particular, Christians and “deviationist” Muslim groups).35 One hopes that Kopassus no longer has the latitude to commit the egregious violations of human rights that were tolerated under the New Order and directly after its collapse, but this is far from certain.

These issues notwithstanding, there are reasons for optimism: Indonesians widely support two things that bode well for the future of individual rights in Indonesia (see Figure 6). The first is democracy, which a large body of empirical political science research confirms is the best political system for protecting human rights.36 The second is a pluralist vision for Indonesian society known as pancasila, which emphasizes Indonesia’s multiethnic and multireligious character along

34 “2009 Human Rights Report: Indonesia,” U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eap/135992.htm. 35 On legal reform, see Tim Lindsey and Mas Achmad Santosa, “The Trajectory of Law Reform in Indonesia: A Short Overview of Legal

Systems and Change in Indonesia,” in Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd ed., ed. Tim Lindsey (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2008): 2–22. On religious pluralism, see Nicola Colbran, “Realities and Challenges in Realising Freedom of Religion or Belief in Indonesia,” International Journal of Human Rights 14, no. 5 (September 2010): 678–704.

36 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Feryal Marie Cherif, George W. Downs, and Alastair Smith, “Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (September 2005): 439–58.


with the importance of development and of consensus and consultation in politics.37 Obama noted Indonesia’s historic record of pluralism and tolerance among various faiths during his well-received speech at the University of Indonesia.38 These high levels of support for pancasila are heartening because this former state ideology prioritizes consensus-building, nationalism, and development while explicitly rejecting any ethnic or religious particularism. Moreover, these ideals are seen as consistent with Indonesian democracy.

For all these reasons, it should be comforting to U.S. policymakers that Indonesians see a strong, democratic, and economically dynamic Indonesia as the main goal toward which their government should strive. If politicized religion and the politics of morality were citizens’ main concerns, it is hard to imagine any way to reconcile Indonesian public opinion with U.S. foreign policy interests. Instead, the Indonesian mass public favors a government that focuses on prosperity, security, and opportunity, which means creating policies that will increase regional stability, combat terrorism and piracy, and protect the rights of all Indonesians. That said, convergent interests between the United States and the Indonesian public, though important, are not enough. Opportunities for partnership based on mutual self-interest run the risk of being hamstrung by Indonesia’s domestic political system. It is here—in the realm of formal democratic politics, and among those very policy leaders and officials with whom the United States must deal in concluding any comprehensive partnership—that the challenges lie.

the challenge of accountabilityIndonesian democratization did not take place under particularly auspicious circumstances for

advocates of real political reform.39 Indonesia faced the challenges of recovering from a massive economic crisis that had been fed by rampant corruption, reforming a political system that had never provided voice and representation for most Indonesians, excising the military from its previously active role in domestic politics while at the same time placing the military’s system of “self-financing” under civilian control, and providing for citizens’ social and economic well-being. All of this had to be accomplished in a period when the very viability of the Indonesian state was in question,40 and while ethnic and religious identities and economic inequality became increasingly politicized, generating substantial violence.41 It is perhaps understandable that faced with such challenges, a decade of democracy has not produced uniformly positive outcomes in terms of political reform, representation, or development.42 But it is nevertheless clear that politics in democratic Indonesia have failed to live up to the expectations of most citizens.

37 Panitia Lima, Uraian Pancasila [An Analysis of Pancasila] (Jakarta: Mutiara, 1977). It is of course the case that these principles could be appropriated by illiberal regimes, including both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes; see Michael Morfit, “Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government,” Asian Survey 21, no. 8 (August 1981): 838–51.

38 “Obama Launches Historic Speech at University of Indonesia,” Jakarta Globe, November 10, 2010, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/obama-launches-historic-speech-at-university-of-indonesia/405873.

39 Harold Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia after Soeharto (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2010). 40 Edward Aspinall and Mark T. Berger, “The Break-up of Indonesia? Nationalisms after Decolonisation and the Limits of the Nation-State in

Post–Cold War Southeast Asia,” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 6 (December 2001): 1003–24. 41 Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, “The Anatomy of Collective Violence in Indonesia During the Transition to Democracy, 1998–2000,”

United National Special Facility for Indonesian Recovery, Working Paper, no. 2/01, 2002. 42 Saiful Mujani, “Refleksi sewindu reformasi: Mengkonsolidasikan demokrasi Indonesia” [Reflections on Eight Years of Reform:

Consolidating Indonesian Democracy], Lembaga Survey Indonesia, http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/117/mengkonsulidasikan-demokrasi-indonesia-refleksi-satu-windu-reformasi; and Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, eds., Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).


For the purposes of this essay the central problem is political accountability. Indonesia’s democratic revolution was the result of economic collapse rather than a mass revolution led by a vanguard of democrats with tight links to social organizations. As Harold Crouch has noted, “the regime had not been brought down by a committed democratic elite that had mobilized mass support against the government.”43 Democracy returned to Indonesia without the organic structural links between politicians and constituents that bind elites to the social forces that produced democracy in countries such as South Korea.44 Today, as analysts of contemporary Indonesian politics such as Dodi Ambardi and Dan Slater have emphasized, Indonesian political parties seem to spend much more time colluding with one another to maintain power than competing with one another to represent the interests of Indonesians.45 This certainly reduces the accountability of various elites and parties in Indonesian politics to one another (so-called horizontal accountability). Furthermore, given the absence of robust links between politicians and constituents, this configuration of Indonesian political power also appears to be threatening the degree to which elites and political parties are accountable to citizens (vertical accountability).46 Citizens may vote leaders out of office at election time, but there are few other links that bind politicians to constituents in a way that produces the vertical accountability needed to incentivize politicians to perform.

These are the consequences of weak accountability in democratic Indonesia:

1. Politicians do not suffer sanction for failing to advocate for policies that citizens demand, nor for incompetence or malfeasance in office.

2. Electoral campaigns are dominated by appeals to broad ideological principles rather than specific policies—this is the case even though some parties do have very developed policy platforms.47 Candidates often come to rely almost exclusively on name recognition, personality, and patronage rather than on the quality of their representation.

3. Politicians who are elected are not those most capable of effectively representing citizens.4. All these consequences have the combined effect of undermining the public’s confidence in

Indonesian democracy, which may generate a self-fulfilling cycle of weak accountability and democratic underperformance.

Weak accountability, in sum, threatens to undermine popular support for Indonesian democracy, which is bad for U.S. interests in the region. However, it also undermines the quality of democracy in Indonesia. Accountability, for example, is the central link between democracy and the protection of human rights.48 Low accountability means specifically that Indonesians are unlikely to get what they demand from their government, which poses a problem for the United States because the things that Indonesians want are the same things that the U.S. government

43 Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia, 3. 44 See James Cotton, “From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea,” Political Studies 37, no. 2 (June 1989): 244–59. 45 Dan Slater, “Indonesia’s Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition,” Indonesia 78 (October

2004): 61–92; and Kuskridho Ambardi, “The Making of the Indonesian Multiparty System: A Cartelized Party System and Its Origin” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2008).

46 The distinction between vertical and horizontal accountability comes from Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (January 1994): 55–69.

47 The best example is the 643-page platform of the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera). See Prosperous Justice Party, Memperjuangkan masyarakat madani: Falsafah dasar perjuangan dan platform kebijakan pembangunan PK Sejahtera [Fighting for Civil Society: The Basic Philosophy of Struggle and Development Policy Platform of the Prosperous Justice Party] (Jakarta: Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2008).

48 Bueno de Mesquita, Cherif, Downs, and Smith, “Thinking Inside the Box.”


wants. Because the United States itself is unlikely to prevail on the Indonesia government to act in ways consistent with U.S. interests, the best hope is that domestic pressure can be exerted on the Indonesian government. But without strong accountability—in particular vertical accountability—this is unlikely.

toward a successful comprehensive PartnershipThe challenge facing the United States is therefore clear. The U.S.–Indonesian comprehensive

partnership can be an important tool for realizing U.S. national interests in Southeast Asia and the Muslim world. To do so, the partnership must appeal to the Indonesian mass public, whose preferences align in important ways with U.S. interests. That public is represented, however, by a democratically elected government that falls short in various measures of accountability and good governance. Nevertheless, that relatively unaccountable government is the very government with which the United States must conclude an agreement.49

To accomplish U.S. goals for the comprehensive partnership, then, U.S. policymakers must pay sustained attention to the demands of Indonesian citizens. U.S. policymakers must also understand that the Indonesian government often fails to meet these demands, and should use this fact to guide the policies that Washington advocates. U.S. policy must accordingly promote better integration into the global economy, domestic political accountability, and an active and healthy civil society.

Indonesians want their government to deliver widely shared prosperity. To achieve this, Indonesia needs healthy integration with markets abroad and better economic governance at home. By bolstering trade and investment ties with Indonesia, the United States can help with the former. Although the United States and Indonesia enjoy a long history of trade relations, the parties negotiating the proposed comprehensive partnership are keen to strengthen these trade relations in the context of an Indonesia that is increasingly reliant on trade but decreasingly reliant on trade with the United States (see Figure 7).

It is important to ensure, though, that bilateral trade and investment ties between Indonesia and the United States are truly cooperative, and that Indonesians perceive them as such. Economic nationalism remains an important current in Indonesian public opinion, and most Indonesians will react negatively to any agreement that smacks of neoliberalism or that is seen as leaving Indonesia at the mercy of foreign economic interests.50 To reiterate the points made above, the problem is not that Indonesians are against trade, or against globalization (see Figure 5), but rather that they see globalization as a process that must be properly managed. This is certainly within the grasp of U.S. and Indonesian negotiators.

Better economic governance, the second key requisite for helping the Indonesian government to deliver widely shared prosperity, is a more difficult challenge. Governance reform requires substantial changes throughout Indonesia’s political system, from improving property rights and legal enforcement to combating corruption to increasing bureaucratic effectiveness. None of these

49 In recent years, however, Indonesia has proven at times to be an unsteady partner. See Ann Marie Murphy, “Democratization and Indonesian Foreign Policy” (paper presented at the Asia Policy Assembly, June 18, 2010, Washington, D.C.).

50 The two losing candidates in Indonesia’s 2009 presidential election spent considerable effort trying to portray the Yudhoyono-Boediono team as “neolibs,” and Yudhoyono and Boediono in turn were eager to deny this charge. Thomas B. Pepinsky, “The United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership and the New Yudhoyono Administration,” Asia-Pacific Bulletin, no. 42, August 17, 2009, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/apb042.pdf.

f i g u r e 7 indonesia’s trade with the world and the united states

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s o u r c e “Indikator Ekonomi Indonesia” [Indonesian Economic Indicators], Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia, available at http://www.depdag.go.id/.


reforms will be easy, and there is little that the United States can do on its own to ensure their success. But the United States can continue to support Indonesia’s own embattled reformers in their quest to improve governance in their country. The United States already offers such support through several U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs that target democratic governance in Indonesia, but on the whole these efforts are limited and relatively unorganized. USAID in Indonesia is correct to understand that the new comprehensive partnership will provide opportunities for the United States to foster better economic governance.51

Such efforts will also have the added benefit of improving domestic political accountability while strengthening Indonesian civil society. Current discussions of the proposed comprehensive partnership have democracy and civil society as their top agenda items,52 and this is as it should be. However, the United States must work harder than it has to emphasize transparency in policymaking, the ability of Indonesians to hold their elected officials accountable for corruption or incompetence, and the reform of Indonesia’s judicial institutions. These are the next steps in reforming accountability in Indonesia: it is only true political accountability that will allow the

51 “Comprehensive Partnership,” U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/about/comprehensive_partnership/.

52 “U.S.-Indonesia Joint Commission and Bilateral Meeting.”


United States and the Indonesian public to realize their mutual interests. A focus on free and fair elections is necessary but by no means sufficient for achieving U.S. goals in Indonesia.

In the final estimate, the future of U.S.–Indonesian relations is positive. U.S. policymakers today enjoy a unique opportunity, one that can allow for a “non-zero sum approach” to future bilateral ties with Indonesia.53 It is in the United States’ interest for Indonesia to become a strong democracy with a dynamic and healthy economy, and Indonesians themselves want much the same. U.S. policymakers should be respectful of the country’s Muslim democracy at the same time that they push its leaders to focus on substantive policies that deliver prosperity and opportunity to Indonesians. As it turns out, Indonesians, too, want this from their government. U.S. policymakers, though, must understand that their Indonesian counterparts need to believe that they have domestic incentives to fulfill the promises in the U.S.–Indonesia comprehensive partnership. Rather than viewing Indonesian public opinion as something to be managed, then, policymakers must approach it as a key component of future U.S.–Indonesian relations.

53 Bruce Vaughn, “Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and American Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, RL32394, August 7, 2009, 31, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32394.pdf.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Overview

Strategic Asia: Continuing Success with Continuing Risksu Ashley J. Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace and NBR

Thematic Studies

The Geopolitics of Strategic Asia, 2000–2020u Aaron L. Friedberg, Princeton University

Asia and the World Economy in 2030: Growth, Integration, and Governanceu Peter A. Petri, Brandeis University and the

East-West Center

Military Modernization in the Asia-Pacific: Assessing New Capabilitiesu Richard A. Bitzinger, Nanyang

Technological University

The Rise of Energy and Resource Nationalism in Asiau Mikkal E. Herberg, University of

California–San Diego and NBR

The Implications of Expanded Nuclear Energy in Asiau Charles D. Ferguson, Federation of

American Scientists

Asia’s Security and the Contested Global Commonsu Abraham M. Denmark, Center for a New

American Security

Climate Change and Environmental Impactu Richard A. Matthew, University of

California–Irvine

Asia-Pacific Demographics in 2010–2040: Implications for Strategic Balanceu Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise

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Politico-Economic and Radical Islamic Challenges to Democracy in Asiau Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi,

Indiana University, Bloomington

Strategic Asia 2009–10: Economic Meltdown and Geopolitical StabilityStrategic Asia 2008–09: Challenges and ChoicesStrategic Asia 2007–08: Domestic Political Change and Grand StrategyStrategic Asia 2006–07: Trade, Interdependence, and SecurityStrategic Asia 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of UncertaintyStrategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of PowerStrategic Asia 2003–04: Fragility and CrisisStrategic Asia 2002–03: Asian AftershocksStrategic Asia 2001–02: Power and Purpose

Previous Volumes

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Matthew Hayes Vice President and CFO Museum of Flight

Shephard W. Hill President Boeing International The Boeing Company

Leo Hindery Jr. Managing Partner InterMedia Partners

Gary S. Kaplan Chief Executive Officer Virginia Mason Medical Center

Clark S. Kinlin President and Chief Executive Officer Corning Cable Systems Corning Incorporated

Pamela S. Passman Corporate Vice President Global Corporate Affairs Microsoft Corporation

Kenneth B. Pyle Founding President NBR Professor University of Washington

John M. Shalikashvili Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (Ret.)

Arnold F. Wellman Corporate Vice President Public Affairs UPS

Honorary DirectorsLawrence W. ClarksonHerbert J. EllisonThomas E. FisherJoachim Kempin

Seattle and Washington, D.C.

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phone 206-632-7370, fax 206-632-7487

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phone 202-347-9767, fax 202-347-9766

[email protected], www.nbr.org

Documents

politics, public opinion, and the u.s.-indonesian ...s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/ file1 the national bureau of asian research nbr special report #25 | november 2010 THOMAS B. PEPINSKy