Political Thought and Chinaâ€™s Transformation: Ideas Shaping Reform in Post-Mao China

Political Thought and China’s Transformation

Politics and Development of Contemporary China

As China’s power grows, the search has begun in earnest for what superpower statuswill mean for the People’s Republic of China as a nation as well as the impact of itsnew-found influence on the Asia-Pacific region and the global international order atlarge. By providing a venue for exciting and groundbreaking titles, the aim of thisseries is to explore the domestic and international implications of China’s rise andtransformation through a number of key areas, including politics, development, andforeign policy. The series will also give a strong voice to non-western perspectives onChina’s rise in order to provide a forum that connects and compares the views ofacademics from both the east and west reflecting the truly international nature of thediscipline.

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Bart Dessein (editor)INTERPRETING CHINA AS A REGIONAL AND GLOBAL POWERNationalism and Historical Consciousness in World Politics

He LiPOLITICAL THOUGHT AND CHINA’S TRANSFORMATIONIdeas Shaping Reform in Post-Mao China

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Political Thought andChina’s TransformationIdeas Shaping Reform in Post-Mao China

He LiProfessor of Political Science, Merrimack College, USA

© He Li 2015

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Contents

List of Tables x

A Note on Spelling xi

Acknowledgments xii

Introduction: Ideas and China’s Transformation 1Significance of the intellectual discourse 2Contending debates among the Chinese intellectuals 5Organization of the book 9

Part I Contemporary Chinese Political Thought

1 Liberalism 15Early spread and reemergence of liberalism 16The liberal discourse 19Implications of the spread of liberalism 22Factors undermining liberalism in China 25Conclusion 28

2 Neo-authoritarianism 31The rise of neo-authoritarianism 31Huntington’s influence on the rise of neo-authoritarianism

in China 32Debate in the 1980s 34The advent of neo-conservatism 37Official party ideology and neo-authoritarianism 39Policy response 40Neo-authoritarianism 2.0? 40Will neo-authoritarianism work for China? 43Conclusion 45

3 China’s New Left 46The advent of the New Left 47Influence of Western ideas 48Rediscovery of Mao’s legacy 49Rethinking the Cultural Revolution 51Bringing state socialism back in 53Criticizing universal values 55

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viii Contents

Promoting the “China Model” 56The rise and fall of the “Chongqing Model” 57Conclusion 59

4 Democratic Socialism 60Origins and early history 60Spread of social democracy in China 61Intellectual discourse on social democracy 64

Constitutional government 65Democratic socialism as the orthodox Marxism 66Reassessment of capitalism 67Farewell to revolution 68Swedish model of social democracy 69

Critiques from the Left and the Right 70Beyond Left and Right? 73Could democratic socialism make a difference? 76Conclusion 77

5 New Confucianism 79Revival of Confucianism 80Major approaches 81

Confucian Marxism 82Confucian liberalism 84Political Confucianism 86Integration of three traditions? 89

Future of New Confucianism 91Conclusion 93

Part II Intellectual Discourse on Critical Issues

6 Chinese Intellectual Discourse on Democracy 97Chinese discourse on democracy 98Democracy with Chinese characteristics 98

Inner-party democracy (dangnei minzhu) 101Promoting democracy through good governance 102Single-party democracy 103Rule by law (Fazhi) 103Deliberative democracy 104

Liberal discourse on democracy 106Liberal democracy is the best available form of government 106Rule of the law 108Limited government 108Fundamental political reform 109

New Left’s perspective on democracy 109Skeptical view of liberal democracy 110

Contents ix

Government is a necessary virtue 111Marxism not human rights is a universal value 112

Conclusion 113

7 Debating China’s Economic Reform 115Origins of the debate 116The debate on economic reform 117

Market vs. State 117Globalism vs. Nationalism 119Growth vs. Equity 122Efficiency vs. Fairness 123Debate on property law 124

Impacts and policy implications 126Conclusion 131

8 Debate over Legitimacy 133Legitimacy crisis: Myth or reality 134Sources of legitimacy 136Debates on possible solutions to legitimacy crisis 140

Liberal discourse 140The New Left perspective 141Discourse of political Confucianism 143

Impacts of the scholarly discourse on legitimacy 146Conclusion 148

9 Conclusion: Fragmentation and Consensus 150Intellectual discourse and state ideological control 151Fragmentation and consensus among Chinese scholars 155Impacts of intellectual discourse 156Concluding remarks 157

Notes 160

Selected Bibliography 192

Index of Chinese Names and Phrases 201

Subject and Name Index 205

Tables

I.1 Gongshi net survey on schools of thought 62.1 Transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy 323.1 Left or Right? 474.1 Third way: Democratic socialism 766.1 Chinese discourse on democracy 997.1 Debates on economic reforms 1258.1 Trilateral parliament proposed by Jiang Qing 144

x

A Note on Spelling

Throughout this volume, Chinese names are always ordered according tothe standard practice in China, where surname precedes given names. I usepinyin for Chinese names and places except for Sun Yat-sen and ChiangKai-shek, who are better known by these names than their names in pinyin.

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Acknowledgments

Writing this book about the intellectual discourse in China has been a moredifficult task than I envisaged. The book was written over a stretch of eightyears. Like my other books, this one has spent a long time in coming tofruition. This project started in 2008, when I spent four months at the EastAsian Institute (EAI) of the National University of Singapore, where I enjoyedthe hospitality of Yang Dali, Zheng Yongnian, Wang Gungwu, and JohnWong and learned from my colleagues including Bo Zhiyue, Lye Liang Fook,Guo Liangping, Zhao Litao, You Ji, Sarah Y Tong, Kong Qingjiang, HuangJing, Wang Feiling, Huang Yanzhong, Sheng Yuming, Xing Yuqing, YangMu, Lam Pin Er, Chen Gang, Cheng Yinghong, Xia Ming, Wu Guoguang,Qi Dongtao, Qian Jiwei, Tseng Hui-yi, Chiang Min-hua, Yu Hong, Shan Wei,Su Fubin, and Yang Guobin. My stint at the EAI in 2011 was productive andenjoyable as well. Much of my conceptualizing took place during my stay atthe EAI in both 2008 and 2011.

I thank the Henry Luce Foundation for offering me a generous grantand residency at the School for Advanced Research (SAR) in Santa Fe, NewMexico. SAR provided me with excellent facilities and intellectual atmo-sphere for the research and writing. I was able to discuss various issuesregarding this research project with scholars from different parts of theworld, including David Stuard, Jason De Leon, Kent Blansett, Laurie KainHart, Amy Joy Lonetree, Islah Mohammad Jad, Philippe Bourgois, GeorgeKarandinos, Abigail Winslow Bigham, and Jon Daehnke. I also owe spe-cial thanks to Merrimack College, my home institution, for supporting myscholarly work on this book with Faculty Development grants and travelsupport.

I express my thanks to Victoria Zhuang at Harvard University for her gen-erosity in careful reading of the earlier version of the entire manuscript. I amforever grateful to my late parents, Li Deren and Huang Juehe, who taughtme both to value learning and to appreciate those things that cannot befound in the books and to William Glade and Tom Jannuzi for teaching mehow to read and think as an area specialist. I owe Naifang, my wife, andBowen, my son, a huge debt of gratitude for their loving encouragement,understanding, and support during the long and arduous journey of thisbook to whom it is dedicated.

This book draws on some previous work that has been substantiallyrevised and updated. An earlier version of Chapter 2 appeared as “Liber-alism and China’s Reform,” in Zhiqun Zhu, ed., The People’s Republic ofChina Today: Internal and External Challenges (Singapore: World ScientificPublishing, 2010), 125–52. An earlier version of Chapter 4 appeared as “The

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Acknowledgments xiii

Chinese Discourse on Social Democracy,” in Baogang Guo and He Li, eds.,The Chinese Labyrinth: Exploring China’s Model of Development (Lanham, MD.:Lexington Books, 2012), 47–66. An earlier version of Chapter 6 appeared as“Chinese Intellectual Discourse on Democracy,” Journal of Chinese PoliticalScience (September 2014): 289–314. An earlier version of Chapter 7 appearedas “Debating China’s Economic Reform: Liberals vs. New Leftists,” Journalof Chinese Political Science, 15, no.1 (March 2010): 1–23. I am very gratefulto the editors of these journals and publishers for their permission to usecopyright materials.

I am deeply grateful to Baogang Guo, Guoli Liu, Fujia Lu, Yijing Wen,Heping Zhao, Joy Zhao, Xiaogang Deng, Curtis Martin, Gavril Bilev, AlisonRussell, Harry Wessel, and Russell Mayer for their valuable comments as wellas for their unstinting support and friendship. I am also grateful to an anony-mous reviewer who wrote a detailed review with many useful suggestionsthat have now been incorporated into the book. Finally, special thanks tothe staff at Palgrave Macmillan for working with me to produce this book.

Introduction: Ideas and China’sTransformation

Since the late 1970s, China has undergone a dramatic process of economicand social transformation, during which the country has experienced and isstill experiencing an outpouring of competing schools of thought (sichao).These schools of thought have affected the pace, scope, content, and natureof China’s reform. This book examines the role of the ideas in such a dra-matic transformation and the dynamic process of discursive interactionsamong Chinese intellectuals over the past three decades of reforms.

It is impossible to comprehend dramatic changes in China without under-standing the full spectrum of Chinese political thoughts that have emergedsince the late 1970s. Because the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is anauthoritarian regime, many China watchers focus on the dynamics ofthe elite politics and policy-making by formal entities based in Beijing.1

Currently, most of the writings on Chinese politics emphasize its fac-tional nature.2 Yet, the issues of ideology and intellectual debates overpolicy have become extremely important in post-Mao’s China.3 It is thegap in our knowledge of intellectual discourse that this book is intendedto fill by tracing the origins and development of political ideas whichinfluenced national policies and socioeconomic changes. I pay special atten-tion to the relations between political thought and transformation andthe interactions among different ideas. By showing how Western theories,as well as the Confucian traditions, are being adapted for contempo-rary Chinese intellectual use, the book highlights how Chinese scholarshave affirmed an independent and critical role for themselves in thepost-Mao era.

The interaction between the political and intellectual elites has becomeincreasingly significant in the post-Mao era. From the very outset of thereform, Chinese political elites with divergent views have taken the issues ofintellectual discourse very seriously. As Merle Goldman argues, their view ofthe world is important because it influences the thinking of the governmentdecision-makers. Chinese intellectuals are not just academics, but many arepolitical activists as well.4 Deng Xiaoping realized that the party could not

1

2 Political Thought and China’s Transformation

modernize China by means of political campaigns and that it had to rely onintellectuals to achieve that goal.

Transformation in China in the past 30-plus years is not just unprece-dented economic growth, but also includes the widespread implantation ofnew values and ideas. The market reform began from the premise that tradi-tional Soviet and Maoist socialism had failed, and China needed to see a newpath. While the government has been busy building the gleaming airportsand high-speed trains, which change the face of China, intellectuals havebeen quietly changing the cultural soil.

Significance of the intellectual discourse

The term “ideology” in Chinese overlaps in usage with thought (sixiang). Ide-ology usually refers to the application of systems of ideas to practical issues,particularly with the aim of promoting or discrediting particular practicesor states of affairs.5 Throughout history, ideology and intellectual discoursewere considered essential to political life. Reformers used new ideas to chal-lenge the existing regimes or institutions. Meanwhile, ideology is also usedby the ruling elites to create consensus among the population for the main-tenance of the existing system. As stated by Confucius, “ming buzheng, zeyanbushun, yanbushun, ze shibucheng” [The name has to be right. Otherwise,the discourse won’t be right. If the discourse is not right, the work of the statecannot be carried out successfully]. Thought is often believed to pave theroad to solutions. The role played by ideology is crucial in modern China.In the words of Brantly Womack,

[o]ne essential aspect of China’s modernization process, which is likely toremain important for the foreseeable future, is the role of ideological pol-itics. Ideology almost necessarily plays a larger role in the modernizationprocess of late starters because the presence of targets, models and threatsfrom advanced countries invites prescriptive, transformative politics.6

Gloria Davies describes contemporary Chinese intellectual discourse as actsof worrying about China.7 In fact, the intellectuals have played such crit-ical roles as knowledge producers, opinion setters, agents of globalization,interpreters of ideas, and a driving force for domestic change, despite asser-tions by critics about their marginalization during the market transition andtheir capitulation to or co-optation by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).Several studies indicate that intellectual discourse matters and that it hasaffected the Chinese economic reform and political change, which meritsthe focus of scholars’ attention.8 While it is easy to dismiss people who workso closely with the party-state as propagandists, China’s new social and eco-nomic freedoms mean that we need to take Chinese intellectuals and theirnew ideas more seriously.

Introduction: Ideas and China’s Transformation 3

It is hard to find a single and all-inclusive definition of intellectualdiscourse. In this book, intellectual discourse is defined as the use of lan-guage to communicate ideas, values, and facts, which reveals the dynamicinteractions among the political ideology, social interest structure, eco-nomic performance, and political regime. By analyzing this dynamic processagainst the backdrop of the country’s changing conditions, we can evaluatethe potential of liberalism in Chinese politics and suggest various scenar-ios for the political future of China, including the prospects for democratictransition.

In Chinese history, scholars have always had a long tradition of help-ing the ruler run the government. According to the Confucian tradition,the literati or scholar-official (shi) has the duty to be concerned with publicaffairs; to paraphrase the text by Northern Song dynasty’s prominent states-man and literary figure Fan Zhongyan (989–1052), the intellectual is “thefirst person to worry about the worries of the world and the last one to takepleasure in its pleasures (xian tianxiazhi you eryou, hou tianxiazhi le erle.).”If a scholar could not become the teacher of the king, the next best thingwas for him to become zaixiang [prime minister in feudal China], a posi-tion which also permitted him to advise and help the ruler. In the wordsof Confucius, “xue er you ze shi” [Officialdom is the natural outlet for goodscholars]. Throughout history, the Chinese academia and intellectuals haveplayed a crucial role in determining the direction of the Chinese state. Theconcept of “to be a scholar is to be the top of society” has long been popularamong the Chinese people. In post-Mao China, scholars still cherish such animportant role. Wu Guanjun, a professor at East China Normal University,claims that they (scholars) see themselves as leaders of social change who areengaged in producing a social blueprint for China’s transformation.9

During the post-Opium War era, there was a vigorous debate among theliterati on the course of China’s possible path to regeneration and revival.In the last years prior to its downfall on the mainland, the Guomindangwas plagued by corruption, notably manifest in favoritism, nepotism, andinefficiency. Ambitious and serious intellectuals were disillusioned; seeinglittle chance to devote themselves to meaningful careers, a great numberof them “went Communist.” This intellectual shift to communism was thedeciding factor which brought about the downfall of the Nationalist gov-ernment on the mainland.10 In 1932, Hu Shih prophetically predicted thatit would be the end of the Guomindang if it should lose the support of theintellectuals.11 By the same token, David Kelly states that the failure of theNationalist regime in the years 1927–1949 rested largely on an ideologicaldeficit.12

After the Communists took power in 1949, Marxism-Leninism-Maoismbecame the only acceptable orthodoxy in China. No competing ideologywas allowed to develop. From 1949 to the late 1970s, intellectuals werethoroughly marginalized in both politics and society. Mao suspected that


Chinese intellectuals were tongluren (fellow travelers), not fully committedto the revolution. Since the reform and opening, the intellectuals proudlyreturned to the core of society. Humanist intellectuals in particular wereconsidered by society to be cultural heroes.13 But the good times did notlast long. Changes in value standard and civic ideology after 1992 forcedintellectuals back to the margins of society, and this time, the marginaliza-tion was primarily economic, rather than political.14 Freedom of thoughthas been a major goal of Chinese intellectuals. In the post-Cultural Revo-lution era, there was a debate between the conservatives and reformists onthe future course of China. The post-Mao era also witnessed major debatesin China on its future path under the impacts of globalization and marketforces. In today’s China, Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought might have lostsalience as an ideology but ideology per se has not.

Although dissident scholars continued to be persecuted, China’s intellec-tuals were no longer denigrated as a class, harassed, suppressed, imprisoned,and persecuted to death as they had been during the Mao era. Like the19th-century self-strengtheners, Deng and his successors have regardedintellectuals as essential to achieve their goal of economic moderniza-tion and make China once again “rich and powerful.” Those intellectualsinvolved in the sciences, technology, and economics, in particular, enjoyedelite status as advisers to the government, similar to that position whichintellectuals had until the 1949 revolution.

While there has been tight censorship and all debates must remain withinthe established ideological framework, ideas on democracy are rapidlyexchanged among netizens, as the Internet offers a major venue for China’spolitical, ideological, and intellectual debates. There are about 800 millionmobile phones sending out short messages and 460 million notebook com-puters exchanging ideas every day.15 Until the 1980s, Chinese intellectualsoperated almost exclusively inside China. Today, there is a growing numberof Chinese intellectuals educated in the West, some of whom are living andteaching outside of China, and a minority, but growing number, of themhave returned to China.

Moreover, a wide range of thoughts and arguments have emerged to createa strong current of discourse that has influenced government policy andpublic opinion. Rarely in China’s history of ideas has one witnessed suchbroad and in-depth discussions on a variety of social and economic issues.Tu Wei-ming is right to indicate that “even if we choose to believe that powerstruggle in China is more a political game than ideological debate, it is worthnoting that the widely accepted way to exercise power in this political gameis through ideological debate.”16 Ideas do have an influence on the action ofpolitics, and under certain circumstances, ideas could be a primary cause ofpolitical behavior. That is what has been demonstrated by the great debatein 1978 on “the criterion of truth” and the debate in the late 1990s on entryinto the World Trade Organization (WTO).


With the deepening of the market-oriented reform, the Chinese intellec-tuals and Chinese society are increasingly diversified. The viewpoints of themost influential intellectuals are very different and contradictory, and moreand more Chinese intellectuals have engaged in heated debates about whosetheory is the most relevant for the current reality and the future of China.

In contemporary China, scholars still cherish the concept of playing therole of teacher to the king or of prime minister, but in a different form.17

Their interest in politics is derived from the lofty tradition that scholarsassume the responsibility of the whole world, although their actual role ischiefly limited to advice and consultation. In China, there is a saying: “youcan write your way into the government.” Some of these scholars have thisintention; they want to write their way into the government. Although themodern zhishifenzi (intellectuals) differed from the traditional literati (shi) inseveral respects, what the two had in common is that they both underscoredthe importance of public concerns.

In contrast to the dominance of one ideology during the Mao years, by theend of the 20th century, China’s intellectuals had opened up a public spaceand filled it with a variety of new ideas and vigorous debates. If the politicalchange in the former Soviet bloc countries is a path that China could follow,the political discourse has and will continue to produce significant politicalconsequences and make the change of China’s political system inevitable.This state of affairs points to the need for more systematic efforts to assessthe intellectual discourse on China’s reforms.

China’s rapid economic growth and social changes in the past threedecades have resulted in a flood of scholarly studies attempting to chart thedirection and the nature of that transformation in the country. Scrutinizingintellectual discourse is critical because China’s top leaders are increasinglypaying attention to the intellectuals and their divergent views in settingpolicy. These discourses have also served as a window into the opaque worldof China’s elite politics. Obviously, ideas and intellectual discourse mat-ter, and they have made and will continue to make significant impacts oneconomic and political changes. It is worth noting that official discourse(discussion within the party-state) on political reform is different from theintellectual one, as the former clearly pursues an instrumental agenda inorder to ensure the consolidation of the Communist rule over a rapidlychanging Chinese society. The focus of this book is on the intellectualdiscourse.

Contending debates among the Chinese intellectuals

For a long time, Chinese scholars upheld Marxism-Leninism as the sole ideo-logical guide for their academic research. The economic reform and openingto the outside world brought a new era in Chinese political thought: severalschools of political thought took center stage on the Chinese intellectual


scene. Although the violent crackdown at the Tiananmen Square has taughtChinese one relentless lesson, namely, that the course of history could notbe changed by ideas alone, Chinese intellectuals are still engaging in a con-stant search for alternative socioeconomic models that could lead China toa better future. In this book, zhishifenzi (the intellectuals) are defined as“those who contribute directly to the creation, transmission and criticismof cultural products and ideas,”18 particularly social scientists who engagewith sociopolitical issues in the intellectual sphere or symbolic realm ofknowledge, values, meaning, or discourses.19

There has been an increasing consensus among the Chinese scholars thatMarxism fails to give any guidance for solving the problems that China isfacing. In the words of Daniel Bell, there is “hardly anybody really believesthat Marxism should provide guidelines for thinking about China’s politi-cal future.”20 According to the formulation of the CCP, the current systemis the “primary stage of socialism,” meaning that it is a transitional phaseto a higher and superior form of socialism. The economic foundation, alongwith the legal and political superstructure, will change in the future. Offi-cially, Marxism is the state ideology, yet the Party no longer emphasizes classstruggle or the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the contrary, the Partyembraces private ownership and encourages capitalists to join the Party.Thus, despite an authoritarian political system, post-Mao China possessesstriking diverse intellectual currents. As Table I.1 shows on the question“What is the mainstream school of social thought in today’s China?”,22 percent of respondents chose socialism with Chinese characteristics, afternationalism/statism (38 per cent). The percentages for democratic socialism,liberalism, New Confucianism are 14, 13, and 4, respectively.

Ever since the death of Mao, the rigidity of the Communist ideologyhas softened and in fact has made room for a (still-limited) plurality ofintellectual orientations. Soon after the Cultural Revolution, the major-ity of Chinese intellectuals embraced liberal ideology and supported Deng

Table I.1 Gongshi net survey on schools of thought

Question: What is the dominant school of thought in today’s China?

Number of votes Percent

Socialism with Chinese characteristics 204 22Maoism 75 8Nationalism/statism 356 38Democratic socialism 126 14Liberalism 123 13New Confucianism 41 4Total 925 100

Source: The survey was conducted from 24 August 2010 to 23 September 2010, http://new.21ccom.net/plus/vote.php?dopost=view&aid=34, date accessed 1 August 2012.


Xiaoping’s reforms, though in much of the first reform decade (1978–1989),a conservative faction (baoshoupai) resisted “emancipation of the mind”(sixiang jiefang). A key feature of the post-Mao era is the development ofintellectual discourse that flourished once more after the strict ideologicalcontrol after the death of Mao. Intellectuals once again regarded themselvesas playing a crucial role in Chinese society. By the mid-1980s, conservatismhad totally lost its influence among Chinese intellectuals. Reform seemedto be “the only game in town.” Liberalism, in the form of pro-reform ideas,dominated public opinion, even among most officials within the govern-ment. In the early reform era (1978–1989), almost all intellectuals stoodfirmly behind the policy of economic reform and open to the outside world.Many scholars despised the one-party system and aspired to import Westernexperience not only in economics but also in politics. They showed disap-proval of China’s traditional autocracy. Fascination with Max Weber’s theoryhas led the thinkers of the “New Enlightenment” to an idea that since cap-italist development is conditioned by Protestant ethics, it is necessary forChina to Westernize not just economically but also culturally.21

In the 1980s, intellectual debate in China largely revolved around “con-servative” and “reformist” poles. China’s intellectuals were largely “estab-lishment intellectuals” who either had close ties with officialdom, if theywere not officials themselves, or worked on policy issues that were importantto policy-makers. Chinese intellectuals can be divided into establishmentand non-establishment intellectuals, or within system or outside systemintellectuals. Given the nature of the communist state, this boundary ispartly blurred. Virtually all intellectuals are involved in the system to somedegree.22

In the initial period of the reform, most Chinese intellectuals thoughtthat Chinese society could realize modernization only with transforma-tion and modernization of culture. They also thought that the only wayto modernize Chinese culture was through the importation of foreignculture.23 As the River Elegy (he shang, a popular television series in 1988)purported to show, despite all the talk of revolution, China remainedtrapped in its age of old oriental despotism, and that China’s only salva-tion was a thorough cultural renovation, indeed, Westernization.24 Manyintellectuals believe that the country would have to move toward Westerneconomic and political models and embrace market economy, multipartyelections, the separation of the party from the state, and the division ofpowers. Nevertheless, they have experienced several major splits since then.The first split occurred in the late 1980s largely between liberal reformersand advocates of neo-authoritarianism. In many ways, the current neo-conservative view goes back to the debate on neo-authoritarianism in the1980s and can be seen as a continuation of the ideas developed in thatdebate.25

Immediately after the Tiananmen protest in 1989, the social climate wasrepressive and uncertain. No one had a clear view of what the future might


hold.26 Once Chinese intellectuals’ consensus on reform was in disarray,most of the Chinese scholars became disillusioned with the official versionof Marxist ideology propagated by the authority and puzzled by reality ofthe political world after the crackdown of the Tiananmen Student Move-ment. To push for further market reform, Deng argues, “Don’t argue; trybold experiments and blaze new trails. That is the way it was with ruralreform, and that is the way it should be with urban reform.”27 This waslater to become known as the “don’t argue” policy, which gives priority toeconomic reform and avoids talking about political ideologies.

During the first few years after 4 June 1989, the mainstream Chineseelites began to reject the liberal ideas that called for an immediate, com-plete, and fundamental democratic reform. They were committed to liberalprinciples in the economic sense, but clearly not in other matters. In otherwords, they saw market-Leninism as the way to China’s future.28 Thoughmost advocates of political neo-conservatism did not state explicitly to rejectdemocratization, they wanted to postpone it until conditions in Chinachanged.

Chinese intellectuals of the 1980s had a relatively limited understandingof Western and Chinese cultures, and although each has his/her own opin-ion, their knowledge structures and ideological trends were nearly identical.However, in the 1990s, a great division occurred in the intellectual commu-nity. The second split among the Chinese intellectuals occurred at the turn ofthe century, after New Leftism came into being in the mid-1990s. As a reac-tion to the government’s radical liberalization ushered in by Deng Xiaoping,the New Leftists present the strongest rhetorical challenge to economic lib-eralism. They believe that China’s transition to market economy has a hugeside effect that needs to be corrected. On the other hand, the Chinese liber-als employ the rhetoric of individual rights, parliamentary democracy, andthe free market capitalism in opposition to the state, yet find themselvesin open support of the CCP’s drive to “liberalize” and push forward marketreforms. By contrast, the Chinese “New Left” is left defending many aspectsof the pre-1978 Maoist system and the last vestiges of state control over theeconomy while opposing market-driven policies.

As China became increasingly modernized, it came up against what waswidely known as a “crisis of faith,” which was not merely a loss of faithin communism but a loss of faith in Chinese culture and tradition as well.Along with the rise of China and the financial crisis in the West, an increas-ing number of Chinese intellectuals have tried to revive and reinvigorate thedeeper cultural and intellectual resources available in Chinese history. Oneof the main resources is the tradition of Confucianism, which of late hasexperienced a remarkable resurgence. Unlike liberalism, New Confucianismrefuses to invoke Western ideas and conceptual schemes to interpret theChinese experience. Confucianism tends to emphasize government byvirtuous kings and ministers to maintain social order and world peace.


Another major intellectual trend that has exercised great influence onChina’s transformation is democratic socialism, which calls for the correctunderstanding of Marxism. Major efforts have been made to distinguish rad-ical Marxism from later writings of Marx and Engels. The social democratsstrongly believe that Marx and Engels in their later years were democraticsocialists and initiators of peaceful transition to socialism.

Despite the tight control of media and political participation, Beijingtacitly allows intellectual discourse to develop relatively freely, believingthat it could promote social harmony amid rapid social changes. As ZhangMusheng, a rural economist and prominent intellectual, has written, “theage of ‘avoiding debate’ has passed. We have drilled our way through ‘chaos,’and now a new age of ‘debate’ is upon us.”29 It is true that Chinese academiais censored by the CCP, and freedom of speech barely exists. Nevertheless,official censorship does not necessarily imply a complete homogeneity ofviews.

Organization of the book

It is well known that great changes are not caused by ideas alone, but they arenot affected without ideas.30 Political thought is not created in a vacuum: itis part of a nation’s political life. Chinese intellectual discourse is not purelyan academic discourse. The topics of debates among Chinese scholars areintertwined with ongoing economic and political changes. As Tu Wei-mingargues, Confucian intellectuals are indeed political activists, and the primarygoal of the endeavors is to shape the existing political order from the insideout.31 I have therefore tried to emphasize the relation between ideas andcircumstances – the social environment in which the thinkers arise and theintellectual cross-currents that serve as formative forces in the progress ofthought.

This book does not constitute an exhaustive discussion on Chinese intel-lectuals, which has already been discussed extensively.32 Instead, it examinesthe discourse among the Chinese intellectuals to see how they perceive andshape China’s economic reform and political change.

This book examines five major schools of political thought that areredefining China’s transformation: liberalism, neo-authoritarianism, NewLeftism, democratic socialism, and New Confucianism. It is the argumentof the book that the adaptation of certain parts of these aforementionedseemingly incompatible ideas has been an essential feature of China’stransformation.

The book is organized into two parts. Part I presents major schools ofthought in contemporary Chinese intellectual circles.33 Part II, which con-sists of three chapters, scrutinizes some of the most contentiously debatedtopics, including democracy, economic reform, and legitimacy of the regime,in greater detail.


Chapter 1 examines the circumstances under which liberalism reemergedin China and then addresses the complicated nature of revived liberalismin China and studies of several related issues: how do the Chinese liberalscholars push for market-oriented reform and political reforms? What rolehas the liberal discourse on market reform played in the process of reformand opening to the global economy? What are the future prospects for liber-alism in China? Under what conditions, if any, might the Beijing leadershipadopt a liberal type of regime?

Chapter 2 goes on to look at the rise of neo-authoritarianism in contempo-rary China. Neo-authoritarianism is a major trend in the spectrum of polit-ical thought that emerged in China in the late 1980s. Neo-authoritarianismholds that modernization is a gradual process, and that, during this process,the existing order and authoritarian government are necessary to maintainsocial stability and ensure a successful social transformation. It has beencriticized by the liberal and New Left intellectuals as trying to defend author-itarianism and obstruct democratization. The chapter ends with an analysisof the impacts of neo-authoritarianism on China’s political changes andexplains whether neo-conservatism is a viable option for the foreseeablefuture.

Chapter 3 begins with the examination of the major arguments of China’sNew Left and then moves to the discussion of the following questions: whatfactors have contributed to the ascent of the New Left? What are the impactsof neo-Marxism, postmodernism, and the world system theory on China’sNew Left? In what ways did Maoism and Western political thought influencethe New Left? Will the New Left develop into a social movement challengingthe Beijing leadership?

In Chapter 4, democratic socialism is analyzed. Since the worldwide finan-cial crisis, there has been a global debate on the future of democratic politics.Its focus is whether social democracy could emerge in new forms and pros-per on a practical as well as an ideological level. China, too, has recently seena resurgence of interest in European social democracy. The chapter addressesthe following questions: how and under what circumstances did democraticsocialism emerge in China? What are the major arguments of the demo-cratic socialist theorists? Does Northern Europe offer better social, political,and economic model? To what extent have the social democrats’ argumentsbeen taken into consideration by the central government? Will the pol-icy programs of the current regime, which embody the major concerns ofdemocratic socialism, lead China to a different political direction?

Chapter 5 aims to explain the renaissance of Confucianism. In the lastcouple of years, Confucian scholarship has been in a process of restoration.Unlike New Leftism and liberalism, New Confucianism refuses to invokeWestern ideas and conceptual schemes to interpret the Chinese experience.Political Confucianism, advocated by Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang, urged


the party-state to Confucianize the CCP and peacefully transforming theCCP through Confucianism. From the perspective of the CCP, however, theargument for political Confucianism was deemed a potential threat to thelegitimacy of the party. The chapter examines the core elements, dynamics,and impacts of New Confucianism.

Chapter 6 focuses on the debate on democracy. Whereas the shots inTiananmen Square temporarily silenced radical calls for democracy in Chinain the late 1980s, democracy has been a long-debated issue in post-MaoChina. Intellectual debates on democracy have made important impacts onChina’s transformation and the Chinese pursuit of democracy. There hasbeen an intense divergence in understanding and interpretation of democ-racy among the Chinese scholars. In spite of different points of view amongscholars in China, there is a growing consensus among them that politicalreform is the right answer to China’s current problems, and democracy is agood thing for China. The chapter analyzes the Chinese discourse on democ-racy and reviews the content, characteristics, and implications of the debateson democracy.

Chapter 7 covers the fierce debates between the New Leftists and liberalson market-oriented reform. The scholars from both the New Left and liberalcamps have opposing views on almost every critical economic issue, such asthe direction of the economic reform, role of the state, globalization, andsocial justice. The chapter assesses the Chinese intellectual debates aboutwhether and under what conditions market reform will lead to politicalliberalization and subsequently democracy.

Chapter 8 investigates the Chinese discourse on legitimacy, which hasgained increasing importance in Chinese intellectual circles. This is a topicof major concern, both among Chinese intellectuals and the state. In recentyears, the CCP has invested a vast amount of resources in the revamping ofits extensive propaganda apparatus and the modernization of official partyideology. Still, there is hardly anybody who really believes that Marxismshould provide guidelines for thinking about China’s political future. More-over, an increasing number of scholars have started to doubt that economicgrowth alone could bolster the CCP’s rule in China in a sustainable man-ner. There has been intense debate among Chinese scholars on legitimacyof the regime, some of them openly challenging the legitimacy of the cur-rent regime. The chapter examines which school of thought might become anew source of ideological legitimacy and what might constitute the principalsources of political legitimacy in the years to come.

Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the findings and draws general conclu-sions. In the last three decades, the CCP has flirted with many ideas rangingfrom neo-authoritarianism to neo-conservatism, from Maoism to national-ism, and from the revival of Confucianism to “national studies.” The chapterassesses to what extent the ideas and theoretical perspectives discussed in


this book have undermined the official ideology and weakened the base ofthe legitimacy of the Communist Party. It also examines whether the pol-icy programs of the Chinese leadership in post-Mao China, which embodysome of the central concerns of the Chinese intellectuals, left or right, couldultimately lead China into a different political direction.

Part I

Contemporary Chinese PoliticalThought

1Liberalism

Liberalism has had a long history in China. Western culture and ideas ofliberty, equality, and fraternity began influencing China about 200 years agoand continue to have a major impact. Although poorly understood and inad-equately diffused before the market-oriented reform of the late 1970s, in thepast three decades liberalism has become an important school of thoughtamong Chinese intellectual circles, and a liberal camp was established inChina in the late 1990s.1

‘Liberalism’ (ziyouzhuyi) is notoriously difficult to define. The term hasbeen used to describe a sprawling profusion of ideas, practices, movements,and practices in different societies and historical periods.2 In the view ofZhu Xueqin, a professor of political thought and a leading Chinese liberal,liberalism can be defined as follows:

It is first of all a theory, then a realist claim. Its philosophical conceptionis empiricism as opposed to apriorism; its historical conception, contraryto any kind of historical determinism, originates from the evolutionisttheory likely to eliminate errors; its reformist vision is dependent on amoderate progressivism that prefers gradual expansion and evolution tothe artificial construction of radicalism. At the economic level, it calls forthe market economy over the planned economy; at the political level,it calls for representative and constitutional democracy and the rule oflaw, while opposing the dictatorship of a single person or of a minorityjust as much as the dictatorship of the masses exercised in the name of thegeneral will; at the ethical level, it calls for the guarantee of the irreduciblevalue of the individual, which cannot be sacrificed, in contrast to otherreducible values, as an instrument for whatever abstract goals it may be.3

A large number of Chinese intellectuals are, or intend to be, liberals andsocialists at the same time, without fully understanding the tensions orcontradictions between these different ideologies. Such intellectuals maysubscribe to liberal and democratic values, but in the end cannot resist the

15

16 Contemporary Chinese Political Thought

seduction of state socialism and nationalism. Therefore, Chinese liberals areusually labeled as the right-wingers. In this book, “liberals” (ziyoupai) referto those who are committed to fundamental liberal values.

The major objectives of the Chinese liberal intellectuals are summarizedin Charter 08 (08 Xianzhang), which was signed by more than 9,000 Chinesecitizens from all walks of life before the government completely shut downthe Charter 08 Web site in mid-January 2009. Political reform appears mosturgent to the Chinese liberals. They hold that without political reform,equity and social justice are impossible. Charter 08 calls on the Chinesepeople to “embrace universal human values, join the mainstream of civi-lized nations, and build a democratic system” as an alternative to one-partydictatorship; it provides a succinct exposition of six basic liberal values andconcepts: freedom, human rights, equality, republicanism, democracy, andconstitutional rule. In addition, it sets forth liberal positions on 19 majorissues for political reform: a new constitution, separation of powers, legisla-tive democracy, an independent judiciary, public control of public servantsand separation of the military from political parties, guarantees of humanrights, election of public officials, rural–urban equality, freedom of associa-tion, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, civiceducation, protection of private property, financial and tax reform, socialsecurity, protection of the environment, a federated republic, and truth andreconciliation.4

This chapter addresses the following research questions: When and howhas liberalism spread China? Who are the key representatives of the liberalsin the post-Mao era? What are the major arguments of the Chinese liberalintellectuals? To what extent do the policies of the current Chinese leader-ship reflect the major concerns of the liberals? What are the prospects forliberalism in China?

Early spread and reemergence of liberalism

Many Western liberal ideas were introduced into China at the turn of the19th century. The late Qing liberals, such as Yan Fu (1824–1921) and LiangQichao (1873–1929), were primarily progressive reformers. They looked toWestern liberalism for a source of wealth and power, which would revitalizethe declining state.5 The spread of liberalism thus contributed to the estab-lishment of the Republic of China in 1911. Chinese liberalism culminatedin the first phase of the New Culture Movement from 1915 to 1919. How-ever, the Russian Revolution in 1917 became an attractive alternative to theChinese intellectuals. With the Communist victory in 1949, classic liberal-ism in China lost its political base and Maoism triumphed. Liberalism, in thesense of tolerance of dissent, protection of civil rights, and the encourage-ment of individualism, was considered an obstacle in the post-1949 China.6

In Mao’s China, no independent ideology was allowed to exist. Liberalism

Liberalism 17

ceased to function after the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957–1958 due toharsh persecution. Mao not only destroyed individualism but also crushedintellectuals as a dominant class in Chinese society.

In spite of the long and dark shadows of totalitarianism, Chinese liberal-ism reemerged in the late 1970s. In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, thenegative attitude toward the Cultural Revolution was shared by the greatmajority of the Chinese, especially Chinese literati. A large number of theintellectuals were severely persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. Theywere determined to find out what caused such a disaster in Chinese historyand how to prevent its reoccurrence. The majority of Chinese intellectualsembraced liberal ideology and supported Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. Diffusionof liberalism was extensive by the late 1980s.7 When Deng Xiaoping enun-ciated his four cardinal principles, the liberals began to diverge from him.Deng maintained that Mao had focused too much on politics and that Chinainstead needed to concentrate on economic development. In contrast, theliberals argue that the fundamental problem is the political system, namely,the totalitarian regime.

After 1989, the liberal camp suffered a major setback. The proponentsof liberal democracy and liberal wings within the system were suppressed.Some were arrested and imprisoned, others were sent into exile; almost allwere silenced. Because of the control by the authorities, the liberal blocvirtually disappeared. The government accused students and the scholarswho took part in the Tiananmen movement as “liberal” and their ideology“bourgeois liberalism.” For a time, liberalism was a taboo in the intellectualdiscourse. After Deng Xiaoping’s nanxun (southern tour) in 1992, liberalismgradually reappeared on the scene of China.8 The regime has prevented theliberal scholars from forming an organization for their political endeavor,but they have managed to congregate regularly at informal occasions and atconferences organized by liberal colleagues. At present, the liberals consistof six vaguely distinctive but to some extent overlapping categories: liberalintellectuals, liberals within the CCP, Christian liberals, democracy activists,human rights lawyers, and grassroots rights activists. These six groups haveadvocated liberalism in their own perspectives through publications andspeeches, taken part in a variety of social and political activities for thecause of democracy, expressed mutual support for each other when perse-cuted by the party-state, and occasionally united to issue joint petitions oropen letters on the Internet to express their shared concerns or demands fordemocratic change.9

There are two types of liberalism in post-Mao China, namely, economicliberalism and political liberalism. The former advocates the speedy andthorough development of the market economy. The latter stresses the neces-sity of an urgent and deep political reform. These liberal scholars, albeit withdifferences, were influenced by Western classical liberalism, especially thatof Friedrich A. Hayek. As liberalism rapidly developed in the early 1990s


in parallel with the country’s accelerating globalization, liberalism shiftedfrom the calls for freedom and democracy of the 1980s to an alternativedemocracy associated with the market economy.

Some moderate liberals, more aligned with European social democracyand the welfare state, call on government to pay more attention to inequalityand environmental protection. For his part, Qin Hui, one of the promi-nent liberals, positions himself on the common ground shared by liberalismand social democracy.10 The community of liberals can also be divided intotwo major groups: within the system (tizhinei) and external to the sys-tem (tizhiwai). The former are typically professors, economists, journalists,lawyers, think tank policy analysts, government officials, and members ofmanagement. The former group believes that the existing party-state can betransformed from within, and that the development of civil society dependsto some extent on the tacit consent of the party in power. Liberal-leaningintellectuals believe that the individual and society together formed one fac-tion distinct from the state, and thus the individual could resist traditionalcentralized state authority through the establishment of a middle-class civicsociety.

The latter group normally doesn’t affiliate with any danwei in the publicsector.11 It is due to the fact that the community of liberal intellectuals wasbadly damaged by the Tiananmen massacre and its aftermath. They eithergave up the hope of transforming “the untransformable” and decided tosearch for better and more feasible alternatives or took up residence over-seas. Without a domestic presence, the influence of the exiled intellectualsis limited, and they have become increasingly irrelevant to politics back inChina. So far in mainland China, there is no powerful and visible dissidentinfluence that can really shake the CCP rule. The focus of this chapter ison those liberals inside the system (tizhinei). In fact, the majority of liberalscholars inside of mainland China belong to this camp.

In spite of the common goal of liberal democracy, liberals within the sys-tem have adopted an approach and strategies fundamentally different fromthose of the liberals in exile. Whereas the Chinese democracy movement inexile sees the political opposition (namely, themselves) as the driving forcefor China’s transition to democracy, the liberals within the system cherishthe hope that democratic elements within the CCP will initiate the processof democratization, building on the existing institutions which are con-ducive to democracy. To this end, leading liberal intellectuals have madeheartfelt proposals to the Party leadership for a smooth political transitionfrom within. Feng Chongyi states correctly that the majority of intellectualsin China today are at least semi-liberals in the sense that they share beliefsin market economy, individual rights, and, to a lesser extent, liberal democ-racy. Yet, only a tiny minority of them hold these liberal ideals profoundlyenough to express them in a systematic way or are brave enough to put theirbeliefs into practice by actively confronting the party-state.12

Liberalism 19

Unlike “establishment intellectuals” who were mainly state servants underMao,13 today’s liberal scholars are “critical intellectuals.” In Western par-lance, they could be called public intellectuals, intellectuals who speak outpublicly on political issues. In the absence of any political pluralism intoday’s China, “the public intellectuals” are called upon to play the roleof an opposition.14 Some leading liberal intellectuals are known as “publicintellectuals” as they frequently bring important and sometimes controver-sial topics to the forefront of public discussion and assert themselves inthe defense of the political or economic rights of a population that eitherhas been misguided or are not well informed.15 It should be noted that asextreme comments tend to attract more attention, some of China’s intellec-tuals are now paying lip service to the trend of abuse in order to increasetheir visibility. As a result, the word “public intellectual” itself has become apejorative.

Liberals, constituted mostly by middle-aged veterans of wenhua re (culturalfever) who spent their youths introducing Western ideas and discourses,still command considerable prestige in Chinese society. Some of themare signers of Charter 08, the manifesto to promote political reform anddemocratization in China. Apart from personal networking, they exercisetheir influence mainly through their publications. Theories of and debatesover liberalism are usually published in the Internet as well as in theliberal journals and newspapers, such as Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Week-end), Nanfang Dushibao (Southern Metropolitan Daily), and Ershiyi Shiji(Twenty-First Century).

The liberal discourse

Over the past 30-odd years, the Chinese liberals have made remarkableadvances in their intellectual endeavors. The basic concern of the liberalsis the political regime. But they differ greatly among themselves in terms ofhow they regard the regime. In the words of Liu Junning, a liberal politicalscientist,

it has become the consensus among most contemporary Chinese liberalsthat it is important to distinguish themselves as classical liberals – in thetradition of Locke, Smith, and Hayek – since that distinction affects thedestiny of liberalism in China and even the future of China itself.16

The current liberal discourse in China highlights four issues: individualliberty, economic liberalism, constitutional democracy, and embrace of theWestern model and globalization. To begin with, the Chinese liberals holdthat fundamental purpose of democracy is the protection of individual free-dom. As a consequence, the protection of the right to own private property isa basic condition both for guaranteeing individual liberty and for furnishing


a legal framework that is indispensable for the development of the marketeconomy.17 Chinese liberalism was born in protest against the totalitarianrule. It seeks to establish both a limitation to authority and a division ofauthority. According to Xu Youyu, a prominent philosopher and proponentof Chinese liberalism,

the core of liberalism is affirmation of individual value and esteem,respect and protection of personal rights and interests. Profound under-standing of liberalism would necessarily break with the traditional con-ception that suppresses individuality and takes the nation and collec-tive as the only value. But it also requires a clear distinction betweenindividualism and egoism or selfishness.18

Second, the liberals uphold economic liberalism. The Chinese liberalsconsider that although the market economy does not necessarily lead todemocracy, it remains no less a necessary condition for that; in the historyof the modern world, there is no example of a stable democracy that doesnot have a market economy.19 Liberal economists believe that the govern-ment’s interventions in economic and social affairs are the root causes ofcorruption and inefficiency and thus have to be reduced to minimum. Theyhave supported core values of economic liberalism, including the protectionof personal property rights, free competition, fair trade, and faith in the mar-ket mechanism. The works of liberal economists such as Keith Joseph, EnochPowell, and Milton Friedman has a large number of Chinese followers. LiuJunning has developed Hayek’s idea by stating that “private property rightsare the most basic human rights in the world.”20 Liu Junning sees privateproperty rights as necessary for economic reform and ultimately for polit-ical reform, which he believes entailed “restructuring of political system.”Liu explained that “as long as we acknowledge a market economy, then wemust acknowledge that the goal of the government is to protect each per-son’s private property.”21 Like Liu Junning, Qin Hui calls for a change inownership as a way “to make breakthroughs to political reform.” He urgedthat “state-owned firms should be sold, otherwise they will be stolen.”22

Liberals hold that privatization is a necessary, though not sufficient, con-dition for the country to make the transition from a central commandsystem to an efficient market economy. Chinese liberals strongly advocatedthat the state must shrink in order to facilitate a growing market econ-omy. Such voices in favor of an unfettered and omnipotent market becamemore and more influential not only in the academia but also in the govern-ment and media. The liberals also advocate economic competition to disruptmonopolies and protect private property.

Third, they uphold the concept of constitutional democracy. Constitut-ionalism appeared in China considerably early on, as the banner of thepolitical reform launched by the late Qing dynasty. However, like otherpolitical ideas, it was banned during the Mao era, but reappeared when the

Liberalism 21

reform-oriented leaders revised the constitution. In the past few years, itbecame a key term used in the liberal discourse because it not only embod-ied the liberal political idea but was also accepted by the authorities. Thus,constitutionalism was a concept that was acceptable to all major politi-cal forces. For the authorities, constitutionalism meant rule by law, but forliberals, it referred to a political system with checks and balances.

Liu Junning has publicly maintained his beliefs that China’s economicfreedoms must go further and be complemented by greater political andsocial liberties, as well as the rule of law. The march toward modernizationis narrowing the gap between China and the West not only economicallybut also mentally and spiritually. Li Shenzhi (1923–2003), a leading expo-nent and advocate of liberalism in China, notes emphatically that “neitherdemocracy nor science existed in Chinese traditional culture.” Li points outthat

the year 1999 is the eightieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement.To recall the past in the light of the present, we feel ashamed that we havenot lived up to the expectations of the pioneer of the May Fourth Move-ment because we have made little progress in achieving either democracyor science.23

For intellectuals in reform era, liberalism embodies the legacies of the MayFourth enlightenment movement.

The liberals deem reforms, political reform in particular, as China’s top pri-ority and their own mission. They gave serious thoughts to democratizingthe political system so that the Cultural Revolution would not recur. Liberalintellectuals share with Western democracy theorists the belief that popularelection provides regime legitimacy. They became evermore convinced thatpolitical reform was truly indispensable to any successful economic reform.As a result, the question of constitutional democracy occupied more andmore of their attention. It was against this background that the call forconstitutional democracy, with all of its standard features such as generalelections, multiparty competition, safeguards of human rights, and checksand balances of power between legislative, executive, and judiciary branches,went out. To them, multiparty democracy is not only the only way out forChina but also the only way to save and regenerate the CCP.

Finally, the liberals maintain that Western democracy is the model to befollowed in China. They advocate a radical and complete change of China.Many liberals associate democracy with modernity and seek to join the mod-ern world. During much of the 1980s, many Chinese admired the UnitedStates, looking at American power and democratic values with wonder andenvy. They interpreted the problems of China’s development accordingto liberal values, blaming the lack of democracy, human rights, and free-dom. Liberal thinkers call upon the Chinese people to rejuvenate China byadopting Western models of modernization, including its political system.


In the 1980s, when China dithered at the historical crossroads, Hayekoffered a refreshing perspective for those who were seeking an alternative tothe country’s sclerotic Marxism-Leninism. Liberal scholars are really inspiredby American democracy, human rights, and other things. They have alwaysupheld the United States on their banner of idealism. For them, class anal-ysis had no validity for China. In the words of Li Shenzhi, “modernizationmeans Americanization.”24 No doubt, Li’s extensive experiences in interna-tional affairs fully convinced him that the United States was the appropriatemodel for China to emulate.25 Based on the assumption that scientific andtechnological revolution originated in the West, Li Zehou comes unexpect-edly to the same conclusion espoused by advocates of total Westernization:“Modernization means nothing other than Westernization.”26 Most liber-als maintain that Westernization does not mean passive Westernization orslavish imitation, but creative absorption and assimilation of things that areWestern.

China’s liberal thinkers favor a “complete and thorough globalization andpromote the concept of ‘universal values’ (quanqiu jiazhi).” According to theliberals, in today’s world, globalization is gaining momentum. Under theprevailing circumstances, China cannot, and should not, embark on its ownroad to modernization. They believe that liberalism, now rejuvenating inthe country, will bring freedom to China and lead a free China into a worldof globalization. While New Left scholars emphasize the detrimental effectsof globalization, liberals argue that poverty and corruption are all China’sinternal problems and that they have little to do with globalization. Chineseliberals warn against the potential dangers of nationalism in causing socialdisorder, in arousing xenophobia and chauvinism, in suppressing individualfreedom and personal rights, and in sabotaging projects of democratizationand modernization.27

Implications of the spread of liberalism

The growth of liberalism has several important implications. China’s market-oriented reform is greatly influenced by liberalism. Chinese scholars havebeen exploring the general characteristics of Western theories and ideas.More and more classic liberal texts are being translated into Chinese, includ-ing the works of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Thomas Jefferson, Alexis deTocqueville, Herbert Spencer, Frederic Bastiat, Ludwig von Mises, Karl Pop-per, F.A. Hayek, Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, Robert Nozick, DouglassC. North, Michael Novak, Isaiah Berlin, and Ayn Rand. Most of Hayek’simportant works have been translated into Chinese, including The Road toSerfdom; Individualism and Economic Order; The Constitution of Liberty; TheFatal Conceit; and Law, Legislation, and Liberty. These works reflected majorimportant intellectual trends in the West and offered Chinese people newalternatives.28

Liberalism 23

These translations provided Chinese readers with unprecedented access toinfluential Euro-American scholarship, liberal ideas such as individual free-dom, human rights, constitutionalism, the rule of law, separation of power,and checks and balances have gradually been accepted. Those who advocatefor democracy represent a broad ideological spectrum, from older generationof Marxist humanist, who still put their calls for political reform in Marxistlanguage, to younger intellectuals returned from the West, who maintainthat China is still far away from liberal democracy.

These translations also created impact on the Chinese elites’ understand-ing of the social, political, and economic theories of liberalism. Since Hayekis recognized in China as one of the few who foresaw the failures of com-munism, he is highly respected by liberal scholars, even the then premierZhu Rongji had Hayek on his bookshelf.29 The Theory of Moral Sentiments wastranslated into Chinese for the first time in 2009.30 Wen Jiabao, then China’spremier, said he often carried the work, which preceded Smith’s more famouswork The Wealth of Nations, in his suitcase when he went abroad. In aninterview with the Financial Times, Wen states that

the society that we desire is one of equity and justice, is one in whichpeople can achieve all round development in a free and equal environ-ment. That is also why I like Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentimentsvery much.31

The fact that economic reform has been carried on in the direction oflaissez-faire market economics illustrates the elite’s acceptance of its basictenets. In the 1980s, liberal ideas were so powerful that even top Party lead-ers including Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, and Zhu Muzhi becameinclined to liberalism to a certain extent.32

Chinese liberal economists are reform advocators who support efficientmarket hypothesis, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and trade lib-eralization. The reform policy is based on liberal theory, for example,marketization and privatization. Deng Xiaoping’s “let some get rich first,so others can get rich later” sounds like Ronald Reagan’s neoliberal “trickle-down economics.” Economic liberalism has become an important force inChina since 1978 when a significant portion in the political elite had at leastsome knowledge of the basic principles of the liberal political economy.

Liberalism that stresses primacy of market allocations and privatiza-tion of state enterprises came into vogue in China’s academia after DengXiaoping’s “southern tour” in 1992. Market rules and efficiency prevailedover state intervention, social preoccupation, and redistribution. Nowadays,economics as a discipline is dominated by neoclassical economics with onlya trace of left-wing Marxist economics. Foreign trade models based on com-parative advantage may have been the most durable aspect of liberalismat the ideological level. It was the liberals who proposed adding to the


Chinese Constitution the clause invoking private property rights, an amend-ment finally adopted in March 2004 during the tenth plenary session of theNational People’s Congress.

Just as Hayek predicted that economic freedom would go hand in handwith liberty, the return of private economic activity in China since the late1970s has led to relative freedom of movement, press, religion, and pursuit ofhappiness despite the strict state control. People’s demand for civil libertiesand media freedom is undeniably on the rise.

Liberalism has made a significant impact upon the party-state’s politicalideology. Chinese leaders are learning that liberalism is a by-product of themarket economy.33 In 2002, the “Three Represents,” a sociopolitical ideologycredited to former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin, became a guiding ide-ology of the CCP at its 16th Party Congress. The ideology is important as itattempted to transform the CCP from a vanguard revolutionary party led bythe proletariat to a governing party representing the majority of the people.The liberals claimed it as a victory because it legitimized the inclusion ofmembers of the business class, that is capitalists, into the Party.

With the diffusion of liberalism, the Chinese leaders have become inter-ested in and willing to accept international norms. China signed the“International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in 1997and the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” in 1998.Some liberal economists served as advisers to top Chinese leaders, includingPremier Zhu Rongji, who supported a faster pace of reform and steered thecountry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Some reformsadvocated by liberals, such as abolition of life tenure of leading posts andestablishment of civil service system, were implemented.

A significant political development in the liberal direction was the pas-sage of a controversial law guaranteeing private property rights in 2007.It enshrines the rights of private individuals to own property in the PRC,an important step in the country’s slow metamorphosis from Leninistmonolith into a uniquely Chinese amalgam of socialist ideology andneoliberal capitalism.34 There were many indications that neoclassical eco-nomics has become a dominant strand of thought among aspiring Chinese“intellectuals.”

Grappling with increasing challenges, the Chinese leadership has come tosee the advantages of liberalization. The CCP leaders such as Hu Jintao andWen Jiabao accepted liberal values such as human rights and the rule of lawas “universal values,” but Chinese liberals had used these terms long beforethe CCP made them part of its vocabulary. The liberals have demonstrateda strong “opinion power” in advocating freedom and democracy as wellas human rights. The very concept of “the state respecting and protectinghuman rights” has now been written into China’s revised constitution. Thenew political philosophy adopted by Hu and Wen is best embodied in theslogan “putting the people first” (yiren weiben), compared to previous party

Liberalism 25

lines that treated people as means for other ends, as expressed in the slogan“class struggle as the key link” (yijieji douzheng weigang) or “development asthe priority” (fazhan caishi yingdaoli). Subsequently, the idea of “putting thepeople first” was further extended into and supplemented by the “scientificdevelopment concept” and the theory of “building harmonious society,”which lists “democracy and the rule of law” as the top criteria. At a pressconference on 16 March 2007, Wen Jiabao declared, “I said democracy, therule of law, freedom, human rights, equality, and fraternity are not some-thing peculiar to capitalism. They are the joint achievements of civilizationof the entire world during its long historical process and the common valuespursued by mankind.”35 Such open discourse on liberalism is disarming theLeninist party-state intellectually, ideologically, and morally and may in theend subdue it without a physical fight, as preached in Daoist strategies.

It should be noted that in the past 15 years, the Chinese discourse ondemocracy has changed profoundly, and today much of it focuses on institu-tional and procedural matters.36 The liberals practiced what they preached.For instance, Li Fan, director of the World and China Research Institute,is very active in promoting grassroots election at the township level. Hehelped, for example, organize an unauthorized election for township headthat took place in Buyun Township in Sichuan in 2000. In short, liberalismhas played a crucial role for the Chinese transition from planned economyto market economy. Certainly, it is true that so far it has had at least a limitedimpact on China’s transformation to constitutional democracy.

Factors undermining liberalism in China

Though the history of Chinese liberalism could be traced to the late 19thcentury, the question of how to adapt Western liberalism to a culturallyunique China remains. In a more globalized world, the pattern of Chinesepolitics has been influenced by ideas and ideologies from outside world.Western liberal ideas have taken a strong hold among Chinese intellectu-als. The awareness of individual rights has been growing among the younggenerations. Yet the impacts of such changes have not been overwhelming,except for several radical movements that ended tragically. New ideas haveto be planted in and adapt to the enduring traditional culture that remainsin the sub-conscience of the society.

The liberal intellectuals dominated China’s intellectual arena in the firstdecade of the nation’s reform. However, the decline of Marxism does notentail liberalism prevails in succession. Feng Chongyi points out, com-pared to the role played by communist liberals within the system of theparty-state in the political transformations in the former Soviet Union andEastern Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the feat of liberal dissi-dents within the CCP has been much less impressive.37 From the late 1990sonward, a large number of disillusioned and frustrated people turned to the


New Left. Indeed, some of the autarkic, populist, and illiberal features ofMao’s China have resurfaced. Some Chinese intellectuals began believingthat the American model of development is deeply flawed. Support for lais-sez faire waned as disparities continued and the unemployment worsened.Some people have lost faith in the market-oriented reform and demand moregovernment regulation of the market. According to Zheng Yongnian, liber-alism advocates rationality, peace, compromise, and social justice. Yet, it hasbecome less and less relevant when these ideas are badly needed in China.38

Liberalism continues to be only what might be called an oppositional ideol-ogy, and basic liberal views are held only by academics in urban centers.In the words of Zhou Lian, associate professor of philosophy at RenminUniversity,

liberalism in China faces two challenges. First, theoretically, liberalismbecomes virtually synonymous with the philosophical demeanor itselfand has less ability to interpret Chinese experience. Second, practically,liberalism is losing its chance to acquire political power as prejudiced andfighting creed (or set of creeds); on the contrary, it has been defined as ananti-state framework.39

There are several factors that have undermined the spread of liberalism inrecent years. To start with, the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s weak-ened Chinese trust in market economy and damaged their confidence in theinvisible hand of the market. The global financial crisis of 2008 has furtherundermined their belief in the Western model of development. To manyChinese, 25 years after the “End of History,” liberalism seems under threat.Debate between the New Left and liberals cooled in the late 1990s, butheated up since the global recession of 2008. In the wake of global finan-cial meltdown, many intellectuals’ admiration for free market mechanismbegan to evaporate. The liberals continue to refuse to parrot the Party line.However, in the minds of a majority of peasants and unemployed workers,the liberal demands for free market seem to make less and less sense. Lead-ing liberal thinker Zhu Xueqin, a professor of history at Shanghai University,suggests that liberals, while advocating empiricism and endorsing the mar-ket system, should also pay close attention to the “increasingly pronouncedsocial divisions and conflicts of interests around us.”40 Until the mid-1990s,the liberals did not seem to show a deep interest in social justice. They weremore concerned about the political and individual rights.

Second, Beijing is fundamentally committed to liberal principles in theeconomic sense but clearly not in other matters. Currently, Beijing has man-aged China’s 1.3 billion people into the East Asian tradition of free-marketauthoritarianism, and so far, there has been no sweeping political trans-formation. In other words, China sees market-Leninism as the way to itsfuture.41 Singapore is a model that Beijing tries to emulate. The attraction

Liberalism 27

of Singapore is that it has achieved Western living standards without beingshaped by Western political standards. China’s dream is to become anotherSingapore. Such a dream is shared by an increasing number of Chinese. Yet,whether that will happen in China is a fundamental international questionin the next decade or two.

Third, the rise of materialism hurt the spread of liberalism in China.Since the mid-1990s, many Chinese have become obsessed with material-ism, and intellectual endeavors have lost popularity. In Chinese history,there was never a strong religious tradition: the Chinese were generallysecular and material interests were always an important factor influenc-ing their evaluation of careers and professions. Salaries for the Chineseintellectuals have increased considerably. Meanwhile, welfare provisionsavailable to them are comprehensive and relatively generous. Xu Ben hasobserved that since 1989, “being increasingly at the mercy of capital,intellectuals are in the process of changing from the role of critical and oppo-sitional thinkers to that of wage earners and moneymakers.”42 Against thisbackground, antiestablishment intellectuals have little to gain and muchto lose.

Fourth, so long as there has been liberalism, there has been antiliberal-ism. The CCP fears that liberalism could weaken its autocratic power, whichit seems to cherish above all else. Party censorship has limited people’sknowledge of liberalism. For instance, 08 Xianzhang (Charter 08) has beencompletely blocked, and most of the web pages that contain 08 Xianzhangcannot be opened inside China.

Official propaganda also created a distorted description of liberalism.43

This distorted version depicts liberalism as alien, irrelevant, and detrimen-tal to China’s socioeconomic order and its national interest.44 As a result,the real progressive meaning of liberalism has not been fully understood inChina. It is worth noting that liberty and freedom are the supreme goals ofthe Chinese liberals.

Fifth, the stunted growth of Chinese liberalism is largely because it hadfound its roots only at the elite level, not at the mass level. China’s liberalslack the political and institutional mechanisms to implement their politicalviews. Given this strict control, they are not able to form a viable Chineseliberal party. Up to this time, the liberals have not taken to grassroots orga-nizing either among workers or in the villages. As Liu Junning points outcorrectly, liberalism has never entered deeply into Chinese society, exceptamong a certain number of educated people.45

Individualism (geren zhuyi) is seen by many as utterly alien to Chineseculture. Moreover, given that the traditional value for the welfare of thegroup has dominated China for hundreds of years and along with thenegative tone/or translation of individualism and the influence of Mao’sfamous booklet attacking individualism, it might be a long way for liber-als to establish individualism as a dominant feature of ideology.46 There is


no compelling reason to believe that liberalism will grow into big wave anytime soon. National direct election is still 20 or 30 years away.

Conclusion

Though it is a daunting task for it to become firmly established in China,there is a real possibility that liberalism will prevail in the long run. Fivefactors will be crucial to the future diffusion of liberalism in China: First ofall, the development of a market economy in China has laid a solid foun-dation for the development of liberal ideas and liberal social forces. Theadvancement of economic freedom and private property has given peoplean appetite for civil and political liberties. And comparatively speaking, thecases of many other societies indicate that a free market in commoditieswill ultimately result in a free market of ideas and a demand for liberalideas. As long as people are free to choose, most people will choose lib-erty and liberalism.47 With increasing private ownership, people will wantmore transparency, predictable laws, less corruption, freer speech, and fewerred tapes. Economic reform has expanded personal freedom: people arefreer to choose an occupation, to move from one danwei to another, andto speak more openly. And command economies have proven inefficient.48

It is widely recognized that China will continue its market-oriented reform,and return to the central-plan economy is highly unlikely. A growing middleclass would help the spread of liberalism.

Second, China’s increasing interaction with the rest of the world, particu-larly with the West, has been another factor promoting a more liberalizingenvironment. The reemergence of liberalism coincided with China’s open-ing to the outside world policy in the late 1978. Trade liberalization hashelped China grow in the non-state sector, dramatically increase per capitaincomes, and invigorate civil society. Autocratic political system is now fac-ing the challenge of the new democratic trend, and a worldwide democratictrend is irresistible.

Furthermore, with the introduction of Western science and technologyand managerial skills into China, Western political ideas naturally followed.Globalization and the opening of the Chinese television market to satelliteand cable broadcasts have also brought various foreign broadcast and printmedia directly into Chinese homes and work units. Globalization will pro-mote the spread of Chinese liberalism. It is true that no one can be certainhow China will behave on international trade issues in the future. Yet, it ishard to imagine that China, as the largest benefactor of the globalization,will go back to its autarkic self-sufficient policy under Mao.

Third, an increasing number of Chinese citizens are traveling and studyingabroad and are becoming more pluralistic and autonomous. Scholars andstudents who had gone abroad for social sciences studies since the late 1970shave begun to return home. Meanwhile, many other Chinese scholars have

Liberalism 29

traveled abroad as visiting scholars. These returned scholars are now ableto introduce accurately Western social sciences, methodologies, thoughts,and theories to the Chinese audience.49 In the West as well as in Taiwan,Hong Kong, Singapore, and other areas, research institutes on China issue avariety of publications, hold a number of conferences to which they invitemainland scholars, and support research projects. Sino-Western contact inthis way has brought about the spread of new ideas. Furthermore, youngstudents on campus in China have stronger foreign language skills and morechannels to read Western works.

While the overwhelming majority of the Chinese students studyingabroad majored in science, technology, and business, quite a few are study-ing social science now. In politics, Rousseau, Mill, and Hayek have attractedtheir attention. Many of the students who returned believe that socialismis not the right track for China. They ascribe the wealth and power of theWest to economic freedom and democracy, endorsing the ideas that eco-nomic freedom and democracy are universal principles governing the wholeworld.50 According to the experience of Taiwan and other Asian societies, thenational authorities will change hands from traditional leaders to studentsreturning from the West. This is happening in China too.

Fourth, although scholars of China studies commonly think China’sallegedly illiberal authoritarian culture inevitably generates authoritarianpolitics, there are limits to Chinese antiliberalism.51 Confucius, for exam-ple, can be interpreted as compatible with Western concepts of libertyand democracy. And the democratic transition in Taiwan and Hong Kongdemonstrates that liberalism and pluralism can survive and gain adherentsin a Chinese environment.52 Fifth, the Internet has grown into the mostpowerful means to build up a public sphere. Web sites, blogs, and weibo(China’s version of Twitter) have become very popular, contributing to thespread of liberal ideas. The cyber space has become an important source forunofficial or unorthodox voices to be heard.

Although the authorities attempt to control the content of the Inter-net through political surveillance, experienced Chinese have found waysto work around the surveillance to express their ideas on the Internet. Formany publications, state subsidies have declined considerably. The shiftfrom propaganda to profit means that journalists, broadcasters, publishers,and filmmakers must shift their thinking from being agents of the party-state to becoming commercially viable, which in turn means that theymust be appealing enough for people to pay for their production. Thesemarket-driven trends are only going to continue to gather force and propelChina’s media and publishing industry in new, and more open, directions.As a result, it is simply impossible for the Chinese Communist Party Propa-ganda Department (CCPPD) and other censorship authorities to effectivelypolice the cyber world and control the flow of information. Paralleling thistrend, the past decade witnessed a nascent civil society developing in China.


Though most of the conditions such as adequate literacy rate, existence of asizeable urban middle class, and protection of certain human rights, whichspawn Western liberalism, were absent in traditional China, these have beenchanged since the market-oriented reform started in the late 1970s. Undersuch circumstances, liberalism has become a powerful intellectual move-ment in Chinese society. Liberalism is much more intellectually appealingthan the official ideology, which will undermine the Communist Party’s roleas the sole source of ideological authority in the long run.

The Chinese economy has grown rapidly in the past three decades. Theliberals’ intensive commitment to market economy and their discourse onglobalization have accompanied and, to a certain extent, contributed to thistremendous development. Their ideas have and will continue to have anincreasing influence on China in the foreseeable future. It must be pointedout that the diffusion of liberalism alone is unlikely to bring about polit-ical change in China. While this could facilitate some changes, it cannotdetermine the outcome of political reform in China. In the long run, theideological disarray that existed in China in the past few decades might forcesome political elites to gradually turn to liberal democracy.

2Neo-authoritarianism

Neo-authoritarianism is a subject of hot debate among Chinese schol-ars in the late 1980s and has been quietly endorsed by the CCP. Neo-authoritarianism refers to an enlightened autocracy: a strong leader adoptsundemocratic measures to enforce economic development. Law and orderare maintained, according to the will of the ruler, as crucial condi-tions for modernization. This political blueprint has been in part justifiedby the economic miracles of the “Four Asian Tigers,” namely Taiwan,Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore. Some Chinese scholars argue thatneo-authoritarianism is a necessary stage as China transits from a traditionalautocracy to liberal democracy.1 The discourse on neo-authoritarianism dieddown at the turn of the century, but has resurfaced since Xi Jinping assumedthe leadership of the CCP in 2012. The first section of this chapter examinesthe theoretical roots of neo-authoritarianism. The second section discussesthe debates among Chinese scholars on neo-authoritarianism, and thenit explains the transition from neo-authoritarianism to neo-conservatism.The last section of this chapter explores relationship between neo-authoritarianism and official ideology and its impacts on political changes.

The rise of neo-authoritarianism

Neo-authoritarianism began to surface in China in 1986, the year that youngintellectuals in Shanghai started to discuss the relationship between compe-tent leaders, the role of centralized power in the process of modernization,and the situation in other East Asian countries, notably the newly industri-alizing countries (NICs).2 The leading proponents of this school of thoughtinclude Wu Jiaxiang, Zhang Bingjiu, Wang Huning, and Xiao Gongqin.Wang Huning, then professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, was consid-ered a leading political scientist and a strong advocate of centralized powerin the reform process, whose writings represent the earliest expression ofthe theory. He wrote in 1986 that because China’s resources are scarce, itsmarket mechanism is imperfect, the cultural level is low, and there is a needto establish a highly efficient power structure system.3

31


Table 2.1 Transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy

Oldauthoritarianism

Neo-authoritarianism

Liberaldemocracy

Economic base Natural economy Semi-marketeconomy

Market economy

Basis oflegitimacy

Mandate of God,custom, conquest

Election ornonelection

Election

Number ofpoliticalparties

Zero or one One or multi Most more thantwo

Individualfreedom

None Economicfreedom, partialpolitical freedom

Individualfreedom protectedby the rule of law

Highestauthority

Monarchy Constitutionalmonarch or headof state

Constitution

Separation ofpower

No Semi-independentparliament

Separation ofthree powers

Source: Zhang Qiang, “Xinquanwei zhuyi zai zhongguo” [Neo-authoritarianism in China], www.aisixiang.com/data/21874.html, date accessed 2 November 2008.

As Table 2.1 illustrates, neo-authoritarians hold that human history under-goes three stages of development, namely, from old authoritarianism toneo-authoritarianism, and then to liberal democracy. Neo-authoritarianism,in this model, would be the transitional stage between a traditional societyand a modern society. Economically, it is characterized by the semi-marketeconomy, which is a transition from the natural economy (or nonmarketeconomy) to the market economy. Politically, it is characterized by enlight-ened autocracy, which is also a transitional form between the old authority’sautocracy and democratic polity.4 The scholars in this camp strongly believethat no society has been able to jump from traditional autocratic societyto democratic society. This is because along with the decline of the tradi-tional authority, there is bound to be a process in which formerly highlycentralized power is gradually decentralized.5 In brief, the neo-authoritariansbelieve that democracy can only be achieved by moving the nation througha transition period of authoritarian rule, and that economic growth cannotbe achieved simultaneously with democratization. In the words of SamuelHuntington, “Men may have order without liberty, but they cannot haveliberty without order.”6

Huntington’s influence on the rise of neo-authoritarianismin China

Neo-authoritarians have relied on Western political thought to formulatenon-Marxist-Leninist and non-democratic approach to transform China’s

Neo-authoritarianism 33

political and economic systems and to justify proposals for authoritariantransitions away from Leninism.7 Chinese neo-authoritarians justified theirideas with references to Western political development studies, especiallySamuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies (1968, revised in1984, which was translated into Chinese in 1988). The book has had anenormous influence on the way people think about development, both inacademia and in the policy world.8 Huntington’s main thesis is that “rapidsocial change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupledwith the slow development of political institutions” would lead to politicalinstability.9 In other words, economic development does not automaticallyresult in political stability, but could, especially in transitional stages, bringabout political disorder. Ma Shu Yun, a professor at the Chinese Universityin Hong Kong, states that Huntington’s emphasis on political order becameincreasingly relevant in China, whereby central control over local authori-ties was eroding, the ability of the government to implement policies wasdeclining, and social unrest was increasing.10

Huntington maintains that authoritarianism may be a necessary orinevitable stage on the road to capitalism, and thus democracy. Authori-tarianism is widely recognized as a form of state power endemic to capitalistsocieties prior to the emergence of a cohesive and hegemonic bourgeois.Huntington argues that the task of managing economic growth and polit-ical order could be best achieved by an authoritarian regime, wherebyauthoritarianism becomes a functional response to social disintegrationand economic malaise. Thus, for the supporters of neo-authoritarianismin China, an “enlightened dictator” is required to force a necessary break-through, so that the reforms could gain new momentum.11 In a 1971article, Huntington observed that central to much of comparative politicsis the concept of the “Great Dichotomy” between the modern society andthe traditional society, with the bridge across the two being the “GrandProcess of Modernization.”12 As with other Western theories, though, propo-nents of neo-authoritarianism interpreted the paradigm according to theirown needs. For them, Huntington’s theory was a model of democratiza-tion, namely, to reach democracy, authoritarian rule had to come first.Chinese analysis of Singapore also evince admiration of Singapore’s cleanand efficient government, social order, rule of law, moral education, highereducation, and high level of technological development.13

Inspired by the 1988 publication of the Chinese version of SamuelHuntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies, some Chinese scholarsutilized his central theoretical premise that “the most important politicaldistinction among countries concerns not their form of government but thedegree of government.”14 Debates over “Asian values” also contributed to thespread of neo-authoritarianism in China. This is partially because the suc-cessful promotion of economic development as well as a nationalist agendahas led some leaders of nondemocratic countries in East Asia to challengethe Western notion of basic human rights and question whether further


democratization is necessary or desirable. Instead, they advocate traditional“Asian values,” or neo-authoritarianism as an ideological shield against theliberal democratic ideas of Western society. Thus, publicly, East Asian polit-ical leaders claim that it is not necessary for developing countries to followthe model of Western development; on the contrary, they incline toward analternative Asian model of political development.15

Debate in the 1980s

There was a brief but vehement debate over neo-authoritarianism whichtook place in Beijing and Shanghai in late 1988 and early 1989. The purposeof the debate was to seek alternative systems of development to Chinesetotalitarianism in the post-Mao period. Wang Huning and Xiao Gongqinexamined the economic success stories of the “four mini-dragons” (alsoknown as four Asian Tiger), to assist Zhao Ziyang, then general secretaryof the CCP, in the promotion of his reform agendas. These scholars saw acorrelation between economic development and authoritarian rule in thesemini-dragons. They found that developing countries with strongman rulershad all been able to achieve a much higher rate of economic growth thanthose ruled by either a democratic government or a totalitarian regime.16

This led them to conclude that neo-authoritarianism might be a good modelfor China.

The advocates of neo-authoritarianism contend that a strong, authori-tarian government was indispensable both to maintain political order andsocial stability and to further the economic reform necessary to beginestablishing a liberal democracy. They argue that modernization in a non-Western developing country like China could not follow the Western model.Rather, they hold that economic modernization and political modernizationshould be carried out in two separate stages, with economic developmenttaking precedence over political democratization and led by a reform-oriented authoritarian government. Thus, authoritarian governments wereresponsible for providing the favorable conditions for sustained economicdevelopment, which meant, first of all, a stable social and political order.Economic reform and modernization could avoid being interrupted by fre-quent social and political turmoil and eventually give rise to a strong middleclass, which would then press for political democracy.

Chinese scholars in the camp of neo-authoritarianism claimed that Chinashould commit to an eventual transition to a democracy, but for the foresee-able future it was necessary to maintain the power of enlightened elementsof the current political régime, until conditions for a stable democratizationwere ripe.17 Though the neo-authoritarians shared a set of basic principles,there were some differences among them, especially on economic issues.This political trend was divided into two schools: the Northern Schoolin Beijing and the Southern School in Shanghai. Wu Jiaxiang and Zhang


Bingjiu belonged to the former, and Xiao Gongqin and Wang Huning to thelatter. Despite distinctions between a “Northern School” and a “SouthernSchool,” scholars from both schools cited the lack of cultural preparation fordemocracy and emphasized the need for a strong authoritarian governmentto guide the developmental process in China.

In their minds, as all the markets in China cannot be considered “freemarket” in the Western sense, an “enlightened dictator” is required to forcethe separation of politics from economy, in order to overcome the forcesthat disrupt the market and guarantee its freedom. Chinese intellectuals,one scholar argues, should base their reform proposals less on their nor-mative preference for democratization. Rather, they should follow to thecentral lesson in Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies: “abandonutopianism.”18 Xiao insists that neo-authoritarianism is more effective thanpluralist democracy. In order to establish a firm basis for state legitimacy,Xiao advised, the regime must do two things. First, it must derive its coreof legitimacy from “the government’s achievements and effectiveness in itsprocess of reform.” Second, it must “creatively interpret” whatever it canrescue from “the revolutionary ideology” in order to form a new “structureof legitimacy.” What needs to be added to such remnants of revolutionaryideology, Xiao suggests, is “pragmatic secularism.”19

Zhao Ziyang presumably envisioned himself as the reform-mindedstrongman. Neo-authoritarianism was the ideology that Deng Xiaoping heldas well. On 6 March 1989, Zhao was said to have told Deng “There is a theoryof neo-authoritarianism in foreign countries, and domestic theoretical circlesare now discussing this theory. The main point of this theory is that thereshould be a certain stage in the modernization process of a backward countrywherein the driving force should come from strongman politics with author-ity, and that Western style democracy should not be adopted.” To whichDeng Xiaoping replied: “This is my idea” (although Deng also said he did notcare for the term “neo-authoritarianism”).20 Such a theory has more appealto people who are already in power – such as Zhao Ziyang before his ousterand Deng Xiaoping – than to people who have been denied power. But it alsoattracts people who are willing to risk their rights for long-term benefits, ifthey can be convinced that the leader is moral and enlightened.21

Neo-authoritarianism proponents do not think it is the best form ofgovernance, but a necessary step at the beginning of development. Justas Xiao Gongqin predicted before the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, neo-authoritarianism cannot take off in China because “whether in theoreticalor practical terms, China does not have the background or conditions thathave brought about neo-authoritarianism in those third world countries.”22

After 4 June 1989, some of the advocates of neo-authoritarianism becamespokespersons for the government supporting the purge of the studentmovement. A most typical representative of this trend is He Xin, aresearcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The majority


of intellectuals then and to this day censure He Xin for his political positionand his views.23

Not everyone in China was convinced by the claims made by advocatesof neo-authoritarianism. Hu Jiwei, former editor-in-chief of Renmin Ribao,writes that we always attach importance to the authority of the leadingparty, the leading organs, and the leading people. However, what we need toestablish is democratic authority rather than autocratic authority.24 ZhouWenzhang argues that there are three major faults of the proponents ofneo-authoritarianism: first, there is no doubt that the role of authority isindispensable in every society, but they fail to see that the key is how touse the political power scientifically. Second, they have blindly worshippedcentralization as a magic weapon. Third, they have indiscriminately copiedforeign experience and modes without making specific analyses. In sum,Zhou maintains that neo-authoritarianism is by no means a panacea forChina’s problem.25

Qin Xiaoying, a researcher at the CCP Central Propaganda Department,considers that those who advocate neo-authoritarianism are either igno-rant about history or trying to produce a sensational effect.26 The neo-authoritarians argue that the general public in China lacks the capacity fordemocratic participation in government affairs, so they prefer the optionof sacrificing a certain degree of political democracy to prevent the “disor-der” which may be brought about by democracy. They hold that a perfectsocial structure based on rule by law should be formed and that ordershould first be established in economic activities. However, according toQin, this will only cause a vicious cycle in history. Law expert Yu Haochengsaid, the advocates of neo-authoritarianism lump together democracy andanarchism. In fact, only autocracy will cause disorder, and only democracywill ensure unity and stability.27 The critics of the theory note that neo-authoritarianism posed the danger of strengthening one-party rule sinceChina’s Communist leaders could postpone the country’s transition to a full-fledged democracy indefinitely, on the grounds that the nation was not yetready for it.

Opponents of neo-authoritarianism believe that neo-authoritarianism wasunwise because previous attempts to modernize indigenous political author-ity in China had failed. They said this was apparent in Yuan Shikai’smonarchical revival, which led to warlordism; in Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Prin-ciples,” which led to civil war, under Chiang Kai-shek; and in Mao Zedong’stotalitarianism, which led to the Cultural Revolution.28 Ying Xuezuen arguesthat advocates of neo-authoritarianism failed to notice that in his later yearsHuntington shifted his focus from neo-authoritarianism to the spread ofdemocracy.29

Generally speaking, the debate was between two groups. The first grouphad an optimistic viewpoint that democracy in China would require uni-versal values of humankind like Western-style democracy. The second


group considered neo-authoritarian rule the lesser of the two evils. Thedebate largely disappeared from the Chinese media after Zhao Ziyang’spurge in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, but the questions thatwere raised in the 1980s remain every bit as pertinent to China’s politi-cal situation today: how to balance the power of the state with individualfreedom.

The advent of neo-conservatism

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, the pace of the reform sloweddown significantly, and the CCP launched propaganda campaigns to pro-mote stability in the face of chaos. In response, neo-conservatism arose inChina as an attempt to mediate the dangers of both an outdated socialismand liberalism by means of centralization, a stress on political stability, anda pursuit of alternative sources for cohesion, such as the resort to traditionand nationalism. It offered an “intermediate” ideology, a “middle position,”or a “middle path” between “conservatives,” which in a Chinese contextwould mean the Old Left, namely figures such as Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun,and Chen Yun, and “radical reformers” or liberals.30

In many ways, the neo-conservative view goes back to the debate on neo-authoritarianism in the late 1980s and can be seen as a continuation of theideas developed in that debate. Though Xiao Gongqin was one of the mostpassionate and outspoken theorists of neo-authoritarianism in the 1980s,he became an ardent advocate of neo-conservatism in the 1990s. In main-land China, neo-conservatism, sometimes translated as New Conservatism,is a major trend in the spectrum of political thought that first arose in theearly 1990s.31 During that period of time, the revolutionary identity of theCCP was threatened by the decline of socialism, while internally, its role asthe vanguard of economic reforms was challenged by its repression of theTiananmen Square demonstrations in June 1989.

Neo-conservatism stresses positivism, gradualism, and rationalism andopposes any anti-order, anti-society, and anti-culture actions character-istic of irrationalism. It holds that modernization is a gradual process,and that, during this process, traditional values, the existing order, andauthoritarian government are necessary to maintain social stability andensure a successful transformation.32 In the economic arena, it seeks tostrengthen the state’s authority, for a new centralization on the basis ofa modern economic transformation of traditional culture. Xiao Gongqinargues that modernization and eventual democratization must rely onthe “visible hand” of government in the short run.33 Other defend-ers even claimed that neo-conservatism is a sign of the maturity ofChina in the 1990s. Neo-conservatism is also characterized by a state-centered nationalism and a retreat from the cultural cosmopolitanism ofthe 1980s. Politically, it represents an attempt to forge a middle position


between conservative political elites advocating limited reforms and liberalreformers advocating democratic political reforms.34 Seen from a Chineseneo-conservative perspective, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revo-lution, and the Tiananmen Protests of 1989 were all in error in that theyattempted to change society through revolutionary means. Advocates ofneo-conservatism share the thesis that “the need for stability overwhelmseverything else.” In the eye of neo-conservatives, the 1989 incident wasa tragic conflict between the romantic radicalism advocated by intellectu-als and a government buried in daily routines. The leading proponents ofthe neo-conservative trend in political thought include Xiao Gongqin andHe Xin.

Neo-conservatism is a product of the political climate of the 1990s andalso a reflection on and reaction to political and cultural radicalism that wasprevalent in the 1980s. Neo-conservatism criticizes various radical proposi-tions for ignoring China’s reality and for trying to transform the country bytotally rejecting the existing order and authorities. In their view, the democ-racy movement of 1989 becomes another example of romantic radicalism.Ironically, the failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement led not onlyto the downfall of Zhao Ziyang, a supporter of neo-authoritarianism, butalso to a strengthening of the authoritarian mentality on the part of thenew top CCP leaders. The incident offered a historical opportunity fortransformation from neo-authoritarianism to neo-conservatism. Thoughneo-authoritarianism influenced some within the CCP in the period from1986 to 1989, notably Zhao Ziyang and his faction, due to the TiananmenIncident and Zhao’s involvement in it, in the wake of 4 June 1989, dis-cussion of the political theory of neo-authoritarianism was subsequentlybanned.

After a period of hibernation following the Beijing crackdown, duringwhich only the most orthodox ideology could be voiced, neo-conservatismgained a prominent public place in 1991. Xiao Gongqin, neo-conservatism’sleading theorist, identifies it as a continuation of the “Southern School”of neo-authoritarianism of the late Zhao Ziyang era. David Kelly sug-gests that theorists who called themselves the “Southern School” of neo-authoritarianism merely renamed themselves as neo-conservatives.35 It isassumed by some academics that the theory of neo-conservatism was intro-duced by the taizidang (princelings or state, party, or military leaders whocome from families of senior party leaders or military generals) in the early1990s. Their article was published in response to the failed Soviet coupof August 1990, with the title “Realistic Responses and Strategic Optionsfor China after the Soviet Upheaval.”36 Throughout the 1990s, intellec-tual discourses shifted from the formerly internally discussed model ofneo-authoritarianism (xin quanwei zhuyi) to the very ambiguous model ofneo-conservatism (xin baoshou zhuyi).


Official party ideology and neo-authoritarianism

The neo-authoritarians are considered as apologists for China’s politicalstatus quo. There are important similarities between neo-authoritarianismand official party ideology, such as advocacy of political stability in thecontext of fears over implosion. In this context, neo-authoritarianism andCCP’s emphasis of “growth with stability” are simply two sides of the samecoin. The two overlapped in the sense that both examined the impacts of“radicalism” on the PRC, and both criticized the Cultural Revolution andMao Zedong’s policies from the perspective of the preservation of stabil-ity. Neo-authoritarianism was mainly meant to confront liberal radicalismcherished by Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s. Neo-authoritarians havebeen generally supportive of government policies. Their denunciation of“radicalism” suited the interests of the CCP. The CCP’s stress on construc-tion of market economy without democratization, growth ahead of liberty,and strong central leadership over multiparty politics elicits strong parallelswith the major arguments of neo-authoritarianism.

At first sight, neo-authoritarianism seems very close to the official partyideology. However, it differs from official ideology in several importantrespects. First, in neo-authoritarian accounts, the Marxist rhetoric wasreplaced with a reference to foreign theorists. Unlike the official ideology,proponents of neo-conservatism did not include Marxism in their discourse.For instance, they invoked Karl Popper’s notion of “piecemeal change”in their promotion of gradualism. Sullivan observed that Chinese “neo-conservatives” often referred to Edmund Burke, Karl Popper, Paul Tillich,Alexis de Tocqueville, and Samuel Huntington.37

Another crucial distinction between neo-authoritarianism and official ide-ology concerns their conception of democracy with Chinese characteristics.As Xiao Gonqing put it, my democracy with Chinese characteristics refersto the fact that the level of the people’s endorsement of government lead-ership is based on the latter’s performance. Moreover, as people feel safer,their tolerance increases, their freedom increases, and their endorsementto party leadership could increase as well. The future of Chinese democ-racy will not adopt the Western model; instead, it would be a meritocracy.Meritocracy with consultative democracy is the democracy with Chinesecharacteristics.38

Last but not least, official ideology and neo-authoritarianism differ onthe issue of liberal democracy. For the regime, a liberal democracy couldnot be envisioned because it would threaten the regime itself, whereas neo-authoritarianism disapproves of it because of its impracticality. Additionally,neo-authoritarianism considers liberal democracy an eventual outcome ofreform, whereas the regime cast it aside and did not commit to it, not evenin the long run. For neo-authoritarianism, a strong authority is needed as a


means to reach the final goal of democracy, while the regime considers it anend in itself and part and parcel of its very ideology.

Policy response

The spread of neo-authoritarianism has had considerable impacts in China.In recent days, neo-authoritarianism cloaked in “China’s national condi-tions” has become fashionable in China. A number of well-educated peoplehave become articulators of neo-authoritarianism in mainland China. Basedon a review of official documents of the CCP and speeches of the Chineseleaders, Zhang Xiaojin and Li Chunfeng asserted that China is movingtoward a system and process that protect the rights and will of the peo-ple, but is still largely confined to improving authoritarian rule in terms ofinstitutions and procedures.39 Xiao Gongqin’s term of “neo-conservatism”was supplanted with the term “gradualism” in official media because theconcept of “conservatism” was still understood as an embrace of Confucianvalues.

The concept of neo-authoritarianism is endorsed by a group of highlyplaced intellectuals. Many influential leaders are adherents of the polit-ical theory of neo-authoritarianism. The leading proponents of neo-authoritarianism include Wang Huning, a key political adviser for theformer presidents Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and the current President XiJinping. Wang was elected to the Politburo of the CCP in November 2012.Many influential leaders of the CCP also aspire to the political theory ofneo-conservatism. If the demise of the Soviet Union has enhanced theappeal of neo-authoritarianism to many Chinese, the global financial cri-sis and China’s growing social problems have highlighted the need for moremeaningful state-led reforms.

Several studies find that China has maintained a policy of authoritari-anism and economic liberalism. China’s reforms since Jiang Zemin havebeen mainly carried out in the form of a soft-authoritarianism, and thatChina is moving toward a system that is still largely confined to improvingauthoritarian rule in terms of institutions and procedures. Andrew Nathanstates that China’s political experiments are mainly pushing for a flexibleauthoritarianism.40 For many years, the Party’s legitimacy was founded onrevolution, it was not easy for the CCP to abandon revolution. However,nowadays, the CCP no longer claims to be a revolutionary party; instead, itemphasizes on being an effective governing party.

Neo-authoritarianism 2.0?

With Xi Jinping heading the fifth generation of the Chinese leadership inthe early 2010s, there is a resurgence of neo-authoritarianism within the


Chinese government and renewed interest of neo-authoritarianism in theacademic circles. Xiao Gongqin calls it “neo-authoritarianism 2.0.”41

Authoritarian regimes, by definition, resist rule of law and an indepen-dent judiciary. Given the negativity associated with authoritarianism andconservatism, Chinese intellectuals are generally disinclined to engage withthem empirically. Today, China’s system is characterized by a strong stateand a disempowered society. The country has experienced speedy economicgrowth, but relatively little progress has been made in the field of politicaldevelopment. Coming hot on the heels of rapid economic growth are a hostof profound social problems, such as the widening wealth gap between thehaves and have-nots, official corruption, and food safety. The New Leftistsattribute all China’s social maladies to what they term “the resurrection ofcapitalism” in a nominally communist state. Their prescription is a secondCultural Revolution, a sweeping political movement that would uproot cor-ruption and return the power to the masses, restoring social justice in theprocess. The liberals, conversely, argue that China’s social problems stemfrom the absence of Western-style democracy. For them, the solution lies inthe immediate introduction of direct elections and a multiparty system, evenif such change would necessitate a “color revolution.” Against this backdrop,neo-authoritarianism has resurfaced in China in the past few years. As HuShaohua wrote in March 2014,

China needs a Leviathan, which can maintain law and order. Many out-siders think China is a dictatorial country, but it is not well-managed.It is still rather chaotic. After Leviathan, we need social contract and indi-vidual freedom, highlighted by Rousseau and Locke; after that we needsocial-economic justice, proposed by Marx. A relatively ideal society com-bines all three aspects. America has all three things more than most othercountries do. A weak country usually has none.42

This view, widely shared among Chinese intellectuals, claims that empha-sizing democracy risks unleashing the grand democracy (daminzhu) andthat stressing participation may lead to mass movements (qunzhong yun-dong). Chen Ming, a researcher at the CASS Institute of World Religions,explains that during the process of reorganizing society to develop the goalof socialism with Chinese characteristics, democracy should be regardedas a double-edged sword “that is extremely likely to destroy this verydevelopment. This being the case, then not only is neo-authoritarianismunavoidable, but we must also acknowledge that it has certain rationality.”43

Tang Liang, professor of political science at Waseda University in Japan,argues that China’s modernization can be characterized as “authoritariandevelopment.” That means a fusion of mixed economic institutions of vary-ing types of ownership with social stability and political cohesiveness. Thepresent phase, where more emphasis is being given to social issues, is likely


to lead on to a new phase where a more mature civil society and a moreextensive middle class are likely to look for greater democratization.44

In 2013, Wu Jiaxiang, a leading scholar of neo-authoritarianism, publishedthe book Gong tian xia, which proposes the idea of “polycentric governance”for China. The book reflects Wu’s continued belief in the benefits of neo-authoritarianism and is reported to have been popular among leading partyofficials. Xiao Gongqin thinks, “Xi Jinping is very a good phenomenon: anew incarnation of his idea of a model leader, Deng Xiaoping.” He furtherstates that “Xi Jinping marks the arrival of a golden age for Chinese neo-authoritarianism.”45 In addition, neo-authoritarians contend that they donot exclude elements of democracy from their theory. They maintain thatmarket itself provides democratic freedoms because increased property own-ership rights and the encouragement of individual entrepreneurs give greaterscope to personal decision-making.46

The social and economic chaos that followed the Arab Spring and thecrises in Thailand and Ukraine have led the Chinese people to cherishtheir current stability. Xi Jinping has demonstrated a clear preference fora controlled political reform and a market-oriented economy. History’s les-son is clear for the Chinese: haste is to be avoided and gradualism tobe enforced. It is not possible to envisage the large-scale participation ofthe masses without inviting the risk of a populist outburst. The propo-nents of neo-authoritarianism reexamined how radical reforms could leadto bloody revolution, as occurred during the French Revolution, the RussianRevolution, and the Revolution of 1911. Xiao concludes:

What China needs is not to overthrow the entire system, but to establisha mechanism to rein in this gap, allowing common people to share in thefruits of three decades of economic development. But the problem is thatany serious reform was, is and will always be opposed by the powerfulinterest groups which benefit from the existing political system.47

As far as proponents of neo-authoritarianism are concerned, neo-authoritarian model is the most pragmatic, least costly model, and thesuccess of economic reform has proved this. Chinese elites are pleased to seethat success of this model is attributable to some of Chinese values. ZhangWeiwei, professor of International Relations at Fudan University, argues thatthe Chinese people have an overwhelming collective fear of chaos.48 Hence,the debate in China is not about getting the correct balance of freedomand security but about a stark choice between total order and total chaos.49

Chan Koonchung, the author of The Fat Years, states that the corporatist-authoritarian state is ignored by both the New Left and liberals, and theydon’t want to understand it. In fact, it has potential and it appeals to manypeople in China. It survived about 40 years in Spain and Portugal, morerecently it existed in Chile about 20 years until the 1990s.50


Will neo-authoritarianism work for China?

Some Chinese scholars maintain that China should pursue democratizationthrough neo-authoritarianism, and quite a few hold that China should intro-duce only a low level of democracy right now and reserve a more advanceddemocracy for later.51 Nevertheless, neo-authoritarianism has been criticizedas trying to defend authoritarianism and obstruct democratization. A clearexample of this can be found in the works of Liu Junning, editor of theliberal journal Gonggong luncong (Res Publica). In a 1998 volume entitledBaoshou zhuyi (Conservatism), Liu Junning argues that the “Burke of theWhigs is the Burke of liberty.”52 In other words, Chinese supporters of “neo-authoritarianism” had distorted conservatism by subscribing to centralizedpower. For Liu Junning, conservatism without liberalism led to politicalauthoritarianism, whereas liberalism without conservatism brought aboutrationalism and radicalism. 53 Gan Yang and Zhang Xudong, two New Leftscholars, point out,

political conservatism in China is no longer clothed in neo-authoritarianism, as was fashionable in the late 1980s. Instead, it isdressed up as a liberalism that opposes democracy. The view widelyshared among Chinese intellectuals is that emphasizing democracy risksunleashing grand democracy (daminzhu) and that stressing participationmay lead to mass movements (qunzhong yundong).54

However, with the “success” of growth with stability, the appeal of the neo-authoritarianism model has been rising. The continued economic growthseems to vindicate the party’s neo-authoritarian strategy: economic take-offin a poor country requires a strong and undemocratic government. As longas this growth remains strong, it is unlikely that the neo-authoritarian strat-egy will lose its intellectual appeal among Chinese leaders. Advocates ofneo-conservatism could continue to make an impact upon political and eco-nomic decisions in China. Even though neo-conservatism purports to defusethe threats of liberalism, the theory makes crucial concessions to liberal val-ues and practices.55 Theorists in this camp hold that the “masses” wouldrequire a period of tutelage before democracy could work in China. Theneeding of a period of “tutelage” was also used by Chiang Kai-shek in hisattempt to retain the Guomindang’s monopoly of power in both mainlandChina and Taiwan.

Neo-conservatives in China, Xiao Gongqin, for example, believe thatdemocracy would only succeed in China if it were preceded by the devel-opment of a market economy, and that only an authoritarian govern-ment could impose a market on an unprepared and unwilling Chinesepopulation.56 Therefore, when economic reform was a matter of concern,neo-conservatives came to advocate “gradualism” and oppose “radicalism.”


They rejected economic or political “shock therapy” that could lead to an“abyss of perpetual chaos.” Indeed, for the majority of Chinese, and advo-cates of neo-conservatism, the negative developments in the former SovietUnion and Eastern European countries after democratization have beenoften used examples to illustrate the importance of stability.57 For them, astrong and stable government is necessary for China to further its economicreforms. China is currently in a mix of both planned and market economies.The high degree of control necessitated by such an economy inevitably leadsto some dictatorial policies. As Yu Keping points out, “Democracy requiresenlightenment; it requires the rule of law, authority, and sometimes evencoercion to maintain social order.”58 Zheng Yongnian notes that a precondi-tion of political development is the provision of very favorable conditionsfor economic progress; thus, political stability must be given the highestpriority.59 Essentially, then, economic modernization and authoritarianismunder an “enlightened dictator” are intertwined. In a paper published in2013, Xiao Gongqin summarizes stages of development of neo-conservatismas follows:

1. achievement of political stability through an enlightened and patriarchalauthoritarian regime;

2. promotion of a market economy by way of maintaining political stability;3. achievement of corresponding social diversification by way of promotion

of economic development;4. development of a civil society through social diversification and differen-

tiation of interests; and5. promotion of exchange among different civil associations and interest

groups, and encouragement of concession, consultation, and exchangeof interests among them.60

In a similar vein, Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu suggested that China’s reformshould go through four stages in succession: economic development, indi-vidual freedom, social justice, and political democracy.61 It was argued thatin each phase economic reform and political reform should coordinate andpromote each other. Democracy is not a spontaneous natural result. Thereform measures proclaimed in the Third Plenum of the Central Commit-tee of the CCP in November 2013 include transforming certain functionsof the government and decentralization, among others. A Singapore-styleapproach (combining a freewheeling market economy and an authori-tarian regime) has clearly emerged from the Plenum. Yet, Xiao Gongqinacknowledges:

Although neo-authoritarianism has brought about economic take-off, thebiggest flaw of neo-authoritarianism is that government related enter-prises have profited more during the transitional period, resulting in


increasing income gap, a rich nation with poor citizens; ‘state ownedenterprises disease’; public money being used for expenditures on for-eign trips disguised as field-study, purchase and use of automobiles andaccommodating visitors; crony-style corruption.62

Conclusion

Argument over democracy and neo-authoritarianism dominated intellectualdebates in the late 1980s. As an ideological trend, neo-authoritarianism hasundergone a number of ups and downs. Neo-authoritarianism was associatedwith reformers in the Party and disappeared after 1989. Neo-conservatism,arising in its place, absorbed a number of intellectual groupings of differ-ent shades. The official embrace of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”is essentially a neo-authoritarianism in practice. The Chinese party-statehas implemented a political regime not confined to the boundaries ofneo-authoritarianism since it has adopted the rule of law as a legitimat-ing ideology and has continued to make efforts to assert the legitimacyof its authority.63 Neo-authoritarianism appeals to many Chinese becauseit fits a Confucian-political-moral paradigm, but it will only serve to per-petuate old authoritarianism in the form of the Communist Party. Thus,neo-authoritarianism wields a double-edged sword for the CCP. The the-ory breaks with Marxism-Leninism and pushes for liberal democracy in thelong run, but on the other hand, it supports policy agenda of the CCP andargues that modernization was best accomplished through gradual reformof society, eschewing revolution and sudden overthrow of the governmentalsystem.

In the past two decades, few scholars in China have openly endorsedneo-authoritarianism, while a vast majority of them have been criticalof it, as it is a political ideology that postulates economic growth underauthoritarian rule and hinders democratization. The New Left denouncedneo-authoritarianism as deviating from socialist fundamentals, while theliberals reject its continued support for absolute party rule and argue neo-authoritarianism sowed the seeds of its own destruction. In the view ofKang Xiaoguang, a strong advocate of New Confucianism, economically,China has transformed into a market economy; yet democracy predicted byneo-authoritarian scholars has not shown up after its economic transition.64

Even the defenders of this school have recognized that it is not the solu-tion to development over the long term. In short, the Chinese top leaderssince Deng Xiaoping have tacitly endorsed neo-authoritarianism. Beijing hasturned away from Maoist radicalism of class struggle and permanent revolu-tion to single-minded focus on growth and stability. There could be contin-uous support for neo-authoritarianism in China, if it could assure growthwith stability. The battle of ideas between democratic and authoritarianapproaches to modernity will continue.

3China’s New Left

Emerging at first as a narrow intellectual critique in the mid-1990s, the NewLeft soon grew wings as it merged with supporters of populism, statism, andnationalism. The “Chinese New Left” is a term used to distinguish it from theOld Left, or conservatives, who are die-hard Maoists. Wang Hui, a professorat Tsinghua University whom many see as the academic leader of China’s“New Left,” suspected the term “New Left” was just being used as a cudgelto belabor liberals.1 The New Left developed out of several major streams ofradicalism such as neo-Marxism, postmodernism, dependency theory, worldsystem theory, and postcolonialism. It has used these perspectives for itscriticism of global capitalism and issues in China’s market reforms.

The New Leftists call for more emphasis on economic justice, not just eco-nomic growth at any price. The majority of the New Leftists have neverexplicitly accepted the label of the New Left that has been stuck on themin reference to the old orthodox Left of the Communist Party. Gan Yang,a leading New Left scholar, argues that the so-called New Left in China isreally “Liberal Left,” whereas the so-called liberals are really “liberal right.”2

As nobody wants to be labeled a New Leftist (xin zuopai), Xu Jilin, a professorof East China Normal University, suggests a neutral term, “New Left Wing”(xin zuoyi).3

The New Left camp is a diverse group: some emphasize the role of the statewhile others stress nationalism, social justice, and the Maoist experiment.Joseph Fewsmith provides a schematic of societal actors on the Left andRight. In his chart, the New Left includes three subgroups: new nationalists,postmodernists, and neo-statists. The group’s research interests differ andtheir detailed opinions on issues still vary, but they are alike in questioningthe direction of China’s reforms and in pinning the blame for new prob-lems in China on the reforms themselves.4 Over time, the camp has evolvedinto an amalgam of loosely associated intellectuals and groups articulatingalternative visions that move beyond the rigid dichotomy of laissez-fairecapitalism and state socialism. Wang Hui, Cui Zhiyuan, Gan Yang, andWang Shaoguang are among some of the leading New Left scholars. Dushu(Reading) and Utopia stand as the two major venues for New Leftist voices.5

46

China’s New Left 47

Since the market reform and political liberalization are derived from liber-alism based on Western experience, in their writings, the New Leftists sharea condemnation for both market-oriented reform and Western-style liberaldemocracy.

This chapter surveys the major arguments of the New Leftists. It starts withan examination of the rise of the New Left and its theoretical roots. It thenproceeds to analyze the major components of the New Left thinking suchas Maoism, state socialism, and the China Model. It concludes with somegeneral observation about impacts of the New Left.6 I will elaborate on therobust debates between the New Left and liberals in the second part of thisbook.

The advent of the New Left

Most Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s held similar views such as support-ing reform and opening up, identifying with values of freedom, democracy,the rule of law, and believing that they were carrying on in the spirit ofthe May Fourth Movement. But developments in the 1990s led to differ-entiation among them. The emergence, development, and evolution of theNew Left have very complex reasons: first, institutional and political factorswere critical, such as the state’s failure to solve acute socioeconomic prob-lems affecting the population. Disappointment with the negative effects ofthe market-oriented reforms prompted scholars to reexamine the reform ina new and more critical light. In 1997, when the Asian financial crisis brokeout, the fallout of this event dramatically demonstrated the risks of globaliza-tion. Suddenly market-oriented reform was no longer a surefire guarantee ofgrowth and prosperity. As a reaction to the radical liberalization ushered inby Deng Xiaoping, the New Left presented the strongest rhetorical challengeto economic liberalism.

Furthermore, after the “accidental bombing” of the Chinese embassy inBelgrade in 1999, there was a wave of student demonstrations and indig-nation among the ordinary Chinese (Table 3.1). China’s New Left adopted

Table 3.1 Left or Right?

Categories China (1978–89) China (since 1990)

Left Conservatives (mainlyin state bureaucracy)

New Leftists representing a sentiment ofdissatisfaction among the peasants and workerscaused by sharp increase of income gap

Right Reformers (supportedby vast majority ofintellectuals)

Liberals (also known as “New Right”)representing the middle class and entrepreneurs

Source: Compiled by author.


a nationalistic stance. The inequalities that came with the market-orientedreform also triggered increasing tension within the intellectual circles: theNew Left was shocked by how polarized society had become and decidedto defend the interests of the poor. They began to ask for a change in thedirection of the reforms and advocated a strong state capable of defendingthe poor.

Influence of Western ideas

The New Left is “new” because it is distinct from the Old Left and it employspost-isms (houxue) as the basis for analyzing contemporary China’s reality.7

It is “left” because it questions the dogma of the “free market” as thecenterpiece of modernity. The emergence of New Left ideas has become avogue among Chinese intellectuals. How do we account for the growingprominence of the New Left? To answer this question, we have to explainthe theoretical roots of the New Left. The Chinese New Left’s origins liemainly in intellectuals who were heavily influenced by the Western theo-ries when they attended university in the United States and Europe. Theyinsist on interpreting China in light of Western “critical theory” and findpostcolonial theory useful in so far as it helps deconstruct the China myth inold colonial and Orientalist discourse as well as its contemporary version ofthe “demonization of China.” The term “New Left” may lead non-Chinesereaders to think of them in the light of the 1960s New Left in the West.However, unlike their Western counterparts, China’s New Leftists call forreforming the system “within the system,” and they are not associated withdissidents or political exiles.

New Leftists have their origins in the works of Andre Gunder Frank,Edward Said, Michel Foucault, and Jean-Francois Lyotard, whose works weretranslated into Chinese and widely circulated in China. These theoristsestablished a series of concepts to describe the changes in social and eco-nomic orders as human societies made the transition from agricultural toindustrial production. The influence of dependency and world system the-ories on the New Left is quite conspicuous. Many New Leftists drew on thewritings of Immanuel Wallerstein to illustrate the power relations underly-ing global economic processes. As a leading critic of capitalism, Samir Amin’swork has exercised great influence in China since the early 1970s.

Hence, it is not surprising that the New Left scholars have borrowed fromthe latest Western critique of capitalism and imperialism to criticize issuesor problems related to China’s modernization. They employ these Westernparadigms to explain the situation in China. Wang Hui maintains that glob-alization is a “misleading abstraction” since it is not a new phenomenonbut simply the latest phase of the development of capitalism beyond thecolonial and imperialist epochs.8 From the perspective of the liberals, theNew Leftists are living in a “post-modern” society, while the Chinese main-land remains a modern, even a premodern, society. The problems for which


China required solutions concerned modernization and thus remained atodds with the problems these scholars proposed to solve.9 In a similar vein,Ren Jiantao, a professor at Renmin University, uses the phrase the “fallacy ofmisplaced concreteness (cuozhi jutigan de miuwu)” to describe what he per-ceives as the primary problem of the New Left discourse.10 In the economicarena, the New Leftists argue that the ongoing economic reform should shiftits focus from boosting economic growth to establishing a solid social safetynet and enhancing social equity.

Rediscovery of Mao’s legacy

The reforms launched by Deng in the late 1970s started with an ideologicalliberation movement and the reevaluation of the Mao’s legacy. The CulturalRevolution era was presented in an extremely negative light. The CCP decou-pled itself from radical Maoism, and Deng Xiaoping rejected the Maoistegalitarianism of the 1960s and 1970s. Deng’s thought set the tone for alltop leaders in China who succeeded him. The liberals tried to use ideologicalliberation to completely reject Mao, but they did not accomplish their goal.Deng insisted that “Mao’s banner” should never be abandoned, meaningthat he opposed the complete rejection of Mao’s legacies.

The New Leftists adhere to Marxism as originally interpreted by Mao andas executed during approximately the first 30 years of the PRC’s existence(1949–1978). They firmly believe that China is, and has been for some time,moving away from the socialist path, which has resulted and will continueto result in the rise of capitalists who will further exploit peasants and work-ers, as they did in China before 1949. In a fashion similar to the worldwideMaoist movement, this strain of the New Leftists are against the Chinesegovernment’s policy of “openness” and economic reforms; correspondingly,they do not consider Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution and Great Leap For-ward to have been wrong headed in an ideological sense, even if some ofthem do oppose the actual outcome and on-the-ground policies of thoseearly experiments.

So, the New Leftists are nostalgic, appealing to Maoism and calling fortheir own version of economic and political democracy. The main objectsof this nostalgia are certain lost features of the Mao era, such as a guar-anteed livelihood and relative equality of income. During the early yearsof the PRC, the Party established an almost impeccable image of honestyand integrity in its dealing with local people. However, widespread pub-lic dissatisfaction with economic disparity, rampant corruption, and severeenvironmental damage elicited a new nostalgia for the Mao era, especiallyamong a younger generation of intellectuals and the poor and vulnerable inChinese society.

From the viewpoint of the New Left, economic democracy means thatthe government needs an egalitarian-orientated distribution policy and thatpolitical democracy should be achieved through the institutionalizing of


communist ideology. Branding free-market economist Mao Yushi, a “traitor”for criticizing Mao’s legacy, the New Leftists are genuinely trying to turn theParty back toward Maoism. The New Leftists emphasize the continuity ofthe two development stages before and after 1978. Meanwhile, they con-sider that the majority of reform policies could not have succeeded withoutthe various preparations of the Mao era. In the words of Gong Yuzhi, theChinese socialist experiment was “started by Mao and realized by Deng.”11

The New Leftists give Mao a very high ranking because they think Maomade major contributions to China’s development and his policies trans-formed China. One aspect of this transformation was the modernization ofthe country. In particular, there was a rapid industrialization, along withsuccess, in the acquisition of nuclear bombs, missiles, and satellite technol-ogy. Under Mao, China’s performance with regard to public literacy, basiceducation, mass vaccination, child health care, and so on was even moreremarkable, given that it had far surpassed the level of other countries at asimilar level of economic development measured by gross domestic product(GDP).

The second major accomplishment the New Leftists credit to Mao was thathe had established a socialist society, one in which a majority of the peo-ple enjoyed equality. Wang Hui also drew attention to the developmentalemphasis of Chinese socialism. He acclaimed Mao’s thought as a “mod-ernizing theory that provided an alternative to capitalist modernity,” andthat attempted to avoid the harsh, exploitative, and competitive aspects ofWestern capitalism.12

Third, in terms of foreign policy, Mao’s revolutionary vision and leader-ship were favorably reassessed by the New Left. They emphasize that Maohad the courage to fight against two superpowers at the same time. Sur-rounded by hostile external forces, Mao implemented a self-reliance policy.The “closed-door” policy was imposed by the West and was also necessaryto protect revolutionary achievements and national dignity. They neglect toacknowledge that in fact Mao commenced a rapprochement with the UnitedStates, which laid a solid foundation for the open-door policy launched byDeng Xiaoping. According to the New Left, only the legacy of Mao can saveChina.

Nearly four decades after his death, Mao continues to haunt the Chinesepolitical system. According to Fewsmith, his legacy seems even more difficultto deal with today than it was 10 or 20 years ago.13 Since the 1990s, therehas been intense popular interest in Mao. In 1989, 370,000 copies of the offi-cial portrait of Mao were printed for public sale, but the following year thenumber of copies rose to 23 million and in 1991 to 50 million.14 To be sure,some Chinese still relish the “good old days” under Mao, when China waspoor, harsh, and miserable for many. For some, Mao is remembered as a greatleader in modern Chinese history. According to a survey in 2013, 85 percentof the Chinese believe that Mao’s achievements “outweigh his mistakes.”15


A reason for this phenomenon is a reaction, or an expression, of grievances,against widespread corruption in the post-Mao era. It can also be seen asattempts by the New Leftists to make use of the dissatisfaction among thosewho face political, social, and cultural problems arising from the process ofthe reform. Many young people who did not experience the Mao era believethat in comparison with today’s Chinese leaders Mao was uncorrupt. Someof them even hope that a Mao-style charismatic leader will reemerge. Theyfrequently blame the government for not taking a tough stance in handlingthe issues of territories with neighboring countries, especially with Japan andthe Philippines, and urge the government to take a “great power” positionto ensure a “just world.”16 It is worth noting that the socialist system estab-lished by Mao seems to be fading rapidly, yet the influence of Mao is likelyto endure for a long period of time.

Rethinking the Cultural Revolution

After the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, China was left in shambles.The CCP and the government were left paralyzed, and the economy wasin ruins.17 Moreover, the CCP was undergoing the crises of faith in social-ism, confidence in the future of the country, and trust in the Party. Suchcrises were known as sanxin weiji (three spiritual crises). In 1978, two yearsafter the chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) ended, the Commu-nist Party declared the Cultural Revolution a disaster and effectively bannedany further public discussion. According to the Party line, at the end ofthe Cultural Revolution, China’s economy was on the verge of collapse.Inefficient governmental handling led to massive unemployment and grossunderproduction. Most colleges and research institutions were shut down,and millions of intellectuals and cadres were purged.

Fansi (reflection) is a frequently used term in contemporary China.Almost five decades after the Cultural Revolution, many Chinese, fromParty leaders to ordinary people, still try to understand why all this couldhave happened. Totally ignoring the horrifying reality of those tumultuousyears of the Cultural Revolution, the New Leftists argue that the theoryof the Cultural Revolution crystallizes Mao Zedong’s creative “sinificationof Marxism.”18 They believe the Cultural Revolution was an example of“creative destruction” and cast the Cultural Revolution in a positive lightwhile viewing the market reform negatively. In their view, the CulturalRevolution, which resulted in a purge of many intellectuals, signaled thevictory of the ordinary people’s China. The market-oriented reforms, on theother hand, marked the restoration of capitalism and dominance of foreigncapital.

In their mind, Chinese society is being pulled by the reformers into aglobal capitalist system. However, they say, it is not the Western-style mod-ernization, but rather a modernity of “dependency.” China has developed


an export-oriented economy, while its GDP has rapidly increased, its work-ers have been cruelly exploited by transnational capital, its natural resourceshave been plundered, its ecological environment has been polluted anddamaged, the polarization of society has grown more severe, and socialinequality has become intolerable.19 They argue that they have rediscov-ered the implications and importance of the Cultural Revolution: first, Mao’sintention of launching the Cultural Revolution was good. Second, the Cul-tural Revolution did not lead the country on the verge of the bankruptcy.On the contrary, China made improvements in certain areas of the economy.Third, during the Cultural Revolution, China made significant achievementsin foreign affairs.20

The New Leftists thus attribute all of China’s social maladies to whatthey term “the resurrection of capitalism” in a nominally socialist state.Their crude prescription is a second Cultural Revolution, a sweeping polit-ical movement that would uproot corruption and return the power to themasses, restoring social justice in the process. Some New Leftists contendthat China’s ideal politics is that outlined in Mao’s May 7th Directive: theelimination of three major distinctions (between town and country, industryand agriculture, and physical and mental labor) and the creation of a totallyequal society.21 The mob dictatorship of the Cultural Revolution, still etchedin many people’s memories, have left the Chinese people more aware thanmost of the potential outcome of such upheavals. However, in the mindsof the New Leftists, the “grand democracy” (daminzhu) was a great trainingschool. Actually, the so-called grand democracy allowed an ignorant mob tohumiliate members of the political and intellectual elites.

Among the New Leftists, Cui Zhiyuan is of particular interest. For Cui,Mao’s theory of the Cultural Revolution is of tremendous value, in particu-lar his concept of the “grand democracy.” Cui argues that the Maoist conceptof “righteous rebellion” (zaofan youli) should be institutionalized because itwould provide the means by which the masses could begin to express theirown negations of society.22 Cui talked several positive elements in the legacyof Mao Zedong’s era, from which, he thinks, institutional innovation canstem. He further connects American innovations in workplace democracyand economic justice to his constructive revaluation of some Maoist experi-ments and to the success stories of collective rural and township enterprisesin China. In an article on the Angang Constitution, the internal charterwritten in the 1950s by the Anshan Steel Company in China’s northeastregion, Cui considers the Angang Constitution to be a Chinese version ofpost-Fordism that advocated economic democracy.

The New Left is of the view that there are elements of traditional social-ism that are worthy of being recuperated and redeployed. For example, HanYuhai has spoken of the values of the working-class dictum “one participate,two transform, and triple combination” (Yican, ergai, sanjiehe) as being a tra-ditional socialist resource that can be recuperated. Yican, ergai, sanjiehe is aCultural Revolution era shorthand for the worker’s takeover of factories from


the old party-state structure sponsored by the Maoist-led apparatus. Liberalscholars have challenged this view, pointing out Yican, ergai, sanjiehe andthe Angang Constitution had nothing to do with economic democracy. GaoHua (1954–2012), a well-known historian, points out that the so-called eco-nomic democracy is just the imagination constructed by some New Leftistsand unrelated to the conditions of the Angang workers.23

The spread of nostalgia for the Cultural Revolution is not without cause,as the spirit of revolution continues to haunt China. Hu Shuli, a pro-gressive editor, described a “collective amnesia” surrounding the CulturalRevolution. “Files on that episode in our history remain ‘secret’ ” and “oldergenerations do not dare look back, while our younger generations don’thave the remotest inkling of the Cultural Revolution.”24 Moreover, in 1978,about half of the 35 million members of the CCP have been admitted dur-ing the Cultural Revolution.25 Many of them advanced their careers through“beating, smashing, and looting,” or otherwise supporting the violence ofthe Cultural Revolution, and they saw the abandonment of radial Maoismas a threat to their careers. In 2012, then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao warnedthat China runs a risk of repeating the Cultural Revolution, if the countryfails to make political reforms.26

In present-day China, bureaucratic capitalism, rampant corruption, eco-nomic polarization, and social injustice evoke memories of China under theCultural Revolution. The broad array of reforms, proposed at the third ple-nary session of the Party’s 18th Central Committee held in November 2013,signals that Beijing is serious about jolting the Party into changing course.The challenge Beijing faces remains to be how to implement them. Vestedinterest blocs have already benefited plenty from the existing system and areresistant to change. Ironically, some New Leftists are still convinced that amass movement like the Cultural Revolution would be the answer to China’scurrent problem. Cui Zhiyuan, for instance, calls for “reconstitution andreconstruction of reasonable elements of the Cultural Revolution under newcircumstances.” One of these elements is Mao’s call to “repeat the CulturalRevolution every seven to eight years.” Cui proposes, “we should institu-tionalize (Mao’s directive) in the form of periodical national elections, andthis is the real essence of the dictatorship of the people’s democracy or thedictatorship of the proletariat.”27 However, Cui’s positive evaluation of theCultural Revolution has attracted much criticism and suspicion. The NewLeftists’ call to return to the mass political movement of the Mao era hasalso harmed their reputation.

Bringing state socialism back in

In the past few decades, China has enjoyed an unusually long run of high“catch-up” economic growth, continuing to close the income gap betweenChina and the highest income countries. State-centered growth is a policyprescription advocated by the New Left. The remarkable successes of China’s


economic growth, as many New Left scholars point out, are attributable pri-marily to the state-led development. The New Leftists maintain that thestate is no longer a purely external, alienated country, but rather a mod-ern nation-state constructed during China’s modernization process with thehelp of the individual, and that this kind of state also participated in the con-struction on society. Consequently, human freedom must be reconsidered inthe framework of globalized capitalism under which state and society as wellas power and capital are woven tightly together.28

The New Leftists hold that the problems of injustice and other negativeeffects of privatization, marketization, and globalization could be redressedby state power. They argue for strengthening the state and breaking whatthey see as a “state capitalist” alliance between the rich and the power-ful. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the New Leftists were quickto pronounce the death of the market-centric approach and proposed withmuch fanfare the advance of state socialism as a new developmental modelthat the Chinese leadership should adopt. China did recover quickly fromthe financial crisis in 2008, largely as a result of a dramatic, carefully tar-geted stimulus package. The New Leftists deem that a strong state is part andparcel of Chinese history, buttressed by its long tradition and practice of amerit-based mandarin system.29 In the world today, where the rules of thegame are mostly shaped by the West, it is difficult to imagine how, with-out a strong state, a developing country can develop and prosper.30 WangShaoguang argues that the notion of a small government and a big marketis fundamentally flawed, and that the Chinese government should furtherexpand to become an “efficiently operated” government.31 In addition, theNew Left scholars think the weak state does not allow the country to carryout much-needed institutional reforms or execute with reasonable efficiencymany needed reform programs.

Many liberals believe that a Western-style free market is required foreconomic growth and that the sustainability of such growth depends onthe functioning of liberal democracy. But the New Leftists consider theseassumptions untenable. They believe that political stability as ensured by astrong “state” is precisely required for sustainable growth. The large-scalebailout actions taken by the United States and other Western govern-ments echoed the New Left’s demand for enhanced state capacity and moreintervention and supervision over the market.

Liberals contend that the free market is still the most efficient mechanismto promote the economy and point out that the government is unlikely toreturn to the mode of command economy. Some of them even claim thatsocial tensions increased after the 1994 tax reform, which centralized rev-enues and left the localities, or at least those without significant industry ornot near cities where residents could find work, bereft of local revenue. It isno coincidence that the number of mass protests began to increase rapidlysince 1994. Liberal economists find that the government’s intervention in


the economic arena is the root cause of corruption and inefficiency, andthus have to be reduced to a minimum.

In a nutshell, the New Leftists view market-oriented reform as a prob-lem requiring fundamental rethinking. They maintain that the problemsof injustice and other negative effects of privatization, marketization, andglobalization could be redressed by state power and a revival of Maoism.

Criticizing universal values

At the end of the previous decade, the issue of “universal values” becamea source of fierce debate in China. Liberals urged the government to acceptthe global consensus and follow the global trend. The global financial crisisprovided the New Left with a good opportunity to counter attack the liberals.China is thus one of the most prominent examples contradicting the earlierclaim that the end of the Cold War would also bring about the “end ofhistory.”32 In recent years, the New Left waged fresh attacks on the humanrights as “universal values” that the West has been advocating for years.Chen Kuiyuan, then president of the CASS, is one of the most prominentindividuals who waged the attacks. Chen charged that some people weredancing the tune of the West by championing “universal values” in China.Chen states:

In the past, Christianity promoted its doctrines as universal values.At present, the West is dominant in discourse, claiming their values suchas “democracy,” “human rights,” and free market economic theory to beuniversal values. Some people in our country have also danced to theirtones, advocating adopting these ‘universal values’ for China.33

Feng Yuzhang, a professor of Qinghua University, argues that “the univer-sal values were simply a ploy of the West to overthrow China’s socialistsystem.”34 Chen Weigang, a professor at University of Macao, argues:

The rise of China as a formidable economic power, which constitutessuch a sharp contrast to the ineffective struggles taking place in Russiaand other former socialist and developing countries, forces us to reach anear-paradoxical conclusion: given the persistence of peripheral liberaldeformation, de-liberalization or de-Westernization is almost a logicalprerequisite for the upward mobility of a peripheral nation within thecapitalist world system that is controlled and dominated by the Westerncore countries.35

Chen adds that only against this background may we understand whythere is currently a widespread resentment of “human-rights imperialism”across the peripheral world, why peripheral nations insist on the primacy


of national sovereignty over democratization, and why it is “in the realmof culture that emerging market nations in Asia and Latin America now feelmost threatened and in which they are most insistently demanding indepen-dence and freedom from Western domination.”36 Not surprisingly, the pastfew decades have witnessed a burgeoning movement across the non-Westernworld that seeks to “Confucianize” or “Islamize” modernity by effectivelyresisting Western values, institutions, and practices.37

Promoting the “China Model”

In the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008, the China Model becamethe subject of much debate.38 Should China adhere to the universal valuesof humanity and integrate into the global mainstream of civilization or seekunique Chinese values to provide an alternative modernity for the world?In other words, it is now a polemic between “universal values” and the ChinaModel. The China Model was advanced as an alternative source of universalnorms. Pan Wei reasons that China’s success can be judged only accord-ing to “Chinese characteristics” because it is fundamentally different fromthe West. Hu Angang agrees, declaring that Western economic theory can-not understand China’s unique “national conditions.”39 The goal here is todevelop Chinese discursive power, the Chinese perspective, and the Chineseschool of social science to fight for the PRC in global ideological battles.

The basis of the China Model advanced by Pan Wei and others after the“great financial crisis” was “the continuity of Chinese civilization.”40 On thisbasis, the model defended the state-owned economy and its vested inter-ests as an advanced economic management without the constraints of theWestern value package; the implicit argument is, “Given that we spurn thedeceitful West, we are opposed to its values; so the state owned economy andthe one-party autocracy must be good.”41 Pan Wei’s China Model dreams ofa World of Great Harmony where the indigenous Chinese ideals of people-centered politics, public/private economy, and the organic village society aretaken seriously in a Cold War-type struggle against the “Western” universalsof democracy and human rights.42

Zhang Weiwei, a leading New Left scholar, argues that China is uniqueas “the world’s only amalgam of an ancient civilization and a huge mod-ern state” and is “increasingly returning to its own roots for inspiration,and producing its own norms and standards.”43 Zhang’s The China Wave, abestseller in China, offers a vigorous summary of the China Model theory.Zhang defines China as a rising civilizational state and argues that as suchit should not accept the Western political model, otherwise it will lose itsadvantages and risks disintegration. Unlike the politically diffuse civiliza-tions of Europe, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent, China hasmanaged to establish political unity over most of its territory. The ChinaModel differs from traditional socialism mainly in its use of a market systemin the economy. Politically, it also differs in its commitment to democracy


with Chinese characteristics and to a new model of party leadership. Zhangconsiders that China’s reform performs much better than the reform effortsin many other countries that have tried to emulate the Western ways. Eco-nomically, China has shocked the world. Such remarkable successes wereattributable primarily to the model of the developmental state. It will find itsown political path and win praise from the entire world. Zhang stresses thatChinese supporters of the Western model should “emancipate their minds”and to set themselves free from the numb Western discourse. It is impor-tant to note that a small but growing number of countries in the developingworld have looked at China as a model for rapid growth.

With increasing confidence, China seems to enter a new era of Chineseexceptionalism. Meanwhile, there is a lot of criticism about the ChinaModel. Critics believe the main goal of the China Model is to affirmand support the current system of governance, which stresses the Leninistvalue of state power. Furthermore, as China still faces many challenges,it is too early to suggest a uniquely Chinese economic model. The lib-erals believe that it would only serve despotism and nationalism andwould prevent China from merging into the mainstream of human civi-lizations. In their view, a distinctive Chinese path that emphasizes plac-ing China outside the “mainstream of human civilization” (that is, theinstitutions and culture of liberal modernity) could only intend to andresult in prolonging the present political autocracy. And without democ-racy and the rule of law, individual freedom and liberation and freedevelopment of market economy would be only empty words. There-fore, how to understand the theory and practice of the Chinese modelhas become the focus of the present ideological and even political strug-gle in China.44 In sum, the New Leftists advocated an unique path ofreform and modernization. They maintain that China could challengethe Western model of liberal democracy and market economy. But theliberals still doubt on whether China is to overcome its accumulatingproblems and offer a genuine alternative to the Western model of devel-opment.

The rise and fall of the “Chongqing Model”

Bo Xilai served as a member of the Politburo and Party Secretary ofChongqing, a megacity of 30 million people, from 2007 to 2012. He startedwith a campaign against mafia-like secret societies, followed with a pro-gram that would distinguish him from other potential candidates for thePolitburo Standing Committee (PBSC). During his tenure in Chongqing, hereinvented himself as a born-again Maoist. Bo repopularized “red culture” –songs, poems, and iconography popular in the third quarter of the 20th cen-tury, when Mao Zedong ran China – across the city and then the nation,becoming the pin-up boy for the New Left, the Old Left, the Maoist Left,and, to a degree, all those attracted to the allure of rising power. Bo also


instituted economic policies that were aimed to win the support of thepoor. He increased spending on infrastructure projects and attracted a largeamount of foreign investment, accelerating the economic growth of theregion. His campaign also included sending cadres and students to workin the fields and factories. Such practices are known as the ChongqingModel.

The Chongqing Model gave the New Left intellectuals a real place, whichthey could viably claim was putting their ideas into practice. To them, Chinais unique and cannot be remade into the West; they reject the idea of a uni-versal model of development. Bo’s “Chongqing experiment” provided theNew Leftists with a set of ideas that could compete against the liberals’ advo-cacy of the market and democracy. Pretty soon extensive discussions aboutthe China Model began to appear in the Chinese press and social media.Advocates of the China Model, reacting in part to the global financial crisisand building off the Chongqing experience, began to argue that China haddeveloped a better model of development and that China could only developif it adhered to Chinese values and rejected those of the West. One byone, leading New Left intellectuals such as Cui Zhiyuan, Li Xiguang, WangShaoguang, and many others went to Chongqing and returned singing itspraises.

The Chongqing Model has been hailed by the New Leftists as a bona fideexample of home-grown political reform, a proof that China can improveits government without copying foreign models. Cui Zhiyuan described theChongqing Model’s dream of prosperity and social justice in a new styleof socialism for the 21st century.45 Wang Shaoguang has labeled this newperiod “Socialism 3.0” in a paper focusing on Chongqing, casting it as thesuccessor Mao’s radical egalitarianism and Deng’s reform and opening.46

Pan Wei, for his part, describes Chongqing as proof that China is movinginto a “post reform and opening era,” returning to the traditional social-ist focus on equality. Arguing that the growth-centered policies of recentdecades have created an unacceptable gap between rich and poor, he says thetime has come for a radical rethinking of Chinese politics. The New Leftistsare using Chongqing, which has encouraged the expansion of state-ownedenterprises, to respond to the economic argument shared by many market-oriented Chinese economists that state investment “crowds out” privateenterprise (guojin mintui). Cui Zhiyuan, who spent much time conductingfield research in Chongqing, argues that in Chongqing, “It’s not the statecrowding out private enterprise. In fact, the state and the market developtogether (guojin minyejin).”

The Chongqing Model, endorsed by the New Left, was found repeatedlyin official, academic, and popular discourse prior to the downfall of Bo Xilai.Today, it still has tremendous appeal among the poor and low-income peo-ple, given the prevalence of inequality and social injustice. Web sites with astrong New Left inclination have continued attracting a lot of attention. For


instance, Wang Hui, the “standard bearer” of China’s New Left, published apaper arguing that the Chongqing Model developed under Bo was a genuinesocialist reform that threatened the supporters of neoliberalism in China.47

However, the arrest of Bo Xilai in March 2012 has deflated the ChongqingModel and cost the New Left much of the intellectual momentum that it hadbuilt up earlier. The New Left thinking is currently under rigorous challenge.Utopia, the mouthpiece of the New Left, was shut down in April 2012, butnot because of its violent taunting of liberals; it was closed because it hadbecome a rallying point for Bo Xilai’s supporters after his downfall.48 All ofthese developments erode the foundation of the Chongqinq Model.

Conclusion

After more than three decades of dramatic reforms, the New Left is still amajor challenge to market-oriented reforms. The New Leftists have com-bined Maoism, populism, statism, and nationalism in their analysis ofpolitical development in China. The Chinese intellectual scene has beentransformed by the emergence of a New Left. Over the last two decades,it has been the “New Left” thinkers such as Wang Hui who have attractedthe most attention, especially on the international stage.49 Yet, in China,economics as a discipline is dominated by neoclassical economics with onlya trace of left-wing Marxist economics.

While it may be doubted that New Leftism will ever come to dominate theintellectuals, particularly in academy, still it is firmly established as a livelyand important trend in Chinese intellectual life. The New Left discourseis significant in several ways. In the first place, given that an increasingnumber of Chinese intellectuals have been pondering the side effects ofglobalization and market reform over the past 20 years, one can arguethat the Chinese government has already taken some of the New Leftists’arguments seriously.50 Second, populism in China was expressed most unam-biguously in the Cultural Revolution, but it has reemerged in the reformperiod in protests against official corruption and has since become a pillarof New Leftism. As long as there is social injustice, the New Left is likely tohold sway.

Third, New Leftism emerged with the rise of nationalism, another influ-ential trend, and together they have played an important role in China.Nationalism has caused some people to question whether the Party isnationalistic enough in sticking up for Chinese interests. Despite the contro-versies, the New Left still displays itself as a force with great appeal amongpeasants, workers, and college students. Even though there was a strongstatist element in New Leftism, the New Left movement as a whole is notendorsed by the party-state.

4Democratic Socialism

Democratic socialism is an intellectual strand within the Marxian tradition,but it is critical of Stalinist variants of socialism and looks to the later writ-ings of Engels as a source for socialism and democracy. The renewal of socialdemocracy has become a focus of ideological debate in China as the con-cept of social democracy has gained its political and intellectual momentumworldwide. Meanwhile, social democracy has not only come to power inmany countries, it has succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of its founders.1

Chinese scholars have been exploring the Third Way, a democratic alterna-tive to the capitalism and communism. The idea of finding a “third way”has been widely discussed since the late 1980s. Over the past 30 years, socialdemocracy has regained public attention and has become an importantcomponent of academic discourse in China.

This chapter addresses the following questions: how and under what cir-cumstances did democratic socialism emerge in China? What are the majorarguments of the democratic socialist theorists? Does Northern Europe offera better social, political, and economic model? To what extent have thesocial democrats’ arguments been taken into consideration by the party-state? Will the policy programs of the current regime, which embody themajor concerns of democratic socialism, lead China to a different politicaldirection?

Origins and early history

Anyone who writes about “social democracy” confronts an interpretiveproblem at the outset: what does the term mean? Indeed, it is not easy todefine social democracy in a simple way. The scholarly work laid down onthe topic of social democracy is plentiful, to say the least, and often incoher-ent. Many simply refer social democracy to all forms of socialism that followan electoral, reformist, or evolutionary path to socialism, rather than a rev-olutionary one. Neither Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932), the leading socialdemocrat, nor the democratic socialists after him had a very clear definition.

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Democratic Socialism 61

Indeed, social democracy is a rather complex system of ideas, which includesmany concepts such as freedom, solidarity, equality, and social justice. Socialdemocracy comes in various national, political, and ideological forms.2

In this book, social democracy is defined as a political ideology that advo-cates a peaceful, evolutionary transformation through democratic meanssuch as election and state-initiated programs. It differs from both liberalcapitalism and communism in that it promotes a balanced approach towardequality and liberty and avoids the classical trade-off between the two goalsunder either liberal capitalism or communism.

The Chinese translation of “social democracy” is shehui minzhu zhuyi andthat of “democratic socialism” is minzhu shehui zhuyi. These two terms areinterchangeable in China. It is necessary to distinguish social democracyfrom democratic socialism in the historical context. The former developedin the early 20th century as a moderate branch of international socialism andthe latter as a major Leftist force in the West. By contrast, most of the politi-cal parties transformed from the communist parties in the former Soviet bloccountries have chosen the term “democratic socialism.”3 In general, both ofthem advocate a policy in favor of social justice and equality, as well as ademocratic transition.

In the late 19th century, “revisionist” was used to describe social demo-crat writers such as Eduard Bernstein who sought to revise Karl Marx’s ideasabout the transition to socialism and asserted that revolution through forcewas not necessary to achieve a socialist society. The views of Bernsteingave rise to reformist theory, which asserts that socialism can be achievedthrough gradual peaceful reforms from within a capitalist system. The Prereq-uisites for Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy (1899) was Bernstein’smost significant work and was principally concerned with refuting Marx’spredictions about the imminent demise of capitalism.4 His observationsabout capitalism led him to believe that it was not leading to an increas-ing concentration of wealth, but rather was becoming increasingly com-plex and adaptable. Bernstein believed that socialism would be achievedthrough capitalism, not through capitalism’s destruction. It is due to thefact that rights were gradually won by workers, their cause for grievancewould be diminished, and consequently, so too would the foundation ofrevolution.

Spread of social democracy in China

The Chinese intellectual discussion on social democracy can be tracedback to the Republican period.5 During much of that period, the Chineseintelligentsia looked to the Western ideas for a source of wealth and powerwhich would lead China to modernity. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father ofthe Republic of China (ROC), was deeply impressed with the writings ofHenry George about adopting a single tax system. He called for “equalization


of land rights” and “restriction of capital.” Sun’s scheme of Tianxia weigong6

embraces the idea of equality, social justice, and great harmony (datong).Sanmin zhuyi (Three Principles of the People) developed by Sun represents aform of social democracy. Sun was prepared to forestall the social inequalitiesassociated with capitalist development.7 Sanmin zhuyi considers the peopleto be the collective ownership of the state, and public interests are above therulers’ own self-interest.

Democratic socialism was inspired by the socialist movements in WesternEurope in the interwar years, especially in the Weimar Germany andEngland.8 Jiang Kanghu (1883–1954) advocated socialism and organizedthe Chinese Socialist Party in Shanghai in November 1911. The Party grewrapidly to 400,000 members, but it was dissolved by the Yuan Shikai’sgovernment in 1913. After visiting the Soviet Union in 1921–1922, Jiangreturned to China once more to try to establish socialism there. He revivedthe Chinese Socialist Party in 1924, which he reorganized in 1925 into theSocial Democratic Party, giving it a platform similar to those of the WesternEuropean social democratic organizations. In advocating social democracyfor China, the Chinese Socialist Party was not alone. Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), the first general secretary of the CCP, ended his days supporting acombination of parliamentary democracy and democratic socialism.9 Twosmall political groups, National Socialist Party of China (Zhongguo guojiashehui dang, NSP) and later the Socialist Party of China (Zhongguo minzhushehui dang, DSP) also espoused social democracy. However, with the com-munist victory in 1949, social democracy lost its political base in China andMaoism dominated.

The Scandinavian countries were among the first batch of countries thatestablished official diplomatic ties with the PRC in the early 1950s. In spiteof this, total denial of social democracy was China’s official policy formany years. Denunciation of social democracy went hand in hand with thecritique of revisionism of the Soviet Communist Party. Social democraticparties were traditionally regarded as allies of the bourgeoisie. The Chineseroutinely described the social democrats in the West as “modern revision-ists” and “traitors” in much of the 1960s and the 1970s. In the early 1960s,Mao Zedong and the CCP revived the term “revisionism” to attack NikitaKhrushchev and the Soviet Union over various ideological and politicalissues, as part of the Sino-Soviet split.

Many Chinese intellectuals may have heard the names of EduardBernstein and Karl Kautsky (1854–1938), forerunners of social democracy,because they were associated with “revisionism” and denounced by theChinese media frequently prior to the late 1970s. However, their knowledgeof these figures’ ideas does not go beyond the sound bite. The exposure toless prominent scholars is far more restricted. They certainly do not recog-nize foreign names like Antony Giddens and Henry George, and have, ofcourse, read none of their writings, not even the most famous.10


Research on social democracy began in the mid-1980s and led to numer-ous articles and book publications.11 Within the context of mainland China,authors were extremely cautious to make openly dissenting statements.Instead, they had to rely on quotes, often from foreign sources, to presenttheir views. In this way, they could make indirect statements on sensitiveissues, provided they refrained from any overt personal judgment. This washow the topic of social democracy was introduced.12 Starting from the early1980s, the CCP established party-to-party relationships with social demo-cratic parties throughout the world. Major think tanks have studied theideology and organizations of various European social democratic parties,hoping to borrow useful features from them. Additionally, ambassadors fromEuropean countries to China were invited to give talks on social democraticmodels of their home countries at a variety of Chinese universities and thinktanks.

Nonetheless, the image of social democracy was “tarnished” by MikhailGorbachev when he described perestroika as building a “new, humane, anddemocratic socialism.” From the Chinese perspective in the late 1980s andearly 1990s, the Gorbachev’s reform essentially embarked on a social demo-cratic reform course. A major conclusion in the CCP’s analysis of the collapseof communist rule in the Soviet Union was that flirting with social democ-racy was to be avoided at all costs, for otherwise China would become asunstable as Russia. In 1998, Pierre Mauroy, then president of the SocialistInternational, visited China and the CCP normalized the relationship withthat important international association.13

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Chinese debate on the direc-tion and strategy of reforms has been intensifying. The writings of Bernsteinand Karl Kautsky were reexamined. Writing in Yanhuang Chunqiu in February2007, Xie Tao, former deputy president of Renmin University, warned thatunless the Party embraced democracy, it was headed for defeat. The solutionto such crisis, in his view, was to follow the Swedish paragon of democraticsocialism.

Xie’s article in 2007 has created a storm in China and has since rekindledthe domestic debate on social democracy.14 The Chinese social democratshave quite a few things in common. First, they are mostly scholars or reform-minded veteran cadres who joined the CCP prior to the victory of theCommunist Revolution in 1949. They are known as liangtouzhen (true believ-ers of liberty and democracy in their later years just like when they wereyoung). They are frustrated that their dreamed socialism has become cronycapitalism, which is controlled by the rich and powerful. Second, their ideaof democratic socialism got developed and matured in their late years. Forinstance, Xie Tao wrote his paper of social democracy at the age of 85. Manyof them have originally been Marxists. Some of them are “critical intellec-tuals.” A few of them, such as Qin Hui, Li Rui, and Cao Siyuan, could beconsidered simultaneously liberal and democratic socialist thinkers.15


Third, they regularly expound on social democracy through contributionto newspapers, journals, and blogs. Yet, they are not linked with politicalorganizations or nongovernmental organizations abroad, thus denying theauthorities any pretext to silence them. For instance, Yanhuang Chunqiu,their leading voice with a hard copy circulation of over 60,000 and steadilyincreasing, is officially registered.16 Last, but not the least, they are strongsupporters of the reform. In the words of Xie Tao, China did not collapse inthe event of tremendous changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.This credit should go to Deng Xiaoping, for launching reform and open-ing up policies prior to the upheaval.17 Simply put, social democracy isa main school of thought or intellectual current, but not a mass politicalmovement.

Intellectual discourse on social democracy

There is an unprecedented tendency to regard the ideas of social democ-racy as a source for inspiration and of solutions for the problems in China.Some establishment intellectuals, as well as liberal intellectuals, argue thatsocial democracy should not be rejected in the first place because “scientificsocialism” was originally known as social democracy. By definition, socialdemocracy means socialism plus democracy, two of the fully legitimate goalsfor the official ideology; that social democracy has proven to be the bestmethod for the developed capitalist world to achieve socialism; and thatsocial democracy has been effectively adapted to the changing environmentof the world.18

Central to the theory of social democracy was the idea that the political,legal, and ethical spheres of modern society had to be developed to counterthe harshness of capitalism. Through the lens of democratic socialism, work-ers need to be protected from greed of the market, the environment needs tobe shielded from the destructive forces of expanding industrialization, andthe gap between the rich and poor needs to be narrowed. The limitationsof capitalism therefore need to be transcended because they are inherentlyinadequate to protect society from the negative effects of capitalism.19

According to Xie Tao, after World War II, there have been three socialsystems in the world. The first is the capitalist system led by the UnitedStates; the second was the communist system (or violent socialism) led bythe Soviet Union; and the third is the democratic socialist system led bySweden. The winner of this competition has been democratic socialism,which has transformed not only capitalism but also socialism.

From time to time, reform-minded Chinese scholars raise the issue ofpossibly transferring to European-style social democracy. They call for the“third path” between capitalism and communism. Zhang Rulun, professorof philosophy at Fudan University, stressed that political democracy and eco-nomic democracy must work as a pair, like the two wheels of a cart and


the two wings of a bird. Without economic democracy, political democracywill lose its fundamental meaning; without political democracy, economicdemocracy could not be guaranteed.20 Contemporary Chinese discussion ondemocratic socialism is dominated by the following, sometimes overlapping,themes: constitutional government, democratic socialism as the orthodoxMarxism, reassessing capitalism, deep but incremental political reform, andthe Swedish model of social democracy.

Constitutional government

Like their counterparts in Europe, thinkers in the camp of democratic social-ists put the subject of constitutional government above all other objectives.Right from the beginning of the adoption of open-door policy, Chinesescholars were committed to looking for the path of economic and societaldevelopment suitable to China. Many of them call for adoption of a com-petitive electoral system and a multiparty system. Some of them decided tofocus on specific subfields of law in order to substantially promote the ruleof law in China.

In an article published in 2011, Xu Juezhai, a researcher at ShanghaiAcademy of Social Sciences, quoted (Engels wrote in 1891): “If anything iscertain, it is this: that our party and the working class can only come topower under the form of a democratic republic. This is even the specificform for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the great French Revolutionhas already shown.”21 Clearly, 40 years after the publication of the Com-munist Manifesto, young Engles’ view on the dictatorship of the proletariatchanged.

The central theme of Xie’s paper “The Social Democratic Model andChina’s Future” is constitutional government (xianzheng). In his viewpoint,“only democratic constitutionalism can provide fundamental solutionsto the Party’s corruption problem. Only democratic socialism can saveChina.”22 Cao Siyuan, a key proponent of constitutional and political reformwho has been dubbed as the “father of China’s insolvent law,” notes thatthere was competition between social democracy with constitutional gov-ernment and totalitarian socialism under dictatorship in the 20th century.Constitutional government was the key to the success of the Swedish sus-tained economic development.23 Li Rui, a former secretary to Mao Zedong,has openly called for the adoption of the Scandinavian-style democraticsocialism. Li said he agreed with the late patriarch Deng Xiaoping that mostparty members were not even sure what socialism meant. “Yet we can besure of one thing,” from Li’s point of view, “Socialism cannot do withoutdemocracy, and it cannot do without rule of law.”24 There seems to be anagreement among social democrats that the CCP’s only way out is throughimplementing constitutional democracy. As Xie Tao put it, “As the rulingparty, the Communist Party must make fundamental changes in its methodof operation.” He went on to say,


From reform of the system of leadership by the ruling party to reformof the country’s political system, this two-step strategy may well be aconstitutional path with Chinese characteristics.25

Nevertheless, the scholars who embrace social democracy are becomingincreasingly vocal in their calls for profound political reform to adopt areal multiparty political system and liberal constitutional democracy. Somescholars believe the “Democratic Party” or the “Socialist Party” would bemore “realistic” or “practical,” given that the CCP in fact does not prac-tice communism. Li Rui even called the CCP to change its name to theChinese Social Democratic Party and join the Socialist International.26 How-ever, there is little chance that the CCP will consider, much less accept, aname change on those grounds.

Democratic socialism as the orthodox Marxism

The past three decades have witnessed frequent calls for correct under-standing of Marxism in the Chinese intellectual circles. There have beenmajor efforts to distinguish radical Marxism from later writings of Marxand Engels.27 According to Xie Tao, Marx and Engels in their later yearswere democratic socialists and initiators of “peaceful transition to social-ism.” In his view, democratic socialism is the orthodox of Marxism.28 Engels’ideas about “peaceful evolution” were fully developed in the Preface to KarlMarx’s The Class Struggles in France, which was considered the “political willof Engels.”29 Xie quoted Engels:

But we, too, have been shown to have been wrong by history, which hasrevealed our point of view of that time to have been an illusion. It hasdone even more: it has not merely destroyed our error of that time; it hadalso completely transformed the conditions under which the proletariathas to fight. The mode of struggle of 1848 is today obsolete from everypoint of view, and this is a point which deserves closer examination onthe present occasion.30

Scholars in the democratic socialism camp emphasize that Marxism is atheory of humanism rather than class struggle and Marxism is consistentwith individual rights, equality, and democracy. Of course, social democratshave frequently debated among themselves over how to interpret Marx’swritings and how to apply his concepts to their contemporary events andconditions. For instance, Ma Licheng, a former senior editor of the People’sDaily’s commentary page, states that in his later years, Engels emphasizedthe importance of transforming capitalism to socialism through election,but he did not totally abandon the idea of gaining the power throughviolent means.31 In the eyes of social democrats, Engels denied the futuresocial model designed when he was young. In a similar vein, Bernstein


wrote that “the ultimate aim of socialism is nothing, but the movement iseverything.”32 In his work, Xin Zilin, a retired researcher at National DefenseUniversity, quoted the following 93 words of Engels in Chinese:

Thus great stress is laid on the dictum that Communism is not a mereparty doctrine of the working-class, but a theory compassing the eman-cipation of society at large, including the capitalist class, from its presentnarrow conditions. This is true enough in the abstract, but absolutelyuseless, and sometimes worse, in practice.33

Xin states that aforementioned 93 words in Chinese cited by him provedthat Engels discarded communism in his later years. Zhang Qiuyuan arguesthat, in his view, Marx and Engels realized that some of their ideas wereimpractical and made three major revisions to their thinking: (1) the Com-munist Party and the working class can only come to power under the formof a democratic republic; (2) violent revolution advocated by the Commu-nist Manifesto has long gone out of date; and (3) social democracy should beimplemented.34

Reassessment of capitalism

It has become apparent that Western Europe has advanced while theSoviet Union and Eastern Europe floundered because the latter followed theStalinist model. Chinese intellectuals have taken notice that the capitaliststate has in many cases become the largest owner, the largest investor, thelargest buyer of commodities and service, and the largest creditor to providefinancing.35 In their view, capitalism seems to be “converging” with social-ism naturally and peacefully, because modern capitalism has already beensocialized and contains social feature. They argue that Western capitalism,with its extensive democracy and welfare mechanisms, has reached a newphase of “democratic socialism,” a peaceful way in which society can becomesocialist. This analysis means that the experience of the Western countriescould serve as a model for China. In the words of He Fang, former deputydirector of the Center for International Studies under the State Council, “theroad pursued by democratic socialist countries is basically right.”36 The pro-ponents of democratic socialism hold that the Communist Manifesto shouldbe read as mere statement of intent rather than as a workable social pro-gram. Marx and Engels were never explicit on the operational procedures ofthe proletarian dictatorship. Most ideas for developing socialism politicallyand economically that have come to be regarded as orthodox socialism areattributable to Lenin and Stalin. These two men essentially equated the insti-tutionalization of socialism with the concentration of power in the hands ofthe Party elite.

It is well known among Marxists that Marx said much about capitalism,more precisely, capitalism during the 19th century but little about socialism.


Their experience in China and study of Marxism boil down to an embarrass-ing question: why is that the capitalist West has accumulated so much morewealth than what the socialist world has ever witnessed? They found thatabsolute free economy will not result in equitable distribution of wealth.They see democratic socialism as the only alternative to this kind of ruthlesscapitalism.

Farewell to revolution

The Chinese social democrats believe that China’s road to democracy shouldtake the form of incremental reform. They argue that democracy in Chinahas to be developed through a cumulative, gradual, and orderly process.Most of them are firmly convinced that the existing system could be madeto work peacefully within. Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu, two top scholars involvedin the pro-democracy protests in the Tiananmen Square in 1989, havegrown disenchanted with the cause of radical revolution. Instead, theyargue a country could achieve democracy only after economic progress, per-sonal freedom, and social justice.37 According to them, if there had beenno Revolution of 1911, China would have fared better through constitu-tional monarchy established under the auspices of the Qing government.Li acknowledged that he was heavily influenced by the works of EduardBernstein.38

Such idea was echoed by other scholars such as Xie Tao. Xie said that theChinese reform can be described by three words: haste, wait, and push. Heproclaimed that

one cannot be hasty; but one cannot wait either; so one has to push for-ward. The Communist Party is heading in the right direction towardsconstitutional democracy in small steps. It is impossible to take big steps,and those slow steps will result in many small steps that turn out to bebig changes twenty or thirty years later.39

Xie Tao did not mention multiparty systems explicitly. But he scornedthe Party’s continuing reverence for a “utopian” ideal of communism andwarned, “Political reform cannot be delayed any longer. Seeking to retain theMaoist political system whilst pursuing only economic reform will lead to abureaucratic capitalism of the kind presided over by Chiang Kai-shek andthe Guomindang [the Nationalist Political Party], as they headed towardsdefeat.”40 The Chinese scholars by and large prefer a way of progressiveness.Many of them embraced the idea of “farewell to revolution.” They share theview that China, at this level of development, cannot achieve democracy ina short run. China should instead carry out political reform in a cautiousand gradual manner.


Swedish model of social democracy

The scholars in camp of democratic socialism believe that China shoulddraw on the Sweden experience, which is suitable not only for the West butalso for China. In the post-Mao China, the Chinese intellectuals are con-fronted with a variety of models. The liberals favor the American modeland share the view that the Soviet model has become archaic and shouldbe totally abandoned. Meanwhile, democratic socialism in Sweden providedalternative model. Its sustained economic development and extensive wel-fare programs fascinated many. Numerous scholars within the democraticsocialist camp argue that China should model itself politically and econom-ically on Sweden, which is viewed as more genuinely socialist than China.There is a growing consensus among them that in the Nordic countries thewelfare state has been extraordinarily successful in eliminating poverty.41

It is well known that the CCP wants to imitate other long-lived one-partyregimes that benefit nation with economic growth and stability. Chineseofficials and establishment intellectuals were more interested in knowinghow the Swedish Social Democratic Party could stay in power for a longperiod of time. The possible answer was welfare socialism.42

Actually, what the CCP really thought worthy of imitation is a long-lived institution with one-party rule that benefits nation with economicgrowth and stability, since its legitimacy lies in the economic growth andnot competitive elections. There are several examples of one party achievingdominance over a country (the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, the Insti-tutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, the Guomindang in Taiwan, and thePeople’s Action Party in Singapore) with all their unique characteristics, butin none of these cases have the dominance been as long as in Sweden. Fur-thermore, few other socialist democratic party has had the same influenceover a stable and democratic country.

The Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP), which dominated Sweden formost of the 20th century, has implemented socialist policies alongside cap-italism. The SAP has given the issue of equality top priority and molded itto its ideological package. Both parliament and cabinet have a 50 percentwomen representation, and the Swedish society is generally viewed as oneof the most equal, in particular the labor market. Sweden is one of the mostdemocratic countries in the world with a long period of stability: no warsfor 200 years, and social changes managed without revolution. During theSocial Democratic rule, Sweden has become one of the richest countries inthe world with one of the widest networks of general welfare.43

Xiao Liang proposed that one notion of the economic basis of the social-ist superstructure should be taxation, rather than public ownership. As theeconomy grows, the sources of taxation will grow and thus also the powerof the state. With this power, the state can correct unjust economic dis-tribution and create a socialist market economy with market features and


social justice and equality.44 This scenario is more or less a blueprint of theSwedish model of the so-called cradle-to-grave welfare capitalism. In 2007,Xie Tao raised the subject in a lengthy essay under the headline “The Modelof Democratic Socialism and China’s Future.” In the paper, Xie cites Swedenas a model for a largely egalitarian society with adequate welfare benefitsas well as full protection of the rights of workers and farmers.45 Ironically,in recent decades, social democrats in Sweden have implemented neoliberalpolicies to the extent that many believe the “Swedish model” to be dead andburied.

A number of scholarly works deal with how social democratic partiesunder changing economic and social conditions have managed to broadentheir popular support, even among the rural population and the self-employed. The main reason was seen as their flexibility in responding tochanges without insisting on dogmatic positions. The inquiry of the Swedishsocial democracy is likely to increase in the future. From the Chinese per-spective, the study of the Swedish social democracy is necessary in order tolearn how to reform society and change the party from a revolutionary partyto a governing party. In the aftermath of the global financial meltdown, asubstantial number of Chinese scholars began to advocate using active state-initiated programs to ameliorate or remove the injustices inflicted by theunbridled market. Welfare state in Northern Europe is not feasible in China.

Zheng Yongnian, a Singapore-based Chinese scholar, stressed that themost contentious aspect of social democracy in China is the “democracy”part, or to put it more plainly, the question of a multiparty system.46 Appar-ently, the Beijing leadership has forgotten that democracy is the foundationof all sustainable and effective social policies. Without democracy, there isno Scandinavian or “Chinese style” harmony and justice. History shows thatwithout democracy there is no true socialism, and without socialism there isno true democracy.

Critiques from the Left and the Right

Democratic socialism can at times appear as if all good things go together –when very often they don’t. In practice, there are essential and irresolvabletensions between liberalism and state socialism and their principal values:equality, liberty, and authority. Democratic socialism draws criticism fromboth the liberal and New Left camps. Neither of them sees Sweden as asuitable model for China. Without any doubt, democratic socialism and lib-eralism bear a strong resemblance to each other on the subject of democracy,especially when they both advocate liberty and constitutional democracy.In history, it is liberalism that first came into being in the West and provideda “platform” for social democracy to ascend to rectify the problems that grewout of unbridled capitalism.


More moderate liberals, such as Qin Hui at Qinghua University inBeijing and Xu Jilin at East China Normal University in Shanghai, promotesomething closer to social democracy that seeks to limit both the power ofthe state and of the market. According to Qin Hui, there is a strong “overlap-ping consensus” between liberalism and social democracy in contemporaryChina, and the differences between liberals and social democrats have notyet become an issue.47

The obvious similarities between liberals and social democrats, however,should not lead us to ignore their differences. Democratic socialists dif-fer from liberals in three respects. First, social democrats claim diversityin the origin of their theory, which derives its key doctrines ranging fromFerdinand Lassalle (1825–1864) to Bernstein. The liberals consider classicalliberalism their unequivocal theoretical root. Liberals, like Xu Youyu, insistthat any social democratic solution to China’s problems can only be con-sidered within a liberal-democratic constitutional framework. Liberalism, inhis word, is an “inescapable stage in China’s democracy.” Second, while theliberals lay emphasis on individual liberty, social democrats seek to balanceliberty with equality. Third, social democrats are basically champions of thewelfare state. The liberals hold a reverse view. According to the latter, mar-ket might not be efficient in the short run, but it is very efficient in thelong run. The state should withdraw from interference with the economyas much as possible, since the effects of government intervention distortotherwise rational market process. It is well known that democratic social-ism endorses an active role for the state in the market economy. Socialdemocrats are critical of capitalism and laissez-faire economics; the socioe-conomic gulf between the haves and have-nots is a major concern. However,economic equality has never been the principal goal of liberalism and a biggovernment is slammed by liberals.

Xie’s essay was fiercely attacked by the Old Left. One basic line of attackwas associating Xie Tao with Gorbachev and implicitly with the ensuingchaotic tendencies in Russia. In a Cultural Revolution style, they fitted Xiewith caps such as “revisionist,” “capitalist roader,” and “serving foreigninterests.” There were a dozen criticism meetings during which Xie wasaccused of subverting the Communist Party, socialism, the state, and theParty constitutions. They argued that the Chinese workers had lost theirrights gradually and that division between the superrich and the rest hadgrown dramatically since the beginning of the 21st century. This was areal threat to China’s “harmonious society” and could lead to chaos, evenrevolution.48

Social democracy has rekindled a variety of critical responses. Not surpris-ingly, democratic socialism draws a lot of criticism from the New Left. Utopia,a prominent Web site of the New Left, has a special column to vilify almostevery key article published by Yanhuang Chunqiu. The New Leftists asso-ciate growing inequality and official corruption in today’s China with the


market-oriented reform. They don’t think the social democracy is the rightanswer to the challenges China faces today. For instance, Zhang Shuhua’swork on Gorbachev’s reform concludes that social democratic reform underGorbachev is the root cause for the implosion of the former Soviet Union.49

Some New Leftists argue that the Nordic model is a real capitalism andfake socialism because it does not address the issue of public ownership. Sev-eral studies by the New Left scholars even argue that the global financialcrisis has proved that China’s model is superior to the Anglo-Saxon devel-opment model. They consider that state socialist countries had been moresuccessful in meeting people’s basic needs (nutrition, health care, education,and housing) and improving women’s conditions than capitalist countrieswith similar levels of economic development. Another argument of theNew Left camp was that socialism offers the best hope for humanity toavoid global ecological catastrophes and to build harmonious relationshipsbetween human beings and our environment.50 One New Left scholar cameto the conclusion that democratic socialism and capitalism can only harmChina, and only socialism can save China.51 Some New Leftists assert theHu-Wen administration has moved too far to the right, betraying socialismand interests of the working class.

The New Leftists are skeptical about democratic socialism approach; theydon’t think democratic socialism is suited to China. Pan Wei, professorof political science at Peking University, maintains that social democratsare socialist in the economy and democratic in politics. Yet, they are notinterested in explaining how a welfare state could be practical among theradically different demography of 1.3 billion and simply proclaim that theadoption of a competitive electoral system would allow for the building ofa “welfare state.” Welfare is attractive to the Chinese, but surely not theNordic kind of taxation.52 Therefore, the Nordic model does not fit well inthe Chinese environment.

The arguments of democratic socialism contradict the official discourse.In the view of the party-state, although all the scholars in this camp professa faith in socialism and a desire to advance Marxism, their new interpreta-tion of Marxism has vitiated the most substantive of the Marxist doctrines.To the surprise of many people, including Xie Tao himself, Xie’s paper onsocial democracy was not banned by the Chinese authorities. Three monthsafter the publication of Xie’s essay, Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], the primarymouthpiece of the CCP, published a response to a reader’s inquiry about Xie’sessay. Renmin Ribao dismissed the European version of democracy as unsuit-able for China. Nevertheless, it stated that social democracy “contains somemerits that China could learn.”53 The central government communicatedthe following about Xie’s essay: it will not be disseminated; it will not berepublished; it will not be criticized; and it will not be argued over with themedia. However, individuals are entitled to express their views.54

A number of factors contributed to this. First, most of those advocatesof social democracy are veteran cadres and well-known scholars. Second, a


large number of European nations have social democratic parties as eitherthe ruling or main opposition party. A fierce critique of democratic socialismcould harm the ties between Beijing and these parties. Third, the scholars ofthis camp pursue to reform the existing system within an orthodox Marxistideological framework. They are not linked with political organizations ornongovernmental organizations abroad, thus denying the authorities anypretext to silence them.

In addition, there are some common grounds between democratic social-ism and official ideology. First, they all seek to build a harmonious society.Second, both are committed to reform within an orthodox Marxist ideo-logical framework. Yet, Beijing strongly believes that democratic socialismshould not be used to replace “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”Above all, the reason that social democracy has risen as an attractive alter-native is its ideological neutrality and thus political practicability. As XuYouyu notes, for many people, “Liberalism is too Westernized and irrelevantto China’s national condition; China’s reality is Marxism-Leninism. If liber-alism is at the far ideal end, then social democracy is somewhere between itand the reality.”55

In the foreseeable future, it is not feasible for the Chinese leadership tofully implement the social democracy in China, given that the spread ofsuch kind of democracy could be a challenge for the party-state in the longrun. In his speech on 17 March 2011, Chen Kuiyuan, then president of theCASS, pointed out:

If Marxism is stealthily substituted, and changed out slyly for ‘democraticsocialism,’ ‘neoliberalism’ or other such bourgeois thought systems, thenature of our Party and our country will change.56

Naturally, Chen Kuiyuan’s speech represents more than his personal view-point. He represents formidable powers of hardliners of the party leader-ship. In the Chinese social fabric, apart from a minority of market worship-pers (market fundamentalists) or state worshippers (state fundamentalists),most people have little difficulty in accepting a balance as emphasized bythe European model between the three forces (state, society, and market),especially a balance between market forces and social forces.

Beyond Left and Right?

The Chinese leadership has been searching for an ideological justificationfor China’s ongoing economic and political reforms. For this purpose, socialdemocracy might be appropriate, because it is embedded in an internationalworkers’ movement and does not require the abandonment of the notionof socialism.57 Prior to 4 June 1989, there was broad agreement over gov-ernment’s policy of reform and opening among the Chinese intellectuals.Their attitudes helped promote the public acceptance of the market reform


and open-door policy launched by Deng in 1978. It has become commonfor Beijing to present advanced working drafts of new theoretical and pol-icy positions to meetings of domestic and sometimes foreign experts forfeedback. Such presentations often give a good indication of the directionin which policy is heading. Though the Chinese authorities expressed areservation toward social democracy discussions on multiparty system andcompetitive election, they are more tolerant of the different interpretationsof social democracy.

With the spread of social democracy, the Beijing leadership has started torethink its economic and social policies. In the words of Xie Tao, the reformand open-up policies since 1978 really belonged to democratic socialism,but in order to avoid being called “revisionist,” the reformers referred tothem as the road of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Xie believesthat the constitutional amendment to include the theory of “Three Rep-resents” and the protection of private property marked the beginning ofdemocratic socialism in China.58 Wen Jiabao made a stream of commentson political reforms since the publication of Xie Tao’s article, which essen-tially stressed both the value of democracy and the importance of a gradualapproach.

Contrary to the expectation that tight political control and the cen-sorship in combination make political discourse on democratic transitionirrelevant in China, Beijing has adapted its political ideology to the rapidlychanging Chinese society and economy. Many of the ideas that were previ-ously identified with social democracy have found their way into “socialismwith Chinese characteristics.”59 Bernstein once said that revisionism meansreformism, when this theoretical concept is translated into political lan-guage. In a similar way, the Chinese authorities coined a new catchphrase:“keeping up with the times” (yushijujin in Chinese) to justify their pol-icy change. Xie finds that since the start of the reform launched by DengXiaoping, “China has stepped onto the path of democratic socialism.”60

It is true that China is in the midst of a fierce clash between differentideas, and this state of affairs has directly impacted political trends in China.Current Chinese social and economic policy is a revised edition of socialdemocracy. First of all, the vast changes unleashed by economic reform andspread of social democratic ideas led Beijing reject the twin pillars of theorthodox Marxism, namely class struggle and historical materialism, andopenly replace them with xiaokang society, which aims at a “basically well-off” middle-class-oriented society and harmonious society.61 The conceptof the dictatorship of the proletariat was quietly replaced by “Three Rep-resents,” which indicates an attempt to reform one-party rule by making itmore inclusive.62 The proletariat practically disappeared from the official dis-course, and class struggle was replaced by “harmonious society.” The Marxistview of democracy as a “bourgeois” facade for class rule was abandoned, anddemocracy was proclaimed essential for socialist ideals. Wen Jiabao argues


that socialists should welcome the ideas associated with liberal thinking inthe West. “Democracy, rule of law, freedom, human rights, equality andfraternity do not belong solely to capitalism.”63

Second, the Swedish welfare state struck a responsive chord amongChinese intellectuals and perhaps even the central party leadership itself.In the name of “scientific development,” a new politics of equity is replac-ing the politics of efficiency. Hu’s catchphrase, “harmonious society,” hasbecome the ideological umbrella under which China has taken the firststeps toward developing a redistributive welfare program. Concerns overefficiency of the Deng–Jiang era (1978–2002) were gradually replaced withconcerns over equity. When being interviewed by Fareed Zakaria in 2008,Wen Jiabao, answering the question concerning the China’s model of devel-opment, argued that the complete formulation of China’s economic policywas to give full play to the basic role of market forces in allocating resources,but under the macroeconomic guidance and regulation of the government.In other words, both hands (visible and invisible) need to be given full play.64

Zheng Yongnian notes that Hu Jintao’s theories of “scientific development”and “putting the people first” owed much to the European social democratictradition.65 Professor Gao Fang, who studies the history of the global com-munist movement, presented a broad comparison between the Europeanmodel of democratic socialism and the scientific socialism. He argued thatthe two models had “similar roots and purposes.” He advocated, “Chinashould unwaveringly adhere to scientific socialism and develop socialistdemocracy by drawing lessons from democratic socialism.”66 At the policylevel, by the late 1990s, China had begun to introduce a broadly based sys-tem of social insurance to cover unemployment, old-age pensions, and otherareas.

Third, as social democrats in Western Europe did in the past two centuries,over the past three decades the CCP has been undertaking “incrementalchanges,” drifting away from the Marxist ideology. The Chinese leadershipis in favor of a mixed economy, which is in many ways capitalistic, butexplicitly defends governmental provision of certain social justice. Increas-ingly, social democrats in China have adopted the goal of state regulation,but not state ownership, of business and industry as sufficient to furthereconomic growth and equitable income. To this end, the Chinese govern-ment privatized much of state-owned enterprises and provided a growingthough insufficient public goods and services for the Chinese citizens. I sharethe view of Zhao Suisheng that although some CCP leaders have con-sidered the feasibility of transforming the CCP into a social democraticparty, they certainly are not ready to see, coincident with the transforma-tion, a lifting of the ban on forming new political parties. The CCP wantsto transform itself into a social democratic party by establishing a demo-cratic socialism where single-party rule prevails despite changes in otherareas.67


Could democratic socialism make a difference?

For the democratic socialists, multiparty democracy is not just the only wayout for China but also the only way to save and regenerate the CCP. Someof them even dubbed themselves jiudangpai (people who want to rescue theParty). Drawing inspiration from the works of Marx and Engels in their lateryears, as their counterparts in Europe did about a century earlier, Xie Tao,Xin Zilin, and other social democratic thinkers have reinterpreted Marxism,criticized arbitrary exercise of power and lack of democracy in China, andcalled for fundamental political reform.

Discourse of social democracy is significant because it provides a potentialalternative to the seemingly inevitable dilemma between the New Left andnationalists on the one hand and the liberals on the other. In the desper-ate search for a Chinese road to modernity, social democracy has been thesubject of intense reflection and debates (see Table 4.1).

Social democrats view themselves as presenting a political economy ofthe middle way, which reject both totalitarianism and free-market funda-mentalism. They maintain robust support for the market economy but positthat market can only work in a mixed economy, with a role for the stateas regulator and as a provider of public goods. They share with liberals a

Table 4.1 Third way: Democratic socialism

Liberalism Democraticsocialism

New Leftism

Role of state inthe economy

Minimum stateintervention ineconomy, privateownership

Mixed economy,private ownership ofthe means ofproduction withsome publicownership of keyindustries, andwelfare state

State ownership ofmeans of productionand extensivewelfare state

Role of themarket

Paramount Important but notsacrosanct

Minimal

Importance ofequality

Low High Extremely high

Politicalphilosophy

Self-interest,free market,and limitedgovernment

Social justice,human rights,liberty, equality, anddemocracy

Class struggle,historicalmaterialism

Principalvalues

Liberty Social responsibility Equality



commitment to liberty, democracy, and market economy. But in public pol-icy, social democrats believe in the virtue of public action for public goods.In spite of the limited public attention it has received in official Chinesemedia, social democracy has played an important role in the contemporaryChinese scholarly discourse. The social democrats’ ideal state is one in whichpeople enjoy both liberty and equality. This has made social democracy moreattractive than liberalism in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

There has been an obvious shift in the Chinese government’s policy-making from an all-out growth mantra toward a more European-styleparadigm that stresses social security, equity, and environment protection,with huge spending on pension, medical care, education, and environmentto come in the coming years. Meanwhile, the sovereign debt crisis in PIGScountries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) also led some scholars to doubtthe feasibility of the extensive welfare programs in a large and poor coun-try like China. In the minds of many Chinese, the Greek economy hasgone bankrupt as a result of an excessively high welfare system and poorperformance. In the survey conducted by People’s Forum, in 2010, demo-cratic socialism was listed third of the top ten visible schools of thought.Its rank dropped to fifth in 2011 and 10th in 2012. It was not included inthe 2013 survey.68 Ross Terrill predicted that the CCP could split over a cri-sis, with non-Leninists winning out and forming a social democratic partythat takes power in Beijing.69 However, whether China will actually movetoward democratic socialism depends on a complex array of contendingideas, interests, and powers.

Conclusion

The Beijing leadership in the reform era has become more pragmatic andless ideological. China’s success is based on its “cherry picking” the policiesthat best work for the country. Apparently, Beijing has been trying to strikea delicate balance between conservatives and reformists. Up to now, there isno indication that the CCP intends to rebrand itself as a democratic socialistparty as its counterparts in Eastern Europe did, nor will the CCP implementmultiparty system in the foreseeable future. While China has carried outdirect elections of people’s deputies to county-level people’s congresses fortwo decades, there is no timetable for the introduction of popular electionat the provincial and national level. In fact, most authors in party journalsinsist that democracy can be functionally consistent with single-party rule.Meanwhile, they all agree that it is necessary to enliven intellectual life andcreativity and curtail crony capitalism.

The CCP has shown itself to be a good learner from other countries’experience and past crises and shifts course when necessary.70 The Chinesediscourse on democratic socialism has helped the CCP adopt some ele-ments of social democracy into its social and economic policies, without


losing its identity or having to deny its socialist tradition. Many of the“revisionist” ideas such as democracy, equality, and human rights are com-monplace in academic circles now. Planning is alive and kicking. Of course,it is now called guihua (guidance) instead of jihua (plan), and it is planningwith and for markets, not socialist planning against markets. In short, thesocial democrats are not fond of the works of young Marx. Instead, theytry to recast Marxism in terms of democratic socialist values such as liberty,equality, and democracy. Still, democratic socialism cannot thrive in Chinawithout democracy, and it cannot be sustained without the rule of law. TheChinese discourse on social democracy has gone a long way but is far fromover.

5New Confucianism

In the years following the May Fourth Movement (1919), Confucianismwas attacked and marginalized. After 1949, the CCP tried to stamp outthe influence of Confucianism from Chinese culture, denouncing it as“feudal” and reactionary. Confucianism and Confucian studies all but dis-appeared from mainland China. Since the mid-1980s, mainland Chinahas witnessed the most sustained resurgence of academic and intellectualinterest in Confucianism. By the mid-1990s, this revival was sometimesreferred to as “Confucian fever,” just as the “culture fever” (wenhua re)had burned a decade ago.1 Mou Zongsan and Cai Renhou, two eminentConfucians, call for a new sociopolitical and moral-cultural order basedon the Confucian Orthodoxy (daotong), a democratic system (zhengtong), ascientific epistemology, and academic autonomy (xuetong).2

The influence of Confucianism in the humanities has moved beyondthe disciplines of history and philosophy and has been taken up withinsuch disparate fields as economics, law, political science, sociology, reli-gion, and education. An increasing number of intellectuals are turning toConfucianism to think of ways of dealing with China’s social and politi-cal predicament. Hundreds of books and articles have been published onthe subject of New Confucianism. Confucian discourses can be found onthe Internet and in the journals, such as Yuandao.3 The Confucian revivaldrastically changed the Chinese view toward their tradition. It has becomean important academic discourse and is no longer confined to the ivorytower dominated by academics working in the philosophy departments inmainland China. In this book, New Confucianism is referring to the intel-lectual movement of Confucianism developed in post-Mao China (1978–thepresent).

As part of the “culture fever” and the “national learning fever” (guoxue re),Confucianism is now seen as an indispensable cultural force that has usheredChina into the 21st century. Several studies suggest that New Confucianismhas become one of the most influential schools of thought in contem-porary China.4 Meanwhile, one of the recent state projects is the revival

79


of traditional China’s greatest sage, Confucius. At the very moment thatChina is roiling with pressure for social, political, and spiritual change, NewConfucianism has unveiled a provocative road map that seeks to reconnectthe nation’s past with its future.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the emergence, contents, andpolitical implications of the Confucian revival started in the 1980s. It beginswith a brief discussion of factors that contribute and shape the reemer-gence of Confucianism. This is followed by an analysis of the discourseamong Marxist Confucians, liberal Confucianists, and political Confucians.The concluding discussion explores the implications of the revival ofConfucianism in post-Mao’s China.

Revival of Confucianism

A number of scholars have attributed the revival of interest in Confucianismin the latter half of the 1980s in China to a combination of several keyfactors.

First, the revival of Confucianism is a result of the rapid economicgrowth in East Asia. Confucianism is believed to contribute a great dealto the economic miracles accomplished. The economic success of some“post-Confucian” societies led many in China to treat Confucianism as thefunctional equivalent of the Protestant ethic. Roderick MacFarquhar, forexample, believes “that ideology [Confucianism] is important to the rise ofEast Asian hyper-growth economies as the conjunction of Protestantism andthe rise of capitalism in the West.”5 In a similar vein, Herman Kahn pre-dicted in 1979, “the Confucian ethic – the creation of dedicated, motivated,responsible, and educated individuals and the enhanced sense of commit-ment, organizational identity, and loyalty to various institutions – will resultin all the neo-Confucian societies having at least potentially higher growthrates than other cultures.”6

Second, the official position of the CCP in favor of the traditional cul-ture as a defining element of socialism with Chinese characteristics givesConfucianism a prime relevance to contemporary Chinese politics. Afterabout a century of anti-Confucian campaigns, nowadays the Chinese gov-ernment emphasizes hexie (harmony), minben (putting the people first),xiaokang (well-off society), dezhi (rule by virtue), and family values such asfilial piety. These are all undeniably key concepts of Confucianism. Clearly,the CCP has attempted to use concepts from Confucianism and the imperialage that are still deeply rooted in Chinese culture. Though some may dis-miss this as propaganda, it is nevertheless the vision articulated by China’sleaders for their nation and society.

This state-backed reinvigoration could be explained by a need to fill theideological vacuum left by the erosion of public faith in Marxism and bya desire to inspire people with a belief system that is less threatening than

New Confucianism 81

some of the new religious currents sweeping the country. Influential partyideologues believe that Confucian capitalism might provide an alternativeto the Western model of modernity. There has been a resurgence of Chinesecultural identity, philosophy, and worldview, in particular Confucianismwhich promises to offer a compelling alternative to Western liberalism asthe country retreats from communism.7

Third, China’s recent astonishing economic growth has produced a con-comitant surge in interest in “Chinese” culture in general and Confucianismin particular. With China’s miraculous rise, an increasing number of Chineseintellectuals have become more confident in their Confucian tradition thanbefore. Today’s New Confucianism is a distinct product of China’s economicreforms, particularly the capitalist triumphalism of the Deng Xiaoping era.The term xinrujia or xinruxue, loosely translated as “New Confucianism,” isincreasingly understood as an intellectual and cultural phenomenon of thelast three decades.

Last but not least, the revival of Confucianism in mainland China is con-sidered to be a direct consequence of the efforts made by Hong Kong andTaiwanese New Confucians to “re-nurture” (fanpu) at the place of origin. Thesuccessful practice of liberal democracy in South Korea and Taiwan raisesthe specter of “Confucian democracy.” A growing number of Confucianscholars endorse the concept of the Confucian democracy of “rule for thepeople,” which has survived in China for the past 2,000 years. The questionthen becomes, how effective can Confucianism be as a source of promot-ing democracy? Against this backdrop, there has been a revival of interestin classical learning (guoxue) in general and in Confucianism in particular.In spite of more positive and confident perception of Confucianism, NewConfucianism has been seen as a part of “cultural conservatism.” Xu Youyuconsiders cultural conservatism a doctrine similar to cultural nationalism,whose concentrated expression is the so-called Chinese national culturefever advocating that reading and studying the classics of Confucius andMencius should be put in the first place in education and ordinary life. Thisassertion was so influential in 2004 that the year was called the ChineseCultural Conservative Year.8 In addition, most Confucian scholars refuseto invoke Western ideas and conceptual schemes to interpret the Chineseexperience.

Major approaches

Over the past three decades, Chinese intellectuals have reconnected withtheir past, and many different proposals have emerged for political reformrooted at least partly in China’s own traditions. Several thoughtful anddetailed proposals try to combine “Western” ideas of democracy with“Confucian” ideas of meritocracy, and rather than subordinate Confucianvalues and institutions to democracy as an a priori dictum, they contain


a division of labor, with democracy having priority in some areas andmeritocracy in others.

The CCP itself has become more meritocratic; it now encourages high-performing students to join. The increased emphasis on educated cadres islikely to generate more sympathy for Confucian values.9 The contemporaryConfucian political thought contains a multiplicity of ideals and motiva-tions, including the Confucian Marxist approach seeing in Confucianismas a means to strengthen Marxism and the CCP; the liberal approach aim-ing at a peaceful transition to a Chinese democracy; and the Confucianapproach on political legitimacy which endeavors to revitalize Confucianismand reconstruct the politics of the kingly way (wangdao). The followingsection will discuss the major arguments of these approaches.

Confucian Marxism

Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, a large number of Chinese havelost their faith in Marxism. Nevertheless, the government needs a strongand dynamic ideology to unite China that includes not only Hong Kongand Macau but Taiwan as well. In this regard, Confucianism provides theCCP with a valid historical basis for claiming cultural unity between main-land China and Taiwan. Some Chinese scholars strive to accommodateConfucianism within Marxist ideology, based on the methods of “criticalinheritance” and “synthetic creation.”

Fang Keli played a seminal role in the development of New Confucianstudies in China from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s. During that periodof time, he served as the director of two major state-funded projects onNew Confucianism under the seventh (1986–1990) and eighth (1991–1995)five-year plans for social sciences. He has consistently identified himselfas an orthodox Marxist. Indeed, he agrees with very few of the NewConfucian theses. He does, however, emphasize the need for dialogue amongNew Confucianism, Marxism, and liberalism. While leading the Beijing-funded research projects, Fang attempted to limit the discussion of NewConfucianism to the sociopolitical framework of Marxism. According tohim, ruxue can only ever be part of the “vocabulary” of a future civilization,not its “grammar.”10 He defined New Confucianism as follows:

The New Confucian Movement was born in the 1920s. Its program hasbeen to reclaim for Confucian thought a leading role in Chinese society,to rebuild the Confucian value system, and on the foundation of it toabsorb and master, and finally to amalgamate with Western learning, inorder to pursue the modernization of Chinese culture and society.11

Fang reckons two scholarly reasons for the research on Confucianism,namely to define the position of New Confucianism in the history of modern

New Confucianism 83

Chinese thought and to map out the movement. There were also two polit-ical reasons. The first is to make sure that it would not go against Marxism,as had occurred in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and, secondly, to understandit because it was a phase in China’s modernization process.12 Fang Kelifurther criticized “Confucian capitalism,” claimed adherence to the “FourCardinal Principles,” and stressed that the study of Confucianism was partof socialist modernization.13 He holds that none of the Western systemsof thought or ideologies that entered China have been able to grow rootsin China, to spread and develop, unless they combined themselves withChinese traditional thinking.14 Chinese Marxist critics made no secret thatthey undertook the reevaluation of New Confucianism not on its ownterms but from the Marxist perspective. Intellectually, Fang Keli notes thatNew Confucianism was a positive phenomenon, but politically, it was mis-taken in its denial of the revolutionary struggle against imperialism andfeudalism.15

In the latter half of the 1980s, some Chinese scholars rekindled thedebate on Chinese Marxism’s affinities with Confucianism. Over thepast few years, scholars formulated various proposals for some sort ofConfucian–Marxist synthesis. Fang and his Marxist peers are interestedin mapping out the conflux between Marxism and Confucianism. CaiFanli, an intellectual historian, identified the following points of com-patibility between Confucianism and Marxism, respectively: “putting thepeople first” thought (minben sixiang) and liberation of humanity; the GreatUnity (datong) ideal and ultimate goal of communism; selfness/impartiality(dagong wusi) and the concept of public ownership and collectivism; empha-sis on the way (dao) and emphasis on natural and social laws.16 QianXun, an intellectual historian at Qinghua University, argues that Marxismand traditional culture need one another because “if, in its develop-ment in China, Marxism wants to become Sinicized, then it must becombined with traditional culture and absorb the excellent parts of thatculture.”17

If Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought are dead in China, whatis China’s political ideology at present? Thus, the CCP finds it necessary toachieve legitimacy from other political strategy. But what will replace it?And what should replace it? Clearly, there is a need for a new moral foun-dation for political rule in China, and the government has moved closer toan official embrace of Confucianism. Mao upheld “continuous revolution”and Deng was a fan of “modernization.” Obviously, both “continuous rev-olution” and “modernization” are terms of the Western discourse. In recentyears, the top leaders in China have used expressions reflecting Chinese tra-ditional culture, such as xiaokang (well-off society) by Jiang Zemin, hexie(harmonious society) by Hu Jintao, and zhongguomeng (China Dream) by XiJinping, to promote their political agenda.


Confucian liberalism

With the revival of traditional culture in recent years, quite a few of liberalscholars have started discussing constitutionalism from a Confucian perspec-tive. Some of them are turning to Confucianism to think of ways of dealingwith China’s current social and political predicament.

Is it possible that Confucianism can offer a compelling alternative toWestern liberalism? Can a society with a Confucian heritage become a lib-eral democracy in which civil liberties and human rights flourish and topgovernment officials are elected by universal suffrage in competitive elec-tions in which multiple political parties can compete freely? According toYao Zhongqiu (pen name Qiu Feng), one of the most influential classicalliberals in China, the answer is yes. Qiu Feng discusses constitutionalismfrom a Confucian perspective. He believes that Chinese intellectuals needto return to their cultural roots: the Confucian classics. He is trying tofind a way to allow liberalism, democracy, and rule of law to take root inChina, saying his ideals boil down to three words: Confucian constitutionaldemocracy. Confucianism, as we see it today, naturally incorporates modernWestern ideas and knowledge. Western thinking and Confucianism comefrom different civilizations, though they may ultimately lead to the samedestination.18

Qiu Feng came to the forefront of New Confucian scholars for his contro-versial opinions about China’s culture. Given that Qiu Feng had establisheda reputation as a liberal with a particular interest in constitutional democ-racy and the writings of Austrian classical liberal writer Friedrich Hayek, hisproclamation a few years ago that he had become a “Confucian scholar”raised more than a few eyebrows. He refuted his critics’ assertions that hehad undergone an ideological transformation, claiming that the Confucianin him had simply become too passionate to keep hidden.19

In an article published in 2012, Qiu Feng suggests that the achievement ofthree decades of reform is largely a result of the Chinese Cultural Renais-sance. That is to say, the reform is a process in the history of Chinesecivilization revival. Looking at the reform from the angle of Chinese civiliza-tion revival will form a new paradigm to think and promote the institutionalreform. If this great vision comes to fruition, it may give elite groups anincentive to move toward maturity in politics and come out of the predica-ment of reforms.20 He suggests that only when Chinese restore the traditionand find their “roots,” they can understand themselves well and be able topursue their well-being.21

Qiu Feng thinks that democracy works successfully in the West becausethere is a widespread basis of Christian religion and morals to act as a foun-dation for democratic society, but, since China can never be wholly Chris-tianized, Confucian values are the only thing that provide this foundation.22

He claims to be exploring the roots of Chinese civilization in an effort to

New Confucianism 85

cope with modern problems. In his opinion, contemporary Chinese scholarsof humanities and social sciences have become rootless, and simply repeatwhat they have learned.

Gao Quanxi, a prominent Chinese Hayekian and law professor at BeihangUniversity in Beijing, considers that Confucianism has certain checks on thepower of the emperor such as co-governance of emperor and prime minis-ter in the imperial court, but such sharing of power in fact had very limitedcheck on the power of emperor.23 Liu Junning, one of China’s leading lib-eral thinkers, proposes a “Confucian liberalism.” Liu offers a comprehensivesociopolitical model called “Confucian liberalism,” which combines repre-sentative democracy, market economy, with Confucian ethics. Liu defendsConfucianism as a modernizing force. In contrast to the great majorityof Chinese liberals, he rejoiced that Confucianism has turned into a driv-ing force for modernization, even while many others are expounding howConfucian obstructs modernization, and he claims that Confucianism anddemocracy have proved compatible regardless of the common belief thatthey are not. In Liu’s opinion, what has made the East Asian model suc-cessful is the combination of Confucianism and Western liberalism, whereasneither Confucianism nor liberalism alone can enable any of the East Asiancountries to modernize as successfully as they have done.24

Similarly, Xu Youyu, a prominent liberal scholar, sees the possibility ofan overlapping consensus between Chinese liberalism and Confucianism.His optimism stems from the view that Confucianism emphasizes zhongyong(the Doctrine of the Mean) while liberalism is ready to compromise.25 More-over, Xu finds no fundamental conflict between the two; quite the contrary,they concur on modernization, market economy, liberty, democracy, rule oflaw, and so on. The liberals normally hold that unlike Western democracy,which is associated with individualism, Confucianism places a high value onfamilies. Confucianism regards filial piety as the uppermost virtue in society,sacrificing individualism at the altar of family. Liberals as a group tend toreject possibilities of Confucian constitutional order. Many liberals believethat Confucianism cannot be a vehicle to promote liberal values.

During the 1980s, some reformist Confucians put forward a program of“Chinese knowledge as the foundation, Western knowledge for practicalapplication” (zhongxue weiti xixue weiyong). They believe that China shouldadopt Western technology but keep what made China China: the ethical,social, and political systems. Li Zehou reversed the slogan: Western sub-stance, Chinese application (xiti zhongyong). That is, substance is not merelyideology but includes technology, the mode of production, and must betransformed.26 Many Chinese scholars share the view that democratic ideaswere absent from Confucianism prior to the 19th century. However, it doesnot follow that Confucianism and democracy must inevitably clash.

A number of liberal scholars claim that Qiu Feng’s spectacular transforma-tion from being a Hayek scholar to an advocate of “Confucian constitutional


democracy” was motivated by a cynical desire to establish his own theorysystem and boost his academic profile.27 Qiu is not only challenged by theliberals, but by Confucians as well. In a recent interview, Qiu acknowledgedthat he is

boxed in by my “enemies.” Public intellectuals, Confucians, liberals, andthe government are all trying to find fault with me. The liberals thinkthat as a Confucian, I should not get involved in politics, and Confucians,most of them study Confucianism from a philosophical perspective andare averse to politically-oriented Confucianism.28

By and large, the liberal scholars believe that Confucianism holds downindividual freedom, so it contradicts the spirit of democracy and should betotally thrown away. What is more, they worry about using Confucianismwith the theory of “Asian Values” as its core.

Political Confucianism

Political Confucianism is a doctrine addressing the revitalization ofConfucianism in mainland China. It challenges the current prevalent demo-cratic movement, both inside and outside of China, which proposes gov-ernance with legitimacy entirely resting on the ballot. Instead, politicalConfucianism advocates the wisdom of “centrality and harmony” containedin Confucianism. It is aimed at revitalizing Confucianism and reconstruct-ing the politics of the kingly way (wangdao) in the modern global context.The term of political Confucianism might be traced to Jiang Qing, whohas been widely acknowledged as one of the leading members of the newgeneration of Chinese contemporary Confucian scholars. Wangdao is con-sidered to be the highest goal of renzheng (benevolent government). It relieson persuasion, education, and influence, and the politics is essentially con-sensual. In his view, wangdao is a combination of renzheng, dezheng (rule byvirtue), and meritocracy. Jiang holds that Confucianism in the beginninghad two parts, namely both political Confucianism and Mind Confucianism(self-cultivation Confucianism).

Jiang coined the term “political Confucianism” in contrast to mindConfucianism (xinxing ruxue). He argues that political Confucianism is thecrux of Confucianism and that the moral virtue of benevolence is cen-tral to the kingly way of Confucian politics. Political Confucianism focusesmore directly on the betterment of social and political order by legislat-ing and legitimating political institutions. (This will be elaborated in detailin Chapter 8.) Jiang argues that political Confucianism was founded bythe Gongyang School, a commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals(allegedly compiled by Confucius himself) that chronicled the history ofthe state of Lu from 722 BC to 481 BC. Indeed, Jiang’s promotion of

New Confucianism 87

Confucianism has involved both explicit and implicit criticism of Marxismand liberalism.

Confucians recognize that people in real life are unequal: they are differ-ent in virtue, intelligence, knowledge, ability, and so on. Therefore, as Jiangcontends, wangdao cannot accept the universal suffrage adopted by Westerncountries that gives everyone the equal right to cast one vote regardlessof his/her virtues and vices. From Jiang’s view, the Chinese people shouldaccept the more than one vote for intellectuals’ position rather than “oneperson one vote” arrangement. Jiang Qing states that since the 19th cen-tury, China has lost both internal cohesion and international position, forwhich the basic reason is the degeneration of Confucianism. He maintainsthat only a political system governed by wangdao could prevent anarchy,eliminate poverty, and create wealth. Wangdao is also preferable to badao(rule by might). According to Jiang,

In China’s mainland nowadays, Marxism and Leninism, both importedalien cultures, have become the dominant ideology with the help of stateauthority. However, these alien cultures cannot become the cultural foun-dation of the Chinese nation to express the national spirit. They mark theclimax of a situation, under which the Chinese nation has been culturallyrootless for centuries.

In Jiang’s view, the biggest obstacle to the modernization of China is noth-ing other than “the complete denial of the Confucian tradition” as well as“the complete Westernization taking place in the mainland of China.” Heconcludes that the most urgent issue in contemporary China’s mainlandis the reinvigoration of Confucianism, which should replace Marxism andLeninism to become (as it used to be) the dominant ideology of the Chinesenation.29

Jiang backs the idea of replacing Marxism with Confucianism as the rulingideology, making it a “national doctrine.” Yet he sees Confucianism as abovethe state, since it exercises the function of criticizing the moral failures of thestate. Confucianism should be based on the Gongyang learning and becomepolitical, seeking to uphold social justice through institutional reforms. Jiangopenly dismisses pluralism of values as leading to secularization and rela-tivization. Only a critical Confucianism could promote the unification ofculture and censor abuses from the government. To remedy the flaws ofthe social contract in Western democratic systems, Confucianism shouldbe established as a quasi-religion expressing the relationship between peo-ple and heaven. Recitation of canonical texts should be incorporated at alllevels of education; academies and Confucian temples should be openedacross the country; Confucian newspapers, radios, and TVs should be estab-lished. Since 2004, Jiang Qing has promoted the replacement of Marxismwith Confucianism in textbooks in schools. Those ideas of Jiang Qing have


attracted a lot of attention among Chinese intellectuals, including those whocherish, promote, or practice Chinese traditions, as well as “liberals” whooften are hostile to the former group. A growing chorus of Chinese scholarsargue that not only are there seeds of democracy in the Confucian tradition,but constitutional democracy is required by the internal development of themoral spirit in Chinese culture.

Jiang plans to use the Confucian revival as a platform for advocatingpolitical reforms in China. Jiang objects to democratic government on thegrounds that it is devoid of a moral dimension due to its treatment of thepeople as an abstract notion rather than as individuals and that it is estab-lished on the basis of social contracts that ignore the relationship betweenpeople and heaven. Wangdao avoids the pitfall of democracy.30 Jiang isstrongly opposed to the notion of developing a Western-style democracybased on a combination of Confucianism and democratic thought on theground that Confucianism would lose its “unique cultural self” and ceasebeing Confucianism. He does not believe that it is possible to develop a“Western-style” civil society in China. In order to establish a Chinese-style orConfucian-style civil society, it is necessary to establish it on “the foundationof the tradition of China’s historical culture.”31

From the perspectives of political Confucianism, “the political future ofChina is far likelier to be determined by the longstanding Confucian tra-dition of humane authority (wangdao) than by Western-style multipartyelections.”32 Jiang’s work has triggered debates in the academic circles. Manyliberals doubt that China’s current political and social problems should be,and could be, solved by the revival of Confucianism in China.

Kang Xiaoguang, another leading figure of the political Confucianism, is amember of important research groups and think tanks and publishes in high-profile journals. For him, the current situation in the PRC is characterized by“efficiency, injustice, and the absence of legitimacy.”33 To Kang, the Western-style democratization is almost impossible in China, because the politicalculture that has been evolved over 2,000 years is based on Confucian prin-ciples. Confucius focused on the legitimacy of the ruling and emphasizedthat the rulers must carry out “a benevolent governance,” or else they loseheaven and be overturned by the people.34

Kang’s main concern is how to maintain social and political stabilityas China undergoes rapid transition and how to improve China’s eco-nomic efficiency, social justice, and international competiveness. He notesthat the Western experience cannot be used to chart China’s future devel-opment because of its decadent values. Liberal democracy also tends topromote national division. He refers to China as an “empire system,”and not actually a nation-state. Like the cases of other empire systemssuch as the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, democracy may go handin hand with national breakup. Liberal democracy cannot solve China’sproblems.

New Confucianism 89

Kang holds that democracy doesn’t work, because it doesn’t fulfill its ownpromises. Democracy would require equality. The Western countries haveestablished market economy, but in those countries liberal democracy didnot bring about equality. As money controls elections and parliaments alike,the bourgeoisie would be the leading class, one-man-one-vote notwithstand-ing. Kang’s assessment is that the status quo in China – money ruling allhuman and political relations – was quite the same in the United States andChina.35 In his view, Confucianism can become a new source of politicallegitimacy for China’s authoritarianism. The system Kang proposes includesbenevolent authoritarianism, a market economy, corporatism, welfare state,and Confucian state religion, a system of cooperation, and checks and bal-ances among different social classes.36 In short, in his mind, neither theexisting authoritarian system nor Western-style liberal democracy seemspractical in China’s foreseeable future. It is worth noting that contemporaryConfucians have enthusiastically recast their Confucian social and politi-cal aspirations in terms of equality and democracy, although the originalConfucian concepts of virtue, the doctrine of human nature, and familialand social rites do not have much to do with equality or democracy.37

Integration of three traditions?

Though political Confucianism and New Leftism hold something in com-mon, both are opposed to the capitalist alliance of political and financialelites who oppress the masses; they hold different views about how to dealwith the problem. For Maoists, the solution is to attack all forms of inequal-ity in society. For Jiang, the best way of challenging material inequality is toreplace the financial elites with “worthy and capable scholar-officials.”38

Most New Leftists tend to disparage Confucianism, they seek inspirationfrom the Marxist tradition as well as China’s Maoist heritage. Still, GanYang, a prolific and influential New Left scholar, recognizes the politicalimportance of reviving Confucianism. Gan developed an interesting butcontroversial idea of the “integration of three traditions.” He argues thatthere are three main traditions in Chinese history, namely, the Confuciantradition, Maoist egalitarianism from 1949 to 1978, and the free market ideasthat have emerged from the market-oriented reforms since the late 1970s.According to Gan, in order to show the strength of Chinese political powerand maintain the accomplishments so far obtained by economic transfor-mation, we should combine Chinese traditions (Confucianism in particular)with the traditions of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.39 In his opinion,the politics in China must take into account a triple heritage in which eachcomposing element is important: the first part of the heritage correspondsin some way to the policy of liberalization launched 30 years ago and ori-ented toward market forces, “which also includes several concepts that havebecome familiar, like freedom and rights.” The second element is the Maoistheritage which for Gan is important not to forget: “it is a tradition that


embodies equality and justice” that is reasserted in the current slogan “har-monious society.” Finally, the “Confucian tradition” must be assimilated.By “Confucian tradition” he means most of all a collection of practicesinherited from the past that structure “daily life,” notably family relations.

In 1989, Gan Yang proposed a theory of Western politics and Chinesemorality. In 2007, Gan published another controversial paper, “The ChineseWay: Thirty Years and Sixty Years.” The core ideas of the article are similar tothe aforementioned “integration of three traditions.” Gan Yang put forwardthe idea of “Confucian socialism” as a way to think about China’s futurepolitical ideology. In this essay, Gan Yang calls for a “Chinese way” whichcould take the form of a “Confucian socialist republic” (rujia shehuizhuyigongheguo).40

The arguments by Gan Yang have triggered both considerable debatesand severe criticism. Zhou Lian, professor of philosophy at Renmin Uni-versity, believes that it is difficult to find any strong arguments to supportGan’s views, stating that the idea of “integrating three traditions” showsthat Gan is precisely trying to whisper in the ears of the powerful, althoughhis exegesis looks as if it is “exoteric” and not “esoteric.”41 Yi Quan assertsthat Confucianism has nothing to do with socialism and compares GanYang’s proposals to Chiang Kai-shek’s New Life Movement (xinshenghuo yun-dong), an effort to unite Confucian values with the Three Principles of thePeople.42 Yang Jisheng argues that the kind of social relations promoted byConfucianism is incompatible with the very idea of a republic.43

Meanwhile, an increasing number of scholars try to find a middle groundbetween liberalism and Confucianism. Bai Tongdong, professor of philos-ophy at Fudan University, and Joseph Chan, professor of political theoryat the University of Hong Kong, argue for models for a hybrid politicalregime that combines elements of democracy and meritocracy with meri-tocratic houses of government composed of political leaders chosen by suchmeans as examination and performance at lower levels of government.44

The “Asian democratic socialism” proposed by Zhou Qing and ZhuangYouming includes a democratic political system that can guarantee eco-nomic development, a market economy with equality of opportunity, andan ethical-cultural order based on Confucian values.45

Although the approaches mentioned varied, the basic goals remain thesame, that is, to rejuvenate China and maintain her cultural identity.46

The CCP has played a careful balancing act with regard to its support forConfucianism. In part, it has used certain elements of Confucianism to sup-port a moral framework that falls in line with the Party’s aim, such as hardwork, filial piety, and respect for authority. However, the CCP was highlyskeptical of the arguments of political Confucianism put forward by KangXiaoguang and Jiang Qing, as political Confucianism could undermine theCCP’s rule of China. The Party therefore withdrew its direct support forConfucianism and only retained the aspects that were most palatable for

New Confucianism 91

their agenda. Like Confucianism, the CCP’s promotion of China’s culturaltradition can be seen as a political tactic and is equally subject to the needsof the CCP.47

Future of New Confucianism

Confucianism is an essential element in statecraft. Nevertheless, most ofthose studying Confucianism from a philosophical perspective are averseto politically oriented Confucianism, as Confucianism places very littleimportance on laws, stresses benevolence (ren), and believes that trust isan essential component of a government. Philosopher Zhang Dainian oncesaid, “The age when Confucianism occupied a ruling position is gone andwill never come back. However, Confucianism can still develop as a schoolof thought among many others. Its scholarly position cannot be ignored.”48

Cheng Enfu, a professor at the Academy of Marxism at the CASS, pointsout that Confucianism cannot and should not be revived at the political(or state) level, but only can and should be revived at the social and per-sonal levels. The study of a national legacy is appreciable, but the full-scalerevivalism of Confucianism certainly hardly works.49

On the other hand, Rey-Ching Lu suggests that Chinese culture willbecome a combination of liberalism and Confucianism. The balance of tra-ditional elements (Confucianism) and modern elements (liberalism) willdepend on each individual’s free will and free choice, so the process ofdemocratization will start with intellectuals and then spread to the wholenation.50 In a similar vein, Fukuyama argues that the Confucian examina-tion system, education, the fairly egalitarian income distribution, relativetolerance, the tradition of dissent and protest, and a tendency towardegalitarianism are not only compatible with but actually promote liberaldemocracy.51

According to Huntington, the core values of Confucianism are not com-patible with liberal democracy.52 By contrast, many Chinese scholars holdthe view that some elements of Confucianism are either democratic or com-patible with democratic ideas and institutions. The Confucian idea of minbenand the idea of heaven vis-à-vis the idea of people are seen as supportingdemocratic institutions. It is the principle of people in particular, which canbe used to support democratic ideas such as votes, parliament, and parties.53

A number of Confucian scholars are appealing to the Communist Partyto make Confucianism the state religion (guojiao). What are the politicalimplications of this phenomenon? In recent years, China has witnessed asustained resurgence of academic and intellectual interest in Confucianism.Confucianism has been invoked by a variety of academics in China as acritique of liberal democracy and market materialism. The tradition hasbeen arrayed against both Marxism and capitalism. For instance, JiangQing has been quite explicit in his rejection of Marxism-Leninism. New


Left scholars, such as Gan Gang and Wang Hui, argue that Confucianismshould not, and cannot, be reconciled with global capitalism. Hu Shaohua’sstudy concludes that Confucianism is neither democratic nor antidemo-cratic, but a-democratic, and that, while not an insurmountable obstacle todemocratization, it offers little help to that process.54

It should be noted that universities were initially introduced in China dur-ing a radical antitraditional movement that centered on the idea “Downwith Confucianism.” Traditional Confucian education institutions such asthe academies that had been established during the Song dynasty werequickly abandoned. At present, Confucianism bears little influence on uni-versities. With no doubt, the true influence of Confucian intellectuals orthose inspired by that tradition on the regime remains very weak, despitethe fact that some scholars, like Kang Xiaoguang, actively lobby for theircause.55 In a recent book comparing workers’ protest in the Chinese rust beltand sun belt, Ching Kwan Lee reports that while the older workers in therust belt use the language of Marxism, the younger workers in the sun beltuse the language of human rights.56 Both of these are today’s Chinese politi-cal languages. It still has to be proved that Confucianism is a better languageof protest.

The installment of a statue of Confucius in the Tiananmen Square in Jan-uary 2011 raised suspicions that the CCP wanted to revive Confucianismas its official discourse. Some even speculate that the Chinese Commu-nist Party (CCP) might change its name to the Chinese Confucian Party(CCP) in the next couple of decades.57 Yet, the removal of the statue inApril 2011 suggests that the Party knows that it would be too much of astretch to go from communism to Confucianism. In a survey conductedby People.com.cn, about 70 percent of the 220,000 people surveyed saidthat it was wrong to put the statue in front of the National Museum ofChina (which is located in the Tiananmen Square), since not everyone isinterested in Confucianism.58 Even Jiang Qing recognizes that it may takeyears (20 years at least) for his ideas of political Confucianism to have sub-stantial political impact.59 It is true that Jiang’s political Confucianism hasbecome a hot topic of discussion. However, as a humanistic scholar based ata remote mountain village, Jiang Qing’s theory so far has had little politicalimpact.

28 September 2014 marked the 2,565th birth anniversary of Confucius.Beijing commemorated the birth of Confucius in an elaborate event, sur-passing any in the past 20 years. Does this commemoration suggest that theCCP will start a new era of embracing Confucianism? Maybe not. On thesame day, Wang Weiguang, the president of the CASS, published an articlesaying that “class struggle cannot be extinguished.”60

New Confucianism has drawn criticism from the perspective of liberalismand the New Left as well. Furthermore, the Chinese intellectuals are sharplydivided, even among Confucian scholars. All of these scholars believe that

New Confucianism 93

Confucianism is applicable and useful in contemporary Chinese society. Buteach, in his/her own way, posits Confucianism in opposition to some keyaspect of existing Chinese political system. In his 2004 book Ten Essays onTradition, Qin Hui argues against the notion that China is a Confucian coun-try. He states that while most dynastic rulers paid lip service to Confucianideals, they were actually ruthless Legalists who ruled through fear andcoercion.61 Qin coined the expression “Confucianism on the outside andLegalism on the inside” to sum up his view of premodern China; the phrasesoon gained traction in intellectual circles.62 Qin has been highly critical ofthose whom he calls “cultural determinists,” academics whom he regards aspro-Party thinkers working to justify the status quo of one-party rule. In thearticle “My View of History,” Qin states that everyone has responsibility forshaping contemporary society and the nation’s future.63 He has consistentlyopposed the view that China’s democratization must be introduced by theparty-state.

Conclusion

The reform since 1978 has modernized the people’s ways of thinking,although the Party continues to twist certain aspects of the Confucian tra-dition, such as obedience of lower social groups to higher ones, to serve itspurposes. As time went on, the people saw the real obstacle to modernizationnot in traditional culture but in party culture. Moreover, the Confucianistshave praised the yielding of thrones to the virtuous by Emperors Yao andShun, who established a precedent by passing the throne on the most virtu-ous and worthy man in the kingdom rather than to the eldest son or closestrelative; they also endorsed the revolutions of Tang and Wu.64 All of theseviews underscore the conceptions that tianxia (all under Heaven) belongsnot to one man but to the people, and that dynasties could be overthrownif they lost the mandate of heaven.

Tu Wei-ming, one of the world’s leading scholars of Confucianism, writes,“the real challenge . . . is how a revived Confucian humanism might answerthe question that science and democracy have raised.”65 He points out,“We need two or three generations’ time and efforts to make the revivalof Confucianism a reality.”66 Obviously, it is still a long way to establish-ing a Confucian constitutional order, Confucian socialism, or Confuciandemocracy in China. Despite all the pomp and fanfare, contemporaryConfucianism remains a scholastic exercise rather than a potent social andpolitical force. While no one can deny its importance in altering the Chineseview of the past, it remains a small step toward making Confucianism a vitalpart of contemporary Chinese life.

Part II

Intellectual Discourse on CriticalIssues

6Chinese Intellectual Discourse onDemocracy

Democracy is an important component of the Chinese political discoursesince the concept was introduced from the West to China in the mid-19th century.1 A democratic movement developed in China over the pasthundred years. Pioneer reformers such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichaoadvocated a constitutional monarchy patterned after the British model. Thelater thinkers, such as Hu Shih (1891–1962), Carsun Chang (1886–1969),and Chang Tung-sun (1886–1973), were ardent supporters of democracy.They opposed both the one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang and thepeople’s democratic dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1911,Dr. Sun Yat-sen established the Republic of China, putting an end to morethan 3,000 years of political system ruled by dynasties. He tried, thoughunsuccessfully, to introduce the democratic system to China. The lack ofdemocracy is a great disappointment of the Chinese intellectuals in themodern era.

The Chinese intellectual discourse on liberal democracy reemerged in1978, when market-oriented economic reform began. China has pursuedpolitical reform since the mid-1990s as an important tool to better moni-tor the behavior of local cadres and to address social unrest, but these effortshave had very limited results. During this time, mass protests have grownin number, scale, and intensity. Against this backdrop, democracy became asource of fierce debate in China.

In the past few decades, in Chinese scholarly discourse, the literature ondemocracy has become vast and is growing rapidly. Yu Keping, the deputydirector of the Central Committee’s Compilation and Translation Bureau,put forward a theory of “incremental democracy,” which highlights theorderly expansion of citizen participation in politics. His article, “Democ-racy is a good thing,” published in 2006, created a huge debate within theParty about the merits of democracy.2

Democracy means different things to different people. To liberal scholars,open and fair political contests are one of the key features of democracy.In a recent study, Tianjian Shi and Lu Jie demonstrated with empirical data

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98 Intellectual Discourse on Critical Issues

that in China the popular understanding of the concept of “democracy”does not match the meaning defined in the liberal democracy discourse;rather, it is based on the guardianship discourse. There is a widely sharedview among ordinary Chinese people that “democracy” means governmentfor the people (and by elites), rather than government by the people.3 Theyexplain this is the reason why, as long as the Chinese government “servesthe people,” it is deemed “democratic” and legitimate.4 In other words, whenthe Chinese say democracy, they really mean meritocracy.

It should be noted that mixing up “government for the people” withdemocracy in the Western sense was so rampant that even the official partydocuments issued in the last few years claim that rule for the people isdemocracy. In a system of Leninist dictatorship, the legality of the stateis derived entirely from the party’s claim to represent the interests of thepeople, and not from any actual award of popular support, except perhapsduring the original seizure of power.5

There is no consensus among Chinese scholars on what is democracy.Likewise, while there are few concepts more critical to the work of politicalscience than democracy, there is very little agreement about how it happens.In this book, I use Linz and Stepan’s definition for democracy.

In a nondemocratic setting, liberalization may entail a mix of policy andsocial changes, such as less censorship of the media, somewhat greaterspace for the organization of autonomous working-class activities, theintroduction of some legal safeguards for individuals such as habeas cor-pus, the releasing of most political prisoners, the return of exiles, perhapsmeasures for improving the distribution of income, and most impor-tant, the toleration of opposition. Democratization entails liberalizationbut is a wider and more specifically political concept. Democratizationrequires open contestation over the right to win control of the govern-ment, and this in turn requires free competitive elections, the results ofwhich determine who governs.6

Chinese discourse on democracy

There has been raging debate among contending ideas about the directionof democratic transition in China. This chapter analyzes the ongoing heateddebates on democracy. It reviews the main structure, characteristics, andimplications of the debates on democracy among three major schools ofthought, namely, democracy with Chinese characteristics, liberalism, andNew Leftism (Table 6.1).

Democracy with Chinese characteristics

As China continues to transform itself, many assume that the nation willeventually move beyond communism and adopt a Western-style democracy.

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Table 6.1 Chinese discourse on democracy

Criteria New Leftism Liberalism Democracy withChinesecharacteristics

LeadingScholars

Cui Zhiyuan,Wang Hui, WangShaoguan,

Li Shenzhi, LiuJunning, MaoYushi

Li Junru, YuKeping

TheoreticalRoots

Neo-Marxism/MaoismDependencytheory

Classicalliberalism

Deng Xiaoping’sTheory

Checks andbalances

Mass movementGrand democracy(Maoist daminzhuexercised duringthe CulturalRevolution)

ConstitutionaldemocracyIndependentjudiciaryCompetitive andfair electionFreedom ofassembly andspeech

Intra-partydemocracyAge and termlimit for the topleadershipDeliberativedemocracy

Rule of law China canand shouldestablish rule oflaw withoutWestern-styledemocracy

Constitutionalism,the Party shouldconduct itsactivities withinthe bounds of thelaw and theConstitution

Rule by law(fazhi) includingdemocraticdecision-makingand protectingthe fourdemocratic rightsof knowledge,participation,expression, andsupervision

Party system Criticizes thedirection of theCommunist Partyand argues thatChina has movedaway from thepath under Mao

Multipartycompetition butavoid mentioningopposition parties

One-partydemocracyMultipartycooperation ledby the CCP ratherthan multipartycompetition

Emphasis Collectiveinterests/nationalinterests

Individual rightsFreedom ofspeechFreedom ofassembly

GoodGovernanceSupremacy ofpublic interestIncrementalpolitical reform


Table 6.1 (Continued)

Criteria New Leftism Liberalism Democracy withChinesecharacteristics

Attitudetowardliberaldemocracy

Negative Embrace it asChina’s futurepolitical system

Not suitable forChina

Representation/deliberation

Massparticipation

Representativedemocracy

Democraticcentralism

Participation All have an equalsay in thedecisions thataffect their lives

Voting anduniversal suffrage

Local electionIndirect election

Could China develop a unique form of government based on its own distinctcharacteristics (guoqing, China’s national conditions)? A number of Chinesescholars say, yes. Zhang Mingshu, a political scientist at the CASS, suggeststhat China’s political culture is based on ethics, unlike the Western one,which is based on scientism. That’s the basis of what kind of democracyChina wants.7 Democracy has been on China’s political reform agenda inrecent years although the concept is interpreted “with Chinese characteris-tics.” Deng Xiaoping himself drew on Mao’s language of Chinese Marxism informulating “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The concept of democ-racy with Chinese characteristics was developed after socialism with Chinesecharacteristics.8 Beijing has turned the latter into an umbrella theory, underwhich numerous policies can be encompassed. Under the influence of theCCP, the theory of democracy with Chinese characteristics has emerged asa main trend among the Chinese intellectuals as they debate what kind ofdemocracy China should pursue.

The Chinese regime claims to be a Chinese form of democracy on thegrounds that it serves the people and rules in their interest, and a majority ofChinese citizens today accept that claim.9 Beijing repeats its own rhetoric ofpolitical reform and self-praises its “Chinese democracy.” Although the basicguideline for building “democracy with Chinese characteristics” was out-lined in the White Paper in 2005,10 it remains very much a work in progressand the subject of fierce debate both inside and outside the CCP.11

Beijing recognizes the universal value of democracy, yet it stresses thatChina should create a Chinese-style model of democracy different from thatof the West, based on China’s own history and current reality. The simul-taneous emphasis on both the universality and peculiarity of democracy isrepeated in another White Paper on Chinese politics, The Chinese Political

Chinese Intellectual Discourse on Democracy 101

Party System in 2007. Generally speaking, democracy with Chinese charac-teristics is distinguishable from liberal democracy in the following respects:inner-party democracy, promoting democracy through good governance,one-party democracy, rule by law (fazhi), and deliberative democracy.

Inner-party democracy (dangnei minzhu)

A growing number of pragmatic reformers believe that to enhance the legit-imacy of the regime, inner-party democracy and the separation of partyand government must be implemented as the starting point for democratictransition.12 Yu Keping states, “to rule the country by law we must first rulethe Party by law.” Gao Fang, a professor at Renmin University, has longcampaigned for the so-called three democracies, that is inner-party democ-racy within the CCP, people’s democracy (renmin minzhu), and inter-partydemocracy among the CCP and the eight satellite parties (dangji minzhu).13

It is understandable that Chinese elites and the public alike are nowinclined to pursue political reforms in a way that is incremental over timeand manageable in scale.14 Some intellectuals also believe that democracywill lead to chaos, or even the dissolution of the country, and they haveno immediate incentive to embrace it.15 Many Chinese scholars in thiscamp share the same concern. The greatest intellectual challenge for liberal-minded Chinese leaders and scholars is to make democracy conceptuallyand procedurally safe for China. For many of them, inner-party democracyis the best path to China’s political transformation.16 Yu Keping’s article in2006 offered a vision of gradual, incremental democratization with Chinesecharacteristics.17 Scholars at the Party School of the CCP (also known as theCentral Party School) developed this line of thinking further. They publisheda book titled Research Report on Political Reform in China in October 2007.In the book, they suggest that China work toward a low level of democracyby 2020, a middle level of democratic development between 2020 and 2040,and an advanced level of democracy between 2041 and 2060.18

Quite a few scholars call for realizing inner-party democratization andthen spreading the process outside the party; given the obstacles in China toa multiparty democratic system, inner-party democracy is not likely to trans-late into a broad political movement, but remain only a device for the partyitself. It should be pointed out that liberal scholars doubt that inner-partydemocracy will lead to liberal democracy.

Yu Keping holds that it would be a grave mistake to assume that Chinaonly needs inner-party democracy, instead of a truer people’s democracy(renmin minzhu) or social democracy (shehui minzhu), both of which wouldinclude grassroots and general democratic elections.19 For Yu, inner-partydemocracy and people’s democracy are complementary. The former is top-down or inside-out and the latter is bottom-up, but ideally they can meetin the middle. Similarly, Wang Changjiang, professor at the Central PartySchool, claimed that promotion of inner-party democracy need not be at the


expense of social democracy. In Wang’s words, “social democracy should notwait.”20

Inner-party democracy was as much, indeed more, of a top-down strategyto deal with party legitimacy and competence as it was something broughtabout by local discontent. The number of inner-party elections of one sortor another undoubtedly expanded over the years, but their vigor declined.The high tide of the inner-party democracy appears to have crested earlyin the 21st century. By the 2006 election cycle, inner-party democracy wasbecoming more formalistic, and for the 2011–2012 election cycle there areno signs of any new breakthrough.21

Promoting democracy through good governance

Governance has recently become a buzzword among Chinese policymakersand academics. It is increasingly reflected in reform practices at all levels ofgovernment in response to emerging social, political, economic, and envi-ronmental issues, as well as to challenges posed by China’s market-orientedreforms and rapid modernization.22 Broadly defined, “good governance”is about the “exercise of economic, political and administrative author-ity to manage a country’s affairs at all levels,” with special considerationfor such good universal norms and practices as participation, the rule oflaw, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effective-ness and efficiency, accountability and strategic vision.23 There is a growingconsensus among Chinese scholars that good governance is crucial for theestablishment of a functioning democracy.

Chinese scholars in this camp hold that China should promote democ-racy through good governance not through direct national elections. Withthis in mind, an increasing number of scholars are paying attention to theimportance of good governance rather than focusing electoral democracy.24

In the words of Yu Keping, “We must innovate social management and atthe same time prioritize the self-governance of society, mutual governanceby the government and the people is the basic path to good governance.”25

Over the past two decades, the Chinese government has experimentedwith democratization in local governance. Facing rising tensions betweencitizens and local government, growing demand for better public servicesand worsening local corruption, Beijing hopes that introducing democraticreforms at the local level can improve the quality of governance and helprenew the legitimacy of the Chinese political system. In addition, the partyis paying more attention to what the public thinks of high-ranking officials.

In his report at the 18th Party Congress, Hu Jintao called for strengthen-ing “Party’s governance capacity,” he proposes “socialist democracy” and not“liberal democracy.” Against this political environment, a practical approachto advance China’s political reform may lie in the promotion of good gov-ernance rather than electoral reform.26 The proponents of good governanceare reformers by and large in that they work with the party-state and seek


incremental change to it, representing good governance as a nonthreateningand feasible option for the party-state’s marked course of reform. Good gov-ernance is considered a prerequisite for higher-level political reforms such asthe electoral reform. The liberal writers, in contrast, work against the party-state and demand radical change in the hope of replacing China’s one-partyrule with liberal democracy.27

Single-party democracy

China has never been a multiparty democracy. The CCP has been fine-tuningits rule to make sure things stay that way. Beijing has been studying themodel of governance of other countries closely so as to avoid the downfall ofother great powers, such as the former Soviet Union. There is little evidenceto show that the CCP look at multiparty democracy as a value. On the otherhand, one-party system has been of great interest to the CCP, and almostevery major party in the world has been examined in some depth.28

Zhao Jianying, a scholar at the CASS, contends that “the liberal tideof thought is in reality just Westcentrism, regarding Western values asthe only reasonable and universal values.”29 The Chinese government andParty leaders seek to strategically use methods such as political consulta-tion with selected non-Party groups and individuals, and institutions suchas the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Theseare aimed at addressing mounting social unrest and popular grievances bycreating additional channels for political participation, but without com-promising on core principles of one-Party control. As Andrew Nathan pointsout recently, “the regime likes to talk about making itself more democratic,installing the rule of law, and promoting human rights. The apparent goalis to build a form of one-party rule that people will accept as responsive andlegitimate.”30

Rule by law (Fazhi)

The concept of the rule of law originated and developed within the frame-work of market-based economic systems. For many, the notion of the ruleof law is associated with liberal democratic political regimes. However, aftermuch debate, and many public speeches by the Beijing leadership, Chinaenacted in 1999 a Constitutional amendment making a reference to a con-cept akin to that of the rule of law. Since 1978, China’s official discourseon legal development has also evolved in several stages – from a require-ment “to strengthen socialist democracy and the legal system” (jiaqiangshehuizhuyi minzhu he fazhi) to the need to “administer the state accord-ing to law to build a socialist country based on the rule of law” (yifa zhiguo,jianli shehuizhuyi fazhi guojia). Later, Jiang Zemin’s call for “combining therule of law with rule of virtue” (yifa zhiguo yu yide zhiguo xiangjiehe)was com-plemented by Hu Jintao’s idea of “building a harmonious society” (jianlihexie shehui), emphasizing fairness and justice through enforcing the rule of


law.31 However, the Party has not embraced liberal idea of freedom of expres-sion and freedom of speech, instead Hu Jintao formulated the so-called fourrights, namely, the right to know, right to participate, right to express, andright to monitor.

In the Chinese language, fazhi can be translated as both “rule of law” and“rule by law.” In a recent paper by scholars from the CASS, the authors arguethat “the rule of law means that the people exercise their right to administerthe affairs of state, economic and cultural affairs and social affairs throughvarious means under the leadership of the CCP and in accordance with theConstitution and the law, ensuring that the affairs of state are administeredin accordance with the law and gradually institutionalizing and building thelegal framework for socialist democracy. The rule of law is characterized bystability, standardization and continuity.”32 It is clear that in the official dis-course, fazhi is not the same as the rule of law. As Tony Saich notes, when theCCP uses the phrase “the rule of law,” it does not mean a system that givesprimacy to law above political considerations and Party policy. Instead, it isa way of managing power, regulating the economy, and disciplining societyin the light of rapidly changing circumstances.33 By emphasizing “Chinesecharacteristics,” the CCP leadership has repeatedly rejected a Western liberaldemocratic concept of the rule of law as a bourgeois ideology, contrary tosocialism and a socialist legal system because it requires the separation ofmajor state powers and the supremacy of the law.

Constitutionalism appeared in China considerably early on, as the ban-ner of the political reform launched by the late Qing dynasty. However, likeother political ideas, it was banned during the Mao era, but reappeared whenthe reform-oriented leaders revised the constitution. In the 1990s, it becamea key term used in the liberal discourse because it not only embodied theliberal political idea but was also accepted by the authorities. For the author-ities, constitutionalism meant rule by law, but for the liberals, it referred toa political system with checks and balances and the Party should be underthe law. In the words of Su Shaozhi, former director of the Marxism Insti-tute of Academy at the CASS, the Constitution, not the party, should besovereign.34

Deliberative democracy

The evolution of deliberative democracy (xieshang minzhu, as it is known asin China, could be more accurately called “consultative authoritarianism”)35

or participatory budgeting suggests a gradual deepening of the system. SomeChinese scholars believe that deliberative democracy will gradually promotea liberalization of the Chinese polity and some form of democracy. Delibera-tive democracy has been regarded as a possible model for China’s democracyby some officials and scholars. Fang Ning, director of the Political ScienceInstitute at the CASS, concludes that China has chosen consultative democ-racy as the most appropriate instrument of democracy building that ensures


that pervasive contradictions typical for a modernizing society do not resultin social explosion.36

The concept of deliberative democracy was created in the West. Ironically,deliberative democracy spread faster and wider in China. Instead of plung-ing itself straight into an instant democracy solution, deliberate democracyis placing strong emphasis on improving governance and operational effi-ciency of its governmental system. A number of Chinese scholars strive toreplace conventional competitive democracy with deliberative democracy.They claim that this is what the Chinese government has been doing since1949, for instance through the institution of the Chinese People’s PoliticalConsultative Conference, Villager’s Self-Administration in rural China, andso on.37 Li Junru, former vice president of the Central Party School, insiststhat China can simply strengthen the existing mechanisms of deliberativeconsultation to serve as a breakthrough point for China’s political reform,together with the implementation of inner-party democracy.38 It is true thatthe CPPCC shares some elements of deliberative democracy, but significantchanges have to be made in order to qualify the system as a true form ofdeliberative democracy.39

The popularity of deliberative democracy in China is partly attributableto the CCP’s advocacy of political consultations between the ruling partyand other political actors which bears certain resemblance to the idea ofWestern deliberative democracy. Although the Chinese practice of politicalconsultation differs from the Western idea of democratic deliberation, inChinese language the term “consultation” (xieshang) shares the same char-acters as “deliberation.” Consequently, “consultative democracy” in Chinese(xieshang minzhu) becomes an equivalent for “deliberative democracy” inEnglish, thus blurring the nuance between the two key words. Within thislinguistic context, some Chinese scholars further argue that Western-styledemocracy is traditionally characterized by electoral democracy; whereasChinese democracy is traditionally characterized by deliberative democracy(actually consultative democracy) since China has already established theCPPCC system, which symbolizes the characteristics of Chinese democracy.Many party theorists believe that political development in China couldavoid electoral democracy and use consultative democracy to achieve realdemocracy.

It is worthwhile to point out the significant differences between politicalconsultation in China’s context and deliberative democracy in the Westernsetting. The discourse on deliberative democracy was initiated and pro-moted mainly by the scholars from the Central Compilation and TranslationBureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. Clearly, Beijingremains reluctant to commit itself to democratization. It just tries to usedeliberative democracy and good governance (governing competence andaccountability) to replace electoral democracy. But the question remains:Will deliberative democracy lead to the government of the people?


Chen Hongtai, a professor at the Institute of Political Science at theCASS, believes that the core values of “constitutional democracy” are humanrights to life, freedom, and property. Legal protection of property rights isa must for China since it is building a market economy. However, a full-scale introduction of constitutional democracy is reasonable only in thecase of complete transition to capitalist market economy, which impliestotal privatization, liberalization, and marketization. In China, the problemof equality and justice (also embedded in the concept of people’s rights –minquan) is more important than the problem of freedom and the rule oflaw.40 Yuan Zaijun concludes that the party’s authoritarian regime in Chinais by nature antidemocratic and that the so-called socialist democracy withChinese characteristics is not democratic.41

Liberal discourse on democracy

Liberal scholars envision a kind of Western-style democracy. They maintainthat constitutionalism is a good thing. They view the development of freespeech, enable government to run more efficiently in the long run. In theirminds, the lack of system of checks and balances is the worst shortcomingof the present political system. China’s liberal school is featured by pub-licly active scholars such as Liu Junning, Qin Hui, Zhu Xueqin, and XuYouyu.42 Proponents of Chinese liberalism believe that economic reform canonly breed crony capitalism if the liberal democratic system is not adopted.Although scholarly writings on liberal democracy are certainly unfamiliar tomost Chinese today, they are familiar to the intellectual elites who in turnoften frame the national debate.43 The following section examines the majorarguments of the Chinese liberals on democracy.

Liberal democracy is the best available form of government

Democracy is a central concern of the Chinese liberals. In their view, liberal-ism is the partner of democracy; “democracy” means “liberal democracy”regardless of cultural or national context. For them, open and competi-tive elections are the sine qua non of democracy. The liberal theorists holdliberalism as an alternative to the Marxist ideology. The liberals are con-vinced, moreover, that liberalism is the only and the best path that Chinesemodernity could take and liberal democracy the best available form ofgovernment. Li Shenzhi, a leading thinker of liberalism and former vicepresident of the CASS, writes the following famous statement:

After 300 years of comparison and selection in the whole world sincethe age of industrialization, and particularly after more than 100 yearsof Chinese experimentation, the largest in scale in human history, thereis sufficient evidence to prove that liberalism is the best and universalvalue.44


The scholars from the liberal camp establish their own positions by studyingliberal ideas of the West and by appealing to their considered convictionsabout the political and social realities of contemporary China. By studyingWestern liberal theories, they are persuaded by the moral desirability of lib-eral ideals. Reflecting on current Chinese reality, they believe that accordingto liberal criteria there are great political and social injustices in the presentsystem. They use liberal conceptual schemes to criticize the existing politicaland social realities and propose changes to overcome their faults.

The liberals advocate expanding direct elections and widening rights forcitizens. The question of constitutional democracy occupies more and moreof their attention. It was against this background that they call for constitu-tional democracy, with all of its standard features such as general elections,multiparty competition, safeguards of human rights, and checks and bal-ances of power between legislative, executive, and judiciary branches wentout. To them, multiparty democracy is not only the only way out for Chinabut also the only way to save and regenerate the CCP. In the minds of liberalscholars, multiparty competition is a bedrock feature of democracy.45

For the liberals, electoral democracy, though not a sufficient condition forrepresentative democracy, is the necessary condition for democracy.46 Theyargue that legitimate political power derives from the democratic principle ofpopular sovereignty, as expressed through free and fair election. In December2012, more than 70 prominent Chinese scholars and lawyers have urged thecountry’s Communist Party leaders to undertake moderate political reformsincluding separating the party from government, though they avoid anymention of ending one-party rule. The petition drafted by Peking UniversityLaw Professor Zhang Qianfan calls on the party to rule according to the con-stitution, protect freedom of speech, encourage private enterprise, and allowfor an independent judicial system. It also calls for the people to be able toelect their own representatives without interference from the CommunistParty.

The liberal thinkers become ever more convinced that political reform istruly indispensable to any successful economic reform. As Li Shenzhi put it,

China’s implementation of political reform will clearly determine theultimate success or failure of its economic reform. A mere open door tothe outside world is not enough, or even genuine without of a domesticopening. Domestically, the door should also be open to all spheres: theeconomy, politics, society, culture, media, freedom of speech, freedomassociation, etc. Only by doing so can China make true progress.47

China’s liberal thinkers are firmly convinced of intrinsic value of liberaldemocracy. Intellectuals with liberal inclinations contend that democracyis a general political civilization which all countries should embrace. Theysee concepts such as human rights not as a Western value but as a universal


value. They favor a complete and thorough globalization and promote theconcept of “universal values” (quanqiu jiazhi). According to the liberals, intoday’s world, globalization is gaining momentum. Under the prevailingcircumstances, China cannot, and should not, embark on its own road tomodernization. They believe that liberalism, now rejuvenating in the coun-try, will bring freedom to China and lead a free China into a world ofglobalization. The liberals think that the ideal model has already been estab-lished by developed countries, and China’s reform should merely replicateWestern development patterns.

Rule of the law

The 1990s witnessed a robust debate between “rule of law” and “rule bylaw.” The liberals argue that China needs the rule of law rather than the arbi-trary whims of party officials. According to the Chinese liberals, the so-calledsocialist legality is at best “rule by law,” in which the law is used by the party-state as an instrument to control society, while the Party itself exercises itspower above the law and is not subject to the law. Since then, tremendousefforts have been made by the Chinese liberals to promote the concept of“the rule of law,” in which everyone, the government officials in particular,is subject to the law, and government power is limited by law, with the resultthat individual rights are effectively protected by the law against the abuseof the government in particular. It was in the process of this debate that theconcept of constitutional government (xianzheng) was revived and incor-porated into the common vocabulary of formal publications in China.48

The liberal scholars believe that democracy is the best political system, andconstitutional government is the initial stage. In 2003, when the ChineseConstitution was undergoing a major revision, participants in both officialand unofficial conferences on constitutional revision called for replacingthe concept of renmin minzhu zhuanzheng (people’s democratic dictatorship)in the Constitution with the concept of renmin minzhu xianzheng (people’sdemocratic constitutional rule).

Limited government

The liberals strongly criticize the political corruption and argue that themain cause for corruption is the lack of a real market and checks andbalances. They do not criticize the marketization that has been initiallystimulated by the state, but they began to question the assumption thatstate-fostered marketization will generate a healthy market. They propose toexpel political power from the market by deepening economic reform andby initiating political reform. As for political reform, the liberals are anxiousto promote liberal ideas such as the rule of law, the mechanism of checksand balances, the constitutional protection of private ownership rights, andthe establishment of basic individual liberties. In promoting the separation


of the state from the market, fair opportunities for individuals and individ-ual liberties protected by further political reform, the liberals believe thatthrough the gradual solution of the problem of corruption, the income gapbetween the advantaged and disadvantaged will be narrowed.

Fundamental political reform

The liberals maintain that Western democracy is the model to be followedin China. Many liberal scholars associate democracy with modernity andseek to join the modern world. In the words of Li Shenzhi, “modernizationmeans Americanization.”49 It is not surprising that in the cyber world, theliberals were often bashed as members of dailudang (traitors who betray theircountry by providing directions to foreign invaders).50 On the other hand,the New Leftists are often labeled as members of wumaodang or the 50 CentParty (Internet commentators hired by the government).

The arguments and positions of the liberals are not uniform. A slightlydifferent and apparently more radical form of liberalism wishes to makeWestern democracy a good model. It is worth noting that even many reform-ers are nervous about granting too much power to rural people, whom theyview as backward and pro-authoritarian. Yao Yang, a well-known economist,holds that the Chinese path of democratization looks very much like thepaths experienced by most mature Western democracies, that is, it is aprocess controlled by the elites.51

According to a recent survey, some 38.1 percent of those surveyed heldmore conservative values, were more critical of overall individualism andleaned toward the “left,” a term that commonly refers to those more patri-otic, according to the study by Zhang Mingshu, a scholar at Institute ofPolitical Science at the CASS. Only 8 percent leaned to the “right,” support-ing more individual freedoms and a smaller government, and were morecritical toward the Communist Party’s legacy. The rest of those polled werecategorized as centrists, neither left nor right.52

There is little doubt that most liberal scholars want a Western-style democ-racy to be China’s future political system. Generally speaking, although theliberal thinkers played a very crucial role during the market-oriented reform,their political reform agenda is not considered viable and usually discred-ited. Many in China at the present time choose economic development overdemocracy. In the minds of establishment of intellectuals and policymak-ers in Beijing, the liberals merely echo Western ideas or repeating Westernconcepts without deep understanding of reality of China.

New Left’s perspective on democracy

Though there is no lack of supporters of liberal democracy in theChinese intellectual circle, more and more criticisms of liberal democ-racy have emerged in contemporary China, conceived even as a wave


of antidemocratic ideology in a general sense. Since the mid-1990s, aNew Left position has emerged, calling for critical rethinking of the rev-olutionary legacy and democratizing innovation in economic and politi-cal institutions.53 The New Left scholars generally think that liberalism’sone person one vote is insufficiently egalitarian, insufficiently democratic.Instead, they advocate that the masses should take part fully in politicsas much as possible and should hold the greater power. This is their greatequality and great democracy.54

In the words of Zhang Weiwei, a professor at Fudan University, “democ-racy is a universal value, but the Western democratic system is not. The twothings cannot be mixed. The core value of democracy is to reflect the will ofthe people and achieve good governance.”55 For him, good governance mat-ters most rather than Western-style democratization. The new emphasis ongood governance suggests that the CCP sees a need to address social issuesthrough a combination of better services and stronger police work ratherthan through political reform.

According to Zhang, like with its economic reform, while China doesnot have a roadmap, it has a “compass.” The broad orientation of the“compass” toward a new type of democracy in China is to establish (1) afirst-rate mechanism for selecting the right talents at all levels of the Chinesestates, (2) a first-rate mechanism for exercising democratic supervision, and(3) a first-rate mechanism for carrying out extensive and intensive socialconsultation.56

Chinese New Leftism is different from its counterpart in the West in style,idea, and content. It has been much less friendly to liberal democracy andcapitalism. Indeed, some New Leftists have been sharply critical of marketreform and wary of liberal democracy. They consider the reform in Chinato be essentially one step away from the socialist model. They believe thattoday’s social problems are rooted in the excesses of capitalism.57 Accordingto Xie Yue, a professor at Tongji University, at the heart of their debate isthe conflict between liberal representative democracy, which is favored bythe liberals, and conceptions of direct democracy, advocated by the NewLeft.58 Politically, the New Left scholars are skeptical of liberal democracy,favor using state power to address the problems that China faces today, anddistrust human rights as universal value. The New Left discourse on democ-racy focuses on the following major arguments: Liberal democracy does notsuit China, government is a necessary virtue, Marxism not human rights is auniversal value, integration of three traditions (Confucianism, the traditionsof Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping).

Skeptical view of liberal democracy

New Leftists refuse to invoke the Western liberal ideas and conceptualschemes to interpret the Chinese experience. From the point of view of theNew Left, electoral democracy is full of deficiencies and flaws and election


is not the solution to China’s problem. According to Wang Shaoguang, awell-known New Left thinker, lottery (or random selection) might be a bet-ter option to get people elected.59 Wang explains that democracy before the19th century was understood to be a system of selecting leaders by lot orchance. It is only in recent history that democracy has been equated withcompetitive elections.60

For the New Leftists, parliamentary democracy was a product of historical,social, and economic evolution of Western societies that was completely for-eign to China. In an op-ed published in the People’s Daily overseas editionon 19 July 2013, Hu Angang, a professor at Tsinghua University, argues thatcompared with the civil society in the West, the people’s society is superiorand the party’s style of government was better because it was homegrownand “fits China’s basic national conditions better.” In an article publishedon the front page of the People’s Daily, Hu Angang calls China’s PolitburoStanding Committee a “collective presidential system with Chinese charac-teristics,” as opposed to the “Western individual presidential system.” Afterelaborating on the merits of the two, he concludes that the former is supe-rior. China is too big and too complex for the Western “bipartisan system,tripartite system, presidential system and bicameral system,” which are “toosimplistic, too limited and too defective.” A collective presidential system,with multiple leaders heading different leading state organs, not only guar-antees a wider consensus “through sharing of decision-making wisdom andexpertise” but also “prevents an individual from making decisions on majorissues and allows timely correction of mistakes.”61

Pan Wei, a Peking University professor, argues that China is currentlyunderdeveloped politically and he also rejects democracy as the solution.Pan dismisses democracy as foolishly fashionable and utopian. Think-ing things through makes clear that democratization would harm Chinaseverely. It certainly has damaged other developing countries. Pan insiststhat “[t]he great democratization wave of the past 20 years has not broughtdeveloping countries prosperity and progress.”62 Debate now often centerson whether Western-style democracy is right for China or whether a “thirdway” of political reform can be found.63 New Leftists, in general, do notbelieve that the Western style of democracy is a feasible or, for that matter,desirable option for China, at least in the foreseeable future.

Government is a necessary virtue

The New Left is characterized by an emphasis on state power to redressthe problems of injustice and other negative effects of privatization, mar-ketization, and globalization. The role and significance of state in socialand political life is perhaps the single most important issue that dividesthe liberals and New Leftists. The “state capacity” theory, formulated byWang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, argues for a strong central governmentto regulate the market and curb its tendency toward regional protectionism


and fragmentation and toward monopoly and unequal competition.64 Theystress that the state played an important role in the reconstruction of mod-ern China. Hu Angang writes, “If China is to become a modern country,the first task is to modernize its state structure. That means establishing asocialist democracy.”65

More importantly, Wang and Hu argue that a capable state should main-tain a credible national defense, a socially just distribution of wealth, and thenation’s moral and political unity.66 According to Wang Shaoguang, the keyto Chinese political change (he prefers the word change to reform) is not tofollow the West or to set up Western competitive electoral institutions, butto promote ordinary people’s interests. In order to achieve that goal, Chinamust strengthen the state capacities. Many New Leftists share the view thatWestern-style democracy is not necessary and even detrimental to the inter-ests of the vast majority of the Chinese people. What China really needs isto have a strong state and develop a better and stable livelihood for her peo-ple. For example, Pan Wei remarks that a consultative rule-of-law regime inChina, in which the rule of law is supplemented by democracy rather thandemocracy being supplemented by the rule of law, is deduced from China’shistory, culture, and existing social system. He holds that it is the rule of lawrather than political democracy that is the most important means of curingrampant corruption.67

Marxism not human rights is a universal value

The New Leftists insist that Marxism has already presented a universallyapplicable social model to the world, and China should therefore return tothe universal values of Marxism. They insist that Western-style democracyas well as its underlying commitment and values such as human rights arenot those genuinely appreciated by the Chinese people who have differentsocial, cultural, and political values.

The New Leftists claim that social justice cannot be achieved withoutsubstantial political reforms, such as more autonomy for organizations offarmers and workers, democratic processes that allow for the articulation ofinterests, and a free press that would expose official corruption. New Left-ists, while abandoning the Marxist notion of the state as an instrument ofclass dominance or arena of class struggle, envision the state as a permanentfeature of the market economy. Furthermore, they invoke Maoist ideals tocriticize the current trends in China toward capitalism and globalization.

Politically, the New Leftists distrust representative democracy, they arguefor daminzhu (the grand democracy in Chinese which means direct massdemocracy). They advocate that the masses should take part fully in poli-tics as much as possible and should hold the greatest power. This is theirgreat equality and great democracy.68 In their view, daminzhu would expandpeople’s political rights and allow them a voice in important decisionsthat concerned the interests of the whole nation. However, their views on


daminzhu were criticized by liberals as heretical. In addition, some NewLeft scholars have asserted that the one-party system should be improvedwithout democratization, thus creating a consultative rule-of-law regime.69

Conclusion

In post-Mao China, there has been an intense divergence in the under-standing and interpretation of democracy.70 Most of people in China viewdemocracy in more complex ways. The arguments of democracy of Chinesecharacteristics, for the most part, are in accord with the official doctrinefor political reform. Party theorists see Western-style democracy as end-less debate and stalemate. They believe that Western-style democracy is notappropriate in China, at least not at China’s current level of economic andcultural development. For the New Leftists, Western-style liberal democracyis fatally flawed. They charge that only China’s nouveau riche will benefitfrom “Western capitalist-style” democracy. Some even call it “democracytrap.”

There is a widespread belief among the Chinese scholars that the develop-ment of democracy invariably requires the existence of a variety of social andeconomic preconditions such as relatively high levels of economic develop-ment and an established middle class. However, quite a few of them holdthat the first task is not to implement election but to increase the size ofmiddle class. Economic development was the best means to this end. Forinstance, Zheng Yongnian argues that many believe that democracy con-tributes to the development of harmonious society. In fact, under certaincircumstances, democracy causes disintegration of the society. A successfulWest is due to its large middle class.71

The liberal scholars generally believe that China must establish a Western-style democratic political system. Since we cannot find anything better thanliberal democracy, we have to live with it. Yet, in the foreseeable future, lib-eral programs on political reform have little chance to be carried out. ManyChinese intellectuals used to take the United States and Western Europe asthe best development model to follow; the global financial crisis of 2008has made many of them wonder about the value of such faith. Demo-cratic socialists’ arguments hold much promise, but they would need to bemodified somewhat to better suit China’s social and political context.

While Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought are still highlyregarded in the Chinese Constitution, pragmatism is encouraged in Beijing’sroutine decision-making process. Unlike strongmen in other undemocraticregimes, the leaders of the CCP have enforced a limit of two terms for theirtop leaders and regularly invoked democracy in their speeches. The officialdiscourse on democracy has changed subtly in recent years. The regime haseven borrowed some reform ideas such as term limits, local elections, pub-lic hearings, and participatory budgeting from Western democracies. Along


with the ongoing debates, people’s demand for civil liberties and media free-dom is undeniably on the rise.72 In the vigorous debate over democracy,most intellectuals are in favor of democratic form of government. In theirview, democracy in China is to be regarded as a kind of natural growth, albeitslow, rather than a transplant from the West.

Scholarly discourse on democracy has made important impacts on China’stransformation and the Chinese pursuit of democracy. In spite of divergencein the understanding and interpretation of democracy among the Chinesescholars, there is a growing consensus among them that political reform isthe right answer to China’s current problems, and democracy is a good thingfor China.

7Debating China’s Economic Reform

Dramatic transformation has occurred in China since the economic reformslaunched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. It was under his leadership that Chinaundertook the ambitious economic reforms that have transformed China’seconomy from an economic backwater into the second-largest economy inthe world. But with the rapid growth has come new challenges: rampant cor-ruption, increasing social unrest, rising levels of inequalities, the yearningfor democracy, and the spread of ideas foreign and inimical to the perceivedinterests of the communist state. Although the outcome of the politicaltransformation in China cannot be forecasted precisely, what has hithertooccurred is already significant enough to warrant a careful analysis of itsdilemmas and dynamics.

Serious questions have been raised about the impacts of the reforms.In the economic realm, the outcomes and orientation of the market-orientedreforms were challenged by the “New Left” (xin zuopai), moderate reformers,and those who distrust the reform. In the social realm, the large increase ininequality has sharpened social cleavages and class conflict.1 China is fac-ing some of its toughest economic challenges and substantial vulnerabilitiesthat require further deep reforms.

China’s mainstream state ideology is now confronted with increasing chal-lenges from a great variety of ideological trends. Among them are the twomajor schools of thought, namely, New Leftism and liberalism. Both theliberals and the New Leftists seek to reform China’s existing political andeconomic systems, and there have been robust debates between the two.Among young students, liberalism has become fashionable and New Leftismhas tremendous appeal.2 Meanwhile, migrant peasants and laid-off workershave become natural allies in the New Left’s struggle against prevalent neo-liberal practice in the name of market efficiency and globalization, althoughmost of them have never even heard of the terms, either New Leftism orliberalism.3

This chapter focuses on the following research questions: What are themajor debates between the New Left and liberals? To what extent do the

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policies of the current Chinese leadership reflect the major concerns ofthe New Left and liberals? How have the New Leftists and liberals affectedthe economic reforms and what changes might they bring to the politicalclimate?

Origins of the debate

Historically, China lacked the tradition and cultural foundations for a lib-eral regime.4 Prior to the reform in the late 1970s, the Chinese intellectualslargely used Marxism to explain and interpret development in China. Since1978, the CCP gradually has relaxed its control over the process of ideo-logical production and dissemination. Before that year, hardly any studentshad the chance to study abroad. That has been changed significantly. Therehas been an increasing number of returned students (they are labeled ashaigui in Chinese) working at Chinese research institutions and universities.5

In this respect, their education in the West has been important and allowedthem to locate and draw on theoretical developments that were congenialto their own thinking. The intellectuals have more freedom to explore thetopics in which they are interested. With the collapse of Mao’s ideology,seeds of regeneration which had lain dormant gradually came to life. Conse-quently, the reform decades were characterized by an influx of Western ideasin social sciences and humanities. Liberal ideals like intellectual freedom, theseparation of powers, civil society, and the rule of law were reexamined.

The 1990s witnessed the increasing differentiation of the Chineseintelligentsia into two political camps, even if the frontier between themhas never been clear-cut.6 The liberal wing of a remnant of the pro-democracy movement reemerged following the Tiananmen crackdown,including figures such as Li Shenzhi (1923–2003), Liu Junin, Qin Hui, XuYouyu, Zhu Xueqin, and many others. Chinese liberals advocate market lib-eralism, adhering to the doctrines of Hayek. They believe market is a natural,“spontaneous order” conducive to social and political stability. China mustdeepen the reform launched by Deng Xiaoping and privatize industries stillin state hands, which further reduces the government’s scope and size andputs more trust in personal initiative.7 As summarized by Xu Youyu, a liberalpolitical theorist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,

The most important reason for this rise of liberalism in China is thatthe direction of market reforms has gained credibility. Economists cannow loudly talk about classical economic liberalism and the positiveeffects of the “invisible hand.” Second, China itself experienced a lib-eral movement that flourished during the 1930s and 1940s. Third, manybooks on Western liberal thought were translated into Chinese duringthe 1990s, including works by Hayek, generating much reactions anddiscussions.8

Debating China’s Economic Reform 117

After 1989, the change of the official reform policies created a situationwhere the term “liberal” could describe a mixture of support and criticism ofthe government, that is approval of marketization, but disapproval of cen-sorship or violation of human rights.9 Chinese liberalism today gives specialattention to property rights, economic freedom, constitutionalism, the ruleof law, limited government, individualism, toleration, pluralism, and theopen society.10 In their mind, market reform would not succeed as long asproperty rights remained vague.

A serious of events in the 1990s caused the differentiation among theChinese intelligentsia.11 In 1997, the Asian financial crisis broke out. Nat-urally, this dramatically betrayed the risks of globalization. Suddenly cap-italism did not seem such a sure-fire guarantee of growth and prosperity.Anti-Western sentiment developed after Beijing failure in 1993 to win itsbid to host the year 2000 Olympic Games. Furthermore, in 1999 with theAmerican “accidental bombing” of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, therewas a wave of indignation among ordinary Chinese and demonstration bystudents. China’s New Left took a strong nationalistic stance, while theliberals worried deeply about the negative effect of rising nationalism.

Thirdly, the New Left was shocked by polarization and decided to standup for the interests of the poor and asked for a change in the direction ofthe reforms, advocating a strong state capable of defending the “vulnerable”groups (ruoshi qunti). Meanwhile, the inequalities that came with the market-oriented reform triggered increasing tension within the intellectual circles.Although a segment of the intellectual elites have developed into an interestgroup tied to the ruling politico-economic bloc, some have gained very littlefrom the economic reform; instead, their relative social and economic statushas deteriorated.

The debate on economic reform

The scholars from both liberals and the New Left camps occupy positions attop academic institutions. There have been heated debates between the twoon the strategies and outcome of the reform. Their debates focus on issuessuch as the market vs. state, globalism vs. nationalism, growth vs. equity,efficiency vs. fairness.

Market vs. State

“Big state is bad, small state is good” was the mantra of economists in the1980s. Since Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, there has been a signif-icant retreat of the state. Until recent years, liberal policies appear to havetriumphed in both the West and the former Soviet bloc.12 China was not anexception in this regard.

In the late 1990s, Hayekian theories became highly popular in China.13

Hayek’s stress on the notion of private property as the basis for liberty is


debated in China. Liu Junning, a liberal scholar, has played an important roleto spread the ideas of private property in China.14 Liu has developed Hayek’sidea by stating that “private property rights are the most basic human rightsin the world.”15 Liberal economists believe that the government’s inter-ventions in economic and social affairs are the root causes of corruptionand inefficiency, and thus have to be reduced to a minimum. The mainvirtue of market economy is that it facilitates economic and technologicaldevelopment more rapidly than other economic systems.

The liberals’ perspective was challenged by the New Left, as Wang Huiputs it, “China is caught between the two extremes of misguided socialismand crony capitalism and suffering from the worst elements of both sys-tems” and “We must not give total priority to GDP growth to the exclusionof worker’s rights and the environment.”16 In March 2007, Wen Jiabao, thethen premier, echoed the voice of the New Left intellectuals: “the biggestproblem with China’s economy is that growth is unstable, unbalanced,uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”17

While the liberals believed that the state must shrink in order to facili-tate a growing market economy, Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang held theopposite. In 1993, they published A Study of China State Capacity,18 in whichthey argued that a strong state is necessary for market reform. In their report,Wang and Hu think that the decentralization that took place in China sincethe reform started threatens to undermine the future of the reform and per-haps even the state itself. They contend that the reform has undermined thestate capacity in China, and that the state’s fiscal revenues, as a percentage ofGNP, have declined and will continue to decline into the foreseeable future,thereby weakening China’s ability to mobilize resources for modernization.19

In the report, Wang and Hu indicate that the fiscal system of “contracted tax-ation” was tending to produce a weak center and strong provinces, seriouslydamaging the capacity of the state to manage the transition from a plannedto a socialist market economy.

The government did not treat Wang and Hu’s report lightly. Wang andHu’s report helped prompt the taxation reform of January 1994, which splitrevenues and responsibility between the central and provincial authorities,with social consequences that are still unfolding.20 Most liberals rejected theidea that the Chinese state could really be as weak as Wang and Hu claimed,and maintained that in any case the government should withdraw from theeconomy in favor of an unfettered market. The report was dismissed by thesecritics as exaggerated and moving in the wrong direction. It is worthy ofpointing out that after 1989 the Chinese state suffered a severe crisis of legit-imacy, so any discussion of the state capacity tended to be read as if it couldbe seeking to strengthen the existing system.

To be sure, among the New Left scholars there is not even a desire toeliminate the market and return to the Soviet-style economy. They mainlywant a state-regulated market economy with a social safety net that could


reduce inequality and protect the environment. Gan Yang called the NewLeft a “New Deal liberalism.”21 On the other hand, the liberals maintainthat freedom will only come when the public sector is privatized, and anew, politically active middle class emerges. Like Marx, the New Left scholarsobviously dislike markets, and in their minds private property is the ultimateevil. For them the state has not done enough. Yet, for the liberals, China isnow paying the price for having stimulated too much since the global crisisin 2008.

Globalism vs. Nationalism

Before China began its process of economic reform in 1978, the governmenthad adopted an inward-looking policy with emphasis on self-reliance. As aresult, China had little foreign trade and attracted very little foreign directinvestment (FDI). The policy was abandoned in the late 1970s, when theCCP gradually opted for a full-scale embrace of global capitalism. Comparedto “shock therapy” in Russia, the opening to the market in China is a grad-ual one. This strategy is related to the conundrum of how to engage globalcompetition. With the Chinese integration with the international economy,we have now witnessed a rise of Chinese nationalism and the discourse onglobalization as well.22

Globalization has been one of the most important discourses within theChinese academic circles in recent years. Nowhere is the intellectual andpolitical challenge of globalization more keenly felt or hotly debated thanin China.23 The debates drew scholars from both the New Left and liberalcamps. Liberal scholars are sanguine about the consequence of globalization.In 1994, Li Shenzhi, described as the “father of Chinese liberalism” by theNew York Times, published perhaps the first article in China on globalization.Li argued that today’s world is becoming more and more integrated and thatif China would like to play a bigger role in the future, the only option isto learn and accept the established rules of the game. With globalizationas the dominant trend, China should not “reinvent the wheel,” but mustunderstand the globalization process more deeply and participate in it moreactively. Only in this way can China’s nationalist wishes be satisfied in thenext century.24

Li’s arguments were echoed in the works of other liberal scholars. ZhuXueqin, who is perhaps China’s leading liberal spokesman today, points outthat “nationalism was the most dangerous force in modern Chinese history.We should enter the world system at top speed, because globalism was much,much better than nationalism.”25 Liberal economists such as Zhou Qiren andFan Gang in the entourage of Zhu Rongji, then premier, were eager to get thePRC into the World Trade Organization (WTO) as soon as possible.26

Liberal scholars saw the WTO as part of an inevitable, albeit painful,process of integration with the global economy, although the New Leftintellectuals argued that the uniquely strict conditions negotiated with the


WTO members constituted a new form of economic imperialism. In theminds of liberals, the reform of the Chinese economy and political systemmeans a transition to the American model, which is their ultimate point ofreference. Some in China have lauded the American system and urged Chinato copy it. Many of them equate modernization with Westernization.

The liberal intellectuals dominated China’s intellectual arena in the firstpart of the Chinese reform. Since the early 1990s, Chinese scholars have paidspecial attention to “globalization.” The literature on globalization has beenmushrooming and literature of international studies is replete with analysesof development and impact of globalization on the China’s economic andsecurity environment. The majority of scholars consider that isolationismwas the major cause behind China’s backwardness and it is in the Chineseinterests to embrace globalization in spite of negative effects it might bringabout. The discourse helped transform the top leaders’ thinking regardingglobalization. Beijing not only endured lengthy negotiations and an ever-expanding set of requirements in order to join the WTO but also used thepro-market rules of that institution to overcome resistance to reform amongdie-hards inside China itself.27

On the other hand, New Leftists argue that contemporary Chinese nation-alism is a by-product of globalization and that the upsurge of nationalismand China’s rapid integration in global capitalism have gone hand in hand.They believe that the government has been in too much of a hurry to enterthe WTO, that a more measured approach would have been more sensi-ble. According to Wang Hui, this is a premier (referring to Zhu Rongji) wholost confidence in the ability of the government to resolve the problems ofthe state-owned enterprises, and hoped that competition from foreign cap-itals would take over as the driving force of the economic reform.28 TheNew Left holds that China’s involvement in “globalization” has resulted inthe unchecked spread of capitalism in China. They contend that China’ssocial problems are nothing but “Western epidemic” or “market epidemic”which the capitalist countries have ever experienced. Their concerns wereconfirmed by a report by the Development Research Center under the StateCouncil, China’s cabinet, that foreign investors control the top-five busi-nesses in each of the industrial sectors that are open to foreign investment.Of China’s 28 leading industrial sectors, foreign investors control most ofthe assets in 21 sectors.29

The Chinese New Left’s resistance to globalization is premised on itsargument that the processes of global capitalism totally destroy indigenousindustries, leaving them disordered and unreconstructed, further marginaliz-ing the undeveloped or underdeveloped countries and undermining severelythe sovereignty of the nation-state. According to the Chinese New Left,economic globalization is a process of subjugating different regions, soci-eties, and individuals to a hierarchical and unequal structure of globalmonopolization. The alternative is nationalism.30


In reality, economic globalization can be a double-edged sword. Chinahas attracted more FDI by far than any other developing country.31 Butit continues to draw capital partially because it is willing to rent work-ers for falling returns. The free-market economic policies have not leftChina worse off on the whole. They have lifted it out of the ranks ofthe world’s poorest countries, created an emerging middle class of serviceindustry workers in the big cities, and made China the largest exporter inthe world surpassing the United States. Meanwhile, any deepening of thereform will require greater engagement with the world through, for example,the WTO.

The New Left was among the first critics of neoliberalism in China. TwoNew Left scholars, Han Deqiang and Yang Fan, have become the best-knownspokespersons of the New Left at the turn of the century. They wrote exten-sively against globalization and China’s accession to the WTO. In 2000,Han published The Crash – The Global Trap and China’s Realistic Choice.32

He describes the high hopes on China’s WTO accession and the supposedefficiency of the market as “market romanticism.” Contrary to the liberals’claim, China’s accession to the WTO under the current terms would onlyjeopardize the infant national industry.

In addition, the New Left thinkers have attempted to link globalizationto social conflict. Globalization fosters economic prosperity and raises livingstandards by specialization, division of labor, and trading according to com-parative advantage. They reduce cost of production, raise productivity, andexpand the production frontier. However, the gains from globalization maynot be distributed evenly in China.33 For the New Left scholars, everythingthat takes place in China can be linked to the expansion of global capital-ism into the country. According to Wang Hui, for example, “in all of itsbehavior, including economic, political, and cultural – even in governmentbehavior, China has completely conformed to the dictates of capital andthe activities of the market.”34 Like elsewhere in the world, the perceivedmal-manifestations of globalization have led to the rise of anti-globalizationintellectual movements in China.35

The liberals hold that the source of these problems is predominantly inter-nal and that the way to resolve them should be to go further reforms,particularly by promoting economic and political reforms hand in hand.In contrast, the New Left believes that the source of these problems ismainly external, rooted in globalization, international capital, and the mar-ket economy.36 In general, the New Left thinking concurs with nationalismon the subject of globalization. They are deeply committed to the agenda ofChina’s intellectual nationalists, including, for example, ridiculing the ideathat human rights had anything to do with NATO’s war in Kosovo. From theperspective of the New Left, neo-nationalism in China is not anti-Western,xenophobic, and aggressive, but is more assertive and open to the outsideworld than China’s earlier forms of nationalism.37


The party-state has given tacit recognition to nationalism as a potentialsource of regime legitimacy. Zheng Yongnian has shown clearly: “In the post-Mao era, the search for political legitimacy has replaced the foreign threatand has become the primary factor underpinning the revival of Chinesenationalism. In other words, the main sources for nationalism in the post-Mao era are domestic rather than external.”38 Elsewhere he elaborates whathe means by “the search for political legitimacy,” “Nationalism has beenused by the Chinese Communist Party as a response to the decline inMaoist faith, and nationalism is ready to become another vision of the CCPideology.”39

Ironically, Jürgen Habermas, “a highly respected ‘mentor’ of New LeftChinese academics,” reacted strongly during his visit to China in the springof 2001 that some members of the Chinese New Left, in their zeal to con-struct anti-imperialist discourses, have (mis)used his theory in such a waythat amounts to justifying nationalist and authoritarian orientations of theChinese state.40 Apparently, China’s New Left seems more enthusiastic aboutanti-imperialism than about anti-authoritarianism.41 On the other hand, theliberals argue that the lack of democracy, rather than global capitalism, as thefundamental source of new forms of domination, oppression, and inequalityin China.

Despite ideological clashes and heated debates, the liberal and the NewLeft have pursued a similar agenda: to make China rich and strong. Theyall wish their mission imports new ideas to help the leadership enact theirprojects. So far, Beijing has downplayed popular criticism of globalizationwhich focuses on the negative effects of China’s growing interaction withthe outside world.

Growth vs. Equity

One of consequences of market reform is the redistribution of wealth andpower. China may be the world’s fastest-growing economy, but it is alsoone of the world’s most unequal societies. This has prompted serious debateamong about social justice among intellectuals, with many articles in jour-nals and books about it. Liberals, following the late Friedrich Hayek, haveinsisted that the market itself is the best guarantee of social justice. ForHayek, state intervention was the beginning of the “road to serfdom.”42

For the same reason, they believe that economic progress will guaran-tee the achievement of fair income distribution and, indeed, that it isthe only way to achieve that end in the long run. From the perspectiveof the liberals, market is not the cause of income inequality. Instead, itcomes as a result of official corruption, exchange of power and money.The real reason for economic disparity is official corruption. Economicdevelopment is less egalitarian in China, but the government’s policiesin the economic reform era have helped to lift tens of millions out ofpoverty.


Cui Zhiyuan says, the crux of the problem is that “the government ismore focused on helping export manufacturers than agriculture and ruralwelfare,” which affect far more people.43 From the point of view of the NewLeft, China is living through a Gilded Age of inequality, whose benefits arenot trickling down to the 800 million peasants who live off the land or flockto the cities for factory or construction jobs. Wang Hui attacked China’s lead-ers for using “the state interference and even violence” to enforce its visionof international capitalism. Wang says it is time for people to understandthat China’s problems are the result of “bad policies and bad governance,”not merely fallout from market mechanics.44 The New Left emphasizes socialjustice, not just economic growth at any price, and views the completedivorce from the redistributionist ideals of Marxist communism as callousand immoral.

Income disparity in China is too stark to be ignored. The CCP began torecognize that its legitimacy cannot rely on economic performance alone.It needs to stress fairness and justice. Nevertheless, few in China believethat China needs another radical revolution. The Beijing leadership hasvowed to raise peasant incomes and stop the most egregious abuse of work-ers’ rights. The leadership has made tackling income inequalities betweenChina’s rich urban and poor rural areas the centerpiece of its new five-yearplan. On the other hand, in a speech to the National People’s Congress (NPC)in March 2006, President Hu declared that China must “unshakably persistwith economic reforms.”

Efficiency vs. Fairness

Liberalism, in particular the “Washington Consensus” on economic reformin developing nations, dominated economic discourse, backed by interna-tional organization and private capital. It is argued that market is a necessary(though not a sufficient) condition for successful democracy. For many years,Beijing implemented market-oriented reform similar to the tenets of theWashington Consensus.

While the drain on state assets that accompanies privatization has beenregarded as problematic for a long time, Lang Xianping (Larry Lang), pro-fessor of Finance at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, provided newfood for thought when he presented the huge losses of state-owned assetsbased on accounting and other data from such well-known companies asHaier, TCL, and Greencool Technology. In August 2004, Lang Xianping tookGu Chujun and other entrepreneurs’ management buy-out (MBO) as a casestudy, raised his opinions that a large quantity of the state asset had beenout-flown and the staff benefit had been violated in state-owned enterprisesproperty right reform. He thought the reform was on a wrong direction. Hecriticized Haier, TCL, and Kelon for taking advantage of the property rightreform to swallow up the state-owned assets. Lang claims that state-ownedenterprises (SOEs) are just as efficient if they employ market managers, and


the hidden cost of MBO is borne by society. His criticism garnered mediaand public attention and set off a new controversy about the privatizationof SOEs.45

Several New Left economists quickly wrote a letter to the leadership call-ing for an investigation into Lang’s charges; eventually the China SecurityRegulatory Commission found that wrongdoing had been committed. GuChujun, chairman of the Kelon, was arrested in September 2005.

Zhang Weiying, a liberal economist, stresses that individuals with con-tribution to society should be well treated. He states that the process ofreforming the SOEs is a process of continuously increasing social wealth.It cannot be said that state-owned assets have lost simply after seeing theirpurchasers have earned money. He believes that a more serious problemis the embezzlement of private property by various government depart-ments. Zhang’s response to the New Left’s charge was seen as liberals’ typicalposition.46

Liberal economists (also known as mainstream economists in China)maintain that the drain on state assets may lead to social inequity, butwhen one considers that both inequality and inefficiency may prevail if theeconomic transition were to slacken, reforms such as privatization shouldbe accelerated rather than suspended. Besides, the mainstream economistswarn that raising objections to the siphoning off of state-owned assets toentrepreneurs could lead to a deceleration in ownership reforms and worsenthe investment environment. They argue that the entrepreneurs who havemade great contributions to China’s economic development should be morerespected and appreciated.

Although liberal economists defended the MBOs, public opinion stronglysupported Lang. Amid floundering stock prices, the ideas of Lang are widelysupported by small investors. Lang has been nicknamed “Supervisor Lang”for his zeal in looking into stock market irregularities. Ironically, in China,which calls itself a socialist country, the government’s thinking on this issueis closer to that of the liberals, who advocate the free-market capitalism thanthat of the New Leftists, who are critical of marketization and privatization.

Debate on property law

In 2004, the Constitution of the PRC was amended to provide that “pri-vate property is inviolable.” To give practical definition to this, a full-fledgedProperty Law was required. The Property Law is a civil law, regulates prop-erty relationships, and adjusts civil relationships stemming from attributionand use of that property. It involves defining the property of the state, thecollective, and the individual, as well as other property protection measures.China’s laws are usually submitted for approval after at most three reviewsat the NPC Standing Committee. However, the debate of the Property Lawspanned nine years, receiving a record of seven reviews at the NPC StandingCommittee and stirring hot debates across the country.


In 2005, Gong Xiantian, a law professor at Peking University and a NewLeft scholar, published a letter on the Internet that accused the draft Prop-erty Law of violating China’s Constitution and betraying the socialist system.He claimed that the draft Property Law was “unconstitutional” in stipulat-ing the equal status of the state, collective, and private ownership. GongXiantian argued that the draft law would “accelerate the loss of the state-owned assets and worsen social polarization and antagonism.” Property thatused to be taken away from the rich for redistribution to the poor is todayroutinely taken away from farmers and given to real estate developers. Gongeven predicted that the legal code would lead to the loss of state-ownedassets at a greater rate. He attacked the bill as veering toward the “fallacies”of capitalist civil codes, the globalization of capitalism and neoliberalismin economics.47 The New Left was very critical of the government’s effortsto clarify property rights and sell off inefficient SOEs. They consider suchpolicies could benefit a small group of the rich.

Gong’s letter aroused huge debates in the jurisprudential circles andbecame a nationwide discussion. The legislation process was then delayed.Obviously, with their slogans of “putting the people first” and “harmonioussociety,” China’s leaders are aware of the social and political risk result-ing from the huge gap between the new rich and the poor. They have totake into consideration the views and suggestions from left-wing academics(Table 7.1).

Supporters of the bill, mainly liberal economists in China’s key aca-demic institutions, say the affirmation of property rights, especially pri-vate property rights, protects the material interests of millions of working

Table 7.1 Debates on economic reforms

Subject New Left Liberals

Role of the state Primary Minimal governmentinterference

Role of the market Promotes growth butgenerate income gapbetween the rich andthe poor

Primary engine ofeconomic growth,promotes efficiency,and countervailsarbitrary state power

State reform Change to regulatory PrivatizationMacroeconomic

policyNeo-Keynesian Neoclassical

Globalization Challenge BenefitOrigin of income

inequalityNegative socialconsequences of themarket reform

Corruption,exchange of powerand money



people and entrepreneurs in the private sector. It encourages more peopleto create wealth for themselves and for the nation. It would also pro-tect private companies against economic crimes, such as embezzlement bymanagement.

The law was originally scheduled for adoption in 2005, but was removedfrom the legislative agenda following these objections. The final form ofthe law contains a number of additions to address these objections. Thelong-awaited and highly contested Property Law was finally approved at theFifth Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on 16 March 2007.Among the 2,889 deputies attending the closing session, 2,799 voted for it,52 against it, 37 abstained, and one didn’t cast vote. That was considereda significant victory for the liberals. Although revised and later passed, thiswas the first time in China’s legislative history that a proposed law had beenderailed by a rising tide of public opinion.48 Yet, the law does not changethe system of land tenure by which the state owns all land. The liberals andNew Leftists are still engaging in debates on this crucial and controversialissue.

In sum, in New Left’s lexicon, socialism, populism, and nationalismare positive values. In the dichotomy of market/state, foreign/national,West/East, the liberals tend to argue in favor of the former, while the NewLeft tends to favor the latter.49 The liberals believe that the free market wouldin the long run support the growth and the rise of Chinese middle class andits access to political power, while radical leftists declared in no uncertainterms that they are on the side of the dispossessed and the exploited lowerstrata of the Chinese society.50 Whereas the scholars from each camp occupypositions at academic institutions, the liberals hold considerably more influ-ence, and their voices have been much more prominent than the New Leftand their voices have more prominence than those of the New Left. Forinstance, Justin Yifu Lin, among other academic economists, has the ear ofthe China’s top leaders.51

Impacts and policy implications

The debates between the liberals and the New Left, which broke out in themiddle of the 1990s, have been a phenomenon rarely seen among main-land Chinese intellectuals since 1949.52 Generally speaking, during the JiangZeming era (1989–2002), the liberals held considerably more influence, andtheir voices had been much more prominent than the New Left. The Hu-Wen administration’s emphasis on harmonious society echoed the NewLeftists’ concern for peasants, social justice, and welfare issues. A 2005 reportfound that President Hu Jintao and his team were tacitly supporting the NewLeft and using it to attack former President Jiang Zemin and his Three Rep-resents theory, which was widely blamed for the growing inequalities thatplagues China.53


The Chinese intellectual discourse since the 1990s can be viewed asa revival of some topics of the May Fourth debates. These included thesearch for a new relationship between the intellectuals and the state, andimport of the Western ideas for deep reforms. They provoked challeng-ing questions about individual freedom, equity, social justice, and globalinequality. Unlike the establishment of intellectuals under Mao, who weremainly state servants,54 both the New Left and liberal thinkers are “criti-cal intellectuals. Wang Hui, a noted New Left scholar, and Fan Gang, aleading liberal economist, were selected as top 100 public intellectuals inthe world in 2008 by Foreign Policy, an influential journal in the UnitedStates.”55

The debates between the liberals and New Leftists have extended to thefield of arts and literature as well.56 Che Guevara is an experimental playput on stage by a group of China’s New Left intellectuals and artists in 2000and 2001 to challenge China’s post-Mao social transformation by evokingGuevara’s spirit. The play was extremely popular among students, retiredcadres, and laid-off workers. Some of them even watched the play 12 times.The play provoked emotional post-performance discussions.

By using montage, the scenes of the play flash back and forth betweentwo historical contexts. One is the 1960s, focusing on the Cuban Revo-lution and Guevarist converse with other revolutionary movements anddecolonization in the Third World in the background. The other is today’sChina within a setting of post-communism and globalization. The playattributes China’s social problems to abandonment of Maoism, embracingof market-oriented reforms, and integration into world economy. The playdisplays strong sentiments of anti-liberalism, anti-globalization, and anti-Americanism.57 Obviously, Che Guevara, an ultra-left, is a link between pastand present, a way to protest the passing of egalitarianism and the inequal-ities that have resulted from recent reforms. Liberals tend to equating CheGuevara with Pol Pot. One liberal states that if Guevara died a few years later,he is just another Pol Pot.58

The intellectual debate can also be seen in Na Er, a popular novel by CaoZhenglu, a Shengzhen University professor. Na Er is a critical examinationof “effects of economic reform on urban workers” in China.59 Han Yuhai, aNew Left scholar, strongly supports both Che Guevara and Na Er and calls forrenewed proletarian literature.

The Chinese leadership wants to modernize the country. To achieve thatgoal, it must learn from the West, but at the same time it must not allowWestern ideas to ferment dissention at home. Just how this delicate tightropewalk works in the public forums for China’s leading thinkers is part of thereason why different ideas are largely tolerated by Beijing, whether it is theNew Left or liberalism. China is not a democracy, but the Party is becomingincreasingly aware that it has to keep a close eye on the will of the peopleand fold their attitudes into its policies.


Beijing attempts to strengthen ideological conformity among Party cadres.Party propaganda machine runs counter to both the New Left in favorof state intervention and the liberals who advocate market force. A largenumber of books and articles were published to censure neoliberalism since2004.60 The purpose of neoliberalism, in Wu Yifeng’s view, was quite instru-mental: the reason that the United States “wants others to implementneoliberalism is only one: everything for the benefit of the United States.”61

He goes on to say that the West, “especially the United States,” spares noefforts to use international economic organizations such as the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the WTO to advance its agenda.The problem, according to Wu, was that there was no successful instanceof neoliberalism helping a developing country: “No matter which countryor region neoliberalism is promoted in, that country or region encountersenormous risk and disaster.”62

In recent years, the New Left has uncomfortable relationship with the gov-ernment as well. In July 2007, Wang Hui and Huang Ping, who took up theirpositions as co-editors of Dushu (Reading) in 1996, were relieved of theircoeditorship. The move was preceded by a series of attacks on the editorsin other official mass media. Their alleged shortcomings ranged from beingbiased to having allowed the magazine to become “hard to read.” They werealso blamed for the magazine’s allegedly declining circulation. Critics of thesackings have expressed their anger on the Internet, arguing that this movewas intended to muffle the voice of those who oppose Beijing’s pro-businesspolicies. There was considerable coverage in the mainstream media of thedecision and its implications.63

Censorship is an operative fact of life in Chinese publishing. Editors keep aclose watch to ensure that perspectives and information, which diverge fromofficial policy interpretation, do not reach an external audience. In spite oftheir uneasy relationship with the party-state, both the liberals and NewLeft publish their own journals. Dushu (Reading), Tianya (Frontier), Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-First Century), Res Publica (Gonggong luncong), YanhuangChunqiu (Spring and Autumn), and Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend)are the major outlets of their intellectual debates.

Freedom of information has always been considered essential in liberaliz-ing China, and the Internet has disseminated chunks of information onceunthinkable.64 The widespread use of the Internet makes it harder for thegovernment to maintain a monopoly over information resources. In addi-tion, unofficial journals, study groups, and seminars organized by privatethink tanks all help in the diffusion of their ideas.

The authorities still punish those who dare to undermine the Communistgovernment’s power, for instance by organizing a political party or a workers’protest. The role of critical intellectuals was eroded by the growing mar-ket forces and party-state. The New Left and liberal scholars were criticized,


but have not been silenced, partially because they do not get involved inpolitical organizing or direct criticism of leaders.

One of the most remarkable changes in the post-Tiananmen China hasbeen the burgeoning civil society, which has led to a significant transfor-mation of the intellectual public space. With the Internet boom, politicaldebates moved to electronic forums in almost no time. A number of non-governmental think tanks (such as Unirule Institute of Economics and DajunEconomic Watch) have established their Web sites.65 Thousands of influ-ential Chinese intellectuals have their blogs.66 The widespread use of theInternet makes it harder for the government to maintain a monopoly overinformation resources. There are some heated debates on the reform pol-icy in cyberspace, some of the technocrats participate in the debates, butfew bear their real name and identify their affiliation. In addition, unoffi-cial journals, study groups, and seminars organized by private think tanksall help the diffusion of their ideas.

At present, Chinese economic and intellectual elites are generally behindthe government. Only a small number of intellectuals identify themselvesas New Left. It is true that ideological diversity could be a challenge for theParty. However, so far, the intellectual debates between the liberals and NewLeft have generated positive effects on the reform.

First, the discourse increased public awareness of the consequences ofsome major policy change. For instance, left-leaning intellectuals in Chinahave made use of Utopia as a platform to challenge this policy direction andBeijing’s overall pro-business agenda. They highlighted the negative socialconsequences of Beijing’s course and generated waves of debates on the wayforward for China. The “vulnerable” groups are receiving increasing atten-tion from the government. Before Dushu printed a piece about the sannongproblems (three rural problems) (referring to agriculture, peasants, and thecountryside) in 1999, the government did not even admit to the existenceof these problems, but two years later it was on the agenda of the NPC.67

Second, some of their proposals, commended by the top leaders, becameofficial policies. Since the late 1970s, the policy process has become moreopen and accessible to influence from outside the bureaucracy. Under suchcircumstances, public discourse debates on the effectiveness of the pol-icy, influencing public opinion, and in some cases bringing policy change.Wang-Hu’s report in 1993 is considered as an important contribution to theeconomic reform and proves to be helpful to in building a strong centralgovernment. The percentage of the central government tax revenue has beengradually increased since 1994.

Cui Zhiyuan’s views on shareholding-cooperative system (SCS) have alsogenerated some political impact. In 1994, Cui wrote an article arguing forthe preservation of the SCS, a kind of labor–capital partnership. A leadingofficial in the government read the article and decided to allow the SCS


to prevail in rural China. The centralized decision-making of the one-partystate has many disadvantages, but one advantage is that it may be easier toimplement radical (but defensible) ideas if the top leadership is convinced.68

In the past few years, the leadership has highlighted its shift from growth-centered to more balanced development-centered policies. The objective isto move the economy away from its heavy reliance on trade expansion whileexpanding domestic demand. More measures could be expected from thegovernment. For example, various export promotion policies such as exportrebate scheme, especially for resource-based export, would be graduallyphased out.

The Hu-Wen administration advanced the “harmonious society” policyagenda, which is designed to confront rural–urban income disparities, todevelop the state welfare net and to boost spending on health and educa-tion. This program appears already to have had some impacts in terms ofreducing income inequality. Meanwhile, the Hu-Wen leadership proclaimedthat China is committed to reforming and opening itself to the outsideworld. A large number of these policies reflected the concerns of the NewLeft and/or liberals.

Third, although Beijing endorses neither New Leftism nor liberalism,their discourse generated a lot new ideas, insight, and approaches that theChinese leadership can cherry pick. From the liberals, the Chinese leadershipborrows the idea of permanent experimentation (for example, a gradualistreform process rather than a shock therapy). It also accepts that the marketwill drive economic growth. The New Left draws Chinese leadership to theissues of inequality and the environment to a quest for new institutions thatcan marry cooperation with competition.69 In the words of Wang Hui, “inthe past, policies were made from inside the government, but now more ofthose (policies initiatives) are coming from society.”70

The policy of the Hu-Wen leadership reflected the influence of the NewLeft. At the end of 2005, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao published the “11thfive-year plan,” their blueprint for a “harmonious society.” For the first timesince the reform era began in 1978, economic growth was not described asthe overriding goal of the Chinese state. Instead, they talked about introduc-ing some aspects of a welfare state and promise of a 20 percent year-on-yearincrease in the funds for pensions, unemployment benefit, health insurance,and maternity leave. For rural China, they promised an end to arbitrarytaxes and to improve on health and education systems. They also pledgedto reduce energy consumption by 20 percent. More recently, the Chinesepolicy-makers has signaled a shift from a no-holds-barred growth to a moresustainable model that would boost social and economic equality and enablelow-income and underprivileged groups to have more access to employmentopportunities, basic education, primary health care, and social security.

Last but not least, the scholarly discourse has broadened horizons for thedecision-makers. Several liberal and New Left arguments have filtered into


the official discourse. For example, the term “social justice,” which has beenmuch debated since the 1990s, is now a regular feature of Party rhetoric.71

The Chinese like to argue about whether it is the intellectuals who influencedecision-makers, or the latter who use pet intellectuals as informal mouth-pieces to advance their own views. Either way, these debates have becomepart of the political process and are used to generate ideas and expand theoptions available to the Chinese authorities.72 For instance, one of mostsignificant changes took place when the National People’s Congress (NPC)made a remarkable amendment to the Constitution by endorsing the term“socialist market economy” to replace the old term “planned economy” inMarch 1993.

Conclusion

The increasingly intense debate now appears to have two strands: the lib-eral reformers who seek to liberalize the economic and political arenasand reverse the recent expansion of the state; the New Left who argue forstrengthening the state and breaking what they see as a “state capitalist”alliance between the rich and the powerful. The past three decades have wit-nessed significant changes in the landscape of intellectual discourse. First ofall, when the debates between the liberal and the New Left started in theearly 1990s, the discourse was among a few elite intellectuals in Beijing andShanghai and their articles were often criticized as too difficult or obscure.Now, their debates not only attracted attention from establishment intellec-tuals and technocrats but also an increasing number of Chinese fledglingintellectuals and netizens. Second, the focus of the debates has shifted fromtheoretical concerns to issues closely related to real-life problems. Third, thedebate on the direction and strategy of the reform has intensified amongChinese intellectuals. Their debate is no longer the tempest in a teacup. Infact, “to gain control of the discourse” is now a buzz phrase in China’s mediaworld.73 Furthermore, there have been multiple venues to spread the lib-eral’s and New Left’s thinking. The discourse appears not only in traditionalprinted format, but more importantly in the digital world. Frequently, sensi-tive topics are posted on the Internet, since it is easier and much quicker tospread one’s belief online.

The Beijing leadership has become more tolerant of intellectual discus-sion on a number of seemingly sensitive issues such as the debate betweenthe New Left and liberalism, if they are conducted in an academic context,and is likely to continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This can beexplained by several factors. First of all, due to the complexity and unique-ness of the Chinese reform, China is undergoing massive transformationwithout a sufficient theoretical basis or guideline. To generate more ideasand policy options to achieve the goal of modernization, the Party is likelyto maintain its policy of encouraging the public discourse on economic


reform so long as it does not challenge the Party’s dominance of the existingsystem.

Second, liberals and conservatives within the leadership are attempting tocheckmate each other’s ability to develop a theoretically consistent frame-work to support their policy position. Peter Moody points out correctly thatin the short term the direction of Chinese politics is shaped by the play ofpower, and ideas are tools in this contest.74

It is widely recognized that the Chinese leadership since Deng Xiaopinghas launched and will continue to deepen China’s economic reforms. That isfor both practical and pragmatic reasons. The Party must recognize povertyof many people and understand the need for economic development. Theyregard economic growth as the best means to legitimate Party’s rule. As itslegitimacy is now based on national achievement, not communist ideology,it must appear in step with popular feeling.75 According to Kerry Brown, thebottom line is that the reform process would not have happened, would nothave economically succeeded, without an ideological justification.76

This chapter has illustrated how the New Left and liberals both reflectand shape the transformation of post-Mao’s China. So far their impact isreflected in some changes in the economic policy. Their influence in thepolitical area is still limited. Their discourse could provide conditions fora Chinese unique path of development that many in the developing andpost-communist countries wish to follow.

8Debate over Legitimacy

Legitimacy is one of the most frequently used and misused concepts inpolitical science. Legitimacy usually enters the analytical picture when it ismissing or deficient.1 Legitimacy can roughly be understood as the right togovern – that one ought to have the authority to get things done. It can beconsidered metaphorically equivalent to a reservoir of water: as long it staysat a certain level, it can be maintained, but if it falls below a certain level,there is the risk that all will be lost.2 Max Weber believes that every suchsystem attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in “legitimacy.”3 InChina’s case, Tong Yanqi contends that no country concerns regime legit-imacy more than China does and no country has removed illegitimateregimes more times than China has.4 Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden arguethat Chinese history boasts a record of resistance and rebellion second tonone.5 Guo Baogang, a Chinese American political scientist, states that theenduring question in political development in China today is no differ-ent from what was sought after throughout Chinese history, namely, theconstant search for political legitimacy.6

Legitimacy is a modern Western concept. The concept was alien to Chinabecause law in pre-modern China was only “an instrument for carrying outcertain of the designs of the state, rather than the justification for the state’sexistence.”7 As Karl Bünger points out, “the Chinese emperor had no ‘right’to rule, but only a ‘Heavenly Mandate,’ that is a duty to fulfill. It was his dutyto keep the human society in a good order.”8 “Legitimacy” as a theoreticalconcept was introduced into contemporary Chinese political vocabulariesin the 1980s and became popular in the 1990s.9 The term was translatedas hefaxing or zhengdangxing, paralleling to the rapid professionalizationof political science, a process which took place in the late 1990s. As YuKeping states, it was then that an intense period of conceptual innovationstarted and that many new concepts from the international political scienceliterature were discussed in China, among them the concept of legitimacy.10

The turmoil of the Cultural Revolution all but destroyed the tradi-tional Maoist modes of legitimacy such as charismatic authority, mass

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mobilization, and Chinese Marxism.11 Desperation and weak legitimacy ledthe CCP to embark on a course of economic reform. Its leaders are well awarethat its legitimacy is weak. Deng turned to performance-based legitimacy torestore the CCP’s reputation. The purpose of the reform, for Deng Xiaoping,was to rebuild political legitimacy for the Communist governance and con-solidate its rule of China and to save the Party from the disastrous situationresulted from Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution.12 The bloody repressionof the student movement in 1989 meant that the government lost sub-stantial legitimacy. Deng and his supporters chose to build state legitimacyon socialism with Chinese characteristics rather than ideology and polit-ical campaigns and perhaps more effectively simply by placing economicreconstruction first. Following the dangers of overdependence on economiclegitimacy, the Party has looked to nationalism and traditional culture todiversify the foundations of its authority.

In this chapter, I will examine the following research questions: To whatextent does China face a legitimacy crisis? What are the major sources oflegitimacy crisis? What could be done to solve legitimacy crisis?

Legitimacy crisis: Myth or reality

In the domain of politics, Machiavelli is well known for having argued thatthe power depends upon legitimacy and social influence.13 Several centurieslater, it is now a well-established fact in sociology and political science thata legitimate political authority has the right to issue laws and to enforcethese laws if necessary. Without legitimacy, any attempt to rule is either anexercise of de facto, but unjustified, authority, or a mere unjustified use ofpower. Since 1989, the CCP has been engaged in a constant struggle forlegitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people. At present, however, not allChinese intellectuals believe that China is experiencing a legitimacy crisis.Yu Keping states that the CCP is not suffering from governing legitimacycrisis, but he acknowledges that there is a high level of governance risk, insome cases, the crisis of governance has occurred.14

Has the current political system in China lost its legitimacy in the eyes ofthe Chinese public? Using opinion polls based on empirical studies, WangShaoguang claims that the Chinese people are very satisfied with the gov-ernment in terms of popular legitimacy. He argues that it is false to describeChina as lacking in legitimacy.15 For Wang, political legitimacy is not some-thing to be defined by moral philosophers in total abstraction from thepolitical reality. Rather, it is a matter of “whether or not a political systemfaces a crisis of legitimacy depends on whether they consider the people wholive there doubt the rightness of its power, and whether they consider it theappropriate system for their country.”16

On the basis of three carefully drawn surveys of Beijing residents between1995 and 1999, Chen Jie found that diffuse support for the current political

Debate over Legitimacy 135

system, based on attitudes toward institutions and values, remains strong,at least among city-dwellers, though it is also gradually declining.17 ZhengYongnian notes the CCP today appears better qualified and technically morecompetent than at any other time in the post-Mao period.18 Similarly, ZouShanding seems to believe that China’s political system is now able to gen-erate critical degrees of regime legitimacy.19 In brief, in the eyes of a numberof Chinese scholars to date, the CCP has won “achievement legitimacy”through continued high-speed economic growth, marked improvement inthe living standard, and rising international status.

Yet, at the end of 2010, there were 180,000 demonstrations nationwiderelating to inadequate social-welfare systems and bureaucratic corruption,reflecting severe discontent among ordinary people.20 This surge of popu-lar discontent poses a serious threat to regime legitimacy. From the view ofthe Beijing leadership, the key issue is not legitimacy but stability (wend-ing). A more recent phenomenon is the emergence of stability as a meansof legitimacy, with the Party presenting itself as the only political institu-tion capable of providing political stability and personal safety during thedifficult and uncertain period of economic transformation.21

Yu Jianrong, a well-known sociologist at the Chinese Academy of SocialSciences, indicates that the resistance mode of peasants has changed inrecent years: it went from spontaneous “routine resistance” prior to the1990s to “lawful rebellion” until 1998 (for example, quoting state policies orlaws to resist political arbitrariness at the local level), then “actively using thelaw to fight” from then onwards.22 Central government spending on domes-tic security increased from 135 billion yuan in 2002 to over 450 billion yuanin 2009.23 By 2013, the public security budget had risen to 769 billion yuan($123.5 billion, exceeding China’s announced defense budget of 720 billionyuan).24 These upheavals have led the Chinese intellectuals to pose suchsignificant questions as, is the party-state that portrays itself as the solerepresentative of the nation a legitimate one?

In theory, the CCP should be legitimized by Marxist-Leninist principles,but following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the CCP has con-cerned itself more with its empirical legitimacy. Under such circumstance,the Party plenum in 2004 issued a resolution on strengthening the “govern-ing capacity” of the Party. The document states that “the party’s governingstatus is not congenital, nor is it something settled once and for all.”25 In hisstudy published in 2004, Wang Changjiang, professor at the Central PartySchool, argues that according to the classical Marxist theory, the Commu-nist Party represents the people, and its political interests is identical withthat of the public; yet, in reality, such consistency seldom appears.26

In 2012, Hu Jintao warned the Party at his opening speech at the 18thParty Congress that official corruption had become so serious that, if nottackled, it could “cause the collapse of the party and the fall of the state.”27

Similarly, in a December 2012 speech, Xi Jinping reportedly told party


insiders, “Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the SovietCommunist Party collapse? An important reason was that their ideals andconvictions wavered.”28 Under such circumstance, the legitimacy of theChinese Communist regime was further called into question. Obviously, theCCP understands that a regime’s legitimacy is not a given once and for all,but rather needs to be maintained in a continuous process of legitimation.

Sources of legitimacy

According to David Easton, sources of legitimacy are to be found in ideology,structure, and personal authority.29 Legitimacy materializes in the people’sbeliefs and “no other source of support can assure such ready acceptance ofthe outputs.”30 For many years, the CCP has put tremendous resources andefforts into what could be construed as ideological work.31 “Without the ide-ology,” writes Peter Moody, “the Party would have no claim to legitimacy.”32

Indeed, ideology work has become increasingly important, as Hu Jintaoput it in 2012, “the international culture of the West is strong while weare weak . . . Ideological and cultural fields are our main targets.”33 It is clearthat ideology is indispensable for legitimating the political rule. The impor-tance of ideology for regime legitimacy has been widely acknowledged. It hasbecome clear that the Chinese government is gradually losing its ideologi-cal legitimacy, instead of maintaining its rule with force, nationalism, andeconomic performance.

As the CCP legitimacy lies heavily on a Marxist narrative of Chinesehistory and historical destiny, any challenge to this narrative is a chal-lenge to the CCP’s legitimacy. Revolutionary ideology legitimated the ruleof the CCP for many years, but it has become increasingly in conflictwith the rapid socioeconomic development that began three decades ago.Now, the revolutionary legacy has become an increasing liability for China,with Mao’s ideology of egalitarianism and idealism utterly at odds withChina’s social reality and the policies of post-Mao leadership, bereft of anyideals of revolution and communism. “The present leadership has onlythe flimsy ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics upon whichto base its claim to ideological legitimacy.”34 Over the past few years,Chinese scholars have generated a variety of interpretations on the sourceof legitimacy.

Ideology is a continuing theme throughout Chinese history that affectsregime legitimacy. James Hsiung, a professor at New York University, pointsout that political legitimacy in China is earned by claiming to rule througha “correct ideology.”35 In Mao’s era, communist ideology used to be thelynchpin of legitimacy. Ideological legitimacy includes moral convictionsabout the validity of the regime or moral convictions about the validityof incumbents of authority. In the words of Kang Xiaoguang, a prominentadvocate of Confucianism, “What is China’s greatest challenge today? It is


not unemployment, not inflation, and not corruption. It’s the lack of acompelling ideology!”36

Under Mao, ideology was an important instrument of political legiti-mation. As Liu Kang declares that the ideology of socialism still promisessocioeconomic equality to all citizens, and as such, it is fundamentally atodds with the objective of global capitalism, which is to maximize profit atall costs. The paramount problem that China faces is the incommensurabil-ity between socialist ideologies and economic capitalism, which inevitablyresults in a legitimation crisis.37

Yu Keping argues that violent conquest, blood ties, religious beliefs, oldsuperstitions, and other factors used to be important sources of legitimacy intraditional politics. In modern times, welfare, good government, and benev-olent government have become the main sources of political legitimacy, andin particular, the establishment of democracy and the rule of law are nowconsidered the key to the creation of political legitimacy.38

Zhao Dingxin, a professor of Sociology at University of Chicago, contendsthat performance legitimacy, an aspect of state legitimacy that was neglectedby Weber in his original formulation of the theory of domination, played aparticularly important role in the history of China and has shaped not onlythe patterns of Chinese history but also today’s Chinese politics. Althoughthe current government spends much effort to heighten its legitimacy byimproving its performance, it will face a major crisis when the Chinese econ-omy cools off unless it establishes legal-electoral legitimacy.39 In other words,the performance legitimacy alone is not a long-term solution.

In his seminal research on the 1989 student movement, Zhao Dingxinargues that moral and economic performance are the two major dimensionsof regime legitimacy in China. Using moral conduct as part of legitimacy isa step further than the purely economic-performance-based legitimacy argu-ment and produces insightful analysis. Zhao also listed territorial defense asthe third dimension but argued that without a pending threat from othercountries, the economic performance and moral conduct therefore becomethe most important dimensions of legitimacy.40

Guo Baogang suggests that although the Chinese notion of legitimacymay incorporate universal criteria, it is essentially grounded in China’s ownhistorical and political traditions. He disaggregates the concept of legitimacyby referring to uniquely traditional Chinese ideas such as minben (puttingthe people first) and limin (giving primary consideration to the welfare ofthe people) and distinguishes between an “original” justification that refersto a moral right to rule according to either divine, charismatic or democraticprinciples, and an “utilitarian” justification principle that is dependent onmaterial, security, and eudemonic incentives.

Guo argues that the Chinese traditional cognitive pattern of political legit-imacy can be described as follows: a ruler, who has tianming (mandateof heaven), possesses the quality of virtue, shows respect to his subjects,


follows the rules of the ancestors, and tries to win the hearts and minds ofthe people, will be considered a just and legitimate one. A just ruler willstrengthen his legitimacy by promoting policies that will benefit the people,not himself, by ensuring relatively equal distribution of these benefits, andby allowing the people to do what they do the best. This unique cognitivemodel has influenced every government and its rulers throughout Chinesehistory. By carefully observing these norms, a ruler, feudal or modern, can beassured of public support and accepted as legitimate.41 Overall, Guo makesa case that when the Chinese leaders attempt to legitimize the regime theyappeal to traditional concepts and categories.42

Xiong Guangqing, professor at University of International Business andEconomics in Beijing, considers ideology, charisma of the leader, perfor-mance, and democratic election major sources of legitimacy. In his view,the major source of the CCP’s legitimacy has gone through the transitionsfrom ideological legitimacy (1949 to 1958) to charismatic legitimacy (1958to 1978), and eventually to performance legitimacy (1979 to the present).Xiong claims that if the regime’s legitimacy is heavily based only on itsperformance, it can easily deteriorate when the economy falls. He con-cludes that at present a transition from performance legitimacy to electorallegitimacy is imperative.43

Tracing the long tradition of the “mandate of heaven,” Tong Yanqi andLei Shaohua note that there is a clear pattern of morality-based legitimacybetween the state and the population. Moral politics will shape the calcu-lation and expectation of the political actors involved.44 In her insightfulessay published in 2011, Tong Yanqi holds that the regime legitimacy inChina has three overlapping layers: morality of the political elite, benev-olent governance, and state responsibility for the well-being of the people.The basic layer is the morality of political elite. The crucial part of the moral-ity is the benevolent governance which specifies that the government hasto be compassionate to the people. The central component of a benevo-lent government is the state responsibility to the welfare of the people. Thewidespread corruption in today’s China has badly undermined the moralfoundation of the state legitimacy.45

Further down the path, Tong states that Chinese history and Confucianteaching reveal a couple of key points for our understanding of legitimacy.First, as early as the Shang dynasty, legitimacy was a significant concern forthe rulers. Second, legitimacy originates from tianmin which comes fromthe morality of the rulers. In order to maintain the Mandate of Heaven, therulers have to maintain their morality. This is a crucial connection betweenthe right to rule and the morality of the rulers. As the highest ruler, theemperor was expected to be the top moral example for all his subjects.Moreover, all his officials have to be morally upright as well. While theChinese invented the merit-based civil service examination system to selectgovernment officials, moral standards have always been the top criteria for


recruitment.46 Some scholars interpret tianmin as a seed of democracy, in thesense that the will of the people was implicit in the mandate of heaven.

Zheng Yongnian holds that in the post-Mao era, the search for politicallegitimacy has replaced foreign threats as the primary factor underpinningthe revival of Chinese nationalism. In other words, the main sources fornationalism in the post-Mao era are domestic rather than external.47 ZhuYuchao likewise finds that the three pillars of China’s strategy of perfor-mance legitimacy include economic growth, social stability, and nationalunity.48

Jiang Qing rejects the democratic view that the consent of the people is themain source of political legitimacy. He considers the main source of legiti-macy to be derived from Chinese cultural resources. Marxism is mainly aforeign ideology and hence cannot underpin political legitimacy for the longterm. For him, the way ahead for China’s political development is wangdao(kingly way of governance) and not democracy. Jiang’s wangdao combinesthe rule of law with dezhi (moral rule) and wuwei (no-action), which isemphasized to minimize the size of government and avoid a welfare state.Moreover, legitimacy does not just derive from a democratic system thatexpresses the will of the people; a legitimate regime must also conform totradition and the natural order of things and uphold natural justice.

Jiang Qing believes that the future of China’s politics should be wangdaorather than liberal democracy.49 He holds that liberal democracy is a par-ticular product of Western history and culture, closely related to Westernreligious, legal, political, and historical contexts and hence not universallyapplicable.50 In Jiang’s opinion, a “differential voting system” should be usedto replace the “one person one vote.”51 Just like communism, Confucianismdoes not require any form of democracy or multiparty rule in order for therulers to be viewed as legitimate. They would have a Mandate of Heaven andthat is all they would need.

Though the Party continues to justify its policies through communist ide-ological formations in the post-Tiananmen period, there is little evidencethat they have any real legitimating effect.52 Not surprisingly, Yu Kepingargues that sources of legitimacy change over time when faced with newchallenges. Good governance will be the most important source of any gov-ernment’s legitimacy in the 21st century.53 Yu Keping is not alone, a growingnumber of Party theorists use the term “governance crisis” to portray the“legitimacy crisis” that confronts China. According to Tian Wenlin, a pro-fessor of Middle Eastern Studies at the China Institutes of ContemporaryInternational Relations, “The idea that democracy must bring power andprosperity is naive. A prosperous society also depends on an advanced gov-ernment and wise leadership.”54 There is an increasingly growing concernamong Party theorists with the governing capacity (zhizheng nengli) of theParty. This involves upgrading the quality of the cadre corps and producingoutstanding leadership.


Debates on possible solutions to legitimacy crisis

In China, discussion on legitimacy has been more one-sided until recently.The crises of acute poverty and conflicts, both military and political, duringmost of the 20th century, have not afforded Chinese intellectuals and polit-ical figures the luxury of Western-style intellectual debates. Authoritarianleadership generally was seen as legitimate in China if it could keep peopleout of conflicts and starvation.

Over the past few years, there has been a great deal of discussions amongChina’s intellectuals over legitimacy. A large number of the Chinese intel-lectuals from across the political spectrum worry about the “legitimacy ofthe regime.” They feel that it is their job to ponder the fate of the nationand to find the correct formula to solve. For the first time in two decades,there is now an urgent discussion about political legitimacy.55 Up to thispoint, they have three radically different visions on political legitimacy: onebased on electoral democracy (liberal), one premised on grand democracyand populism (New Left), another one based on traditional culture (politi-cal Confucianism). This section will examine the major arguments of theseperspectives.

Liberal discourse

Chinese liberal thinkers envisaged a situation where people with differ-ent political stands coexist peacefully, each enjoying an equal right toexpress their own views. This would be the best way to realize “stabil-ity and unity.” They suggest that China must establish a Western-styledemocratic political system. In their view, liberal democracy is the “com-mon law” of human society that represents the most legitimate, and evena history-ending, political system for mankind. Authoritarian states lackmeaningful political competition and elections to provide direct feedbacksand therefore legitimacy deficits often remain hidden until anger and dis-content burst into open. Their conception casts doubt on the legitimacyof Chinese party-state as people’s democratic dictatorship and of the CCP,which claims to be the nation’s sole legitimate representative. Given theimportance of ideological legitimacy in Chinese tradition, this created aproblem.

As noted in Chapter 2, the scholars from the liberal camp establish theirown positions by borrowing liberal ideas of the West. They use liberalconceptual schemes to criticize the existing political realities and proposechanges to overcome their faults. Teng Biao argues that the only source oflegality for a regime nowadays is the endorsement of its power throughmethods such as elections and voting. Economic development can onlyachieve partial “justification.” People demand basic freedom and dignity.Without political freedom, there cannot be complete “justification.” On theother hand, even if the regime did achieve “justification,” this would not


be equivalent to gaining “legitimacy.” The legal basis of political power canonly originate in genuine endorsement by the people.56

Liberal-minded intellectuals believe that electoral democracy is the mostsolid foundation for legitimacy and electoral democracy is the key to legiti-mate government. They firmly believe that the CCP already has been facinga legitimacy crisis and that only by introducing constitutional governmentand judicial independence, expanding direct elections, and widening rightsfor citizens can China be free from such a crisis. For them, electoral legiti-macy is essential because it is based on popular mandate rather than consentby a few privileged individuals. In their view, a general direct election couldenhance participation. It can bring about capable leaders who are commit-ted to working for the people’s interests. This may help to strengthen thelegitimacy of elected officials. Influenced by the Western mainstream ide-ology, liberals think that the sole criterion for classifying political systemsis whether competitive election exists. This Western conception of democ-racy has been criticized by the New Left for defining democracy in terms ofprocedure instead of substance.

Party theorists emphasize that democracy takes various forms accordingto different national conditions, and good democracy should first suit acountry’s national conditions. In contrast, liberals such as Liu Xiaobo arguethat the purpose of the “theory of national conditions” is to refute the uni-versal nature of democracy and to conceal the problems of legitimacy ofthe current CCP regime by invoking special national conditions.57 ZhouJinghao, a US-based Chinese scholar, contends that the legitimacy of gov-ernment must include democratic values. The absence of democracy mightbe an important factor for the declining legitimacy of the CCP. If the CCPdoes not fundamentally change its political system, it will undermine itslegitimacy of governance and eventually postpone its transformation froman economic giant to a world leader recognized by international society.58

The liberal scholars believe that political legitimacy in contemporary Chinais precarious and the current regime suffers from a legitimacy crisis cov-ered only superficially by economic development and nationalist politics.Corruption is widespread and institutionalized in China. Without the ruleof law it is debatable if the CCP will be able to effectively reduce andprevent it.

The New Left perspective

Under Mao the CCP claimed that Marxism is the only truth, and Marxismprovided the foundation of the legitimacy of the revolution and the PRC.Yet, since the end of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP has seldom claimedMarxism as a universal truth; instead, it maintains that every state devel-ops its own approach of social and economic development. Market-orientedreform under Deng brought about phenomenal economic growth in China,but it also created huge divisions between the rich and the poor within


Chinese society. Maoist egalitarianism was then undermined as both an idealand a social reality. The lack of new ideological orientation now amounts toa serious crisis. Yang Fan, a leading “New Left” scholar at China Universityof Political Science and Law, describes the situation as a conflict between“capitalization of political power and socialist ideology.”59

Meanwhile, rampant official corruption and social injustice have violatedthe principles of what the people believe to be good government, and threat-ened the Party’s legitimacy, which presenting daunting challenges to itsmodel of economic development. The CCP’s socialist legacy has been rein-vigorated by the New Leftists who are critical of the liberal economics,compare American democracy to a plutocracy, and advocate a strongerrole of the state in response to the country’s growing social inequality,regional disparity, and rampant corruption, and injustice in the process ofprivatization.

From the perspective of liberal democracy, open and fair elections are thebottom line of democracy, though it may be insufficient or unachievablewithout the support of other favorable conditions. To the New Leftists, elec-toral democracy is full of deficiencies and flaws. Wang Shaoguang contendsthat elections need to take place alongside public consultations, the selectionof delegates by lottery, and a return to some of the practices of the CulturalRevolution such as sending officials to spend time in the countryside.60

Wang Shaoguang defines democracy as “a combination of responsibility,responsiveness, and accountability.” He claims that “only when politicalreform is no longer solely equated with competitive elections can the truenature of political change in China come to light.”61 Wang asserts thatWestern democracy has failed and become a so-called electocracy (rule byelections). That electocracy reduces the role of citizens to a series of discretechoice points, often shifting the actual moment of choice to the politician.

Cui Zhiyuan, a professor at Tsinghua University, notes that progressiveforces in China should not imitate social democratic practices pursued inWestern Europe. Instead, Cui argues for labor–capital partnerships and socialdividends paid to all citizens according to age and family status.62 For theNew Leftists, Western-style liberal democracy is fatally flawed. Some of themhave also been influenced by the collapse of faith in elections in developeddemocracies that are beset by falling turnouts, the rise of populism, and acrisis in the very idea of representation.

As mentioned in Chapter 7, as its core, the New Left pushed for increased“state capacity” viewing the state as the ultimate defense wall againstinequality and corruption. China is on a path toward a degree of inequal-ity that will reach levels likely to cause severe social disruption. Many NewLeftists share the view that Western-style democracy is not necessary andeven detrimental to the vast majority of the Chinese people. They claimthat what China really needs is to have a strong state and develop a betterand stable livelihood for her people and China should avoid the “democracy


trap” paralyzing some developing countries. In short, the New Left scholarswould prefer to increase “state capacity” to bolster the state legitimacy.

In China, as a reaction against the unanticipated consequences of global-ization and market-reform which accelerated in the early 1990s, liberalismhas lost some of its appeals. Meanwhile, the first decade of the 21st centurywas marked by a resurgence of populism. Populism implies championship ofthe rights and power of the people against that of the privileged elites. Thepopulists have employed an “us-them” strategy to help the ruoshi qunti (“vul-nerable” groups in Chinese) focus on a common enemy as the source of theirsuffering, typically the existing system at home or the global system domi-nated by the West. Their discourse emphasizes the social and political rightsof the poor. Historically, Maoism is considered as a form of populism.63 TheCCP came to power by mobilizing and unifying diverse groups of marginal-ized and discontented segments of the population. Chinese don’t vote at anational level, so popular opinion doesn’t have a direct bearing on the lead-ership lineup as it does in many other countries. But the Party increasinglyrallies around populist issues in an effort to demonstrate how it is in touchwith commoners. The Hu-Wen administration (2003–2012) departed fromthe pro-business policies implemented and initiated a pro-poor approachin order to accumulate their political capital. Populism is lauded by some,reviled by others, and has sparked a variety of critical responses. No mat-ter how well intended though, without elimination of official corruption,populist social programs have hardly dealt with the root course of injustice.Although populism has not become a fully developed political movement,at present there is great potential for such a movement to grow.

Despite the establishment of large number of welfare programs and theelimination of agricultural tax, China continues to experience widespreadpolitical discontent and social unrest. Many liberal scholars worry that thespread of populism could undercut reform and the rule of law. Some evenfear that the growing populism might produce a breakdown in the politicalprocess and lead the country into chaos.64

Discourse of political Confucianism

Confucianism is traditionally concerned mainly with public administra-tion (zhidao), but not with political legitimacy (zhengdao). In other words,Confucianism stresses the proper ways of public administration rather thanprocedural political legitimacy.65 The question of political legitimacy iscentral to the constitutional thought of political Confucians. Under thisapproach, legitimacy is not simply what people think of their rulers; it isthe deciding factor in determining whether a ruler has the right to govern.

Political Confucianism challenges the current prevalent democraticmovement, both inside and outside of China, which proposes gover-nance with legitimacy wholly resting on the ballot. Instead, politicalConfucianism advocates the wisdom of “centrality and harmony” contained


in Confucianism, especially the Confucian tradition of the Gongyang Schoolthat flourished in the Han and late Qing dynasties in China. It is aimed atrevitalizing Confucianism and reconstructing wangdao in the modern globalcontext.

Jiang Qing, a contemporary Confucian intellectual, contrasts hisConfucian theory with Western-style liberal democracy and declares thatConfucianism is more appropriate for China. His institutional proposals con-tain certain liberal assumptions, such as freedom of religion. Nonetheless,he argues for the establishment of Confucianism as a state religion and com-pares the system to state religions in the United Kingdom and Sweden, withother religions not being prohibited. He believes that an embrace of Westernideas, especially democratic politics, liberty, and equality, is not suitable forChina’s development. Scholars in this camp argue that democratic institu-tions such as parliamentary systems, elections, and equal rights are naturalextensions of Confucianism.66

Unlike Western-style democracy, in the discourse of political Confucianism,there is more than one source of legitimacy. Jiang proposed a trilateralparliament system for China (see Table 8.1). In his view, political power can

Table 8.1 Trilateral parliament proposed by Jiang Qing

House Representation Membership

House ofExemplaryPersons (TongruYuan) also calledthe House of Ruor the House ofConfucianTradition

Legitimacy of heaven(a sacred, transcendentsense of natural morality)

Candidates for membership shouldbe nominated by scholars andexamined on their knowledge ofthe Confucian classics andthen assessed through trialperiods of progressively greateradministrative responsibilities –similar to the examination andrecommendation systems used toselect scholar-officials in theimperial past.

House of theNation (GuotiYuan)

Legitimacy of earth(wisdom from history andculture)

Members would be selected fromdescendants of great sages andrulers, along with representativesof China’s major religions(including Buddhism, Daoism,Islam, and Christianity).

House of thePeople (ShuminYuan)

Legitimacy of the human(political obediencethrough popular will)

Members of the House of thePeople should be elected either byuniversal suffrage or by heads ofoccupational groups.

Source: Jiang Qing, A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its PoliticalFuture (Princeton University Press, 2012).


be justified through three sources: the legitimacy of heaven (a sacred, tran-scendent sense of natural morality), the legitimacy of earth (wisdom fromhistory and culture), and the legitimacy of the human (political obediencethrough popular will).

Each house possesses real parliamentary power, and the bill must beaccepted by at least two houses, in order for it to become a law. In a way,this produces a system of checks and balances to guarantee that the bestdecision is reached and that no branch of the house is overly dominant. Allin all, the constitutional framework is supposed to endorse wangdao. It hasmore dimensions of political legitimacy than liberal democracy, where onlythe people’s will is reflected in the consent of the government. To protect theprimacy of sacred legitimacy in Confucian tradition the House of ExemplaryPersons would have a final, exclusive veto, but its power would be con-strained by that of the other two houses. For example, if they propose a billrestricting religious freedom, the houses of the People and the Nation couldoppose it, stopping it from becoming law. Liberal scholars point out thatJiang Qing rejects the concept of “equality,” an idea that propagates liberaldemocracy. For instance, the Confucian scholars in the House of ExemplaryPersons proposed by Jiang Qing are elected by recommendations and nomi-nations. They believe that the Guoti Yuan advocated by Jiang represents thewill of the Chinese aristocracy.

Jiang’s theory of wangdao is further underscored by Kang Xiaoguang, whocombines a political or politicized version of Confucianism with the latter’selevation to the role of state religion. Kang envisions a renzheng (benev-olent rule). For Kang, the solution to China’s dilemma is renzheng basedon Confucian principles, “a dictatorship by the community of Confucianscholars.”67 The goal of renzheng is to provide a legitimate and stable politicalstructure for China that will create national growth and harmony. To installhis Confucian blueprint of a benevolent rule in the PRC, Kang calls for a“peaceful evolution” and depicts a double strategy of Confucianizing theCCP at the top and Confucianizing society at the lower level.

Kang considers that the restoration of China’s theocratic tradition willprovide the CCP with a new legitimacy grounded in benevolent authoritar-ian rule and will simultaneously solve China’s religious problem by creatinga religion whose interests and priorities will be aligned with those of thestate.68 To achieve a benevolent government, he argues, it is necessary toConfucianize China. In practical terms, Confucian education must be inte-grated into the formal educational system. Primary and middle schoolsshould set up basic courses in Confucianism. In the long run, it mustbecome a state religion as well. Kang thinks Confucian political philosophytreats collective interest, rather than individual interests, as its top priority.He claims that certain Western values are bad, such as individualism, theWestern view of man’s “evilness by nature,” and its view of government “asa necessary evil.” Individualism without the state propagating certain main-stream values would lead to instability. The idea that people were “evil by


nature” was not a convincing concept, as people held the potential of bothdoing bad and doing good.69

In his view, Confucianism should become the source of political legiti-macy. The system Kang proposes includes benevolent authoritarianism, amarket economy, corporatism, a welfare state, and Confucian state reli-gion, a system of cooperation, and checks and balances among differentsocial classes.70 This system can supply justification for renzheng wielded byeminent Confucian scholars. Kang contends that only Confucian scholarscan properly rule because they alone know “the will of heaven.” Thus, theproject of re-Confucianizing China is not just an academic or purely schol-arly endeavor (as assumed by some so-called New Confucians). In Kang’swords, the project involves two simultaneous agendas:

to Confucianize the Chinese Communist Party and to ConfucianizeChinese society. When Confucianism replaces Marxism-Leninism as stateideology and Confucian scholars replace the communist cadres, theprocess of creating a benevolent government is complete.71

With the reemergence of Confucianism in contemporary Chinese soci-ety, it might be used by the CCP for legalization purposes. In this case,Marxism equipped with Confucianism would be a little more legitimizedthan Marxism alone. Alternatively, the Confucianism might get rid of thecontrol of the CCP and influence the Chinese political culture on its owninitiative. Then the legitimacy of the Party could be further challengedby the native Confucianism.72 In short, political Confucians, such as JiangQing and Kang Xiaoguang, offer wangdao and renzheng as the solutions forthe CCP’s legitimacy deficiency. In spite of different views among politi-cal Confucians, they all agree Confucianism can become a new source ofpolitical legitimacy in China.

Impacts of the scholarly discourse on legitimacy

The Chinese authority has failed so far to put forward a coherent theory thatcan justify the current political order. Intellectuals, Left or Right, all considerthat the CCP is facing a severe legitimacy crisis. However, they offer differentsolutions to the same problem. A growing number of Chinese scholars worrythat if the ideology is questioned, so is the basis of the regime’s right to rule.Various studies find that China faces a severe “faith crisis” and a large num-ber of young people think Marxism is out of date.73 As Zhao Dingxin makesclear, “state has been dominated by a Party that clenches onto a commu-nist ideology that fewer and fewer Chinese takes seriously.”74 Several newideas were established to address the issues of democracy and legitimacy.These new ideological strands have in many ways undermined the officialideology and threatened the base of Party legitimacy. I share the view of


Zbigniew Brzezinski that at some point, however, a new source of legitimacywill have to be discovered. It will no longer be derived from some utopianconcept of revolution or of a historical end-state defined as communism.This new source is going to be based much more on consent and publicsanction.75

Since 1989, Western political scientists have called the CCP’s lack oflegitimacy a factor of major uncertainty, and there have been quite a fewpredictions about the breakdown of the party-state in mainland China.However, history has demonstrated that the lack of legitimacy does not nec-essarily mean that the CCP will fall from power in the near term. There area number of illegitimate political systems in the world which show no signof disappearing soon. As Adam Przeworski put it rightly, “a regime does notcollapse unless and until some alternative is organized in such a way as topresent a real choice for isolated individuals.”76 The issues of ideology andintellectual debates have become extremely important in post-Mao’s China.In the digital age, it is by no means easy for the state to control the politicaldiscourse. The Chinese discourse on legitimacy is not a just long-term threatto regime legitimacy. It is already having an impact on a variety of politicalpractices.

As observed by Bruce Gilley, the CCP today has become a “responsive” or“legitimacy-driven” regime. That can be seen in the vast array of importantpolitical changes that it has been forced to introduce since Tiananmen – therule of law, property and rights protections, more media freedoms, publicconsultation on development projects, cadre promotion rules, stronger anti-corruption and environmental protection agencies, and even opening Partymembership to the middle class and the rich. The CCP is no longer a revo-lutionary party but a governing party.77 The Beijing leadership has realizedthat to keep its legitimacy, the Party must strengthen its governing capac-ity, become more professional and efficient. The last thing the CCP wantsis to be seen as neglecting the social costs of economic reforms; this couldseriously damage the Party’s legitimacy.

The CCP’s ideology has undergone remarkable changes in the pastthree decades as a result of dramatic reforms. To preserve its relevanceand legitimacy, the Party has not only restructured its orthodox Marxismand redefined Mao Zedong thought but also developed new ideologi-cal theories. Instead of declining, China’s official ideology has thus beenrevitalized and reoriented, guiding the Party to adapt to rapid changesof socioeconomic situations, both internally and externally. Furthermore,the Party has implemented changes in the selection of senior Party offi-cials that purportedly introduce limited competition referred to as cha’exuanju, the system operates by allowing more candidates than there arelike local elections. Such practice of inner-Party democracy is seen as ameans of solidifying the legitimacy of the CCP, providing for “checks andbalances.”


Liberal intellectuals call for expanding direct elections, constitutionaldemocracy, and the rule of law. Yet their programs are unlikely to be carriedout given the current political environment. It should be noted that experi-ments with elections at the village level began in the late 1980s. However, 20years of the elections have hardly expanded to the township level and showno signs of anything that could be interpreted as leading to governmentsin China legitimacy by an election mandate within the foreseeable future.National direct election, an essential of electoral legitimacy, has been delayedby a variety of regime tactics. The New Leftists believe that today’s social andeconomic problems are all rooted in the excesses of capitalism, and theymaintain that China must strengthen state capacities and call for a “granddemocracy.” Many doubt such measures would save the party-state in thelong run. With the revival of Confucianism in China, the CCP has activelypromoted traditional culture in the country.78 A number of intellectuals viewConfucianism compatible with democratic ideas and institutions. Still, it isquestionable that Confucianism will become a new source of political legit-imacy. Although this notion of an ideology based on Confucian moralitymight sound more appealing than communism for the CCP, it is debatableif it could be a long-term solution for the CCP’s legitimacy concerns.

Conclusion

In short, there has been a lively debate in China academic circles and amongChina’s political elites on the legitimacy crisis. The debate over legitimacy isan open and public one. This includes ideas that run counter to the dom-inant official line.79 Beijing strongly believes that an improved standard ofliving for the people of China could solve the question of legitimacy for theCCP and has used socialism with Chinese characteristics to justify its rule.The discourse on legitimacy marks an important breakthrough in China’sideological discourse.

Intellectual debates have affected regime legitimacy in various positiveways. In the post-Deng era, the Chinese leadership has used nationalism,“three represents,” “harmonious society,” “putting the people first,” and“the China Dream” to justify its mandate of heaven. Nevertheless, the CCP’slegitimacy is vulnerable to growing challenges. The popular term in the post-Deng’s era among the CCP leaders is yushi jujin, meaning that the Partymust be adaptable and flexible to the changing governance environment.It is clear that what the CCP appears desperate to achieve next is a newkind of legitimacy. Discontent over stalled political reforms, income dispar-ity, and a political scandal involving murder and corruption suggest changeis expected. A growing number of pragmatic reformers hold that to bolsterthe legitimacy of the regime, inner-party democracy and the separation ofParty and government must be implemented as the starting point for demo-cratic transition. That might be implemented under the fifth generation of


the Chinese leadership. Still, it is a long way to establish a liberal democraticregime in China. In short, different schools of thought have been establishedto address legitimacy, one of the most pressing problems of China’s transfor-mation, but as of now none of these schools of thought has succeeded indoing so.

9Conclusion: Fragmentation andConsensus

The Chinese reform since 1978 has been ranking as one of the mostextraordinary episodes of social and economic transformation in history:industrialization, marketization, urbanization, and globalization, all occur-ring at the same time. Chinese intellectuals used to be tiny, highly educatedelites. By quadrupling its output of college graduates in the past decade,China now produces eight million graduates a year from universities andcommunity colleges. By the end of this decade, China expects to have nearly195 million community college and university graduates, compared with nomore than 120 million in the United States then.1 Rapid economic growthhas also created a burgeoning middle class.

As an old Chinese saying goes, “one idea could make a country prosper-ous and it could ruin the country [yiyanyixingbang, yiyanyisangbang].” A goodnumber of Chinese intellectuals truly believe in that. A wide range of per-spectives have emerged and created a strong current of discourse that hasinfluenced government policy and public opinion.

The end of the Cultural Revolution brought a new era in Chinese polit-ical life. As the preceding chapters have shown, intellectual discourse isone of the powerful forces shaping the course of China’s transforma-tion. Policies change when people’s fundamental values change. The mostimportant change in recent years for China’s intellectuals has been the dis-establishment of China’s intellectuals from the party-state and increasingprofessionalization of intellectual work.2 Amid swift economic and socialchanges, Chinese intellectuals have debated on a variety of issues rangingfrom economic reform, democracy to regime legitimacy.

In the first decade of the reform (1978–1989), the attitude of intellec-tuals toward the reform was one of unconditional support, but now toa large extent is guided by their self-interest. Marx considers that a per-son’s thinking is determined by his/her class affiliation. His/her thoughtmirrors the special interests of his/her class, antagonistic to the interestsof the members of all other classes. Liberalism represents the interests ofintellectuals and their aspiration for liberty and freedom. The power base

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Conclusion: Fragmentation and Consensus 151

of the liberals is Guangdong Province and other coastal regions, wheremarket reforms first served as a pilot test for the nation three decadesago. Neo-authoritarianism has been quietly endorsed by bureaucrats andentrepreneurs who want to maintain order and stability. The New Leftrepresents a sentiment of dissatisfaction among the peasant and work-ers who are negatively affected by the extent and continuing increase inincome inequality. Proponents of democratic socialism are mainly intellec-tuals and veteran cadres who joined the revolution prior to 1949 and stillbelieve in freedom and democracy just as when they were young. Neo-Confucianists are those who bemoan the loss of a moral compass in a rapidlychanging society and wish to rejuvenate China and maintain her culturalidentity.

After three decades of market-oriented reform, Chinese society has becomemore diversified and open. People’s consciousness about their rights and thevalue of democracy has been rising steadily. Meanwhile, tumultuous daysin the West and emerging democracies present an opening for conservativeideas to flourish. While we can observe the left and right camps among intel-lectual circles, such a division is hardly detectable among current top leaders.Many Chinese continue to believe, in accordance with China’s leaders, thatcollective rights trump individual rights and that improving standards ofliving for all citizens is a higher good to allow greater freedom of speech forsome citizens.

Fukuzawa Yukichi, a Japanese Enlightenment writer, once said that anation’s rise depends on the change of three aspects: the first is the changeof people’s belief, the second is the change of political system, and the thirdis the change of technology. This must not be accomplished in reverse order.In an interview in April 2014, General Liu Yazhou, political commissar ofthe People’s Liberation Army National Defense University, made an argu-ment that Japan’s Meiji Restoration was successful as Japan followed thisorder. In the case of the Qing dynasty, the reform failed as it did not followsuch a sequence.3 Liu’s talk has contributed to a series of heated discussionson ideology and political system in China.

Intellectual discourse and state ideological control

Since the victory of the Communist Revolution in 1949, the state has alwaysbeen worried that intellectuals could challenge its authority. When the“four cardinal principles” (Marxism-Leninism, socialism, Party leadership,and people’s democratic dictatorship) were included in the Constitution ofthe PRC in 1982, the principle of “the leadership of the Communist Party”was declared the most important of the four. This insistence on the principleof Party leadership imposed a severe constraint on political liberalization.For a long time, anyone who dared to challenge the Party’s pre-eminencehas been either co-opted or, more often, sidelined or suppressed. Change of


government control of media has been a gradual, stop-start, and sometimesfrustrating process.

In China, the framework for research and development of political ideasincludes the following: research institutes, associations, educational insti-tutes, professionals, publications, conferences, and research projects. Mostresearch resources are concentrated in these institutions. These institutionsnot only provide an infrastructure to produce and spread ideas but alsoorganize market place for those ideas. In exchange for a lifelong salary andother welfare, a large number of writers and artists have lost the freedom toexpress themselves and to tell the truth. Thus, the important role played bygovernment think tanks, party intellectuals or party theorists, who controlresources in the party and government, should not be overlooked.4

Since Xi Jinping took the Party leadership in 2012, the CCP has becomemore assertive and less tolerant. Intellectuals from left to right are beingimposed top-down by an iron-fist leadership that seems even more deter-mined than its predecessor to suppress public debates and expressions ofdissent. Political freedom in China is even a step backward. Constitutionalgovernment, civil society, and many other sensitive topics are outside publicdiscourse, whereas they had previously been a topic tolerated and somewhatencouraged by the reformist leadership. The Party’s Secret Document no. 9issued in August 2013 prohibited seven topics from discussion in educationalinstitutions and media. These topics, known as the “seven nos,” includeconstitutionalism, civil society, nihilistic views on history, universal values,liberalism, doubt over the reform, and promotion of the West’s views of themedia. Teachers and journalists who dared to transgress this directive havebeen punished. The CCP’s alienation of China’s makers of public opinion –writers and teachers – could undercut its political mandate.5 Western liberaldemocracy is another alternative for China’s future, but the party leader-ship, in the name of guoqing (China’s unique national conditions), refuses tochoose this approach, likely to its own peril in the end.

In 2013, Xi Jinping called for “Three Confidences” (confidence in direc-tion, confidence in theoretic foundation, and confidence in system), whichmany analysts describe as a sign of lacking confidence. In fact, three decadesof economic achievements have not bolstered the leadership’s political self-confidence, let alone their vision and courage for the inevitable reformsin political and ideological realms.6 The Chinese central authorities havemarginalized and suppressed the intellectuals who have challenged theCCP’s legitimacy. One example is the jail sentence the government imposedon the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo. Any perceived challengeto the Party leadership would be quickly suppressed. Some of them pushedpolitical reforms too far and too fast and beyond the leadership’s willing-ness to tolerate. When the Party refused to tolerate their challenge and actedto repress them, they responded by breaking up with the government andleaving China for exile.7


For a long time, politicians, businessmen, and academics alike distancedthemselves from the concept of “capitalism” in discussions, and especiallymade sure not to “take (the wrong) side.” Anything ending with “ism” hasthe potential to be highly sensitive in China. In a politically charged envi-ronment, being labeled as “against the Party and against socialism” couldspell the end of one’s career. Today, intellectual life is in no way free fromorthodox restrictions or from official or self-appointed censors. Time andagain, conservatives tried to tighten controls on intellectual life. As HuaShiping argues, contemporary Chinese intellectuals are caught in a situa-tion in which they expose themselves to political danger but don’t have thepower to protect themselves. Therefore, they cannot be as assertive as the tra-ditional Confucian and Western scholars because they have to be concernedabout the possible political consequences of what they say.8

The tragic events of 1989 taught Chinese intellectuals an important les-son, that is, their demands for democracy and political reform would notmean much unless such demands could integrate with issues close to thehearts of the ordinary people. Due to strict government control, so far pub-lic intellectuals in China have largely served only as educators for change.Few have actually joined the protest movement now emerging in China,although some of them have millions of followers on social media. In the1980s, talented students at leading Chinese universities often did not seekto join the CCP. Today, it’s a different story. College campuses have becomethe main location for recruitment efforts.9

To be sure, the relation between the Chinese intellectual discourse andthe party-state is complex. Some scholars have endorsed the policies of theCCP in order to secure some sort of political patronage for their views. Quitea few are very proud if their suggestions and/or policy recommendationsare accepted by the party-state. Almost all conflicting schools of thoughthave been competing to gain government endorsement of their suggestionsand/or policy recommendations. The Chinese leaders since Deng Xiaopinghave put their emphasis upon both anti-Left and anti-Right. It has proventhat the CCP has succeeded in the sense that extreme ideology (Left or Right)has not dominated Chinese politics.

The post-Mao Chinese leaders understand that in a globalized world, themore brutal forms of intimidation such as mass arrests and violent crack-downs are best replaced with more subtle forms of coercion and persuasion.In China, contrary to what is widely believed, throughout the reform era,government ideological control is a combination of shou (tightening up) andfang (letting go). In other words, sometimes government carried out the pol-icy of political liberalization and sometimes it implemented the policy ofrepression. During the shou phase, the conservative wing of the Party tries totighten controls on intellectual life. Intellectual life is by no means free fromorthodox restrictions or from official or self-appointed censors. This has ledto the fact that many scholars shun political action. As a result, none of the


schools of thought discussed in this book has become a social movement, allof these strands of thought remain as a state of mind of intellectuals.

During the fang time, the more pragmatic wing of the Party often relax theideological constraints and create greater ideological freedom to pursue pol-icy alternatives. The pragmatic approach to ideology permitted greater accessto alternative concepts, approaches, methodologies, and information, andtherefore created a relatively flexible intellectual sphere in China. Chinesesociety is more diversified, so does the intellectual trends. Increasingly avariety of schools of thought, as long as they do not threaten the party’smonopoly on power, are being tolerated. It is expected that Beijing will con-tinue to promote new ways of thinking, as expressed by the well-knownslogans such as “seek truth from the facts,” “emancipate our minds,” and“keep up with the times.” That explains why in spite of the fact that the CCPcontinues to maintain strict ideological control, non-Marxist modes of dis-course, incompatible with the communist ideology, are able to survive andeven flourish in the post-Mao years. Despite the Party’s calls to “speak withone voice,” dissenting ideas and differences are being voiced and heard. Thecycle of shou and fang is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. In addi-tion, since the “four cardinal principles” have never been clearly defined,there has been plenty of room for flexible interpretation. Likewise, the defi-nitions of some of the other principles, such as socialism, have changed overthe years from public ownership and central planning to mixed ownershipand a market economy.

Dominik Mierzejewski put it correctly that the central leadership haslearnt from the history of the late 1980s that any blockade of intellectualthoughts may result in internal turbulence, as the Chinese proverb “watercan carry the boat, as well as overturn it” (shui ke zaizhou, yike fuzhou)predicts. To avoid such a situation, the Chinese leadership entered into adiscussion and tried to make good use of the Chinese intellectuals’ power.10

Yang Fan, a New Left scholar, observes that the government wants to takeadvantage of the contentious debates between the ultra-Left and ultra-Right,but has no intention to implement democracy.11 Thus, in China alternativepolitical parties are illegal, but registered social groups (shetuan) are legal.12

Xu Jilin concludes that public intellectuals are better off organizing the insti-tutions of publicity, such as journals, newspapers, and Web sites, than inorganizing independent political parties.13

Chinese scholars of social sciences in general lack their own indigenousmethodologies. These scholars either borrow Western methodologies orretreat to mere case descriptions. Unlike their overseas colleagues, main-stream or establishment scholars are subject to political and ideologicalconstraints in their thinking. Quite a few of them have failed to take noteof the negative effects of one-party rule in an authoritarian society and it isnot easy for them to go beyond the official line. After 1989, a large numberof disillusioned intellectuals turned away from scholarship and entered the


business world. Rong Jian, a prominent liberal scholar, claims that Chineseintellectuals in general merely echo Western ideas or repeating Western con-cepts and could not think about reality in China.14 It should be noted thatno matter how much the government brainwashes intellectuals with officialideology or tries to appease and co-op them, quite a few of them remaincritical of their government. Like intellectuals in other societies, Chineseintellectuals tend toward non-materialistic values and favor the market andrapid reform more than the general public.

Fragmentation and consensus among Chinese scholars

Chinese intellectuals are more ideologically divided than ever before. Intel-lectual life today revolves around heated debates among disparate, not easilyreconcilable, perspectives: mainly liberalism, neo-authoritarianism, demo-cratic socialism, New Confucianism, and New Leftism. Confounded by thenegative effects of the market-oriented reform, consensus on reform erodedsignificantly in the early 1990s. Intense debates ensued with ideas and argu-ments contested and defended by all sides. In the words of Tu Wei-ming,Chinese intellectuals once represented the universe (tian), but now theyare facing consensus crisis.15 The challenges that China is facing are deeplyrooted, opinions are too widely different and are too divided to form a con-sensus. Nevertheless, after decades of heated exchanges, some consensushas been reached. While their debates continue, the consensus building isunderway.

To begin with, no matter which camp they come from, the Chinese intel-lectuals largely agree that political system reforms are hanging over theirheads. The prevailing view is that democracy is good, although they havedifferent definitions on terms of democracy, and how to achieve it. Regard-less of their different theoretical orientations, the vast majority of Chinesescholars agree that the existing system in general and political system in par-ticular needs further and far-reaching reforms. Almost all intellectuals alsoseem to agree on one thing: the economic reform cannot succeed withouta political reform. Thus they consider that the political reform is the key tocombating official corruption and facilitating economic reform. In spite oftheir differences, they generally agree that human history has not “ended,”as Fukuyama claims.

Second, whereas before 1989 some intellectuals had opted for the strategyof direct confrontation, afterwards it is generally believed that incrementalreform could be a better way to reach the goal of democracy. Intellectualssuch as Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu, for example, have by no means abandonedthe ideals of liberty and freedom they cherished during the 1980s; theymerely make a case for a more realistic and pragmatic approach given the factthat the strategy of the late 1980s failed. Most Chinese intellectuals concurthat the Chinese road to modernization requires steady and experimental


steps. The mainstream position rejects radicalism and recognizes the gradualcharacter of political reform, and recommends moving gradually from easyproblems to more difficult issues, from local experiments to wider use. Theyoppose radical changes on the ground that it would lead to destruction anddisorder, and eventually another Cultural Revolution.

Third, unlike previous generation of Chinese thinkers such as Sun Yat-senand Mao Zedong, none of today’s public intellectuals advocate overthrowingthe government by force. Instead, vast majority of Chinese scholars wantto promote democratic reform within the system. According to a recentsurvey, when asked whether they agreed that radical reforms would not ben-efit the country’s development and democratic system construction, about46 percent said “yes,” 27 percent said “no,” and 27 percent were unsure.Meanwhile, about 42 percent rejected the idea that the Arab Spring, whichattempted to eliminate corruption and bring democracy and freedom bytoppling their leaders, could bring democracy to the Middle East. Only 16percent supported the idea.16

A good number of Chinese do believe that China needs more than pop-ular discontent to engineer change, but up to now very few choose to leadtheir cause nationally. Only a few social protests led by particular groupssuch as environmentalists and retired veterans are able to generate a favor-able outcome for the protestors. While perhaps a positive indicator of anincreasingly open and pluralistic intellectual community, these debates haveconstituted a new challenge for consensus-building in China’s future devel-opment. It is undeniable that the differences among the major schools ofpolitical thought remain immense.

Impacts of intellectual discourse

Chinese intellectuals and their debates have exerted tremendous influenceover the transformation in the post-Mao era. To date, Beijing has rejected thecomplete platform of the all schools of thought, preferring to cherry pick themost appropriate policy suggestions from the competing schools of thought.There is hardly any doubt that the intellectuals who have participated in thediscourses of China’s ongoing reforms are not simply pursing knowledge forits own sake, but articulating a point of view in the hope of influencinggovernment policy or public perception. It is likely to have at least threeimportant and politically complex outcomes.

First, quite a few of Chinese scholars have been in the position of advisingand assisting in the governance of the country. They offer the CCP adviceon how to solve the problems that China has been facing. Some of theirwords have carried a lot of weight and the CCP has listened to them care-fully. For instance, in the course of sharp debates on the pros and cons of theopen-door policy and accession to the WTO, the official Chinese discourseon globalization has evolved from a simplistic emphasis on international


linkages for national survival to a more nuanced analysis for the stakesof cooperation and competition at the global level.17 With the spread ofliberalism, since the late 1980s, the Chinese party-state has increasinglyembraced globalization, enabling the country to propel itself into a positionof economic international importance.

After three decades of unparalleled growth and social changes, the Chinesereform is now in “deep water” with economy showing signs of slowdown.Under such circumstance, Beijing can no longer afford to “cross the riverby feeling the stones.” It is a daunting challenge for the current leadershipunder Xi Jinping to break down political and economic “vested interests” ingovernment and industry that oppose reforms because they have profited sohandsomely from status quo. Beijing definitely needs scholars’ advice abouthow to further the reforms.

Second, some Chinese intellectual elites (such as Wang Huning) havebecome part of the ruling elites, thus they could put their belief intopractice.18 As observed by Joseph Fewsmith in 2013, a decade ago, both theNew Left and the liberals were intellectual voices in the wilderness; today,both have their supporters within the Chinese government. This migra-tion of intellectual debate from the societal level to the governmental levelalso reflects the inability of official Marxism to rally support.19 When theparty-state makes a major policy shift, it often conducts a dialogue designedto harmonize the policy transformation with its proclaimed social goals.Hence, the intellectual discourses often converge with the Party line andgovernment policies, but this is not always a result of intellectuals pander-ing to the party-state.20 Intellectual independence is considered a badge ofhonor, and different strands of schools of thought accused each other ofalignment with the government. In reality, most of them want to see theparty-state develop and carry out the policy change they have advocated.

Last, the Chinese intellectual discourse is transforming country’s intellec-tual and political landscape and shaping individual and collective conscious-ness. Debates among scholars have stimulated a popular understanding ofmarket-oriented reform and liberal democracy. Despite the fact that China isruled by a one-party state, the Internet has sharply advanced people’s rightto know, right to express, right to participate, and right to supervise.21 As inother parts of the world, China’s political and intellectual discourses rein-force or challenge existing and emerging systems, or reinforce parts of thesystems and challenge others.22 The implications of these ideological debatesare enormous and will determine the future of China.

Concluding remarks

Since the late 1970s, China has enjoyed unprecedented growth for almostfour decades. Rapid growth has propelled China to a position as the second-largest economy in the world, with a realistic estimate of surpassing the


United States to become the world’s largest in the years to come. Chineseintellectuals have played and will continue to play an instrumental role inshaping the course of the transformation. Without policy debates amongscholars, it is difficult to imagine how the course of the reforms would havecome about.

This study reaches several conclusions: first, Marxism will be increasinglyirrelevant to China, and different theoretical paradigms have been estab-lished to address the pressing problems of China’s transformation, but noneof these perspectives succeeded entirely in doing so. It should be kept inmind that all the emerging schools of thought discussed in this book arestill in their maturing process.

Second, Marxism is not altogether a dead letter in China as some ana-lysts believe. As discussed in this book, Marxism has run into trouble sincethe reforms started in the late 1970s, as many of Marx’s predications failedto come true. Yet, the CCP has continued to make appeals to interpreta-tions of Marxism that can explain its embrace of global capitalism and theexpansion of capitalism at home. At the fundamental level, the CCP is stillcommitted to Marxism as its ultimate goal, though at the operational level,the Party’s official ideology, policy, and practice have been redefined andchanged significantly. The CCP, being a self-professed Marxist party, mustlook to Marxism for ways of further reform. It is a delicate balance. TheParty must justify its market-oriented reform while simultaneously provid-ing at least an appearance of continuity with its own ideological history.It has become more challenging for the Party as it looks only at Marxism forguidance of the reform and ideological inspiration. Hence, the CCP is draw-ing on whatever is useful at home and abroad while gradually reformingChina’s political system.

Third, along with the spread of new ideas, the CCP’s ideology has under-gone remarkable changes. The CCP no longer advocates the dictatorship ofthe proletariat and the idea of democracy has also gained ground with it. TheCCP is transforming from a revolutionary party (gemingdang) to a governingparty (zhizhengdang). Although China has tried and is continuing to exper-iment with many types of political innovation, so far the results have beendisappointing.23 The reforms China is undertaking are simply too compli-cated to fit into the existing theory. New approaches are needed to guidethe ongoing reforms. Indeed, though the Marxist-Leninist creed remainsthe official ideology in China, a blend of nationalism, economic liberalism,democratic socialism, neo-authoritarianism, Maoism, and Confucianism hasbeen used as a tool for creating a strong government, pursuing economicreforms and maintaining the legitimacy of the CCP.

Last but not least, in the past few decades, it is not just the dominance ofMarxism that has been broken in China; the Western model is also being dis-credited. The Chinese intellectuals understand that communism has failedand democracy is desirable. A number of Chinese thinkers have become


increasingly confident, believing that China is able not only to catch up withWestern economy but also challenge the liberal model of democracy. Manyof them don’t want no-holds-barred capitalism, but a higher type of societywhere people enjoy a democratic system, economic prosperity, and incomeequality. Unfortunately, from the perspective of many scholars in China, aworkable system containing democracy, liberty, and social justice has notbeen invented. As a result, the Chinese intellectuals are still searching for anoptimal approach to modernity. The battle of ideas among Chinese scholarswill continue in the years to come.

Notes

Introduction: Ideas and China’s Transformation

1. See, for example, Zhiyue Bo, China’s Elite Politics: Political Transition and PowerBalancing (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2007) and Xiaowei Zang andChien-wen Kou, eds. Elites and Governance in China (London: Routledge, 2013).

2. Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 BeijingStudent Movement (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001), Chapter 7.

3. Kalpana Misra, From Post-Maoism to Post-Marxism: The Erosion of Official Ideologyin Deng’s China (New York: Routledge, 1998), 6.

4. Merle Goldman, “Politically-Engaged Intellectuals in the 1990s,” The ChinaQuarterly, 159 (September 1999): 700–11.

5. Peter Moody, “Confucianism as Legitimizing Ideology,” in Deng Zhenglai andSujian Guo, eds., Reviving Legitimacy: Lessons for and from China (Lanham, MD:Lexington Books, 2011), 112–13.

6. Brantly Womack, “The Phases of Chinese Modernization,” in Steve Chin, ed.,Modernization in China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1979), 1.

7. Gloria Davis, Worrying about China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 1.

8. For an excellent assessment of the subject, see Yinghong Cheng “Liberalism inContemporary China: Ten Years after Its ‘Resurface,’ ” Journal of ContemporaryChina, 17, no. 55 (2008): 383–400; Merle Goldman and Ashley Esarey, “Intel-lectual Pluralism and Dissent,” in Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond, eds., PoliticalChange in China: Comparisons with Taiwan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008),49–78; and Junning Liu, “Classical Liberalism Catches on in China,” Journal ofDemocracy, 11, no. 3 (July 2000): 48–57.

9. Guanjun Wu, The Great Dragon Fantasy: A Lacanian Analysis of Chinese Thought(Singapore: World Scientific, 2014), 7.

10. Wen-shun Chi, Ideological Conflicts in Modern China: Democracy and Authoritarian-ism (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986), 293.

11. Ibid.12. David Kelly, “China: Major Ideological Trends of 1995,” in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed.,

China in the Post-Deng Era (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998), 56.13. Xu Jilin, “Contradictions Within Enlightenment Ideas,” in Tian Yu Cao, Zhong

Xueping, and Liao Kebin, eds., Culture and Social Transformations in Reform EraChina (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 228.

14. Ibid.15. David Bandurski, “Turning Back to ‘New Democracy’?” http://cmhku.hk/2011/

05/19/12486/, date accessed 19 May 2011.16. Tu Wei-ming, Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectuals

(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 175.17. Chi, Ideological Conflicts in Modern China, 290.18. Tom Bottomore, Elites and Society (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 53.19. Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1993), 166 and Merle Goldman and Edward Gu, eds., Chinese Intellectualsbetween State and Market (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 4.

160

Notes 161

20. Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a ChangingSociety (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 8.

21. Alexander V. Lomanov, “Harmonious Democracy: China’s Quest for Stability andJustice,” in Viatcheslav Morozov, ed., Decentering the West: The Idea of Democracyand the Struggle for Hegemony (London: Ashgate, 2013), 141.

22. For details, see Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek, eds., China’s EstablishmentIntellectuals (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1986).

23. Tian Yu Cao, Xueping Zhong, and Kebin Liao, eds., Culture and Social Transforma-tions in Reform Era China (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1.

24. Peter Moody, Conservative Thought in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD:Lexington Books, 2007), 42.

25. Tsai Wen-hui, “New Authoritarianism, Neo-Conservatism and Anti-Peaceful Evo-lution: Mainland China’s Resistance to Political Modernization,” Issues & Studies,28, no. 12 (December 1992): 1–22.

26. Wang Hui, The End of Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity (London: Verso,2010), 105.

27. Deng Xiaoping, “Zai wuchang, shenzhen, zhuhai, shanghai dengdi de tanhua yao-dian” [Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai],Renmin ribao (6 November 1993), 1.

28. Nicholas D. Kristof, “China Sees ‘Market-Leninism’ as Way to Future,” New YorkTimes, 6 September 1993, 5.

29. Bandurski, “Turning Back to ‘New Democracy’?”30. Leonard T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 30.31. Tu, Way, Learning, and Politics, 10–11.32. For this subject, see Zhidong Hao, Chinese Intellectuals at a Crossroads: The Chang-

ing Politics of the Chinese Knowledge Workers (Albany: State University of New YorkPress, 2003) and Merle Goldman, “A New Relationship between the Intellectualand the State in the Post-Mao Era,” in Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-fan Lee,eds., An Intellectual History of Modern China (Cambridge University Press, 2002,Chapter 8).

33. The overview is by no means exhaustive and does not claim to cover all possibleschools of political thought in contemporary China.

1 Liberalism

1. Chongyi Feng, “The Chinese Liberal Camp in Post-June 4th China,” ChinaPerspectives, no. 2 (2009): 30–41.

2. Paul Starr, Freedom’s Power: The True Force of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books,2007), 2.

3. Zhu Xueqin, “1998, Ziyouzhuyi xueli de yanshuo,” [1998, The Philosophical Dis-course of Liberalism] in Zhu Xueqin, Shuzhaili de geming: Zhu Xueqin wenxuan [TheRevolution in the Study: Selected Texts by Zhu Xueqin] (Changchun: Changchunchubanshe, 1999), 381.

4. The English translation of the document by Perry Link, http://www.2008xianzhang.info/english.htm, date accessed 1 August 2014.

5. While Chinese liberalism by now has over a 100-year history stretching backto Yan Fu’s translations of works of Victorian liberalism in the late 19th cen-tury, it is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a sophisticated examination ofthe subject, see Max Ko-wu Huang, The Meaning of Freedom: Yan Fu and the Ori-gins of Chinese Liberalism (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2008), Philip

162 Notes

Huang, Liang Ch’I-chiao and Modern Chinese Liberalism (Pullman: State Universityof Washington Press, 1972), and Yung-Tsu Wong, “The Fate of Liberalism in Revo-lutionary China: Chu Anping and His Circle, 1946–1950,” Modern China (October1993): 457–90.

6. Eugene Lubot, Liberalism in an Illiberal Age: New Culture Liberals in RepublicanChina, 1919–1937 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 131.

7. For more information on the rise of liberalism in China, see Xu Youyu, “TheDebates between Liberalism and the New Left in China since the 1990s,”Contemporary Chinese Thought, 34, no. 3 (2003): 6–17.

8. In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping paid a visit to a few southern cities, includingShenzhen, the most successful Special Economic Zone. During the tour, he criti-cized those who harbored doubts about the country’s reform and open-up policyand stressed the importance of economic development. During the tour, Dengnoted that a market economy did not equal to capitalism and that socialism alsohas its own market. Deng’s talks, which helped bring China’s reform programback on track, are considered to have had far-reaching significance on reforms inChina.

9. Feng, “The Chinese Liberal Camp in Post-June 4th China,” 31.10. Qin Hui, “Ziyouzhuyi, shehuiminzhuzhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo wenti,” [Liber-

alism, Social-democracy and Problems in Contemporary China] in Gong Yang,ed., Sichao: Zhongguo xinzuopai jiqi yingxiang [Schools of Thought: China’s NewLeft and Its Impact] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), 385.

11. Danwei (work unit) is the name given to a place of employment in mainlandChina.

12. Feng, “The Chinese Liberal Camp in Post-June 4th China,” 31.13. “Establishment intellectual” is a term coined by Carol Hamrin and Timothy

Cheek. For detail, see Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek eds., China’sEstablishment Intellectuals (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1986).

14. As Xu Jilin underlines regarding the formation of a community of intellectualsand of a new form of engagement: “It is precisely this global network of knowl-edge that can construct a complete meaning for this world and represent a thirdforce outside of power and of capital, that is to say an autonomous and expand-ing cultural field. It is the foundation of the public commitment of intellectuals.”See Xu Jilin, “What Future for Public Intellectuals? The Specialisation of Knowl-edge, the Commercialisation of Culture and the Emergence of Post-modernismCharacterise China in the 1990s,” China Perspectives, no. 52 (March–April, 2004):16–30.

15. For an excellent case study on China’s public intellectual, see Timothy Cheek,“Xu Jilin and the Thought Work of China’s Public Intellectuals,” China Quarterly,no. 186 (2006): 401–20.

16. Liu Junning, “Intellectual Turn: The Emergence of Liberalism in Contempo-rary China,” in Ted Galen Carpenter and James A. Dorn, eds., China’s Future:Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2000),56–7.

17. Xu Youyu, “Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo,” [Liberalism and ContemporaryChina] in Li Shitao, ed. Zhishifenzi lichang – ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixi-angjie de fenhua [The Positions of the Intellectuals – Debate on Liberalism and theScission among the Chinese Intelligentsia] (Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe,1999), 417.

Notes 163

18. Xu Youyu, http://www.factualworld.com/article/Xu_Youyu, date accessed 1August 2014.

19. Xu, “Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo,” 419.20. Kate Zhou, “China’s Break from Serfdom,” http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?

ID=6479, date accessed 1 August 2014.21. Cited in Merle Goldman, From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights

in China (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2005), 149.22. Ibid., 151.23. Li Shenzhi, “Zhongguo chuantong wenhua zhong jiwu minzhu yewu kexue,”

[Chinese Traditional Culture: No Democracy, No Science] in Qiu Shi ed., JiefangWenxuan (1978–1998) [Article Selection of Liberation (1978–1998)] (Beijing:Economic Daily Press, 1998), 1118–24.

24. Huainian Li Shenzhi [In Commemoration of Li Shenzhi], 2 vols., publishedunofficially in January 2006, 339.

25. From the late 1978 to the early 1980, Li Shenzhi was a member of the Inter-national Issues Writing Group established by the Party Central Committee.Meanwhile, he accompanied Deng Xiaoping on his visit to the United States,serving as adviser to the delegation.

26. Li Zehou, “Manshuo xiti zhongyong,” [Notes on Western Substance and ChineseFunction] in Li Zehou, ed., Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shilun [Essays on ModernChinese Thought] (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1987), 420–21.

27. Li Shenzhi, “Heping fendou xing zhongguo,” [Rejuvenating China ThroughPeaceful Efforts] in Li Shenzhi, ed., Ershiyi shiji de yousi [Concerns about the21st Century] (Hong Kong: Mingbao chubanshe, 2003), 30–41.

28. Liu Junning, “Intellectual Turn: The Emergence of Liberalism in Contem-porary China,” in Ted Galen Carpenter and James A. Dorn, eds., China’sFuture: Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat (Washington, DC: Cato Institute,2000), 57.

29. Jonathan Alter, “On the Road in China,” Newsweek, 29 June 1998.30. In 1776, Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of the Nations. And in the same histori-

cal period, he wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Adam Smith made excellentarguments in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. He said in the book to the effect thatif fruits of a society’s economic development cannot be shared by all, it is morallyunsound and risky, as it is bound to jeopardize social stability. If the wealth ofa society is concentrated in the hands of a small number of people, then this isagainst the popular will, and the society is bound to be unstable.

31. “Transcript: Wen Jiabao,” Financial Times, 2 February 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/795d2bca-f0fe-11dd-8790-0000779fd2ac.html#ixzz2utpkmWSO, dateaccessed 1 August 2014.

32. Chongyi Feng, “The Return of Liberalism and Social Democracy: BreakingThrough the Barriers of State Socialism, Nationalism, and Cynicism in Contem-porary China,” Issues & Studies: An International Quarterly on China, Taiwan, andEast Asian Affairs, 39, no. 3 (2003): 8.

33. Elizabeth Rosenthal, “China’s Leading University Celebrates and Ponders,”New York Times, 5 May 1998.

34. Bo Zhiyue and Chen Gang, “Global Financial Crisis and the Voice of the New Leftin China,” EAI Background Brief, no. 443 (2008), 3–4.

35. “Full Text of PRC Premier Wen Jiabao’s News Conference,” http://www.chinaelections.org/en/17/03/2007, date accessed 17 March 2007.

164 Notes

36. Cheng Li, China’s Changing Political landscape (Washington, DC: Brookings Insti-tution Press, 2008), 6–7.

37. Feng, “The Return of Liberalism and Social Democracy,” 11.38. Zheng Yongnian, “Ziyouzhuyi de zhongguohua jiqi zai zhongguo de qiantu,”

[Sinonization of Liberalism and its Fate in China] Lianhe zaobao (Singapore)11 August 2009, http://bbs.news.163.com/bbs/jueqi/148312355.html, dateaccessed 17 December 2014.

39. Zhou Lian, “The Debates in Contemporary Chinese Political Thought,”in Fred Dallmayr and Zhao Tingyang, eds., Contemporary Chinese PoliticalThought, Debates and Perspectives (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky,2012), 34.

40. Quoted in Gerda Wielander, Christian Values in Communist China (Oxford andNew York: Routledge, 2013), 133.

41. Nicholas D. Kristof, “China Sees ‘Market-Leninism’ as Way to Future,” New YorkTimes, 6 September 1993.

42. Ben Xu, Disenchanted Democracy: Chinese Cultural Criticism After 1989 (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 1999), 13.

43. The Chinese people were required to study Mao Zedong’s “Five Old Essays”including “Serve the People,” “In Memory of Norman Bethune,” “The Foolish OldMan Who Moved the Mountain,” “Where Do Correct Thoughts Come From?” aswell as “Oppose Liberalism.”

44. See, for example, He Bingmeng ed., Xinziyouzhuyi pingxi [Analysis ofNeoliberalism] (Beijing: Social Science Documentation Publishing House, 2004).

45. Liu Junning ed., Ziyouzhuyi de xiansheng: Beida chuantong yu jinxiandai zhongguo[The Harbinger of Liberalism: The Tradition of Peking University and ModernChina] (Beijing, Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1998).

46. Mao Zedong denounced liberalism (ziyouzhuyi) in his famous essay “fanduiziyouzhuyi” [against Liberalism] written in 1937.

47. Liu Junning, “Classical Liberalism Catches on in China,” Journal of Democracy, 11,no. 3 (July 2000): 48–57.

48. Andrew Nathan, “Classical Liberalism Catches on in China,” in AndrewJ. Nathan, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Will China Democratize?(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 193.

49. He Li, “Returned Students and Political Change in China,” Asian Perspective, 30,no. 2 (Summer 2006): 5–29.

50. Personal interviews in China in 2008 and 2009.51. Barrett L. McCormick and David Kelley, “The Limits of Anti-Liberalism,” Journal

of Asian Studies, 53 no. 3 (August 1994): 804–31.52. Yun-han Chu, “The Evolution of Political Values,” in Bruce Gilley and Larry

Diamond, eds., Political Change in China: Comparison with Taiwan (Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner, 2008), 27–48.

2 Neo-authoritarianism

1. Wu Jiaxiang, “The Study Scheme for Neo-Authoritarianism,” in Liu Jun and LiLin, eds., Neo-Authoritarianism: The Debate about Theoretical Guidance of Reform(Beijing: Beijing Economics Institute Press, 1989), 52–60.

2. Barry Sautman, “Sirens of the Strongman: Neo-Authoritarianism in RecentChinese Political Theory,” China Quarterly, 129 (March 1992): 72–102.

Notes 165

3. Quoted in Barry Sautman, Ibid., 75.4. Deng Ziqiang, “Concerning Controversial Views on Neo-authoritarianism,” in

Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan, and Marc Lambert, eds., Beijing Spring,1989: Confrontation and Conflict: The Basic Documents (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1990),126–27.

5. Wu Jiaxiang, “Commenting on Neo-authoritarianism,” in Oksenberg, Sullivan,and Lambert eds., Beijing Spring, 132–33.

6. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale Univer-sity Press, 1968), 7–8.

7. For the impacts of Western political thought, see Michael J. Sullivan, “The Impactof Western Political Thought in Chinese Political Discourse on Transitions fromLeninism, 1986–1992,” World Affairs, 157, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 79–91.

8. Francis Fukuyama, “Forward by Francis Fukuyama,” in Samuel Huntington’s,Political Order in Changing Societies, xi.

9. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 4.10. Shu Yun Ma “The Rise and Fall of Neo-Authoritarianism in China,” China

Information, 5, no. 3 (Winter 1990–1991): 4.11. Ibid., 1.12. Samuel Huntington, “The Change to Change,” Comparative Politics, 3 (1971):

283–322.13. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy & Adaptation; American and

European Relations with China (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press,2008), 93.

14. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1.15. Alan Dupont, “Is There an ‘Asian Way,’ ” Survival, 38, no. 2 (1996): 13–33

and Mark R. Thompson, “Whatever Happened to ‘Asian Values’?” Journal ofDemocracy, 12, no. 4 (2001): 154–65.

16. Tsai Wen-hui, “New Authoritarianism, Neo-Conservatism and Anti-Peaceful Evo-lution: Mainland China’s Resistance to Political Modernization,” Issues & Studies,28, no. 12 (December 1992): 5.

17. Andre Laliberte and Marc Lanteigne, The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century:Adaptation and the Reinvention (New York: Routledge, 2008), 147.

18. Yan Bofei, “Abandon Utopianism,” Dushu, 2 (1989): 6. Also see “Dilemmas ofModernization,” China News Analysis, no. 1399 (15 December 1989): 5.

19. Xiao Gongqin, “Zouxiang chengshu: dangdai zhongguo gaige de huigu yu zhan-wang” [Toward Maturity: Reflection on and Prospects for Contemporary Reformin China], Beijing Qingnianbao [Beijing Youth Daily] (13 May 1993): 3 and BenXu, “Chinese Populist Nationalism: Its Intellectual Politics and Moral Dilemma,”Representations, 76, no. 1 (Fall 2001): 126.

20. “Deng Xiaoping on Neo-Authoritarianism,” in Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert,eds., Beijing Spring, 125.

21. Xiao Gongqin and Zhu Wei, “New Authoritarianism: A Painful Dilemma,” WenhuiBao, 17 January 1989, quoted in Zhang Shuqiang, “Marxism, Confucianism andCultural Nationalism,” in Zhiling Lin and Thomas W. Robinson, eds., The Chineseand Their Future: Beijing, Taipei, and Hong Kong (Washington, DC: The AEI Press,1994), 101.

22. Ibid.23. Liu Qingfeng, “The Topography of Intellectual Culture in 1990s Mainland China:

A Survey,” in Gloria Davies, ed., Voicing Concerns: Contemporary Chinese CriticalInquiry (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 62.

166 Notes

24. Hu Jiwei, “Establish Democratic Authority,” in Oksenberg, Sullivan, and Lamberteds., Beijing Spring, 138.

25. Zhou Wenzhang, “Neo-authoritarianism: An Impractical Panacea,” in Oksenberg,Sullivan, and Lambert eds., Beijing Spring, 135–36.

26. Qin Xiaoying, “Escaping from a Historical Cycle,” Chinese Sociology and Anthro-pology, 23, no. 4 (Summer 1991): 7–30.

27. Deng Ziqiang, “Concerning Controversial Views on Neo-authoritarianism,” inOksenberg, Sullivan, and Lambert eds., Beijing Spring, 127.

28. Michael Twohey, Authority and Welfare in China: Modern Debates in HistoricalPerspective (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 156–57.

29. Ying Xuejun, “Weiquan zhengzhi de shoumin yu minzhu weixie lun [Fortuneof Authoritarianism and Argument of Threat from Democracy], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/gsbh/2014/0417/104532.html, date accessed 17 April 2014.

30. Barrett L. McCormick and David Kelly, “Limits of Anti-Liberalism,” Journal ofAsian Studies, 53, no. 3 (1994): 821; Gu and Kelly, “New Conservatism,” Gu Xinand David Kelly, “New Conservatism: Ideology of a New Elite,” in David S.G.Goodman and Beverley Hooper, eds., China’s Quiet Revolution (Melbourne andNew York: Longman Cheshire St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 220; Joseph Fewsmith,China Since Tiananmen, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008),80; Sullivan, Democracy and Developmentalism, 342.

31. For the literature on neo-authoritarianism, see Shu Yun Ma, “The Rise and Fallof Neo-authoritarianism in China,” 1–18; Sautman, “Sirens of the Strongman:Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory,” 72–102. The majorChinese articles on neo-authoritarianism are collected in Liu Jun and Li Lin,eds., Xinquanweizhuyi [Neo Authoritarianism] (Beijing: Jingjixueyuan chubanshe,1989).

32. Els Van Dongen, “Goodbye Radicalism!” Conceptions of Conservatism among ChineseIntellectuals during the Early 1990s,” Ph.D. Diss., Leiden University, 2009.

33. Xiao Gongqin and Zhu Wei, “A Painful Dilemma: A Dialogue on the The-ory of ‘New Authoritarianism,’ ” trans., in Stanley Rosen and Gary Zou, eds.,“The Chinese Debate on the New Authoritarianism” (1), Chinese Sociology andAnthropology (Winter 1990–1991): 69–93.

34. Michael J. Sullivan, “The Impact of Western Political Thought in Chinese PoliticalDiscourse on Transitions from Leninism, 1986–1992,” World Affairs, 157, no. 2(Fall 1994): 79–91.

35. David Kelly, “China: Major Ideological Trends of 1995,” in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed.,China in the Post-Deng Era (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998), 70.

36. It is rumoured that the article was the work of a team headed by Chen Yuan, ChenYun’s son, and Deng Yingtao, Deng Liqun’s son. For a good discussion on thetopic, see David Rolls, The Emergence of the “Jiang Zemin Era”: Legitimacy and theDevelopment of the Political Theory of “Neo-conservatism” 1989–1995, Ph.D. Diss.,University of Southern Queensland, 2004.

37. Van Dongen, “Goodbye Radicalism!” Conceptions of Conservatism Among ChineseIntellectuals During the Early 1990s.

38. At the panel discussion on 8 December 2013, Qin Hui points out that the XiaoGongqin changed the final goal of neo-authoritarianism from liberal democ-racy to “democracy with Chinese characteristics.” “Qin Hui, Xiao Gongqin dengjibian xinquanwei zhuyi” [Debate Among Qin Hui, Xiao Gongqin and Oth-ers on Neo-authoritarianism,” http://news.ifeng.com/exclusive/lecture/special/xinquanwei/xinquanwei1.shtml, date accessed 1 August 2014.

Notes 167

39. Zhang Xiaojin and Li Chunfeng, “‘Minzhu’ huayide yiyi bianqian: yi zhongguogongchandangdaibiaodahui zhengzhibaogao wei benwende fenxi” [Changes in Mean-ing of Discourse on ‘Democracy’: Analysis of the Political Report to the NationalParty Congress], in Yu Xunda and Xu Siqin, eds., Minzhu, minzhuhua yu zhilijix-iao [Democracy, Democratization, and Governance Effect] (Hangzhou: ZhejiangUniversity Press, 2011), 117–53.

40. Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Political Trajectory: What Are the Chinese Saying?”in Cheng Li, ed., China’s Changing Political Landscape (Washington, DC: BrookingsInstitution, 2008), 25–43.

41. Xiao Gongqin, “Cong Deng Xiaoping dao Xi Jinping: Zhongguo gaige de zaich-ufa” [From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping: Restart of the Chinese Reform], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/ggcx/article_2013121997274.html, date accessed15 December 2013.

42. Excerpt from an email from Hu Shaohua, associate professor at Wagner College,in March 2014.

43. Quoted in John Makeham, Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary ChineseAcademic Discourse (Cambridge: The Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), 197.

44. Tang Liang, Is Democratisation in China Possible? The Authoritarian Path to Develop-ment (New York: Routledge, 2014).

45. Chris Buckley,“Xi, in ‘Godfather’ Mold, Looks Assertive and Even Imperial,”New York Time, 15 November 2013.

46. Twohey, Authority and Welfare in China, 132.47. Xiao Gongqin, “The Specter of Political ‘Ultra-ism,’ ” http://www.newschinamag.

com/magazine/the-specter-of-political-ultra-ism, date accessed 30 October 2012.48. Zhang Weiwei, Zhongguo zhenhan: Yige “wenmingxing guojia” de jueqi (Beijing: Shiji

chubanshe, 2011), 55.49. William A. Callahan, China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future (New York: Oxford

University Press, 2013), 149.50. Chan Koonchung, Xinzuoyi sichao de tujin [The Panorama of the New Left Think-

ing], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2013122697740.html,date accessed 26 December 2013.

51. Wang Zhanyang, “Zhongguo jixuyao fazhan didu minzhu” [China Needs toDevelop Low-Level Democracy Urgently], Tansuo yu Zheng-ming [Exploration andFree Views], 1 (February 2012), 3–12.

52. Liu Junning, Baoshou zhuyi (Conservatism) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexuechubanshe, 1998), 9.

53. Ibid., 14, 264.54. Gan Yang and Xudong Zhang, “Critique of Chinese Conservatism in the 1990s,”

Social Text, 16, no. 2 (Summer, 1998): 46.55. Kelly, “China: Major Ideological Trends of 1995,” 70.56. Ibid.57. Yang Zhong, “Legitimacy Crisis and Legitimation in China,” Journal of Contempo-

rary Asia, 26, no. 2 (1996): 215.58. Yu Keping, Democracy Is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in

Contemporary China (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 4.59. Yongnian Zheng, “Development and Democracy: Are they Compatible in

China?” Political Science Quarterly, 109, no. 2 (1994): 248.60. Xiao Gongqin and Zhou Zhixin, “Zhongguo zhuanxing de kunjing yu chulu”

[Obstacles and Solution for China’s Transformation], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2011071639726, date accessed 1 December 2011.

168 Notes

61. Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu, Gaobie geming: huiwang ershi shiji zhongguo [Farewell toRevolution: Looking Back Upon China of the Twentieth Century] (Hong Kong:Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 1995), 55.

62. Xiao Gongqin, “Cong Deng Xiaoping dao Xi Jinping: zhongguo gaige de zaich-ufa” [From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping: Restart of the Chinese Reform], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/ggcx/article_2013121997274.html, date accessed15 December 2013. Many firms in China are suffering from “State-owned enter-prises disease” such as loose and inactive management, unclear responsibility,and low productivity.

63. Zhang Qiang, “Xinquanweizhuyi zai zhongguo” [Neo-authoritarianism inChina], www.aisixiang.com/data/21874.html, date accessed 2 November 2008.

64. Kang Xiaoguang, “Dazhuangui” [Great Transformation], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_20140430105284.html, date accessed 30 April2014.

3 China’s New Left

1. Wang Hui, “The New Criticism,” in Chaohua Wang ed., One China, Many Paths(London: Verso, 2003), 60–1.

2. Gan Yang, “Debating Liberalism and Democracy in China in the 1990s” inXudong Zhang ed. Whither China?: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China(Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 79–102.

3. Xu Jilin, Liu Qing, Luo Gang, and Xue Yi, “In Search of a ‘Third Way’: A Con-versation Regarding Liberalism and the New Left Wing,” in Gloria Davies, ed.,Voicing Concerns: Contemporary Chinese Critical Inquiry (Lanham, MD: Rowmanand Littlefield, 2001), 199.

4. Charles W. Freeman and Wen Jin Yuan, “The Influence and Illusion of China’sNew Left,” The Washington Quarterly, 35, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 66.

5. Wang Hui, co-editor of Dushu (1996–2007), was asked to quit his job at Dushu inJuly 2012. After the purge of Bo Xilai, the government closed Utopia, which wasone of the main platforms for China’s New Left.

6. For two collections that provide useful information on the Chinese “New Left,”see Chaohua Wang, One China, Many Paths; Xudong Zhang, Whither China(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).

7. The Old Leftists are opponents of the reform launched by Deng and outspokencritics of “bourgeois liberalization.”

8. Wang Hui, “Fire at the Castle Gate,” New Left Review, no. 6 (November–December2000): 69–99.

9. See the criticism by Wang Dingding, “Huaizhe xiangchou, xunzhao jiayuan”[A Nostalgic Longing for Home], Dushu, no. 4 (1995): 10–15.

10. Guanjun Wu, The Great Dragon Fantasy: A Lacanian Analysis of Chinese Thought(Singapore: World Scientific, 2014), 199.

11. Gong Yuzhi, “A Unique Transcendence: Deng Xiaoping’s China and MaoZedong’s China,” in Cao Tian Yu, Zhong Xueping, and Liao Kebin, eds., Cultureand Social Transformations in Reform Era China (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 340.

12. Wang Hui, “The Condition of Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Problemof Modernity,” Wenyi zhengming, no. 6 (November 1998): 7–26.

13. For a detailed study on the subject, see Joseph Fewsmith, “Mao’s Shadow,” ChinaLeadership Monitor, no. 43 (2014): 1.

14. Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 477.

Notes 169

15. “85% Say Mao’s Merits Outweigh His Faults: Poll,” Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times],http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/834000.shtml#.Uulb97d3sb0, date accessed24 December 2013.

16. Suisheng Zhao, “Understanding China’s Assertive Foreign Policy Behavior dur-ing the Global Financial Meltdown,” The World Financial Review, http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=409, date accessed 21 November 2013.

17. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,2004), 116.

18. Jian Guo, “Politics of Othering and Postmodernization of the Cultural Revolu-tion,” Postcolonial Studies, 2, no. 2 (1999): 225.

19. Tian Yu Cao, “Introduction,” in Tian Yu Cao, Xueping Zhong, and Kebin Liao,eds. Culture and Social Transformations in Reform Era China (Leiden: Brill, 2010),16–17.

20. Zhao Feng, “Xinzuopai shili huichao tanxi” [Discussion of Return of theNew Left], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2014020599983.html, date accessed 5 February 2014.

21. Jiang Qing, A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can ShapeIts Political Future (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 200–01.

22. Liu Qingfeng, “The Topography of Intellectual Culture in 1990s Mainland China:A Survey,” in Gloria Davies, ed., Voicing Concerns: Contemporary Chinese CriticalInquiry (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 52.

23. Gao Hua, “Angang Xianfa de lishi zhenshi yu zhengzhi zhengquexing” [Histor-ical Reality of the Angang Constitution and Political Correctness], Ershiyi Shiji[Twenty-First Century] 58, no. 4 (2000): 62–9.

24. Evan Osnos, “Confucius Comes Home,” The New Yorker (13 January 2014): 35.25. Bruce Dickson, “Conflict and Non-Compliance in Chinese Politics: Party

Rectification, 1983–87,” Pacific Affairs, 63, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 172–73.26. Zhang Lijia, “The Specter of the Cultural Revolution,” New York Times (22 May

2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/23/opinion/the-specter-of-the-cultural-revolution.html?_r=0, date accessed 17 December 2014.

27. Cui Zhiyuan, “Zhidu chuangxin yu dierci sixiang jiefang” [Institutional Innova-tion and a Second Liberation of Thoughts], Ershiyi Shiji, no. 8 (August 1994): 7and “Fahui wenge zhong de heli yinsu” [Bring into Play the Reasonable Elementsof the Cultural Revolution], Yazhou Zhoukan [Asia Weekly], (26 May 1996): 47.

28. Xu Jilin, “Contradictions Within Enlightenment Ideas,” in Tian Yu Cao, ZhongXueping, and Liao Kebin, eds., Culture and Social Transformations in Reform EraChina (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 222.

29. Zhang Weiwei, The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State (Hackensack, NJ:World Century, 2012), 129.

30. Ibid., 130.31. Wang Shaoguang, “Xiaozhengfu dashehui cong genben shang shi cuo

de,” [The Notion of Small Government and Big Society Is FundamentallyFallacious] http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class17/201103/219956.html, dateassessed 10 March 2011.

32. “The End of History” is an essay by Francis Fukuyama published in The NationalInterest in 1989. In the essay, Fukuyama argues that the advent of Western liberaldemocracy may signal the endpoint of humanity’s sociocultural evolution andthe final form of human government.

33. Bo Zhiyue and Chen Gang, “Global Financial Crisis and the Voice of the New Leftin China,” EAI Background Brief, no. 443 (2008): 4–5.

170 Notes

34. Ibid.35. Chen Weigang, Confucian Marxism: A Reflection on Religion and Global Justice

(Leiden: Brill, 2014), 7.36. Robert William Fogel, The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 234.37. Chen, Confucian Marxism, 7.38. Joseph Fewsmith, “Debating Constitutional Government,” China Leadership Mon-

itor, no. 42 (October 2013): 4.39. Hu Angang, China in 2020: A New Kind of Superpower (Washington, DC: Brookings

Institution Press, 2011), 30.40. Pan Wei, “Modern Chinese System: Analysis of the China Model of Economics,

Politics, and Society,” in Pan Wei, ed., The China Model: Reading 60 Years of thePeople’s Republic (Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2009), 3–85.

41. Quoted in David Kelly, “Approaching Chinese Freedom: A Study in Absolute andRelative Values,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 42, no. 2 (2013): 162.

42. Pan Wei, “Modern Chinese System, 3–85.43. Zhang, The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State, 1–3.44. Tian Yu Cao, “Conclusion,” in Tian Yu Cao, ed., The Chinese Model of Modern

Development (London: Routledge, 2005), 298.45. Cui Zhiyuan, “Chongqing shida minsheng gongcheng de zhengzhi jingji xue”

[The Political Economy of Chongqing’s 10 Biggest People’s Livelihood Projects],Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao xuebao [Journal of the Party School of the CentralCommittee of the CCP], 14, no. 5 (2010): 5–10.

46. Peter Martin and David Cohen, “Socialism 3.0 in China,” http://thediplomat.com/2011/04/socialism-3-0-in-china/, date accessed 25 April 2011.

47. Wang Hui, “The Rumour Machine, London Review of Books, 34, no. 10 (24 May2012): 13–14.

48. William A. Callahan, “The China Dream and the American Dream,” Economic andPolitical Studies, 2, no. 1 (January 2014): 143–60.

49. Mark Leonard, What Does China Think? (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).50. Freeman and Yuan, “The Influence and Illusion of China’s New Left,” 71–9.

4 Democratic Socialism

1. Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land (New York: Penguin Press, 2010), 229.2. In Singapore, the People’s Action Party (PAP) was initially a member of the

Socialist International. In Mexico, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) is amember of the Socialist International, as is the rival Party of the Democratic Rev-olution (PRD), making Mexico one of the few nations with two major, competingparties of the same international grouping.

3. For detailed discussion on the topic, see Chongyi Feng, “The Third Way: TheQuestion of Equity as a Bone of Contention between Intellectual Currents,”Contemporary Chinese Thought, 34, no. 4 (Summer 2003): 75–94.

4. Eduard Bernstein, Henry Tudor ed., The Preconditions of Socialism (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993).

5. For a more detailed discussion on the subject, see Edmund Fung, “State Building,Capitalist Development, and Social Justice Social Democracy in China’s ModernTransformation, 1921–1949,” Modern China, 31, no. 3 (July 2005): 318–52.

6. Tianxia weigong can be literally translated into global oneness or communityownership of the public sphere.

Notes 171

7. Edmund Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural and Polit-ical Thought in the Republican Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),225–26.

8. Ibid., 191.9. Roger B. Jeans, Jr., Democracy and Socialism in Republican China The Politics of Zhang

Junmai (Carsun Chang), 1906–1941 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 48.10. Henry George promoted the Single Tax Movement, which sought a form of

democratic socialism.11. For example, see Qiu Yuanping, Chai Shangjin, and Lin Deshan eds., Dangdai

shehuiminzhuzhuyi yu “disantiaodaolu” [Contemporary Social Democracy and the“Third Way”], (Beijing: Dangdai shijie chubanshe, 2004).

12. Hans Hendrischke, “The Chinese Discourse on Social Democracy,” in MauriceBrosseau, Suzanne Pepper, and Tsang Shu-ki, eds., China Review, 1996 (Hong Kong:The Chinese University Press, 1996), 98–9.

13. The Socialist International is the worldwide organization of social democratic,socialist, and labor parties. It currently brings together 162 political parties andorganizations from all continents.

14. Xie Tao, “Minzhu shehuizhuyi yu zhongguo qiantu” [The Model of DemocraticSocialism and China’s Future], Yanhuang Chunqiu, no. 2 (February 2007): 1–8.Yanhuang Chunqiu is a monthly backed by reformist party elders. The earlyversion of the essay, entitled “Zhiyou minzhushehuizhuyi nengjiu zhongguo”[Only Democratic Socialism Can Save China], was published as the prefaceto Xin Ziling, Hongtaiyang de yunluo: qianqiugongzui Mao Zedong [The Fall ofthe Red Sun: The Merits and Sins of Mao Zedong], (Hong Kong: Shuzuofang,2007).

15. Cao Siyuan, one of the most famous scholars on constitutional law in China,has contributed tremendous amount of time to push forward the progress ofsocial democracy. In the early 1980s, he successfully lobbied the National People’sCongress (NPC), the Chinese legislature, to pass PRC’s first law of bankruptcy.

16. Established in 1991, Yanhuang Chunqiu is an influential journal. It has publishedarticles dealing with critical issues such as democracy, constitutional governance,as well as critical reviews of important but sometimes sensitive events and leadersincluding Zhao Zhiyang and Hu Yaobang.

17. Xie, “Preface,” in Xin Ziling, Hongtaiyang de yunluo, xx.18. Chongyi Feng, “The Third Way: the Question of Equity as a Bone of Contention

between Intellectual Currents”: 84–5.19. For a good introduction of the subject, see Thomas Meyer with Lewis Hinchman,

The Theory of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).20. Zhang Rulun, “Disantiao daolu,” [The Third Way] in Li Shitao, ed., Zhishifenzi

lichang – ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenhua [The Positions ofthe Intellectuals – Debate on Liberalism and the Scission among the ChineseIntelligentsia], (Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000), 343.

21. Xu Juezhai, “Engesi wannian de guancha yu sikao” [Engles’ Observation andThinking in His Later Years], Makesi lienin zhuyi yanjiu [Research on Marxism-Leninism], no. 1 (January 2011): 43.

22. Xie, “Minzhu shehuizhuyi yu zhongguo qiantu” [The Model of DemocraticSocialism and China’s Future].

23. Cao Siyuan, “Ruidian jingyan: xianzheng baohu le minzhushehuizhuyi” [SwedishExperience: The Constitutional Protection of Democratic Socialism], YanhuangChunqiu, no. 8 (August 2009).

172 Notes

24. Wenzhai Bao, 17 February 2007, quoted in Willy Lam “Hu Jintao Battles the CCP’sCrisis of Confidence,” China Brief, 7, no. 10 (2007), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4163&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=197&no_cache=1#.VJL7p6Eo6vE, date accessed 18 December 2014.

25. Xie, “Preface,” xxxv–xxxvi.26. Li Rui, “Preface,” in Xin Ziling, Hongtaiyang de yunluo, viii.27. When the Communist Manifesto was published in 1948, Karl Marx was 30,

Friedrich Engels was 28.28. Xie, “Preface,” xxii.29. Bernstein called “Preface” to Karl Marx’s The Class Struggles in France the “political

will’ of Engels. Similarly, Xin Ziling argues that Engels passed away four monthsafter he wrote these words. Therefore, it should be treated as his “political will.”The New Left scholars contend that there is no such a thing like “political will”of Engels.

30. Preface of The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850 was written by FrederickEngels in 1895. Quoted in Xie, “Minzhushehuizhuyi yu zhongguo qiantu.”

31. Ma Licheng, “Minzhushehuizhuyi zai zhongguo” [Democratic Socialism inChina], 37 Jinji Guancha Bao [Economic Observer News], 25 September2010.

32. Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism (New York: Shocken Books, 1961), 202.33. Friedrich Engels, “Preface to the English Edition,” in Friedrich Engels, The

Condition of the Working Class in England (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 39.34. Zhang Qiuyuan, “Engesi de hua geiwo de qishi” [New Thinking from the

Writings of Engels], http://new.21ccom.net/articles/gsbh/article_2010072914396.html, date accessed 29 July 2010.

35. Hong Yunshan, “On the Transformation of the Capitlist System of Own-ership.” Guangmin Ribao (13 February 1989), quoted in Zhang Shuqiang,“Marxism, Confucianism and Cultural Nationalism,” in Zhiling Lin and ThomasW. Robinson, eds., The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei, and Hong Kong(Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1994), 85.

36. He Fang, “Yingwei shehuizhuyi zhengming” [Restore the True Meaning of Social-ism], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/lsjd/lsjj/article_2011122650882.html, dateaccessed 26 December 2011.

37. Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu, Gaobie geming: huiwang ershishiji zhongguo [Farewell toRevolution: Looking Back on Twentieth-century China] (Hong Kong: Tiandi BookCompany, 1997).

38. For an overview of Li Zehou’s philosophical system, see Gu Xin, “Hegelianismand Chinese Intellectual Discourse: A Study of Li Zehou,” Journal of ContemporaryChina, 8 (Winter–Spring 1995): 1–27.

39. “Xie Tao Speaks At Hong Kong University,” http://www.zonaeuropa.com/200709.brief.htm, date accessed 22 September 2007.

40. Xie, “Minzhu shehuizhuyi yu zhongguo qiantu” [The Model of DemocraticSocialism and China’s Future].

41. Xiang Wenhua, Sikandenaweiya minzhushehui zhuyi yanjiu [Research on Demo-cratic Socialism in Scandinavia] (Beijing: Central Compilation & TranslationPress, 1999).

42. Xinning Song, “European ‘Models’ and Their Implications to China: Internal andExternal Perspectives,” Review of International Studies, 36, no. 3 (July 2010): 759.

43. For detailed discussion on the Swedish model, see Henrik Simonsen, Towarda “One-Party Democracy”? – Prospects for a Future Democratic PRC with Reference

Notes 173

to Swedish Democratic Experience, http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34906, date accessed 18 September 2009.

44. Xiao Liang, “Lilun de tupo yu gege de tupo” [Theoretical Breakthrough andReform Breakthrough], Caijin wenti yanjiu [Financial and Economic Studies],no. 11 (2007). Quoted in Wang Yanlai, China’s Economic Development and Democ-ratization (Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 171.

45. Xie, “Minzhu shehuizhuyi yu Zhongguo qiantu” [The Model of Democratic Socialismand China’s Future].

46. Zheng Yongnian, “China Shows Increasing Interest in Social Democracy despiteResistance to Multiparty System,” Lianhe Zaobao, http://www.zaobao.com/special/forum/pages5/forum_zp071016a.html, date accessed 16 October 2007.

47. See Qin Hui, “Ziyouzhuyi, shehuiminzhuzhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo ‘wenti’ ”[Liberalism, Social Democracy and Issues in Contemporary China], Zhanlüe yuguanli [Strategy and Management], no. 5 (2000): 83–91.

48. For detail, see Huang Dagong, ed., Dalunzhan: minzhushehuizhuyi yu zhongguochulu: Xie Tao yinqi de zhengming [Big Debate: Democratic Socialism and China’sFurure], (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu, 2007).

49. Zhang Suhua, “Sulian jieti shi minzhushehuizhuyi de pochan,” [Bankruptcy ofDemocratic Socialism Is the Cause of the Breakdown of the Soviet Union] inTianyu Cao, ed., Shehuizhuyi haishi shehuiminzhuzhuyi?: Zhongguo gaige zhongde“minzhu shehuizhuyi” sichao (Hong Kong: Dafeng chubanshe, 2008), 129–40.

50. Minqi Li, “After Neoliberalism: Empire, Social Democracy, or Socialism?” MonthlyReview, 55, no. 8 (2004): 34.

51. Wu Bing (pseudonym), “Minzhushehuizhuyi jiushi zibenzhuyi” [DemocraticSocialism Is Capitalism], the paper was initially published at Maoflag.net, theEnglish translation of the paper is available at http://www.wengewang.org/read.php?tid=14959&uid=1645, date accessed 15 March 2008.

52. Pan Wei, “Western System versus Chinese System,” EAI Background Brief, no. 530,East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore (20 May 2010), 5.

53. “Ruhe kandai minzhushehuizhuyi” [How to Evaluate Democratic Socialism],Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] (10 May 2007), 9.

54. Ma Licheng, “Jiaofeng: Dangdai,zhongguo de bazhong sichao” [Crossing Swords:Eight Schools of Thought in Contemporary China], Tongzhougongjin, no. 1 (2010).

55. Xu Youyu, “Ziyouzhuyi haishi shehuiminzhuzhuyi? Qianyi weilai zhongguoxianzheng yuanli,” [Liberalism or Social Democracy? – Preliminary Analysis onChina’s Constitutional Principles in Future] in Feng Chongyi and Zhu Xueqin,eds., Xianzheng yu zhongguo, zhongguo ziyouzhuyi lun cong zhi yi [Constitutionalismand China, Book Series on Chinese Liberalism vol. 1], (Hong Kong: Hong KongPress for Social Sciences Ltd, 2004), 198.

56. Chen Kuiyuan, “Xinyang makesizhuyi, zuo jiangding de makesizhuyizhe” [Hav-ing Faith in Marxism, Being a Firm Marxist], http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class16/201105/231240.html, date accessed 17 May 2012.

57. Hendrischke, “The Chinese Discourse on Social Democracy,” 96.58. Xie, “Preface,” xx.59. Hendrischke, “The Chinese Discourse on Social Democracy,” 97.60. Xie, “Minzhushehuizhuyi yu zhongguo qiantu” [The Model of Democratic

Socialism and China’s Future].61. Harmonious Society is a socioeconomic vision that is said to be the ultimate

end result of Chinese leader Hu Jintao’s signature ideology of the scientificdevelopment outlook.

174 Notes

62. The CCP claims that apart from the Communist Party, eight so-called democraticbut nominal parties are allowed to take part in the advisory body, the ChinesePeople’s Political Consultative Conference.

63. Quoted in Joseph Kahn, “In China, Talk of Democracy Is Simply That,” New YorkTimes (20 April 2007), A1.

64. Ibid.65. Zheng Yongnian, “China Shows Increasing Interest in Social Democracy despite

Resistance to Multiparty System,” Lianhe Zaobao, http://www.zaobao.com/special/forum/pages5/forum_zp071016a.html, date accessed 16 October 2007.

66. Gao Fang, “Evolvement of the Relationship Between Scientific Socialism andDemocratic Socialism in Recent Century – Only Socialist Democracy Can SaveChina,” Lilun xuekaun [Theory Journal], 6, no. 6 (2007): 15–22.

67. Suisheng Zhao, “Political Liberalization without Democratization: Pan Wei’s Pro-posal for Political Reform,” Journal of Contemporary China, 12, no. 35 (2003):351.

68. Survey Center of the People’s Forum,“Renmin luntan: 2013 zhide guanzhu deshida sichao” [People’s Forum: Top 10 Visible Schools of Thought in 2013],http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2014020599978_2.html, dateaccessed 5 February 2014.

69. Ross Terrill, “The Case for Selective Failure,” The Wilson Quarterly (Autumn2010), 60.

70. For details, see David Shambaugh, “The Chinese Discourse on NoncommunistParty-States,” in David Shambaugh, ed., China’s Communist Party: Atrophy & Adap-tation; American and European Relations with China (Washington, DC: WoodrowWilson Center Press; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 87–102.

5 New Confucianism

1. John Makeham, Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese AcademicDiscourse (Cambridge: The Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), 1.

2. Mu Zongsan, Daode de lixianzhuyi [Moral Idealism] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju,1985) and Cai Renhou, Rujia sixiang de xiandai yiyi [The Modern Significance ofConfucian Thought] (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 1999).

3. Yuandao is the main theoretical front of contemporary New Confucianism. Thejournal was launched by Chen Ming, a researcher at the Institute for World Reli-gion at the CASS in 1994. Chen Ming continues to serve as the journal’s chiefeditor.

4. Ma Licheng, Dangdai zhongguo bazhong shehui sichao [Contemporary ChineseSocial Thought] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2012), Peter Moody,Conservative Thought in Contemporary China (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007),and Xiao Gongqin, “Dangdai zhongguo liuda shehui sichao de lishi yan-bian yu weilai zhanwang” [Evolution and Future Development of Six MajorSocial Thoughts in Contemporary China] Lindaozhe [Leaders] no. 29 (2009),112–19.

5. Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Post-Confucian Challenge,” in Korea: Past, Present andFuture (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1985), 68.

6. Herman Kahn, World Economic Development: 1979 and Beyond (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1979), 122.

7. Yun-han Chu, “Sources of Regime Legitimacy and the Debate over the ChineseModel,” ABS Working Paper Series, no. 52 (2011): 22.

Notes 175

8. Xu Youyu, “Intellectual Discourses in Post-Mao China and Today,” http://chinachange.org/2014/05/24/intellectual-discourses-in-post-mao-china-and-today/, date accessed 24 May 2014.

9. Daniel A. Bell, “Reconciling Confucianism and Socialism? Reviving Tradition inChina,” Dissent, 57, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 91.

10. Makeham, Lost Soul, 342.11. Fang Keli, Xiandai xinruxue yu zhongguo xiandaihua [New Confucianism and

Chinese Modernization], (Tianjin: Renmin chubanshe, 1997), 453.12. See Fang Keli, “Guanyu xiandai xinrujia yanjiu de jige wenti” [On Some Issues in

New Confucianism Research], in Fang Keli and Li Jinquan, eds., Xiandai xinruxueyanjiu lunji [Collected Essays on New Confucianism Studies] (Beijing: Zhongguoshehui kexue chubanshe, 1989), vol. 1: 1–13.

13. Song Xianlin, “Reconstructing the Confucian Ideal in 1980s China: The ‘Cul-ture Craze’ and New Confucianism,” in John Makeham, ed., New Confucianism:A Critical Examination (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 81–104.

14. Fang Keli and Li Jinquan, eds., Xiandai xinruxue yanjiu lunji [Collection of Studieson Contemporary New Confucianism], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexuechubanshe, 1989), 8.

15. Fang Keli, “Lüelun jiushi niandai de wenhua baoshou zhuyi sichao,” [A Brief Discus-sion of the Cultural Conservative Trend of the Nineties] in Sha Jiansun and GongShuduo, eds., Zou shenmelu: yu zhongguo jinxiandai lishi shang de ruogan zhongdashifei wenti (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1997), 157–61.

16. Cai Fanglu, “Ruexue yu makesizhuyi de qihechu jiqi zai dangdai xinwenhuazhong de weizhi” [The Points Confucianism Shares in Common with Marxismand Its Place in the Contemporary New Culture], Jiangxi shehuikexue, no. 1 (1993):6–10.

17. Makeham, Lost Soul, 241.18. “In Conversation with Yao Zhongqiu,” http://www.newschinamag.com/magazine/

in-conversation-with-yao-zhongqiu, date accessed 15 August 2013.19. Liu Wanyuan, “The Constitutionalist’s New Robes,” http://www.newschinamag.

com/magazine/the-constitutionalists-new-robes, accessed 1 September 2013.20. Yao Zhongqiu, “Wenmin fuxing shiyezhong zhi biange xinfan” [A New Reform

Paradigm: Chinese Cultural Renaissance], Journal of Open Times (September 2012).21. Yao Zhongqiu, Muhuaxia zhili zhisushi: Tiansia [A History of the Order of Chinese

Governance: Tianxia], (Haikou: Hainan Chubanshe, 2012).22. Jiang Qing, “Debating with My Critics,” in Jiang Qing, ed., A Confucian Constitu-

tional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2012), 196.

23. Gao Quanxi “Zuopai shi shi, yuopai shi sanwen,” [Left Is Poem, and RightIs Prose] http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_20140303101563.html, date accessed 3 March 2014.

24. For detailed discussion on the subject, see Liu Junning “Xinjiapo: rujiaziy-ouzhuyi de tiaozhan” [Singapore: The Challenge of Confucian Liberalism] Dushu[Reading], no. 2 (1993): 9–15.

25. Xu Youyu, “Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai zhongguo,” [Liberalism and ContemporaryChina] in Li Shitao, ed., Zhishifenzi de lichang [Positions of the Intellectuals],(Changchun: Shidai Guofan Jianlun, 2000), 415.

26. Peter Moody, Conservative Thought in Contemporary China (Lanham: LexingtonBooks, 2007), 87.

27. Liu Wanyuan, “The Constitutionalist’s New Robes.”

176 Notes

28. “In Conversation with Yao Zhongqiu,” http://www.newschinamag.com/magazine/in-conversation-with-yao-zhongqiu, date accessed 15 August 2013.

29. Jiang Qing, “Zhongguo dalu fuxing ruxue de xianshi yiyi jiqi mianlin de wenti”[The Real Significance of Reviving Confucianism in the Mainland and Its Prob-lems], Ehu [Goose Lake], no. 170 (August 1989) and no. 171 (September 1989),quoted in Fang Keli, Xiandai xinruxue yu zhongguo xiandaihua [ContemporaryNew Confucianism and China’s Modernization], Tianjin, China: Tianjin Renminchubanshe, 424–25.

30. Makeham, Lost Soul, 271.31. Ibid., 269–70.32. Jiang Qing and Daniel A. Bell, “A Confucian Constitution for China,” New York

Times, 10 July 2012, A25.33. Kang Xiaoguang, “Confucianization: A Future in the Tradition,” Social Research,

73, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 77.34. Kang Xiaoguang, “Political Development and Political Stability in the Era of

Reform,” The Chinese Economy, 35, no. 5 (September–October 2002): 83–6.35. Ibid.36. Ibid.37. Ruiping Fan, “Jiang Qing on Equality,” in Ruiping Fan, ed., The Renaissance of

Confucianism in Contemporary China (New York: Springer, 2011), 55–6.38. Daniel A. Bell, “Introduction,” in Jiang Qing, A Confucian Constitutional Order:

How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2012), 17.

39. Zhou Lian, “The Debates in Contemporary Chinese Political Thought,” in FredDallmayr and Zhao Tingyang, eds., Contemporary Chinese Political Thought, Debatesand Perspectives (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 35.

40. Gan Yang, “Zhongguo daolu: sanshi nian yu liushi nian,” Dushu [Reading], no. 6(June 2007): 3–13.

41. Zhou Lian, “The Debates in Contemporary Chinese Political Thought,” 36.42. Yi Quan, “Xin gaige gongshi buneng zou rujia shehuizhuyi daolu” [The New

Reform Consensus Cannot Lead to Confucian Socialism], Gaige neican [InternalInformation on Reform], no. 16 (2006): 43–5.

43. Yang Jisheng, “Xiandai minzhu zhidu: yi genbuneng bei paichu de gaige gongshi”[The Contemporary Democratic System: A Consensus on Reform which CanNot Be Put Aside], Quoted in Sébastien Billioud, “Confucianism, ‘Cultural Tra-dition’ and Official Discourses in China at the Start of the New Century,” ChinaPerspectives, no. 3 (2007): 63.

44. Joseph Chan, “Political Meritocracy and Meritorious Rule: A Confucian Perspec-tive,” in., Daniel A. Bell and Chenyang Li, eds., The East Asian Challenge forDemocracy: Political Meritocracy in Comparative Perspective (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2013), 31–54, and Tongdong Bai, “A Confucian Version ofHybrid Regime: How Does it Work, and Why Is It Superior?” in Daniel A. Bell andChenyang Li, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Democracy: Political Meritocracy inComparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 55–87.

45. Zhou Qing and Zhuang Youming, “Xinjiapo xiandaihua dianjiren de zhiguolilun” [Theories of Governance of the Pioneers in Singapore’s Modernization],Dongnanya yanjiu [Study of Southeast Asia], no. 5–6 (1993): 58–63.

46. For a good study on the subject, see R. Keith Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past:Identities and Change in Modern China, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: PearsonPublisher, 2011).

Notes 177

47. Jiawen Ai, “Selecting the Refined and Discarding the Dross: The Post–1990Chinese Leadership’s Attitude Towards Cultural Tradition,” in Patrick Daly andTim Winter, eds., Routledge Handbook of Heritage in Asia (London: Routledge,2012), 132.

48. Moody, Conservative Thought in Contemporary China, 88.49. Enfu Cheng, “Seven Currents of Social Thoughts and their Development in

Contemporary China with a Focus on Innovative Marxism,” http://mltoday.com/seven-currents-of-social-thought-in-people-s-china, date accessed 1 August2014.

50. Rey-Ching Lu, Chinese Democracy and Elite Thinking (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2011), x.

51. Francis Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, 6, no. 2(April 1995): 24–5.

52. Samuel Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” Political ScienceQuarterly, 99, no. 2 (1984): 208.

53. Baogang He, “Four Models of the Relationship between Confucianism andDemocracy,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 37, no. 1 (March 2010): 18–33.

54. Shaohua Hu, “Confucianism and Western Democracy,” Journal of ContemporaryChina, 6, no. 15 (July 1997): 347.

55. Sébastien Billioud, “Confucianism, ‘Cultural Tradition’ and Official Discourses inChina at the Start of the New Century,” China Perspectives, no. 3 (2007): 64.

56. Ching Kwan Lee, Against the Law: Labor Protest in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

57. Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a ChangingSociety, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 12.

58. “Li kongzi xiang tuo bu tuo?” [Is That Appropriate to Put the Statueof Confucius?” http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/87423/13749642.html, dateaccessed 17 January 2011.

59. Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a ChangingSociety (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 188.

60. See more at: http://www.ntd.tv/en/programs/news-politics/china-forbidden-news/20140926/225207-new-confucius-era-vs-class-struggle.html#sthash.aSCKKg3i.dpuf, date accessed 14 October 2014.

61. Qin Hui, Chuantong shi lun [Ten Essays on Tradition] (Shanghai: Fudandaxuechubanshe, 2003).

62. Qin Hui, “Zhongguo wenhua de zuida wenti shi rubiao fali” [The Largest Prob-lem of Chinese Culture Is Confucianism on the Outside and Legalism onthe Inside], http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20100116/18207257091.shtml, dateaccessed 16 January 2010.

63. Qin Hui, “Wo de lishiguan” [My View of History] http://www.confucianism.com.cn/Showdashi.asp?id=8296&bid=a000300070006, date accessed 13 October 2006.

64. Tang Wu Revolutions refers to the revolutions led by Tang, the first king of theShang dynasty, overthrowing Jie, the last ruler of the Xia dynasty, and King Wu,the first king of the Zhou dynasty, overthrowing Zhou, the last ruler of the Shangdynasty.

65. Tu Wei-ming, Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectuals(Albany: State University of New York, 1993), 158.

66. Tu Wei-ming, “Chinese Intellectuals Once Represent Heaven (Tian), But NowThey Are Facing Consensus Crisis,” http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2013061785672.html, date accessed 17 June 2013.

178 Notes

6 Chinese Intellectual Discourse on Democracy

1. Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead(New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), Geng Yunzhi, “Xifang minzhu zaijindai zhongguo de mingyun” [Western Democracy and Its Practice in ModernChina,” Yanhuang Chunqiu, (July 2003), Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), and Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition:The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,2006).

2. Yu Keping, Democracy Is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture inContemporary China (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).

3. Tianjian Shi and Jie Lu, “The Shadow of Confucianism,” Journal of Democracy, 21,no. 4 (October 2010): 123–30.

4. Yun-han Chu, “Sources of Regime Legitimacy and the Debate over the ChineseModel,” ABS Working Paper Series, no. 52 (2011): 8.

5. Nathan, Chinese Democracy, 103.6. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:

Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: TheJohns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3.

7. “Voice on Chinese People’s Political Ideas,” Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times],19 April 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/776016.shtml, date accessed19 April 2013.

8. Research Center for the Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Character-istics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Socialist Democracy with ChineseCharacteristics: Features and Strengths,” Qiushi, 2, no. 3 (1 July 2010): 36–43,and Su Zhihong and Cui Kerui, “Democracy: A Concrete Historical Concept-Reflection on the Concept of Socialist Democracy with Chinese Characteristics,”Jiangsu Social Sciences, no. 4 (2011): 124–28.

9. Tianjian Shi, “China: Democratic Values Supporting an Authoritarian System,” inYun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin, eds., HowEast Asians View Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 209–37.

10. Information Office of the State Council, Zhongguo de minzhu zhengzhi jianshe[Building of Political Democracy in China], (White Paper), http://chinausfocus.com/library/government-resources/chinese-resources/documents/white-paper-building-of-political-democracy-in-china-october-2005/, date accessed 19October 2005.

11. Melissa Murphy, Decoding Chinese Politics: Intellectual Debates and Why They Matter(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), 10–4.

12. For this subject, see Baogang Guo, “Political Legitimacy and China’s Transi-tion,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 8, no 1–2 (Fall 2003): 1–16 and JosephFewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2013), 68–107.

13. Gao Fang, Zhengzhixue yu zhengzhi tizhi gaige [Political Science and PoliticalReform] (Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 2002).

14. Cheng Li, “Intra-Party Democracy in China: Should We Take It Seriously?” ChinaLeadership Monitor, no. 30 (Fall 2009): 3.

15. For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see Cheng Li, “Introduction:Making Democracy Safe for China” in Yu Keping, Democracy Is a Good Thing:Essays on Politics, Society and Culture in Contemporary China (Washington DC: TheBrookings Institution Press, 2009), xvii–xxxi.

Notes 179

16. Li, “Intra-Party Democracy in China,” 3–4.17. Yu, Democracy Is a Good Thing.18. Quoted in Jung Nam Lee, “A Critical Analysis of Theory of Chinese-Style

Democracy,” International Area Review, 13, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 75.19. Yu Keping, “Xuyao liqing youguan minzhu de jige guanxi” [The Necessity to

Clarify Several Conceptual Factors Concerning Democracy], Beijing ribao [BeijingDaily] (16 March 2009).

20. Wang Changjiang, “Zhuoli tuijin dang zhizheng de gaige chuangxin” [Pro-moting Reforms and Innovation in the Party], Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily](28 September 2009).

21. Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China, 174.22. For detail, see Deng Zhenglai and Sujian Guo, eds., China’s Search for Good

Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).23. UNDP Report, Governance for Sustainable Human Development, 1997.24. Yu Keping, Lun guojia zhili xiandaihua [Essays on the Modernization of State

Governance] (Beijing: Sheke wenxian chubanshe, 2014).25. David Bandurski, “Yu Keping: Prizing the Will of the People,” http://cmhku.hk/

2012/04/16/21469/, date accessed 16 April 2012.26. Baogang Guo, China’s Quest for Political Legitimacy: The New Equity-Enhancing

Politics (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 63.27. Yingjie Guo, “The Role of Intellectual Elites in China’s Political Reform,” in

Xiaowei Zang and Chien-wen Kou, eds., Elites and Governance in China (London:Routledge, 2013), 34.

28. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy & Adaptation (Berkeley, CA:University of California Press, 2008), 92–105.

29. Zhao Jianying, “Dangqian woguo wenhua rentong weiji de biaoxian ji yuanyin”[Manifestations of and Reasons for Our Country’s Current Cultural IdentificationCrisis], Lingdao Canyue [Leadership Reference] (2005): 19.

30. Andrew J. Nathan, “China at the Tipping Point? Foreseeing the Unforeseeable,”Journal of Democracy, 24, no. 1 (January 2013): 23.

31. Ignazio Castellucci, “Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics,” Annual Survey ofInternational & Comparative Law, 13, no. 1 (2007): 35–92 and Jiefen Li, “SocialistRule of Law with Chinese Characteristics,” Issues & Studies, 43, no. 1 (March 2007):115–57.

32. Research Center for the Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Character-istics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Socialist Democracy with ChineseCharacteristics: Features and Strengths.

33. Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (Hampshire, NY: Palgrave Macmillan,201), 125–26.

34. Shiping Hua, “All Roads Lead to Democracy,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars,24, no. 1 (January–March 1992): 52.

35. It is also referred to as participatory democracy and consultative democracy.36. Fang Ning, “Minzhu de zhongguo jingyan” [China’s Democratic Experience],

http://www.aisixiang.com/data/46992.html, date accessed 22 November 2011.37. Zhou Lian, “The Debate in Contemporary Chinese Political Thought,”

in Fred Dallmayr and Zhao Tingyang, eds., Contemporary Chinese PoliticalThought, Debates and Perspectives (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky,2012), 32.

38. Li Junru, “Chinese Should Not Be So Humbled about Democracy,” http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/4624705.html, date accessed 25 July 2006.

180 Notes

39. Jin Anping, Yao Chuanming, “Xieshang minzhu buying wudu” [DeliberativeDemocracy Should Not be Misinterpreted], Zhongguo Renming Zhengxie LilunYanjiuhui Huikan (Journal of Association on the Study of the Theory of ChinesePolitical Consultation), no. 3 (2007), http://chinaps.cass.cn/readcontent.asp?id=8049, date accessed 18 December 2014.

40. Chen Hongtai, “Zhongguo yin xuanze shenmo leixing de minzhu fazhan moshi”[What Kind of Model of Democratic Development China Must Choose], Zhongguotese shehuizhuyi yanjiu, no. 2 (2011), http://myy.cass.cn/news/457494.htm, dateaccessed 18 December 2014.

41. Zaijun Yuan, The Failure of China’s Democratic Reforms (Lanham: Lexington Books,2011).

42. Xiaoqin Guo, Dang dai zhongguo sixiangjie guoshi fangtanlu [Interviews of Contem-porary Chinese Thinkers] (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 2009) and Xiao Sanza,Zuoyuo weinan: Zhongguo dangdai sicao fantang lu [Interviews of Scholars of Con-temporary Chinese Schools of Thought] (Fuzhou, China: Fujianjaoyu chubanshe,2012).

43. Guangbin Yang and Miao Li, “Western Political Science Theories and the Develop-ment of Political Theories in China,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 14, no. 3(September 2009): 275–97.

44. Li Shenzhi, “Hongyang beida de ziyouzhuyi chuantong” [Promoting and Devel-oping the Liberal Tradition of Peking University], in Liu Junning, ed., Ziyouzhuyide xiansheng:Beida chuantong yu jinxiandai Zhongguo [The Harbinger of Liberalism:The Tradition of Peking University and Modern China] (Beijing: Zhongguo renshichubanshe, 1998), 4–5.

45. Didi Tang and Gillian Wong, “Chinese Scholars Push for Mild Political Reform,”http://news.yahoo.com/chinese-scholars-push-mild-political-reform-092942854.html, date accessed 26 December 2012.

46. Bai Gang, “Xiandai xifang minzhu zhuyi” [Review of Contemporary WesternDemocracy], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2010070612683_4.html, date accessed 6 July 2010.

47. Li Shenzhi, “Yeyao tuidong zhengzhi gaige” [Promoting Political Reform Too],Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu [Modern China Studies], (April 1998): 17–9.

48. Suisheng Zhao, ed., Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratiza-tion (Armonk: Sharpe, 2006).

49. Huainian Li Shenzhi [In Commemoration of Li Shenzhi], 2 vols., publishedunofficially in January 2006, 339.

50. Zhou Zhixin, speech delivered at the Harvard University on 2 May 2013, http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2013051583418.html, date accessed1 June 2013.

51. Yang Yao, “A Chinese Way of Democratisation?” China: An International Journal,8, no. 2 (September 2010): 343.

52. Zhang Mingshu, Zhongguoren xiangyao shenmoyang de minzhu [What Kind ofDemocracy Do the Chinese People Want] (Beijing: Social Science DocumentationPublishing House, 2013).

53. Leftism is used in a different sense from the currently popular usage in the West.In China, The New Leftists are more like conservatists, they oppose the policy ofmarket-oriented reform and liberal democracy.

54. Jiang Qing, A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can ShapeIts Political Future (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 202.

Notes 181

55. Zhang Weiwei, The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State (Hackensack, NJ:World Century Publishing Corporation), 118.

56. Ibid., 115.57. Han Zhu, “China Should Avoid Traps of Universalism,” http://www.china.org.cn/

opinion/2012-06/28/content_25758932.htm, date accessed 28 June 2012.58. Xie Yue, “Xinzuopai yu ziyouzhuyi de zhengzhixue zhizheng” [The Debate over

Political Science between New-Left and Liberalism], Shanghai Jiaotong daxue xue-bao: zhexue shehuikehuipan [Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University: Philosophyand Social Sciences Edition], no. 1 (2003): 19–24.

59. Wang Shaoguang, Minzhu sijiang [Four Lectures on Democracy] (Beijing:Shenghuo Dushu Xinzhi Press, 2008).

60. Ibid.61. Hu Angang, “Huihuang shinian: Zhongguo chengong zhidao zai nali?” [Brilliant

Decade: What Is the Secret of the Chinese Success?], Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily,Overseas Edition] (3 July 2012).

62. Quoted in Daniel C. Lynch, “Envisioning China’s Political Future: Elite Responsesto Democracy as a Global Constitutive Norm,” International Studies Quarterly, 51(2007): 712.

63. C. Fred Bergsten, Charles Freeman, Nicholas R. Lardy, and Derek J. Mitchell,China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington, DC: The Peterson Institutefor International Economics, 2008), 44.

64. Bo Zhiyue and Chen Gang, “Global Financial Crisis and the Voice of the New Leftin China,” EAI Background Brief, no. 443 (March 2009).

65. Hu Angang, “Equity and Efficiency,” in Chaohua Wang, ed., One China, ManyPaths (London: Verso, 2003), 226.

66. Xudong Zhang, ed., Whither China?: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China(Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 56.

67. For more discussion of Pan Wei’s criticism of liberal democracy, see “Towarda Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China,” Journal of Contemporary China,12, no. 34 (February 2003): 3–43; also Suisheng Zhao, ed., Debating Polit-ical Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization (New York: Sharpe,2006).

68. Jiang Qing, A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can ShapeIts Political Future (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 202.

69. Pan Wei, “Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China,” in SuishengZhao, ed., Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization(Armonk: Sharpe, 2002), 3–43.

70. For a general discussion of this issue, see Rey-Ching Lu, Chinese Democracyand Elite Thinking (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), Fred Dallmayr andZhao Tingyang, eds., Contemporary Chinese Political Thought, Debates and Per-spectives (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), and Ethan J. Leiband Baogang He, eds., The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China (New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

71. Zheng Yongnian, “Zhonggong changqi chizheng de tiaozhang yu zhihui” [Chal-lenges to Long-term Governance of the CCP and Wisdom], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2013050482632.html, date accessed 4 May 2013.

72. Cheng Li, “Introduction: Assessing China’s Political Development,” in Cheng Li,ed., China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy (Washington, DC:Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 11.

182 Notes

7 Debating China’s Economic Reform

1. Dali Yang, “Economic Transformation and Its Political Discontents in China:Authoritarianism, Unequal Growth, and the Dilemmas of Political Develop-ment,” Annual Review of Political Science, 9 (2006): 143–64.

2. Sun Yixian, Chen Aisheng, Li Yunli, and Fang Hongyan, “Guanyu xinzuopaisichao zui daxueshen yingxiang zhuankuan de diaocha baogao,” [The Investiga-tion Report of the Trend of the New Left Thought’s Influence on UndergraduateStudents] Nanchang hangkonggongye xueyuan xuebao shehuikehuipan [Journal ofNanchang Institute of Aeronautical Technology, Social Science Edition], 8, no. 1(January 2006): 30–3.

3. This observation is based on my fieldwork in China.4. Peter Moody, Conservative Thought in Contemporary China (Lanham: Lexington

Books, 2007), 5.5. For details, see He Li, “Returned Students and Political Change in China,” Asian

Perspective, 30, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 5–29.6. Chaohua Wang, “Introduction,” in Chaohua Wang, ed., One China, Many Paths

(London: Verso, 2003), 28.7. For more information on liberalism in China, see Xu Youyu, “The Debates

between Liberalism and the New Left in China Since the 1990s,” ContemporaryChinese Thought, 34, no. 3 (2003): 6–17.

8. Xu Youyu, “Contemporary Chinese Society’s Ideological Splits,” http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=13310, date accessed 17 November2010.

9. Wang Hui, “The New Criticism,” in Wang ed., One China, 61.10. Liu Junning, “Classical Liberalism Catches on in China,” Journal of Democracy, 11,

no. 3 (July 2000): 53.11. Xu, “Contemporary Chinese Society’s Ideological Splits.”12. Neoliberalism is a philosophy, arising in the 1960s. Neoliberalism emphasizes the

importance of economic growth and asserts that social justice is best maintainedby minimal government interference and free market forces.

13. Hayek is highly respected by most Chinese scholars, even then Premier ZhuRongji, has Hayek on his bookshelf. Cited in Liu Junning, “Classical LiberalismCatches on in China,” 48.

14. Liu Junning is a liberal political scientist and founder of the journal Res Publica,which fosters the theoretical and public rise of liberal thinking in China.

15. Kate Zhou, “China’s Break from Serfdom,” A Review by the Grassroot Institute ofHawaii, published on 29 March 2004, http://www.mackinac.org/6479?print=yes,date accessed 1 August 2014.

16. Mark Leonard, What Does China Think? (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 33.17. “China Confident in Maintaining Economic Growth: Premier,” http://www.

china.org.cn/english/2007lh/203252.htm], date accessed 16 March 2007.18. Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, Zhongguo guojia nengli baogao [A Study of the

State Capacity of China] (Shenyang, China: Liaoning People’s Publisher, 1993).19. Wang Shaoguang, “Jianli yige qiangyouli de minzhu guojia – jianlun “zhengquan

xingshi” yu “guojia nengli” de qubie” [Establishing a Powerful Democratic State:Also on the Distinction between the “Form of Government” and “State Capac-ity”], in Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu zhongxin lunwen [Essays from the Center ofContemporary Chinese Studies], no. 4 (1991).

20. Hu Angang “Equity and Efficiency,” in Wang ed., One China, 225–6.

Notes 183

21. Ren Ze, “Is China’s ‘New Left’ ‘Liberal Left?’ ” in Gong Yang, ed., Sichao: Zhongguo“xinzuopai” jiqi yingxiang [Schools of Thought: China’s “New Left” and Its Impact](Beijing: China Social Science Press, 2003), 313.

22. For details, see Yong Deng and Thomas G. Moore, “China Views Globaliza-tion: Toward a New Great-Power Politics?” The Washington Quarterly, 27: 3(Spring 2004), 117–36 and James H. Mittelman, “Globalization and Develop-ment: Learning from Debates in China,” Globalizations, 3, no. 3 (September 2006):377–91.

23. For detailed study on the subject, see Nick Knightm, Imagining Globalisation inChina: Debates on Ideology, Politics and Culture (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,2008).

24. Li Shenzhi, “Quanqiuhua yu zhongguo wenhua” [Globalization and ChineseCulture], Taipingyang xuebao, 2 (1994), 3–11.

25. Wang, “The New Criticism,” 79.26. Zhou Qiren is a professor at the China Center for Economic Research at Peking

University. Fan Gang is an economics professor at Peking University and directorof government-affiliated National Economic Research Institute in Beijing.

27. Fred Bergsten, “A Partnership of Equals: How Washington Should Respond toChina’s Economic Challenge,” Foreign Affairs, 87, no. 4 (July–August 2008): 57.

28. Wang, “The New Criticism.”29. “China Regulates Foreign Mergers for More Investment,” People’s Daily

Online (11 September 2006), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200609/11/eng20060911_301644.html, date accessed 1 August 2014.

30. Yongguo Chen, “Globalization: Resistance from the Chinese New Left,” ARIEL:A Review of International English Literature, 34, no. 1 (January 2003): 111–26.

31. For a detailed study on the impact of FDI, see Yasheng Huang, Selling China: For-eign Direct Investment during the Reform Era (New York: Cambridge University Press,2002).

32. Han Deqiang, Pengzhuang: quanqiuhua xianjing yu zhongguo xianshí xuanze [TheCrash – The Global Trap and China’s Realistic Choice], (Beijing: Beijing EconomicManagement Press, 2000).

33. Shaoguang Wang, “The Social and Political Implications of China’s WTO Mem-bership,” Journal of Contemporary China, 9, no. 25 (November 2000):373–405.

34. Wang Hui, “Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity,”in Xudong Zhang, ed., Whither China: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China,(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001), 160. Also see Wang Hui,China’s New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 2003).

35. For details, see Yongnian Zheng, Globalization and State Transformation in China(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

36. Xu, “Contemporary Chinese Society’s Ideological Splits.”37. For details, see Mobo Changfan Gao, “The Rise of Neo-Nationalism and the

New Left: A Post-Colonial and Postmodernism Perspective,” in Leong Liew andShaoguang Wang, eds., Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 44–62.

38. Zheng, Globalization and State Transformation, 51.39. Ibid., 41.40. See Chin-Chuan Lee, “Rethinking the Political Economy: Implications for Media

and Democracy in Greater China,” Javnost-the Public, 8, no. 4 (2001): 92, and

184 Notes

Gloria Davies, “Habermas in China: Theory as Catalyst,” China Journal, 57(January 2007): 78, for further discussion.

41. Most of Qiangguo (Strong China) Forum’s 28 recommended netters at http://people.com.cn/GB/32306/33607/index.html are clearly identified as leftists.

42. David Kelly, “Guest Editor’s Introduction,” Contemporary Chinese Thought, 38,no. 1 (Fall 2006): 3–14.

43. Jehangir S. Pocha, “China’s Inequities Energize New Left Failures of Reform BuoyNew Thinking,” The San Francisco Chronicle, 19 June 2005.

44. Jehangir S. Pocha, “China’s Inequities Energize New Left,” San Francisco Chronicle,(19 June 2005), F1.

45. Lang Xianping posts a series of commentaries and papers on his Web site. Fordetails, see http://www.langxianping.com.cn

46. Zhang Weiying is one of China’s most prominent economists.47. Gong Xiantian, “Yibu weibei xianfa he beili shehuizhuyi jibenyuanze de

‘wuquanfa (cao’an)’ ” [A ‘(Draft) Property Law’ That Violates the Constitutionand Deviates from the Fundamental Principles of Socialism], http://www.wyzxsx.com/xuezhe/gongxiantian/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=62, date accessed 1 Decem-ber 2008.

48. Joseph Fewsmith, “China in 2007: The Politics of Leadership Transition,” AsianSurvey, 48, no. 1 (January–February 2008), 84.

49. Au Loong-Yu, “Chinese Nationalism and the ‘New Left’,” Socialist Outlook,no. 10 (Summer 2006), http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article3234,date accessed 18 December 2014.

50. Xu Jilin, “The Fate of an Enlightenment: Twenty Years in the Chinese IntellectualSphere (1978–1998),” in Merle Goldman and Edward Gu, eds., Chinese Intellectualsbetween State and Market (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 199.

51. Andrew Borwne, “Influential Voice Sees 20 Years of Roaring Growth,” Wall StreetJournal, 20 (August 2014): A4.

52. Xu Youyu, “The Debates between Liberalism and the New Left in China since the1990s,”6.

53. Pocha, “China’s Inequities Energize New Left.”54. “Establishment intellectual” is a term coined by Carol Hamrin and Timothy

Cheek. For details, see Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek eds., China’sEstablishment Intellectuals (Armonk: Sharpe, 1986).

55. For details, see “The Top 100 Public Intellectuals,” Foreign Policy, no. 166 (May–June 2008), 58–61.

56. He Yanhong, “Dangdai zhongguo de ‘zinzuoyi wenxue’ ” [The “New Left-WingLiterature” in Contemporary China], Nanfang wentan [Southern Cultural Forum],no. 1 (2008): 5–11.

57. Yinghong Cheng, “Che Guevara: Dramatizing China’s Divided Intelligentsia atthe Turn of the Century,” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture, 15, no. 2 (Fall2003): 1–44.

58. Xiao Gongqin, “Xinzuopai he dangdai zhongguo zhishifenzi de fenhua” [NewLeft and the Polarization of Intellectuals in Contemporary China], in Gong Yang,ed., Sichao: Zhongguo “xinzuopai” jiqi yingxiang [Schools of Thought: China’s “NewLeft” and Its Impact] (Beijing: China Social Science Press, 2003), 415.

59. “Na Er” literally meaning “there,” is a mispronunciation of “ying te na xiong naier” (Internationale) by the grandmother in the story. “Na Er” also means “where.”The dream of international solidarity of the working class – where is it to be foundin China today?

Notes 185

60. See, for example, He Bingmeng, ed., Xinziyouzhuyi pingxi [Analysis ofNeoliberalism] (Beijing: Social Science Documentation Publishing House, 2004).

61. Wu Yifeng is a well-known Marxist economist at Renmin University.62. Cited in Joseph Fewsmith, “China under Hu Jintao,” China Leadership Monitor,

no. 14 (Spring 2005), http://www.hoover.org/publications/clm/issues/2903766.html, date accessed 1 August 2014.

63. Eva Cheng, “Beijing Attacks ‘New Left’ Magazine,” Green Left Weekly, no. 725(21 September 2007).

64. Jim Yardley, “China’s Leaders Are Resilient in Face of Change,” New York Times,6 August 2008.

65. Dajun Economic Watch has been established by Zhong Dajun, a well-known NewLeft. Unirule Institute of Economics (or “Tianze” in Chinese), was established byMao Yushi, a well-known liberal economist.

66. For details, see Geremie R. Barmé and Gloria Davies, “Have We Been NoticedYet? Intellectual Contestation and the Chinese Web,” in Goldman and Gu, eds.,Chinese Intellectuals between State and Market, 75–108.

67. Leslie Hook, “The Rise of China’s New Left,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 170,no. 3 (2007): 12.

68. Cui Zhiyuan is a well-known New Left thinker. For details, see Daniel Bell, China’sNew Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2008), 193.

69. Mark Leonard, “China’s New Intelligentsia,” Prospect, no. 144 (March 2008),1–9, http://cdd.stanford.edu/press/2008/prospect-intelligentsia.pdf, date accessed19 December 2014.

70. Leslie Hook, “The Rise of China’s New Left,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 170,no. 3 (2007): 13.

71. Gloria Davies, Worrying About China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 102.

72. Mark Leonard, “China’s New Intelligentsia.”73. For details, see Pan Wei, “Ganyu yu xifang zhankai zhengzhi guannian

jingzheng,” g [Dare to Compete with the West in Political Discourse], HuanqiuShibao [The Global Times], 25 January 2008, http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php?293/c10, date accessed 19 December 2014.

74. Moody, Conservative Thought in Contemporary China, 9.75. According of Wang Hui, “Today we are no longer an isolated group of intel-

lectuals. We have become a broad-based movement with real support fromthe people which gives us clout.” Cited in Pallavi Aiyar, “The IdeologicalDebate in China,” 25 April 2006, http://www.thehindu.com/2006/04/25/stories/2006042505010900.htm, date accessed 5 August 2008.

76. Kerry Brown, “The Communist Party of China and Ideology,” China: An Interna-tional Journal, 10, no. 2 (August 2012): 56.

8 Debate over Legitimacy

1. Philippe C. Schmitter, “What Is Legitimacy and How Can It Be Acquired? Lessonsfrom Deviant Case,” in Deng Zhenglai and Sujian Guo, eds., Reviving Legitimacy:Lessons for and from China (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield-Lexington, 2011), 29.

2. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1971), 124–88.

186 Notes

3. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. Talcott Parsons(New York: The Free Press, 1964), 325.

4. Yanqi Tong, “Morality, Benevolence, and Responsibility: Regime Legitimacy inChina from Past to the Present,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 16, no. 2 (June2011): 145.

5. Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden, eds., Chinese Society: Change, Conflict andResistance, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2010), 11.

6. Baogang Guo, China’s Quest for Political Legitimacy: The New Equity-EnhancingPolitics (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 184.

7. Stuart Reynolds Schram, ed., Foundations and Limits of State Power in China(London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,1987), x.

8. Karl Bünger, “Concluding Remarks on Two Aspects of the Chinese Unitary State asCompared with the European State System,” in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Foundationsand Limits of State Power in China (London: School of Oriental & African Studies,University of London, 1987), 316.

9. Yanqi Tong and Shaohua Lei, Social Protest in Contemporary China, 2003–2010:Transitional Pains and Regime Legitimacy (New York: Routledge, 2013), 27.

10. Yu Keping, “Zhongguo zhengzhixue de jincheng” [The Development of PoliticalScience in China], Xueshu Yuekan [Academic Monthly], 39, no. 11 (2007): 5–11.

11. Zhang Qiang and Robert Weatherley, “The Rise of ‘Republican Fever’ in the PRCand the Implications for CCP Legitimacy,” China Information, 27, no. 3 (2013):281.

12. Rey-Ching Lu, Chinese Democracy and Elite Thinking (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2011), 61.

13. John T. Jost and Brenda Major, “Emerging Perspectives on the Psychology ofLegitimacy,” in John T. Jost and Brenda Major, eds., The Psychology of Legiti-macy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations (CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001), 4.

14. Yu Keping, “Shibada zhihou de zhongguo: gaige guanjianqi” [China after the 18thParty Congress: A Crucial Period], Zhehuizhuyi Yanju [Research on Socialism], no. 2(2013): 1–11.

15. Wang Shaoguang, “Is the Way of Humane Authority a Good Thing,” in JiangQing, ed., A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape ItsPolitical Future (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 141–47.

16. Daniel A. Bell, “Introduction,” in Jiang Qing, A Confucian Constitutional Order:How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2012), 16.

17. Jie Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004).

18. Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds., The Chinese Communist Party inReform (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2.

19. Shanding Zhou, “Changes in the Official Ideology in Contemporary China,”Griffith Asia Institute Regional Outlook Paper, no. 29 (2011).

20. Bloomberg Businessweek, “China’s Spending on Internal Policing OutstripsDefense Budget.” Bloomberg Businessweek, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=amYa34Dsls3s&pos=9. date accessed 6 March 2011.

21. Robert Weatherley, Politics in China Since 1949: Legitimizing Authoritarian Rule(New York: Routledge, 2013), 14.

Notes 187

22. Yu Jianrong, “Social Conflict in Rural China Today: Observations and Analysis onFarmers’ Struggles to Safeguard Their Rights,” Social Sciences in China, 26, no. 3(Autumn 2005): 125–36.

23. Xie Yue, “Rising Central Spending on Public Security and the Dilemma FacingGrassroots Officials in China,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 42, no. 2 (2013):87–9.

24. Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, “China’s Wen Warns of Inequality and Vowsto Continue Military Buildup,” New York Times, 5 March 2013.

25. Quoted in Bruce Gilley and Heike Holbig, “The Debate on Party Legitimacyin China: A Mixed Quantitative/Qualitative Analysis,” Journal of ContemporaryChina, 18, no. 59 (March 2009): 341.

26. Wang Changjiang, “Zhongshi dui ‘dangde liyi’ wenti de yanjiu” [Emphasizingthe Research on the “Interest of the Party”], Makesi Zhuyi yu Xianshi [Marxism &Reality], no. 4 (2004): 4–7.

27. “China’s Hu Jintao Warns Congress Corruption Could Cause Fall ofState,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/08/china-hujintao-warning-congress-corruption, date accessed 8 November 2012.

28. Chris Buckley, “Vows of Change in China Belie Private Warning,” New York Times,14 February 2013.

29. David Easton, A System of Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1967),301–02.

30. Ibid., 310.31. For details, please see Kerry Brown, “The Communist Party of China and

Ideology,” China: An International Journal, 10, no. 2 (August 2012): 52–68.32. Peter Moody, Tradition and Modernization in China and Japan (Belmont, CA:

Wadsworth, 1995), 172.33. “Chinese President Hu Jintao Warns of Cultural Warfare from West,” Daily Tele-

graph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8988195/Chinese-President-Hu-Jintao-warns-of-cultural-warfare-from-West.html, date accessed 2January 2012.

34. Diana Lary, “The Uses of the Past: History and Legitimacy,” in Andre Laliberteand Marc Lanteigne, eds., The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century: Adaptationand the Reinvention of Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 2008), 133.

35. Pramit Pal Chaudhuri and Reshma Patil, “China, the Nervous Dragon,” HindustanTimes, 11 October 2010.

36. Kang Xiaoguang, “Falungong wenti de zhengzhi xiaoying” [The Political Effectof the Falun Gong Problem], Zhongguo shehui daokan [Guide to Chinese Society],no. 33 (2000), quoted in David Ownby, “Kang Xiaoguang: Social Science, CivilSociety, and Confucian Religion,” China Perspectives, no. 4 (2009): 104.

37. Kang Liu, Globalization and Cultural Trend in China (Honolulu: University ofHawaii Press, 2003), 129.

38. Yu Keping, “Good Governance and Legitimacy,” in Deng Zhenglai and SujianGuo, eds., China’s Search for Good Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011),15.

39. Dingxin Zhao,“The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Histori-cal and Contemporary China.” American Behavioral Scientist, 53, no. 3 (November2009): 416.

40. Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 BeijingStudent Movement (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001), Chapter 7.

188 Notes

41. Baogang Guo, “Political Legitimacy and China’s Transition Towards a Mar-ket Economy,” in Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu, eds., China’s Deep Reform:Domestic Politics in Transition (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,2006), 154.

42. Baogang Guo, “Political Legitimacy a China’s Transition,” Journal of ChinesePolitical Studies, 8, no. 1–2 (Fall 2003): 1–16.

43. Xiong Guangqing, “Zhongguo gongchandang chizheng hefaxing de zhuangbian:lishi, xianshi yu qianjing” [Transformation of the Origin of Political Legitimacyof the Chinese Communist Party: History, Reality and Prospect], http://www.aisixiang.com/data/39760.html, date accessed 1 August 2014.

44. Tong and Lei, Social Protest in Contemporary China, 12.45. Tong, “Morality, Benevolence, and Responsibility,” 145–46.46. Ibid., 146.47. Zheng Yongnian, Globalization and State Transformation in China (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2004), 41.48. Yuchao Zhu, “ ‘Performance Legitimacy’ and China’s Political Adaptation Strat-

egy,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 16 (February 2011): 136.49. Jiang Qing, Shengming xinyang yu wangdao zhengzhi [Faith About Life and the

Politics of the Kingly Way] (Taipei: Yangzhengtang Wenhua), 292.50. Jiang Qing, “From Mind Confucianism to Political Confucianism,” in Ruiping

Fan, ed., The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China (New York:Springer, 2011), 24.

51. Ruiping Fan, “Jiang Qing on Equality,” in Ruiping Fan, ed., The Renaissance ofConfucianism in Contemporary China (New York: Springer, 2011), 64.

52. Peter Sandby-Thomas, Legitimating the Chinese Communist Party since Tiananmen:A Critical Analysis of the Stability Discourse (London: Routledge, 2011), 7.

53. Yu Keping, “Good Governance and Legitimacy,” in Deng Zhenglai and SujianGuo, eds., China’s Search for Good Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan,2011), 6.

54. Huang Jingjing, “Democracy ‘in Progress,’ ” Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times],19 November 2011.

55. Mark Leonard, China 3.0: Understanding the New China, 16, http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/china_3.0, date accessed 1 August 2014.

56. Teng Biao, “Political Legitimacy and ‘Charter 08,’ ” http://www.hrichina.org/content/3791, date accessed 14 June 2014.

57. Liu Xiaobo, “Two Essays on China’s Quest for Democracy,” Journal of Democracy,22, no. 1 (January 2011): 154. Liu Xiaobo is an independent intellectual and thepresident of Independent Chinese PEN Center. He was sentenced to 11 years’imprisonment and two years’ deprivation of political rights on 25 December2009 in connection with his signing of Charter 08.

58. Jinghao Zhou, “Legitimacy without Democracy, Way of Transition Toward Super-power,” American Journal of Chinese Studies, 19, no. 1 (October 2012): 127.

59. Yang Fan, “Weiji yu fan weiji” [Crisis and Anti-Crisis], Zhanlue yu guanli [Strategiesand Management], no. 3 (1998): 36–55.

60. Wang Shaoguang, Minzhu sijiang [Four Lectures on Democracy] (Beijing:Shenghuo Dushu Xinzhi Press, 2008) and Leonard, China 3.0.

61. Emilie Frenkiel, “Political Change and Democracy in China, An Interview withWang Shaoguang,” http://www.laviedesidees.fr/spip.php?page=print&id_article=797, accessed 15 July 2009.

Notes 189

62. Cui Zhiyuan, “Liberal Socialism and the Future of China: A Petty BourgeoisieManifesto,” in Tian Yu Cao, ed., China’s Model for Modern Development (London:Routledge, 2005), 157–74.

63. For detailed discussion on this subject, Ma Licheng. Dangdai zhongguo bazhongshehui sichao [Contemporary Chinese Social Thought] (Beijing: Shehui KexueWenxian Publishing, 2012). 166–69.

64. Ibid., 161–75.65. Jiang Qing, “From Mind Confucianism to Political Confucianism,” 23.66. Jiang Qing, A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape

Its Political Future (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).67. David Ownby, “Kang Xiaoguang: Social Science, Civil Society, and Confucian

Religion,” China Perspectives, no. 4 (2009): 109.68. Ibid, 101–02.69. “Prof. Kang Rejects ‘Westernisation’, Advocates ‘Confucianisation,’ ” http://www.

franzbleeker.de/modern_society_kangxiaoguang_confucianism_001.html, dateaccessed 1 August 2014.

70. Ibid.71. Kang Xiaoguang, Renzheng: Zhongguo zhengzhi fazhan de disantiao daolu [Benevo-

lent Government: The Third Road to China’s Political Development] (Singapore:World Scientific, 2005), vii–xlix.

72. Ai Jiawen, “Two Sides of One Coin: The Party’s Attitude Toward Confucianismin Contemporary China,” The Journal of Contemporary China, 18, no. 61(2009): 701.

73. Zhuo Wenhua, “Dangdai zhongguo makesizhuyi xinyang weiji yu chongjianzhilu” [Marxism Belief Crisis and the Road of Reconstruction in ContemporaryChina], Journal of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications (SocialScience Edition), 23, no. 3 (2011): 16–20.

74. Dingxin Zhao, “China’s Prolonged Stability and Political Future: Same PoliticalSystem, Different Policies and Methods,” Journal of Contemporary China, 10, no. 28(August 2001): 440.

75. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Disruption without Disintegration,” Journal of Democracy,9, no. 1 (January–March 1998): 5.

76. Adam Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy,” inGuillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, ed., Transi-tions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1986), 52.

77. Bruce Gilley, “The Beginning of the End,” Wall Street Journal (8 June 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121252350348242359, date accessed 19 December 2014.

78. For detail, see Sébastien Billioud Confucianism, “ ‘Cultural Tradition’ and OfficialDiscourses in China at the Start of the New Century,” China Perspectives, no. 3(2007): 50–65.

79. Jinghan Zeng, “The Debate on Regime Legitimacy in China: Bridging the WideGulf between Western and Chinese Scholarship,” Journal of Contemporary China,23, no. 88 (2014): 616.

9 Conclusion: Fragmentation and Consensus

1. Keith Bradsher, “Next Made-in-China Boom: College Graduates,” New York Times,16 January 2013, A1.

190 Notes

2. Timothy Cheek, “The End of Intellectuals: 60 Years of Service, Subversion, andSelling in China,” in William C. Kirby, ed., The People’s Republic of China at 60:An International Assessment (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011),349.

3. “Liu Yazhou shangjiang tan qingzhengfu weihe baigei ribenren” [General LiuYazhou on Why the Qing Court Was Defeated by Japan], http://www.aisixiang.com/data/73989.html, date accessed 15 April 2014.

4. Wenfang Tang, “Party Intellectuals’ Demand for Reform in ContemporaryChina,” Hoover Essays in Public Policy, no. 97 (Stanford: Hoover Institution,Stanford University, 1999), 32.

5. Bhaskar Roy, “Mao Is Dead, Long Live Mao,” http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1433, date accessed on 4 October 2014.

6. Liu Kang, “Dinner Party of Discourse Owners: China’s Intellectual Scene Today,”The Minnesota Review, no. 79 (2012): 113.

7. Xiaoqin Guo, State and Society in China’s Democratic Transition: Confucianism,Leninism, and Economic Development (New York: Routledge, 2003), 67.

8. Shiping Hua, “All Roads Lead to Democracy,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars,24, no. 1 (January–March 1992): 44.

9. Gang Guo, “Party Recruitment of College Students in China,” Journal of Contem-porary China, 14, no. 43 (May 2005), 371.

10. Dominik Mierzejewski, “ ‘Not to Oppose But to Rethink’: The New Left Discourseon the Chinese Reforms,” Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia, 8, no. 1 (2009): 26.

11. Yang Fan, et al, “Xianzheng nengfou chengwei xinde gaige gongshi?” [CanDemocratic Constitutionalism Become New Consensus for New Reform?], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2013041981695.html, date accessed16 April 2013.

12. The number of registered social groups in China reached nearly 425,000 in 2009,according to a latest bulletin released by Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs. Quotedin Zuo Likun, “425,000 Social Groups Registered in China,” China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-02/03/content_9423772.htm, date accessed3 February 2010.

13. Citied in Timothy Cheek, “The Worlds of China’s Intellectuals,” in Lionel Jensenand Timothy Weston, eds., China in and beyond the Headlines (Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield, 2012), 159.

14. Rong Jian, “Meiyou sixiang de zhongguo” [An Unthinking China], http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2013032679928.html, date accessed1 August 2014.

15. Tian is one of the oldest Chinese terms for the cosmos. Tu Wei-ming, “ChineseIntellectuals Once Represent Heaven (tian), But Now They Are Facing ConsensusCrisis,” http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxwh/shsc/article_2013061785672.html,date accessed 17 June 2013.

16. Huang Jingjing, “Democracy ‘in Progress,’ ” Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times],19 November 2011, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/686345.shtml, dateaccessed 18 December 2014.

17. Kalpana Misra, “Globalization Revisited: Evolving Chinese Discourses on theOpen Door Policy and Integration with the World Economy,” in Chandra Chari,ed., Superpower Rivalry and Conflict: The Long Shadow of the Cold War on theTwenty-first Century (London: Routledge, 2010), 124.

18. Wang Huning, a former professor at Fudan University, serves as a memberof Politburo and Director of the Policy Research Office of the CCP CentralCommittee.

Notes 191

19. Joseph Fewsmith, “Debating Constitutional Government,” China Leadership Mon-itor, no. 42 (October 2013), 7.

20. Yingjie Guo, “Discourse of Justice and Class: Impact of China’s Intellectual Eliteson Social Policy,” in Xiaowei Zang and Chien-wen Kou, eds., Elites and Governancein China (London: Routledge, 2013), 28.

21. Robert Lawrence Kuhn, How China’s Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China’s Past,Current and Future Leaders (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 451.

22. Ibid, 22.23. Joseph Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2013), 17.

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Index of Chinese Names and Phrases

08 Xianzhang 08 , 16, 27

badao , 87Bai Tongdong , 90baoshoupai , 7baoshou zhuyi , 43Bo Xilai , 57–9

Cai Renhou , 79Cao Siyuan , 63, 65cha’e xuanju , 147Chan Joseph , 90Chan Koonchung , 42Chang Tung-sun , 97Chen Duxiu , 62Chen Ming , 41Chen Kuiyuan , 55Chen Wei Gang , 55Chen Yun , 37Cheng Enfu , 91Chiang Kai-shek , 36, 43, 68, 90Confucius , 2, 3, 29, 80–1, 86, 88, 92Cui Zhiyuan , 46, 52–3, 58, 99, 123,

129, 142cuozhi jutigan de miuwu , 49

dailudang , 109daminzhu , 41, 43, 52, 99, 112–13dangji minzhu , 101dangnei minzhu , 100danwei , 18, 28, 162ndao , 83daotong , 79datong , 62, 83dagong wusi , 83Deng Liqun , 37Deng Xiaoping , 1, 8, 17, 23, 35, 42,

45, 47, 49–50, 64–5, 74, 81, 89, 99,100, 110, 115, 116–17, 132, 134, 153

dezhi , 80dezheng , 86Dushu , 46, 128–9

Ershiyi shiji , 19, 128

Fan Gang , 119Fan Zhongyan, , 3Fang Keli , 82, 83Fang Ning , 104fang , 153–4fanpu , 80fansi , 51fazhan caishi yingdaoli , 25fazhi , 103–4Feng Chongyi , 18, 25

Gan Yang , 43, 46, 89, 90, 119Gao Fang , 75, 101Gao Hua , 53Gao Quanxi , 85gemingdang , 158geren zhuyi , 27Gong tian xia , 42Gong Xiantian , 125Gong Yuzhi , 50Gonggong luncong , 43, 128Gongshiwang , 6Gongyang , 86–7, 144guihua , 78Guo Baogang , 137guojiao , 91guojin mintui , 58guojin minyejin , 58Guomindang , 3, 43, 68–9, 97guoqing , 100, 152Guoti Yuan , 144guoxue re , 79guoxue , 80

haigui , 116Han Deqiang , 121Han Yuhai , 52, 121He Fang , 67He shang , 7He Xin , 35–6, 38hefaxing , 133hexie , 80houxue , 48Hu Angang , 56, 111–12, 118

201

202 Index of Chinese Names and Phrases

Hu Jintao , 24, 40, 75, 83, 102–4,126, 130, 135–6

Hu Jiwei , 36Hu Qiaomu , 37Hu Qili , 23Hu Shaohua , 41, 92Hu Shih , 3, 97Hu Shuli , 53Hu Yaobang, , 23Huang Ping , 128

Jiang Kanghu , 62Jiang Qing , 10, 86–7, 90–2, 139,

144–6Jiang Zemin , 24, 40, 83, 103, 126jianli hexie shehui , 103jiaqiang shehuizhuyi minzhu he fazhi

, 103jihua , 78jiudangpai , 76

Kang Xiaoguang , 10, 45, 88–90, 92,136, 145–6

Kang Youwei , 97Lang Xianping , 123, 124

Li Fan , 25Li Junru , 99, 105Li Rui , 63, 65, 66Li Shenzhi , 21, 22, 99, 106–7, 109,

116, 119Li Xiguang , 58Li Zehou , 22, 44, 68, 85, 155Liang Qichao , 16, 97liangtouzhen , 63limin , 137Lin Yifu (Justin Lin) , 126Liu Junning , 19, 20–1, 41, 43, 85,

99, 106, 116, 118Liu Xiaobo , 141, 152Liu Yazhou , 151Liu , 44, 68, 155

Ma Lichen , 66Mao Yushi , 50, 99Mao Zedong , 4, 36, 39, 49, 51–2,

57, 62, 65, 83, 89, 110, 113, 134,147, 156

minben , 80, 91minben sixiang , 83

ming buzheng, ze yanbushun, yanbushun,ze shibucheng ,

, 2minzhu shehui zhuyi , 61Mou Zongsan , 79

Nanfang Dushibao , 19Nanfang Zhoumo , 19, 128Na Er, , 127, 184nnanxun , 17

Pan Wei , 56, 58, 72, 111–12

Qian Xun , 97Qin Hui , 18, 20, 63, 70–1, 93, 106,

116Qin Xiaoying , 36Qing (dynasty) , 20, 68, 104, 144, 151Qiu Feng (Yao Zhongqiu) , 84quanqiu jiazhi , 22, 108qunzhong yundong , 41, 43

Ren Jiantao , 49renmin minzhu xianzheng , 108renmin minzhu zhuanzheng ,

108renmin minzhu , 101Renmin Ribao , 26, 36, 49, 72renzheng , 86, 145Rong Jian , 155rujia shehuizhuyi gongheguo

, 90ruoshi qunti , 117ruxue , 81, 82

sanmin zhuyi , 62sannong , 129sanxin weiji , 51shehui minzhu zhuyi , 61shehui minzhu , 101shetuan , 154shi , 3, 5Shi Tianjian , 97shou , 153–4shui ke zaizhou, yike fuzhou ,

154Shumin Yuan , 144sichao , 1sixiang , 2sixiang jiefang , 7

Index of Chinese Names and Phrases 203

Su Shaozhi , 104Sun Yat-sen , 36, 61, 97, 156

taizidang , 38Tang Liang , 41tian , 155, 190ntianming , 137tianxia , 93tianxia weigong , 62Tianya , 128tizhinei , 18tizhiwai , 18Tong Yanqi , 138tongluren , 4Tongru Yuan , 144Tu Wei-ming (Du Weiming) , 9, 93,

155

Utopia , 46, 59, 71, 129

Wang Changjiang , 135Wang Hui , 46, 48, 50, 59, 92, 99,

118, 121, 123, 127–8, 130Wang Huning , 31, 34–5, 40, 157Wang Shaoguang , 46, 54, 58,

111–12, 118, 134, 142wangdao , 82, 86–8, 139, 144–6Wen Jiabao , 23–5, 53, 74–5, 118,

130wending , 135wenhua re , 19Wu Guanjun , 3Wu Jiaxiang , 31, 34, 42wumaodang , 109wuwei , 139

Xi Jinping , 31, 40, 42, 83, 135, 152,157

xian tianxiazhi you eryou, hou tianxiazhi leerle , , 3

xianzheng , 65, 108Xiao Gongqin , 31, 34–5, 37, 38–44xiaokang , 74, 80Xie Tao , 63–6, 68, 79, 71–2, 74, 76xieshang minzhu , 104–5xieshang , 104Xie Yue , 110Xin Zilin , 67, 76xin baoshou zhuyi , 38xin quanwei zhuyi , 38

xinrujia , 80xinruxue , 80xinshenghuo yundong , 90xinxing ruxue , 86xin zuopai , 46, 115xinzuoyi , 46Xiong Guangqing , 138xiti zhongyong , 85Xu Ben , 27Xu Jilin , 46, 71, 154Xu Youyu , 20, 71, 73, 81, 85, 116xue er you ze shi , 3xuetong , 79

Yan Fu , 16Yang Fan , 121Yanhuang Chunqiu , 62, 64, 71, 128yiren weiben , 24yijieji douzheng weigang , 25yican, ergai, sanjiehe , , , 52, 53yifa zhiguo yu yide zhiguo xiangjiehe

, 103yifa zhiguo, jianli shehuizhuyi fazhi guojia

, 103yijieji douzheng weigang , 25yiyanyixingbang, yiyanyisangbang

, , 150Yao Yang , 109Yao Zhongqiu , 84Yu Haocheng , 36Yu Jianrong , 135Yu Keping , 44, 97, 99, 101–2,

133–4, 137Yuan Shikai , 36, 62Yuandao , 79, 174nyushi jujin , 74, 148

zaixiang , 3zaofan youli , 52Zhang Bingjiu , 31Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang) , 97Zhang Musheng , 9Zhang Qianfan , 107Zhang Qiang , 32Zhang Weiwei , 42, 56–7, 110Zhang Weiying , 124Zhang Xiaojin , 40Zhang Xudong , 43Zhao Dingxin , 137Zhao Suisheng , 75

204 Index of Chinese Names and Phrases

Zhao Ziyang , 23, 34–5, 37–8Zheng Yongnian , 26, 44, 70, 75,

113, 122, 135, 139zhengdangxing , 133zhengdao , 143zhengtong , 79zhidao , 143zhishifenzi , 5, 6zhizheng nengli , 139zhizhengdang , 158Zhongguo guojia shehui dang ,

62Zhongguo minzhu shehui dang

, 62

zhongguomeng , 83

zhongxue weiti xixue weiyong, 85

zhongyong , 85

Zhou Lian , 26, 90

Zhou Qiren , 119

Zhu Muzhi, , 23

Zhu Rongji , 23, 24, 119–20

Zhu Xueqin , 15, 26, 106, 116, 119

Zhu Yuzhao , 139

ziyoupai , 16

ziyouzhuyi , 15

Subject and Name Index

Asian financial crisis, 26, 47, 117authoritarianism, 26, 32–3, 89

Bell, Daniel A, 6Bo Xilai, 57, 58–9Burke, Edmund, 39, 43

Cai Renhou, 79Cao Siyuan, 63, 65, 171nCCP (Chinese Communist Party), 2, 6,

8–9, 11, 17–18, 21, 24–5, 27, 33–4,36–40, 44–5, 49, 51, 53, 62–3, 65–6,69, 72, 75–6, 79–80, 82–3, 90–2,99–101, 103–5, 107, 110, 113, 116,119, 122–3, 134–6, 138, 140–3,145–8, 152–4, 156, 158

censorship, 4, 9, 27, 29, 74, 98,117, 128

Central Compilation and TranslationBureau, 105

Central Party School, 101, 105, 135Chan Koonchung, 42Charter 08, 16, 19, 27Chen Duxiu, 62Chen Kuiyuan, 55, 73Chen Ming, 41Chen Weigang, 55Chen Yun, 37Cheng Enfu, 91Chiang Kai-shek, 36, 43, 90China Dream, 83, 148China Model, 47, 56–8Chinese People’s Political Consultative

Conference, 103, 105Chongqing Model, 57–9civil society, 18, 28–9, 42, 44, 88, 111,

116, 129, 152class struggle, 6, 25, 45, 66, 74, 76,

92, 112cold war, 55, 56Communist revolution, 63, 151Confucian liberalism, 84Confucian Marxism, 82

Confucianism, 8, 10, 11, 79, 90–3revival of, 11, 80–1, 88, 93, 144see also liberal Confucianists; New

Confucianism; politicalConfucianism

Confucius, 2, 3, 29, 80, 81, 86, 88, 92conservatism, 7, 41, 43corporatism, 89, 146corruption, 3, 20, 22, 28, 41, 45, 49,

51–3, 55, 59, 65, 71, 108–9, 112,115, 118, 122, 125, 135, 137–8,141–3, 147–8, 155–6

Cui Zhiyuan, 46, 52–3, 58, 99, 123, 129,142

Cultural Revolution, 4, 6, 17, 21, 36,38–9, 41, 49, 51–3, 59, 71, 82, 99,133–4, 141–2, 150, 156

Davies, Gloria, 2deliberative democracy, 99, 101, 104–5democracy with Chinese characteristics,

39, 98–101, 106democracy trap, 142, 143democratic socialism, 6, 9–10, 60–8, 90,

151, 155, 158Deng Liqun, 37Deng Xiaoping, 1, 8, 17, 23, 35, 42, 45,

47, 49, 50, 64, 65, 74, 81, 89, 99,100, 110, 115–17, 132, 134, 153

Doctrine of the Mean (zhongyong), 85Dushu (magazine), 46, 128, 129

economic reform, 2, 5, 7–9, 11, 20–1, 23,28, 34, 37, 42–4, 49, 68, 74, 81, 97,106–8, 110, 115–32, 147, 150, 155,158

election, 7, 16, 21, 25, 28, 32, 41, 53, 61,66, 69, 74, 77, 84, 88–9, 98–102,106–7, 110–11, 113, 138, 140–2,144, 147–8

electocracy, 142electoral democracy, 102, 105, 107, 110,

140–2Engels, Friedrich, 9, 60, 65–7, 76Ershiyi shiji (magazine), 19, 128

205

206 Subject and Name Index

faith crisis, 146Fan Gang, 119Fang Keli, 82, 83Fang Ning, 104Feng Chongyi, 18, 25Fewsmith, Joseph, 46, 50, 157Four Cardinal Principles, 17, 83,

151, 154Fukuyama, Francis, 91, 155

Gan Yang, 43, 46, 89, 90, 119Gao Fang, 75, 101Gao Hua, 53Gao Quanxi, 85global financial crisis, 26, 40, 54, 55, 56,

72, 77, 113globalization, 2, 4, 11, 18, 19, 22, 28, 30,

47–8, 54–5, 59, 108, 111–12, 115,117, 119–22, 125, 127, 143, 150,156–7

Goldman Merle, 1Gong Xiantian, 125Gong Yuzhi, 50Gonggong luncong (magazine), 43, 128good governance, 99, 101–3, 105,

110, 139definition of, 102

governing capacity, 135, 139grand democracy, 41, 43, 99, 112,

140, 148definition of, 52

Guo Baogang, 137Guomindang, 3, 43, 68–9, 97

Habermas, Jürgen, 122Han Deqiang, 121Han Yuhai, 52, 121harmonious society, 25, 71, 73–75, 83,

90, 103, 113, 125–6, 130, 148, 173nHayek, Frederick, 17, 19–20, 22–4, 29,

84–5, 116–18, 122He Xin, 35, 36, 38Hu Angang, 56, 111–12, 118Hu Jintao, 24, 40, 75, 83, 102–4, 126,

130, 135–6Hu Jiwei, 36Hu Qiaomu, 37Hu Shih, 3, 97Hu Shuli, 53

human rights, 16–17, 20–5, 30, 32, 55–6,78, 84, 92, 103, 106–7, 110, 112,117–18, 121

Huntington, Samuel, 32–3, 39, 91, 135–6

ideology, 1–6, 8, 11–12, 16–17, 24, 26–7,30–1, 35, 37–40, 45, 50, 61, 63–4,73–5, 80, 82–3, 85, 87, 90, 104, 106,110, 115–16, 122, 132, 134, 136–9,141–2, 146–8, 151, 153–5, 158

income inequality, 122, 125, 130, 151individualism, 16–17, 20, 22, 27, 85,

109, 117, 145inner-party democracy, 147–8intellectual discourse, 1–3, 5–7, 9, 17, 38,

64, 97, 127, 131, 150–1, 153, 156–7definition of, 3

intellectuals, 1–12, 15–19, 21, 23–7, 31,35–6, 38–41, 43, 46–9, 51, 58–9, 62,67, 69, 73, 75, 81, 84, 86–8, 91–2,97, 100–1, 109, 113, 114, 116, 118,120, 122, 126, 131, 133–5, 140–1,146, 148, 150–9

definition of, 6Internet, 4, 17, 19, 29, 79, 109, 125,

128–9, 131, 157

Jiang Kanghu, 62Jiang Qing, 10, 86, 87, 90–2, 139, 144–6Jiang Zemin, 24, 40, 83, 103, 126

Kang Xiaoguang, 10, 45, 88, 90, 92, 136,145–6

Kang Youwei, 96keep up with the times, 74, 154Kelly, David, 3, 38

Lang Xianping (Larry Lang), 123, 124legitimacy, 9, 11–12, 21, 32, 35, 40, 69,

82–3, 86, 88–9, 101–2, 118, 122–3,132, 133–49, 150, 152, 158

legitimacy crisis, 134, 139–41, 146, 148source of, 136, 139, 144, 147

Leninism, 33, 83, 87, 113Li Fan, 25Li Junru, 99, 105Li Rui, 63, 65, 66Li Shenzhi, 2, 99, 106–7, 109, 116, 119Li Xiguang, 58Li Zehou, 22, 44, 68, 85, 155

Subject and Name Index 207

Liang Qichao, 16, 97liberal Confucianists, 80liberal democracy, 17–18, 23, 30–2, 34,

39, 45, 47, 54, 57, 81, 84, 88–9, 91,94, 97–8, 100–2, 106–7, 109–10,113, 139–40, 142, 144–5, 152, 157

definition of, 15liberal intellectuals, 16–18, 21, 25, 64,

120, 148liberalism, 3, 6–10, 37, 40, 43, 47, 59,

70–1, 73, 77, 81–2, 85, 99–100, 106,108, 115–17, 119, 123, 143, 150,152, 157

definition of, 15see also neoliberalism

Lin Yifu (Justin Yifu Lin), 126Liu Junning, 19, 20, 21, 41, 43, 85, 99,

106, 116, 118, 182nLiu Xiaobo, 141, 152Liu Yazhou, 151Liu Zaifu, 44, 68, 155

MacFarquhar, Roderick, 80Ma Lichen, 66Ma Shu Yun, 33mandate of heaven, 93, 137–9, 148Mao Yushi, 50, 99Mao Zedong, 4, 36, 39, 49, 51–2, 57, 62,

65, 83, 89, 110, 113, 134, 147, 156Maoism, 6, 10–11, 16, 47, 49–50, 53, 55,

59, 62, 99, 127, 143, 158Market-Leninism, 8, 26market-oriented reform, 5, 10–11, 15, 26,

28, 30, 47–8, 51, 55, 59, 72, 89, 102,109, 115, 123, 127, 141, 151, 155,157–8

market reform, 2, 8, 10–11, 46–7, 51, 59,73, 110, 116–18, 122, 125, 143, 151

Marx, Karl, 9, 41, 61, 66–7, 76, 78,119, 150

Marxism, 157, 158Marxist Confucians, 80May Fourth Movement, 21, 47, 79Meiji Restoration, 151meritocracy, 39, 81–2, 86, 90, 98middle class, 18, 28, 30, 34, 42, 47, 74,

113, 119, 121, 126, 147, 150Moody, Peter, 132, 136Mou Zongsan, 79

Nathan, Andrew, 40, 103national conditions, 40, 56, 73, 100–11,

141, 152National People’s Congress (NPC), 24,

123, 126, 131nationalism, 6, 11, 16, 22, 37, 46, 57, 59,

81, 117, 119–22, 126, 134, 136, 139,148, 158

neo-authoritarianism, 7, 9–11, 31–45,151, 155

neo-authoritarianism 2.0, 40–2neo–conservatism, 8, 10–11, 31, 37–40,

43–5neoliberalism, 59, 73, 125, 128, 182nNew Confucianism, 9–11, 45, 79–96, 155

definition of, 79New Left, 8–11, 22, 26, 41–3, 46–59,

70–8, 89, 92, 98–100, 109–11,115–16, 118–32, 140–3, 148, 151,154–5

new leftism, 8–10, 59, 76, 89, 98–100,110, 115–32, 155

Old Left, 37, 46, 48, 57, 71, 168none-party democracy, 99, 101open door policy, 50, 65, 74, 107, 156

Pan Wei, 56, 58, 72, 111–12party-state, 2, 11, 17–18, 24–5, 39, 45,

53, 72–3, 93, 102–3, 122, 128, 135,140, 147–8, 150, 153–4, 157

People’s Daily, 66, 72, 111Perry, Elizabeth, 133political Confucianism, 10–11, 86–90,

92, 140, 143–4political reform, 5, 10–11, 16–17, 19–21,

23, 30, 38, 42, 44, 53, 58, 65–6, 68,73–4, 76, 81, 88, 97, 99–105,107–14, 121, 142, 148, 152–3, 155–6

populism, 46, 59, 126, 140, 142–3post-isms, 48postmodernism, 10, 46public intellectual, 19, 86, 127, 153–4,

156putting the people first, 24–5, 75, 80, 83,

137, 148

Qian Xun, 97Qin Hui, 18, 20, 63, 71, 93, 106, 116Qin Xiaoying, 36

208 Subject and Name Index

Qing (dynasty), 20, 68, 104, 144, 151Qiu Feng (Yao Zhongqiu), 84

Ren Jiantao, 49returned students, 29, 116River Elegy, 7Rong Jian, 155rule of law, 15, 21, 23–5, 32–3, 44–5, 47,

57, 65, 75, 78, 84–5, 99, 102–3, 106,108, 112–23, 116–17, 137, 139, 141,143, 147–8

rule by law, 21, 36, 99, 101, 103–4, 108

scientific development, 25, 75Selden, Mark, 133social democracy

definition of, 61see also democratic socialism

social justice, 11, 16, 26, 41, 44, 46, 52,58, 61–2, 68–9, 75–6, 87–8, 112,122–3, 126–7, 131, 159

socialism with Chinese characteristics, 6,41, 45, 73–4, 80, 100, 134, 136, 148

southern tour, 17, 23, 117state capacity, 54, 111, 118, 142–3state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 23, 75,

120, 123statism, 6, 46, 59Su Shaozhi, 104Sullivan, Michael, 39Sun Yat-sen, 36, 61, 97, 156Swedish Model, 63, 65, 69–70, 75

Tiananmen, 5, 7–8, 11, 17–18, 35, 37–8,68, 92, 116, 129, 139, 147

Tu Wei-ming (Du Weiming), 9, 93, 155

universal values, 22, 24, 36, 55–6, 103,108, 112, 152

Wang Changjiang, 135Wang Hui, 46, 48, 50, 59, 92, 99, 118,

121, 123, 127–8, 130Wang Huning, 31, 34–5, 40, 157Wang Shaoguang, 46, 54, 58, 111–12,

118, 134, 142Washington Consensus, 123Wen Jiabao, 23–5, 53, 74–5, 118, 130

Womack, Brantly, 2World Trade Organization (WTO), 4, 24,

119–21, 128, 156Wu Guanjun, 3Wu Jiaxiang, 31, 34, 42

Xi Jinping, 31, 40, 42, 83, 135, 152, 157Xiao Gongqin, 31, 34–5, 37–9, 40–4Xie Tao, 63–6, 68, 71–2, 74, 76, 79Xie Yue, 110Xin Zilin, 67, 76Xiong Guangqing, 138Xu Ben, 27Xu Jilin, 46, 71, 154Xu Youyu, 20, 71, 73, 81, 85, 116

Yan Fu, 16Yang Fan, 121Yanhuang Chunqiu (magazine), 63, 64,

71, 128, 171nYao Yang, 109Yao Zhongqiu, 84Yu Haocheng, 36Yu Jianrong, 135Yu Keping, 44, 97, 99, 101–2, 133–4, 137Yuan Shikai, 36, 62Yuandao (magazine), 79, 174n

Zhang Bingjiu, 31Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang), 97Zhang Musheng, 9Zhang Qianfan, 107Zhang Qiang, 32Zhang Weiwei, 42, 56, 57, 110Zhang Weiying, 124Zhang Xiaojin, 40Zhang Xudong, 43Zhao Dingxin, 137Zhao Suisheng, 75Zhao Ziyang, 23, 34–5, 37–8Zheng Yongnian, 26, 44, 70, 75, 113,

122, 135, 139Zhou Lian, 26, 90Zhou Qiren, 119Zhu Muzhi, 23Zhu Rongji, 23, 24, 119–20Zhu Xueqin, 15, 26, 106, 116, 119