PoliticsintheTwentiethCenturybyAdrianRutt

Itisclearthatthetwentiethcenturywasdisastrous.Somethingmusthavecausedthe

ongoingconflicts,death,anddestructionsocharacteristicoftheearlycentury.Attheturnofthe

centurytherewasaconfidencefeltwiththeadvancesmadeinscience,technology,andideas

nationswereforcedtoshedtheireighteenthcenturyisolationistattitudesandwelcomethese

changes.However,thepromisingcenturymadeaturnfortheworse:twomassivelydestructive

worldwarsforcedpeopletoreanalyzetheirconfidenceinmodernization.

Somethingwaswrongwithmodernity,andweoweittofigureslikeHannahArendt,

AlasdairMacIntyre,andMichaelOakeshottfornotonlydiagnosingsomeoftheproblemsbut

offeringsolutionstosomeoftheproblemsthatmaterializedinthetwentiethcentury.However,

eachphilosopherapproachedtheirsituationdifferentlywhichinturnclarifiedwhatitwasthey

believedtobewrongaboutmodernsociety.HannahArendtwasoneofthefirstpoliticalthinkers

toaddressthetotalitarianismandmassmovementsofhertimewiththelandmarkbookThe

OriginsofTotalitarianismpublishedin1951.

Arendtrealizedthatalthoughmansabilitytothinkwasanecessaryandgoodthing,a

particularuseoforemphasisonreasonhadthepotentialtoleadtoamultitudeofproblems.The

Enlightenmentsfocusonapurerationalandlogicalmannerofthinkingledmentobelievethat

thesenewadvancesinscienceallowedmantoknowmoreabouthimselfthatwasmuddledby

experienceorthesenses.Sheclaimedthatmanrealizedhisnewlywonfreedomfromthe

shacklesofearthboundexperienceinsteadofobservingnaturalphenomenaastheyweregiven

tohim,heplacednatureundertheconditionsofhisownmind,thatis,underconditionswon

froma..cosmicstandpointoutsidenatureitself.HereArendtassertsthatmanhasfreedhimself

fromtheempiricallensbywhichhepreviouslylookedattheworldandattemptedtoshifthis

perspectivetosomepointoutsideofnature.Inshort,manisnolongeracreaturelookingoutinto

theworld,butisnowoutsideoftheworldattemptingtolookin.TheproblemforArendtisthat

thoughtsaboutsteppingoutsideofmanscontextwillalwaysbecoloredwiththeindividual

biases,prejudices,andcontextsofthatparticularindividualsthoughtssotherewillalwaysbean

inabilitytostepoutsideofourpersonalhistoriesandcircumstancesandviewourselvesfromthat

outsidepointofview.FromthisideastemstheassertionthatArendtbelievedtobecomea

massivemisstepinhumanthought:mansthinkingthattheycanviewthemselvesfroma

completelyobjectivepointofview.

ThisArchimedeanpointthatArendtreferstohelpsexplainmansattempttouniversalize

lawsofnature,andthussomeoftheproblemsdoingsocreates.Sincemanisconstantlytryingto

stepoutsidethemselvesinanefforttodescribeandobservenaturefromacompletelyobjective

viewpoint,theyareunawarethattheyareactuallyprojectingtheirownthoughtsuponthis

Archimedeanpointfromwhichtoobservenature.Shethinksthatthisprojectisnotonlybound

tofailbutwillbeusedbythosewhothinktheyhavetheobjectiveviewofhumanityfor

disastrousresults.Again,thispresentsenormousproblemsforArendt,anditisuponthisidea

whichshecentersmanyofhercriticismsofmodernsociety.Sincemanwassocaughtupin

tryingtostepoutsideourselvestoviewourselvesobjectivelymanalsolosttouchwithhimselfin

theprocess.LosingtouchforArendtwashavingthearrogancetobelievethatmancouldfigure

outthepuzzlethatwashimself,wheninrealitymanisntaproblemtobesolvedbutacondition

inwhichwelive.Attemptingtostepoutsideourselvesisusefulforcertaintypesofthinking,but

itcannotbetheonlyprocessbywhichtointroducenewideasorview,anditcertainlyisnta

justificationforthem.Itisanincompleteprocessoneofmanyprocessesbywhichto

discovermoreaboutourselves.Arendtspositioncanbesummedupassuch:humansthemselves

canneverbecompletelyobjectiveaboutthemselvesorhumanity.

HannahArendtwitnessedthedawnoffascistandcommunistgovernmentsinthe

twentiethcenturyandsoughtanswerstowhytheseobviouslycorruptformsofgovernmentwere

forming,gainingpopularity,andsucceeding.Sheplacespartoftheblameontheintellectual

changethattookplaceinthemidnineteenthcentury,thatis,theideawecangetsomeobjective

grasponourselvesorabouttheworldinwhichwelive.Thischangematerializedinitiallywith

theinventionofthetelescopebyGalileo,whichArendtsaidtobethebeginningofthisscientific

enterprisetheviewingofourselvesfromsomewheremaybespacetolookdownonus.

Thescientificenterprisereacheditsclimaxintheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturieswhichsaw

theinventionanddiscoveryofmorescienceanddiscoverythananyothercenturysince.

However,evenafterallofthesediscoveries,Arendtbelieved,manwasneversatisfiedbutrather

refusedtoacceptanythingasconcrete.Manbelievedeverythingtobemerelyastepinamuch

largerprojectandwhatwasneededwasmoreinformationandscientificdiscovery.Withthehelp

ofscientificprinciplesmanstartedtoquestioneveryinstitutionandideainsearchofuniversal

lawsthatcouldbeprovedandappliedtoallofhumanity,andfromthissearchcametheriseof

totalitariangovernments.Thesetotalitarianrulersandideologiesreplacedexperientialliving

insteadoflivingwithexperienceasaguide,ideologiescreatedallencompassingworldviewsand

narrativesthatservedasinfallibleguidelinesforliving(e.g.ideasliketheinferiorityofother

ethnicitiesortheinherentwrongnessofthisorthatreligion).ThisiswhereArendtbelieves

scienceandtotalitariangovernmentsareintertwined:thethoughtthatmancouldbeexplained

objectivelyinscientifictermsledtotheideathatallthatwasneedwasaplanorguidefor

humanitytofollowittookthefocusfromindividualthinkingandputitinthehandsoftheselect

fewwhoownedtheseplans.

ForArendtthen,totalitarianismdiminishesaction.Actionisthemostimportantaspectof

man,anditwasalsothemostimportantpartofamanslifeinancientGreece.Theriseofcruel

andoppressivegovernments,sheargued,wasinpartduetomansneglectofactionandthe

increasingdesiretoconformandbecomfortableinthefaceofoverwhelmingcomplexity

broughtaboutbymonstrousleapsinscientificdiscovery.Atthemomentmanstartedtocraved

individualismandpursuitofpersonalgain,hewasalsooverwhelmedandconfusedbythenew

complexityandchaosthesituationpresentedthisconfusiondrovepeopleintocomforting

ideologiesandpartiesinwhichtheybecameanonthinkingmembers.Theseideologiesisms

whichtothesatisfactionoftheiradherentscanexplaineverythingandeveryoccurrenceby

deducingitfromasinglepremisecalmedthechaoticconfusingworldforpeople.

Incontrast,thepublicsphereinGreeklifewasaplacewheremancoulddistinguish

himselffromothersbyhisactionsandindividuality.Modernity,however,moldedlifetobecome

almostexclusivelyintrospectiveandthusvaluethepursuitofpersonalgainoverthegainofthe

community.Manhadsacrificedtheideaofthecommunityattheexpenseofindividualismand

pursuingonesownends:thefocuswasonthefamily,wealth,andpersonalenrichmentinstead

ofanactivelifeinthecommunityworkingtowardaparticulargoal.InAncientGreece,freedom

andindividualityinthepublicspheremeanttakingaction.Itwastakingpartinthedaily

arrangementsofsocietythatdefinedthecitizenandhisfreedom.Action,theonlyactivitythat

goesondirectlybetweenmenwithouttheintermediaryofthingsormatter,correspondstothe

humanconditionofplurality..thispluralityisspecificallytheconditionnotonlytheconditio

sinequanon,buttheconditioperquamofallpoliticallife.HereArendtassertsthatgenuine

individualityonlyexistsinsofarasthecommunitydoes:thesocialandtheindividualare

inextricablybound.Withouttheabilitytodistinguishonesselfwithinthecommunity,we

becomemereanimalslaboringandreproducingbydisavowingthecommunityandseeing

freedomasthefreedomtonotact,wearenolongerhuman.Thetwentiethepitomizedthis

divisionbetweentheindividualandthesocial.

AlthoughArendtseparatedlifeintothreeparts:labor,work,andaction,itisclearthat

actionwasthetraitthatshebelieveddistinguishedusfromanimalsandthusthemostimportant.

Actioninvolvedbothfreedomandplurality.Byfreedomshemeantthathumanshadtheability

tostartsomethingnew,createnewideas,orcritiqueolderideastomakethembetterorrelevant

againwithinthecommunity.Freedomwasnotthefreedomtowithdrawfromthecommunityit

hadnodefinitionwithintheprivaterealm.Thesecondpartwasplurality,andwithoutplurality

theideathattherearemanydifferentviewsandcompetingperspectivesfreedommeant

nothing.Ifhumansdonothaveastageinwhichtopresentthesedifferentideastobecritiqued

andtocritiqueothers,freedombecomestransformedintoselfishnessandpersonalpursuits.The

differencebetweenancientfreedomandmodernfreedomforArendtisthattheancientsviewed

freedomastakingactioninthepublicsphere,makingdecisions,andimmortalizingonesself

amongpeerscreatingsomethingnewornoteworthy.Themodernideaoffreedom,however,is

choosingwhetherornottoparticipateinthepoliticalarenanotparticipatingmeantfollowing

onesownindividualpathwithoutthehindranceofthecommunityasawhole.Thisiswhere

Arendtsawnonparticipationinpoliticsleadtomassmovementsofsecurityseekingpeople

unitedundertheideologyandideasofasingle,idiosyncraticleaderorregime.Sincethe

communitywasdissolvedinfavoroftheprivate,peoplewholackedanysignificantrelationships

feltlonely,and,unitedunderoneideaorpremise,thisispreciselywhereideologicalthinking

takesitsfoothold.ForArendt,theindividualismthattookoverinthetwentiethcentury,

combinedwithideologiesthatmadelifesensicaltoremovedcitizens,couldonlyleadto

totalitarianism.

Arendtalsodefineddistinctionandindividualismdifferentlyandbothledto

extremelydifferentoutcomes.Sheclaimedthatdistinctionmeantdistinguishingonesselffrom

agroupofpeoplewithinacommunitybyproducingsomethingnoteworthyornovelthiswas

synonymouswiththeancientideaofindividualism.However,inthetwentiethcentury

individualismtransformedintohavingasenseoffreedomtodoanythingonewantswithout

havingregardforthecommunityoritsmembers.Fortheancients,theindividualandthesocial

wereoneinthesameinthetwentiethcenturytherenowexistedachasmbetweenthetwo.

Clearly,themoderntypeofindividualismisdangerousduetoitsapathyinthepoliticalarenain

favorofanactivepersonallife.

Arendtfearedthatlifeandpoliticswerebeingreducedtoaprocessofpredictablepatterns

(namelythepatternthatlifewasallaboutfreedomintheprivatesphereoflabor,family,

economics,etc.lifeascomfort,ratherthanlifeasdistinctionandgenuinedifferenceand

individuality)fedbytheconstantprogressionofscience.Shearguedthatthisconstant

progressionwasactuallydetrimentaltotheinherentlyspontaneousnatureofman.This

spontaneityorlivingwithoutbeingconfinedtoscientificboundariesstandardizationand

predictabilityisexpressedthroughactionanideathathassincebeenlostbutisdesperately

neededinthemodernageaccordingtoArendt.Humanbeingswillneverbeabletostepoutside

themselvestocreateauniversalsetofrulesthatallmanmustadhere.Thepluralityofman,his

inherentspontaneity,andhisneedtocreateandimmortalizehimselfamonghispeersstandsin

directcontrasttotheideathatwecancreateorviewtheworldfromanobjectivepoint

somewhereoutsideofourselves.

AlasdairMacIntyresharedsomeofArendtsworries.LikeArendt,MacIntyrealso

observedthedawningoftyrannyandtotalitariangovernmentsandwasdissatisfiedwith

modernityaswell.Hediagnosedthesituationnotasthelossofapublicspherewhereonecould

engageingenuinepoliticalactionbutratherasmoralcrises.FromtheoutsetMacIntyreclaims

thatweashumansareinastateofmoralconfusion:sincetherearemanydifferentoften

competingvocabulariesandconceptualframeworksfromwhichtotalkaboutmoralsthe

entireconversationendsupinsubjectivismandthusconfusion.Subjectivismforhimmeant

beingunabletomakeanymeaningfulmoraljudgementsgivencompetingmoralcodes,andwe

becomeunabletodistinguishbetterfromworseandbecomeeasilyconvincedrightandwrong

aresubjectivepreferences.MacIntyrebelievedthatinthefaceofthisemotivismthedoctrine

thatallevaluativejudgmentsandmorespecificallyallmoraljudgmentsarenothingbut

expressionsofpreference,expressionsofattitudeorfeeling,insofarastheyaremoralor

evaluativeincharactersocietyhaslosttheabilitytoreasonmorally.

MacIntyrewasalsointriguedbytheancientGreeksparticularlytheideaofthepolis,and

hebelievedthatpartsofthepoliscouldberesurrected,reformed,andappliedtomodernsociety.

Ultimately,hewantedtolearnfromthepolis,andhebelievedthatthisparticularGreek

institutionwassuperiortoanywehavetoday.Specifically,itwastheideaofheroisminthepolis

thatfascinatedhim.Thisheroism,whichisalmostsynonymouswithArendtsviewoftheman

ofactioninancientGreece,camefromindividualsknowingtheirplacewithinsociety,and

attemptingtocreateanimmortallegacywithinthesocialconstructsofthepolis.Hewantsusto

askquestionslikewhatdoesitmeantobeheroic?orwhatwouldaherodointhissituation?

Theseleadtoquestionsaboutwhatitistobeagoodhuman,andwhatitmeanstoactmorally

withthisheroorgoodhumaninmind.Wehavethefreedomtochoose,soourmisstepis,for

MacIntyre,notliningupourpossiblemoralchoiceswiththechoicesaheroorgoodhuman

wouldmakewithinacommunityofpeople.Again,freedominthepoliswasdifferentiatedfrom

freedominthetwentiethcenturyinthatthemoderndefinitionMacIntyre,likeArendt,thinksof

asmerelyanindividualbearingrightsandseekingpureautonomyseparationfroma

community.Havingthistypeoffreedom,though,breedsasubjectiveemotivistictypeofsociety

andalackofanidentitywithinacommunityofpeople.BothMacIntyreandArendtthinkwe

cannotdividetheindividualfromthesocial,andtodosoleadstoanindividualismthat

inevitablyleadstoamoralsubjectivism.

Fromthisideaofheroism,Maclntyresetsthefoundationforhismoralandpolitical

philosophy.Hestatesthateachindividualhasagivenroleandstatuswithinawelldefinedand

highlydeterminatesystemofrolesandstatuses......Insuchasocietyamanknowswhoheisby

knowinghisroleinthesestructuresandinknowingthisheknowsalsowhatheowesandwhat

isowedtohimbytheoccupantofeveryotherroleandstatus.BythisMacIntyremeantthatall

peoplebelongtoaparticularnarrativethatisthestoryoftheirlives,andthisnarrativeisthe

forcebehindhisabilitytostatethatpeoplecanmakegoodandbaddecisions.Forexample,a

fatherhasparticularpictureofagoodfatherthatheshouldattempttomirror,andheshould

makedecisionsbasedonthatpicture.Inotherwords,thepictureofthisgoodfatherpresents

whatexactlyagoodfatherwoulddointhisorthatsituationitisnotanidealorrule,but

ratherhowagoodfatherwouldactinaparticularsituation.ThisishowMacIntyresayswe

shouldallmakeourmoraldecisionseachandeveryday.LikeArendt,hedoesntbelievethat

makinggoodorbadchoicesisbaseduponsomeobjectiveviewofhumannatureorideal,and

attemptingtodouseidealsorrulesonlyservestoconfuseusinouractualmoralandpolitical

deliberations.

SowithArendt,hebelievedthatpeoplecouldnotberippedfromtheircontextandbe

forcedtoapplyasetofabstractobjectiverulestotheirextremelyspecific,individualized

situation.Tostepoutsideonesselfistonothaveanygroundsformakingmoralchoices

because,forMacIntyre,thereisnoobjectiveportiontoaparticularcontextsavetheobjectivity

withinanindividualscontext.Putanotherway,whatisobjectiveforonepersonisonly

objectiveasitrelatestotheirparticularcircumstance,butitisnotnecessarilyobjectivefor

anyoneelsesincetheircircumstanceisdifferent.Howdoesamanknowwhattodoina

particularsituation?Intheabsenceofstrictrulefollowing,MacIntyresaysthatthrough

collaborationandagreementwithothersaboutwhatconstitutesvirtuousactioninlightofwhata

manistobecome,mancanactuallymakerightmoraldecisions.HereheusesAristotelian

philosophyandhumantelostoarguehiscase.AccordingtoAristotle,tobehappyandtolivelife

inaccordancewiththevirtuesisagoodlife.Atfirstthisvirtueisambiguous,butMacIntyresays

thatifasmall,particularcommunityagreesonthishumantelos,andaparticularindividualfails

toliveparallelwithit,thenthewordvirtueisgivenmeaningwithinthatcommunitysparticular

context.Inshort,mansharesacommongoodandatelosthatisonlyrelevanttoaparticular

communityorgroupofpeople.Andthatteloscanonlybemeasuredupagainstwhatitsmembers

agreeuponitcannotbemeasuredfromsomeoutsidesourceorfromsomewhereoutsideitself.

ItisobviousthatMacIntyreisdissatisfiedwithcurrentmoralthinking,butheisequally

dissatisfiedwithcurrentpoliticalinstitutions.UnderstandingMacIntyresmoralphilosophyis

criticaltounderstandinghispoliticaldiscontent.He,likeArendt,wishestoseethe

reestablishmentoftheindividualinpublicsphere,andbelieveseverymanwhoisableshould

participateinthedaytodaydealingsofpolitics,becausetheactivityitselfholdsintrinsicvalue.

Forhim,therearecertainactivitiesthataregoodnotbecausetheyproducesomeexternalresult

suchaswealth,butbecausetheactionproducesaninternalgoodwithintheperson.Playinga

sportisnotgoodorbadinsofarthatitresultsinawinoraloss,butitisgoodbecausetheaction

ofparticipatinginthesportitselfisgood.Hereheassertsthathumanslikerocksortrees

haveadefinedteloswhichwasgiventousbyAristotle:tobehappylivinginaccordancewith

thevirtues.Assoonasweacceptthatthisisourtelos,weseethatrulefollowingandpure

rationalisminmoralitybecomesdangeroustolivingahappylife.MacIntyrebelieves

participationinpoliticsworksidenticaltoparticipationinasport,buteverysinglepersonmust

participatetoreapthebenefitsbothintrinsicallyandmorallyasacommunity.Politicsfor

MacIntyreisthistypeofmoraldeliberationaboutwhathumanscanpracticallycomeabout

giventheiruniquesituationandcircumstancessothatboththeindividualqualitiesofthe

individualsurfaceandthecommunitycanflourish.Withthisview,MacIntyrecanthelpbut

criticizetwentiethcenturycapitalismandclassicliberalismwhichonlybreedspolitical

disengagementandapathy.

Politics,then,constitutesatypeofdialogueandfairness:withtheabsenceofstrictrule

following,humans(withatelos)candeliberateamongstthemselvesaboutwhetherornota

particularmemberofthecommunityhasfulfilledthattelos.Withoutrulesorundueweightgiven

totheories,thecommunityreleasesfromideologicalthinkingmadetofitspecificandindividual

circumstancesitismorefluidinnature.Buttherewillalwaysbe,forMacIntyremoreandless

experiencedpeopleplayingthisgameofmoralandpoliticaldeliberation.Soexperientialor

practicalknowledgewasvitalforMacIntyrespoliticstofunctionproperlyasitwastoo,and

possiblymoreimportant,forphilosopherMichaelOakeshottsunderstandingofpolitics.

MichaelOakeshott,liketheprevioustwophilosophers,wasdissatisfiedwithcertain

elementsinmodernsociety.However,hetooapproacheditfromadifferentperspective.For

Oakeshotttheproblemwasthatourworldanditspoliticswereinfectedwithrationalism.

Oakeshottbelievedthatthemideighteenthcenturybroughtonaninfluxofrationalthinkersto

thestage,though,forhimpurerationalisminthefieldofpoliticsormoralitywasdangerous.

Althoughheclaimedtobeconservative,itwasnotaparticularbrandorideological

conservatismhewantedtodownplaytheideologicalthinkingthathebelievedcamedirectly

fromthemindoftherationalist.Rationalism,forOakeshott,wasabeliefthatanyhumanpractice

couldbereducedtoasetofguidelineswhichanyonecouldreadoruseasguidelinestoconduct.

LikeMacIntyre,Oakeshottbelievedthatmoralityisneitherasystemofgeneralprinciplesnora

codeofrules,butavernacularlanguageWhathastobelearnedinmoraleducationisnota

theoremsuchasalwaystellthetruth,buthowtospeakthelanguageintelligently.Itisnota

deviceforformulatingjudgementsaboutconduct,butapractice.Moraleducationtakesplace

betweenmembersofacommunitywhodeliberate,practice,anddecideuponacertainmorality

notuponsomemoralprinciplearrivedatrationally.Withoutthisideaofpractice,masteryinany

areaisthenreducedfortherationalisttoanabstracttheorybywhichexperientialknowledge

becomesahindrancetotheoreticalpractice.Oakeshottdoesnotdenytheexistenceoftheoretical

learningorreason,ratherhebelievesthetwotypesofknowledgeboththeoreticaland

experientialareinseparablemuchlikeArendtandMacIntyrebelievetheindividualandthe

socialareinseparable.

Therationalistsmistakeistoattempttoseparatethesetwotypesoflearning,andmoreover

believethattheoreticallearningistheonlyessentialpartofknowledge.Oakeshottdisagrees

statingthatitisfoolishtotrytoseparateknowledgeintotwodistinctandclearpartsbecause

botharerequired.Knowledgeisacombinationofknowthatandknowhowhesaysknow

thatknowledgereferstotheguidelinesonewouldfollowinordertostartorproceedina

particularproject,likearecipeorconcretedirections.Knowhowknowledge,ontheother

hand,referstotheknowledgethatonesimplycannotlearnfromguidelinesorbooks,butmust

learnfromactuallylivingtheexperiencepracticalknowledge.Asimpleexamplewouldbethat

ofplayingasport.Onecouldonlyreasonablyparticipateandfunctioninasportafterspending

daysreadingabouttherulesnotbecausetheyhaveagoodgraspoftheparticularsport,but

becauseofsomepreviousknowledgeofwhatasportis.Stillthatparticularpersonwouldnot

succeedinthesport.Nomatterhowmuchlearningisdoneonthetheoreticallevel(reading

directions,recipes,guidelines,etc.),thereisnosubstituteforexperientialknowledgeofthelived

experiencewhetherthatbeinpoliticsormorality.Thistypeoflearning,accordingtoOakeshott,

canonlybedonethroughtheintimacyofpersonalexperienceandthatanyruleoruniversalisby

definitionabstractinthatitisonlyapartoftheactuallivedexperiencethatcreateditinthefirst

place.HereOakeshottmakesclearwhathebelievestobetheshortcomingsofpolitical

education:itistooabstractandtheoretical.Politicaleducation,iswronglyaccordingto

Oakeshott,believedtohavetakenplaceonceoneisequippedwithapoliticalideologytoguide

onespoliticalchoices.

ForOakeshotthowever,topracticepoliticscorrectlytakesmorethanjustatheoretica

knowledgeofpolitics.Usinganideologyasaguidetopoliticalchoicesisakintothe

rulefollowingconceptofmoralitythatArendtandMacIntyreseeasharmful.Ifeveryissuein

modernsocietyisdifferent(duetothepluralityofviews)howcouldarationalapproachbeable

toencompassthemultitudeofspecificcircumstances?Theserationalisticideasaresimply

ideologiesappliedtoprecisesituationswithoutconcernforanyoftheindividual,contextual

factorsofthesituation:thingssuchasreligion,customs,ortradition.Again,rationalismisthe

searchforsomethinghighertoreferencesomethingoutsideofourselves.Oakeshottbelieved

thatthispurelyrationalisticthinkinginpoliticalsettingswasdevastatingtosociety:itpresenteda

welltrainedmindratherthananeducatedone.Onethathasreadmanybooks,buthasnever

practicallyimplementedanythinghehaslearned.Hesaysabouttherationalist:andif,withas

yetnothoughtofanalysis,weglancebelowthesurface,wemay,perhaps,seeinthe

temperament,ifnotinthecharacter,oftheRationalist,adeepdistrustoftime,animpatient

hungerforeternityandanirritablenervousnessinthefaceofeverythingtopicalandtransitory.

Therationalistpresentssolutionsthataredisconnectedwiththeactualcircumstancesinwhich

theproblemisset,becausetheyaretooimpatienttosolveaproblemthantounderstandthe

natureoftheproblemitselffullyandthinkthroughpossibleresponses.Thiswasdirectlyaresult

ofpoliticaleducationleaningtooheavilyonabstractprinciplesratherthanthepolitical

judgementofpracticalexperiencegives.

Theaimofrationalismistofindthebestapproachtoanygivensituation,buttheproblem

isthatapproachingasituationfromapurelyrationalperspectiveleavesnoroomforthecurrent

situation.Forexample,politicstodayaimsatfindingsolutionstotheproblemswithinourcurrent

state.Whatisproblematiciswhenleaderspresentideasforabetterlife,theycompletely

disregardanythingthatmightbeusefulthatisworkingi.e.theymakesweepingchangesinan

attempttoperfectsomethingallthewhileditchingwhatmayhavebeenusefulinaprevious

system.Politics,inshort,seemstolookateverythingasmalfunctioningandsearchesforone,

overarchingsolutiontothemalfunction.Oakeshottwouldproposealternativelythatmodernday

politicsshouldlookatwhatisworkingandwhatisusefulandexpanduponthoseideasinaslow

andthoughtfulmanner.Progressshouldoccurcarefullyandcautiouslywithasmallerscale

trialanderrorprocessthatcontinuallyanalyzesthepresentsituationwhileatthesametime

comparingwithtradition,which,forOakeshott,isthepractical,knowhowtypeofknowledge.

EvenwiththispracticalknowhowknowledgeOakeshott,alongwithArendtandMacIntyre,is

skepticalofperfection(ortheattemptatperfection)inanyhumanendeavor.

Inthetwentiethcentury,totalitarianregimeswereaimingatthekindofrationalist

perfectionandattemptingtoharnesstoharnessalloftheresources(humanincluded)toachieve

thatvisionofperfection,whichOakeshottisskepticalwearecapableof.Theseregimes

inevitablybecome,Oakeshottconcludes,oppressiveandmisguided.Oakeshottcomparespolitics

toaboathesaysmensailaboundlessandbottomlessseathereisneitherharborforshelternor

floorforanchorage,neitherstartingplacenordestination.Theenterpriseistokeepafloatonan

evenkeeltheseaisbothfriendandenemyandtheseamanshipconsistsinusingtheresources

ofatraditionalmannerofbehaviorinordertomakeafriendofeveryhostileoccasion.For

Oakeshott,ideologyconsistsinthinkingthereisadestination,butthetruejobofproperand

effectivepoliticsistosimplyaddressissuesastheyrise.Politicscannotbeprescriptive,andmust

usewhatisgiventousthroughtraditionandinnovationtoaddresswhateverissuesarisetokeep

thesystemworkingsmoothly.

Whatunitesthesethreethinkersistheirdisdainfortheprojectofhumanperfection,

thinkingthatweashumanscanhaveanobjective,purelyrational,andcomprehensiveviewof

ourselves,andtheirbeliefthatindividualismwasattherootofmanyofthetwentiethcenturys

problems.Arendt,MacIntyre,andOakeshottallbelievethereissomethingfoolishabouta

humanprojectthatconsistsinthesearchforhumanuniversalsoronetruesysteminaworldof

plurality.Itisthinkingthatwehavediscoveredthetruththatwethenpushitontootherswho

liveindifferentcircumstancesandwithdifferentideas.Thougheachintheirownwayhave

diagnosedandattemptedtoaddressthisfoolishnessindifferentways.