Political Scientists and Public IntellectualsAuthor(s): Heinz EulauSource: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec., 2002), p. 659Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1554798 .

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FORUM FORUM

Political Scientists and Public Intellectuals Political Scientists and Public Intellectuals

I was very much impressed by Andrew Stark's profound structural interpreta- tion of the question of "Why Political Scientists aren't Public Intellectuals" (PS&P, September 2002). I do not want to rehearse or respond to his par- ticular argument which I find quite per- suasive. But, it seems to me, there is more to the story, and Stark himself provides the clue in a single sentence: "Yet if the problem is structural, the solution must be the individual." It is this thought I want to address.

I must give some background. Once upon a time I was something of a "policy freak." After receiving the Ph.D. in 1941, and there being few academic openings at the time, I soon found my- self in a unit of the U.S. Department of Justice with the grandiloquent name "Special War Policies Unit." Initially, we made some "policy," but after it had been made the operation became rather bureau- cratic and uninteresting from a policy perspective. I quit, and by 1944-45 had become, first a free-lance writer, then an assistant editor of The New Republic. I wrote a lot of editorials and signed pieces, mostly on international politics or the internal politics of particular coun- tries. I was, I suppose, a "public intellec- tual" of sorts, of a New Deal persuasion. I returned to academic life in 1947, teaching at a small but then better liberal arts college where I remained for ten years. In those years I continued to write what I would call "opinion pieces" on topics like "Communism and the Abuse of Free Speech" (1953) or "The Politics of Happiness" (1956)-the latter on the 1956 election. In those years I "retooled" and tured from political theory (my doc- toral field) to "behavioral science." From then on I avoided being a "public intel- lectual" intent on "influencing" public policy or some mystical public. How come, as I continued to be "politically active" (at least for a number of years, in the CDC, the California Democratic Clubs)?

These, then, are my credentials which, I think, give some legitimacy to my say- ing something about the three

I was very much impressed by Andrew Stark's profound structural interpreta- tion of the question of "Why Political Scientists aren't Public Intellectuals" (PS&P, September 2002). I do not want to rehearse or respond to his par- ticular argument which I find quite per- suasive. But, it seems to me, there is more to the story, and Stark himself provides the clue in a single sentence: "Yet if the problem is structural, the solution must be the individual." It is this thought I want to address.

I must give some background. Once upon a time I was something of a "policy freak." After receiving the Ph.D. in 1941, and there being few academic openings at the time, I soon found my- self in a unit of the U.S. Department of Justice with the grandiloquent name "Special War Policies Unit." Initially, we made some "policy," but after it had been made the operation became rather bureau- cratic and uninteresting from a policy perspective. I quit, and by 1944-45 had become, first a free-lance writer, then an assistant editor of The New Republic. I wrote a lot of editorials and signed pieces, mostly on international politics or the internal politics of particular coun- tries. I was, I suppose, a "public intellec- tual" of sorts, of a New Deal persuasion. I returned to academic life in 1947, teaching at a small but then better liberal arts college where I remained for ten years. In those years I continued to write what I would call "opinion pieces" on topics like "Communism and the Abuse of Free Speech" (1953) or "The Politics of Happiness" (1956)-the latter on the 1956 election. In those years I "retooled" and tured from political theory (my doc- toral field) to "behavioral science." From then on I avoided being a "public intel- lectual" intent on "influencing" public policy or some mystical public. How come, as I continued to be "politically active" (at least for a number of years, in the CDC, the California Democratic Clubs)?

These, then, are my credentials which, I think, give some legitimacy to my say- ing something about the three

colleagues-James Q. Wilson, Samuel Huntington, and Stanley Hoffmann- whom Stark singles out as political sci- entists who, by publishing for the public on all kinds of topics, took on the role of "public intellectual." Now let me be clear: all three are truly distinguished scholars, and I have no doubt that, when they "go public," what they say and/or do is grounded in their scholarly study of the things they say and/or do. But what they say in public is opinion (for that's what the public or policy makers expect from them) and, as the great po- litical theorist Leo Strauss has taught us (at least my generation), opinion is not the same thing as knowledge. And while knowledge is fallible, opinion is even more so. Now, in all deference to Professors Wilson, Huntington and Hoffmann, who among their peers in our profession has ever checked up on them-whether their opinions or policy views, especially those concerning the future, were correct or "right" after the events have passed that they sought to interpret, explain, predict, not to say ad- vocate? I certainly haven't and, there- fore, I cannot pass judgment on them.

But I can pass judgment on myself when I did this sort of thing, and I had to find out, regretfully, that I was wrong. To mention just two examples. In my debut article for The New Republic (October 18, 1943), entitled "Franco Prepares to Change Sides," I expressed the opinion (based on my deep knowl- edge of Spanish politics) that Franco could not last much longer unless he deserted the Axis (toward which he was "neutrally," if not benevolently, inclined) and joined the Allies. Well, he didn't join, and he lasted as Spain's dictator for more than 25 years. As late as 1952, I visited occupied Germany and reported to The New Republic's readers the fol- lowing (in an article entitled "Germany: 'A-Political' Ally," June 8, 1952): "Inside Germany, the atmosphere is quiet, cloudy and charged with potential danger. Just what danger it is difficult to say, but in so many ways-despite the changed set- ting and the changed cast-the Bonn

colleagues-James Q. Wilson, Samuel Huntington, and Stanley Hoffmann- whom Stark singles out as political sci- entists who, by publishing for the public on all kinds of topics, took on the role of "public intellectual." Now let me be clear: all three are truly distinguished scholars, and I have no doubt that, when they "go public," what they say and/or do is grounded in their scholarly study of the things they say and/or do. But what they say in public is opinion (for that's what the public or policy makers expect from them) and, as the great po- litical theorist Leo Strauss has taught us (at least my generation), opinion is not the same thing as knowledge. And while knowledge is fallible, opinion is even more so. Now, in all deference to Professors Wilson, Huntington and Hoffmann, who among their peers in our profession has ever checked up on them-whether their opinions or policy views, especially those concerning the future, were correct or "right" after the events have passed that they sought to interpret, explain, predict, not to say ad- vocate? I certainly haven't and, there- fore, I cannot pass judgment on them.

But I can pass judgment on myself when I did this sort of thing, and I had to find out, regretfully, that I was wrong. To mention just two examples. In my debut article for The New Republic (October 18, 1943), entitled "Franco Prepares to Change Sides," I expressed the opinion (based on my deep knowl- edge of Spanish politics) that Franco could not last much longer unless he deserted the Axis (toward which he was "neutrally," if not benevolently, inclined) and joined the Allies. Well, he didn't join, and he lasted as Spain's dictator for more than 25 years. As late as 1952, I visited occupied Germany and reported to The New Republic's readers the fol- lowing (in an article entitled "Germany: 'A-Political' Ally," June 8, 1952): "Inside Germany, the atmosphere is quiet, cloudy and charged with potential danger. Just what danger it is difficult to say, but in so many ways-despite the changed set- ting and the changed cast-the Bonn

Republic seems like a second perform- ance of Weimar. The spirit that animates the performance is traditional, and gives rise to the same old, vague forebodings." How wrong I was!

As the fifties turned into the sixties and I more and more adopted the "behavioral persuasion" in my research as a political scientist, I also became more and more sensitive to the tension I felt between disinterested scholarship and (necessarily) interested participation in public affairs. Along came the war in Vietnam and I noted my colleagues tak- ing positions for or against the war that had absolutely nothing to do with their scholarship, yet which many of them ar- gued as being based on insights related to some knowledge of the "facts" and/or "morality." There are those who try to distinguish between their role as citizen and their role as political scien- tist. I doubt that the distinction can be maintained over the long haul. When a political scientist speaks, writes or acts in public, neither various publics nor policy makers make that convenient distinction. As a "public intellectual" he/she acquires legitimacy for his/her public persona as a professional, not as a citizen.

I have come to the conclusion that there is no way out of this dilemma. What I find most discouraging is that those among us who opt for the role of "public intellectual"are somehow consid- ered to be morally and socially superior beings because they are engage and de- vote themselves to one or another cause in the "public interest," while those of us who shun the public scene are said to be "hanging back." And, quite often, I discover much fakery in the behavior of colleagues who permit themselves to be interviewed in the media as experts on some current and pressing event. With great authority they will tell the interviewer what they and I have read in the op.ed. page of the morning's The New York Times.

Heinz Eulau Stanford University

Republic seems like a second perform- ance of Weimar. The spirit that animates the performance is traditional, and gives rise to the same old, vague forebodings." How wrong I was!

As the fifties turned into the sixties and I more and more adopted the "behavioral persuasion" in my research as a political scientist, I also became more and more sensitive to the tension I felt between disinterested scholarship and (necessarily) interested participation in public affairs. Along came the war in Vietnam and I noted my colleagues tak- ing positions for or against the war that had absolutely nothing to do with their scholarship, yet which many of them ar- gued as being based on insights related to some knowledge of the "facts" and/or "morality." There are those who try to distinguish between their role as citizen and their role as political scien- tist. I doubt that the distinction can be maintained over the long haul. When a political scientist speaks, writes or acts in public, neither various publics nor policy makers make that convenient distinction. As a "public intellectual" he/she acquires legitimacy for his/her public persona as a professional, not as a citizen.

I have come to the conclusion that there is no way out of this dilemma. What I find most discouraging is that those among us who opt for the role of "public intellectual"are somehow consid- ered to be morally and socially superior beings because they are engage and de- vote themselves to one or another cause in the "public interest," while those of us who shun the public scene are said to be "hanging back." And, quite often, I discover much fakery in the behavior of colleagues who permit themselves to be interviewed in the media as experts on some current and pressing event. With great authority they will tell the interviewer what they and I have read in the op.ed. page of the morning's The New York Times.

Heinz Eulau Stanford University

Impact of School Voucher Research Impact of School Voucher Research

In an article otherwise lamenting political scientists' inability to influence public policy ("Politics, Political Sci- ence, and Specialization," June 2002,

In an article otherwise lamenting political scientists' inability to influence public policy ("Politics, Political Sci- ence, and Specialization," June 2002,

pp. 187-190), Robert Jervis takes issue with recent research on school vouchers, to which we have contributed (2002). Jervis argues that voucher experiments

pp. 187-190), Robert Jervis takes issue with recent research on school vouchers, to which we have contributed (2002). Jervis argues that voucher experiments

"are largely irrelevant, or at best a first step." Comparisons of students in pri- vate and public schools are of little value as long as most students remain

"are largely irrelevant, or at best a first step." Comparisons of students in pri- vate and public schools are of little value as long as most students remain

PSOnline www.apsanet.org PSOnline www.apsanet.org

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