Political Science Final 26-06-10-Sub

8/7/2019 Political Science Final 26-06-10-Sub

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CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 RESEARCH PROPOSALThe Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperationthe lynch pin of U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation,

according to the deals supportershas to navigate several necessary conditions. Assuming all

of these conditions will be met, U.S.- Indian strategic cooperation will proceed. A new raft of

questions, however, will then immediately arise. Will nuclear cooperation expand oras some

Indian and American critics have predictedbecome effectively dead due to a lack of mutual

nuclear interest? To what extent will Indian nuclear supporters who have pushed nuclear power

as an energy independence effort be interested in buying foreign reactors? Shortly after the July

11, 2006, Mumbai terror bombing, Indian officials announced they were doing all they could to

assure Indian nuclear plants would be safe against terror attacks. Will the Indian government be

able to do enough?

Key proponents of strategic cooperation and the nuclear deal, meanwhile, insist that India

should be allowedeven encouragedto build up its strategic nuclear missile forces to serve as

a counterweight to China. Might New Delhi expand its nuclear forces but choose not to

cooperate closely with the United States? This immediately raises the question of Iran. The Hyde

Act requires the President to report whether India, which struck a high-technology-diplomatic

intelligence-military-training strategic cooperation agreement with Iran in 2003, is working

actively with the United States to isolate and sanction Iran for its nuclear misbehavior. The

question is will India do so?

India has close ties to Iran to help it outflank Pakistan. It also has clear cultural

sympathies (India has 150bmillion Muslims, and Iran has recognized Kashmir as a legitimate

part of India), and even clearer economic interests (India is a major refiner of Iranian oil and

views Irans oil and natural gas as an energy option to service is own economy). India has

allowed sensitive nuclear and rocket technology transfers to be made to Tehran and was reported

to have discussed space launch cooperation with Iran, which would have direct application to


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Irans development of missiles capable of hitting Europe and the United States. Can the interests

India might develop with the United States override its attraction to improving its ties to Tehran?

All of these questions are addressed in this Research paper

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Whether the civil nuclear cooperation agreement by India and the United States lead to

decrease in the Indias exercise of sovereignty over its foreign policy issues in South Asia?

2. Whether the strategic relationship between India and the United States lead to more stability in

the region of South Asia or upset the power balance?

3. Whether the strategic relationship between India and the United solve thee problem of

terrorism in the region of South Asia?

1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The researcher has followed the doctrinal method of research and has referred to secondary

resources to answer the research questions. The researcher has referred the books, articles,

editorial opinions and newspaper reports of noted academicians, foreign policy experts and

politicians to gauge the political scenario.


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CHAPTER-II

ANALYSIS OF INDO-US RLEATIONS

2.1 THE VALUE OF A TRANSFORMED U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP

The principal value in transforming the U.S.-Indian relationship is that it provides hope

for reaching the summum bonum that eluded both sides during the Cold War. The possibility of

decent U.S.-Indian relations during that period survived at the end of the day only because of the

shared values that derived from a common democratic heritage. With the passing of the bipolar

international order and with Indias own shift towards market economics at home, the traditional

commonality of values is now complemented by an increasingly robust set of inter societal ties

based on growing U.S.-Indian economic and trade linkages, the new presence of Americans of

Indian origin in U.S. political life, and the vibrant exchange of American and Indian ideas and

culture through movies, literature, food, and travel.

These links are only reinforced by the new and dramatic convergence of national interests

between the United States and India in a manner never witnessed during the Cold War. Today

and for the foreseeable future, both Washington and New Delhi will be bound by a common

interest in:

Preventing Asia from being dominated by any single power that has the capacity to

crowd out others and which may use aggressive assertion of national self-interest to

threaten American presence, American alliances, and American ties with the regional

states;

Eliminating the threats posed by state sponsors of terrorism who may seek to use

violence against innocents to attain various political objectives, and more generally

neutralizing the dangers posed by terrorism and religious extremism to free societies; Arresting the further spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related

technologies to other countries and subnational entities, including substate actors

operating independently or in collusion with states;


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Promoting the spread of democracy not only as an end in itself but also as a strategic

means of preventing illiberal polities from exporting their internal struggles over power

abroad;

Advancing the diffusion of economic development with the intent of spreading peace

through prosperity through the expansion of a liberal international economic order that

increases trade in goods, services, and technology worldwide;

Protecting the global commons, especially the sea lanes of communications, through

which flow not only goods and services critical to the global economy but also

undesirable commerce such as drug trading, human smuggling, and WMD technologies;

Preserving energy security by enabling stable access to existing energy sources through

efficient and transparent market mechanisms (both internationally and domestically),

while collaborating to develop new sources of energy through innovative approaches that

exploit science and technology; and,

Safeguarding the global environment by promoting the creation and use of innovative

technology to achieve sustainable development; devising permanent, self-sustaining,

marketbased institutions and systems that improve environmental protection; developing

coordinated strategies for managing climate change; and assisting in the event of natural

disasters.

What does it mean, then, to say that U.S.- Indian interests are strongly convergent, if

bilateral collaboration cannot always be assumed to ensue automatically? It means three things.

First, that there is a grand summum bonum that the two sides can secure only collaboratively,

even though each party is likely to emphasize different aspects of this quest. For the United

States, the ultimate value of the U.S.-Indian relationship is that it helps preserve American

primacy and the exercise thereof by constructing a partnership that aids in the preservation of the

balance of power in Asia, enhances American competitiveness through deepened linkages with a

growing Indian economy, and strengthens the American vision of a concert of democratic states

by incorporating a major non-Western exemplar of successful democracy such as India. For

India, the ultimate value of the U.S.-Indian relationship is that it helps New Delhi to expand its

national power.


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Although this growth in capabilities leads India inexorably to demand formally a multi-

polar world a claim that, strictly speaking, implies the demise of American hegemonythe

leadership in New Delhi is realistic enough to understand that American primacy is unlikely to

be dethroned any time soon and certainly not as a result of the growth in Indian power. Rather,

because Indian power and national ambitions will find assertion in geographic and issue areas

that are more likely to be contested immediately by China rather than by the United States,

Indian policymakers astutely recognize that only protective benefits accrue

to New Delhi from American primacy, despite their own formalbut not substantive

discomfort with such a concept.

Second is that the United and India share a common vision of which end-states are desirable and

what outcomes ought to be pursuedhowever this is doneby both sides. Irrespective of the

tensions that inhere in the competing visions of hegemony and multi-polarity at the level of

theory and in the grand strategies formally pursued by the two countries, both Washington and

New Delhi are united by a common understanding of which strategic end-states are in the

interests of both sides. Thus, both countries, for example, agree that a powerful authoritarian

China that has the capacity to dominate the Asian landmass serves neither American nor Indian

interests. Both sides similarly understand that a radicalized Islam at war with itself and the world

outside it threatens the security of both countries even if only in different ways.

Further, neither country believes that despite their own possession of nuclear

weapons and their reluctance to surrender these capabilities either permanently or

to some global authority, other states or nonstate actorseven if friendlyought

to be encouraged to acquire such capabilities. Such a list can be developed

further, only proving that the ambiguities that lie in each countrys conception of

the summum bonum at the grand strategic level does not in any way translate into

fundamental differences at the practical level where certain critical political goals

are concerned.

As a result, not only is a close U.S.-Indian bilateral relationship eminently possible, it is

fundamentally necessary since both countries will be increasingly critical to the achievement of

those goals valued by each side. Third, that there are no differences in vital interests, despite the


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tensions in the competing grand strategies, which would cause either party to levy mortal threats

against the other or would cause either country to undercut the others core objectives on any

issue of strategic importance.

2.2 THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSFORMING THE U.S.-INDIAN

RELATIONSHIP

Several practical implications flow from the three realities that define the U.S.-Indian

relationship. To begin with, the strengthening U.S.-Indian bond does not imply that New Delhi

will become a formal alliance partner of Washington at some point in the future. It also does not

imply that India will invariably be an uncritical partner of the United States in its global

endeavors. Indias large size, its proud history, and its great ambitions, ensure that it will likely

march to the beat of its own drummer, at least most of the time. When the value of the U.S.-

Indian relationship is at issue, the first question for the United States, therefore, ought not to be,

What will India do for us?as critics of the Bush administrations civilian nuclear agreement

with New Delhi have often asserted in recent memory.1 Rather, the real question ought to be, Is

a strong, democratic (even if perpetually independent) India in American national interest? If

this is the fundamental question and if the answer to this question is Yesas it ought to be,given the convergence in U.S. and Indian national security goalsthen the real discussion about

the evolution of the U.S.-Indian relationship ought to focus on how the United States can assist

the growth of Indian power, and how it can do so at minimal cost (if that is relevant) to any other

competing national security objectives.2

Advancing the growth of Indian power consistent with this intention, as the Bush

administration currently seeks, is not directed, as many critics have alleged, at containing

China. A policy of containing China is neither feasible nor necessary for the United States at this

point in time. India, too, currently has no interest in becoming part of any coalition aimed at

1 Ashton B.Carter, Americas New Strategic Partner? Foreign Affairs, Vol.85, No. 4, July-August 2006, pp. 33-44.2 Ashley J. Tellis, South Asian Seesaw: A New U.S. Policy on the Subcontinent, Policy Brief, Number 38,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, May 2005.


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containing China. This is not because New Delhi is by any means indifferent to the growth of

Chinese capabilities but because Indian policymakers believe that the best antidote to the

persistently competitive and even threatening dimensions of Chinese power lies, at least in the

first instance, in the complete and permanent revitalization of Indian national strengthan

objective in which the United States has a special role.3

As Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns succinctly stated in his testimony before the

House International Relations Committee on September 8, 2005, By cooperating with India

now, we accelerate the arrival of the benefits that Indias rise brings to the region and the

world. 4 Once the fundamental argument is understood that Indias growth in power is

valuable to the United States principally not because of what it does for us, but because of what

it enables New Delhi to become in the context of an emerging Asiathe second order

consideration of whether (and how) India will collaborate in endeavors critical to the United

States can be appreciated in proper perspective. Only when the importance of strengthening India

in Americas own self-interest is affirmed, however, does the question of whether and how New

Delhi would partner with the United States become a useful one. It is not necessary to have a

Realist obsession with great power politics in order to defend the validity of such an approach.

As we look at the three most pressing challenges likely to dominate the common attention

of the United States and India in the first half of the 21st century the rise of China amidst

Asian resurgence in general, the threat of the continuing spread of WMD, and the dangers posed

by terrorism and religious extremism to liberal societiestwo assertions become almost

selfevidently true: Not only are the United States and India more intensely affected by these

three challenges in comparison to many other states in Europe and Asia, but effective diplomacy,

wise policy, and bold leadership also will make the greatest difference in achieving the desired

strategic coordination between Washington and New Delhi that serves American interests just

as well as any recognized alliance. 5 Since the character of U.S. policy, leadership, and

diplomacywhether tacit or explicitwill be critical to making such U.S.-Indian collaboration

3 Ashley J. Tellis, The Changing Political-Military Environment: South Asia, in Khalilzad, etal., pp. 203-240.4 R. Nicholas Burns, The U.S. and India: An Emerging Entente? Remarks as Prepared for the House InternationalRelations Committee, Washington, DC, September 8, 2005.5 Blackwill, pp. 9-17; Tellis, South Asian Seesaw: A New U.S. Policy on the Subcontinent.


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possible, both the administration and the Congress will have to partner in this regard. The most

important contribution that the legislative branch can make here is by helping to change Indias

entitative status from that of a target under U.S. nonproliferation laws to that of a full partner.

The administrations civilian nuclear agreement with India is directed fundamentally

towards this objective. To be sure, it will produce important and tangible nonproliferation gains

for the United States, just as it will bestow energy and environmental benefits on India.6

But, at a

grand strategic level, it is intended to do much more: Given the lessons learned from over 50

years of alternating engagement and opposition, the civil nuclear cooperation agreement is

intended to convey in one fell swoop the abiding American interest in crafting a full and

productive partnership with India to advance our common goals in this new century. As

Undersecretary of State Burns phrased it in his recent testimony, our ongoing diplomatic efforts

to conclude a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement are not simply exercises in bargaining and

tough-minded negotiation; they represent a broad confidence-building effort grounded in a

political commitment from the highest levels of our two governments.7

In reaching this conclusion, the administration hasadmirablyresisted the temptation

of pocketing Indias good nonproliferation record and its recent history of cooperation with the

United States, much to the chagrin of many commentators who have argued that New Delhi

ought not to be rewarded for doing what it would do anyway in its own national interest. On this

question, too, the Presidents inclinations are correct: Given Indias importance to the United

States in regard to each of the issue-areas identified earlier in this chapter, reaching out to New

Delhi with the promise of a full partnership is a much better strategy for transforming U.S.-India

relations than the niggardly calculation of treating Indian good behavior as a freebie that

deserves no compensation because New Delhi presumably would not have conducted itself

differently in any case. On all these issues, President Bush has made the right judgmentafter a

hiatus of many decadeswith respect to India and its importance to the United States. In that

6 Ashley J. Tellis, Should the US Sell Nuclear Technology to India?Part II, YaleGlobal Online, November 10,2005; Ashley J. Tellis, Atoms for War? U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and Indias Nuclear Arsenal,Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.7 R. Nicholas Burns, The U.S. and India: The New Strategic Partnership, The Asia Society, New York, October18, 2005.


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judgment lies the best hope for avoiding yet another unproductive sine wave in bilateral relations

in this new century.

CHAPTER-III

RELEVANCE OF INDIA TO THE UNITED STATES

3.1 STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF INDIA IN SOUTH ASIA

The United States in its attempt to exercise dominance over the region of South Asia has

a natural ally in the form of India. The unifying factors, which makes Indo-US relations unique

as compare to Sino-India or Sin-US, being primarily the issues of democracy and terrorism.

Moreover, the threat posed by China to the superpower status of the United States can only be

offset by a strong alliance with a neighboring country, sharing common interests. To understand

these dynamics and closer understanding of Sino-Indian relation is required.

For decades, the Indo-Chinese rivalry dominated Asias strategic concerns. Greater

Chinese economic penetration in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka since the 1990s led to

worries of increasing Chinese influence. Since its economic awakening, however, India has been

vigorously pursuing a pragmatic policy towards China. Second to the US, Indias foreign policy

concerns are concentrated on capitalizing on convergence with China, in line with its Look East

policy. Indian foreign policy experts insist that the old boundary disputes and military tensions,

which brought India and China to war in 1963, are clearly over and there is no obvious

territorial threat from China to India.8

An important aspect of the Chindia idea is the growing Indian interest in developing

economic relations with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

As Kamal Nath, Union Minister for Commerce and Industry, explains:

Southeast Asia will be an important trade bridge between China and India to create an

economic powerhouse in the world.

8 Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe.


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Despite the obvious economic congruence, however, relations with China remain

complex and areas of tension persist. Indeed, the issues that bind the two countries together are

also the issues that divide them and fuel their rivalry because of their divergent positions in the

international system, contrasting strategic cultures and political systems, and competing geo-

political interests. Since 2005, India has found itself pitted against China at the United Nations,

at the International Atomic Energy Agency over Irans nuclear programme, and at the East Asia

Summit and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) over the issue of Indias membership.

The emergence of a pro-China axis comprising Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh at the

13th SAARC Summit in Dhaka in November 2005 was particularly worrying for India. It has

been disconcerted by Beijings skilful use of economic and military levers to draw Bhutan,

Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives and Sri Lanka into its orbit, after Pakistan and Myanmar. India

has become increasingly aware that its position as the sole benefactor to smaller economies in

South Asia is under threat.

By offering military supplies and economic investments to Sri Lanka, China has robbed

India of some of its leverage vis--vis the island. In Nepal, China has already increased its

investments and could easily overtake Indias bids to develop hydro-power.

For now, New Delhi believes that although China has excellent bilateral relations with all the

South Asian countries, it can never usurp Indias position in the region. China will have to work

doubly hard to claim the soft space within the Indian region China cannot assume that space

naturally.

. Sri Lanka has been particularly strategic about sharing investments between China and

India in its power sector. Bangladesh, despite owing its independence largely to Indian

intervention, has refused to entertain Indias requests to allow transit to gas from Myanmar

which energy-hungry India desperately needs.

India is aware that it has to have a long-term view in countering China, both

economically and strategically. In its quest for energy, China has been eyeing the Andaman Sea

off Myanmars coast as an important source of oil to fuel the economic expansion of its western


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provinces a development which is not welcomed by New Delhi. Nonetheless, India is willing

to work imaginatively within existing frameworks, particularly in the case of Nepal where it sees

an asymmetrical advantage. In Nepal, for instance, a practical demonstration of this new thinking

could see India warming to the idea of multilateral consortia for investment in the hydro-power

sector as a way of diluting bilateral Chinese investments into the Nepalese economy.

3.2 INDO-US STRATEGIC COOPERATION

Defense cooperation between the United States and India is in the early stages of development

(unlike U.S.-Pakistan military ties, which date back to the 1950s). Since September 2001, and

despite a concurrent U.S. rapprochement with Pakistan, U.S.-India security cooperation has

flourished; U.S. diplomats rate military cooperation among the most important aspects of

transformed bilateral relations. The India-U.S. Defense Policy Group (DPG) moribund since

Indias 1998 nuclear tests and ensuing U.S. sanctions was revived in late 2001 and meets

annually.

In June 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense pact outlining

planned collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-way defense trade, increasing

opportunities for technology transfers and co-production, expanded collaboration related to

missile defense, and establishment of a bilateral Defense Procurement and Production Group.

The agreement may be the most ambitious such security pact ever engaged by New Delhi. A

Maritime Security Cooperation Agreement, inked in 2006, commits both countries to

comprehensive cooperation in protecting the free flow of commerce and addressing a wide

array of threats to maritime security, including piracy and the illicit trafficking of weapons of

mass destruction and related materials. In April 2007, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific

Command, Adm. Tim Keating, told a Senate panel that the Pentagon intends to aggressively

pursue expanding military-to-military relations with India. During his August 2007 visit to New

Delhi, Adm. Keating lauded U.S.-India defense relations as solid, good, and improving

steadily.9The sentiment was echoed by Secretary of Defense Gates during his February 2008

visit to the Indian capital. The United States views defense cooperation with India in the context

9 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on U.S. Military Command Budgets, April 24, 2007; US AdmiralSays Military Cooperation With India Improving Steadily, Associated Press, August 23, 2007.


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of common principles and shared national interests such as defeating terrorism, preventing

weapons proliferation, and maintaining regional stability. Many analysts view increased U.S.-

India security ties as providing an alleged hedge against or counterbalance to growing

Chinese influence in Asia, though both Washington and New Delhi repeatedly downplay such

probable motives. Still, while a congruence of U.S. and Indian national security objectives is

unlikely in the foreseeable future, convergences are being identified in areas such as shared

values, the emergence of a new balance-of-power arrangement in the region, and on distinct

challenges such as WMD proliferation, Islamist extremism, and energy security. There also

remain indications that the perceptions and expectations of top U.S. and Indian strategic planners

are divergent on several key issues, including the role of Pakistan, approaches to conflict

resolution in Iraq and in Palestine, and Indians relations with Iran, as well as with repressive

governments in places such as Burma and Sudan.10

3.2.1 COMBINED MILITARY EXERCISES.

Since early 2002, the United States and India have held a series of unprecedented and

increasingly substantive combined exercises involving all military services. Cope India air

exercises have provided the U.S. military with its first look at advanced Russian-built Su-

30MKIs; in 2004, mock air combat saw Indian pilots in late-model Russian-built fighters hold

off American pilots flying older F-15Cs, and Indian successes were repeated versus U.S. F-16s

in 2005. Indian pilots joined military aviators from South Korea and France to participate in

August 2008 U.S. Air Force training exercises over Nevada. U.S. and Indian special forces

soldiers have held at least five Vajra Prahar joint exercises, and at least 133 U.S. Special

Forces soldiers have attended Indias Counter-Insurgency Jungle Warfare School. Moreover,

major annual Malabar joint naval exercises are held off the Indian coast. The seventh and most

recent of these came in September 2007, when India hosted a total of 27 warships from five

countries including the United States, Japan, Australia, and Singapore for maneuvers in the

Bay of Bengal. It was the first time such exercises were conducted off Indias east coast. U.S.and Indian officials tout ongoing joint maneuvers as improving interoperability and as evidence

of an overall deepening of the bilateral defense relationship.11

10 See also Vibhuti Hate and Teresita Schaffer, U.S.-India Defense Relations: Strategic Perspectives, CSIS SouthAsia Monitor, April 4, 2007.11 US-India Joint Exercises Growing in Sophistication, Scope, Inside the Pentagon, January 31, 2008.


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3.2.2 ARMS SALES

Along with increasing military-to-military ties, the issue of U.S. arms sales to India has

taken a higher profile, with some analysts anticipating that New Delhi will spend as much as $40

billion on weapons procurement over the next five years.162 The first-ever major U.S. arms sale to

India came in 2002, when the Pentagon negotiated delivery of 12 counter-battery radar sets (or

Firefinder radars) worth a total of $190 million. India also purchased $29 million worth of

counterterrorism equipment for its special forces and has received sophisticated U.S.- made

electronic ground sensors to help stem the tide of militant infiltration in the Kashmir region. In

2004, Congress was notified of a sale to India involving up to $40 million worth of aircraft self-

protection systems for mounting on the Boeing 737s that carry Indias head of government.

Moreover, the State Department has authorized Israel to sell to India the jointly developed U.S.-

Israeli Phalcon airborne early warning system, an expensive asset that some analysts believe may

tilt the regional strategic balance even further in Indias favor.12

In 2006, Congress authorized and New Delhi approved the $44 million purchase of the

USS Trenton, a decommissioned American amphibious transport dock. The ship, which became

the second largest in the Indian navy when it was commissioned as the INS Jalashwa in June

2007, set sail for India carrying six surplus Sikorsky UH-3H Sea King helicopters purchased for

another $39 million.13In May 2007, the Pentagon notified Congress of a possible sale to India of

six C-130J Hercules military transport aircraft (along with related equipment, training, and

services) in a deal that could be worth more than $1 billion to the manufacturer, Maryland-based

Lockheed Martin. In January 2008, Washington and New Delhi signed an agreement to finalize

the deal, which represents the largest-ever U.S. defense sale to India. The Indian government

reportedly possesses an extensive list of desired U.S.- made weapons, including PAC-3 anti-

missile systems, electronic warfare systems, and possibly even combat aircraft. The March 2005unveiling of the Bush Administrations new strategy for South Asia included assertions that

the United States welcomed Indian requests for information on the possible purchase of F-16 or

F/A-18 fighters, and indicated that Washington is ready to discuss the sale of transformative

12 See also CRS Report RL33515, CombatAircraftSales to South Asia.13 US-Made Jalashwa a Lemon: CAG, Times of India (Delhi), Marc h 15, 2008


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systems in areas such as command and control, early warning, and missile defense.14India in

August 2007 invited foreign tenders for the sale of 126 new multi-role combat aircraft in a deal

that could be worth more than $10 billion. Lockheed Martins F-16 and Illinois-based Boeings

F/A-18 are competing with aircraft built in Russia, France, Sweden, and by a European

consortium. Lockheeds pitch reportedly includes offering a super-cruise version of the F-16

that saves large amounts of fuel by achieving supersonic speeds without the use of afterburners.

Boeing, for its part, has sought to establish multiple joint ventures that could better

position the company to become Indias preferred aerospace and defense partner.15

Some top

Indian officials express concern that the United States is a fickle partner that may not always

be relied upon to provide the reciprocity, sensitivity, and high-technology transfers sought by

New Delhi. In 2006, the Indian Navy declined an offer to lease two U.S. P-3C maritime

reconnaissance aircraft, calling the arrangements too costly. Moreover, Indias offset policy

states that any defense purchases worth more that $76 million must include offset clauses

amounting to at least 30% of the deals total value. This policy, already described as narrow

and fairly restrictive by the U.S. Ambassador to India, was altered to require that fully half of

the value of any multi-role combat aircraft import be attached to offsets. U.S. laws requiring on-

site verifications of exported defense equipment may represent a further irritant, as Indian

officials reportedly have expressed discomfort with such physical inspections.16

Joint U.S.-India military exercises and arms sales negotiations can cause disquiet in

Pakistan, where there is concern that induction of advanced weapons systems into the region

could disrupt the strategic balance there. Islamabad worries that its already disadvantageous

conventional military status vis--vis New Delhi will be further eroded by Indias acquisition of

sophisticated force multipliers. In fact, numerous observers identify a pro-India drift in the

U.S. governments strategic orientation in South Asia. Yet Washington regularly lauds

Islamabads role as a key ally in the U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition and assures Pakistan thatit will take no actions to disrupt strategic balance on the subcontinent.

14 Building a Modern Arsenal in India, New York Times, August 31, 2007; US Aims to Edge Out Russia in bigArms Sales to India, Reuters, December 26, 2007.15 US Contenders Enhance Their MRCA Offerings to India, Janes Defence Weekly, January 30, 2008; BoeingSeeks Leverage on Indian Fighter Order, Aviation International News, February 19, 2008; Boeing Keen toDevelop Indias Aerospace Industry, Reuters, July 16, 2008.16 [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/43853.htm].


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CHAPTER-IV

IMPACT ON SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY

4.1 IMPACT ON PAKISTAN

India is geographically dominant in both South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. While

all of South Asias smaller continental states (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan) share

borders with India, none share borders with each other. The country possesses the regions

largest economy and, with more than one billion inhabitants, is by far the most populous on the

Asian Subcontinent. The United States has a keen interest in South Asian stability, perhaps

especially with regard to the India-Pakistan conflict nexus and nuclear weapons, and so closelymonitors Indias regional relationships.

4.1 .1 PAKISTAN

Decades of militarized tensions and territorial disputes between India and Pakistan

arguably have hamstrung economic and social development in both countries while also

precluding establishment of effective regional economic or security institutions. Seemingly

incompatible national identities contributed to both wars and to the nuclearization of the Asian

Subcontinent, with the nuclear weapons capabilities of both countries becoming overt in 1998.

Since that time, a central aspect of U.S. policy in South Asia has been prevention of interstate

conflict that could destabilize the region and lead to nuclear war. In 2004, New Delhi and

Islamabad launched their most recent comprehensive effort to reduce tensions and resolve

outstanding disputes, an effort that has to date resulted in modest, but still meaningful successes.

New Delhi acknowledges that a stable Pakistan is in Indias interests. At the same time, however,

many top Indian leaders are convinced that Pakistan has long been and remains the main source

Indias significant domestic terrorism problems. They continue to blame Islamabad for


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maintaining an infrastructure of terror and for actively supporting terrorist groups such as

Jaish-e- Mohammed and Laskhar-e-Taiba that are held responsible for attacks inside India.17

The Obama Administration has taken keen interest into Indo-Pak issue, and has

facilitated several diplomatic efforts to reconcile the differences. The administrations deep

interest can be attributed to a variety of reasons18 Primarily amongst them being its War on

Terror in Afghanistan, ensuring stability in South Asia to ensure better investment opportunities

for American companies, countering Chinas influence in the region of South Asia.

4.1.2 KASHMIR ISSUE

Although India suffers from several militant regional separatist movements, the Kashmir

issue has proven the most lethal and intractable. Gunbattles and bomb blasts in Indias Jammu

and Kashmir state reportedly killed an average of 5 or 6 people every day over the period 1989-

2006. 19 Conflict over Kashmiri sovereignty also has brought global attention to a potential

flashpoint for interstate war between nuclear-armed powers. The problem is rooted in

competing claims to the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military Line of Control

(LOC) separating Indias Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir state and Pakistan-controlled

Azad [Free] Kashmir. The dispute relates to the national identities of both countries: India has

long sought to maintain its secular, multi-religious credentials, in part by successfully

incorporating a Muslim-majority region, while Pakistan has since independence been conceived

as a homeland for the subcontinents Muslims. India and Pakistan fought full-scale wars over

Kashmir in 1947-1948 and 1965. Some Kashmiris seek independence from both countries.

Spurred by a perception of rigged state elections in 1989, an ongoing separatist war between

Islamic militants (and their supporters) and Indian security forces in Indian-held Kashmir is

ongoing and has claimed tens of thousands of lives.20

India blames Pakistan for supporting cross-border terrorism and for fueling a separatist

rebellion in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley with arms, training, and militants. Islamabad,

17 Negotiating War, Outlook(Delhi), May 28, 2008; MK Narayanan (interview), India Abroad, September 21,2007; ISI Still Helping Terror Groups Against India: Narayanan, Times of India (Delhi), March 26, 2008; No LetUp in ISI Operations:Report, Times of India (Delhi), June 9, 2008).18 CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations.19 India Says Kashmir Toll Over 41,000, Others Differ, Reuters, December 7, 2006.20 [http://www.indianexpress.com/story/210147.html]


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for its part, claims to provide only diplomatic and moral support to what it calls freedom

fighters who resist Indian rule and suffer alleged human rights abuses in the region. New Delhi

insists that the dispute should not be internationalized through involvement by third-party

mediators and India is widely believed to be content with the territorial status quo. In 1999, a

bloody, six-weeklong battle in the mountains near the LOC at Kargil cost more than one

thousand.21An August 2007 opinion survey found nearly 90% of the residents of Srinagar, Kashmirs

most populous and Muslim-majority city, desiring Kashmiri independence from both India and Pakistan.

In the largely Hindu city of Jammu, however, 95% of respondents said Kashmir should be part of India

lives and included Pakistani army troops crossing into Indian-controlled territory22. Islamabad

has sought to bring external major power persuasion to bear on India, especially from the United

States. The longstanding U.S. position on Kashmir is that the issue must be resolved through

negotiations between India and Pakistan while taking into account the wishes of the Kashmiripeople.

4.1.3 TERRORISM AND PAKISTAN

Among the top goals of Indian officials in 2008 has been gauging the new Pakistani

governments commitment to the bilateral peace process. Within this modest context, the

outcome of Pakistans February national election was viewed as generally positive.23However,

ensuing months have seen a deterioration of India- Pakistan relations, and some in New Delhi

express frustration that the new civilian leaders in Islamabad have little influence over Pakistans

powerful military and intelligence agencies.24 In August, the Indian national security advisor

expressed worry at the possibly imminent removal from office of Pakistani President Pervez

Musharraf, saying such a development would leave radical extremist outfits with freedom to do

what they like in the region.25

21 Ibid22 http://www.indianexpress.com/story/210147.html]) Kashmiri Separatist Says India Talks Break Down, Reuters,August 30, 2007.23 Quietly Forward, Frontline (Chennai), June 20, 2008.24 India Frustrated by a Rudderless Pakistan, New York Times, August 12, 2008; India Yearns for PakistansMusharraf Amid Turmoil, Associated Press, August 12, 2008.25 Q&A With Indian National Security Advisor MK Narayanan, Straits Times (Singapore), August 12, 2008.


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In May, India accused Pakistan of committing multiple cease-fire and territorial violations along

the Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC); one incident left an Indian soldier dead. June visits to

Islamabad by External Affairs Minister Mukherjee, and later by Pakistans foreign minister to

New Delhi, were cordial and appeared to get the peace process back on track, but produced no

new initiatives. Then, on July 7, a suicide car bomb killed 58 people, including four Indian

nationals, at the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Afghan and Indian officials later

claimed to have evidence that Pakistans intelligence agency was complicit in the attack, a

charge reportedly echoed by the U.S. government. Late July serial bomb attacks in the cities of

Bangalore and Ahmedabad killed scores of people and triggered heightened suspicions of foreign

involvement in terrorist acts inside India.26Indian security officials also claim that Pakistans

Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) is poised to send 800 religious militants into India.27

On July 21, Foreign Secretary Menon met with his Pakistani counterpart in New Delhi to

launch the fifth round of the bilateral Composite Dialogue. Following the meeting, the Menon

warned that recent events culminating in embassy bombing had brought the peace process

under stress. Blunt language again followed a high-level meeting in Sri Lanka, where Menon

suggested that India-Pakistan relations were at a four-year low ebb. 28 Along with the Kabul

bombing, Indians widely suspect Pakistani complicity in recent terrorist attacks inside India. At

the same time, further lethal shooting incidents along the LOC in July exacerbated bilateral

tensions. When the Pakistani Senate passed a resolution on the situation in Indias Jammu and

Kashmir state (see below), an Indian official called the move gross interference in Indias

internal affairs. The exchange was soon repeated when the Pakistani foreign minister decried

excessive and unwarranted use of force in Kashmir by the Indian government, a charge

rejected as unhelpful by New Delhi. Moreover, New Delhis progress in an initiative that would

allow India to purchase nuclear materials and technologies on the international market spurred

Islamabad to warn of a potential new nuclear arms race on the Asian subcontinent.29

26 (Sophisticated Attacks Catch Indian Agencies Napping, Reuters, July 29, 2008; Hello, Anybody There?(editorial), Times of India (Delhi), July 29, 2008)27 Pakistan Behind Afghan Attacks, BBC News, July 14, 2008; India Blames Pakistan in EmbassyBombing, Associated Press, July 21, 2008;28 Briefing by Foreign Secretary After India-Pakistan Foreign Secretary-Level Talks, Indian Ministry of ExternalAffairs, July 21, 2008; India Official Sees Sinking Relations With Pakistan, New York Times, August 1, 2008.29 India Reacts Strongly to Pakistan Comments on Kashmir Violence, BBC Monitoring South Asia, August 12,2008;


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4.2 IMPACT ON OTHER COUNTRIES IN SOUTH ASIA

4.2.1 AFGHANISTAN

India takes an active role in assisting reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, having committed

some $1.2 billion to this cause, as well as contributing some 4,000 workers and opening

numerous consulates there (much to the dismay of Pakistan, which fears strategic encirclement

and takes note of Indias past support for Afghan Tajik and Uzbek militias). Among Indian

assistance to Afghanistan are funding for a new $111 million power station, an $84 million

roadbuilding project, a $77 million dam project, and construction of Kabuls new $67 Parliament

building, to be completed in 2010. There are reported to be several hundred Indian commandos

stationed in Afghanistan to provide protection for Indian reconstruction workers. The United

States has welcomed Indias role in Afghanistan. A July 2008 suicide bombing at Indias Kabul

Embassy was taken as a stark message to Indian leaders that Taliban militants and their allies

want New Delhi to withdraw from Afghanistan. Prime Minster Singh instead responded by

vowing $450 million in new Indian aid for Afghan reconstruction.30

4.2.2 NEPAL

Looking to the north, New Delhi supports consolidation of Nepals democratic and

conflict resolution processes, in particular through continued political assimilation of the

Maoists. India remains concerned by political instability in Kathmandu and by the cross-border

infiltration of Maoist militants into India. In April 2008, Nepali Maoists won a surprise electoral

victory in taking more than one third of Kathmandus Constituent Assembly seats to oversee a

new coalition government. The new Kathmandu government has since threatened to abrogate the

1950 Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty, which allows for unrestricted travel and residencyacross the shared border. While Indian officials are fairly sanguine about the development and

30 Afghan Bombing Sends Stark Message to India, New York Times, July 9, 2008; India Announces $450 MillionAid to Afghanistan, Reuters, August 4, 2008.


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vow openness to working with the new Nepali government, they are likely to have concerns

about the potential for instability in Nepal to exacerbate Indias own internal insecurities.31

4.2.3 BANGLADESH

To the east, and despite Indias key role in the 1971 creation of neighboring Bangladesh, New

Delhis relations with Dhaka have been fraught with tensions related mainly to the cross-border

infiltration of Islamic and separatist militants, and tens of millions of illegal migrants into India.

New Delhi is undertaking a $1.2 billion project to fence Indias entire 2,000-mile shared border

with Bangladesh. The two countries border forces engage in periodic gunbattles. Still, New

Delhi and Dhaka have cooperated on counterterrorism efforts and talks on energy cooperation

continue. The Bangladeshi faction of the Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami an Islamist militant outfit

that was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under U.S. law in March 2008 and that

has links to Pakistan-based terrorist groups has been implicated in several terrorist attacks

inside India, including May 2008 terrorist bombings that killed at least 63 people in Jaipur,

Rajasthan. Bangladeshs militarybacked interim government, which took power in 2007, may

benefit India by reducing anti-India rhetoric and by addressing the apparently growing influence

of Islamist forces that are seen as a threat to Indian interests.

4.2.4 SRI LANKA

In the island nation of Sri Lankaoff Indias southeastern coast, a Tamil Hindu minority

has been fighting a separatist war against the Sinhalese Buddhist majority since 1983. A

Norwegian-brokered cease-fire unraveled in 2006 and, after a series of military successes in

2007, the Colombo government abrogated the cease-fire in January 2008. More than 60 million

Indian Tamils live in southern India and tens of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees have

fled to India in recent months and years. Indias armed 1987 intervention to assist in enforcing a

peace accord resulted in the deaths of more than 1,200 Indian troops and led to the 1991

assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by Tamil militants. Since that time,

31 Maoists Scrap 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty, Indian Express (Mumbai), April 24, 2008; Elections in Nepal: MaoistsOffer an Uncharted Course, CSIS South Asia Monitor118,May 2, 2008.


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New Delhi has maintained friendly relations with Colombo while refraining from any deep

engagement in third-party peace efforts. New Delhi resists Colombos push for more direct

Indian involvement and insists there can be no military solution to the islands ethnic troubles.

The Indian Navy played a key role in providing disaster relief to Sri Lanka following the

catastrophic December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.


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CHAPTER-V

CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

We are now in position to answer several questions that we raised in the researchproposal. The first issue, that was raised that is whether the signing of the nuclear deal will result

in a shift in Indias foreign policy with regard to other countries particularly Iran and Pakistan.

As much as, the regional stronghold of India is beneficial to the United States, it is also a trump

card in the hands of India, to resist any dictation of policy by the United States. The very fact

that India has at its disposal several other possible alliances, prevents the United States from any

sort of intervention in foreign policy issues.

However, it is imperative that the success or failure of Indo-US relationship will be

crucial in determining the course of world affairs particularly in South Asia. The growing

economic supremacy of China, and its military dominance can only be balanced by joint effort

by both these countries. Any shift in loyalties is very likely to result in a massive disturbance in

the equilibrium that is being maintained in the region of South Asia. Nevertheless, the resolution

of several outstanding issues like Kashmir, Burma (Myanmar), the NPT, Iran, trade barriers,

immigration etc. will be required before a long-lasting relationship can be forged.

South Asia is turning into one of the most significant regions in terms international

terrorism. With 3 prominent nuclear powers in the region and it being the breeding ground of

several terrorist organizations it is indeed a matter of concern for the rest of international

community to ensure stability in the region, and prevent any possibilities of a war-like situation.

The Indo-US partnership will be crucial to eliminate terrorist infrastructure in the region, to

resolve the issue of the Junta in Myanmar, the LTTE in the Sri Lanka and the insurgency in

Tibet. The US brings with itself the NATO alliance which has proved successful in the past in

Central Asia and the Balkans in such operations. Moreover, the military and economic

cooperation will strengthen Indias own capabilities in ensuring security in the region.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Carla Anne Robbins, Bushs India Deal Bends Nuclear Rules, Wall StreetJournal, July 20,

2005, http://www.indianembassy.org/US_Media/2005/July/WSJ2.htm. See C. Raja Mohan,

Indias Nuclear Exceptionalism in Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, ed.

Morten Bremer Maerli and Sverre Lodgaard (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 152171.

2. See George Perkovich, Is India a Major Power? The Washington Quarterly 27, no.

1 (Winter 200304): 129144. For an explanation of the Bush administrations assumptions

about India, see Ashley J. Tellis, What Should We Expect From India as

a Strategic Partner? in Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation, ed. Henry Sokolski

(Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), pp. 231258,

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.

army.mil/pdffiles/PUB755.pdf.

3. Ashley J. Tellis, The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging

India and Pakistan, The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 2142.

4. See A.G. Noorani, Kashmir Resolution: Never Before So Close, Daily Times (Lahore),

June 25, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C06%5

C25%5Cstory_25-6-2008_pg3_5.

5. Delhis Durand Line, Indian Express, June 16, 2008, http://www.indianexpress.com/

story/323133.html.6. J. Alexander Thier, A Toxic Cocktail: Pakistans Growing Instability, USIPeace Briefing,

February 2008, http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0201_pakistan.html.

7. See C. Christine Fair, India-Iran Security Ties: Thicker Than Oil, in Gauging U.S.-

Indian Strategic Cooperation, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute,

2007), pp. 259290. For a critique, see Harsh V. Pant, India-Iran Ties: The

Myth of a Strategic Partnership, India in Transition, February 11, 2008, http://casi.ssc.

upenn.edu/print_pages/pdf/print_Pant.pdf.

8. See A.G. Noorani, Myths About Muslims: Dont Communalise the Nuclear Deal,

Times of India, July 9, 2008, p. 22.

9. Joshua Richards and Teresita Schaffer, India and the Gulf: Convergence of Interests,

South Asia Monitor, no. 113 (December 4, 2007), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/

sam113.pdf.


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Political Science Final 26-06-10-Sub