Political Science Document

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Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena

Executive Decree Authority by John M. Carey; Matthew Soberg Shugart; Structure and Policyin Japan and the United States by Peter F. Cowhey; Mathew D. McCubbins; Do InstitutionsMatter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad by Bert A. Rockman; R.Kent WeaverReview by: Kent EatonComparative Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Apr., 2000), pp. 355-376Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New YorkStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/422371.

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2/23

Review

Article

Parliamentarism ersus Presidentialism n the Policy

Arena

Kent Eaton

John M.

Carey

and Matthew

Soberg

Shugart,

eds.,

ExecutiveDecree

Authority,

New

York,

CambridgeUniversity

Press,

1998.

Peter

F.

Cowhey

and

Mathew

D.

McCubbins,

eds.,

Structureand

Policy

in

Japan

and

the

United

States,

New

York,

CambridgeUniversity

Press,

1995.

Bert A. Rockman and R.

Kent

Weaver,

eds.,

Do

Institutions

Matter?

Government

Capabilities

in the United States and

Abroad,

Washington,

D.C.,

The

Brookings

Institution

Press,

1993.

Academic debate

between advocates of

parliamentary

and

presidential democracy

initially

focused on which

institutional

arrangement

better contained

political

con-

flict and provideddemocraticstability.This early focus reflected the conditions in

the

1980s,

when

many

countries

were

emerging

from

periods

of nondemocraticrule

and

choosing

between the two

options.

Critics of

presidentialism

warned

that the

separation

of

powers

carried

significant

risks

for

these

new

democracies,

while other

scholars

disputed

the link

between

presidentialism

and the breakdown of

democracy.1Policy

figured

in this debate

only

insofar

as

critics of

presidentialism

argued

that the

separation

of

powers

increased he likelihoodof

policy

stalemateand

thus

regimeinstability.

Increasingly,

however,

he

terms of the

debate over

parliamentarism

nd

presiden-

tialism have broadened to include a more explicit concern for policy. Does the

process

of

policy making

and

implementation

in

parliamentaryregimes

differ in

important

and

systematic ways

from the

policy process

in

presidential

systems?

The

three

books

under

review

are

to

date

the most

comprehensive

and

sophisticated

reat-

ments

connecting

the

debate

over

parliamentary

and

presidential government

with

actual

policy

outcomes.

Each

is

a collection of case studies that

combines the

detailed

analysis

of

specific policies

in

selected

countries

with

attempts

o

generalize

about the role of

institutions

n

policy

selection.

None of these books is

exclusively

concerned

with

the

question

of

parliamentary

versus

presidential government, yet

important nsights

can be

gleaned

from each about

the

systematic impact

of

govern-

mentaltypes on thepolicy process.

355

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/23

Comparative

Politics

April

2000

Shifting

the focus

of

the debate

to

policy

outcomes is

obviously

a welcome

depar-

ture for those

whose interest in

politics

results

from their

primary

nterest

in

policy.

But it is importanto other audiences as well for a varietyof reasons.Due to a grow-

ing appreciation

of the

independent

role of

political

institutions,

fewer

political

sci-

entists now

perceive

democratic

stability

as

mainly

a function of economic

policy

and

performance

han

twenty years

ago.

Nevertheless,

many

scholars

worry

about

the

long-term

resilience of

democracies in which

politicians prove

unable to find

policy

solutions for entrenched

problems

such

as

poverty

and

unemployment.2

Others have

argued

that

certain

styles

of

policymaking

threaten

he

very

consolida-

tion of

democratic

government.3

The new

policy

focus on

governmental ype

thus

provides

an

important

connection to the sizable

body

of

scholarship

on

democratic

transition and consolidation.The debate over

parliamentarism

and

presidentialism

has

always

had an

important

normative

dimension;

the academic

arguments

of each

side have

occasionally

found

their

way

into debates

in

different

countries over the

merits of each

governmental

ype.4

If one

governmental ype

can be shown to have

certain

policymaking

attributes,

his

conclusion

would further

heighten

the

signifi-

cance of

the academic

debate

for the nonacademicworld. For committed institution-

alists the

emphasis

on

policy

also makes it

possible

for

the debate

over

governmental

type

to contribute o theoreticaldiscussions of the

consequences

of institutionalvari-

ation for

policy process

and substance.5

At the same

time,

some of the new research

on

policymaking

in

parliamentary

nd

presidentialsystems

offers

grist

for the mills

of those who advocate approachesto policy selection that are based on interests

rather than

institutions.

For

example,

while many of the contributors

to the

three

books

under review

emphasize

the importanceof governmental

ype as an institu-

tional

choice,

some find in their policy case studies

that this choice

matters ittle rel-

ative to other factors such

as

the

organization

and strengthof various interestgroups.

The literature

on governmental ype now ties

in to central debateswithin compara-

tive

and international

political

economy between those who

ascribe causal impor-

tance

to

the

political

institutions that supply policy and those

who emphasize

the

interests hat demandpolicy.

Perhaps ronically,the new focus on policy outcomes also offers additionalevi-

dence

to

help adjudicate

he debate over whether the parliamentarism-presidential-

ism

distinction

s

by itself very

useful. As the

scholar whose critiqueof presidential-

ism

set off

the

debate

in

the

1980s, Linz maintains

that all presidentialand

parlia-

mentarysystems have a common

core that allows

their differentiationand some

sys-

tematic

comparisons. 6Accordingto

Linz,

despite

institutionalvariation within

the

categories

of

parliamentary

ndpresidentialgovernment, he

fusion or separation

of

powers generates

some consistent differences in terms of the

incentives and

con-

straintsthat face

policymakers.

For

example,

despite the importance

of the number

and

stability

of

parties

in

the

cabinet, its ultimatedependence

on parliament emains

a criticalpoint thatdistinguishescabinetsfrom all independentlyelected chief exec-

356



4/23

Kent

Eaton

utives.

In their

analysis

of the

institutional

foundations of

democratic

government,

Moe and Caldwell

likewise

emphasize

the

transcendental nature

of

the choice

betweenparliamentary ndpresidentialgovernment. Whennations choose a presi-

dential or

parliamentary

orm,

they

are

choosing

a whole

system,

whose

various

properties

arise

endogenously...out

of

the

political

dynamics

that

their

adopted

form

sets in

motion. 7

In

contrast,

scholars who

emphasize

institutionalvariationwithin

each

govern-

mental

type

downplay

the

significance

of the distinction

between

parliamentarism

and

presidentialism.

Instead,

these scholars

suggest

thatthe debate

between

parlia-

mentary

and

presidentialgovernment

s

pitched

at too

high

a

level

to

be able to

yield

meaningful insights

about

political

outcomes and the

policy process.

For

them,

because of variationwithin each governmentaltype, generalizationsabout differ-

ences between

parliamentary

nd

presidential

governments

are

either

impossible

or

must be

highly

qualified.

For

example,

Shugart

and

Carey

responded

to

Linz's cri-

tique

of

presidentialism

by highlighting diversity

in the

performance

of

different

presidentialsystems

and

by

attributing

his

diversity

to a series

of lower-level

nstitu-

tional

choices,

including

the

president's

formal

legislative powers

and the

electoral

calendar.8 ones likewise focused on variationwithin

presidentialism

and

tracedthe

stability of some presidential systems

to electoral laws that

produce

majorities

for

the presidents

party in the legislature.9Mainwaringalso

emphasized

the

number

of

parties;he argued that the interbranch onflicts

said to

characterize

presidentialism

as a type are particularly cute in multiparty ystemsandless pronounced n

systems

with fewerparties.'0Tsebelis notes that policymaking

n

parliamentary

ystems

gov-

erned by multipartycoalitions shares features

with presidential

systems,

including a

greaternumber

of veto points and greaterobstacles

to

policy

change.11

n

addition

to

party system

variation,

democracies may vary

in such

other

institutional

dimensions

as electoral

rules, bicameralism,

federalism, and judicial

review.

Due

to

these

con-

founding

variables,

Tsebelis has questioned

the utility of

institutional

debates con-

ducted in pairs such as those

that contrast

parliamentary

nd

presidential

regimes

without simultaneously

accounting for variation n

these

other

institutional

dimen-

sions.12

Is the distinction between parliamentary

and

presidential

government

of

funda-

mental importance,or is it merely

one of many

institutional

eatures

hat

merit

equal

attention

by political analysts? Despite

salient

differences

that I

highlight

below,

most of the researchpresentedin Do

Institutions

Matter?

and

Structure

and

Policy

supports he importanceof the distinction

between

parliamentarism

nd

presidential-

ism. Neither of these

books, however,

focuses

exclusively

on

governmental

type.

Given their attempts

o explain

specific,

complex

policy

outcomes,

it

is

little

wonder

that the contributors ncorporateother

explanatory

variables

in

addition

to

govern-

mental

type.

The contributors o

Structureand

Policy

are

the

most

parsimonious n

this regard,due to their common

commitment

to

rationalist

institutionalism.

They

357



5/23

Comparative

Politics

April

2000

argue

that

two sets of

institutions,

governmental ype

and

electoral

rules,

account for

variation n American and

Japanesepolicies

in a numberof

distinct

areas,

including

the budget,telecommunications,nuclearpower,the exchangerate,andforeign poli-

cy.

Pursuing

a much more inductive research

method,

the contributors

to Do

Institutions Matter? are more eclectic in their

approach

and consider a

variety

of

what

they

take to be

separateexplanatory

variables,

including

bureaucraticautono-

my,

electoral

constraints,

social

conditions,

and

past

policy

choices.

While the

con-

tributors o Structureand

Policy

consider

many

of these same extra variables n their

case

studies,

they argue

that the

response

of

politicians

to

bureaucrats,

ocial struc-

tures,

and

policy

inheritances

is determined

largely by

the nature

of

the

political

institutions

surrounding

hem,

that

is,

governmental ype

and

electoral

rules.

Havingconsidered additionalexplanatoryvariables n one way or another,most

of

the

case

studies in

these books

report regular

and

significant

differences between

parliamentary

nd

presidentialsystems.13

hope

to

show,

however,

that

problems

of

case selection in

many

instances lead authorsto overstateclaims about the differ-

ences between

parliamentarism

nd

presidentialism.

On

the one

hand,

the focus on

Japan

and the U.S. as

examples

of

parliamentary

and

presidential

government,

together

with the

use of a common

rationalist

approach,

makes Structureand

Policy

a

powerfully

coherentand

tightly argued

book. On the other

hand,

t is

often difficult

to

determine whether the

policy

outcomes identified result from

presidential

and

parliamentary overnment

or from the

American

and

Japanese

versions of

them,

two

party presidentialism

n the U.S. and a

single-party-dominantystem

in

Japan.

Do

InstitutionsMatter?

partially

remedies this

problemby theorizing

about

and

present-

ing

research

on

different varieties of

parliamentarism, ncluding party government,

multiparty

coalitions,

and

single-party-dominantsystems. Though

it

includes ten

case

studies that cover nine countries

n

various

combinations,

t

unfortunatelyimits

its

analysis

of

presidentialism

o the U.S. This restriction

poses

a

problem

because

many

of

the attributes hat are said to

characterizeU.S.

presidentialism,

uch

as pow-

erful

legislative committees,may

be absent in other

presidentialsystems.

Executive

Decree

Authority

ills the

gap

in

researchon

presidentialism

with

studies of

policy-

making in five non-U.S. presidential systems: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Russia, and

Venezuela.

4

This review

essay

addresses

six

differentattributesof the

policy process.

I

synthe-

size

and

evaluate relevant

policy

evidence from each of the three

books about

how

parliamentary

nd

presidentialgovernments

differ for

each attribute.These

attributes

include

the number of

veto

players,

the site of

policy negotiations, the provision of

collective

goods, accountability,

nterest

group strategies,

and

delegation

to

bureau-

crats.

I

argue

that

many,

but not

all,

of

the

apparent egular

differences between

par-

liamentarism

and

presidentialism

breakdown when the

diversity

of each

governmen-

tal type is takeninto account.

358



6/23

KentEaton

The Number of Veto

Players

The number of veto players is at the heart of the distinction between systems that

fuse

legislative powers

in the

parliament

and

systems

that

divide

powers

between the

legislature

and the

chief

executive.

According

to

Tsebelis,

a veto

player

is an indi-

vidual or collective actor whose

agreement

is

required

for a

policy

decision. 15

n

presidentialsystems separately

elected

veto

players

hold fixed terms

and

enjoy

sepa-

ratesources of democratic

egitimacy. Multiple

veto

points

make

it difficult to

pass

legislation;

successful

bills are

often the

product

of

policy bargains

and

logrolls

that

are

virtually mpossible

to

reverse

once

legislated.'6

When

the executive and

legisla-

tive

branchesare controlled

by

different

parties,

either

may

veto

policy changes

initi-

ated in the other

branch,

and

irreconcilable

policy disagreements

between

the

branches can not

be

institutionally

resolved

by any

means short of

impeachment.l7

In

many presidential systems policy

differences between the branches

appear

to

drive

impeachment

proceedings,

and these

proceedings

tend

to

prove

more

destabi-

lizing

than the vote

of no

confidence

procedure

used to resolve

importantpolicy

dis-

putes

in

parliamentary

ystems.l8

When the two branchesare controlled

by

the same

party,

Tsebelis

argues, they

shouldnot be countedas

separate

veto

players.

However,

this

counting

decision

probably

understates

he amount

of

policy

conflict that

occurs

underunified

government

n

presidential ystems

since

presidents

and

legislators

are

still elected

by

different rules and in districts of

different

sizes,

which

should be

understoodas institutional ources of policy disagreementeven when the sameparty

controls both

branches.

In

parliamentarysystems

the cabinet

originates

in

and is

responsible

to

the

majority

n

the

assembly

and thus can not veto the

policy prefer-

ences of the

majority

and

remain

a

cabinet for

long.

In the

potential

absence

of such

veto

points,

some scholars

identify

a

commitment problem

in those

parliamentary

systems

where

majority parties enjoy

such

a

concentrationof

power

that

they

can

more

easily renege

on

policy

deals than

in

most

presidentialsystems.

9

Policy

stud-

ies

in the

books under review that

compare

the

U.S.

with

single party parliamentary

systems support

the

connection between

presidentialism

and

greater

veto

points.

Including other presidentialand parliamentary systems in the analysis, however,

throws the

connection into

question.

Support

or

the

importance

of

veto

players

in

presidentialism

s most

abundant

n

the detailed

case

studies

that

compareJapanand the U.S.

in

a numberof policy are-

nas, including

nuclear

power,telecommunications, ndthe environment. n Structure

and

Policy, Cohen, McCubbins,

and

Rosenbluth

argue

that the

separation

of

powers

helps explain why

the U.S. has

lagged

behind

parliamentary ystems like Japan n the

development

of

nuclear

power.According

to

these

authors,

the passage by the U.S.

Congress

of two

pieces

of

legislation-the

National Environmental

olicy

Act and the

Federal

WaterPollution Control

Act-gave

the

states powerful ools

to check

plans

for the developmentof nuclearpower generationcapacity,even to the extent of dupli-

359



7/23

Comparative

Politics

April

2000

eating

and

perhaps challenging

Nuclear

Regulatory

Commission

reviews. 20

By

empowering

states and

localities,

legislators strategically

ensured that the local con-

stituentswho are important o them are allowed to participate n regulationby the

independently

lected executivebranch.This

procedure

has resulted

n

a

multiplicity

of licenses

required

o

site,

build,test,

and

operate

nuclear

power plants

in the

U.S.,

many

of which are

processed

at

different

evels of

government

n a

lengthy process

made

even

more uncertain

by intervening

elections.

In a

parliamentary

ystem

like

Japan,

n

contrast,

he

legislature

retains ultimate

authority

overthe bureaucratswho

process

licenses,

and

legislators

have

structured more

streamlined

process.

If

impor-

tant constituents are harmed

by

nuclear

power regulation,

the

majority

Liberal

Democratic

Party

(LDP)

in the

legislature

can

easily bring

responsible

bureaucrats o

task,

unlikein

presidential ystems.

This streamlined

process

lowers

regulatory

costs

and the risks

of

investment

n nuclear

power.

Thus,

Japan

has been able to

develop

nuclear

power

to a much

greaterdegree

than the U.S. because

a

single

veto

player,

he

LDP,

has nothad to share

authority

with

any

other

separately

lected actor.

Noll andRosenbluthcome

to

many

of the

same conclusions

regarding

veto

points

and

policy stability

in their

analysis

of telecommunications liberalization.

Both

Japan

and the U.S.

substantially

iberalized theirtelecommunicationsmarkets

n the

1980s

and 1990s in

response

to user and

suppliergroups

who were

opposed

to

regu-

lated

monopolies.2'

While the authorstrace differencesin the content of liberaliza-

tion

policy

to the

differentelectoral

incentivesfacing Japanese

and American egisla-

tors, they attribute he speed of policy change to the numberof veto players.In the

U.S. serious efforts to

challenge

AT&T'svertical integrationbegan

in

the 1930s

and

resulted

in

its separation into eight companies

only in 1981. This lengthy

delay

resulted from the

conflicting

interestsof four different veto

players: Congress,

the

departments

of

defense andjustice, and the courts.

In

contrast,

the LDP in Japan

began

discussions

on

the

privatization

of

Nippon

Telegraph

andTelephone (NTT) in

1982 and voted to

submit

the

telecommunications

bill to the

diet in April 1984.

Legislating

privatization depended on the

decision of just

a single actor and,

because

agreements

are

negotiated

behind the scenes, with cash used for side

pay-

ments,a legislativedeal need not reveal all of its terms, and so is easier to reach. 22

While the

contributors o Structure and

Policy agree that

the U.S. presidential

system

has more veto

points

than Japaneseparliamentary overnment,

he multiple

veto

points

at

play

in

presidential systems

do not always conspire

against policy

change.

In

their

analysis

of

internationalmacroeconomic

coordination eading

to the

1985 Plaza

Accord,Fukui and Weatherford rgue

that the U.S.

executive was able to

force

Japan

o take action

to drive

up

the value of its currencybecause of the

credi-

ble

threat

that,

in

the absence of such

a

change in exchange rate policy, the

U.S.

Congress

would

use its prerogatives on trade

policy to penalize

Japan.23At the

domestic

level, then,

the

separation

of

powers

may create obstaclesfor policy change

that become opportunitiesn a two-level game.

360



8/23

KentEaton

Based on the

comparisons

of the U.S. and

Japan,

presidentialismappears

o create

more veto

players

than

parliamentarism.Widening

the focus to include other

types

of parliamentary ndpresidentialsystems,however,suggests that the simple distinc-

tion between

parliamentarism

nd

presidentialism

does not determinethe numberof

veto

players.

Two

examples

are

multipartyparliamentarism,

discussed

by

some of

the contributors o Do Institutions

Matter?,

and

presidential

ystems

wherethe

presi-

dent is endowed with constitutional decree

authority,

discussed

by

Carey

and

Shugart.

Among parliamentaryystems,

the

logic

of veto

point analysissuggests

that mul-

tiparty

coalitionswill

yield

a

higher

numberof veto

players

than

single-party-domi-

nant

systems, potentially approximating

he

veto

points

that characterize

presiden-

tialism. In Do Institutions

Matter?,

Schick

analyzes

efforts

by

the

U.S.,

the

Netherlands,

and Sweden to reduce

budget

deficits

in

the 1980s and

finds

similar

outcomesin the U.S.

presidentialsystem

and Dutch

multipartyparliamentarism.24

n

the U.S. the

conflicting

fiscal

priorities

of

congressional

Democrats and a

Republicanpresident

ed

not

only

to

historic

deficits,

but to

dissembling

about

polit-

ical

responsibility

for

the deficit.

In

the Netherlands'

parliamentarysystem early

success in deficit

reduction

by

a coalition

government

of ChristianDemocrats and

Liberals was reversed prior to the 1989 elections, when the two cabinet parties

developed differentpolicy preferences.The Christian

Democrats

wanted

to

increase

spending,while the Liberalsremainedcommittedto austerity;each had the means

to

veto attemptsby the other partyto enact its preferredpolicy. Schick contraststhese

two cases

of

paralysis with party government in Sweden.

The

Swedish Social

Democratic Party enjoyed a majority

in

the legislature from 1982

to

1991. This

majority enabled

it to

concentrate sufficient power

in

the cabinet to eliminate the

deficit

by increasing

revenue five

percentagepoints

relative to

GDP.

As

further

sup-

port

for the

critical distinction between

party government

and

multipartycoalitions,

Schick

argues

that

during

Sweden's earlier

experience

with

multipartyparliamen-

tarism

between

1980 and 1982 a coalition of bourgeois partieswas unable

to

pursue

a determinedcourse

in

fiscal

policy.25

In

presidentialsystems, Executive Decree Authorityuncovers a great deal of vari-

ation

in

the

degree

to which

different

presidents

are endowed

with

constitutional

decree

authority.Though

one

of the

major purposes

and main contributionsof this

book is to

question

the

assumption hat decree authoritynecessarily undermines

con-

gressional prerogatives,

n

practice constitutionaldecree authorityoften reduces the

veto power of players in the legislature. For

example,

Carey and Shugart correctly

point

out that constitutionaldecree

authority

alone does not allow the

president

o set

policy unilaterally

or circumvent he

veto

points

characteristic

f

presidentialism.

In

the

presence

of

cohesive

assembly majorities,

decree

authority...will

not allow execu-

tives to make their

policy preferences stick unless decree

is

combined with reactive

powers, uch as the abilityto veto rivallawspassed by the legislature.26Many legis-

361



9/23

Comparative

Politics

April

2000

latures

in

presidentialsystems,

however,

rarely

enjoy

cohesive

majorities

and,

for

these

bodies,

constitutional decree

authority

(as

distinct

from

delegated

decree

authority) hreatens heirabilityto participatemeaningfully n the policy process.

Furthermore,

ven

if

the

president

does

not have a

veto,

legislatorsmay

still face

practical problems

in

reversing

or

modifying

decrees.

This case is

best

seen in

Powers'study

of

Brazil,

where

presidents

can use

provisional

measures

to

decree

laws into effect for a

period

of

thirty

days.

Such decrees become law

only

when

approved

by

the

legislature,

but the executive

can reissue

decrees

indefinitely.

Recent

presidents

such as FernandoCollor de Mello have

depended

on

the reitera-

tion of

decrees

to

implement

their most

important

nitiatives.

Consequently, public

policies

are

debated after rather

han

before their

enactment nto law. 27

hough

the

congress

is

technically

free to alter

the

decrees,

in

practice

it is

constrained

by

what

Powers calls

clean-up

costs since

the 1988 constitution

requirescongress

to cor-

rect

through

additional

legislation

all of the

possible

ramifications of

rejecting

a

decree.

In

orderto

reject

the

antiinflationary

decree

through

which PresidentCollor

froze bank

accounts,

for

instance,

congress

would have had to

anticipate

and take

action on

a

variety

of

possible

consequences

of

rejecting

the

decree,

including capi-

tal

flight,

inflation,

and the

collapse

of the

banking system.

The

practical

dilemmas

posed by

rejecting presidential

decrees were also salient in

Argentina.

Ferreira

and

Goretti

argue

that

the

Argentine

supreme

court

approved

a

presidential

decree

that

created a forced

public

loan

system

since

finding

the decree unconstitutionalwould

havehad seriousimplicationsfor the solvency of the state.28 n practice,decreescan

underminethe

effectiveness

of congressionalveto players, and

consequentlylower

the barriers o

policy change

in presidential

systems,

even when these players

retain

formal

legislativepowers.

Whether

powers

are

fused

or

separated

s

an

important

consideration n counting

veto

players,

but

it

is not determinative. nstead,counting the

numberof veto players

at work in

a

given policy

area is often a messy andsubjectiveaffair,despite Tsebelis'

argument

hat veto

player

analysis

offers

a conceptually

consistentmethod of

mak-

ing comparisons

across systems. 29Difficulty

in defining what should count

as a

veto playerchallengesthe deceptively straightforwardppealof the veto playercon-

cept.

For

example, though

the contributors o

Structureand Policy

contrast he single

veto

player

in

Japaneseparliamentarism

with the multiple players

in U.S. presiden-

tialism, they

presentcompellingevidence that

significant veto

playersoperatewithin

the

LDP.

Cowhey argues

that

unwanted nitiatives

by LDP cabinetministers on

mili-

tary policy

were

checked

by

the LDP's own Policy Affairs Research Committees

(PARC).30

Noll and

Rosenbluth

show

that, despite

the swift legislationof NTT's

pri-

vatization,

the

company's ong-standing ies

to members of the PARCtelecommuni-

cations

division

succeeded

in

preventing

real privatization of NTT for several

years. 31

n

Do

Institutions

Matter?, Feigenbaum,

Samuels, and Weaver conclude

that Japanoutperformedthe U.S. in developing nuclear power but argue that the

362



10/23

Kent

Eaton

LDP

also had to confront and

overcome the

opposition

of

affected local communi-

ties

by

buying

them

off.32These cases

reveal

the

ambiguity

involved in

counting

veto players.In light of Japanese policy stasis in the 1990s in the face of growing

economic

crisis,

which

many

attribute

o

internalLDP

dynamics,

who is to

say

that

the

veto

players

operating

within

the LDP count for

less than

veto

players

in

presi-

dential

systems?

Despite

the benefits of veto

player

analysis,

including spatial

mod-

eling

and

applications

of the winset

concept,

detailed research s

necessary

to identi-

fy

veto

players

and to

specify

the

nature of their veto

power.

As

successfil

policy

analysts

have

always

known,

the

first

step

in

policy analysis

is

identification

of all

the relevant

actors who have stakes

in andthe

power

to affect the outcome of

a

poli-

cy process.

The

Site

of

Policy

Negotiation

One of the

many

contributions

of these three

books is the

suggestion

that

parliamen-

tarism

and

presidentialism

may

differ

systematically,

not so

much

in

the amountof

bargainingamong politicians

over

policy,

but rather n the

sites where such

bargains

are

negotiated.

Sites

affect

the

visibility

of

bargains

to

voters,

and

visibility may

decrease or increase

the

likelihood of

agreementamong politicians

over different

types

of

policy. Many

of the

policy

case studies under

review indicate that it

can

be

harderto locate who has influence and where they exert it in systems with fused

powers.

In these

systems,

policy analysts

tend to

emphasize

the

importance

of

party

caucuses,

subcabinet

level

meetings,

and

informal,

private

give-and-take

between

party

leadersand

backbenchers

as sites of

policy bargains.

Public and often

publi-

cized conflict

over legislation is

more

common in

presidential

systems, where

a

bill

must

work its

way

throughthe

separately

elected

chambers to

a

separatelyelected

president.

The

separationof

powers

creates the

potential

for

greater

policymaking

transparency,

n

important

inding that

standsup

across many

countries.Two cau-

tionarypoints

are

in

order,

however.

First,

private,

behind-the-scenes

exchanges are

importantn presidentialsystems, too. Second,the heavy use of executivedecrees in

some

presidential

ystems

undercuts

presidentialism's

laim to

transparency.

Due

to its

tendency to

publicize

conflict,

the

separationof

powers may

have

played a

role

in

tarnishing

presidentialism's

reputationas

an

institutional

arrange-

ment that can

be

effective at

policymaking.

Failures

by

politicians in

presidential

systems to

overcome veto

points and

legislate

policy are

likely to

become

public

knowledge.

For

example,

Piersonand

Weaver

report

thatonly

two out of seven

pen-

sion cutting

initiatives n the

U.S.

presidentialsystem

since 1977

actually

resulted in

major

changes,

a higher

failure

rate

than in the

parliamentary

ystems

they study.

They

note,

however,

that, in

parliamentary

ystems,

proposals

that lack

adequate

supportwithinthe governingpartyusuallywill not see the lightof day. 33

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11/23

Comparative

Politics

April

2000

Since informationabout

policy

and

politicians

is often

costly

to

acquire,

he

sepa-

ration of

powers may produce

valuable information

for

voters.

In

Structure and

Policy, Cowhey arguesthat the tug-of-warbetween the branchesin the U.S. presi-

dential

system

leadsto more

systematic

disclosure of informationabout

policymak-

ing.

This increases the

transparency

f

foreign policy

choices

both

to voters at home

and

foreign

allies. 34

He concludes that U.S.

foreign policy

commitments

have been

highly

credible because

they

concealed

no

hidden

agreements

that

could

easily

unravel

if

exposed.

In

Japan,

in

contrast,

the LDP had

to

rely

on

prominent

pledges

and other

self-binding

behaviorto make

credible its

commitment o limited

amounts

of

defense

spending

because

it

enjoyed

such

a

concentration

of

power

that it

alone could decide to deviate from

the

country's

avowed

foreign policy

commit-

ments.

Noll andRosenbluth

argue

that the same veto

points

thatslowedthe

pace

of liber-

alization

in the U.S. also

heightened

the

transparency

of

the

policy process.

This

transparency

ad a

positive

effect since

transparency

nd the

possibility

for coordi-

nated

corruption

between

regulators

and

regulated

industries are

inversely

related.

They

note,

in

contrast,

the

high

levels of

corruption

hat

characterize elecommuni-

cations

policy

in

Japan,

where

responsibility

for

policy

trade-offsand

side

payments

were concentratedover a

long period

of time

within

a

single

party

in

parliament.

Different

locations

for substantive

policy bargains

are

also

apparent

n

budgetary

politics.

As

part

of their

central

argument

hat LDP

politicians

ratherthan bureau-

cratscontrol the budgetaryprocess, McCubbinsand Noble maintainthat legislators

in

Japan

have

enormous

policy input,

but not necessarily in the

legislature.They find

that internal

party

bodies

(Policy

Affairs

Research

Committees)

to which LDP legis-

lators

are

named rather

than parliamentarycommittees are

important. Spending

ministries

report

to the relevant

PARCdivisions before they submit

their requests

to

the

Ministry

of

Finance. 35

ackbenchers hus get what they

need for electoral

suc-

cess from the

budget

before

it

is

submittedto the parliament.

Party leaders control

the

process by balancing

electoral particularismwith broad

macroeconomic

con-

straints,

but this

balancing

act is not subjectto great public scrutiny.

Budgetarypoli-

tics in the U.S. differ sharply.The budget that the presidentsends to Congress is

occasionally

declared dead on

arrival and,

with few exceptions, is substantially

reworked

by Congress

at

many differentstages

and in a highly visible manner.

Not

all

bargaining

over

the budget is visible

in presidential ystems. For

example,

in

a

study

of

Argentine

budgetarypolitics Jones

finds that most importantbargains

between

legislators

and

the executive branchalso

occur

as

the budget is being

draft-

ed

by

the

finance

ministry,

well

before

it

makes

it to

the floor of the congress.36

Most

likely,

the connection between

presidentialismand policymaking

transparency

depends

on

intervening

variables such as the

degree

to

which

internalcongressional

institutions

are

developed.

In

presidential systems where

politicians face

lower

reelection rates and higher party discipline than in the U.S., legislators may have

364



12/23

KentEaton

fewer

incentives

to invest in the

development

of institutions ike

congressional

com-

mittees. These

systems

centralize

policy

negotiation

in

the executive

branch

despite

the formalseparationof powers.

The

regular egislativeprocess

in

presidentialism

mplies

a

tug-of-war

between

the branches that

produces

information about

politicians,

their

policy preferences,

and connections to

pressure groups.

There are

real concerns about how

often

these

channels are

actually

used in

manypresidential

democracies.

Legislation

via

execu-

tive decree often

supplants

the

use

of

regular legislative

channels.

The reliance on

decrees

suggests

that

policy

bargains

are

negotiated

in

the executive

branch,

not

in

open

give-and-take

between the executive

and

legislative

branches. For

example,

Ferreiraand Goretti note the

reliance

of

Argentine

president

Carlos Menem

on the

issuance of decretos de necesidad

y urgencia (need

and

urgency

decrees),

many

of

which

were

not even communicated o

congress. They

also find

that

the

legislature

took

no

action on 90

percent

of the decrees

that Menem

submitted.37Lackof

action

does

not

necessarily imply agency

losses

for

legislators,

since the

content

of

many

simply anticipated egislators' preferences.

While the

decrees do not seem

to threat-

en the interestsof

legislators

from Menem's Peronist

Party

significantly,they

reduce

the

transparency

nd

stability

of the

policymaking

process.

In

Venezuela,

Crisp

notes

that the legislature

commonly

delegates

decree

powersof

varyingscope to

the presi-

dent when both branchesare

controlled

by

the same

party.38

argains

over

policy

are

subsequently worked out,

not on the

floor of

congress or in

public

interactions

between the branches,but within the governingparty.This practice looks not unlike

parliamentarism.

The Provision of

Collective

Goods

Many

politicians

appear to

be more

interestedin

legislating

targeted

policies that

provide particularistic

enefits than

policies of

nationalscope

thatprovide

collective

goods.

Figuring out why

different

political

systems

strikesuch

different

balances in

the provision of collective versus particularisticgoods is an increasingly salient

research

agenda.

Students of

the U.S.

presidential

system have

long

noted the

pro-

nounced

interestof

legislators

n

providing

heir

constituents

with

divisible

goods for

which

they can

claim credit.

Linz

extends

the

argument

more

broadly

to

congres-

sional parties in

presidential

systems, which

do

not have

responsibility

for national

policy and

subsequently

turn to the

representation

of special

interests,

localized

interests,and

clientelistic

networks n

their

constituencies. 39

Manyof

the

contributors

o these

books

tendto

supportthis

view

of

legislatures

in presidential

systems,but

they also

make

two points

that

partially

counter t.

First,

particularistic

decision

makingmay

also

characterize

cabinet

government

n

parlia-

mentarysystems. As Rockmanand Weaverargue, the centralizationof budgeting

365



13/23

Comparative

Politics

April

2000

authority

n cabinet

government

maypromote

a

'politically

efficient' allocation of

resourcesto the districts of

cabinet

ministers,

to

localities

favoring

the

governing

partyorparties,or to tightlycontested electoral districts. 40 n overarchingheme of

Structure

and

Policy

is that

party

leadersin

Japan'sparliamentary ystem carefully

balance

the

particularistic

demands

of individual

legislators

with the

party's

overall

macroeconomic

policy strategy.

Second,

though

the

separation

of

powers

may

free

legislators

in

presidentialsys-

tems from

responsibility

or national

policy,

presidentialismguarantees

a

policymak-

ing

role for

an actor elected in a nationwidedistrict.In

both

parliamentary

nd

presi-

dential

systems legislators

are

typically

(but

not

always)

elected

in

subnationaldis-

tricts,

but

in the

lattera chief

executive

is

separately

elected

in a national district.As

Moe and Caldwell

argue,

unlike

legislators,presidents

are

held

responsible

for vir-

tually

every aspect

of

national

performance. 41

residents are thus

institutionally

well

poised

to

articulate

he

need

for

collective

goods

such as the nationaldefense.

For

example,

in three

studies

comparing

various

aspects

of

defense

policy

in

Japan

and the U.S.

Bobrow, Cowhey,

and

Kolodziej

come to similar

conclusions about

the

protagonism

of the

president

vis-a-vis defense

policy.

All three authors

ind

that U.S.

defense

policy

combines

the

different

policy preferences

of

presidents

and

legisla-

tors in a

relatively

stable

bargain:

the

president

takes

responsibility

for

shaping

national defense

policy

as a collective

good,

while

legislators

infuse

this

policy

with

particularism

uch

as defense

contracts or local constituents.42

Accountability

The questionof accountability

has figured prominently

n debatesover the fusion

and

separation

of

powers.

Critics

of

presidentialismargue

that,

since

the executive

and

legislative

branches

share

policymaking

authority,

hey can shirksole responsibility

for

policy

failures,

making

it

difficult for

voters to know whom they should

hold

accountable.43 n

parliamentary

ystems,

voters can easily identify the parties

with

representationn the cabinetas exclusively responsible or policy.In contrast,Shugart

and

Carey

find a

high degree

of

accountability

n presidentialism since voters

vote

directly

for an executive who cannot be

removed

by shifting coalitions

in the assem-

bly. 44

Most

of

the

policy evidence amassed

in Do InstitutionsMatter? supports

he

argument

hatpolicymaking n presidential ystems

suffers from

greateraccountabili-

ty problems

than in

parliamentary ystems.

Some of the chapter

authors,

however,

argue

that voters have an

easier

time holding individual legislators

accountable

in

presidential

ystems

like the U.S. Furthermore, nalysis of a broader

set of presiden-

tial

systems

in

Executive

Decree Authority

suggests that delegationmay in practice

solve some of the

accountability

problemscreatedby the separation

of powers.

Sharedlegislative authoritybetween two separatelyelected branches often plays

366



14/23

KentEaton

havocwith voters'

ability

to

identify

which actors are most

responsible

for

the

policy

outcomes that

matter

to

them. With

respect

to

the

political

behavior

that led to his-

toric budget deficits in the U.S. in the 1980s, Schick finds that nobody was to

blame because

everybody

was to

blame. '45

ccountability,

however,

does not

just

entail

punishing

politicians

for

unpopularpolicies;

it also

requires

that voters are

able to reward hem

for

enacting policies

they

favor.

The

desire for rewardscan

lead

to

perversepolicy

outcomes

under the

separation

of

powers.

For

example,

Schick

argues

that under

divided

government

n

presidential

systems

a

biddingup process

sometimesoccurs in which each branch

ncreases

the

good

supplied

by

government

in an

attempt

to claim

credit

for the

policy.

Examples

include

the

sharp

increase

in

social

security

benefits in 1972

and the

deep

tax

cut of

1981.

Vogel

uncovers

a simi-

lar

dynamic

at

play

in the

provision

of

collective

goods

such as

a cleaner

environ-

ment. Under Nixon's

government,

at

a time

when

public

concern

about

pollution

was

very high,

each

branch

wanted to claim

credit for tougher

environmental

regulations.46

Thus,

the identificationand

accountability

problems

characteristicof

presidential

democracy

led to

higher

levels of

regulation

than

politicians

with the

same

policy preferences

would

likely

have

endorsed

n

a

system

of

fused

powers.

To

the extent that

parliamentary

ystems

concentrate

policymaking

authority

n

the

cabinet,

accountability

problems

may

be lessened. Such

concentration

of

power,

however,

may

create

problems

of its own

for

policies

that involve

the

imposition

of

losses, since

there can be no fudging about

political

responsibilityfor

these losses.

As Pierson and Weaverargue, becausegovernmentalpower is more centralizedin

parliamentary

ystems, accountability s more

centralized

as well. 47

Theymake

this

point persuasively n their

discussion

of

efforts by

American,

Canadian,

and British

politicians to cut old age

pensions. They

find that,

despite

heading a

single-party

majority government

hat

gave

him the

necessary

power to

de-index social

security

benefits

as called for in the

Conservative

party

platform,

Canadian

prime minister

Brian Mulroneybacked away

fromthis

position

because he was

concerned

aboutthe

electoral fallout of imposing

pension

cuts.48

While Pierson and

Weaver

generally

find

lower levels

of

accountability in

the

U.S. presidentialsystem,they arguethat,throughmechanismssuchas roll call votes

and

vetoes,

individual egislators

and

the

presidentcan

be

held

individuallyaccount-

able for policy positions.49Roll

call

votes

may be

an

especially

effective

way

of

increasingthe

accountabilityof

legislators

elected in

single

member

districts,

where

voterscan

demand

oyalty

to the

district

over

loyalty to

the

party.

Recent

decisions in

Venezuela (1993) and

Bolivia

(1996)

to

incorporate

ingle

member

districts

into

the

traditional

system

of

party lists

were

designed in

part to

increase this

type of

accountability

between

legislators

and

their

constituents.In

single

member

districts

in

parliamentary

systems, the

ability

of

voters to

hold

legislators

individually

accountable to their

districts

is

undercutby

the

level of

party

discipline

needed to

maintainconfidencein the government.50

367



15/23

Comparative

Politics

April

2000

If

politicians

can be held

individually

accountable

in

presidential

systems, they

can also

try

to avoid

being

held accountable

by delegatingpolicymaking authority

o

the president. With the critical difference that the president retains his separate

source of democratic

legitimacy, delegation

in

presidential

systems

mimics

parlia-

mentarism

by concentrating

decision-making

power

in the executive cabinet. Some

country

case

studies

in ExecutiveDecree

Authority

show that

legislators

often

dele-

gate

reform

powers

to the

president

n the

hope

that the electoratewill

hold the

pres-

ident alone accountable for the

pain produced by

economic

reform. For

example,

Parrish finds

that Russian

legislators

voted to

delegate sweeping

decree

powers

to

President Yeltsin

in

November

1991 in order to facilitate the radical economic

reform

program

for which

they

did

not want to be

held

responsible.

These

powers

enabled Yeltsin to issue decrees related

to

banking,

he stock

market,...investment,

customs

activity,

the

budget,

price

formation, taxation,

property,

and

reform,

and

employment. 51 imilarly,

Schmidt

argues

thatPeruvian

egislators

in

the

opposition

APRA

party delegated power

to the

president

in

1968

to

impose

tax reform and

waived their

right

to

review the decreesin an

attempt

o eschew

political responsibil-

ity.52

These

examples

raise

an

interesting puzzle.

If there is

widespreadagreement

about how the

president

will use decree

powers

(a

plausible

assumption),

and if

leg-

islators

believe

that

such

decrees

will

hurtconstituents

who matter o

them,

then

why

do

legislators

believe that these constituents

will not

hold them accountable

for

knowinglydelegating the power

necessary to issue such decrees?

Perhaps egislators

areconfident thatvoters, like most scholarsto date,will takedecrees as evidence of

presidential

usurpationand thus hold the president

alone responsible,even when

leg-

islatorshave

acquiesced

in the decrees.53

Interest

Group Strategies

In

trying

to

influence the

policy

process,

do interestgroups adoptconsistently

differ-

ent

strategies

n

parliamentary

s opposed to presidentialsystems?

The contributors

to

Structure and Policy find that they do because different

political institutions

encourage

reelection-mindedpoliticians to prioritize

very different

sets of interests.

For

example,

legislators

in

Japan's ormer electoral

system of

single nontransferable

votes

privileged

particularisticdemandsfrom

constituentsmore

than would be likely

in a

system

of

closed

party

lists. With respect to the U.S.

presidential system,

Cowhey

and

McCubbins argue that shared law-making authority

broadens

the

natureof the

coalition necessary

to change policy,

which potentiallycreates

oppor-

tunities for

a wider array

of interests.54

Many of the chapter authors

in Do

Institutions Matter? are much less willing

to attribute interest group access

to

prior

nstitutionalvariables.For instance, Schick closes his

analysis of budgetpol-

icy by arguingthat, even without consideringinstitutionaldifferences,deep-seated

368



16/23

KentEaton

patterns

of interest

group organization

alone

can

explain

much of the variation in

deficit reductionthathe documents.

Thus,

interest

grouppluralism

in the U.S.

and

fragmentedcorporatism n the Netherlandspreventedeffectivebudget cutting,while

strong

and stable ties between

the

labor movement and the Social

Democrats in

Swedenfacilitatedeffectivefiscal

policymaking.55

Apart

fromthese

differences,

there is broad

agreement

hat the

separation

of

pow-

ers

creates

two foci for

pressuregroup

activities

in

presidential

systems:

the

execu-

tive branch

and the

legislative

branch.56

Vogel

argues

in his

study

of environmental

policy

that the

separation

of

powers

lowers the cost

of

access

for

interest

groups

since

it

is not

necessary

to

command

the

support

of a

significant

numberof voters

in

order

to

affect the decisions

of a

congressional

committee. 57He

finds that this

argument

holds

for all sorts of

diffiuse

nterests

in the

U.S., including

the women's

movement,

civil

rights,

and consumer

organizations.

Vogel

also

argues

that,

once dif-

fuse interests

get

favorable

policies adopted

in

presidentialsystems, multiple

veto

points

lock

in

these

policies.

A case

in

point

is

the

difficulty

President

Reagan

encountered

in

attempting

to

reverse environmental

regulation

in the

1980s.58

In

contrast,

n

single-party-dominant arliamentary ystems

like

Japan,

environmental

groups enjoyed

little access to decision

making

since

they

were not

electorally

important

o the LDP and

Japan

has no

independently

elected

president

who

might

have

been more

responsive

to

their concerns.

However,

if the

costs of interestgroup access are

low in

the

U.S.,

how

much is

due to the separationof powers and how much to the particularlydecentralized

nature of

power

in the

U.S.

Congress

after

the

reforms of

the 1970s? In most other

presidentialsystems legislative

committees are less

institutionalized,

nd

policymak-

ing authority

tends to be held more

tightly by party leaders

rather than

dispersed

among backbenchers. Where there are

few

incentives

for committee members to

develop policy

expertise,

delegation

to the

executive

becomes

relatively

more

attrac-

tive as a means of taking advantageof bureaucratic xpertise

in

the design

of

poli-

cies.

Notwithstanding Carey

and

Shugart'sargument

that

delegation may

enhance

the interestsof congressional majorities,when legislators delegateto presidentsthe

authority o write the specifics of policy, they are sending clear signals to interest

groups

about where to

focus

their

lobbying

efforts.

Since Do

Institutions

Matter?

and Structure

and

Policy

view

presidentialism

through

he

lens

of the

U.S., they

tend to

agree

that

interest

groups

have

greater

ob-

bying options

in

presidential

as

opposed

to

parliamentary ystems. They disagree

sharply,however,

about where

interestgroups focus

their

pressure

activities

in

par-

liamentarysystems. Rockman and Weaverargue that

in

parliamentary ystems the

bureaucracy

nd the

cabinet ministers

are

the

main points

of access

open

to interest

groups. 59

For

example,

in

explaining

the

efficacy

of

Japanese

industrial

policy,

Krauss and Pierre emphasize the relationshipbetween the Ministry of International

Tradeand Investmentand large industries organized into trade and peak associa-

369



17/23

Comparative

Politics

April

2000

tions.60

In

contrast,

he contributors o Structureand

Policy challenge

the traditional

view

that centers

responsibility

for

Japanese policymaking

in the

bureaucracy.

Instead,for these authorspartyleadersare the individualsmost responsiblefor pro-

cessing

the various demandsof interest

groups, despite

the

appearance

of bureau-

cratic

dominance.

Consistently,

he

interests

that

matter most to the

LDP,

including

large

manufacturers,

inance,

and

agriculture,

are

favored

in

the

policy

process

rela-

tive

to

less

important

nterests ike consumersand environmentalists.

Delegation

to

Bureaucrats

Politicians

in

parliamentary

nd

presidentialsystems

alike must

rely

on

bureaucrats

to

implement

the

policies they adopt.

Thereare

reasons, however,

to

expect

that

leg-

islators in

presidentialsystems

will

be much more

wary

about

delegating

discretion

to bureaucrats

or

fear that the

president

as a

separately

elected

politician

will use

the

bureaucracy

in

ways

that do not

advance

legislators'

interests.

According

to

Cowhey

and

McCubbins,

once the

legislature

has

delegated powers

to

the

president,

any attemptsby Congress

to overturn executive

actions

legislatively

require

the

acquiescence

of the executive

himself

(or

an

extraordinary

majority,

as defined in

the

Constitution). 61

n

parliamentary ystems legislators

retain

ultimate

authority

over the

cabinet and

over

bureaucrats

n

the event that

delegated

powers

actually

undermine hemajority n the legislature.

In

support

of this

distinction,

several

policy

studiesfind thatthe

legislature

n the

U.S.

presidential ystem attempts

o reduce its

exposure

to

unresponsive

bureaucrats

by writing

very

detailed

egislation

and

by favoring

a

high degree

of

procedural

om-

plexity.

An

example

of

detailed

lawmaking

n the U.S. is

provided

n

the

energy poli-

cy study by Feigenbaum,Samuels,

and Weaver.

They

find that

legislatorsattempted

to

micromanagepolicy problems

rather han

give

discretion o the executive. 62

uch

detailed

lawmaking

has

been

particularly

acute when different

partiescontrolledthe

two

branches,

but it

also occurs

under unified

governmentsuch

as

the periodin the

1970s when Congressand PresidentCarterclashed over the developmentof nuclear

power.

With

respect

to

proceduralcomplexity,Vogel's 1986 study of environmental

regulation

contrasts the

use

of

uniform emissions

standardsand

elaborate environ-

mental

impact

statements

n the

U.S.

with the

high flexibility

and

greatercase-by-case

discretionof bureaucratsn

Britain.63 oll and

Rosenbluth ind similar

regulatorydif-

ferences

between the

U.S.

and

Japan.

U.S.

legislators, knowing

that

they are more

likely

to

have

policy

conflicts...withthe

independent xecutive, are more likely to rely

on

formalized

decision-makingprocesses

and

judicial

review

to

police

the

decisions

of

agencies

than

are

legislators

n

Japan. 64

Moe and

Caldwell take the

argument

ur-

ther

by writing

that

legislators

in

presidential systems systematically produce

bureaucraticmonstrosities ecause of theirpreference orcomplexity.65

370



18/23

Kent

Eaton

As

is

the case with other attributes of the

policymaking process,

however,

the

propensity

o

delegate authority

o

bureaucrats

may

not be uniform

across the differ-

ent types of presidentialand parliamentary ystems. Despite the variousways they

design delegation

to

safeguard

against

the

possibility

of

usurpationby

the

president,

legislators

in

most of the

presidentialsystems

studied

in

ExecutiveDecree

Authority

do not seem to share with U.S.

legislators

such a

pronouncedpreference

for

detailed

lawmaking.

The

scope

for

bureaucraticdiscretion

is

consequently

much

broader.

Crisp's

study

of

delegation

in the

Venezuelan

democracy

is a

powerful

corrective

to

the notion that

legislators

in

presidential

systems

use

detailed

legislation

to rein in

the

president

and the

bureaucracy.Crisp

shows instead that

strong

partydiscipline

encouraged

egislators

fromthe

ruling

Accion

Democrdtica

party

to

delegate

broad

authority

o President

Andres

Perez

in

the 1970s.The

president

used this

authority

o

erectnew

bureaucratic tructures

n the form of

credit

institutions

hrough

which he

channeledVenezuela's

oil

export

revenues.66

Members of the

ruling party

certainly

benefited from

this bureaucratic

argesse,

but

they

did not need

detailed

lawmaking

and

oversight

committees to

do so. In this

case,

party

discipline appears

to be as

important

as

the

separation

of

powers

in

shaping

the

propensity

o

delegate

authority

over

the

bureaucracy.

Conclusion

For each

attribute

of the

policy process

analyzed

above,

various

policy

studies

from

the books under

review

support he

case

for

systematic

differences

between

govern-

mental types.

These

differences are

generally

called

into

question,

however,when

variationwithin each

governmental ype

is

considered.

Consequently,n

most cases

fundamental

distinctions

between

parliamentarism

nd

presidentialism

end

to

wash

out. For

example,

the

separationof

powers

may

create

more

potentialfor

veto

play-

ers to obstruct policy

change than

is

common

in

parliamentary

ystems.

However.

the use of

multiparty

coalitions in

parliamentary

ystems

serves to

internalize

veto

points in the cabinet,and executivedecrees in practiceunderminethe performance

of

legislators

as

veto

players n

many

presidential

ystems.

In

applyingthe

veto

play-

er

concept, then,

it is importantnot

just

to

determine

whether

powersare

divided but

to specify exactly how they are

divided.

While

the

separationof

powersmakes

poli-

cymaking highly

transparent n

presidential

systems like

the

U.S.,

executive

decree

authority

undercuts his

feature n

others.

Though

legislators

in

presidentialsystems

are freerto

focus on

particularism

hantheir

counterparts

n

parliamentary

ystems,

the

direct

election of

the

president

in a

single,

nationwidedistrict

ensuresa

policy-

making role

for an

actor

with

few

particularistic

incentives.

Shared

legislative

authority

makes it

difficult for

voters to

identify which

branch

they

should

hold

responsible for policy, but vetoes and roll call votes in some presidentialsystems

371



19/23

Comparative

Politics

April

2000

help

voters

hold

individual

politicians

accountable.

While certain

types

of

parlia-

mentary

systems

betterconcentrate

responsibility

for

policy

within the

cabinet,

this

type of individualaccountability s rarein parliamentarism.The separationof pow-

ers

gives

interest

groups

two

separately

electedbranches

on

which to focus

pressure,

but the

degree

to which the

legislature

s

organized

o

respond

to these

groups

varies

widely among

different

presidential systems.

Finally,

in

some

presidentialsystems

politicians

are loathe to

delegate

discretion

to

bureaucrats and instead

legislate

detailed

laws,

while in

others

they

show no

Documents

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