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EUROPA-UNIVERSITÄT VIADRINA UNIWERSYTET IM. ADAMA MICKIEWICZA POZNAN
Master Thesis
Political Protest in Poland after Solidarity
Years 1989-2010
Author: Naemi Schadagies
Matr. No. 35068
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
M.A. European Studies / Politologia
First Supervisor:
Prof. Timm Beichelt
Second Supervisor:
Dr. Jarosław Jańczak
Outline
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 0
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
A. Some preliminary Thoughts .........................................................................................1
B. State of the Art ...............................................................................................................3
C. Aim and Scope ...............................................................................................................4
II. Political Protest ........................................................................................................ 6
A. Protest Potential .............................................................................................................8
B. Conditions for Eruption ................................................................................................9
1. The macro-level: Political Opportunity Structures ............................................ 9
2. The micro-level: Incentives ............................................................................. 12
a) The macro-micro Relationship ..................................................................... 12
b) Social and Norm-driven Incentives .............................................................. 12
3. The meso-level: Social Networks, Collective Identity, Framing ..................... 14
a) Network dynamics: Framing processes........................................................ 15
b) The missing link: Collective Identity ........................................................... 16
4. Mobilization ..................................................................................................... 18
C. The Formation of Movements .................................................................................... 21
III. Protest in Poland ................................................................................................... 23
A. Transition Period: 1989-1997 ..................................................................................... 24
1. 1st Phase: 1989-1993 ....................................................................................... 25
2. 2nd Phase: 1993-1997 ...................................................................................... 29
B. Consolidated Democracy: 1997 – 2004 .................................................................... 31
C. Poland in the EU: 2004 – 2010 .................................................................................. 34
D. The Smoleńsk Tragedy 2010 and its Aftermath ....................................................... 38
E. Characteristics of Protest 1989-2010 ......................................................................... 40
IV. Explaining the Peace ............................................................................................. 42
A. Protest Potential ........................................................................................................... 42
1. Grievances........................................................................................................ 43
2. Polarization ...................................................................................................... 48
B. Conditions ..................................................................................................................... 49
1. The macro-level: POS ...................................................................................... 49
a) 1989-1997..................................................................................................... 50
b) 1997-2004..................................................................................................... 52
c) 2004-2010..................................................................................................... 53
2. The micro-level: Incentives ............................................................................. 55
a) Consequences of changing POS ................................................................... 56
b) Norms and Values ........................................................................................ 57
3. The meso-level: Networks ............................................................................... 59
V. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 63
VI. Annex ...................................................................................................................... 68
A. Situation in the Country .............................................................................................. 68
B. Political Situation......................................................................................................... 69
C. Economic Situation ..................................................................................................... 70
D. Quality of Living ......................................................................................................... 71
VII. References .............................................................................................................. 72
0
Abstract
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie sich politischer Protest in
Polen seit dem Zusammenbruch des Sozialismus darstellt und welche Theorien
kollektiven Handelns geeignet sind, diese Entwicklungen zu erklären. Daher werden auf
den folgenden Seiten zwei unterschiedliche Aspekte beleuchtet. Zum einen wird die
Frage beantwortet, wie sich politischer Protest seit 1989 entwickelt hat und welche
Charakteristika sich ausmachen lassen. Zum zweiten werden die Beobachtungen mittels
Anwendung der einschlägigen Theorien eingeordnet und erklärt.
Insbesondere die Theorie kollektiven Handelns von Mancur Olson nimmt in der
Betrachtung eine zentrale Rolle ein, welche auf dem Rational Choice Ansatz beruht.
Darüber hinaus werden Theorien aus dem Konstruktivismus heran gezogen. Die
Möglichkeit, diese verschiedenen Ansätze zu integrieren wird in Kapitel zwei der
vorliegenden Arbeit besprochen.
Im darauffolgenden Abschnitt wird auf den politischen Protest in Polen wie er sich seit
1989 darstellt eingegangen. Dabei fällt vor allem auf, dass seit dem Zusammenbruch
des sozialistischen Systems der Protest zu jeder Zeit sowohl in Hinblick auf
Teilnehmerzahlen als auch in Hinblick auf Dauer und Intensität weit hinter dem zurück
geblieben ist, was Polen vor 1989 erlebte. Auch im Vergleich mit westlichen
Demokratien ist die Protestrate in Polen gering geblieben.
In Kapitel vier wird daher aufgezeigt, in wie weit die anfangs präsentierten Theorien
diese Beobachtungen erklären können und in wie fern es nötig ist, sowohl Rational
Choice als auch konstruktivistische Ansätze anzuwenden. Dadurch wird es möglich, ein
vollständiges Bild zu zeichnen.
Politischer Protest in Polen ist demnach vornehmlich abhängig von sozialen Faktoren,
da die Menschen bei einer Abwägung von Kosten und Nutzen diese höher werten als
andere Aspekte. Der spezifische Charakter der polnischen Gesellschaft führt dabei dazu,
dass Anreize zum Protest sehr stark sein müssen, damit kollektives Handeln entsteht.
1
I. Introduction
Poland today is a fundamentally different country from what the world saw when it was
witness to a mass movement that would eventually bring down the state socialist system
that had dominated most of Central and Eastern Europe for more than 40 years. During
the 1980s, society engaged in masses in political protests and other collective action
voicing its dissatisfaction with the current state of society and economy and demanding
fundamental changes. Still under this impression, one might ask whether Poland could
possibly serve as a trouble spot again. Especially in connection to today’s financial and
economic crisis, this question seems relevant. This paper will therefore attempt to assess
the development of political protest activity since the collapse of the communist system
and conclude from the available evidence what the state of civil society and the
prospects for large scale protest are today. To this end, the existing theories of collective
and protest action will be applied which will lead to an explanation of the developments
since 1989.
A. Some preliminary Thoughts
Poland is special in that sense that national consciousness has developed although
during large parts of its history, no Polish state existed, let alone a nation-state. The
national momentum was indeed formed in close relation to some and by strict
separation from other neighbors (Kenney 2007: 138). In this sense, a case study of
recent Polish history will have to draw on experiences before regaining independence
and most importantly on the process of building a Polish nation-state.
Compared with all other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Poland had by far the
most active citizens and the most intense experiences with protest until 1989 (Kubik
1998: 142). Not the least, Solidarity was created in Poland and like no other movement
or organization contributed to the collapse of state socialism in the area (Ekiert, Kubik
1998: 91). Furthermore, no other CEE country experienced a civil mass movement the
way Poland did. Solidarity was a unique phenomenon, created by spontaneous civil
society activism and was unexpectedly successful (Krzemiński 2009: 348). It poses a
2
great challenge to examine what happened to this strong activity after the system
collapsed in 1989, as there can be no doubt that its significance waned after that year.
Contrary to what could have been expected after 1989, civil society has not been
playing a visible role, neither during transformation nor afterwards (Krzemiński 2009:
349). Therefore, an analysis of Polish public life after Solidarity lost its influence and
disintegrated will yield interesting results in need of interpretation.
What makes Poland the ideal subject of study is firstly the availability of data. Like no
other country in Central and Eastern Europe, sociological research looks back on a rich
tradition and therefore, data collection has been conducted fairly thoroughly throughout
the years (Sokolowski 2002: 3sq.). Results from this study may also serve to shed light
on other countries that rid themselves of socialism in 1989 and 1990 and could also be
the starting point for inter-CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) analyses.
In the field of protest research, movements and organizations play an important role. In
Poland, organizations of civil life such as NGOs have been working in union with
political parties (Krzemiński 2009: 349), making a distinction between the civil and
political sectors difficult. Even today, there is doubt about the sheer existence of civil
society in Poland, let alone its activeness (Krzemiński 2009: 347).
When democracy was introduced in Poland, beginning in 1989, society was confronted
with a completely new situation. Solidarity, for ten years the uniting factor for Poles,
lost its momentum and power almost instantly. The mere fact that today, Poles do not
believe Solidarity to be of benefit anymore (Beyer 2010: 2) shows how tremendously
the society’s and individuals’ attitude towards protest and activism has changed.
Therefore, Polish civil society has undergone a remarkable change since 1989, not only
in the area of non-governmental organizations, but also in local self-government, in the
area of informal movements and groupings, as well as in the area of civil activities
(Gliński 01-15-2008: 2). An analysis of this development over a time-span of 20 years
will bring new insights and may help clear up doubts.
3
B. State of the Art
Research on social movements and protest has been rich and publications concerning
movement theory are manifold. Regarding rational choice theory, the seminal book on
the theory of collective action by Mancur Olson has been relevant for movement
scholars. In recent years, constructivist approaches have also gained influence, namely
in the areas of identity and framing theories. This paper will therefore not introduce new
theoretical aspects but rather provide an assessment of the effectiveness rational choice
still has in today’s Poland.
Research on protest in Poland, on the other hand, has been scarce. In general, research
on civil society’s activities, which would encompass protest action, has for the time
since 1989 been very rare (cf. for this assessment Kubik 1998: 132). Some publications
deal with the transition period, the authors do however not always agree on the time
span this entails. Jan Kubik and Grzegorz Ekiert for example have examined the years
1989 to 1993, whereas Pieter Vanhuysse goes further in also classifying 1993-1997 as
transition phase (Ekiert, Kubik 1998; Kubik 1998; Vanhuysse 2006). This leads to the
situation that broad evaluations can be found only for very few years after the collapse
of the socialist system in Poland. After that, reports and analyses have seen a sharp
decline the later the publication date. For the time after 1997, only individual articles on
protest events have been published (e.g. Fuchs 2000), but no comprehensive studies can
be found on protest action.
The Smoleńsk tragedy of 2010 led to a new wave of articles published on Poland, but
these were mainly concerned with the implications of the incident for international,
mostly Polish-Russian, relations. Newspapers in Poland covered the protest waves
triggered by decisions taken in the aftermath of the plane crash, but outside of the
country not much was heard about the social mood. Therefore, also scholarly
publications have been rare. Few reports on the general impact of the incident on Polish
society can be found in some magazines and periodicals (Gnauck 09-21-2010; Hinsey
2011; Najder 2010), but an in-depth evaluation of protests in the days after the incident
is yet to be published. As the plane crash happened only in April 2010, research on its
long-term implications might still be in progress however.
4
In summary, the field of protest research in Poland after 1989 and especially after 1993
is still very open and leaves ample room for generating knowledge. The paper at hand
will try to provide a first step into this direction but is by no means aiming at an in-
depth assessment of all protest evens since 1989.
C. Aim and Scope
This paper will provide an overview over the main developments of political protest in
Poland over the 20 years between June 1989 and April 2010. There has been
considerable talk about Polish protest affinity, especially about violent farmers’ protests
who seem to be strongest in voicing dissatisfaction by protest (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 97;
Castle, Taras 2002: 154). The following analysis will attempt to shed new light on this
assumption by evaluating the main protest events since 1989 and providing an overview
over the participants. In the following chapters, an assessment will be provided as to
under which circumstances for Poles protest today and how this decision can be
explained by the presented theories. If rational choice in its basic form cannot provide a
thorough explanation, constructivist ideas will also be included and an attempt will be
made to provide a possible enlargement of the theory of collective action that is able to
illustrate the complex reasons behind the unexpectedly calm society after 1989. In order
to provide an outlook on future developments, the probability of an eruption of fierce
protest in the near future will be assessed in the concluding chapter.
The following analysis will start with an overview over theories of collective action and
protest behavior. The basis for this is the pertinent theory of collective action introduced
by Mancur Olson. This choice was taken as protest is a form of collective action and as
Olson has proven to be the reference point for most research in this field. In order to be
able to fully assess the reasons behind Poles’ behavior, this theory resting on rational
choice needs to be expanded, however. It will become clear that only in the time
immediately following the collapse of the state socialist system, rational choice unfolds
high explanatory power. Later this does not hold anymore. Therefore, the political
opportunity structures approach will be incorporated in the theory. Also theories of
framing and identity will be presented which will further help explain the developments.
5
The protest analyzed in this paper can take on different forms, and be either disruptive
or non-disruptive. The former can be strikes, illegal demonstrations and violent forms
such as riots. The latter forms of protest are legal demonstrations, voting, open letters
and statements. As disruptive forms of protest tend to be covered more thoroughly by
the media as well as other forms of publications, the information available on protest is
richer in the area of disruptive forms as all of these usually receive public attention
whereas in the non-disruptive forms only legal demonstrations and, in the case of
obvious dissatisfaction voiced by the electorate, national voting behavior are usually
covered. As the analysis provided here is ultimately directed at assessing the distortion
of political life by political protest and the existence of a hot spot in Poland, the data
used here will also be concentrating on the named forms of protest.
History always plays a role in today’s life. Especially the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe have to deal with dominant legacies that have strong influences on
society today (Kubik 1998: 131). Even if this paper deals with the time after the
collapse of the state socialist system, it is therefore necessary to look back to the time
before 1989 and consider the factors relevant for the situation today.
Chapter two of this paper will provide the theoretical basis for the subsequent
evaluation and will give an insight into the theories enumerated above. A focus will be
lying on rational choice theory, but other relevant approaches stemming from the
constructivist school of thought will also be presented in order to include them into an
encompassing theory.
In chapter three, protest events and –waves will be presented and an attempt at
categorizing will be undertaken. To this end, the time span dealt with in this paper will
be divided into several periods coinciding with important political developments. For
each period, the most important protest events will be presented and their specifics such
as numbers of participants, reasons for protesting as well as the outcome be evaluated.
In a subsequent chapter, the provided evidence will be analyzed and put into context
within the frame of the theory presented in the first chapter. Here, an explanation of
protest in Poland will be attempted. The conclusion will finally summarize the findings
and try to provide an outlook to further developments.
6
II. Political Protest
Generally speaking, it is difficult to determine what exactly is meant by “protest”.
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 5) use the expression “contentious politics” to
describe
“episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their
objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a
party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at
least one of the claimants.”
This definition already includes the most important aspect of protest – its collectiveness.
However, it is rather narrow in scope and leaves room also for government to engage in
such actions. In this paper, the focus is on civil action; therefore a definition with a
slightly different character is needed. Other authors1 agree that protest needs to have
some kind of adversary, be it a person, government action or a law. Further criteria of a
definition that can be found in literature include the notions that protest is an irregular
behavior expressing objection to decisions of a target. The protesters cannot achieve
their goal to alter the decision or decisions in question by themselves and move to exert
influence on third parties. The target of a protest action, therefore, is “the person,
institution, or organization that the protesters want to respond or react to their demands
or grievances” (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 109). As McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 5)
point out, this action is “episodic rather than continuous, [and] occurs in public”. In this
paper, we will therefore define “protest” as irregular activity that is collectively carried
out in public and opposed to one or more decisions of a certain target with the aim to
influence this target’s behavior and decisions either retrospectively or in the future.
Protest can have different aims and targets and needs not in all cases be political. A
demonstration against a company’s decision to close a factory would be classified as
protest but not necessarily as political. Therefore, a definition of the term “political
protest” needs to encompass also a notion of “political”. In order not to narrow the
1 E.g. Turner (1969), Zald; Ash (1966), McAdam et al. (2001). For details see Opp 2009: 35sq.
7
scope too much, it will simply be assumed that “political” protest is aimed at a decision
taken within the political system regardless of the actual person taking the decision
including his or her position within the system. Purely economic decisions about wages
and working conditions of state-employees will however be excluded as the state is not
acting politically, but in the role of a normal employer here.
Protest can also take on different forms and may be legal or illegal, violent or not and
can take place on a regular basis (the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig and other cities
in the former GDR were very regular for example) or can happen spontaneously and
highly irregularly or even only once. In the following, a look will thus firstly be taken at
the emergence of protest as the action itself and then the focus will be narrowed down
and a more detailed look at protest movements will be provided.
As McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 72) point out, protest rarely happens with a
defined beginning and a definite end. The processes of mobilization and demobilization
are complex, interdependent and happen simultaneously. The authors therefore suggest
a dynamic model to assess the interdependence of protests in episodes in which the
mobilization dynamics are explicitly evaluated and their reasons examined. This is an
important notion and should not be forgotten whenever protest action is examined. As
has been suggested in the introduction, however, this paper is concerned with protest
action and its frequency, and the focus does not lie on the processes of mobilization.
Rather, it is concerned with individual and collective decisions whether or not to engage
in protest action. Therefore, the presented argument will be following the rather static
approach suggested by rational choice theory.
The biggest group of people within a society is made up of those who can be mobilized
under favorable conditions on important issues to them if the organizers put in enough
effort (Meyer 2004: 140). Consequently, it is feasible to consider the factors providing
for protest action as such first before the discussion turns to movements that can and
most often do serve as organizers of protest action.
8
A. Protest Potential
In order to take part in political protest, a person firstly needs to feel some grievance,
due to a lack of supply with public goods. (Opp 2009: 109). Public goods are defined as
being non-exclusive in consumption, meaning that consumption by one person
automatically makes it accessible for all others (Olson 1971: 14). Put differently, a
public good is one, that cannot be distributed by the market but need to be delivered by
agencies that do not aim at making profit such as the government (Sokolowski 2002: 8).
Grievances occur when a person or a group of people feel deprived of a certain good.
What needs to be considered in this context, is preferences. The individual or the group
will have certain preferences and therefore, will voice demands for specific goods (Opp
2009: 47). If Poles will protest for a certain good, it does thus not mean that Germans or
Brits will do the same.
A recent example of the relevance of grievances as the basis for protest was the nuclear
accident in Fukushima, which triggered protests against nuclear power all over the
world. The protests emerged due to people’s fear from such accidents happening
elsewhere. The public good in question here is public security, which the governments
failed to provide. In Germany, protests subsided as soon as exit from nuclear power
supply was decided. It is important to note that grievances are relevant for protest
potential in cases where no prospects for improvement exist. This means that people
feeling such grievances also need to expect no change of the situation in the future
without their personal engagement.
Aggregation of existing grievances will therefore provide a fairly good idea of the
potential for protest in a society, as high levels of grievances provide for a high
potential. In a subsequent chapter in which the theoretical overview will be applied to
Poland aggregate data provided by public opinion polls will therefore be drawn on in
order to assess the overall level of grievances in the society.
A second factor that contributes to the existing potential for protest is polarization
(McAdam et al. 2001: 322). This means that arguments are radicalized and society is
divided sharply along the lines of argument. Especially in Poland this is important, as
the following chapter will show. With moderate positions emptying and opinions
9
shifting to the extremes, steps taken by one side can much more likely lead to fierce
protest by the other side. Especially in cases where one side is taken by members of the
political system, their steps are publicly followed and perceived.
B. Conditions for Eruption
The most basic assumption of rational choice theory is that people’s behavior is
governed by a calculation of costs and benefits (Opp 2009: 46). Therefore, the benefits
of protesting need to outweigh its costs. Protest then emerges due to dissatisfaction of
the people with the current distribution of public goods and the expectations to improve
the situation by protesting. These circumstances on the societal, i.e. the macro-, level
provide a person’s environment and can have direct influences on the probability of the
individual engaging in protest. However, it is necessary to understand the link between
the macro- and the micro-level in order to assess the link between changes in the
environment and individual action. Moreover, individuals do rarely act on their own and
are usually influenced by their social networks, which provide for a meso-level
environment that also influences the individuals decision. In the following sections all
three levels will therefore be examined and links between them will be established in
order to be able to fully understand individual as well as collective action.
1. The macro-level: Political Opportunity Structures
Studies over the past more than 30 years have shown the importance of the political
context for the analysis of social movements (Meyer 2004: 134). This focus on polity
has in literature become known as the Political Opportunitiy Structures (POS) concept.
It rests on the assumption that the political environment provides variables favorable or
unfavorable for the emergence of protest. These variables depend on evolution of the
system over time, making change the most important factor in the assessment of
opportunities. Success or failure of any social movement is consequently dependent on
external factors provided by the socio-political context of the relevant society at a given
time (Meyer 2004: 126). Opportunity structures therefore are developments “that render
10
the established political order more vulnerable or receptive to challenge” (McAdam et
al. 1996: 8). In other words, if the system introduces changes that make it easier for
challengers to gain access and to put through their claims, a POS has opened. Political
Opportunities Theory is based on the assumption that the structure provides bigger or
smaller chances for success of a social movement, depending on the specific claims the
movement is making, and its aim is to “predict the emergence, actions and successes of
social movements, focusing on the interaction between activists as agents and the polity
as structure” (Meyer 2004: 127sq.). What makes the theory relevant at this point is the
focus on structure, or the polity, which shapes the opportunities for success or failure of
protest behavior.
McAdam et al. (1996: 3) explain “that social movements and revolutions are shaped by
the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context
in which they are embedded.” Following this line of thought, it is possible to conclude
that the setting determines the outcome, or more precise, that protest action and
movements are unique to and specifically shaped by the environment they act in.
Therefore, a specific kind of protest action will emerge due to the specific opportunities
provided by its surroundings. In a later section movements will also be discussed more
closely, and it will be examined under what circumstances the formation of a movement
is likely.
Doug McAdam (1996: 26) has formulated four categories of variables that Political
Opportunity Structures consist of:
I. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system,
II. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that
typically undergird a polity,
III. The presence or absence of elite allies,
IV. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression.
All changes in the political system can thus be classified as POS if they fall into one of
these categories. Variables that are taken into account for the research in question
furthermore need to be linked to the aims of potential protest, and they need to actually
change the chances of success. If it is made possible to directly address the person in
11
charge but the concerns voiced through this channel still do not reach the person in
question due to technical or other reasons, the chances obviously are not enhanced.
Whether the people know about these variables is however unimportant at this level;
Opportunity structures are assessed objectively. The entry of many members of the
political elite in the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s2 was therefore a
relevant variable of the third category and thus opened a POS for the movement.
Different authors, among them Sidney Tarrow (1996: 54) have pointed out that opening
opportunity structures alone do not in all circumstances lead to more political protest. In
a system that already provides for easy access, more opportunities can also lead to less
protest. This is true insofar as protest is defined as irregular behavior. If the
opportunities for regular action are great, then there does not seem to be much need for
irregular behavior. Put differently,
“Protest occurs when there is a space of toleration by a polity and when
claimants are neither sufficiently advantaged to obviate the need to use dramatic
means to express their interests nor so completely repressed to prevent them
from trying to get what they want.” (Meyer 2004: 128).
As this argument suggests, the polity needs to take on a certain shape in order to support
protest action. Overall, protests happen much more often in democracies than in other
forms of government. Whereas strikes have happened about three times less often in
autocratic regimes than in democracies, demonstrations and riots have taken place about
twice as often in democracies than in other regimes during the course of the 20th
century
(Vanhuysse 2006: 1). In democracies, a general openness of the system can be assumed,
which aligns with the “space of toleration” required for protest according to Meyer.
Relative closeness on the other hand varies, but also in democracies laws that restrict
freedoms such as the freedom of assembly can be passed. Therefore, “partially opened
access” (Tarrow 1996: 54) provides for the strongest incentives to protest in the case of
opening opportunities. This will become even clearer when the interdependence of
factors will be discussed.
2 During that time, many political office-bearers also joined Solidarity, which opened a POS of the third
category, but also lessened the system’s potential for repression, a category IV POS.
12
2. The micro-level: Incentives
The crucial notion is that behavior is influenced by incentives. Individuals need to be
personally affected in order to react. Therefore, in the following section the relationship
between the macro-level providing POS and the individual level will be examined. In a
subsequent section, the focus will furthermore be directed at other sources of incentives
affecting the individual directly.
a) The macro-micro Relationship
Objectively existing chances for success do not suffice for a person to engage in protest
action; Incentives always occur on the micro level. Therefore, there is a need to translate
the macro-level circumstances into factors affecting the individual directly. Changing
Opportunity Structures lead to a change in the individuals’ expectations for success or
failure. The higher the perceived chances for success are, the more likely protest is to
emerge, as individuals are more willing to take part in action that promises success.
These individual calculations then transform into collective action (Opp 2009: 198).
Consequently, changing POS are more likely to invoke protest behavior in those cases
where they are recognized by the people and perceived as making protesting worthwhile
in the sense that it furthers reaching the goal. Conversely, closing Opportunity
Structures make protest less likely. For example, if repression is enhanced in a society,
protests will generally become less likely as it increases the costs of participation for the
individual and success becomes less likely.
b) Social and Norm-driven Incentives
One way to directly take influence on individuals’ behavior has been called “selective
incentives” (Olson 1971: 51). These are incentives that afflict directly on the individual,
instead of all members of the society in the way POS do. Olson introduces these as a
means for an organization to mobilize members. When taking part in a collective action
does not only lead to the creation of the desired public good, but does also bring
13
personal advantages such as preferential access to the organization’s resources, and the
individual has a preference for this access, a positive selective incentive is invoked and
engagement of the individual in the protest action becomes more likely. Conversely,
negative selective incentives may also be created such as exclusion from certain
membership benefits for failure to comply. As Opp (2009: 50) puts it:
“The stronger the positive selective incentives for contributing and the stronger
the negative selective incentives for not contributing, the more likely
individuals contribute to the provision of the public good.”
The focus here lies on the possibilities organizations and movements have for
mobilizing their members. It is, however, possible to take the argument one step further
by looking at the individual level. Although rational choice theory has suggested that
people only act out of economic interest, it is more plausible to include norm-driven
behavior into the picture. Empirical evidence has shown that non-material incentives in
many cases have an even bigger impact than material incentives such as higher wages of
better access to supply of certain goods. Olson (1971: 60sq.) recognizes this and
suggests “social incentives” which stem from the interaction between individuals in a
society to be added. In this sense, disapproval from peers will be categorized as a
negative social incentive, as this can lead to an increase in the costs of protesting. The
strength on this incentive is however dependent on the individual and his or her
preferences. This idea will be further developed in the following section on social
networks.
Moral concepts and norms do also contribute to the weighing of costs and benefits. For
every person, this scheme of ideas is different; therefore, they can also be seen as
selective incentives (Olson 1971: 61). The more internalized a norm to participate or a
norm not to rely on the work of others is in a person, the more likely he or she will be to
take part in protest action.
Individuals do not act in isolation. In the following sub-chapter, the already mentioned
influence of an individual’s social environment will be therefore be analyzed.
14
3. The meso-level: Social Networks, Collective Identity, Framing
As has been noted before, protest under normal circumstances is a joint action.
Therefore, it is only plausible that social networks and collective cognitive processes
play an important role in its emergence. As Opp (2009: 110) notes, networks favorable
for protest behavior provide encouragement for their members to engage in protest
action. On the other hand, networks adverse towards public engagement discourage
their members.
What has been said about the individual level can generally be applied to groups as
well. Social networks consist of members who share at least some common ideas and
goals (Opp 2009: 198). Therefore it is feasible to take a look at goals of groups and their
influences. If chances for achievement of the groups’ goals become more likely, its
members will engage in protest.
These suggestions include however the free rider problem: if other members of the
group or network engage in protest and achieve the desired change, the individual might
even feel less inclined towards taking part in the protest action (Olson 1971: 16; Opp
2009: 198). Yet what needs not be forgotten is social interaction within a group. Such
dynamics as peer pressure and social control can lead to participation in the protest
action even if the individual’s own considerations would not incline him to do so (Olson
1971: 60 sq.). Collective action is therefore influenced by the individuals’ identification
with the group. This identification is greatest in cases where a strong common identity
can be discerned.
Membership in a network alone however does not by itself constitute a common
identity. The biggest influence of network membership on the individuals’ behavior can
be expected if the individuals feel a strong affiliation to the group and the group has
become a sponsor of identity to its members (Opp 2009: 218). This mechanism is most
efficient in close networks. Furthermore, goal intensity plays a role. The more desirable
the achievement of the goal becomes, the more likely any member of the group or
network is to take part in collective action (Opp 2009: 61). Thirdly, “perceived personal
influence” (Opp 2009: 198, italics in the original) is important. If individuals feel their
own role in the action makes a difference, they are much more likely to take part. This
15
is of course a matter of communication and interaction and shaped decisively by peers.
This deliberation does not propose a complete solution to the free rider problem, it
however shows a trend. In case of a close network with a high goal intensity and high
perceived influence of each individual, free riding will less likely occur than in other
cases.
a) Network dynamics: Framing processes
Social networks have specific dynamics that differentiate them from other groups of
people. The interrelatedness of members of social networks leads to a certain uniformity
in behavior. This thought has also been suggested by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, who
note the importance of “signaling”, i.e. members of the same network reacting to signals
of their peers to either continue in or abort the action. The same can be assumed to
happen before the protest action takes place. Members of networks signal each other
whether to take part. Thus it can be said that protest reproduces by social interaction. In
a society that is already experiencing much protest, the individual will consequently
probably be a member of a social network encouraging protest, whereas a society with
little or no protest behavior will not provide strong societal incentives for protest. These
processes whereby circumstances are collectively interpreted have become known as
“framing processes” (McAdam et al. 1996: 2).
The notion of “framing” rests on the acknowledgement of “the central importance of
ideas and cultural elements in understanding the […] participation in social movements”
(Zald 1996: 261). It is a process by which different interpretations of a single issue are
open for contention within a movement, network, or even society. The argument often
develops along the lines whether to act, emphasizing either the possible gains or the
possible losses of protest action (Gamson, Meyer 1996: 283, 285). Framing often
happens as initiatives by social movement leaders (Zald 1996: 261), who put forward a
proposition for the interpretation of a certain question. These interpretations are
contested within the movement until a common stance is reached.
16
Ways and methods for protesting are also defined by framing processes. If a certain
protest measure such as peaceful demonstrations fit the social norm, a network will
much more likely see it adequate for the solution of a certain problem than in a society
where protest is only accepted if it is violent (Zald 1996: 267). Consequently, the
organization of a protest event will be successful in gathering people in a situation
where framing has led to a common understanding of a need for action. The type of
protest action chosen thus depends on the political environment. Strategies followed by
social movements become more or less attractive depending on the polity itself as well
as on the role actors play in it (Meyer 2004: 128).
This stresses the importance of social construction of reality. If a change in the political
environment is collectively perceived as an opening opportunity structure and chances
of success are expected to have risen, protest becomes more likely. Even though rational
choice and constructivism have traditionally been considered incompatible, it is possible
to incorporate the framing perspective into the logic of collective action by
acknowledging the influence of these processes on the individual’s calculations. In a
network that is agreeing on abstaining from protest, social costs in the case of defecting
from this rule are high and need to be taken into account when trying to understand
people’s behavior.
b) The missing link: Collective Identity
Collective identity has been presented as the missing perspective on rational choice
(Opp 2009: 222). The idea is that people do engage in actions that do not seem logical
or based on a weighing of costs and benefits. These actions can, such is the argument,
only be explained by looking at identity. In the following, this approach will be
described and its relevance explained. Then a possible way of incorporating the identity
approach into the logic of collective action and thus into the rational choice theory will
be introduced.
“A collective identity exists, by definition, if there is a group (i.e. individuals
with at least one common goal) with common beliefs, with common normative
17
convictions, that is connected by social relationships (i.e. there is a social
network) and by emotional bonds.” (Opp 2009: 210)
Collective identity is then identification with a group. It is important to note that
collective identity deals with emotions or rather feelings of attachment to given
individual experiences. This has an influence on collective action in the sense that a
strong collective identity will compel the individual to act in favor of the group he or
she is identifying with. Therefore, the stronger the collective identity of a group
favoring protest action is, the more likely its members will take part.
The decisive notion is that individuals feel attached to different groups, therefore have
different collective identities. Opp (2009: 215) mentions the examples of categories
such as man or woman, roles and statuses such as professions, and group memberships
such as in movements. Therefore, collective identity is relevant to protest behavior if
individuals feel attached to relevant groups like movements or protest organizations
(Opp 2009: 219). In cases where these identities conflict, the individual’s preferences
determine the outcome, i.e. the behavior. A strong collective identity of a social
movement or other network supporting protest will make it more likely that this identity
will prevail in the case of conflict. Success strengthens collective identity as members
experience a feeling of collective achievement which amplifies the social connections
within the group (Opp 2009: 228), conversely failure will lead to a loosening of ties.
Rational choice assumes that all actions by an individual are based on the calculation of
costs and benefits. By applying a broad view on the idea of rationality, it can be
assumed that a strong identification is a solid base for expecting benefits or rewards.
Complying with group action will render rewards for the individual such as social
acceptance and respect, whereas non-compliance will trigger negative feedback from
the other members of the group. The higher personal identification with the group gets,
the higher the costs of non-compliance and the bigger the personal feeling of reward
when being accepted in the group. Therefore, if people engage in seemingly irrational
behavior, an implicit weighing of social costs and benefits is likely.
18
4. Mobilization
Generally speaking, Opp’s (2009: 200) conclusion that “the political environment may
trigger protest behavior” by providing changes that can transform into incentives seems
to be highly relevant. It has become clear that incentives rarely ever exist on their own
but occur at the same time and are interrelated. An individual confronted with a
multitude of incentives will have to weigh their importance and to decide which ones to
follow. Taking rational choice theory as the basis for analysis, the assumption is made
that people calculate and weigh their existing resources such as time and social
acceptance and decide on the way to best utilize them (Opp 2009: 180). Lipset argues
that revolts only happen when people are not afraid of a loss in power, status or goods
(Lipset 1968: 92), thus confirming the assumption of a weighing of costs and benefits.
In this case, the costs of further bearing the situation and the grievances are weighed
against the costs and possible benefits of protesting. If the benefits of eliminating the
grievances outweigh the costs of protesting, the eruption of protest becomes more
probable. This also counts for the structure, i.e. the relative openness, of systems. If a
system is very closed, repression is more likely in the case of protest, thus protesting
bears high costs. In a very open system, access to the decisions is very easy even by
regular means. Protesting in this case bears high costs in the sense that irregular
behavior leads to higher opportunity costs. Protesting therefore takes place in such
situations when it is the best possible way to achieve the goal.
Consequently, high potential for protest does not alone determine also a high level of
protest engagement in a society. There also needs to be a perceived chance of success,
regardless of the actual probability determined by the opportunity structures. If the
chances for success are high, but the people affected by grievances do not note the
favorable situation, they will still not protest (Opp 2009: 109). Thus, existing
opportunities that can be discerned on the macro-level are only relevant if there is a link
to the micro-level by which these opportunities are made known to people with
grievances. This bears two distinct features. Firstly, potential protesters need to notice
the change that opened an opportunity. Secondly, this opportunity needs to be
recognized by the individuals as such (McAdam et al. 2001: 43). A further development
of the POS model takes this condition into account and concentrates on the “expectation
19
of success” and thus links the macro- to the micro-level (Opp 2009: 169). Protest action
will therefore only take place if the individuals taking part in it expect their chances of
success to be sufficiently high, or in other words, that their actions do make a
difference.
Social movements put forward their interpretation of reality which has been reached by
an internal framing process. This may or may not be accepted by unmobilized people
(Opp 2009: 234), resulting in them taking part in the proposed protest action or
abstaining from it. So framing is not only a way of developing a common understanding
of protesting or not protesting but also of mobilizing more people to take part in
protests.
Framing processes are therefore dependent on the larger cultural context they happen in.
Only if a meaningful background of common understanding is given, these processes
can take place. This is due to them resting on a common understanding of right and
wrong and basic norms of social life (Zald 1996: 266). In this context, events and
circumstances are “framed” so they fit in the picture and connect to familiar images.
Mobilization can consequently happen when and if a certain number of people agree on
an interpretation of reality as giving the opportunity and justification of protest, i.e.
when a shared feeling of injustice exists and a shared perception of opportunity
structures (Opp 2009: 253).
Collective identity and framing processes therefore influence the cost calculations of the
individual. High costs exist in an environment that is generally protest-averse. Framing
processes change this social environment of an individual. If changes occur in the
political environment, social networks collectively interpret these changes as favorable
or unfavorable for protesting. The individual may either actively take part in this
process or can adopt the final interpretation of the situation. Either way will the
established frame have an influence on the individual’s behavior. If there is a strong
emotional bond towards the group or network, he or she will only in cases where
personal cost-benefit calculations differ much from the group’s calculations defect from
the collectively established decision. Thus collective identity plays an important role in
the question of engagement in or abstaining from protesting.
20
Consequently, the individual sees itself confronted with incentives stemming from
different societal levels. Firstly, macro-level factors rarely affect the decision directly.
Rather they influence incentives working on the individual level such as perceived
personal influence. The same is valid for meso-level factors. Changing opportunity
structures on the macro-level for example change the expectations for success on the
individual as well as on the group level. Changes in the social environment in turn also
affect incentives on the individual level which by changing the individuals’ behavior
again lead to changed group dynamics. Only if by recognizing that the individual’s
decision is not only influenced by different and often contradicting factors but also that
these factors influence, change, and sometimes eliminate each other, it will be possible
to understand the evolution of protest and protest movements in Poland since 1989.
This link between the macro- and micro-levels becomes even clearer when
reconsidering the protest potential mentioned earlier. Protest potential is dependent on
the aggregated grievances in a society, which is made up of individual feelings.
Therefore, the connection between both levels is a crucial aspect of the assessment of
protest behavior in a society. Only if the macro- and micro-level conditions are
favorable to the emergence of protest, will people engage in protest activities.
To evaluate whether protest will or will not erupt at a given time and in a given society,
an assessment of the political environment and changes that have been made is
necessary. This way it becomes possible to explain why certain changes have provoked
protest and others have not, and why protest emerged at one point and not at another.
Especially when it comes to explaining protest movements and -waves, an evaluation of
changed circumstances is crucial. One important connection has been shown by Meyer
and Tarrow (1998: 7), by pointing out the link between turnout at elections and
engagement in protest behavior. As shown above, protest reproduces. Furthermore,
people who vote are more likely to protest and generally take part in political activity.
This notion suggests that people are overall more or less politically active but rarely do
engage only in one type of political activity.
21
C. The Formation of Movements
In the previous part, the emergence of political protest as such has been evaluated. In
the following, the argument will be taken one step further by assessing the
circumstances necessary for the emergence of protest movements. This is relevant as
collective action mostly happens in those cases where all the conditions for protest are
fulfilled and people are “sufficiently organized to act” (McAdam et al. 1996: 8).
Consequently, movements serve as the basis for protest in so far as they constitute the
organizational frame that makes protest action likely.
It needs to be mentioned that research on the emergence of movements is rare. It rather
seems as if scholars tend to assume them as given when elaborating on protest (cf. for
an overview Opp 2009: 360). This chapter will therefore point out variables that seem to
be relevant as they are mentioned in various publications.
Protest action rarely happens spontaneously but most often is organized by some kind of
movement or organization. These associations have become known as mobilizing
structures (McAdam et al. 1996: 3), which are a necessary precondition for collective
action. Although mobilizing structures do not necessarily consist only of movements,
but also of unorganized social networks, the existence of a formal organization aids in
the mobilization process. Strong organizational ties will amplify social incentives
including the framing process (McAdam et al. 1996: 9); therefore, it seems sensible to
assume that in a society where movements are a normalcy, protest action will happen
more often. Moreover, movements can also create new POSs that in turn lead to the
creation of new protest and eventually movements (McAdam 1996: 35). This happens
in those cases when movements achieve some of their goals, which often lead to
changes in the polity. Furthermore, success by one movement can also induce others to
follow suit.
There is considerable disagreement in literature when it comes to define “movement”.
Sidney Tarrow and David S. Meyer (1998: 4) define it as “collective challenges to
existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with common purposes and
solidarity, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities”. This
definition is very detailed and includes interaction processes which in this paper will not
22
be dealt with. Therefore, it is necessary to broaden the view and exclude such details.
Gamson and Meyer (1996: 283) characterize movements as “sustained and self-
conscious challenge[s] to authorities or cultural codes by a field of actors”. This
emphasizes the collectivity of the movement, but leaves out the for this paper
expendable facets of the previous definition. Furthermore, it stresses that a movement is
not uniform but a collectivity of multiple actors. Meyer and Tarrow (1998: 18) also
point out that a movement is “generally composed of a number of organizations and
affiliated organizations cooperating – to some degree – to advance political claims”.
This shows one important characteristic, namely that movements can be and often are
networks of smaller groups. Olson (1971: 5) mentions the purpose of “organization”,
which is “the furtherance of the interests of their members, without the requisite of
success. He points out, however, that in case of complete failure, the movement will
most likely not be able to persist.
A minimal definition that many scholars can agree on includes a group of people with at
least a nominal level of organization who have a common goal (Opp 2009: 36sq.).
Consent exists on the prerequisite of a certain number of people – one person alone is
not a movement. Furthermore, the movement needs to have an “antagonist” and cannot
reach their target on their own but want to achieve their goal by influencing the
antagonist. It is important to note that a movement is only given when its members are
active over a certain period of time. Therefore a protest movement will in this paper be
defined as a group of people with at least a minimal degree of organization who share
the goal to influence the actions of others whose decisions they want to reverse, prevent,
or advance and take action on a recurring basis.
A movement emerges when protesters unite and their protest becomes more frequent.
They are created under the impression of the specific political circumstances a society
offers at a given time (McAdam et al. 1996: 11) and emerge usually to further the
common interest of their members. Where individual interests are concerned, and
unorganized protest is more promising, movements are not likely to form. On the other
hand, they will most likely be called into existence where a number of people share a
common goal (Olson 1971: 7), and where organized protest is necessary to achieve this
goal. McAdam et al. (1996: 11) also note that the form or type of movement is
23
dependent on the possibilities, or rather opportunities, available to the protesters. In a
society that has prohibited the formation of formal organizations, and that suddenly
allows registration of unions, the opportunity will most probably be seized and unions
will be created; whereas a society that has enjoyed a general freedom of association for
a long time will probably see the registration of different types of organizations on an
irregular basis.
In addition, movements are based on interaction between individuals. A society that
already records close interpersonal ties is therefore more apt to see movements forming.
Opp (2009: 125) refers to a case study on a Spanish mining village and points out the
“relatively dense network of inhabitants” as a relevant factor in the explanation of the
emergence of mass protest. It is therefore possible to conclude that the stronger the ties
between individuals in a society are the more likely movements form that are actively
involved in the political process of this society.
What is more, movements influence each other much in the same way as individuals do.
If a number of movements have formed, others are more likely to follow than in the
case of a single movement as pioneer. Additionally, they are more likely to organize
protest in such cases, where other movements have already engaged in protest action
(Tarrow 1996: 60). Protest will therefore most likely happen in a society with many
active movements where the factors named in the previous chapter are favorable.
III. Protest in Poland
In the preceding chapter, a theoretic look at the emergence of protest and protest
movements has been presented. With this background, the situation in Poland and its
development after the successes of the Solidarity movement will be examined. In
general, different phases of political development according to political reforms will be
examined and the protest intensity during these phases will be evaluated. During the
transition years, protest behavior of Polish citizens was different from today when
Poland is a consolidated democracy. The time span since 1989 will therefore be divided
into two rough periods. The transition period, which lased more or less until 1997, when
24
today’s constitution was introduced, will thus be examined first. The frequency of
protest was higher in the first years of transition; therefore, a division will be made after
1993. The subsequent section will then turn to Poland as a consolidated democracy. As
entering the European Union had a significant impact on Polish citizens’ behavior, a
separate look at the time after 2004 will be provided. Lastly, the events of 2010 when
the tragedy of Smolensk hit Poland will be evaluated.
A general characteristic of protest in Poland is the struggle of “well-defined social
groups” (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 102) for economic benefits. This is not surprising as
grievances, which we have defined in the preceding chapter as prerequisites for protest,
are per definition mostly economic in nature. Trade unions and federations have been
the most actively involved in protest have, as they constitute the best-organized groups
and have the largest membership base (Korkut 2005: 151). Furthermore, union
membership has since the time of Solidarity been rather a matter of political
involvement (Zaborowski 1993: 65), not so much of civic action. Apart from these,
until today, no influential protest movements have emerged in Poland. Therefore, the
distinction between political and other forms of protest is often unclear. The most used
form of protest was striking (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 104), sometimes supported by
demonstrations. This makes a distinction between political and purely economic protest
further difficult. The following analysis will therefore concentrate on those protest
actions that are decidedly political and try to omit those that are only economic in
character. This approach is sensible insofar as the target of protest is most often easily
identifiable as either being the bearer of a political function or not. Where state
institutions and agencies are affected, protest is per definition political. However, there
are cases that cannot be classified as either but have characteristics of both. These will
be used for illustration purposes where applicable.
A. Transition Period: 1989-1997
During the transition years Poland experienced a very low strike rate in general. Only in
the years 1992 and 1993, the participants in strikes exceeded 10 per thousand (or 1%)
25
working-aged people (3% and 1.5% respectively). This was due to a short-lived strike
wave led by Solidarity, which waned after 1993 (Vanhuysse 2006: 18).
Scholars disagree on how to interpret the transition phase in terms of the named protest
waves. Jan Kubik and Grzegorz Ekiert argue that protest has become “institutionalized”
and that citizens were active during transition (Kubik 1998; Ekiert, Kubik 1998). Others
tend to see protest action as rather spontaneous and infrequent (Korkut 2005;
Vanhuysse 2006). Nevertheless, all authors agree that protest rates were much lower
than expected. Korkut for example speaks of “passive tolerance [...] for the reform
policies” (2005: 152) by the citizenry, and Ekiert and Kubik mention “relative social
quiescence” (1998: 93). Therefore, even those authors that see protest as an integral part
of Polish transition can agree on a significant break of protest behavior after 1989.
1. 1st Phase: 1989-1993
The years between 1989 and 1993 saw by far the most protest events during transition.
Polish citizens engaged in popular protest much more frequent in the years following
the collapse of communism than in other CEE countries. However, protest frequency
was still lower than in most Western democracies (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 92sq.) and much
lower than in the years preceding the collapse of the state socialist system. The targets
of protest actions during the first transition years were practically always state
institutions (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 100sq.), consequently the protest action needs to be
classified as political even in cases where striking for economic benefits was the only
action taken. More specifically, strikes in the first years of transformation were directed
mainly at the restructuring of the country’s economy and the worsening labor
conditions, expressing disputes between employees and the state. These strikes usually
happened spontaneously and were not organized by unions, but were often supported by
them after being set up (Stegemann 2009: 320). Strikes in the mining industry, for
example, were conducted in order to ease national income restrictions and to cut the
debts of state-owned enterprises.
26
Participation in political life in general was declining after 1989. Ekiert and Kubik note
that “collective protest emerged as one of the most important forms of participation in
public life” (Ekiert, Kubik 1998). Considering what has been said earlier about the
relative social peace, and the notion that protest itself was not widely spread, it will be
shown that it was not very desirable for Poles to become actively involved. Instead of
protesting, many workers chose the “silent non-exit option” (Vanhuysse 2006: 60). This
means that they chose to go into informal employment, if they had not been in it even
before the fall of communism. This way, they escaped from the state’s influence and
detached themselves from the labor policies others protested against.
In 1989, the outcomes of the Round Table talks paved the way for political involvement
of Solidarity and its successor parties. The semi-free elections of 1989 guaranteed 65%
of seats in the Sejm for the ruling party, 35% of the seats as well as all seats in the
Senate were to be openly contested (Tworzecki 1996: 50). During these elections,
Solidarity won all seats for contention. This event led to a politicization of the
organization and reformed it from a protest movement to a political movement (Korkut
2005: 163). Thus, the most influential civil organization lost its leaders to politics. By
definition, they could, and eventually did, hereafter serve as antagonists for protest.
Immediately after the collapse of the old system, fights within the civil society elites
began on how to interpret history and on spheres of influence. These leaders becoming
the new political elite led to a paralysis on the civil level, where suddenly leaders were
missing (Rode 2009: 418). As a result, civil society became increasingly powerless in
the face of inner-elite struggles on the political level (Korkut 2005: 161). Already
during this period, the Solidarity movement began to fall apart. Its members in the
government were without exception members of the intelligentsia, which led to
allegations of elitism of the ruling Solidarity circles (Tworzecki 1996: 51). In 1990,
differences among these high-ranked Solidarity members broke out and eventually led
to Lech Wałęsas declaration of the “war at the top” (Beyer 2010: 30). This period
caused a deep chasm within the movement and polarized Polish society further. As a
result, unions saw a sharp decline in membership during these years (Korkut 2005:
155). Until 1990, Solidarity had been the uniting mass movement for all political protest
27
in Poland. After its split, protest did not fade away at once, but manifested itself in
various small parties and other groupings (Millard 2009: 783).
In 1991, a threshold of 5% of votes for parties and 8% for coalitions was introduced, 3
and consequently parliamentary representation of organized protest diminished in 1993.
Most of those protest movements that still gained seats in the Sejm in 19934 lost some
of their deputies over time due to resignation. Especially Solidarity and its successor
parties suffered from this development (Millard 2009: 785sqq.). This shows the falling
degree of organization that has been dropping steadily since 1989.
After Solidarity’s split in 1990, several areas of civil society experienced a dynamic
development to fill the existing gap between government and its citizens. The first area
where civil society became apparent was the local level, especially in local self-
government structures. Secondly, ad hoc and other barely formalized groups were
installed in Poland, such as youth movements and subcultural milieus. Lastly, NGOs
started to be instituted in Poland (Gliński 01-15-2008: 3). However, this cannot veil the
fact that protest movements were weak or virtually nonexistent after Solidarity had
entered politics. Local organizations are neither instituted not fit to engage in large-scale
collective action needed for protest against national government politics. Furthermore,
these organizations were usually formed around one or more charismatic leaders
(Szczerbiak 2001: 101), thereby depending on this person or group of persons to keep
the organization alive. In 1993, several NGOs had been founded in Poland in various
fields. Most of them were not descendants of the Solidarity movement but instead
founded by professionals (Sokolowski 2002: 10). These groups only rarely engaged in
political protest but were mostly occupied with specific aspects of the founder’s
profession. Furthermore, quasi-NGOs were instituted by politicians who used these
organizations to further their own goals and political career (Gliński 01-15-2008: 3).
Contrary to what might have been expected, no new protest organizations were created
during the first transition years. Instead, existing groups such as Solidarity split, and as a
result a rise in the overall number of organizations can be observed (Ekiert, Kubik 1998:
102).
3 This was a result of the 1991 elections which had resulted in a highly diverse Sejm. It could not
efficiently work as too many parties and groupings had gained seats. 4 The first election carried out under the new regulations.
28
Between 1989 and 1993, the number of people involved in any given protest action
nevertheless increased (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 98). In 1990 and 1991, most protests were
organized by farmers’ unions demanding increases in subsidies on agricultural products
and resorting mostly to demonstrations and street blockades (Pleines 2006: 17). In
February 1991, various branches experienced strikes and demonstrations by workers,
protesting against the popiwek, a tax that was levered on wage growth in order to limit
inflation (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 97). During 1992 and 1993, the peak years for protest,
miners and other workers in the state-owned mining sector were responsible for most
protests. Their demands covered a range of issues, mostly economic but also political.
Starting in summer 1992, protests took on a nationwide scale. The demands raised by
protesters were explicit and combined economic as well as political aspects, such as
changes in the privatization law and a restriction on foreign investment. The actions
started on a local level, but were incorporated into a nationwide campaign by unions
establishing a national coordinating committee. Among the organizers of the campaign
were Solidarity ’80, a militant splinter of Solidarity and Samoobrona,5 the strongest
farmers’ union. Through this establishment and the issuing of a list of 21 demands, they
drew on the national experience with Solidarity’s success (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 106). In
mid-December 1992, Solidarity organized a nation-wide strike against the rising costs
of living, which transformed into a general strike of all mines in Upper Silesia
(Stegemann 2009: 332). During the first half of 1993, a number of other sectors,
including the public sector, were involved in the protest wave, involving at most
300,000 workers in a strike lasting for one month (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 97). In spring of
that year, the demand to relax economic policies led to a protest campaign organized by
Solidarity. The protesters were successful in inducing a vote of non-confidence in
parliament which led to the incumbent government being voted out of office (Ekiert,
Kubik 1998: 113). This, however, was only possible due to Solidarity’s representation
in parliament, leading to a blurred line between civil protest and parliamentary
procedures.
5 Samoobrona and its leader Andrzej Lepper also played a decisive rule in the farmers’ protests of the late
1990s; see subsequent section.
29
The biggest protests did not occur in the regions that were affected most by the
economic and social reforms, but in those regions where the degree of organization was
the highest, namely Warsaw, Silesia, Gdańsk, Cracow, Szczecin and Lodz (Ekiert,
Kubik 1998: 98). The concerns of protesters were most often connected to their local
community or workplace; only about 30% of protests concerned matters that the
national institutions were actually responsible for (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 109).
In summary, the years between 1989 and 1993 were characterized by increasing protest
frequency and magnitude, but still with considerably lower levels of protest than the
preceding years. Protest activities were mostly carried out by “members of ‘mainstream’
social categories” (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 113), who had been privileged under socialism
and lost their privileges after 1989. These protesters were generally organized in labor
unions, and new organizations were not widely founded.
Protest action was diverse and uncoordinated. Organization of protest by more than one
movement was the exception rather than the rule (Castle, Taras 2002: 178). Therefore,
strikes organized by a union were usually the means of choice for protesters, who
protested mostly against state institutions (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 114). Thus, protest
during the first transitions years was political protest carried out in a labor-related
environment. Success was however scarce, especially in the field of macro-economic
policies (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 114), i.e. the reforms that made transition to a market
economy possible. Only on local issues or in specific questions did protest yield some
results.
2. 2nd Phase: 1993-1997
During the second half of the 1990s, farmers started to become the most active protest
group, replacing workers. Their standard of living had fallen even more than that of the
former group and they started to feel increasingly marginalized in the modernizing state
(Castle, Taras 2002: 180). Their unionization rate was still high, and as unions played a
noticeable role in the reformulation of Polish labor law during the years 1989 to 1997
(Stegemann 2009: 369), their influence should not be forgotten. However, after 1993,
30
strike rates dropped impressively (Stegemann 2009: 369; Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 93), and
after 1995 strikes became relatively rare, never exceeding 42 in total in any given year
with a maximum of 40,000 participants. Compared even with Western countries this is
rather peaceful (Castle, Taras 2002: 178). Even with farmers becoming more active, this
development did not replace the subsiding engagement of workers after 1993.
To contest this waning activism, Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza
Solidarnosc, AWS) was formed in 1996 and incorporated more than 30 center-right
political parties and movements (Szczerbiak 2001: 95). It was an attempt to reunite the
anti-Communist protest under the old Solidarity label, but could also be seen to be a
reaction to the problem caused by civil elites becoming active in the political sphere.
This union of splinter parties was far from being a cooperation of protest movements.
Instead they had transformed into real parties that became members of the political
system – a situation that bans them per definition from being part of the protest. As
Korkut (2005: 152) observes, “it was not the citizenry that shaped the post-communist
political order, but the citizenry was obliged to accept this order”. The divide between
politics and the civil sphere could not be bridged by this attempt and AWS soon lost its
significance. Having gained more than 30% in the elections in 1997, already in the next
round they could not pass the 8% threshold (Alexander 2005: 382).
Even in the case of protest, the attitude towards the reform process was positive and the
participants supported the changes as such (Korkut 2005: 152). More specifically,
protests were never directed against the new system, instead their aim was to participate
in the reform process and correct specifics (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 107). These protests
mostly led to minor policy changes (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 111); however, their influence
was low. The years after 1993 were thus remarkably peaceful.
What is more, protest during transformation was very much a matter of self-interest of
those involved, missing the unique feature of Solidarity as an encompassing solidary
action (Castle, Taras 2002: 182). The short-lived attempt of the AWS did not prove to
be successful and social engagement settled at a very low level.
In summary, the transition phase proved not to be very beneficial for political protest on
a large scale, as the civil society elites who had initiated protest during the Solidarity
31
years moved to politics. However, the levels of protest during the transition years were
still surprisingly low considering the hardships stemming from transition combined with
expanding opportunities for protest (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 93). The process that made
politicians out of Solidarity members also changed these individuals’ convictions and
dedications (Korkut 2005: 156), leading to low responsiveness of the system to
demands voiced by the citizenry and low efficacy of protests.
B. Consolidated Democracy: 1997 – 2004
The introduction of a new constitution happened only in 1997, due to polarization
within Polish society and politics. Between 1992 and 1997, the basis for state action had
been a “small constitution”, so that there would be time to work out the details of the
final document. Polarization happened due to two main reasons. Firstly, the threshold to
enter parliament was contested mostly by Solidarity successor parties who had gained
less than 5% in the last parliamentary election and who were thus banned from taking
part in the final vote on the constitution. A second issue that was fiercely debated was a
reference to God in the preamble of the constitution. Especially the church voiced
opposition to the compromise that mentions but does not put God exclusively as the
source for right and wrong (Ziemer 2009: 147sq.). Surprisingly this situation did not
result in intense protests when the final draft to be voted upon became public. Even
turnout at the constitutional referendum in May was below 50% (Ziemer 2009: 149),
whilst demonstrations or strikes did not happen at all in this context.
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, unionization levels dropped further. Between
2001 and 2005, Solidarity lost about 1/3 of their membership base. In 2005, the
unionization rate was only 14%, compared to 80% in 1981. Today Poland is one of the
countries in the EU with the lowest unionization rates (Rode 2009: 416). Furthermore,
voters’ identification with Solidarity and its heritage waned over time. At the beginning
of the 2000s, a sharp shift away from Solidarity successor parties was distinguishable in
the presidential election (2000) and the following parliamentary election (2001)
(Millard 2009: 792).
32
In 2001, the farmers’ union Samoobrona, being the last one to remain a movement
without political engagement besides the already existing farmers’ party PSL, started
running for election on a populist and nationalist agenda under the leadership of the
infamous Andrzej Lepper (Korkut 2005: 156). A differentiation between social
movements and political parties has thus become impossible as every movement now
has its political branch.
1998 and 1999 saw a protest wave where the demands were rarely taken into account by
politicians and the aims were never fully reached. Starting in July 1998, when 15,000
grain growers demonstrated in Warsaw, and continuing until May 1999, farmers, led by
Lepper, fiercely protested and rioted against agrarian politics (Lange 06-15-2007: 17)
and subsidized food imports from the EU. The system change of 1989 had already
brought painful reforms for farmers when food subsidies were cut by 80% and input
subsidies were also reduced by a high percentage (Kiereta 2001: 87). Furthermore, the
transformation process as well as the opening of the Polish market led to a deterioration
of real prices for agricultural goods (Kiereta 2001: 88). In 1998, a market depression for
agricultural products further decreased farmers’ incomes, a process that continued in
1999. Farmers across Central and Eastern Europe were severely affected after Russia
experienced an economic crisis during that period. This led to a decline in agricultural
output of about 15% (Institut für Agrarentwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa 2003: 1).
Furthermore, support to agriculture significantly dropped after 1999 and stayed on a low
level afterwards (Institut für Agrarentwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa 2003: 7).
Protest did however not mobilize as many people as one would expect as only 12% of
Polish farmers participated in the action.
The outcome of the so-called “farmers’ wars” was an agreement between the farmers’
unions and the government in which higher guaranteed prices for grain were secured.
The protests were nevertheless not very successful as the government reduced subsidies
the following year to the level they had been before the agreement came into power
(Pleines 2006: 18). So the protesters were not able to reverse the downward trend of
lower income nor to secure broader government support over time.
In February and July 1999, doctors, nurses and midwives demonstrated against the
planned health care reform. It was to be the end of a reform process that had started in
33
1991. Until then, medical care had been organized by the state in a national health care
service, which aimed at equalizing access to medical support for all citizens, but
suffered greatly from inefficiency (Podzerek-Knop 2004: 3). The reform process was
directed at reducing centralization, introducing health insurance and at privatizing the
sector. From the beginning on it was characterized by great insecurity as different ideas
were discussed at the same time and the final plan was not implemented in the end.
Instead, it was supplanted by a series of ad hoc measures which led to a lack in
transparency and high incentives for corruption (Podzerek-Knop 2004: 6, 10). The
reform of 1999 aimed at putting an end to the precarious situation and introduced an
internal market with competition between insurances and between providers of medical
services, following a more individualized, market-oriented approach (Podzerek-Knop
2004: 21). Protest therefore demanded a continued involvement of the state and
expressed dissatisfaction with the role of health insurances that were going to be
responsible for paying for medical services (Podzerek-Knop 2004: 78) and as such
could de facto decide upon the income of service providers. Nevertheless, the reform
was introduced and the medical sector privatized as protest failed to reach its aims.
In the aftermath of the reform’s introduction, nurses continued their struggle for a pay
raise and improved working conditions. However, the government took on a defensive
stance as the reform had introduced privatization and thus transferred responsibilities to
the public health insurances. After more than half a year of protesting by squatting
ministries, demonstrating, which included a gathering of about 20,000-30,000 nurses in
Warsaw in June, and a hunger strike later that month, an agreement between the
government and the nurses’ union was reached. The agreement offered the nurses pay
raises; however, in August not more than 10% of all nurses had received the promised
money (Börzel 2010: 34). At the end of 2000, nurses again squatted the Ministry of
Health in an attempt to obtain a wage rise of 125 Euro, but had to give up their action in
December (Lange 06-15-2007: 16). Finally, the work situation of this occupational
branch remains precarious and protest by different means has not been successful in the
long run.
In September 1999 about 30,000 people demonstrated against the government, after a
call to action by farmers’ unions, requesting the government to resign and calling for
34
snap elections (Lange 06-15-2007: 17). The number of participants, however, fell by far
short of the 100,000 organizers had hoped for. In this sense, this incident seems to be
symptomatic for protest in Poland since transformation (Castle, Taras 2002: 178). In
2002, Solidarity was successful in organizing demonstrations against the reforms of the
Labor Law (Stegemann 2009: 396), but failed in reversing the process. At the beginning
of 2004, strikes concerning the retirement law were launched by Solidarity, including a
law initiative which was finally passed by the parliament in 2005 (Stegemann 2009:
369). All in all, only few protest actions were recorded during the years following 1999,
and those that took place failed in reaching their goals in most cases.
C. Poland in the EU: 2004 – 2010
Before EU-accession, much protest was heard from the Polish farmers. 6
Their general
skepticism towards the EU was based on a feeling of disinformation, but their fears
were centered around soil sales to foreign investors and competition with subsidized
products from other EU member states (Bachmann 2011: 127). Under Socialism there
had been guaranteed prices for their products and no competition from other countries.
The shock of transition to a market economy was already forceful, and the prospects of
being incorporated into an even larger market therefore not desirable. As rural
population makes up about one third of the Polish population, their votes were however
necessary for the accession referendum to pass (Kiereta 2001: 155). Polish peasants’
interests were secured through parliamentary representation. Firstly, the Polish
Peasants’ Party (PSL) has been playing a decisive role in government formation in
Poland. Secondly the radical Self-Defense (Samoobrona) also claimed to be supporting
farmers’ interests (Bachmann 2011: 130). Before the accession referendum, the Polish
peasants could thus be considered a veto player due to their high degree of organization
as well as due to their influential parliamentary representation (Bachmann 2011: 131).
In the forerun to the accession referendum in Poland, political protest by farmers and
rural population in general was thus higher than during the preceding years. However,
6 See section B for details. Although farmers’ protest of 1998 and 1999 was not solely protest against EU
accession, it still forms one aspect of the collective action.
35
as intense struggle can only be accredited to farmers a nationwide protest wave cannot
be discerned. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that by far not all farmers opposed
EU accession and protested. Especially those farmers that do not produce for the market
were not so concerned about competition (Pleines 2006: 15) and did not take part in
protest as frequently as those fearing lower prices and higher competition.
During the first years of the 2000s, civil society in Poland had been growing, especially
in the cities. About 32,000 different NGOs were active in those years, predominantly in
the areas of education, health service and social activities (Garsztecki October 2001).
Under the Kazcyński administration, starting in 2005, this development was halted.
Today Poland still shows the lowest participation rate in voluntary organizations of all
EU countries with 2/3 of the whole citizenry being completely uninvolved in any kind
of movement or organization in 2009 (Szawiel 2009: 498, see also table 1). Polish
citizens also show very low readiness to participate in unpaid social work for the good
of the community, and in 2010 less than 1/5 of Poles above the age of 18 participated in
such activities (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznych 2010: 0, see table 1). Civil society
thus experienced only a short phase of growth since 1989 and remains weak.
Table 1: Have you, during the course of last year, been working voluntarily and unpaid for your
community, church, settlement, village, town, or for people in need?
(CBOS 2010: 12)
Between 2005 and 2007, public mockery of the government much like during
Communist time was widespread in Poland. This behavior cannot, however, count as
protest as the central part of our definition includes the aim to influence decisions. By
36
displaying politicians as unable or discrediting them otherwise, the decision to be
influenced is less than clear in the best, and nonexistent in the worst cases. Curiously
enough, public protest or even revolts were limited.
Under the Kaczyński government, weeks-long strikes by doctors and nurses became
prominent even outside of Poland. Furthermore, teachers, mailmen and miners protested
several times (Vetter 2008: 182). Even so, their protest was aiming at higher wages and
better working conditions. Although these occupational groups are all state-employed,
their protest aims do not fulfill the conditions for political protest. The state addressed
by these protests was acting in the same way as any other employer and consequently
the notion of “political” is missing here. Most public critique was heard from the
intellectuals who accused the Kazcyńskis of undermining the rule of law in Poland. This
critique did however not serve as a starting point for further protest (Vetter 2008: 11).
Therefore, political protest against the Kazcyński government did not happen on a
noticeable scale even though discontent was widespread.
Consequently, campaigning for the parliamentary election of fall 2007 was as fierce as
it had never been before (Vetter 2008: 123) and reached a level of polarization unknown
to this date. The governing PiS-party was trying hard to mobilize voters whilst the
opposition parties tried to win former PiS supporters over. Voter turnout was the highest
since 1989. Especially young people who had not been involved in political activity
before, voted and reminded their peers to follow suit (Vetter 2008: 129). Finally, the
moderate conservative party PO won the elections and Donald Tusk became prime
minister.
Right after Tusk had stepped into office as prime minister in 2007, several occupational
groups again voiced claims for higher wages. Firstly, teachers became active, later also
doctors and nurses working in public hospitals as well as miners pressured the new
government for wage increases (Vetter 2008: 147). This can be seen as a continuation of
the protests under the former government as those had not been successful. Therefore,
the same argument is valid here, that these collective actions do not fulfill the criteria of
political protests.
37
Generally speaking, collective action, be it formal or informal, legal or illegal has been
unpopular in Poland. In a survey conducted in 2006, for example, only 1.4% of those
questioned had taken part in a public demonstration, and only 0.2% in illegal public
protests (Gliński 01-15-2008: 4). The most activity in Polish civil society can be found
in the NGO sector. Yet the establishment of Polish NGOs has effectively been a process
initiated by the political elites, meaning that a growing of movements out of the
citizenry has virtually not taken place (Gliński 01-15-2008: 6). In 2008, about 65,000
NGOs were registered in Poland, comprising mostly sports, tourism, recreation and
hobby associations. Furthermore, cultural and arts as well education associations exist.
Areas, in which the most activity by Poles takes place are local church activities and the
engagement of parents in their children’s schools (Gliński 01-15-2008: 4). Engagement
in political movements or organizations, by contrast, is uncommon.
Interest groups, in their nature most fit to organize protest action, are often either used
by parties as their sphere of influence or they become parties themselves instead of
protesting (Korkut 2005: 159). Still today unions are active in politics and can be
identified as being of a rather “socio-political” (Korkut 2005: 164) character. Leaders
often use their position within the union to advance to political positions or to receive
political gains from it. Thereby unions cannot be classified as pure civil society
organizations.
The biggest problem Polish NGOs, and civil society in general, have to face are meager
finances. What is more, the gap between rich NGOs and those that operate on a very
low budget has been widening (Gliński 01-15-2008: 5). Civil society has consequently
been facing strong barriers to institutionalization and organization of public action. In
combination with the matters of organizations rarely touching on political issues, it
becomes obvious that political engagement must remain low.
Over the last years, general trust in effectiveness of protest measures such as strikes has
been declining and with it membership in unions such as Solidarity. On the other hand,
employers’ associations have been gaining influence (Vetter 2008: 34), and by the same
token, civil society in Poland is not considered to be an equal partner by neither
government nor business (Gliński 01-15-2008: 2). At the beginning of 2010, 28% of
Polish citizens were active in civic organizations, which is the highest number since
38
1998 (Garsztecki 04-20-2010: 6), but still very low compared to unionization rates at
the end of communism.
The dominant feature of Polish public life is increasingly the privatization of issues;
people feel more attached to their local communities and families instead of the nation
(Garsztecki 2010: 6). A mechanism of “muddling through” has prevailed over the past
years as personal alliances continue to determine policy-making in Poland and
institutionalized channels for voicing demands are rarely used (Korkut 2005: 158).
Public protest on a large scale seems to become more unlikely, even if the proportion of
people engaged in civic organizations may slowly be rising as the number from 2010
suggest. As demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, the type of organization varies
and is rarely even connected to political issues.
D. The Smoleńsk Tragedy 2010 and its Aftermath
On April 10, 2010, the biggest tragedy in contemporary Polish history took place. On
their way to a joint memorial service in honor of the Polish officers who were killed by
Russian soldiers at Katyń with the Russian president, the airplane carrying the Polish
president Lech Kaczyński alongside his wife and 95 other important public figures7
crashed. All passengers died (Lesser 2010). Even if the event brought about a certain
peace between the political parties who halted their controversies and fights for some
months, decisions taken by officials triggered civil protest on a larger scale than ever
since 1993. The general tone of these protests was a feeling that officials had not
sufficiently honored the victims. In this context, conspiracy theories of murder became
popular and further heated public mood (Najder 2010: 35). Two main incidents incited
the protests.
The first issue that triggered protest was the question of the burial site for Lech
Kaczyński and his wife Maria. Only a few days after the crash, hundreds of people took
to the streets, voicing their discontent over the plan to lay them to rest in Cracow’s
Wawel, the site where Polish kings and national heroes have traditionally been buried
7 Among them were the complete military leadership, several members of parliament and relatives of
officers who had been killed in the Katyń massacre.
39
(Hinsey 2011: 143). Mainly young people were involved in these demonstrations,
protesting against the “deification” (Hinsey 2011: 150) of the late president. The
demonstrations subsided after a few weeks, especially after the funeral had taken place
in Cracow on April 18 (Gnauck 09-21-2010: 5). If this was political protest matching
the definition is at the least not completely clear. The decision in question was taken by
Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz, who is not a member of the polity but a high-ranking
church official. Yet the topic was of a highly political matter and the carrying out of a
state funeral is in the hands of members of the system. So even if members of the
political system did not take the decision about the site alone, they were part of it. The
protests can therefore be classified as political.
The second issue had more impact on political life, although the numbers of protesters
did not exceed a few hundreds. Shortly after the plane crash, scouts groups placed a
wooden cross in front of the president’s palace in Warsaw. Before assuming office, the
newly elected president Bronisław Komorowski planned to remove it, as a religious
sign was not seen fit for a public place like the president’s palace and to place it in the
church of St. Anna. This plan was met by public protest organized through a protest
committee set up ad hoc by members of PiS and the public, which even resulted in
public riots in front of the President’s Palace (Gnauck 09-21-2010: 5). The rioting
public attacked priests and officers in charge of the removal of the cross (Krzemiński
2010: 41). In the end, the plan to transfer the cross was temporarily dismissed. As a
result a counter demonstration was set up mostly by young people communicating via
Facebook a few days after the planned transfer date (Majcherek 2010: 22). The
organizers of the demonstration were successful in convening a few thousand
participants in favor of the removal (Garsztecki 2010: 6). Finally, the cross was
transferred to the chapel in the Palace in September (Gnauck 09-21-2010: 5). This was a
quite exceptional case for Poland as the demonstration did not only lead to riots, but
was also met by a counter demonstration. Moreover, its significance stems from
religious Poles who wanted to keep the cross attacking church officials. This had been
unthinkable until this incident in the traditionally catholic Poland.
40
E. Characteristics of Protest 1989-2010
It is now possible to pinpoint certain waves in the organization of protest since the
collapse of the communist system in 1989. Firstly, transition provided fertile grounds
for protest with its peak in 1993 and the following rapid decline. The second wave can
be discerned in 1998 and 1999 with a number of sectors involved. Protest after 1999
was less encompassing so it is not possible to make out any more waves. The most
intense protest action since the beginning of the millennium happened in 2010 after the
Smoleńsk national tragedy. It is, however, not possible to link these waves directly with
political developments. Neither the introduction of the current constitution in 1997 nor
Poland’s accession to the European Union led directly to enhanced protest, even though
the forerun to EU accession saw some protest events. It seems as if protest, however
scarce, is rather linked to economic development than to political decisions, which
might mean that only matters that affect the individual directly such as lower income or
political decisions directly leading to a worsening of personal living conditions trigger
protest.
During the first transition years, Polish citizens still engaged in collective action and
tried to take part in the reconstruction of the nation state. However, not nearly as many
people were mobilized as during the last years of communism. The means of choice for
protesters remained striking, and 1993 saw by far the most strikes since the end of the
communist system. The Central Statistical Office of Poland has recorded the number of
strikes on a five-year-basis, showing that in 1990, 250 strikes occurred, while between
1995 and 2006 the numbers stayed below 100 every year. The same applies to the
numbers of employees on strike, which did not exceed 100,000 in that time period. Only
2007 and 2008 saw a huge increase in the number of strikes – in 2007 almost 2,000 and
just below 13,000 in 2008. However the number of employees on strike in 2007 was
still below 60,000 whereas the 250 strikes in 1990 mobilized 116,000 people (Główny
Urząd Statystyczny (Central Statistical Office) 2010: 44sq.). This is in congruence with
the findings presented in the previous sections. At the end of the Kaczyński
administration and at the beginning of the Tusk administration, public officials went on
strike, but Poland in general did not experience much protest since the early 1990s.
41
As the once uniting movement Solidarity broke apart, and protest goals were only rarely
reached, protests subsided. Even in the public discussion on the structure and content of
the new constitution, public collective action was rare. Instead, people’s actions have
been directed at the imminent personal environment such as schools, sports clubs and
charity. These areas saw an increase in engagement and in number of organizations.
All in all a noticeable decline in the importance and influence of unions in society can
be discerned. Even though NGOs have been forming in Poland and civil society has
been developing, this has mostly happened in areas of personal matters. Movements
concerned with political matters are still today usually unions or groups influenced by
political parties.
Parties and movements in Poland have shallow roots in society. As actors such as trade
unions and other societal groupings have been very active in the political arena, the
distinction between political parties and other forms of organized voicing of opinion or
protest is sometimes hard to make in Poland. This is also a result of elites shifting from
the civil to the political sphere.
In summary, it is possible to conclude that public collective action has been stagnating
on a low level. The hardships stemming from transition combined with expanding
opportunities for protest led to a surprise in the low levels of protest during the
transition years (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 93). After that, only in exceptional cases, before
the passage of new and far-reaching laws and before EU accession, was protest initiated
at all. Even then, fewer people than anticipated or even only one branch of workers
participated. Instead, mass collective actions could be seen where state-employees
demanded higher wages and better working conditions, a further confirmation that
personal matters have become more important than political ones.
The plane crash in 2010 and the following protests did not prove to be a real exception.
Even if hundreds of participants gathered to protest either in favor or against the burial
of the Kaczyńskis in the Wawel or in favor of or against the wooden cross, the actions
did not bring the masses to the streets that those protests of the 1980s had. Furthermore,
the incident came unexpected and as a shock to Poland. In this sense it is comparable to
other events that sparked protest. Moreover, religion is always a very personal issue and
42
the question whether a cross is fit to honor the victims cannot possibly be answered
objectively. So the combination of a sudden, far-reaching incident and personal matters
generating protest aligns well with the findings from the previous years.
Instead of protesting, Poles have rather voiced their dissatisfaction by boycotting
elections. Turnout has been very low in national as well as local elections, with the
result being lower the higher the level. Parliamentary and presidential elections usually
have a turnout between 42 and 68% (Tworzecki 1996: 48; Garsztecki October 2001),
which is lower than in most Western democracies. Those Poles that have not boycotted
the elections have mostly voted for the opposition. Over the course of the last 20 years,
not a single governing party in Poland has been able to win a second election (Bader,
Zapart 2011: 260). Thus, Poland is far from being a host to unrest, protest, and possibly
riots.
IV. Explaining the Peace
Over the last 200 years, Poland has been divided multiple times and struggled for its
identity in fights against Russia and Germany (Garsztecki 2010: 2). Presumably, much
of the existing potential for protest and fights for a common cause was eradicated once
the country regained its independence. The following section will assess in how far this
assumption is true and which other factors might have influenced the behavior of Poles
since 1989. Applying and evaluating the model outlined in chapter two, it will be
evaluated which factors really played a role in individuals’ behavior and why social
movements and protest organizations have not been very popular in the country.
A. Protest Potential
It is not a lack of potential that has kept Poles from protesting. Grievances are and have
been high in the Polish society. Communism left behind a large rural population, high
unionization rates as well as many non-competitive farms and firms, all three favorable
43
preconditions for protest (Vanhuysse 2006: 44). Especially in the transition years,
poverty skyrocketed (Beyer 2010: 5) and has been high ever since. The following
chapter will show how high the levels of both factors leading to protest potential,
namely grievances and polarization, are until today.
1. Grievances
Grievances are in general higher in Poland than in Western democracies as people tend
to hold the state responsible for issues and benefits that is usually not the duty of a
national government (Krzemiński 2009: 352). Poles are traditionally very distrustful of
the government, holding it responsible for all deprivations and poverty (Beyer 2010:
38). During communist times, the state established itself as the only one responsible for
the distribution of goods and services, which in turn led to citizens having high
expectations and demanding supply of these to a high extent (Wnuk-Lipiński 1993: 74).
Therefore, grievances develop quickly. Especially during transformation, they were
high. After the state had been responsible for the general welfare of its people during
communism, increasing unemployment and increasing costs of living – general
deprivation, in short – led to high grievances in society (Castle, Taras 2002: 182). This
deprivation also harmed the unions that had become politically active, as citizens who
lost their jobs and saw a decline in their living standards accredited the developments to
political decisions taken by union elites (Rode 2009: 419). Protest potential rose during
the first years of transformation due to an increase in the perceived threat of
unemployment, especially because the feeling of personal safety decreased during that
time (Wnuk-Lipiński 1993: 91). The appliance of strikes, as the most successful method
during communism, and its peak in 1993 becomes thus understandable.
Generally speaking, Poles have been very critical of the situation in their country and
express a feeling of stagnation. Interviews confirm the assumption that protest potential
in Poland still exists. 8 Since 1989, Poles have generally been rather dissatisfied with the
8 An analysis of the relevant data by CBOS can be found in the annex to this paper.
44
way the country develops, and have assessed the political as well as the economic
situation negatively.9
Table 2: Generally speaking, is the situation in Poland heading in a good or bad direction?
(CBOS: Trends)
As expected, the fall of communism brought about a positive attitude in society, which
changed quickly, and at the beginning of 1992, most Poles already noted a general
negative development. What is more, negative assessment reached a new high at the
beginning of 1999, a year of protest waves. Starting in December 1998, the Polish
Public Opinion Research Center (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, CBOS) has
registered predominantly the answer “negative” to the question whether the country in
general was moving in a positive or negative direction. Furthermore, there have only
been nine months between January 1999 and January 2011 in which the predominant
answer to that question was “positive”. Even worse is the picture when asking for an
assessment of the political or economic situation. In neither case has there ever been a
majority of positive answers.
9 CBOS has surveyed social moods since 1807, so it is possible to get thorough data. However, research
reports are only accessible online for the time span 1997 (using data from 1996) to 2011. For the time
before that, only graphs are available, which are harder to interpret exactly.
Good Bad Difficult to say
45
The political situation as illustrated in table 3 was classified as “good” only in the
beginning of the Third Republic, but “neither good nor bad” dominated as answer
during most of the years 1996-1999. This changed afterwards and between July 1999
and December 2009, not even in ten months the answer was not mostly “bad”, marking
a significant downwards turn in the overall assessment. Since the beginning of the Tusk
administration, the assessment has mostly been ambivalent, although there has since
1996 not been a single month in which the dominant answer was “good”.
Table 3: How do you generally evaluate the current political situation in Poland? Is it:
(CBOS: Trends)
In the economic sphere, as table 4 shows, the picture is not much different, although at
the beginning of the 90s, due to the communist heritage, the assessment was much
worse than in the years after 1995. Recently,10
the assessment was usually undecided.
The assumption that dissatisfaction with public affairs is a general phenomenon in
Polish society is therefore sensible. This general dissatisfaction does of course not
translate directly into grievances, but it offers a fairly good idea that grievances have
existed on a significant scale during all years between 1989 and 2010. As protests have
10
Since 2006.
good neither good nor bad bad
46
been mostly for personal economic benefits, the survey data connected to the economic
situation is especially important.
Table 4: How do you generally evaluate the current economic situation in Poland? Is it:
(CBOS: Trends)
Even if the public had supported economic and social reforms as such, their impacts led
to rising grievances in society early during the 1990s (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 95). Those
workers that protested were almost exclusively employed in state-owned industries or
the public sector. Before communism collapsed, they therefore enjoyed privileges they
now lost in the new system (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 100). Even though a decline in living
standard had been anticipated by analysts before reforms were introduced, the hardships
they produced were much bigger than predicted. Besides loss in income and
skyrocketing unemployment rates, social benefits had to be cut and subsidies for basic
goods were reduced to a minimum. In comparison with 1989, in 1993, average real
income per capita in Poland was by 12% lower, and real wages had dropped by 25%
and remained at that level the following years (Vanhuysse 2006: 10). When reforms
sharply decreased job security, fears of losing employment skyrocketed in post-
communist countries. In November 1990, 65% of Polish workers were willing to strike
if in danger of losing their jobs (Vanhuysse 2006: 14–15).
good neither good nor bad bad
47
In the 1990s, after an initial decline from 50% in 1990 to 34% in 1992 and 27% in
1994, satisfaction with democracy rose again. Yet in 2000, an even deeper dip is
observable. Until 2006, this value only reached 38% again. So gradual improvements
are visible, yet the leap above 50% has not happened so far. Still in 2009, 49% of Poles
were dissatisfied with the way democracy worked in their country and 57% wished for
far-reaching reforms in the system (Garsztecki 04-20-2010: 2). The assumption of
existing grievances and thus existing protest potential is therefore feasible.
Table 5: Satisfaction with democracy
(Pollack 2008: 42)
Protest potential has been declining, however. In recent years, Poles have been voicing
general satisfaction with the outcomes of the reforms of the transition period
(Krzemiński 2010: 35). The declining potential seems to reflect the relative social peace
– but does not explain the outburst of protest after the Smolensk tragedy in 2010.
48
What is important to note in this context, is the personal situation of Poles. In the
interviews conducted by CBOS, the quality of life has every time but once11
been
predominantly assessed as “neither good nor bad”; and since 2004, “good” has always
received more assent than “bad”, and has had almost the same value as “neither nor”
since 2009. We can thus assume that grievances are not as high as they could be if the
overall assessment of the country’s situation were felt more intensely by citizens
personally.
Table 6: How do you evaluate the quality of living of yourself and your family?
(CBOS: Trends)
2. Polarization
Polarization has been a dominant feature of Polish politics. Especially in matters of high
national significance, it has been strong. Korkut (2005: 161) shows how this feature
dominated elections in Poland, for example the presidential election of 1996 and the
parliamentary elections of 1997 and argues that this is a common feature of post-
socialist countries’ politics.
11
I.e. every month between 01/1996 and 01/2011. Only in September 2008, the answers “neither nor” and
“positive” received the same amount of answers.
Good Neither good nor bad Bad
49
The most prominent example of polarization in Poland however is the constitution that
was not introduced until 1997 – eight years after the communist system had collapsed.
This delay happened due to polarization. A more recent example of high polarization
was the debate about the burial site for the late president Kaczyński. Contrary to the
time before the constitution was introduced, this time the contrasting positions even
resulted in protest.12
These examples show clearly that in matters of national
importance, polarization is the normal case rather than being an exception.
Therefore, protest potential exists and has been existing, but as has been noted before, it
only unfolds when personal preferences are involved and when these are invoked by
incentives. In the following sections the structural and societal developments observable
in the time period under discussion will therefore be examined as well as their impacts
on incentives for protest.
B. Conditions
The following chapter will provide a closer look at the three levels which influence
individuals as well as groups in the decision whether to take protest action. The order in
which these factors will be evaluated will follow the one in which the theoretical
background was presented. Therefore, structural factors will be examined first before
turning to individual incentives and network dynamics.
1. The macro-level: POS
Political opportunities for protest in former Eastern Bloc countries multiplied after the
fall of the Berlin Wall and reforms burdened high social costs on the citizens of these
countries, yet public protest was scarce (Vanhuysse 2006: 1). Moreover, even though
opportunity structures opened in numbers after the collapse of the authoritarian system
in 1989, they were not expanded farther in the following years. Instead, a number of
laws were introduced after 1990 to hinder civic activities. In the following, an
12
See chapters III B and D for a detailed description.
50
examination of opening and closing opportunity during transition as well as later will be
provided.
As the assessment of Political Opportunity Structures is always tied to change in the
political system, a subdivision of the following analysis is necessary. The changes will
therefore be analyzed according to the chronological division made in the preceding
chapter.
a) 1989-1997
The collapse of communism brought about a situation in which, at first, responsibilities
were unclear. The existing state and its structures had been delegitimized and were thus
unable to perform their full functions. At the same time, new structures had not been
built yet and neither democratic parties not social organizations were able to fill the gap.
Instead, employees’ associations such as labor unions stepped in and played an active
part in reforming the system. Especially the re-founded Solidarity played an active role
in the transformation process and its members became politically involved (Stegemann
2009: 277sq.). This can be seen as closing opportunity structure for increasing
uncertainty about responsibilities and the question who the right contact person is
makes taking action difficult.
As soon as the old system was abolished, new opportunity structures nevertheless
opened. In December 1989, the constitution was amended to pave the way for transition
to a democratic system (Paczkowski 2009: 140). Censorship was eliminated and
freedom of expression along with freedom of the press were introduced when the
censorship authority was dismantled in May 1990 (Paczkowski 2009: 140). Solidarity
elites soon occupied the political sphere and provided security who to address.
Already during the Round Table Talks, the basis for free elections was created. The
recreation of the Senate as upper chamber of parliament brought about 100 seats which
were to be openly contested. Furthermore, 35% of all deputies in the Sejm (the lower
chamber) were to be freely elected (Banaszak 1999: 130). The first step towards
51
liberalization of the electoral system was thus taken, which opened new opportunities
for citizens to channel their protest.
However, some of these new opportunity structures soon closed again. The “war at the
top” showed Solidarity’s preoccupation with itself and left no room for meaningful
protest. Responsive authorities proved to be scarce even among those that had been
struggling to change the authoritarian system of the Peoples’ Republic.
After the fall of Communism, the legal framework for the establishment of local self-
government was to be established in three steps. While the first step was introduced
already in 1990, it was only nine years later that the second step was taken. The third
step foresees complete financial independence of local self-government but has not been
introduced to the present day (Gliński 01-15-2008: 3). Considering the relative
popularity of locally organized associations noted earlier, that independence of local
self-government therefore means a significant POS, as local organizations would have
the possibility to address local officers. A non-introduction of the reform does not
exactly mean a closing POS, however, the delay after promising such a reform is almost
equal due to the fact that a mere announcement can lead to expectations and its non-
fulfillment to further uncertainty on both sides.
In May 1991, after much discussion, a new law on trade unions was passed. It secured
freedom of association as well as a guarantee of independence from the state for the
unions (Stegemann 2009: 303). In a second law passed on the same day, freedom of
associations was also granted to employers (Stegemann 2009: 308). Furthermore, the
right to strike was codified in the law on trade disputes (Stegemann 2009: 316).
Opportunity structures thus opened when a legal frame was introduced.
This legal framework for labor disputes was reformed in 1993 and supplemented by a
pact on state-owned enterprises in transition, which included a deterioration of worker
participation (Stegemann 2009: 339). These as well as all other reforms were
undertaken by the new elites, leaving no possibility for active involvement of civil
society (Korkut 2005: 150). Therefore, opportunities were withheld from the public in
two ways. Firstly, some of those POS just recently introduced were abolished.
52
Secondly, civil society – that had mainly brought about the collapse of the old system –
was banned from taking part in the creation of a new system.
In 1992, the so-called “small constitution” was passed in order to gain more time to
work out the details of the constitution of the Third Republic. This document did not in
itself provide for new POS, as it dealt only with the distribution of competencies
between Parliament and president and provided a basis for the functioning of the state
(Paczkowski 2009: 147). However, it replaced the old Socialist constitution and
therefore abolished the repressive state system Poles had dealt with until that time. The
structure of the polity has been identified as important aspect in connection with the
likelihood of protest.13
Therefore at least in an indirect sense the introduction of the
“small constitution” opened a POS.
b) 1997-2004
New POS were introduced when finally the new constitution of 1997 was passed.
Firstly, it guarantees basic and human rights (Alexander 2005: 381). This is laid out in
chapter II, entitled “The Freedoms, Rights, and Obligations of Persons and Citizens”
(National Assembly of Poland 02/04/1997). Art. 31 includes the freedom of the person.
Furthermore, Art. 41 guarantees legal proceedings in case of arrest. Therefore, arbitrary
arrest and physical harm in case of protest is not legally possible, reducing possible
costs for protesters. Compared with the legal uncertainty of communist times, this
constitutes a clear opening of opportunity structures when the constitution was
introduced.
What is more, the constitution finally fixed democracy as the only legitimate system
(National Assembly of Poland 02/04/1997: Ch. I). This is an opening opportunity
structure as the introduction of a democratic constitution abolished all uncertainty about
the future political system and provided a basis for constant involvement of the public.
Even though these provisions were only a further development of the small constitution
of 1992, the document was final and therefore, an opening POS can be recognized. The
13
See chapter II B 1 in this paper.
53
freedom of association that had been codified by laws before also became part of the
constitutional law (Stegemann 2009: 360), securing this opportunity.
On the other hand, many movement forms were banned from running in elections, as
candidates were to be nominated by “parties or voters” (National Assembly of Poland
02/04/1997: Art. 100). Before, all kinds of movements were allowed to nominate
candidates (Banaszak 1999: 139). The constitution thus reserves the right to stand in
election exclusively for political parties and so-called elections committees, barring all
other forms of movements from entering (Millard 2009: 784sq.). Opportunities for these
were thus limited, making activity in political movements more difficult due to less
potential influence.
All in all, the years between 1997 and 2004 were characterized by consolidation of
democracy which brought about more stability and continuity in the question of who to
address with which matters. Even though the governing party changed every period,
administration and rules were established to deal with public demands.
c) 2004-2010
When Poland entered the European Union in 2004, the described development was
fundamentally changed. Poland had to undergo several reforms before being admitted,
which were imposed by EU authorities residing in Brussels. Participation even of the
national parliament, let alone the public was very limited. Elites again played the
decisive role in the accession negotiations (Korkut 2002: 297, 299). This development
obviously implies a closing opportunity structure as those responsible for local changes
were far away and not often easily accessible. Furthermore, the shift of policy decisions
to the supranational level took some decisions out of local authorities’ hands and made
it harder for citizens to influence the outcome. Even if the national government supports
claims made by movements and groups, this does not guarantee their conversion into
European politics.
On the other hand, involvement of citizens is a core EU concern in policy making
(Korkut 2002: 299). Accession to the Union therefore also opened opportunity
54
structures for Polish citizens. Firstly, it is important to note that European Union
administration already had been institutionalized and working for years before Poland
entered the Union. Questions about responsibilities were thus not the rule, contrary to
what Poles had experienced during transition. Furthermore, the European Union has
installed mechanisms to involve the public, namely public consultations and the
possibility of petitioning the parliament in matters the Union is responsible for
(European Commission; European Parliament). With only two instruments, the
opportunity structures for citizens to take influence on the European level is, however,
limited. Therefore, the net balance of POS during and after EU accession has to be
classified as negative.
Furthermore, in 2004, a collection of laws on the activity of NGOs were introduced,
impeding especially small and medium-sized organization in their activities as it
introduced a number of administrative requirements for an organization to be officially
registered (Krzemiński 2009: 355). The legal basis for the works of civil society thus
took on a rather unfavorable shape.
During transition, those elites that had been active in the Solidarity movement were
surprisingly ineffective in implementing the ideals developed in the movement,
including the creation of a favorable surrounding for the development of civil society.
Consequently, the first Post-Socialist government did not provide for an encompassing
change in the legal framework for civil participation in the political process. Only in
2005, the first public funds for civil initiatives were introduced (Gliński 01-15-2008: 6),
which until today do not, however, provide enough support for efficient work as all civil
society organization suffer from a lack in funds.
In October 2005, Lech Kazcyński was elected President of Poland and shortly after, in
July 2006, installed his twin-brother Jarosław as Prime Minister. From that time, Polish
politics were marked by populism and opposition to Western Europe and the EU (Vetter
2008: 9–10). This also brought about a break in political opportunities for civil society,
as during the Kazcyński era, the state doctrine in Polish politics rested on the idea of the
provident and paternalistic authoritarian state, which discouraged civil society action
(Vetter 2008: 47). The positive development that had begun earlier was therefore
55
stopped and could only start again when Jarosław Kazcyński was replaced as prime
minister in 2007.
Today, freedom house ranks Poland as “free”, with civil as well as political liberties
receiving grade “1” (Freedom House 2011). Opportunities for influence therefore must
exist for citizens and groups. However, political opportunity structures are still largely
determined by personal alliances between elites, leaving not much room for civil society
to address those responsible for alleviating grievances (Korkut 2005: 160). Those elites
that have shifted from engagement in civil society to engagement in politics often show
incomprehension of demands by the public (Korkut 2005: 170). Furthermore,
corruption still hinders influence by official channels. Transparency international ranks
Poland 41st of 178 countries evaluated in its 2010 corruption perceptions index
(Transparency International 2010: 2–3). Opportunity structures, albeit given by the
constitution, are therefore still not big as political elites do not regularly consider public
demands.
Even existing opportunity structures are rarely used. Knowledge about them and about
their correct exploitation, e.g. the formation of a movement, are not widely distributed
and often concealed by the system (Krzemiński 2009: 352). POS have therefore been
limited since 1989 and still are smaller than assumed at first glance. Opportunity
structures are not only a matter of laws and institutions but also of practice of those
responsible. In the case of Poland, this leads to a limitation of the legally existing
opportunities.
2. The micro-level: Incentives
As noted before, incentives exist either due to a change in the political environment or
as a consequence of a set of norms of an individual. In the following section therefore
firstly the incentives created by changing opportunity structures will be examined
before then turning to an assessment of dominant norms and values in Polish society.
56
a) Consequences of changing POS
Even if different phases of opportunities and waves of protest can be made out, “the
overwhelming majority of Polish society ignored the new possibilities of political
activity offered by the transformed system.” (Zaborowski 1993: 67) The example of the
law on trade unions clarifies this. Most strikes conducted during the first years after the
law had been passed were not in compliance with it (Stegemann 2009: 319). It seems
thus as if the opening opportunity structure were not recognized as such which leads to
the assumption that strike rates could have been higher if the POS had been known.
Consequently, incentives produced by changing POS have been limited.
After the collapse of state socialism in Poland, a fierce debate on the path of transition
emerged – including the question of the aim of transition. However, not one single plan
succeeded and was carried out; the transition phase was rather a process of “muddling
through” instead of following a coherent strategy (Sokolowski 2002: 7). This lead to a
general feeling of helplessness facing the state and made the opening POS that were
connected to e. g. the abolition of censorship or the introduction of free elections almost
invisible to the public.
In the years 1997-2000, Solidarity, as member of the government, engaged intensely in
the reform process, which was scorned upon by huge parts of the membership base
(Stegemann 2009: 378). It seems as if this development led to further disillusionment of
members as to their own personal influence. The less influence an individual feels it has
on the political arena, the less he or she is likely to engage in political activity such as
protest. Therefore, the changing political environment, already offering limited POS
during those years, further discouraged citizens from protesting.
As noted above, the perceived individual influence is important in the decision whether
to engage in protest activity or not. This perception of personal influence declined
quickly after the collapse of the old system. As protest during the first years of the
republic was not successful in most cases (Castle; Taras 2002: 179), people tended to
expect less influence they could exert by protesting. This showed a survey outcome of
1997, where 76% of those surveyed agreed to the statement that “people like me do not
have an influence on politics in our country” (Korkut 2005: 161). People thus tend to
57
see ordinary citizens as having very little or no influence at all (Beyer 2010: 51).
Changing POS did not influence this perception, as they have not been noticed by the
public. Therefore, the link between the macro- and micro-levels is weak, which leaves
other factors with relatively more influence on Poles’ protest behavior. As noted before,
if people do not feel their actions make a difference, even obviously opening
opportunity structures will not lead to protest.
Due to the entanglement of elites and organizations in politics, citizens tend not to
differentiate between the civil and the political society. Mistrust vis-à-vis either is high
(Korkut 2005: 162), consequently incentives to engage in action organized by
movements and organizations are low. There is a feeling that aims proclaimed by these
groups are not to be taken for granted and that engagement in action therefore does not
aid in bringing about desired change.
Negative incentives furthermore exist in connection with unionization. Those engaging
in setting up a union in any company risk losing their jobs (Rode 2009: 427). In
connection with the Poles’ conviction that any job is better than no job, the strength of
this negative incentive becomes clear. “At a time of declining living standards, the
unemployed and abnormal pensioners had stronger incentives to ‘exit’ into the informal
economy, instead of pursuing public goods through political ‘voice’.” (Vanhuysse 2006:
5) Therefore, incentives to evade politics and collective action and instead find help
through those trusted have remained high in Polish society.
b) Norms and Values
The most important preference Poles have internalized is the wish for freedom from
occupation. After more than 100 years of division, followed by more than 40 years of
Communist suppression, national sovereignty was on top of the list until 1989 (Beyer
2010: 41). No other public good has been able to be valued as highly after finally
reaching the desired freedom in 1989. Therefore, incentives since then tend to stay far
behind what Poles had experienced before.
58
A deeply internalized norm in Poland is the “us-versus-them” mentality in which the
state is seen as the opponent responsible for the alleviation of all grievances in society
(Ekiert; Kubik 1998: 110). Such mistrust against the state and its responsiveness to
citizens’ demand has resulted in a desire for distance from the state instead of active
participation and attempts to change the situation. The early polarizations during the
presidential election campaign 1990 and the “war at the top” led to a further
estrangement of society from politics. “Politics” became understood as negative and
politicians as being preoccupied with their personal intrigues, benefits and differences
(Krzemiński 2009: 351). Consequently, people have developed an attitude of rather
evading the polity instead of tackling it directly. Politics have widely become
considered a “dirty movement” by the Polish public (Korkut 2005: 168), that do not
help to achieve justice or benefits for the public. People therefore consider engaging in
protest as acting in vain. Opportunity costs are considered much higher than possible
benefits.
This divide between the public and the civil sphere has been further nurtured during the
years since transition. The lack of trust in political institutions today is also the result of
numerous scandals as well as the intensity with which public discussions are conducted
(Garsztecki 04-20-2010: 4). In 2002, a scandal had high impact on public life in Poland
when the movie producer Lew Rywin was proven to be involved in bribery concerning
the planned media law. He was alleged with trying to sell his services to the publishing
house Agora, who wanted to take over the private TV station Polsat. In 2003,
parliament installed a congressional investigation committee whose sessions were
transmitted live on TV, and that in the end found Rywin guilty. He was sentenced to
three years in prison. The public, however, took note mostly of the intense entanglement
of politics, economic interests and the thin line between legal and illegal action
including organized crime (Ziemer 2009: 159).
Similarly, in July 2004 another investigation committee was set up to investigate the
involvement of (then) President Kwaśniewski in dubious proceedings in the context of
privatization of the energy sector. The events in question happened in 2001 when a
close acquaintance of Kwaśniewski’s tried to secure the takeover of the Gdańsk refinery
by Russian investors. The Polish competitor was Orlen, the country’s biggest oil
59
company, whose boss was arrested by the Secret Service right before the decision
whether to invest in the refinery (Raabe 2005: 2). The public’s attention also in this case
was directed mainly towards the close ties between politics and crime, leading to further
mistrust. The public broadcast of sessions of investigation committees has mostly been
used by individual politicians to distinguish themselves from their colleagues (Ziemer
2009: 159; Raabe 2005: 2) instead of promoting democratic proceedings and the rule of
law.
What was not internalized due to these events was a norm of discussion and
compromise (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 114). Therefore, the parliamentary routines have not
enjoyed much trust by Poles. Consequently, even during consolidation of democracy
and its acceptance as “the only game in town”,14
a general distance between society and
politics remains and leads to negative incentives when individuals decide whether to
protest. Instead, a feeling of disillusion has been dominating.
Most Poles today are tired of fundamental changes and wish for a society in which
constant engagement and mobilization are unnecessary (Majcherek 2010: 23).
Therefore, incentives to engage in actions with possibly far-reaching results need to be
very strong in order to have any effect.
The influence of different incentives furthermore confirms what has been shown by
other case studies before. Non-material incentives seem to play a much bigger role in
Poland than material incentives. Especially negative incentives provided by society as
well as by politics seem to have a higher impact than prospects for improvements of the
economic situation through protests. The following section will confirm this assumption
further as the strength of societal networks will be evaluated.
3. The meso-level: Networks
Social networks favoring protest action already became weak during the 1980s when
many activists left Poland during martial law (Krzemiński 2009: 352), thus leaving the
14
Pollack (2008: 45) shows that even though Poles tend to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works
in their country, the vast majority of citizens is convinced of democracy as such.
60
existing movements with a lack of leadership. Beyer (2010: 37) furthermore emphasizes
the Communist heritage that played a decisive role in the formation of social networks
after 1989, which consists of mistrust and fear of repression. This socialization led to
Poles mistrusting each other and developing close ties only in a small circle of family
and very close friends. In Poland as in all CEE countries, participation in civil society
was undesirable after the fall of Communism, as mistrust of communist organizations
and disappointment with Post-Communist developments coincided with strong family
ties and friendship networks (Vanhuysse 2006: 60). Such circumstances include high
costs of breaking out and engaging in collective action outside the “circle of trust”.
Most often, Poles have not engaged in protest when encountering difficulties but rather
have tended to rely on their families and close friends for support, a behavior that is
supported by the close circles existing in Polish society.
The predominant model of life strategy is closely connected to a lack in social trust.
Only members of the closest family circles are unconditionally trusted, all others are
seen as potential adversaries. The perception of social relations is thus that I can only
win if others loose and vice versa (Krzemiński 2009: 354). Collective action and the
support of the “common good” or even a “higher cause” is not desirable in these circles
and met with non-acceptance (Beyer 2010: 51). Politics have become known as a game
in which the stronger side, the one that is able to subordinate others, wins (Krzemiński
2009: 353). Loose, protest-averse networks lead to the decision to rather migrate than to
support change at home (Rode 2009: 428). A survey conducted in 2005 showed that
“conformist behavior” continues to be important in Polish society (Korkut 2005: 153).
Collective political action and joint representation of interests is therefore undesirable as
it would mean counteracting the perceived rules of politics and society which is costly
and rarely promising.
Generally speaking, “Poles do not trust one another” (Szawiel 2009: 498). Mutual
relationships and social trust have settled on a low level, especially in comparison with
other European states (Gliński 01-15-2008: 4). Only in three other European countries
was social trust lower in 2004 and 2006 (Szawiel 2009: 497). Poles still suffer from a
perceived treason of the elites as Solidarity leaders gave up many claims the movements
had fought for during the 1980s and instead followed their own agendas when they
61
entered politics (Gliński 01-15-2008: 6). It is therefore not surprising that NGOs and
movements are only slowly forming and still enjoy only limited membership.
This division between the public and private sphere becomes clear when considering the
following example. During transition, receiving unemployment benefits while
informally working at the same time was a generally accepted practice in Poland with
2/3 of Poles agreeing to this still in 1998 whilst only 1/3 thought this was “cheating the
government” (Vanhuysse 2006: 61). Thus the continued emphasis on the state as
responsible for delivery of commodities and caring for its citizens becomes obvious.
Furthermore, Solidarity’s self-dissolution at the beginning of the 1990s led to an
estrangement of its members from the activities of the movement. The network quickly
lost its internal ties and started to dissolve and break apart. The polarized society was in
no state to provide for stable networks that enhance protest behavior. Group
identification was low or nonexistent, and incentives that can be concluded from the
situation rather point away from collective action. Consequently, the basis for collective
action was rather weak already at the beginning of the 1990s and became only less
stable with Solidarity becoming politically active and at the same time splitting into
various parties.
When unemployment hit the labor market and abnormal pensions were introduced,
those falling in either of the two categories often left their unions (Vanhuysse 2006: 55),
meaning that potential for protest diminished. Social networks, while being favorable
for mobilization of employed persons, become unfavorable for those unemployed. The
longer unemployment lasts, the more likely a network of unemployed emerges, which is
not supporting social action (Vanhuysse 2006: 65), or, differently put, “the unemployed
and abnormally retired were now likely to have a lower overall effectiveness in
organizing disruptive protests because of decreasing levels of extra-household
sociability” (Vanhuysse 2006: 67). For those unemployed or retired, their personal
relationship with the state changed. Instead of convening regularly with others,
identifying common interests and voicing them vis-à-vis the state, they now were
dependent on welfare and had a rather individualized stance (Vanhuysse 2006: 64). This
further supported the above mentioned estrangement of Solidarity members from the
union and led to a society with protest-averse networks that made protesting socially
62
costly. Today, almost 19 out of 20 Poles avoid membership or activity within
associations, even if they are not political (Zaborowski 1993: 67). The social norm
therefore is to abstain from getting involved in public life. Reconsidering the idea of
collective identity, it seems as if Poles have a collective identity that is attached to
private circles such as family and shared identities as responsive members of a nation
are weak.
On the other hand, mobilization for protest has been somewhat successful with workers
in non-competitive sectors, which were also threatened most by unemployment, and
whose social networks were tighter than on average. A second group likely to be
mobilized consists of farmers who lost 2/3 of their income in comparison to non-
agricultural workers between 1989 and 1991. Polish farmers were highly unionized with
the Solidarity Farmers’ Union and Samoobrona being strong (Vanhuysse 2006: 34). As
mentioned above, the farmers were especially successful in organizing protest before
Polish EU-accession due to their high degree of organization (Bachmann 2011: 127).
This shows once more the importance of networks in Polish society. Looking at the
evidence presented in the preceding chapter, it is noticeable that the mobilization even
in the mentioned groups has been low, however, as farmers who enjoyed the highest
mobilization rates were still not engaged on a scale comparable with other EU countries
or higher.
Regarding frames created within movements, they are more efficient in case they gain
media attention. In Poland, the media has reported very little about movement activity,
neither about protest action nor about press statements and opinions. This could be due
to two factors. Either the media is averse to providing information on civil society or
there is too little to talk about. Chances are high that the latter is the case. As Gamson
and Meyer note “the media […] are more open to extrainstitutional than to institutional
action” (1996: 288). These framing processes are often shaped by civil society elites.
The “elite-drain” from civil society has therefore led to a vacuum that implies
organizational problems as well as networks that are rather averse to protest. Today,
with societal elites becoming engaged in politics, role models for civic action are
missing. Considering the notion that protest reproduces when networks are supporting
63
such collective action, the conclusion needs to be drawn that missing elites will lead to
weaker networks and therefore to less collective action.
The Catholic Church has played a vital role in Poland’s history. Still today, it plays an
important role in family life. However, in recent years, the Polish Catholic church has
been less involved in politics than its western counterparts. This role is the result of a
process of fundamental change in Poland. During the 1980s, the church provided the
place for civil mobilization where discussions and the making of plans were possible –
ultimately the place that made resistance possible at all (Krzemiński 2010: 42). Today,
Catholicism has a meaning of conservative attitudes and a scournful look on
modernization (Krzemiński 2010: 41). Involvement in political processes since 1989
has at the same time often resulted in disgrace for the church and disapprovement from
society (Krzemiński 2010: 40). Therefore, the church has not played a vital role in the
initiation of protest since the beginning of the 1990s. It needs to be taken into account
that its passiveness as regards politics provides a negative incentive for religious Poles,
adding to what has been identified as discouraging factors before.
In summary, Polish civil society is characterized by great influence by elites and a
strong focus on activities in connection to personal matters as well as the Catholic
Church, but only little to no involvement in the political arena. Furthermore, quasi-
NGOs, which have been founded by local political elites, have shown to be quite
successful, as well as ad hoc groups and local para-political organizations (Gliński 01-
15-2008: 3). This combination provides for negative incentives on the individual level
regarding involvement in political matters such as protesting. Polish society does not
provide for a stable basis of involvement of the individual.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, Polish society has shown to be multifaceted. It has become clear that
rational choice theory can only be applied to a limited extent, as especially after 1993
protest potential and behavior have not been in congruence. Grievances, measured as
dissatisfaction with the situation in the country, have been high as has polarization on
64
national matters, but protest behavior has, apart from waves in 1993 and in 1999, been
stagnating on a rather low level. An exception to this rule can be discerned in 2010,
when the decisions taken in the aftermath of the national tragedy of Smoleńsk triggered
protest in Warsaw that nevertheless subsided after some days. This incident is, however,
not exceptional regarding the matters Poles have been protesting about. Much of the
protest of 2010 had a background in religious feelings and national pride. In identifying
protest during the 20 years under consideration here as mainly centered around personal
matters, it is possible to categorize the matters of 2010 in the same way.
Abstract ideas such as democratic procedures and anti-corruption measures have on the
other hand not led to protest. Neither have the prospects of accession to the European
Union as such led to protest of demonstration of support. Only the farmers were
involved when their fears of competing with subsidized products led to demonstrations
and riots. However, their fears were also very real and related to their personal situation.
Therefore, protest still only happened due to personal fears or real deprivations.
Those cases in which protest happened can be divided into two categories. Firstly,
grievances reached a level that made the situation unbearable for those feeling them.
This was especially the case for the protests during the transition years as well as the
nurses’ protest in 1999. In other cases, a charismatic leader and a strong organizational
base provided for a network favorable for protest. This was the case for the peasants’
protests during the 1990s and early 2000s, especially as in this case grievances about the
current agrarian policy of the government only constituted part of the motivation whilst
the other part was centered around fears about the future. In summary, grievances are
significant for protest in Poland as long as they are perceived on a personal level instead
of an abstract one. In those cases when deprivation reached a high level, protest was
initiated. Protest did not happen, on the other hand, when dissatisfaction with the
political or economic situation stayed on an abstract level.
The basic structures for protest engagement of Poles were set during the transition
phase. A sharp decline in engagement in political activities can be seen in Poland since
1993, with some scarce peaks that nevertheless never exceed the events of 1993 in
participants and days. Disillusionment and a perception of highly unlikely success led to
decisions against protesting. Even if grievances have been and still are high, the choice
65
is to follow a strategy of “muddling through” by evading rules or bluntly breaking them
instead of using the existing opportunity structures. A disagreement with the presumed
significance of political opportunity structures can further be made out by looking at the
times of big changes and at the times of protesting. In most cases, these have not been in
congruence. Neither the abolishment of censorship and other repression measures in
1989 nor the introduction of the new constitution in 1997 brought about significant
protest waves. Accession to the EU also opened POSs, however, the distance of
Brussels decisions from national and local grievances also closed some, which makes
the net outcome unclear. Nevertheless, protest action happened before, not after
accession. So the significance of POS needs to be denied for the most cases of protest in
Poland since 1989.
The influence of incentives, on the other hand, has been very high. Due to unsuccessful
protest and unresponsive elites, the feeling of personal influence on the situation in the
country has been very low, which in turn has led to low protest frequency. This feeling
of low personal influence on political decisions is reinforced time and again also by
unrealistic claims the people voice vis-à-vis the state. When these are not fulfilled, the
impression of non-responsiveness is further given and citizens feel that their demands
do not count. Therefore, incentives to actively engage are diminished, which is reflected
in Polish abstention from protesting.
Moreover, internalized norms and values point away from engaging in public collective
action. For Poles, it seems to be less costly to achieve personal aims by cheating the
government, evading responsibilities and working around the rules instead of initiating
protest. This behavior enjoys high acceptance in Polish society and constitutes the norm
rather than the exception as the assumption rests in public perception that the state and
politicians cannot be trusted and cheating them is legitimate. The Socialist heritage of
an “us-versus-them” is still strong in Poland; and high-profile scandals have nurtured
this feeling until today. The result is an evasion of public affairs, including not voting
and abstaining from protesting even in cases in which the calculation of costs and
benefits would usually lead to different behavior.
This feeling of mistrust also dominates social networks, as social trust in general is very
low in Poland. Uniting for a common cause under such circumstances can only happen
66
when the situation is indeed exceptional. Close networks only exist in very small circles
of family and very close friends. Within these circles, the division between the public
and the private sphere is further supported with trust declining the deeper a person is
involved in politics. The lack of leadership in social movements has also contributed to
their weakness. Framing processes have been slowing down due to this lack of
leadership potential within social movements, as no alternative frames exist to those
supported by the general positioning of society against the political sphere. Neither
irregular behavior such as protest nor regular behavior such as voting has enjoyed much
support within social networks. As engagement in politics in general, including regular
as well as irregular behavior, supports further engagement in politics, it needs to be
noted that the societal environment in Poland does not provide for a stable basis of
constant protest engagement. In summary, the meso-level has been very influential in
Polish society and has provided for more explanatory power than economic or structural
developments.
Two findings have become clear. Firstly, Polish society does not have a very high
protest potential. People are rather indifferent towards changes in the political sphere
and experience grievances only if they directly affect their personal life. Secondly,
Poland is not exceptional in this regard. It seems perfectly normal that in a society
where people are relatively satisfied with their personal life, only those that are either
very concerned with politics or feel strong grievances engage in collective action.
Protesting seems to be a means of last resort. Chances of Poles uniting for a common
cause again seem dim under these conditions. As long as others are not seen as
comrades but rather as competitors, less costly ways exist to achieve personal goals and
as long as grievances do not reach a critical point at which the very existence of the
individual is threatened, a new wave of protests seems highly unlikely. There has not
been a “rebirth” of a civil society in Poland, and the antagonism between “the state” and
“the people” remains.
Rational choice theory can only explain this situation to a limited extent. Only by
including non-material incentives, the explanatory power rises. For the case of Poland,
the inclusion of social incentives is crucial as Polish society reproduces feelings of
distrust vis-à-vis others as well as vis-à-vis politics. As long as grievances do not
67
become threatening to personal survival, they are not addressed in Poland by means of
protest. Even if it is congruent with rational choice theory that people calculate costs
and benefits in order to decide, it needs to be noted that the perceived costs of engaging
in protest action are high in Poland. Thus, grievances and incentives need to be quite
powerful in Poland in order to move Poles enough to engage in collective action and so
overcome their mistrust of each other and their feeling of low personal influence.
68
VI. Annex
A. Situation in the Country
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
96 + + o - - - - o - - - -
97 + + - + + + + + + + + -
98 - - - o + - o - + + + -
99 - - - - - - - - - - - -
00 - - - - - - - - - - - -
01 - - - - - - - - - - - -
02 - - - - - - - - - - - -
03 - - - - - - - - - - - -
04 - - - - - - - - - - - -
05 - - - - - - - - - - - -
06 + - - - - - - - - - - -
07 - - - - - - - - - - + +
08 + - + + + - - - - - - -
09 - - - - - - - - - - - -
10 - - - + - - + - - - - -
Source: CBOS
Relative answers to the question:
“Generally speaking, is the situation in Poland heading in a good or bad direction?”
+ = most answers “positive”
o = no value higher than “neither positive nor negative”
- = most answers “negative”
69
B. Political Situation
Jan. Feb. Apr. Mar. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
96 o - o o o o o o o o o o
97 o o o o o o o o o o o o
98 o o o o o o o o o o o o
99 o o o o o o - - - - - -
00 - - - - - - - - - - - -
01 - - - - - - - - - o o -
02 o - - - - - - - - - - -
03 o - - - - - - - - - - -
04 - - - - - - - - - - - -
05 - - - - - - - - - - - o
06 o - - - - - - - - - - -
07 - - - - - - - - - - o o
08 o
09 - - - - - - - - - - - -
10 - - - o o o o - - - - o
Source: CBOS (For 2008, only a graph was provided, not the individual data.)
Relative answers to the question:
“How do you generally evaluate the current political situation in Poland?”
+ = most answers “good”
o = no value higher than “neither good nor bad”
- = most answers “bad”
70
C. Economic Situation
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
96 o o o o o o o o o - o o
97 o o - o o o o o o o o o
98 o o o o o o - - o o - -
99 - - - - - - - - - - - -
00 - - - - - - - - - - - -
01 - - - - - - - - - - - -
02 - - - - - - - - - - - -
03 - - - - - - - - - - - -
04 - - - - - - - - - - - -
05 - - - - - - - - - - - -
06 o o o - - - o o o o o o
07 o o - o o o o o o o o o
08 o o o o o o o o o o o o
09 o - - - o - - o o o o o
10 o o o o o o o o o o o o
Source: CBOS
Relative answers to the question:
“How do you generally evaluate the current economic situation in Poland?”
+ = most answers “good”
o = no value higher than “neither good nor bad”
- = most answers “bad”
71
D. Quality of Living
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
96 o o o o o o o o o o o o
97 o o o o o o o o o o o o
98 o o o o o o o o o o o o
99 o o o o o o o o o o o o
00 o o o o o o o o o o o o
01 o o o o o o o o o o o o
02 o o o o o o o o o o o o
03 o o o o o o o o o o o o
04 o o o o o o o o o o o o
05 o o o o o o o o o o o o
06 o o o o o o o o o o o o
07 o o o o o o o o o o o o
08 o o o o o o o o o o o o
09 o o o o o o o o o o o o
10 o o o o + o + o + + o o
Source: CBOS
Relative answers to the question:
“How do you evaluate the quality of living of yourself and your family?”
+ = most answers “good”
o = no value higher than “neither good nor bad”
- = most answers “bad”
72
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