Political Law - Wayne

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    POLITICAL LAW 1

    I.

    A.M. No. RTJ-05-1959 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUDGE VICENTE A.

    HIDALGO, Presiding Judge of the RegionalTrial Court of Manila, Branch 37

    FACTS: Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or declaration of

    nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership and

    possession a property against the Republic of the Philippines in the RTC of Manila .It is

    also known as the Arlegui Residence which housed two Philippine presidents and

    which now holds the Office of the Press Secretary and the News Information Bureau.

    The case was initially dismissed by the presiding Judge of the Manila RTC (Branch 35)

    on the ground of state immunity. The case was re-raffled to the Manila RTC (Branch 37),

    with respondent Vicente A. Hidalgo as presiding Judge. In an Order, Judge Hidalgo

    declared the Republic in default for failure of Solicitor Gabriel Francisco Ramirez, the

    handling solicitor, to file the required Answer within the period prayed for in his

    motion for extension. It is contended that the respondent Judge violated the

    Constitution and the fundamental rule that government funds are exempt from

    execution or garnishment when he caused the issuance of the writ of execution against

    the Republic.

    ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke immunityfrom suit.

    HELD: It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not there by

    necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State

    waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, Is to give the other party an opportunity to

    prove, if it can, that the state has a liability. The functions and public services rendered

    by the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public

    funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law

    II.

    SALONGA VS FARRALES 105 SCRA 359, 369 (1981)

    FACTS: The defendant Julia B. Farrales is the titled owner of a residential lot in Sta. Rita

    Olongapo City. Within the owned parcel of land by the defendant, the plaintiff, spouses

    Salonga are the lessees of the 156 sq. meters of land where the latter erected a house and

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    is paying rentals to the defendant .Sometimes before 1968, the plaintiff failed to pay

    rental and that as a result, the defendant filed an ejectment case for non-payment of

    rentals against the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant forced the plaintiff. The plaintiff then

    offered that they will just buy their occupied parcel of land instead of vacating the land

    and the house of strong materials, however, despite of the insistence of the plaintiff, the

    titled owner defendant refused to accept the offer, thus there is no contract of sale or sell

    in the aforesaid land was realized. The plaintiff then, after a strict refusal from the

    defendant-owner to sell her land, filed for petition for relief. The case was heard and

    elevated until the CA, praying for ordering to the defendant to sell her parcel of land

    where the house of the plaintiff was erected and that the plaintiff invoke their right to

    be subjected under Section 6, (9) Article II of the new constitution, referring to the

    application of social justice which they contended that it delimits and regulated

    property rights and private gains.

    ISSUE:

    Was the contention of the plaintiff correct such that by invoking for the promotion of

    social justice, provided in article 6 (9) Article II of the constitution, they could gain their

    contention for relief and force the defendant to sell her land?

    RULING:

    No, the contention of social justice cannot be invoked by the plaintiff just gain relief andforcethe defendant to sell her land where the plaintiff's house was erected.Social Justice

    is said to be for promotion of economic development and proper equilibriumbetween

    the relationship of all units of the society. However Social Justice cannot be invoked

    totrample on the rights of property owners who under the constitution and laws are

    also entitled forprotection. Social justice is not intended to take away rights from a

    person and give them to anotherwho is not entitled thereto.In the case at bar, the

    plaintiff cannot force the defendant to sell her title by invoking equity and justice rather,

    the plaintiff 's may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse,bythe lessee do not have the right to buy the land. The right of property of the

    defendant over her ownedland cannot be simply override by invoking social justice,

    since the right of property is also protectedby the state. Thus, judgment affirmed in

    favor of the defendant

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    III.

    Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC Case Digest

    Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

    248 SCRA 300

    Facts:

    Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of

    Representative of Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio

    Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification of

    the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the

    constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an

    amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to sincechildhood in item no. 8 in said certificate.However, the amended certificate was not

    received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always maintained

    Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of the COMELEC

    with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondents petition for

    disqualification meritorious.

    Issue:

    Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a

    result of her marriage to the late President Marcos.

    Held:

    For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court

    upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of

    candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the

    following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Taclobanbecame petitioners

    domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b)

    domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a

    bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and

    acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof ofthe concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the

    wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence

    in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married

    President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new

    home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile

    after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband

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    died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose

    Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

    IV.

    LOONG vs. COMELEC Case Digest

    LOONG vs. COMELEC

    216 SCRA 760, 1992

    Facts: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certificate

    of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in

    the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election),

    respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a petition seeking todisqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the

    latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age.

    Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the respondent

    COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in

    a resolution which is the subject of this petition.

    Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of

    candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-

    day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

    Issue:Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law.

    Held:No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent

    COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false

    representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the

    grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule

    23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of

    candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at anytime after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the

    date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission

    which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not

    supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

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    V.

    September 14, 1993 (G.R. No. 75025)

    PARTIES:

    Petitioner: VICENTE GARCIA

    Respondents: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE

    HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,

    THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV

    FACTS:

    Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of

    Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against

    him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for

    back payment of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March1984 but the records do not show whether petitioners reinstatement was to the same

    position of Supervising Lineman.

    ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been

    reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

    HELD:

    The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which

    was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not

    generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for

    reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

    If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and

    makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense

    charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense,

    the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby

    restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the

    finding of guilt.

    In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of

    proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the

    offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court

    commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily,

    petitioners innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to

    him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies

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    that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is

    restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

    Petitioners automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back

    wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to

    make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the

    service. The right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed

    and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against

    them.

    Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was

    illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.

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