CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE POLICE POWER POLICE POWER; THE STATE UNDER ITS POLICE POWER, MAY ALTER, MODIFY OR AMEND MININ G EXPLORATION PERMITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE GENERAL WELFARE. SOU THEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING COOP., et al. [G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marc opper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which inclu ded the Diwalwal area. On June 27, 2991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's SmallScale Mining Act. The law established a People's Small-Sca le Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary's direct sup ervision and control. Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 13 3 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case. On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Mar copper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp oration (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covere d by the permit. In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office N o. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated MPSA applica tion of petitioner and thereafter, several MAC cases were filed. On March 3, 199 5, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Pursuant to th is statute, the MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. The RPA subsequ ently took cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidated with the MAC cases. On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 w hich provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option o f direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Ar ea. On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, pr ohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC). It prayed for t he nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground th at the "direct state utilization" espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum order arbitrarily impose d the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR. ISSUE: Whether or not the "direct state utilization scheme" espoused in MO 97-03 divested petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133. HELD: NO. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state utilization" as a policy i n resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate t hat what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing e lse. Contrary to petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operat ing or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. As to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by petit ioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133 19 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et

hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! is one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting th at Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter. And until a posit ive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in the Consolidated Mines cases , EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be i mpaired by the issuance of MO 97-03. It must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total a nd absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No. 133 merely evidenc es a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the explor ation, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources ar e matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining expl oration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right wi thin the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of th e Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may al ter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general wel fare. Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constit ution and Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of th e exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral reso urces, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements wi th qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ord ered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accord ance with the constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State may n ot be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the on ly plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold r ush. EMINENT DOMAIN EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION IS DETERMINED AT THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT EXCEPT WHEN THE COURT FIXES THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AT THE DATE IT WAS TAKEN CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO [G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002] DAVIDE, JR., C .J: FACTS: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged th erein that it needed the land for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction o f a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hote l Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P 20,826,339.50. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amoun t of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the exprop riation proceedings. The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower courts decision in toto. ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of t he filing of the complaint. HELD: NO. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning fo r the

determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which express ly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Co urt of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensatio n should be determined as of the 20 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the prop erty as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an excep tion: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was tak en and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings." BILL OF RIGHTS DUE PROCESS DUE PROCESS; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS NOT PART OF THE DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION BENEDICTO and RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Bened icto and Rivera were indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 in relation to Sectio n 34 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informat ions filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases N os. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to su bmit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to reg ister with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical pe rsons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorizat ion from the Central Bank. On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all th e Informations filed against them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, absence of a preliminary investigation an d extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960. On Septe mber 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. A similar motion filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases agai nst her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the tri al court in its order dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for re consideration, but the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 19 94. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Motion to Quash for absence of a valid preliminary investigation. (2) Whether or not the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of petitio ners. HELD: (1) NO. Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by t he Constitution. It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient groun d to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and the respo ndent is probably guilty thereof. Instead, the right to a preliminary investigat ion is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived, ei ther expressly or by implication. When the records of the case were disclosed to them, in opting to enter their respective pleas to the charges, and filed vario us motions and pleadings, they are deemed to have made an express waiver of thei r right to have a preliminary investigation. (2) NO. In the instant case, it mus t be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353 retain ed the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions. Even the most cursory glance at th e repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a sav ing clause, expressly providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have n o effect on pending actions for 21

POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! violation of the latter Circular. A saving clause operates to except from the ef fect of the repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new law. In the present case, the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clea rly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punis h offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or under investigation. DUE PROCESS; THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A COMPONENT PART OF DUE P ROCESS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE. SALES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: Petitioner, the incumbent town mayor of Pagudpud, Ilo cos Norte, fatally shot the former mayor and his political rival, Atty. Rafael Benemerito, in an alleged sho otout after a heated altercation between them. After the shooting incident, peti tioner surrendered and placed himself under the custody of the municipal police. The next day, a criminal complaint for Murder against petitioner was filed. Mun icipal Judge Calvan then conducted a preliminary investigation as under the old rules, with two stages: (1) the determination of whether there is reasonable gro und to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably gu ilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or info rmation is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substa nce of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to present ev idence in his favor if he so desires. Municipal Judge then forwarded the case re cords to the Provincial Prosecutor who, instead of conducting a preliminary inve stigation of his own, merely forwarded the said records to the Ombudsman for the latter to conduct the same. The Ombudsman then directed the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit, which the latter found superfluous as he previously submi tted such to the Provincial Prosecutor. An Information for Murder was filed agai nst petitioner. This Court is tasked to resolve the issue of whether or not the proper procedure was followed and whether petitioner's constitutional rights wer e safeguarded during the preliminary investigation conducted before the filing o f an Information for Murder against him and the issuance of a warrant for his ar rest by respondent Sandiganbayan. Petitioner asserts that the Information was ha stily filed and the warrant for his arrest was improper because of an incomplete preliminary investigation. Respondents say otherwise. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judg e was proper. (2) Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was proper. HELD: (1) NO. Presidential Decree 911 (further amending Sec. 1, R.A. 5180, as amended by P.D. 77) upon which the present rule is based, removed the preliminary examin ation stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper. Now the proceedings consists of only one stage. Respondent Judge did not conduct the re quisite investigation prior to issuance of the arrest warrant. The Rules require an examination in writing under oath in the form of searching questions and ans wers. The statements of witnesses were not sworn before him but before the Provi ncial Prosecutor. The purported transcript of stenographic notes do not bear the signature of the stenographer. Moreover, he did not complete the preliminary in vestigation. He claimed to have examined only the witnesses of the complainant. He issued a Resolution and forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor wi thout giving the accused (petitioner) an opportunity to submit counter-affidavit

s and supporting documents. While it is true that the usual remedy to an irregul ar preliminary investigation is to ask for a new preliminary investigation, such normal remedy would not be adequate to free petitioner from the warrant of arre st which stemmed from that irregular investigation. The Provincial Prosecution h as no power to recall the warrant of arrest. 22 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! (2) NO. As this Court pointed out in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, "the purpose of a preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious a nd oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive tria ls. While the right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a pre liminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is n ot a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accu sed's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full m easure of his right to due process." Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determi ning whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the mer its of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of la w to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes a judicial proceeding when there is an opportunity to be heard and for the production of and weighing of ev idence, and a decision is rendered thereon. The authority of a prosecutor or inv estigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary investi gation is no less than a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. W hile the investigating officer, strictly speaking, is not a "judge" by the natur e of his functions, he is and must be considered to be a quasi-judicial officer because a preliminary investigation is considered a judicial proceeding. A preli minary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the cons titutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any mat erial damage. Indeed, since a preliminary investigation is designed to screen ca ses for trial, only evidence may be considered. While even raw information may j ustify the initiation of an investigation, the stage of preliminary investigatio n can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated war ranting the eventual prosecution of the case in court. In other words, it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making s ure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigat ion serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of t he guarantee of freedom and fair play which are the birthrights of all who live in our country. It is therefore imperative upon the fiscal or the judge, as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie cas e or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt o f the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determ ination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the con ditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degre e upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a fi nding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the cle ar dictates of reason. Measured vis-a-vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, we hol d that the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed, for the following reasons: First, the records show that the suppos ed preliminary investigation was conducted in installments by at least three (3) different investigating officers, none of whom completed the preliminary invest igation. There was not one continuous proceeding but rather a case of passing th e buck, so to speak, the last one being the Ombudsman hurriedly throwing the buc

k to the Sandiganbayan. Second, the charge against herein petitioner is Murder, a non-bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone, not to mention the fac t that the principal accused is an incumbent mayor whose imprisonment during the pendency of the case would deprive his constituents of their duly-elected munic ipal executive, should have merited a deeper; and more thorough preliminary inve stigation. The Ombudsman, however, did nothing of the sort and instead swallowed hook, line and sinker the resolution and recommendation of Graft Investigation Officer. Third, it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the Ombudsman's certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of this case much more so in the face of the latter's flawed report and one-sided factual findings. In the order of procedure for criminal cases, the task of dete rmining probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is a responsi bility which is exclusively reserved by the Constitution to judges. People v. In ting clearly delineated the features of this constitutional mandate, viz: 1.] Th e determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to 23 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; 2.] The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assi sts him in making the determination of probable cause. It is the report, the aff idavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, if any, and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and 3.] Judges and prosecutor s alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cau se for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation pr oper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be releas ed. Even if the two inquiries be made in one and the same proceeding, there shou ld be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause f or purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The prelimina ry investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe tha t the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the fu nction of the prosecutor. Stated differently, while the task of conducting a pre liminary investigation is assigned either to an inferior court magistrate or to a prosecutor, only a judge may issue a warrant of arrest. When the preliminary i nvestigation is conducted by an investigating prosecutor, in this case the Ombud sman, the determination of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor cannot serve as the sole basis for the issuance by the court of a warrant of arrest. T his is because the court with whom the information is filed is tasked to make it s own independent determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warran t of arrest. Indeed the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitu tion which requires probable cause to be personally determined by the judge, not by any other officer or person. DUE PROCESS; THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED BY THE CSC ITSELF DOES NOT ME AN THAT IT COULD NOT BE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE. CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE CO MMISSION [G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil Service C ommission that Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for Cruz af ter the latter had previously failed in the said examination three times. The CS C found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie case exists agains t you for DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTER EST OF THE SERVICE. The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material averments of the "Formal Charge." They also decla red that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. The petitioner s subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at th e same time. On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Repo rt and Recommendation" finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and orderi ng their dismissal from the government service Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Boo k V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismiss al from the office and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen agains t the government employee. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as

investigator, complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time. HELD: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considere d experts in their field, are 24 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of the records, t he Commission finds respondents guilty as charged. The photograph pasted over th e name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from the signa ture of Gilda Cruz. Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correc tly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case in stituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions o f its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subt itle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987. It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly inf ormed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that there was a denia l of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to ta ke cognizance of the case. DUE PROCESS; DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIRES THAT EVERY LITIGANT MUST BE GIVEN AN OP PORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, et al. [G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-I NP). The PCINP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. T he Bids and Awards Committee voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract was executed between PC-I NP and Tahei Co. The COA subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts indicated on the disbursement voucher and the purchase order. Conse quently, the DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against the res pondents. After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended the indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On review, the O ffice of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaints agai nst Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. Formal charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espea and San tos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal information. Flores and Tanch anco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the Office of t he Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against Flores an d Tanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudd en turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners as accused violated their right to due process. HELD: YES. It appears that the charge against respondents was previously dismiss ed. For this reason, there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted, without questioning the dismis sal of the charge against the said respondents, could not and should not be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating their r

ight to due process. Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of d ue process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them wit hout their knowledge. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be gi ven an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himsel f in person at every stage of the proceedings. 25 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! SEARCHES AND SEIZURES SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRES THAT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WARR ANT A BELIEF THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME JUST COMMITTED. SALES vs. S ANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: see page 22 ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arre st issued by the Sandiganbayan was properly issued. HELD: NO. What the Sandiganbayan should have done, faced with such a slew of con flicting evidence from the contending parties, was to take careful note of the contradict ions in the testimonies of the complainant's witnesses as well as the improbabil ities in the prosecution evidence. Certainly probable cause may not be establish ed simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has good g rounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people wo uld be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" only in the fallibl e discretion of the judge. On the contrary, the probable cause test is an object ive one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances m ust be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man t hat the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. This, as w e said is the standard. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PERSONAL DETERMINATION MERELY EMPHASIZES THE EXCLUSIVE AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ISSUING JUDGE TO SATISFY HIMSELF OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBALBE CAUSE. ATTY. EDGAR H. TALINGDAN vs. JUDGE HENEDINO P. EDUARTE [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1610, October 5, 2001] BELLOSILLO, J: FACTS: Complainant alleged that sometime in April 2000 elements o f the PNP stormed into his residence to arrest him and his client, Luzano, on the strength of a Warrant of Arrest dated 12 April 2000 issued by respondent Judge Eduarte in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 of the RTC-Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela for the supposed crime of li bel. Surprised that such a case existed against him and his client as they had n ot been previously charged, complainant filed a Very Urgent Motion to Quash and/ or Set Aside Warrant of Arrest and Direct Prosecutor's Office to Conduct Prelimi nary Investigation dated 5 May 2000 asking that the Warrant of Arrest be set asi de for being premature since they had not been previously notified of the charge against them and no preliminary investigation was ever conducted by the public prosecutor's office yet, and for being defective since the amount of bail was no t specified therein in violation of their constitutional right to bail. Responde nt Judge granted the motion and recalled the warrant of arrest in an Order dated 12 May 2000 admitting that he issued the same under the mistaken belief that a preliminary investigation had already been conducted and an information already filed in court. Complainant nonetheless filed this administrative case. ISSUE: Whether or not the judge failed to follow the required procedure and was negligent in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. 26 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit

o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: YES. Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examin ation under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may prod uce, and particularly describing . . . the persons . . . to be seized." Interpre ting the words "personal determination" we said that it does not thereby mean th at judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thIs would be to unduly laden them with pr eliminary examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of conc entrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather what is emphas ized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the pro secutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, iss ue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable caus e, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting af fidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to the ex istence of probable cause. Much more is required by the constitutional provision . Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenograp hic notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification. In the case at bench respondent Judge not only failed to follow the required pr ocedure but worse, was negligent enough not to have noticed that there was not e ven a prosecutor's certification to rely upon since no information had even been filed yet in court, and that Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 was merely docketed as such on the strength of a mere complaint filed by the private complainant Leonci o Dalin Sr. himself. Respondent Judge admitted that he signed the Warrant of Arr est against complainant and the latter's client simply because it was presented to him for signature by the Criminal Docket Clerk. There was thus a total and un warranted abdication of a judicial function. Respondent cannot exculpate himself from administrative liability by contending that the mistake was entirely attri butable to the Criminal Docket Clerk who failed to faithfully comply with her "d uty" of going over the records of criminal cases and ensuring first that an info rmation had already been filed in court before preparing the warrant of arrest. A judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification of th e investigating officer as to the existence of probable cause making him adminis tratively liable. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST IS DISCRETIONARY UPON THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE. CRUZ and MONEDERO vs. JUDGE AREOLA [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, March 6, 2002] PUNO, J: FACTS: On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigati on Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Inform ation for Estafa against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the Land Transportation Office, based on the complaint filed by herein complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found no cogent reason to reverse, modify, or alter the resoluti on of the Office of the Ombudsman and recommended that the case be set for trial . Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both respondent Judge and hi s Branch Clerk of Court with ignorance of the law. Complainants take issue of th e fact that although respondent Judge already issued a warrant of arrest, he sti ll deferred its implementation to give way to a reinvestigation of the case on m otion of the accused. They believe that there is no longer any reason why the re spondent Judge should withhold the issuance of a warrant of arrest considering t hat the Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that there exists p

robable cause to indict the accused. In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge ma nifests that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function o f a judge as he is mandated to determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant. Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand, claims t hat it is a ministerial duty on her part to release duly signed orders, resoluti ons and decisions of the presiding judge of her branch. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring the implementation s of the warrant of arrest. 27 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue e xcept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Prelimi nary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information o r it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issua nce of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is execu tive in nature. It is part of the prosecutions job. The second kind of preliminar y investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. In making th e required personal determination, a judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of reliance depend s on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the judges sound discretion . It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge t o issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally ex amined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. For the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justic e, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. It appears from the records that the challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judge were not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely exercised his sound discretion in not immediately is suing the warrant of arrest and in suspending further proceedings pending reinve stigation of the case. On her part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be f aulted for performing a ministerial function, that is, releasing Orders duly sig ned by the respondent Judge. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION DOES NOT REQUIRE PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAILS. YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: Presiding judge of the RTC of Kalookan City, issued search warrants for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. The police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) . 45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were 2 M-16 rifl es with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions, among others. Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court informations accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential De cree No. 1866. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained. At the hearin g for bail, the RTC denied petitioners motion for bail earlier filed for the ac cused are being charged of two criminal offenses and both offenses under Preside ntial Decree 1866, Sections 1 and 3 thereof prescribe the penalty of Reclusion T emporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1 2-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no person charged with a capital offense o r an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidenc e of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the cr iminal prosecution. Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders viola ted Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of t he Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discreti on when it ruled that the search and seizure orders in question were valid and the objects seized admissible in evidence.

HELD: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and le gal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is t he only practical means of enforcing the constitutional 28 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 calib er pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners. Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulte d. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The s earch was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordan ce with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege lack o f particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warra nts. That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the sa me kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specifi ty in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that th e things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leav e no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it woul d be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial sim ilarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice. The cas e of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out t hat one of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of object s to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited t o those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination of the Search Warrants shows that they were worde d in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct re lation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and ex plosives. What the warrants authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES WHEN VALID. PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL [G.R. NO. 123137, October 17, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: Appellants PO2 Albert Abriol of the Philippine National Po lice (PNP), Macario Astellero, Januario Dosdos, and PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were char ged with and convicted, of murder for having shot one Alejandro Flores, and of I llegal Possession of Firearms for the handguns that they were armed with. On app eal, one of their contentions against their conviction for murder is that the PN P cannot be presumed to have done their work regularly due to the errors and blu nders they committed in transferring the possession and custody of the physical evidence and in having failed to issue acknowledgment receipts thereof. They fur ther contend, as against their conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearms, th at the handguns and ammunition taken from them by the police officers were illeg ally seized in the absence of a warrant. ISSUES: Whether or not the handguns and ammunitions used in the killing were ill egally seized from appellants in the absence of a warrant. HELD: NO. There are eight (8) instances where a warrantless search and seizure i s valid. They are: (1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) sea rches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug la ws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or c onstructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7)

searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regul ations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations. In this case, the warrantless searc h and seizure of the subject handguns and ammunition is valid for two reasons. I t was a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal shooting , and pursuit of a fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police officers , and a more than reasonable belief on the part of the police officers that the fleeing suspects aboard said vehicle had just engaged in criminal activity. The urgent need of the police to take immediate action in the light of the foregoing exigencies clearly satisfies the requirements for warrantless arrests under the Rules of Court. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with firearms and 29 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ammunition which they were not authorized to carry, appellants were actually vio lating P.D. No. 1866, another ground for valid arrest under the Rules. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; THERE MUST BE A PRIOR JUSTIFICATION FOR AN INTRUSION IN A PPLYING THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE; SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE DURING A VALID ARREST. PEOP LE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CUBCUBIN [G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr. , PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamont e slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the road A tricycle driv er, who refused to divulge his name, told him them accused-appellant and the vic tim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told Rosal and Mal inao, Jr. that Garcellano's description fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulc e and led the policemen where accusedappellant lived. Upon arriving the police as ked permission if they could enter the house. After entering they found a bloodi ed shirt and two spent .38 caliber shells. Accused appellant was then asked to r eturn to the cafe for identification. He was positively identified by the waitre ss to be the person with whom the victim drank with. The police then went back t o his house and there found a .38 paltik pistol. An information for murder was t hen filed against accused-appellant. The trial court found him guilty and senten ced him with the capital punishment. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the arrest of the accused appellant was valid. (2) Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure. HELD: (1) NO. On the first issue, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The question, therefore, is whether there was "pro bable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to bel ieve that accused-appellant committed the crime. We hold that there was none. Th e two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that accused-appella nt had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirel y on what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP st ation in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 199 7 and reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the s aid city; by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano fitted accused-appellant, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew wher e accusedappellant lived and accompanied them to accused-appellant's house. Thus , PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to them by others. (2) NO. On the second issue, accused-appellant contends that neither he nor his son gave permission to the arresting police officers to search his house and, therefore, the "Hanes" t-shirt, the two spent slugs, and the .38 caliber r evolver allegedly found in his house are inadmissible in evidence. The prosecuti

on, on the other hand, insists that accused-appellant consented to the search of his house. 30 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! To be sure, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal r ight which may be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication can not be presumed. There must be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to rel inquish the right. As in this cases, a mere failure on the part of the accused t o object to a search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view" doctrine . As this Court held in People v. Musa: The "plain view" doctrine is usually app lied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, b ut nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the "pla in view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a p rior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to su pplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Finally, the prosecution says the search can be justif ied as incidental to a valid arrest. Even assuming the warrantless arrest to be valid, the search cannot be considered an incident thereto. A valid arrest allow s only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The rationale for such search and seizure is to prevent the person arrested either from destroying evi dence or from using the weapon against his captor. It is clear that the warrantl ess search in this case cannot be justified on this ground. For neither the t-sh irt nor the gun was within the area of accusedappellant's immediate control. In fact, according to the prosecution, the police found the gun only after going ba ck to the house of accused-appellant. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO APPLY THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. PEOP LE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPACION [G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant t hat accused-appellant was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM ) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of ac cused-appellant who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carl os City, Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said surveillance, they s aw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of the accused-appellant which they suspe cted to be marijuana plants. Despite failing to obtain a warrant, the team proce eded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of accused-appellant in t he early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the accused-appellant. What happened thereafter is subject to conflictin g accounts. The prosecution contends that the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about t he suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering from migraine The operatives the n uprooted the suspected marijuana plants. Accused-appellants version of what tra nspired is that around one-thirty in the early morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) per sons who he thought were members of the military, entered the premises then went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as the same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the others went a round the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his house and t

he premises. ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure performed at the backyard of the ac cused was valid. 31 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: NO. In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does n ot appear either that the situation falls under any of he exceptions. Consequent ly, accused-appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearl y violated. It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure f rom unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either expr essly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in allowing the m embers of the military to enter his premises and his consequent silence during t he unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary submissio n or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so whe n members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. I t is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence agains t the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating objec t. Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be appli ed: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which t he police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the e vidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be wher e they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search. Here, there was no va lid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accusedappellant's premises w ithout the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspi cion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came in " plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on Jul y 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one t o be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana pla nts inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into accusedappe llant's residence. RIGHT TO INFORMATION RIGHT TO INFORMATION; COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF THE PLUNDER CASES SHALL BE LIMITE D TO AUDIOVISUAL RECORDING FOR DOCUMENTARY PURPOSES. RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIOTV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORME R PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PH ILIPPINES [A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as o ne of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the r ight of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the on e hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if the re is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor or of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignt y, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard agai nst attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of se lfish interests. On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterate s his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground tha

t its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experien ce with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave 32 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstratio ns aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the oth er. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be serv ed through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage. ISSUE: Whether or not the cases of a former President pending before the Sandiga nbayan can be covered by live television and radio broadcast without impairing the right of the accused to a just and fair trial. HELD: NO. The Court finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision p rohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former preside nt. In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court has resolved t o order the audiovisual recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Conside ring the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordin gs will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Onl y later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. Th e master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Manageme nt and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to la w. There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings a re historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege). Second, the Estrada cases involve m atters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how t heir government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual present ation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people. They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganb ayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenogra phic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes. On t he other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will th us be distracted from the proper performance of their roles - whether as counsel , witnesses, court personnel, or judges - will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeop ardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized. T he possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided. At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial - which, it may be assumed, is t he concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trial s will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing unti l after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be avoided. Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the tria ls can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of the a ccused to a fair trial. Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, this Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought t o be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a publ ic character."

SEPARATE OPINION: VITUG, J: In addressing the present motion for reconsideration, colleagues on the Court op ine that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings for docume ntary purposes because, first, the hearings are of historic significance; second , the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fu ndamental right to know how their government works; third, the audio-visual pres entation is essential for education and civic training of the people; and fourth , such recording can be used by appellate courts in the event that the review of the proceedings, ruling, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. 33 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! The proposition has novel features; regrettably, I still find it hard to believe that the presence of the cameras inside the courtroom will not have an untoward impact on the court proceedings. No empirical data has been shown to suggest ot herwise. To the contrary, experience attests to the intimidating effect of camer as and electronic devices in courtrooms on the litigants, witnesses and jurors. In addition, the natural reticence of witnesses at the stand can even easily be exacerbated by placing them on camera in contravention of normal experience. The demeanor of the witnesses can also have an abstruse effect on the ability of th e judge to accurately assess the credibility of such witnesses. The presence of cameras, for whatever reason, may not adequately address the dangers mentioned i n the Court's decision of 29 June 2001. There are just too many imponderables. M ost importantly, it does not seem right to single out and make a spectacle of th e cases against Mr. Estrada. Dignity is a precious part of personality innate in every human being, and there can be no cogent excuse for impinging it even to t he slightest degree. It is not the problem of privacy that can cause concern mor e than the erosion of reality that cameras tend to cast. RIGHTS UNDER THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL CANNOT BE CLAIMED DURING INDENTIFICATION IN POLICE LINE-UP. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMESTUZO, et al. [G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: On February 26, 1991, four days after a reported robbery with multiple rape, a group of policemen together with accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, wen t to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City where accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a certain "Mario" and "searched the first and second floors of the building. Failing to find said Mari o, the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, "Nilol oko lang yata tayo ng taong ito" and "Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino." It was at t his juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon. Thereafter, Bagas was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused Ampatin. They were brought to th e Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed under detention together wit h the other two accused, Amestuzo and Vias. When the complainants arrived, accuse d-appellant was brought out, instructed to turn to the left and then to the righ t and he was asked to talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused A mestuzo and Vias. Accused-appellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited co mplainants to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped wh en one of the policemen intervened. Accused-appellant alleges that the trial cou rt committed a serious error when it deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer during his investigation. His singular presentation to the complainants for identification without the benefit of counsel, accusedap pellant avers, is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be a ssisted by counsel to which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested by t he police and placed on detention. He maintains that the identification was a cr itical stage of prosecution at which he was as much entitled to the aid of couns el as during the trial proper. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not appellants right to counsel was violated. (2) Whether or not t here was a valid out-of-court identification of appellant to the complainants. HELD: (1) NO. Herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when

he was presented for Identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that duri ng this identification by the 34 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confess ion from accusedappellant. In fact, records show that the police did not at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented before the complainants. The all eged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custod ial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudici al admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his c onviction. In the present case, there is no such confession or extrajudicial adm ission. (2) YES. The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly suggestive. E ven before complainants had the opportunity to view accused-appellant face-to-fa ce when he was brought out of the detention cell to be presented to them for ide ntification, the police made an announcement that he was one of the suspects in the crime and that he was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culpri ts. MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ATTACHES ONLY UPON THE START OF CRIMINAL CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. ESTELITO REMOLONA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [G.R. No. 137473, August 2, 2001] PUNO, J: FACTS: Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in Kiborosa Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, th e District Supervisor of Infanta inquired about Nerys Civil Service eligibility w ho purportedly got a rating of 81.25%. Mr. America also disclosed that he receiv ed information that Nery was campaigning for a fee of 8,000 pesos per examinee f or a passing mark in the board examination for teachers. It was eventually revea led that Nery Remolonas name did not appear in the passing and failing examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating belonged to a certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of 65%. Estelito Remolona in his written statement of facts said that he met a certain Atty. Salupadin in a bus, who offe red to help his wife obtain eligibility for a fee of 3,000 pesos. Mr. America ho wever, informed Nery that there was no vacancy when she presented her rating rep ort, so Estelito went to Lucena to complain that America asked for money in exch ange for the appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-1988, America was able to receive 6 checks at 2,600 pesos each plus bonus of Nery Remolona. Remolona ad mitted that he was responsible for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no knowledge thereof. On recommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civi l Service, the CSC found the spouses guilty of dishonesty and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. On Motion For Reconsideration, onl y Nery was exonerated and reinstated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of due process as the extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him was in blank form and that he was not assisted by counse l. HELD: NO. Right to Counsel is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case unde r custodial investigation when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a p erson has been taken in custody. The right to counsel attaches only upon the sta rt of such investigation. The exclusionary rule under Paragraph 2, Section 12 ap plies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not those made in an administrative investigation. MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DOES N

OT APPLY TO A SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT NOT ELICITED THROUGH QUESTIONING BY THE AUTH ORITIES. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALOLOY [G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002] 35 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! PER CURIAM: FACTS: At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of August 3, 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho was foun d. Autopsy reports found that Genelyn was raped before she was drowned. The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, who clai med that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek . While in the wake of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the Barangay Captain that h e only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping and throwing her body in the ravine. While in the custody of the authorities, he was asked incriminating questions by Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that Juanito was not y et in custodial investigation. Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, co upled with circumstantial evidence, the trial court found Juanito guilty of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. On appeal, Juanito maintains that the trial court violated Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution when it a dmitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Cen iza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his const itutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incr iminatory information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police i nvestigators, for as public officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While these rights may be waived, the prose cution failed to show that he effectively waived his rights through a written wa iver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial co nfession is inadmissible in evidence. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the barangay captain was admissible. (2) Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the j udge was admissible. HELD: (1) YES. As to his confession with the Baragay Captain Ceniza, it has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed t he crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Con stitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confession s. In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GEN ELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontan eous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given be fore he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection wit h the commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which could have compelled h er to testify falsely against him. (2) NO. However, there is merit in Juanitos cl aim that his constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment th e accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon s claim that no complaint has yet been filed and that neither was h e conducting a preliminary investigation deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time Juanito was already under the custody of the police au thorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then be fore Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements.

MIRANDA DOCTRINE; TWO KINDS OF INVOLUNTARY OR COERCED CONFESSIONS TREATED IN SEC TION 12 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VALLEJO [G.R. No. 144656, May 9, 2002] PER CURIAM: 36 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! FACTS: The accused appellant, Gerrico Vallejo, was sentenced to death by the RTC of Cavite City for the rape slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Cavi te on July 10, 1999. Accused-appellant now questions the validity of the method by which his bloodstained clothes were recovered. According to accused-appellant , the policemen questioned him as to the clothes he wore the day before. Thereaf ter, they took him to his house and accused-appellant accompanied them to the ba ck of the house where dirty clothes were kept. Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the oral and written confessions presented as evidence against him. He alleges that the oral confessions were inadmissible in evidence for being hea rsay, while the extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimi dation. Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan of Rosario, Cavite and to NBI Forensic Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for being violative of his constitutional rights as these were made by one alrea dy under custodial investigation to persons in authority without the presence of counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not the oral and written confessions used against the accused is inad missible. HELD: NO. Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts : "(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be wa ived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. "(2) No torture, force, v iolence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will sha ll be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or oth er similar forms of detention are prohibited. "(3) Any confession or admission o btained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence aga inst him." There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third deg ree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which ar e dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, give n without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section. Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the consequences of the statements he was to make as well as the wr itten confessions he was to execute, for he was properly informed by Atty. Leyva that it may be used against him and there was no attendance of force or any for m of coercion. Neither can he question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva wh o acted as his counsel during the investigatio