Lopez vs. Roxas Nature: Prohibition with preliminary injunction Facts: •On the November 9, 1965 general elections,•Congress elected Fernando Lopez Vice President of the Philippines•For getting more votes than respondent Gerardo Roxas.• January 5, 1966, Roxas filed a petition at the Presidential Electoral Tribunal contesting the victory of Lopez.•Petitioner contended that Presidential Electoral Tribunal should not be allowed to hear the case because•Republic Act No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional", and that, "all proceedings takenby it are a nullity." Issues:1.WON RA No. 1793 is inconsistent with the Constitution because the latter does not provide forelection protests involving the office of the President and the vice president as this would prejudicethe tenure of the president and the vice president HELD: NORATIO:A protest regarding the validity of the victory of a presidential or vice presidential candidatedoes not in any way prejudice his tenure. The protest, in the first place, is a question of the validity of such person’s authority to be president or vice president.If it is discovered that such candidate won because of tampered ballots and the like, then hisvictory would be invalid.2.WON it is illegal to allow members of the Supreme Court to sit in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal asthis would be a violation of the separation of powers.HELD: NORATIO:a)the power to judge to judge matters concerning the election, returns and qualifications…isessentially judicialb)Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to determinewhether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tamperedwith, or reflect the true results of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, torecount the ballots cast, and, incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, whichCongress has no power to do   

Lansang vs. GarciaNature:Facts:Two hand grenade explosions occurred on August 21, 1971 at Plaza Miranda where the Liberal Partyof the Philippines was holding a public meeting for the presentation of its candidates for the November 8,1971 elections. Eight persons were killed and many were injured.As a result, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus.Petitioners sought for writs of habeas corpus after being arrested without a warrant therefore anddetained. They questioned the validity of Proclamation No. 889.IssueHELD/RATIO1. WON Proclamation No. 889 violated par. 4section 1 of article 3 and par 2, section 10 of article 7 of ConstiNo.Petitioners initially contended that theproclamation was made based solely on theidea that there was a conspiracy and intent torise in arms among several groups in thecountry.However, court held that with themodifications thru Proclamation No. 889-A,Marcos declared that the ‘enemy groups’ hadalready entered into the conspiracy and havein fact joined together to engage in armedinsurrection and rebellion.The Plaza Miranda incident was only oneamong the many violent incidences thatbrought forth such proclamation2. WON there was invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger therof  WON public safety required the suspension of the privilegeYES.The existence of the CPP and the NPA wereclear proof of the state of rebellion andinsurrection of the country. These groups believe that force andviolence are indispensable to the attainmentof their goal.  YES.President had in his possession records of killings of several government officials by theCPP, bombings of the COMELEC building,MERALCO, and others.3. WON petitioners are covered by saidproclamation as amendedYES.They have been charged for a violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and were thencovered by the proclamationIN case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, the President can: 1) call out the armed forces 2) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus3) put Philippines or any part therof under martial law  Tuason v. Register of DeedsFACTS:Petitioners bought in 1965 from Carmel Farms Inc. a piece of land in Caloocan Cityby virtue of which they were issued a title in their names and they took possessionof their

property. In 1973, President Marcos, exercising martial law powers, issuedPD 293 cancelling the certificates of titles of Carmel Farms and declaring the landscovered to be open for disposition and sale to members of the MalacañangAssociation Inc.ISSUE:W/N the President has the power to cancel certificates of titlesHELD:  The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. Sincehe was never vested with judicial power -- such power, as everyone knows, beingvested in the SC and such inferior courts as may be established by law -- the judicialacts done by him were under the circumstances alien to his office as chief executive. Carino vs CHR Adjudicatory Power of the CHR On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on 17 Dec 1990, Secretary Carino ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino. ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.  HELD: The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial. Sinica v. Mula, G.R. No. 135691. Sept. 27, 1999 In this case, assailed was the COMELEC Resolution on Oct. 6, 1998 in SPA No. 98-292, declaring the substitution of mayoralty candidate Teodoro Sinaca, Jr. by petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca as invalid.Facts:In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute candidate for the mayoral post of the Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr.,

was disqualified for being convicted of bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the canvassing.(Matugas Wing was a faction in the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD party, as well as the Barbers Wing. Each faction has separate candidates for the mayoral post in the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte.)Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica before the COMELEC. He alleged that said substitution was invalid because:a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as a substitute; andb) it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the substitution.The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case. However, when respondent Mula filed a Motion for Reconsideration, COMELEC en banc set aside the resolution of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code that the substitute must belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate. Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because he was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member.Therefore, this case before the Supreme Court.Issue:WON the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the provisions of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.Decision:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of 6 October 1998 of the COMELEC en banc is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered declaring EMMANUEL SINACA as having been duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte.Ratio Decidendi:NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced.Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written acceptance of the party's nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such. Echegaray vs. Secretary of JusticeNature:Facts:On June 25, 1996:•Leo Echagaray was convicted•For raping his 10 year old daughter of his common law wife

•And was given the death penalty.  Petitioner now files this case with the following contentions:•that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for:(a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment,(b) violation of our international treaty obligations,(c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.RA no. 8177: lethal injection as the method for the imposition of death penalty  Issuesheld1.WON lethal injection violates Section 19, Article 3 of the ConstitutionPar. 2 Section 19 of Article 3:“The employment of physical, psychological, ordegrading punishment against any prisoner ordetainee or the use of substandard or inadequatepenal facilities under subhuman conditions shall bedealt with by law.” NO.•Although the Director of Prisons is not atrained phlebotomist, section 1 of the third par. Of RA 8177 requires that prior to theexecution, all involved personal shall betrained in the task so as to avoid inflictingunnecessary pain. The Consti protectsconvicts only from punishment which areinherently cruel and degrading.•The pain experienced in lethal injection isonly incidental to the execution not its mainfeature. 2. WON reimposition of the death penalty violatesinternational treaty obligationsNO•International Convention on Civil andPolitical Rights recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on theright to life but should be limited to most serious crimes (Article 6, section 2)•The Philippines did not sign nor ratify theSecond Optional Protocol to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aimingat the Abolition of the Death Penalty. 3. WON RA no. 8177 is undue delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of Justice and theDirector of Bureau of CorrectionsNO.•It is a form of delegation of legislativeauthority to administrative bodies.Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureauof Corrections which drafted the details for the lethal injection execution is a constituent unit of the Department of Justice tasked to take charge of the administration of the correctional system.•The Secretary of Justice is thus tasked to supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the LethalInjection Manual in consultation with the DOH 

4. WON section 19 of the rules and regulations toimplement RA No. 8177 is invalidES.•Section 19: Execution Procedure delegatesthe making of the Lethal Injection Manualsolely to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections but does not include theSecretary of Justice’s authority or mode of approval or review for such manual.•Second paragraph of section 19 requires the confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect to convict and to the public at large.•2ndparagraph violates Section 7 of Article 3 of Consti: the right of people to informationon matters of public concern.•No legal impediment exists for the convict tohave access to the contents of the manual.  5. WON Section 17 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 is invalid for beingdiscriminatory and contrary to law. (Suspension of the Execution of the Death Sentence)YES.* Section 17 provides suspension of death penalty for 3 years for pregnant women. This is a violation of  Article 83 of the RPC which only suspends executionto a year. Where there is conflict between animplementing law and a congressional statute, thestatute must remain Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until theaforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 areappropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision. De La Llana vs AlbaConstitutional Law – Political Question – if there is no question of law involved – BP 129In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). HELD: The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.  Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the

question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in theexercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.”Radiowealth v. AgregaladoFacts This case is about the purchase and installation ofP585 worth of Webster Teletalk machines, model 206MA,and Webster telephone speakers. The Clerk of Court certified the purchase and installation of these machines on the 2ndand 3rd floor of Malacañang Annex, which used to house the Supreme Court, were of urgent character and necessary to public service.C. L. Dacanay, chairman of the Property Requisition Committee appointed by the President disapproved the purchase and installation as contrary to EO 302 and the policy adopted by the cabinet discontinuing open market purchases, as well as being violative of EO 298.The Auditor-General also refused to sign the treasury warrant to be able to pay Radiowealth.Held  In the requisition of fixtures, equipment, and supplies, both the executive and judicial departments are on the same footing. The several EO’s that the Auditor-General gives as basis for refusing to sign the warrant are not based on express legislation.Marbury v. MadisonHeld Whether an act repugnant to the Constitution canbecome the law of the land. The Constitution is theparamount law of the land, an act of legislature, repugnant tothe Constitution is void. It is the duty of the Court to decidecases where laws are in conflict with each other. If a law isvoid because of its repugnance to the Constitution, does

it,notwithstanding its validity, bind courts and oblige them togive effect? It is the province and duty of the judicialdepartment to say what the law is.Notes  In cases where a law passed by the legislature iscontrary to the Constitution, the Constitution takesprecedenceThis case establishes the Supreme Court's power of judicialreview. That means that the Court has the right to review acts of Congress and, by extension, actions of the President. If the Courtfinds that the law is unconstitutional, it can overrule the law.Marshall argued that the Constitution is the “supreme law” of theland and that the Supreme Court has the final say over the meaningof the Constitution. He wrote, “it is emphatically the province andduty of the judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs.Madison, 5 US 137, 2 L.Ed. 60).”Marbury v. MadisonFactsOn his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adams’s term.William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”Issues

1. Does Marbury have a right to the commission?2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine

whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void?4. Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond

what is specified in Article III of the Constitution?5. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

Holding and Rule (Marshall)

1. Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

 The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams.

1. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.

 Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.

1. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void.

 It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

1. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution.

 The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.

1. No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.

 To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.Disposition Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commissionPACU vs. Secretary of EducationFacts:The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No. 2706otherwise known as the ³Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools andcolleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction´ and was amended by Act No. 3075and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the actdeprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rightsand duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on theSecretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standardsconstitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before openinga school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of acitizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or  permit before such person could exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant LegalRepresentative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciablecontroversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2)Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act isconstitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court.Issue:Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 may be declared void and unconstitutional?Held:The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form theyseek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is anestablished principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining adirect injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determinedthe validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained commoninterest to all members of the public. 

Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a lawunconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental tothe decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under thelegislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort andit must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actionslike this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does notsit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The courthowever, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument toshow that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per sedemonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the courtconclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitionersappended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail toindicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capriciousor pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibitionExecutive Secretary v CA G.R. No. 131719 Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.      Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.       On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period of only twenty (20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042.      The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. 5 According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12 6 and Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of the Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled

workers also have the right to seek employment abroad.       According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.         According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and due process and to the "equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters is unconstitutional.      The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.       The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution 10 prohibiting ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume that a licensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials, employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of the said prohibited acts.      The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprive licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which the summons and the complaint would be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the filing of the answer to the complaint would take more than 90 days. This would thereby shift on local licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreign employers.  The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional:      SEC. 9. Venue. — A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.      In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) the respondent has no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition

was premature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State.  In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that: As earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the defect and impropriety of the petition.       On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said decision. Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of only P50,000; and       Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it. Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by it in the said case on August 24, 1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs.      SO ORDERED.      Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the said writ amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified via a writ of certiorari and prohibition.      The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.       To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.       Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.       One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (People v. Vera,

65 Phil. 56). This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991]).  In view of petitioner's standing      The petitioners contend that the respondent has no locus standi. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. Although the respondent filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf of licensed and registered recruitment agencies, it failed to adduce in evidence a certified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said members authorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings. Neither is the suit of the respondent a class suit so as to vest in it a personality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are profit-oriented.       The petition is meritorious. The respondent has locus standi to file the petition in the RTC in representation of the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies impleaded in the amended petition. The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. 16 An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.      We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized for the purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international levels; providing, creating and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein.  In view of standing in behalf of unskilled workers      However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 63 20 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.  In view of retroactivity      In People v. Diaz, 24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied retroactively.  In view of equal protection clause       In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving

for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade.       Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.       The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.  In view of the VALIDITY of Sec. 6 of RA 8042      The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides that employees of recruitment agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment has been upheld in People v. Chowdury: An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.       By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal and procedural provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042, including the imposable penalties therefor. Until the Court, by final judgment, declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of the said provisions cannot be enjoined.      Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers and employees and their relatives employed in government agencies charged with the enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who commit large scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime charged.       The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The respondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension that, because of time constraints, its members would have to defend foreign employees in cases before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.      Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws in the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment.      By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042.      The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of

preliminary injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.TAÑADA VS. TUVERA      136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) FACTS:  Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. HELD:Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.  The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.  Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat.  It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.  That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process.  It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.  The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.It is insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing totaxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving "paramountpublic interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens andlegislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only(1)in cases involving constitutional issues and(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet theserequirements on standing. Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or where a tax measure isassailed as unconstitutional. Voters are allowed to question thevalidity of election laws because of their obvious interest in thevalidity of such

laws. Concerned citizens can bring suits if theconstitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance"which must be settled early. Legislators are allowed to sue toquestion the validity of any official action which they claim infringestheir prerogatives qua legislators. Petitioners do not have the samekind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assertan interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standingrequirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditureof public moneys,nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allegethat their tax money is"being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power ", or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondentCOMELEC , or that public money is being deflected to any improperpurpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent fromwasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid orunconstitutional law.Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review . As held by this Court in Tanvs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our presentChief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or nota taxpayer's suit should be entertained. Petitioners' suit does notfall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits(Kilosbayan vs.Morato (Recon), GR 118910, Nov. 16, 1995).KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al. FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract ofLease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO's charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional lawbecause some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit.Tolentino v. Sec. of FinanceFacts  

VAT is issued on the sale, barter, or exchange ofgoods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange ofservices. It is equivalent to the 10 percent of the gross sellingprices of gross value in money of goods or properties sold,bartered, or exchanged or from the gross receipts from thesale or exchange of services.RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VATsystem and enhance its administration by amending theNIRC role.The substantive issues raised in some of the cases arepresented in abstract and hypothetical form because of lackof concrete record.Held   The Court has no power to render advisory opinionsor even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. Inthe case at bar, the Court is being asked to sit as a 3rd legislative chamber to view the law.Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994 Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.  Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution  Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.  The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings

were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.Lozada vs COMELECVacancy in the Legislature  Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term." COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the legislature. HELD: The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: "Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof." There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC. It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP. 

 RA 6645: AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILLING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.  Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for due distribution and publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings.ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of RepresentativesFacts: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress.†Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.â€Issue: Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109.Held: No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it

would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury. The petitions were dismissed. Fabian vs. Desierto G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998 Facts: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder andPresident of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila EngineeringDistrict. PROMAT participated in the bidding for governmentconstruction projects, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed anadministrative complaint against private respondent.  Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private respondent’s new counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid Held: The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrativedisciplinary cases.

It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC. de Agbayani vs. Philippine National Bank The SC rejected the Orthodox view but instead, the courtadopted the view that before an act is declaredunconstitutional it is an operative fact, which can be a sourceof rights and duties.Modalities of constitutional interpretation:a) historical approach – approach through analyzingthe intention of the framers of the Constitution andthe circumstance of its ratificationb) structural approach – drawing inference from thearchitecture of the three-cornered powerrelationships found in the constitutionalarrangement.c) Doctrinal approach – rely on established precedentsd) Ethical approach – seeks to interpret the Filipinomoral commitments that are embedded in theconstitutional documente) Textual approach – reading the language of theconstitution as the man on the street wouldunderstand it. f) Prudential approach – weighing and comparing thecosts and benefits that might be found in conflictingrules.EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY  The law is either:1.void– if on its face it does not enjoy any presumption of validitybecause it is patently offensive to the Constitution. It produces noeffect creates no office and imposes no duty. (Igot v. Comelec, 95SCRA 392).2.voidableif on its face it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. The law becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity; the declaration produces noretroactive effect (Serrano de Agbayani v PNB, 38 SCRA 429).In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, we held:The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.[171] In that case, this Court further held that the Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to rule otherwise would be iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act may be justified when based on an unconstitutional provision of law.

Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2008FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippinelaws, both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agriculturalchemicals.Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital recovery component of Php10.00 perbag of fertilizer. The levy was to continue until adequate capital was raised to make PPI financiallyviable. Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted thedepository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986.After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphildemanded from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaintfor collection and damages, questioning the constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust,unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process.PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because itdoes not have a "personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition because"incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the sellerfertilizer company.ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.What is the power of taxation? RULING: Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mereprocedural technicality which may be waived.The imposition of the levy was an exercise of the taxation power of the state. While it is true that thepower to tax can be used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy was revenuegeneration. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantialpurposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct andhave different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation that mayinterfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power isthe regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects" and"lawful means" tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power. Thepower of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.      LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008 FACTS OF THE CASE:

            During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law R.A. 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million in order to restrain "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.            Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had city hood bills pending in Congress but 24 of them were not converted during the 11th Congress. The House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 to exempt the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress but it was adjourned without the Senate's approval. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:            Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009.- The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.            These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.ISSUES:            Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of 1987 Constitution; and whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. RULING OF THE COURT:            The Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and 10, Article X of 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause, and are thus unconstitutional. The constitution provides:Section 10, Article X of 1987 Constitution.xxx xxx xxxNo province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)            In that case, the cityhood bills violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other laws. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. The Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.            If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local

government units. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they preclude the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.            The Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:            1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;            2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;            3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and            4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.            The exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which is unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.            The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted.            Furthermore, R.A. 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law. It took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Hence, the retroactive application is inadmissible.             WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petitions and declares UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.